Youth, Arms & Drugs:
Potential Security Developments
Surrounding Elections in Liberia
Eldridge Adolfo
FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, is a mainly assignment-funded agency under the Ministry of Defence. The core activities are
research, method and technology development, as well as studies conducted in the interests of Swedish defence and the safety and
security of society. The organisation employs approximately 1000 personnel of whom about 800 are scientists. This makes FOI Sweden’s
largest research institute. FOI gives its customers access to leading-edge expertise in a large number of fields such as security policy
studies, defence and security related analyses, the assessment of various types of threat, systems for control and management of crises,
protection against and management of hazardous substances, IT security and the potential offered by new sensors.
FOI
Swedish Defence Research Agency
Defence Analysis SE-164 90 Stockholm
Phone: +46 8 555 030 00 Fax: +46 8 555 031 00
www.foi.se
FOI-R--3120--SE
ISSN 1650-1942
User Report December 2010
Defence Analysis Eldridge Adolfo
Youth, Arms & Drugs:
Potential Security
Developments Surrounding
Elections in Liberia
Cover photo by: UN Photo/Eric Kanalstein
FOI-R--3120--SE
Titel
Ungdomar, vapen och droger - kritiska
risker vid valet i Liberia
Title
Youth, Arms & Drugs: Potential Security
Developments Surrounding Elections in
Liberia
Rapportnr/Report no
FOI-R--3120--SE
Rapporttyp
Report Type
Användarrapport
User Report
Månad/Month
December
Utgivningsår/Year
2010
Antal sidor/Pages
64 p
ISSN
ISSN 1650-1942
Kund/Customer
Försvarsdepartementet/Department of
Defence
Projektnr/Project no
A12018
Godkänd av/Approved by
Maria Lignell Jakobsson
FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut
FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency
Avdelningen för Försvarsanalys
Division of Defence Analysis
164 90 Stockholm
SE-164 90 Stockholm
FOI-R--3120--SE
Sammanfattning
FOI:s Afrikagrupp har på uppdrag av Försvarsdepartementet genomfört en studie
av den nuvarande situationen och utvecklingen av säkerhetsfrågorna i fyra länder
i Västafrika. Denna analys är en försvarspolitik-analys som fokuserar på den
nuvarande situationen i Liberia och den eventuella utvecklingen av
säkerhetsläget under de kommande två åren. Rapporten diskuterar den aktuella
situationen i landet genom att titta på den rådande politiska dynamiken;
sannings- och försoningskommissionens rapport och rekommendationer;
korruption; etnicitet; markkonflikter och religiösa spänningar; striden om politisk
(styrande) makt; ekonomi och arbetsmarknad (främst med avseende på unga);
olaglig handel med droger; samt reformeringsprocesser av säkerhetssektorn.
Rapporten identifierar omedelbara konfliktriskfaktorer såsom valet 2011, rättvisa
och straffrihet frågor, civila säkerhetshot, mark och etniska spänningar, och
medborgargarden/informella säkerhetsåtgärder. Pappret diskuterar också några
potentiella framtida säkerhetshot i form av ungdomsarbetslöshet, illegala droger
och handel med handeldvapen i Liberia. Den militära och säkerhetspolitiska
förmågan att navigera dessa hot - både närliggande och potentiella - diskuteras
potentiella extremscenarior för säkerhetsutveckling som skulle kunna antas
inträffa under de närmaste två åren.
Nyckelord: Liberia, Sannings- och Försoningskommissionen, korruption,
etnicitet, jord, normativ makt, droger, säkerhetssektorreform
3
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Summary
On commission from the Ministry of Defence, the FOI Studies in Africa Security
Team have made an analysis of the current situation and security developments
in four countries in the West African sub-Region. This analysis is a defence
policy analysis that focuses on the current situation in Liberia and potential
security developments over the next two years. The paper discusses the current
situation in the country by looking at the political dynamics; the truth and
reconciliation commission report and recommendations; corruption; ethnicity,
land and religious tensions; the struggle for normative power; the economy
including youth employment and trafficking in illicit drugs; and the security
sector reform processes. The paper then identifies the proximate conflict risk
factors including the elections in 2011; justice and impunity issues; civil security
threats; land and ethnic tensions; and the vigilante/informal security operations.
The paper also discusses some potential future security threats that appear in the
form of youth unemployment and the illicit drugs and small arms trafficking in
Liberia. The military and security capabilities to navigate these threats - both
proximate and potential - are discussed in potential worst case security
development scenarios that could be enacted in the next two years.
Keywords: Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, corruption, ethnicity,
land, normative power, vigilantes, illicit drugs, security sector reform.
4
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Table of Contents
Executive Summary
1
7
Introduction
10
1.1
Aim .................................................................................................. 11
1.2
Outline ............................................................................................. 12
1.3
Method & Materials ......................................................................... 12
1.3.1
Analytical Framework.................................................................. 13
2
Background
14
3
Current Situation
19
3.1
Political Dynamics ........................................................................... 20
3.2
Truth & Reconciliation Commission ................................................ 22
3.3
Corruption........................................................................................ 23
3.4
Ethnicity, Land & Religion ............................................................... 25
3.5
The Struggle for Normative Authority.............................................. 26
3.6
The Economy .................................................................................. 28
3.7
Youth Unemployment...................................................................... 29
3.8
Illicit Drugs & Arms Trafficking ........................................................ 30
3.9
The Army & Security Sector ............................................................ 31
3.10
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement .......................................... 32
3.11
Security Sector Reform ................................................................... 33
3.11.1
4
Current Capacity ......................................................................... 35
Proximate Security Risks
38
4.1
Elections (2011) .............................................................................. 38
4.2
Justice & Impunity ........................................................................... 40
4.3
Ownership & Identity ....................................................................... 41
4.4
Vigilantes & Informal Securities ...................................................... 43
5
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4.5
5
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
Youth, Arms & Drugs ...................................................................... 44
Potential Security Developments
48
Scenarios ........................................................................................ 48
Scenario I: The Fight for Land .................................................... 48
Scenario II: Election Violence, Vigilantism & Drug Wars............ 52
6
The Role of the International Community
54
7
Conclusions
56
7.1
8
Recommendations .......................................................................... 57
Bibliography
59
Acronyms & Abbreviations
64
6
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Executive Summary
With the ending of the fourteen year long conflict in Liberia in 2003 and the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a transitional government was
put in place and oversaw the democratic elections in 2005. The new government
led by President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has now started the processes of turning
round a country that for over a century maintained an oppressive administrative
system, to a country that is democratically run. The new government has focused
on four pillars for its reconstruction which are: Consolidating Peace and
Security; Revitalising the Economy; Strengthening Governance and Rule of
Law; and Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Delivery of Basic Services,1 which
define the government’s medium to long term development efforts. This paper
focuses on the current situation in Liberia and potential security developments
over the next two years.
There are a number of key issues surrounding the current situation in Liberia.
The political dynamics and tensions have certainly changed considerably since
the ending of the conflict. However, the political landscape is still dominated by
the same actors that dominated it during the time of the conflict which has
stymied rapid progress towards improved democratic governance politics.
Elections are scheduled for 2011 and the two main parties contesting the election
will be: the Unity Party led by President Johnson Sirleaf; and the Congress for
Democratic Change led by George Weah. Both candidates face challenges
towards them being allowed to stand for President, as the Liberian Constitution
clearly states that the candidates must have resided in Liberia for ten consecutive
years prior to the election: a condition neither candidate fulfils.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report has raised the issue
around President Johnson Sirleaf contesting the elections. The TRC report
explicitly recommends that Ellen Johnson Sirleaf not hold public office in
Liberia for thirty years. This affects many of the politicians in the ruling party as
well as the opposition as they were involved in the conflict and have been listed
for committing ‘Egregious Domestic Crimes, Gross Human Rights Violations or
Serious Humanitarian Law Violations,’2 or in the case of the President providing
financial support to actors who did commit these crimes. Irrespective of the TRC
recommendations, President Johnson Sirleaf has declared her intension to run for
President in 2011. The TRC report also recommends that an Extraordinary
Criminal Court for Liberia to try all persons recommended by the TRC. Again,
1
2
See Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Republic of Liberia. (April 2008 to June 2011). 2008. p. 43.
See Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Volume II: Consolidated Final
Report. June 30 2009.
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this affects many of the prominent political leaders either in office or seeking
office and has caused tensions in society.
Issues of land, ethnicity and religion have caused tensions in society which have
gone over into violent destruction on several occasions since the elections in
2005. The main tensions between Mano, Gio and Mandingo ethnic groups in
Nimba and Lofa county and present a serious national security risk. These
tensions are challenging the formal and informal governance structures in these
places and highlight Liberia’s weak institutions as well as lack of control over all
of its territory.
Despite the economy growing since the end of the conflict, it remains small and
unable to employ the majority of Liberia’s workforce. Liberia has a large youth
population - approximately 70 % of Liberia’s total population is under thirty five
years of age. Most of these youth including ex-combatants remain unemployed
or underemployed in the informal economy. The Government has taken a firm
anti-corruption stance and has had notable successes. However, corruption still
persists and continues to weaken the state institutions and undermine citizens
confidence in the state security. Illicit drug trafficking is being established in
Liberia as a transit route for cocaine being shipped to Europe. Small arms and
light weapons also move easily between Liberia’s porous borders.
As part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a Security Sector Reform
programme is being carried out. The Armed Forces of Liberia has been
dismantled and recreated from scratch. The United States of America has been
leading this process and to date has meticulously vetted, recruited and trained
approximately 2000 soldiers. However, the training was controversially done by
Private Military Companies and Liberia still lacks an officer corps and questions
are abound as to whether such a small armed force can protect Liberia and if the
strategy is consistent with the threats Liberia faces internally and regionally. The
Liberia National Police did not undergo such drastic changes but has been given
new training with approximately 4000 police trained and deployed nation wide.
However, the police do not have adequate uniforms, are grossly under-equipped,
and under - and not consistently - paid. Apart from the Coast Guard and the Drug
Enforcement Agency, most of the other security agencies such as intelligence,
customs, Immigration and more have not received any training. National security
and defence strategies are still not in place.
In terms of potential security developments, several proximate conflict risk
factors have been identified in Liberia. The 2011 elections are expected to be
hotly contested and the risk of violence at these elections remains a threat that
could trigger additional violence. The TRC report together with justice and
impunity issues provide another risk as people would like to see the
recommendations of the TRC report implemented and a clamp-down on elite
corruption and impunity. This presents an additional challenge at the elite level
8
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where there has been resistance to the hard drive for anti-corruption under the
Johnson Sirleaf Presidency.
The tensions surrounding the land and ethnicity conflicts present a serious
challenge to the immediate national security of Liberia. These issues evoke
strong challenges to the governance structures, identity and issues of who
belongs and who does not. These are potentially dangerous because they have
mainly occurred in areas bordering Guinea’s Forestiere region and the area
controlled by Forces Nouvelles in Cote’D’Ivoire, which are both unstable areas
with the easy access to arms and fighters.
A potential security threat can be found in the trafficking of illicit drugs and
small arms, combined with youth unemployment. With no means of making a
living, joining drug trafficking can be seen as a lucrative get-rich-quick scheme.
The greatest danger posed by cocaine is its enormous value compared to the
small size of the Liberian economy. With the amounts of money the business
generates – close to US$500 million durin 2010 in Liberia – and with the socioeconomic conditions that prevail, drug trafficking can easily penetrate to the very
highest levels of the government and military in order to use Liberia as a transit
point.
Future scenarios towards the end of the paper show that the main risks to national
security in the next two years – the proximate risk factors: land, riots,
demonstrations, election violence, drug wars and vigilantism - could be played
out in the more urban settings of Monrovia, Ganta and Voinjama, as well as the
border counties of Lofa, Bong and Nimba. If any of these risk factors were to
break out they would stretch the capacity of the army and security forces in terms
of personnel and equipment. If a combination of two or more these risks factors
(or all of these risks) were to break out simultaneously, the army and security
apparatus will be not be able to respond adequately to these threats.
9
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1 Introduction
Liberia is still emerging from the ashes of fourteen years of civil war that
devastated not only the country - claiming over 250 000 lives in Liberia alone3 but it also adversely affected its neighbouring countries. The civil wars saw
armies, rebels, mercenaries and child soldiers all fight each other for political
power in some instances, and for economic resources in other instances. The
wars eventually came to an end in 2003 with the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), between the Government of Liberia, two rebel groups
and eighteen political parties in Accra, Ghana. The CPA defined a framework for
peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.
Today Liberia is a fragile state4 that is trying to work its way out of the conflict
mode. The elections in 2005 saw the incumbent President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
elected and the work of turning the economy around, as well as addressing the
social-political tensions found in the country has begin. However, Liberia retains
the necessary ingredients to fall straight back into conflict. Many of the preconflict and conflict challenges the country faced such as corruption,
unemployment, certain groups being marginalised and both national and personal
security are still a concern today. The United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) is deployed in Liberia, and is still in a peace-keeping phase with eight
thousand troops stationed there.5
Youth unemployment and underemployment6 remain high and the country is
witnessing an increase in armed robberies7 Small arms and light weapons are still
in circulation and easily obtainable. Many of the ex-combatants have not been
reintegrated into society but have instead been remobilised into informal security
3
United States Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector
general. Report of Inspection. Embassy Monrovia, Liberia. Report Number ISP-1-08-20A, March
2008. p. 3.
4
A “fragile state” is a state significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its subsystems. (It is
a state that is particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international
conflicts). In a fragile state, institutional arrangements embody and perhaps preserve the
conditions of crisis. See Crisis States Workshop – London, March 2006.
5
UNMIL can have up to ten thousand peace keepers, but sources working with the Security Sector
Reform in Liberia have confirmed through interviews that there are eight thousand peace keepers
station in Liberia at present. Interviews: Monrovia, October 17 and 18, 2010.
6
Underemployed is a technical term used to describe the type of employment found in the informal
sector, which are often not fulltime jobs, pay is not adequate to the work carried out, and these jobs
often have decent work deficits. Liberia has a small formal economy and thus most jobs are found
in the informal sector.
7
Crime Watch Liberia. First Report on ”Public Awareness on Armed Violence Reduction and
Social Cohesion.” (UNDP). July, 2010. Also confirmed through several interviews with the
Liberian National Police and International Organisations working on Security Sector Reform.
10
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networks, including vigilante groups, or into regional mercenary groups. The
trafficking of illicit drugs has emerged, and drug abuse in Liberia has also
increased.
The elections due to take place in 2011 are certain to ignite a political battle.
With President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf declaring her candidacy for the Presidential
elections – one of the election promises she made in the 2005 election, was that
she would only stand for one term – this will raise the stakes of the election as no
incumbent President in Liberia has ever been unseated. Liberia has a long history
of election violence and together with the other challenges the country is facing,
there is a clear risk of a violent election in 2011. However, the question is: how
serious will this violence be and will it lead to instability in Liberia? Will there
be a relapse into violent conflict on the scale of what was seen in the 1990s?
Because of the nature of the Liberian conflict and its interconnectedness to the
instability in the sub-region throughout the 1990s and now, there is a great risk
that if Liberia faces instability, then so will the rest of sub-region. Likewise, if
any of the Mano River Basin states become unstable or fall into violent conflict,
then Liberia is likely to follow suite.
1.1 Aim
The aim of this analysis is to look at the possible or potential security
developments in post-conflict Liberia within the next two years. It is a defence
policy document that makes an analysis of the various challenges facing postconflict Liberia, and seeks out those that make it most vulnerable to instability.
This includes analysing the social, economic, political and security problems that
continue to adversely affect the country. These are both the formal and informal
structures including the unofficial arena where politics are played out. The paper
seeks to identify the potential future worst case scenarios Liberia is likely to face
over the next two years.
Regional dynamics and volatility could also present conflict risk factors for
Liberia. These are: the perennial problem of insecurity engendered by the
lingering crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, particularly throughout 2010; the fragility of
Sierra Leone particularly during the 2012 elections; and the unstable political
situation in Guinea as the elections are conducted in 2010. All of the risks for
stability and violent conflict are analysed for the three countries including their
regional impacts as part of this series and are found in: Sierra Leone: Splitting
Under the Strain of Elections?, by Adolfo, E.; Potential Security Developments
in Cote d’Ivoire, by Elowson, C; and Potential Security Developments in Guinea,
by Mac Dermott, J., all published in 2010. In addition, annex 1 of this document
(also found as annex one in the three documents mentioned above) gives a
concise analysis of the regional security dynamics and how they are interrelated
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to each other with specific timelines and their conjuncture with events in the
three other regional countries highlighting possibilities for conflict triggers.
1.2 Outline
A chapter dealing with the method and analytical framework is next and is
followed by a chapter on Liberia’s political background which provides the
context upon which the analysis is formed. The chapter after is on the current
situation and lays out the socio-political, economic and security challenges
Liberia is faced with. This is followed by a chapter on the potential security
developments in Liberia, which focuses on the proximate conflict risk factors and
the security forces capabilities to manage any instability these proximate risks
may cause. It also discusses some possible scenarios. The chapter on the role of
the international community is followed by the conclusion and recommendations.
1.3 Method & Materials
This study was carried out through a combination of desk research, interviews,
observations and informal and formal discussions with many of the individuals
and actors in Liberia between May 2009 and October 2010. The desk research
consisted of studying a broad variety of secondary sources from academic
material; lecture papers by scholars, politicians and civil society practitioners
writing about Liberia, as well as a plethora of available media articles from
across the globe. The desk research included studying primary sources such as
official government, political party, UN and other development partners’
documents.
A number of national and international persons working for the UN, the
Government of Liberia, the military, the police, former warring factions, civil
society, journalists as well as democratic and conflict practitioners In Sierra
Leone were interviewed. Criterion for the selection of the interviewees was based
on their involvement, knowledge and experience of working and being active in
present day Liberia. The interviews were carried out in person and over the
telephone, and the eventual choice of interviewees was partially influenced by
their availability. Due to the sensitive nature of the subject at hand, as well as the
current positions most of the interviewees hold within Liberia, the interviews
were carried out in confidence and the interviewees preferred to remain
anonymous.
As is the case with politics in all corners of the globe, much of the real politics is
conducted behind the scenes, in unofficial and informal settings and many of the
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real political struggles and deals are not thrashed out in the public and official
8
sphere. Thus, this paper is also informed by the unofficial channels and will
make use of these channels to flesh out the real situation in Liberia.
As part of the method of this paper, the analytical framework below uses a
qualitative method. However, it embraces some of the concepts and risk factors
that originate from the more quantitative schools of thought dealing with conflict
analysis. This, as is discussed below, is because on their own neither quantitative
nor qualitative factors can capture the real empirical context of Liberia and
would thus, provide an inadequate lens with which to analyse the situation in
Liberia.
1.3.1
Analytical Framework
The task of this analytical framework is to create a lens with which to analyse the
situation in Liberia. The analytical framework will achieve this by the current
situation in Liberia in the following spheres: political, social, economic and
security. It will then identify the more proximate conflict risk factors and through
the use of scenarios, map out some of the potential security developments likely
to unfold over the next two years in Liberia.
The Issues affecting the current situation are:
1. The Political Dynamics and Tensions;
2. Justice and Impunity Issues including Corruption;
3. Ethnic, Land and Religious tensions;
4. Weak Institutions (Both formal and informal);
5. Socio-economic poverty including youth unemployment;
6. Youth Unemployment;
7. Trafficking of Illicit Drugs and Small Arms; and
8. The Security Sector Reform.
The Proximate Conflict Risk Factors are:
1. The 2011 Elections;
2. Justice and Impunity tensions
3. Civil Security Threats including Vigilantes and informal securities; and
4. Land and Ethnic Violence.
8
For examples from the Western world see e.g. Michael Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy: Social Poetics
in the Nation-State (New York, 1997), Andrew Shryock, Off Stage/On Display: Intimacy and
Ethnography in the Age of Public Culture (Stanford, Calif., 2004).
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2 Background
The historical downward trajectory of Liberia – a small west African country
with a population size of 3.4 million people9 - is not dissimilar to many other
countries that have fallen into civil war. What makes it different though is the
specific ways within which its history has conspired to deliver such a blood bath.
Preceding the fourteen year civil war that saw over 250 000 people killed,
millions of people displaced, thousands of women and girls raped, children
turned into soldiers, resources plundered and neighbouring countries destabilised,
Liberia went through a century of abuse by its political and security forces.
Retracing some of this history is important, because one of the central plinths of
post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform is to dismantle the
oppressive and disruptive political and security apparatus that led to the conflict
in the first place and build a politico-security architecture that avoids the
catastrophic pitfalls of the past.
As a state, Liberia was founded in 1822, when freed slaves – later known as
Americo-Liberian or “Congo” - from the United States of America, under the
auspices of the American Colonization Society, declared Liberia independent.
Liberia was to be a “happy home” to thousands of Black Americans who were
once victims of oppression and slavery. However, instead of promoting good
governance, what was inaugurated under ‘Americo-Liberian’ political elite
domination, was a system of oppression10 through what was entitled the Masonic
Order.11 Right up until the Samuel Doe led coup d'etat in 1980 all political
power, social status, and economic affluence were tightly held in the hands of the
Americo-Liberians and used to suppress the indigenous Liberians. The True
Whig Party dominated Liberian politics.
The military has always played a crucial role in Liberia and up until 1908
Liberia’s major armed force was the colonial militia which – in line with the
9
Cook, N. “Liberia's Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance.” Congressional
Research Service. May 19, 2010. p 3.
10
See Zounmenou, D. Managing Post-War Liberia: An Update. Institute for Security Studies,
Situation Report. 7 July 2008. p. 2.; See also Lipski, J. M. The Spanish of Equatorial Guinea:
Research on la hispanidad's Best-Kept Secret.
11
The Masonic Order of Liberia is a fraternal organization based on the principles of Freemasonry.
This Masionic Order formed an informal fraternity whose membership was made up of AmericoLiberians (both men and women) mainly in Monrovia and excluded indigenous Liberians. Most
political and business decisions affecting Liberia were informally decided here and all presidents
and leaders (from True Whig party) of Liberia from 1822 to 1980 were members of this Masionic
order. Samuel Doe destroyed this Masionic order and the social ordering it caste, and while there
have been recent attempts to revive it in Monrovia, it does not even enjoy a peripheral role in
Liberia today.
14
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Americo-Liberian dominance – was used to violently defend the interests of the
Americo-Liberian’s against the indigenous Liberians.12
By the 1970’s the tensions between the indigenous Liberians and the AmericoLiberians had become openly antagonistic. On 12 April 1980, a bloody coup led
by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe was staged. Doe’s forces executed President
William R. Tolbert, his family and more than a dozen officials of his government
- mostly of Americo-Liberian descent - publicly on a beach near Monrovia. A
People's Redemption Council (PRC), headed by Doe, subsequently suspended
the constitution and assumed full legislative and executive powers. The AmericoLiberian political domination came to an end.
Doe led an extraordinarily brutal regime that not only disenfranchised many
Liberians but also effectively erased the boundaries between legitimate and
illegitimate political action. His government did little to transform the political
landscape, but instead further complicated the socio-economic and political
contradictions that marred the political environment.13 While Doe’s regime overturned the seventy-year hierarchy that placed Americo-Liberians on top,14 he
increasingly adopted an ethnic outlook as he surrounded himself with members
of his Krahn ethnic group and worked to promote narrow ethnic interests of
mainly the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups who soon dominated political and
military life in Liberia. This caused a heightened level of ethnic tension leading
to frequent hostilities between the politically and militarily dominant Krahns and
Mandingos, and other ethnic groups in the country and in particular the Mano
and Gio ethnic groups in Nimba County.15
The First Civil War – 1989-1996
Charles Taylor entered Nimba County from Côte d’Ivoire on 24 December 1989
with 120 or so fighters trained in Muammar Qaddafi’s Benghazi camp for
African revolutionaries and in Burkina Faso, under the name of the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Nimba civilians, the victims of retributive
attacks by Doe’s now Krahn-majority army in 1985, were receptive to Taylor’s
anti-Doe message.
12
See Malan, M. “US Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement.” Refugee International.
July 2008. p. 2.
13
See Zounmenou, D. Op. Cit., 7 July 2008. p. 2.
14
See Global Security at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/liberia/monroviamason.htm; See also Sullivan, T. “Old Ruling Elite Making A Comeback in Liberia.” Associated
Press, September 29, 2001.
15
See Zounmenou, D. Op. Cit., 7 July 2008; Malan, M. Op. Cit., July 2008; and
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/liberia-1980.htm
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As the fighting escalated into civil war, three distinct factions became engaged in
a national power-struggle: forces loyal to Doe, and two mutually opposed rebel
groups led by Charles Taylor and Prince Johnson. Taylor, a former Doe aide, and
Johnson had started their campaign under the same banner, the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPFL). Prince Johnson soon broke away due to policy
differences and formed the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(INPFL). Johnson's forces captured and killed Doe on September 9, 1990 and
temporarily gained control of the Presidency. The Presidency passed through
several hands, before settling in the hands of Amos Sawyer, who managed to
pacify some parts of the country. The Armed Forces of Liberia soon collapsed.
Thirteen peace accords and cease-fire agreements were signed but the conflict
never really ended. One of the factors that drove the warlords to reject a
transition to non-violent, peaceful and civilian controlled situation, was their
exploitation of Liberia’s natural resources. Once the civil war unfolded, Taylor
found wealth, and the war was increasingly about maintaining that fortune. His
main sources of revenue for him and his warlords were Liberia’s diamonds,
timber, rubber, gold, and iron ore.
On 17 August 1996, after 134 days of killing and mayhem, Nigeria and other
West African states brokered a cease fire between the warring factions.
Disarmament and demobilisation of warring factions was hastily carried out and
special elections were held on 19 July 1997, which Charles Taylor and his
National Patriotic Party (NPP) won.
The Second Civil War 1997-2003
Taylor’s 1997 election was accompanied by chants of “You killed my Ma, you
killed my Pa, I don’t wanna hear about it, I’ll still vote for you!” This was an
implicit mandate for Charles Taylor to fix the country. However, Charles Taylor
did not address the fundamental issues of Liberian society - such as governance,
socio-economic prosperity and human security - but instead continued
plundering the resources of the country which left the armed forces as
unequipped, demoralised and unpaid as the previous Doe government.
As a result, opposition to the Charles Taylor administration emerged. Liberians
United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) began attacks on government
targets in northern and western Liberia. Neither the Government of Liberia nor
the LURD appeared capable of a military victory. The LURD and many
expatriate opposition groups insisted that President Taylor leave office and that
an interim government assume power. Charles Taylor insisted on staying in
power until the end of his term.
16
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From the beginning of the 1990’s, the various armed militias forcefully recruited
children and youth as soldiers, while many other children and youth voluntarily
joined the fighting groups.16
By June 2003 rebels were engaged in clashes with government troops in a
number of areas throughout the country. The President of Liberia called for the
resignation of his cabinet, which led to further instability. On June 4, 2003, a
UN-backed court in Sierra Leone announced that it had indicted Liberian
President Charles Taylor for war crimes and issued an international warrant for
his arrest.17 Under the indictment, Mr. Taylor was charged with “bearing the
greatest responsibility” for war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious
violations of international humanitarian law” in Sierra Leone since 30 November
1996.18
Peace talks were conducted in Akosambo, Ghana, arranged by ECOWAS and a
cease-fire was agreed to on June 17, 2003, by these representatives and 18 other
political parties, as a forerunner to a transitional government which would
exclude President Charles Taylor.
Despite an earlier pledge that he would step down if the act were to bring peace
to the country, it became apparent that Taylor would not step down. Under
intense U.S. and international pressure, President Taylor resigned on August 11,
2003 and as part of a peace agreement and was flown into exile in Nigeria. On
August 18, leaders from the Liberian Government, the rebels, political parties,
and civil society signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that laid the
16
While it is correct to say some children and youth volunteered to join the fighting forces because
they joined the fighting forces without direct coercion, the word volunteered is somewhat
misleading. Many of these young people “volunteered” because the only other option was to be
abducted. Others Volunteered as a way of providing security for themselves from other fighting
forces and many of these were females who feared being abducted and turned into “sex slaves”.
Instead, a mitigating strategy was to join the fighting force and become one of the commanders or
combatants “Bush Wives,” which spared them from being sexually and domestically abused by
everyone. (Bush wives is a term that refers to a couple getting together in the bush – the fighting
forces camp placed in the bush during conflict). There are others who also joined simply because
they believed in the cause (their group was oppressed by either Doe or Taylor); they felt the
government was not responding to their needs such as youth employment and empowerment; and
some others just simply wanted to join the fighting. See Brett, R. and Spechtt, I. Young Soldiers:
Why They Choose To Fight. 2004; and Bøås, M. and Bjørkhaug, I. DDRed in Liberia: Youth
Remarginalisation or Reintegration? MICROCON Research Working Paper 28, Brighton. 2010.
17
Charles Taylor who has been arrested and is being tried by the Sierra Leone Special Court, faces
11 charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity over his alleged role in the civil war in
Sierra Leone. He is accused of backing the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in starting and
sustaining the conflict which saw over 200 000 people die. He is also accused of selling “Blood
Diamonds” and buying weapons for RUF during the decade long civil war.
18
See “Human Rights First.” Crimes against humanity and the case against Charles Taylor. August
2007.
17
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framework for constructing a 2-year National Transitional Government of
Liberia. The transitional government with the help of ECOWAS and UNMIL
oversaw peaceful democratic elections in 2005 which were contested twenty
three candidates. The November 8, 2005 presidential runoff election saw Ellen
Johnson-Sirleaf win over her closest opponent George Weah.
The transitional Government was set-up to initiate the processes of institution
building, Security Sector Reform and Justice Sector Reform. However, the
transitional government was plagued with several challenges including a severe
amount of corruption which meant that many of these issues were never
resolved.
18
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3 Current Situation
The current Situation in Liberia is one of relative calm with bursts of instability.
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s government stepped into office in January 2006
and set off with a series of reforms that have considerably changed the landscape
of Liberian governance. However, even with the progress achieved thus far,
Liberia still faces many challenges. The violent conflict is over, but in terms of
conflict stages, Liberia is in a post-conflict peace-building stage that is still
considerably dominated by peace keeping activities.19 As a result, some of the
key issues affecting Liberia remain within the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and
the political-social milieu surrounding it.
The long conflict had devastating consequences for all of Liberia’s national and
local institutions including the informal social institutions. As a result, Liberia
has very few institutions, and the institutions that do exist are very weak20 and
undergoing various forms of transformation. This range of institutions covers all
sectors, including the Police, customs, judiciary, schools, hospitals, prisons,
transportation, and many more.
As a result, these weaknesses have added to the political, economic and social
tensions found within the country, which play a critical role in maintaining or
disturbing the relative stability found in Liberia.
This chapter ”Current Situation” will simply layout the key institutions and
structures that populate the current political, economic, social/cultural and
security landscape of Liberia. These include the very important informal and
local institutions such as the “Secret Societies” and “Chieftaincies.”
19
This is as opposed to its neighbouring country Sierra Leone which is a little further down the line
of peace-building. See Adolfo, E. Seirra Leone, Potential Security Developments, as part of this
same FOI series. Essentially, these two processes are not sequential with one coming after the
other, but are processes that are carried out simultaneously. However, at any one particular point
during these processes, there is a greater emphasis on one depending on how far away from the
conflict the process has come. For example, there is a bigger emphasis on peace-keeping and
security immediately after the conflict and a bigger emphasis on building institutions and
establishing the rule of law twelve months after the end of the conflict. See de Zeeuw, J. Building
Peace in War-Torn Societies: From Concept to Strategy. (Research Project on ‘Rehabilitation,
sustainable peace and Development’). Netherlands Institute for International Relations
‘Clingendael’ Conflict Research Unit. August 2001.; See also In Galtung, J. War, Peace and
Defence: Essays in Peace Research. Vol. 2 (Ejlers, C. Copenhagen). 1975.
20
By “Weak Institutions” this document refers to the institutions lacking in capacity, expertise,
resources and in some cases the “will”, to deliver the goods and services they were set-up for.
19
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3.1 Political Dynamics
The ruling Unity Party (UP) lead by President Johnson Sirleaf has set-up a
cabinet seen as competent by many as it is dominated by technocrats,
professionals, and former opposition or policy activists. The government has
grouped its development drive into four pillars: Consolidating Peace and
Security; Revitalising the Economy; Strengthening Governance and Rule of
Law; and Rehabilitating Infrastructure and Delivery of Basic Services,21 which
define the government’s medium to long term development efforts.22
However, the political landscape in Liberia is still home to many politicians and
War-Lords that actively participated in the fourteen year civil conflict. As noted
in the background section, all these parties fought with, and against each other, at
some point during the fourteen years of conflict. These ties make for a very
aggravated political discourse today. Every act by any party is regarded with
mutual distrust and suspicion. There are tensions between the government and
the opposition parties on a number of issues ranging from corruption to national
cohesion. Some opposition leaders accuse the government of reviving old ethnic
and social divisions. For instance, the current government’s decision to hold the
members of the transitional government accountable is seen as undermining the
reconciliation processes. Deterioration in the relations between key political
actors and social forces could derail the fragile peace.
The CPA provided for a blanket amnesty which has allowed the parties who
actively drove the conflict to freely be politically active. Due to the “Strong
Man”23 politics in Liberia, this has resulted in these “Strong Men” dominating
Liberian politics. This has had the effect that the political discourse and culture
has some difficulties in moving forward and in particular in ending the cultures
of impunity and corruption.24
A good example of this was when both houses of parliament unanimously
rejected a bill sponsored by the government in support of UN Resolution 1532,
which mandates the UN member countries to identify and seize all assets
belonging to individuals associated with Charles Taylor. This rejection of the bill
was compounded by the fact that several members of parliament are, in fact,
21
See Poverty Reduction Strategy. Op. Cit., 2008. p. 43.
These are spearheaded by an entity called the Liberia Reconstruction and Development
Committee (LRDC), which is composed of four working committees, each of which supports a
separate “pillar.” See Cook, N. “Liberia's Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S.
Assistance.” Congressional Research Service. May 19, 2010. p. 11.
23
”Strong Man” Politics is a phrase use in Liberia to describe a type of politics that is advanced by
the use of threat of the use of force and violence.
24
Zounmenou, D. Op. Cit., 7 July 2008. p. 12.
22
20
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Taylor associates.25 The initiative was seen as targeting warlords and their
followers and was thus greeted with suspicion and accusations that the
government is trying to revive old cleavages. Again, a drop back into the conflict
politics. Further, it also meant that progress in addressing issues such as deep
rooted corruption and impunity continue to be hindered.26
With regards to power politics, the same old modes of operation that created
instability continue. For example, the alleged military coup attempt on 19 July
2007, in which the government of Liberia announced the arrest of five people in
connection with an alleged coup attempt. Those detained included former
Speaker of Parliament, the former head of the presidential guard during the Doe
regime and leader of a 1994 coup attempt and several associates were arrested
and charged with treason for allegedly plotting the ouster of the Johnson Sirleaf
government.27 Contradictory evidence presented so far has, however, cast serious
doubts on the government’s claims. A co-accused confessed to the judges that
government officials offered him bribes and freedom in exchange for false
testimony.28
It is difficult to see how a military coup d’ etat could be carried out with UNMIL
and the US military firmly in control of the security sector and the military in
particular. However, whether it was a genuine attempted coup or just simply
false charges orchestrated to remove the opposition: both are tactics and modes
of operation that were used by the different oppressive Liberian regimes of the
past.29
General and presidential elections are scheduled for October 2011. The elections
will almost certainly be contested by a multitude of parties and various political
coalitions. The 2005 elections were contested by no less than twenty three
Presidential candidates. The two main parties are the Unity Party (UP), headed
by the incumbent President; and the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC),
headed by George Weah the runner-up in the 2005 Presidential elections.
Together, these two parties garner approximately 85 % of the electorates vote, at
approximately 45 % and 40 % respectively.30 As mentioned above, there are a
plethora of political parties in Liberia, but the main parties that hold the
remaining 15 % are:
25
Ibid.
See Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Volume II: Consolidated Final
Report. June 30 2009. p. 361.
27
Zounmenou, D. Op. Cit., 7 July 2008. p. 12.
28
Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010. p. 19.
29
See Malan, M. “US Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement.” Refugee International.
July 2008.
30
Interview with UNMIL member of staff, Monrovia. 31 August, 2010.
26
21
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
Labour Party (LP);

National Union for Democracy (LNUD);

New Deal Party (ND);

Liberty Action Party (LAP); and

Liberia Unification Party (LUP).
On the back of growing public criticism over the proliferation of political parties
two coalitions have been formed in 2010: The ’“Democratic Alliance” made up
of Labour Party, which came third in the 2005 presidential elections, and the
New Deal Party. The other coalition is the “New Unity Party” made up of the
United Party, Liberty Action Party, and Liberia Unification Party. The Congress
for Democratic Change has signed an agreement to go into a coalition with the
Liberian National Union party lead by Winston Tubman.
With the elections just over twelve months away there are some key election
issues that are dominating the political discussion and these are: Firstly, the
recommendations of the TRC report. (See TRC report discussion below). The
second is a constitutional issue that stipulates whether a candidate can or cannot
legally stand for President. The Constitution states that “No person shall be
eligible to hold the office of President or Vice President unless that person is (a)
A natural born Liberian citizen of no less than 35 years of age. (b) ...; and (c)
Resident in the Republic ten years prior to his election ...”’31 Point ”C” has been
the cause for discontent as both leading candidates - President Ellen Johnson
Sirleaf and George Weah - have not lived in Liberia for the last ten years
consecutively. Technically this should rule them both out and certain politicians
are agitating for this.
3.2 Truth & Reconciliation Commission
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was one of the outcomes of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The TRC mandate states that, ‘national
healing and reconciliation will be greatly enhanced by a process which seeks to
establish the truth through a public dialogue which engages the nation about the
nature, causes and effects of the civil conflicts and the impact it has had on the
31
Article 52 of the 1986 Liberian Constitution and Election Laws Forum. 1986.
22
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Liberian nation in order to make recommendations which will promote peace,
justice and reconciliation;’32
There are many issues with the TRC report but the two main issues of contention
at this juncture are: firstly, the TRC report recommends that ‘any person that it
determines is responsible for committing EDC [”Egregious” Domestic Crimes],
GHRV [“Gross Human Rights Violations”] or SHLV [“Serious” Humanitarian
Law Violations], or that planned, instigated, ordered. Committed, aided or
abetted in the planning, preparation, financing or execution of any crime within
its mandate, not be bestowed with government or legislative authority and power
to govern or make decisions on behalf of the Liberian people whom they
victimized.’33 The report gives several lists for the different categories of crimes
it mentions, and specifically names the President as well as many other political
figures set to contest the election and recommends that they be barred from
holding public office for thirty years.34 The TRC report has been handed to the
Law Reform Commission and the Ministry of Justice where the President has
asked that they investigate the legal implications before the recommendations are
implemented.35 However, the President has announced that she will seek reelection to a second term in 2011 irrespective of the TRC recommendations that
she not hold office for thirty years.36
The second issue is the recommendation that the government set-up an
‘“Extraordinary Criminal Court for Liberia” to try all persons recommended by
the TRC ...’37 Again, this affects many of the prominent political leaders either in
office or seeking office. This has thus far been met with ferocious criticism of the
TRC from the former heads and members of the different fighting factions
involved in the conflict and active in politics today.
3.3 Corruption
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has publicly vowed to take forceful action
against corruption. The President took the step of requiring all key officials to
declare their assets so as to expose any dramatic leaps in wealth. The officials
32
Truth and Reconciliation Commission Mandate. Enacted on May 12, 2005, by the National
Transitional Legislative Assembly, the TRC Mandate is the Act That Established the Truth And
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Liberia.
33
Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Volume II: Consolidated Final Report.
June 30 2009. p. 360.
34
Ibid. (Non of the lists include George Weah as he did not participate in the conflict).
35
The Buyer Report. Country Report for Liberia, “Outlook for 2010-11.” June 2010.
36
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s Annual Message to the National Legislature. 25 January 2010.
37
Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Op. Cit., June 30 2009. p. 349.
23
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were also required to follow a national code of conduct.38 Steps taken to fight
corruption thus far are the establishment of:

Anti-Corruption Commission;

General Auditing Commission;

Code of Conduct – Declaration of Assets;

Ongoing installation of automative systems to reduce the chances of
abuse and misuse; and

Government has focused on building institutions.39
An audit of the preceding transitional government - that was heavily criticised for
corruption - was carried out, and all the transitional government political
appointees were dismissed. The entire staff of the Finance Ministry were also
dismissed, pending a screening of employees’ qualifications and level of
probity.40 The new government took on the Governance and Economic
Management Program (GEMAP) that was forced upon the transitional
government in order to deal with “serious economic and financial management
deficiencies” and is reported to have slowed down leakages.41
Despite the steps taken to fight corruption by the Johnson Sirleaf government,
some current high level government officials have been accused of corruption.
The Anti-corruption Commission was first charged with investigating allegations
that certain current and former Johnson Sirleaf Administration officials had
received contract renewal bribes, as well as allegations of other corrupt actions,
in several cases.42 Lower level corruption among civil servants including the
police and other security and customs agencies continues.
While there have been many resignations and dismissals - which are in
themselves indications that corruption is persistent in the present government there have been no prosecutions and convictions as yet. An interviewee has
stated that:
‘While it would be fair to say that measured against the past,
these steps are notable: they are not enough. In order to strengthen
the governments legitimacy and the perception that something is
being done about justice and impunity issues, especially amongst
38
See Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010. p. 12.
See President John Sirleaf’s interview with J. Margolis. 26 July, 2010.
40
Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010. p. 13.
41
Ibid. p. 12.
42
Ibid. p. 16.
39
24
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the elite, the government needs to take concrete steps towards the
implementation of the TRC report, its recommendations and
prosecute some of the elite.’43
3.4 Ethnicity, Land & Religion
Linguistically, the ethnic groups found in Liberia could be divided into three
main groups: the Mande people in the north and far west, the Kru ethnic groups
(including the Krahn) in the east and southeast, and the Mel in the northwest.44
About 2.5 % of the population is Americo-Liberian. Of the non-African origin
population, the largest groups consist of Lebanese and Syrians.45 The main
religion in Liberia is almost exclusively Christian with small pockets of Islam
amongst the Mandingo and Lebanese populations.
Because of intermarriage and a national unification program, ethnic divisions are
rapidly becoming less distinct, especially around the capital. However, tensions
over access to land particularly in the non-modern legal sectors46 in the rural
areas are creating violent clashes that are increasingly taking on ethnic and
religious tones. The Lofa and Nimba counties bordering Guinea and Cóte
D’Ivoire respectively, are the main sites of contention.
The crisis is of such urgent importance that the President set up a land
commission in August 2009, which presented its report to the President in June
2010. Prior to that, in 2006 an Ad-Hoc Presidential Commission on the County
Inter Ethnic Land Dispute was set-up. The Commission’s main task was to
investigate the various land disputes deriving from continued ethnic tensions
between Mano, Gios and Mandingos in Nimba county. Land disputes are ranked
high as one of the issues threatening national peace and security in the country.47
43
Interviewee: Monrovia July 12, 2010.
The largest ethnic groups are the Kpellé, Bassa, Gio, Kru, Grebo, Mano, Krahn, Mandingo, Gola,
Gbandi, Loma, Kissi, Vai, and Bella.
45
See Ellis, S. The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an
African Civil War. 1999.
46
Liberia currently has a dual justice system involving a formal court hierarchy under the judiciary,
and a system of customary courts originally authorized under the Hinterland Regulations. This
system evolved as a result of the Liberian state’s efforts to extend its authority over the hinterland
through the Ministry of Internal Affairs and use of indirect rule. See Findings of the Legal
Working Group As adopted on December 10, 2009.
47
Rincon, J. M. ”Ex-combatants, Returnees, Land and Conflict in Liberia.” Danish Institute for
International Studies (DIIS) Working Paper. 2010. p. 18.. Also confirmed through several
interviews in Liberia.
44
25
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3.5 The Struggle for Normative Authority
‘Liberia’s civil wars, stretching from 1898 to 2003, left the
country’s institutions and infrastructure in ruins. All the formerly
dominant systems of authority [those in existence in 1979] that
enforced social order at different scales have been significantly
weakened and face newly constituted systems in competition for
dominance.’48
While Liberian politics was dominated by “Strong-Man” politics, there were less
harsh social systems in place at the mezzo and micro levels, where social
management and other forms of social inclusion were found in various forms
including in sodalities or “Secret Societies” as they are known: mainly the Poro
and Sande societies. According to Sawyer, due to the local authority vested in the
chieftaincies and ”Secret Societies,” they played a crucial role as conduits to
implementing government policy at local level.49 The secret societies served for
political stratification and networking, and they are intricately linked to business
and politics.50
During the fourteen year conflict, many young people who participated in armed
groups and fighting forces were socialised into different societal practices and
value systems. Many of these systems were predominantly based on the exercise
of brutal physical violence and domination including sexual and gender based
violence. Their actions were directed at immediate short-term gains. Participation
in the fighting forces exposed these groups of youth to new narratives of justice
and rights, and created a political awareness among these previously
marginalised groups. After fourteen years of continuous conflict, these new value
systems and social interactions have to some extent been normalised among
these youth groups.51
This is connected to the land and ethnicity disputes as the conflicts repeatedly
displaced the various populations across borders and within the country. In the
new places where these populations temporarily settled and the old places they
left behind, new networks were created with new systems of authority through
which power is now exercised. ‘Old linkages were either severed (symbolically
and/or physically) or were irreversibly altered.’52 The ending of the conflict
48
See Corriveau-Bourqure, A. “Confusions and Palava: The Logic of Land Encroachment in Lofa
County, Liberia.” Norwegian Refugee Council Report. 2010. p. 20.
49
See Sawyer, A. Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia. 2005
50
See Jörgel, M. and Utas, M. ”The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and Informal Security
providers in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. (FOI). December 2007. p. 59.
51
See Corriveau-Bourqure, A Op. Cit., 2010.
52
Ibid. p.5.
26
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initiated the return of these displaced populations. The land that had been vacated
by the displaced populations during the conflict (this is particular to the rural
areas in the border counties and especially areas that are now being turned into
towns and cities), was occupied by new tenants and in many cases mostly young
ex-combatants who remained where they were when the conflict ended.
As the displaced people have returned to their homes, they have found that not
only have many of their homes been occupied, but that the pre-war forms of
authority had been significantly altered in the favour of the new informal
institutions. These comprise of youth organisations, women’s groups, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), ex-combatant networks, new networks of
patronage, the growth of ‘non-traditional’ religious movements and the rejection
of traditional religious sodalities and customary authorities which were often
abusive and exploitative.53 The formation of the new networks and new forms of
social interaction - especially among youth – has provided these groups with
mechanisms with which to re-negotiate what they perceived were formerly
oppressive systems. These new networks have also provided new channels for
social mobility and the acquisition of wealth. The return of displaced populations
- including the elders - and their attempts to re-insert themselves on the local
social governance norms, has happened simultaneously with the re-emergence of
the state - albeit in its weak form - trying to re-establish itself as the dominant
authority. This has created a clash as the new resist the re-imposition of the old.
The slowly re-emerging state is also a major actor in this process through its
attempts to (re)assert its authority and, in some cases, insert itself into spaces
over which it previously only had tenuous control. With the proliferation of new
systems of authority (particularly youth groups who are willing to contest the old
forms of authority), multiple layers of authority have been created and, in the
process, formerly dominant forms of authority - chieftaincies in particular - have
been weakened.54 This has brought about a situation where individuals and
groups are now able (and at times, willing) to use force to make and protect
claims over certain commodities. This has been most evidently seen in the land
disputes that have occurred mainly in the border counties of Lofa and Nimba.
This is further exacerbated by the fact that while the state is trying to re-insert
itself, it does not have the capacity to do it effectively throughout most of its
territory including the urban centres such as Monrovia. Work is currently being
53
54
Ibid.
Please note here that the emphasis is on ”Weakened.” There are no dichotomies in this case and
the chieftaincies have not lost all their power: Their power has, however, diminished relative to
new forms of authority. Some interviewees have stated that the rural population still heavily
believes in witchcraft and secret societies, and that these social institutions regulate their behaviour
to a larger extent than they do those who reside in the urban areas. Thus, some of these social
institutions serve to keep certain wayward behaviour in check.
27
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done to institute the rule of law and strengthen existing government institutions.
However, at this particular juncture, most of the state institutions are weak and
are creating partial and temporary authorities that are intermittently either strong
or weak and thus subject to constant contestation. This is once more, most
commonly demonstrated in the land disputes that often turn violent.
The fact that Liberia has weak institutions, coupled with corruption – as is
discussed below – means that even a well intended government finds it difficult
to make an impact on many of the governance challenges Liberia faces. This is a
vacuum created by many years of war and destruction that the current
administration has inherited.55
3.6 The Economy
Since the signing of the Governance and Economic Management Program
(GEMAP), there has been a better mobilisation of national resources. According
to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Liberian government
revenues went from a mere US$ 80 million in 2005, to US$ 130 million in 2006
before jumping to US$ 200 million in 2007.56 Equally, the growth rate has
increased from 5.3 % in 2005, to 7.9 % in 2007. Liberia’s slow growth in 2009
was largely due to the global economic and financial crisis. Foreign exchange
inflow also fell in 2009 against 2008 because of a drop in remittances from 959
million US Dollars in 2008 to USD 782 million in 2009. ‘The Economist
Intelligence Unit forecasts real GDP growth of 6 % in 2010, rising to 7.3 % in
2011 as investment in the mining sector increases.’57
The current government is negotiating and has entered into several multi-year,
large natural resource and agricultural concession deals since 2006. These are
potentially multiple billion dollar investments which indicate foreign investor’s
confidence in the country’s political progress and prospective stability.58
However, it is still to be seen how and where this will trickle down to the
ordinary people in Liberia.
55
See also Zounmenou, D. Op. Cit., 7 July 2008. p. 4.
(UNDP, 2006b,)
57
See The Buyer Report. “Country Report for Liberia, June 2010; See also Cook, N. “Liberia's PostWar Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance.” Congressional Research Service. May 19,
2010. p. 2. See also (UNDP, 2006b; UNSC, 2007a).
58
See Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010. p. 2.
56
28
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3.7 Youth Unemployment
In Liberia, youth are defined as persons between 15 and 35 years of age.59 Thus,
Liberia has a very youthful population with up to 70 % of the population under
the age of thirty five.60 There are high levels of unemployment amongst this
group, approximately 85 %61 are unemployed or underemployed in the informal
economy, working under bad conditions and experiencing decent work deficits.62
The majority of the youth have migrated to Monrovia and can be found roaming
the streets. The conflict destroyed the schooling systems and denied hundreds of
thousands of youth the chance of gaining an education. Today, many of the youth
are either heads of households, themselves parents or homeless and thus
inhibiting them from starting or continuing any form of schooling as they are the
primary bread-winners. While the schooling system has been somewhat
reignited, the educational levels remain very poor with many teachers being
drawn from the pool of pupils themselves. An interviewee working with an NGO
focusing on youth has said: ‘The standard of education is very low. Many kids
are not in school and many that are in school are not being taught by proper
teachers and are therefore not learning. For example, in this school here [in
Nimba County], pupils are being taught by a fifth grader. What can a fifth grader
teach? So many are going to school but not acquiring anything.’63
The DDR training given to many of the young combatants was very short-term,
often ad hoc, and was not based on a thorough analysis of both the labour and job
markets. Thus, the trainings delivered did not match the jobs available.64 The
situation today is such that there are very few jobs yet not enough people with
the skills to occupy these jobs. Furthermore, the economy is very small and not
generating any jobs to absorb the labour found in the market.65
An interviewee with an international organisation working on youth employment
stated that: ’The youth unemployment situation is desperate in Liberia with
almost no-one having a job. We have started several programmes to create jobs
59
The Liberian government’s rationale behind such a broad definition of youth is that 14 years of
warfare have left “over-age youth” ill-equipped to cope in a post-war society. Therefore, the
government has decided to focus resources on this age cohort. This age range represents a large
share of the total population. However, this is the same demography used for most west African
countries.
60
Liberia Demographic and Health Survey. 2007. p. 8.
61
Youth Action International. Liberia Country Profile. 2009.
62
See ILO ”Decent Work Country Programme in Liberia.” August 2008.
63
Interview with Liberian NGO employee in Nimba county. 19 August, 2010.
64
See Jennings, K. M. “The Struggle to Satisfy: DDR Through the Eyes of Ex-Combatants in
Liberia.” International Peace-keeping 14, No. 2. 2007. p. 204-218.
65
Interview: Youth Employment expert at an International Organisation in Liberia. August 17,
2010.
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through public sector jobs and training, and although we are doing everything we
can to alleviate the problem, the reality is that we will not be able to create mass
employment to absorb even half of the unemployed youth over the next two
years.’66
The Liberian Poverty Reduction Strategy states that, ‘The situation of Liberian
youth was another major concern ... Coupled with the breakdown of traditional
values and norms as a result of the war, the situation of youth is a potentially
volatile security challenge.’67
3.8 Illicit Drugs & Arms Trafficking
The West African region – from the Sahel desert in Mali all the way west to the
coastal countries in the Mano River Basin including Cóte D’Ivoire - has had a
recent increase in the trafficking of illicit drugs as well as small arms and light
weapons. The cocaine trade through West Africa continues at a rate of perhaps
25 tons per year, with a retail market value of US$6.8 billion at destination in
2008. However, there is anecdotal information from law enforcement circles that
cocaine trafficking via West Africa may have started to increase again in late
2009.68 These are believed to be operated by international criminal networks.
The weak state institutions particularly along the border areas including the
border posts, and the long Liberian coastal line combined with the lack of
capacity within the Liberian National Police (LNP) (discussed below), means
that the movement of illicit drugs and small arms can be done with relative ease
in and around Liberia.
This was demonstrated in a recent plot uncovered in Liberia in May 2010, by a
Joint US and Liberia Undercover Operation.69 In this particular case, drug
traffickers were attempting to carry out the following through Liberia: ship
approximately 4,000 kilograms of cocaine worth the retail value of over $100
million; followed by a shipment of approximately 1,500 kilograms of cocaine,
before finally shipping approximately 500 kilograms of cocaine, all through
Liberia as a transit point.70 The sum of money involved is close to half a billion
dollars over a six month period. This makes it a significantly large area of
66
Interview with representative of an International Organisation working on youth employment,
Monrovia, 20 August, 2010.
67
Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Republic of Liberia. (April 2008 to June 2011). 2008. p. 50.
68
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ”Destabilizing influence of drug trafficking on
Transit Countries: The Case of cocaine.” World Drug Report. 2010. p. 242.
69
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Unsealing of Charges Arising from Historic Joint
Undercover Operation in The Republic of Liberia. http://allafrica.com/stories/201006011167.html
70
Ibid.
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business involving large sums of money that could easily tempt government
officials and security officers as well as the large unemployed youth population
into this illicit trade.
In fact, international traffickers have since 2007, ‘attempted to bribe high-level
officials in the Liberian Government in order to protect shipments of vast
quantities of cocaine, and to use Liberia as a trans-shipment point for further
distribution of the cocaine in Africa and Europe.’71 This coincides with the high
level of drug addiction within Liberia, which may have rolled-over from the
conflict period. Furthermore, the trafficking of illicit drugs and small arms in
Liberia and the West African region, have been linked to international terrorist
networks.72
A challenge Liberia faces with small arms is that there is no legislation covering
small arms and thus it is difficult to control their movement. However, this is
being discussed within the security sector reform programme, and a legislative
bill on the regulation of small arms will soon be drafted and presented to the
legislature.
3.9 The Army & Security Sector
Security has improved markedly since 2003 and while things are relatively stable
in Liberia, it remains a fragile state, propped-up by the 8000 UN Peace-Keepers.
Important steps have been taken within the National Security Architecture. A
National Security Council, which is chaired by the President, has been
established and meets when regularly to discuss national security policy.
However, the proposed county and district based security mechanisms which are
to report to the National Security Council to improve coordination between the
national government, local government, civil society, and traditional leaders,73
have not as yet been realised.
A National Security Strategy and Implementation Framework has been drafted,
though still not officially passed by Parliament or publicly made available. Due
to this strategy not being complete, it has created a void for security doctrine and
71
Ibid.
The Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, also known as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb or
AQLIM) and its offshoots or autonomous cells and are found in North/Central Africa and the
Sahel in Mali west Africa. See also O’Regan, D. “Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from
Latin America and the Caribbean.” Africa Security Brief. A Publication for Africa Centre for
Strategic Studies. No. 5. July 2010; and Wyler, L. S. & Cook, N. “Illegal Drug Trade in Africa:
Trends and U.S. Policy.” Congressional Research Service. September 2009.
73
As proposed in the Poverty Reduction Strategy. Op. Cit., 2008. p. 51.
72
31
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implementation, which makes it difficult to assess the SSR progress against any
clearly defined security policy. The Security Pillar established under the Poverty
Reduction Strategy, meets monthly with the International Community to look at
security priorities and possible funding for these priority areas. A new National
Security Advisor has also recently been appointed to the National Security
Council.
The elite in Liberia are fearful of the military for it has established records of
coup d etat’s, mutinies and disobedience. If the armed and security forces were
not overthrowing the government, then they functioned as instruments for the
incumbent regime’s security as opposed to providing for the security of the
citizens.74 The former case may explain why the President of Liberia has chosen
her stepson, Fombah Sirleaf, to head the National Security Agency. Trained at
the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he enjoys a good personal and
professional relationship with the president and is widely respected. However,
the latter case explains why many Liberian officials want to set up and
institutionalise a structure that will continue to work effectively as personnel
changes over time.75
3.10 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
In accordance with the 2003 CPA, the United States (US) government leads the
reform of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and the Ministry of Defence and
UNMIL lead the police reform.76
The CPA ordered a restructuring of the security forces which included: the
National Police Force, the Immigration Force, Special Security Service (SSS),
custom security guards and such other statutory security units. The Special
Security Units which include the Anti-Terrorist Unit, the Special Operations
Division (SOD) of the Liberian National Police Force and such paramilitary
groups that operate within organisations such as the National Ports Authority
74
Zounmenou, D. Op. Cit., 7 July 2008. p. 5; See also Adedeji, E. The Challenges and
Opportunities of Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Liberia. Occasional Paper No.9 of the
Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). 2005.
75
See also International Crisis Group. ”Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform.” Africa
Report No. 148. 13 January 2009. p. 20-21.
76
Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United
for Reconcilation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(MODEL) and Political Parties Accra, August 18, 2003. See also Malan, M. “US Civil-Military
Imbalance for Global Engagement.” Refugee International. July 2008, and Zounmenou, D. Op.
Cit., 7 July 2008. p. 5.
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(NPA), the Liberian Telecommunications Corporation (NTC), the Liberian
Refining Corporation and the Airports were also to be restructured.77
Today, not all of these security agencies have been restructured but relative
progress has been registered in the main security and defence entities of the
Liberian National Police (LNP) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). It is
worth noting that progress was made with regards to reducing the number of
armed and mobile groups by the end of the official Disarmament, Demobilisation
and Reintegration (DDR) process in 2005, with 103,019 ex-combatants disarmed
and 101,495 demobilised.78
3.11 Security Sector Reform
An innovative approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR) modelled on a similar
system the US implemented in Iraq saw the AFL completely dismantled. New
and largely untainted citizens have been recruited into the military after
undergoing a meticulous vetting process.79 These recruits have undergone
training and are being used as the basis of the AFL. They have been trained and
supported with technical assistance by the Private Military Companies and US
military forces. However, the daily tasks of reforming the AFL have been carried
out by Private Military Companies and not the US military. DynCorp was
contracted to help vet, recruit, and provide basic training and equipment for the
new force. DynCorp also refurbished and provided operations and maintenance
services for two AFL bases, Camp Sandee Ware and Barclay Training Center,
and provided Operation and Maintenance for the two bases. Pacific Architects
and Engineers (PAE) was contracted to provide construction services and
specialty training, equipment, logistics, and base services.80 To date,
approximately 2000 have been vetted, recruited, trained and receiving mentor
support to develop an officer corps. A National Defence Strategy is also being
developed.
The SSR training is being carried out by PMC’s raises serious questions with
regards to the mentors and models being provided for the AFL. The PMC’s are
77
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Op. Cit., August 18, 2003. See also Jaye, T. Dr. ”An
Assessment Report on Security Sector Reform in Liberia.” Governance Reform Commission of
Liberia. The RAND Corporation. 23 September, 2006.
78
(UNDP, 2006a; UNMIL, 2007; USIP 2007).; See also Zounmenou, D. Managing Post-War
Liberia: An Update. Institute for Security Studies, Situation Report. 7 July 2008. p. 7. See also
UNDP, 2006a; and UNMIL, 2007.
79
While it is fair to say that one can never be 100 % clean, this process has made for 99 % clean
force in the sense that the recruits do not have a bad record behind them. It is important to make
sure they do not get incentives to create a bad record in future.
80
See Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010. p. 22.
33
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made up of trainers who are all former U.S. soldiers, but who have opted out of
their national military and chosen a “paramilitary” occupation with a stronger
cash-work nexus. While they may provide good basic and even advanced
infantry training, they are certainly not the ideal role models to instil in the AFL
the notion of duty to country and military service ethics – including the
democratic principle of civil supremacy over the military. Mark Malan likened
many of the PMC trainers and their biographies to that of Colonel Elwood Davis,
the “Dictator of Grand Basa.” The risk of contamination of the new recruits however well vetted - is high. Indeed, in a country and region where recent
history has been shaped by warlords and mercenaries, the U.S. Department of
State has shown remarkable insensitivity by sending in contractors to shape the
new army.81
The training of the AFL was supposed to include three weeks of training devoted
to human rights, sexual and gender based violence, and education in civics and
civil-military relations in a democracy. This was eventually dropped due to
budgetary constraints.82 This raises the question of whether this will leave
Liberia with a problem in the future where the soldiers are again not trained in
any of the necessary and valid “soft skills.” Not training the forces on these
issues means that they are no different from their predecessors in the sense that
they are capable of using their weapons effectively, but are still not aware of
what the reasonable limits are with regards to human rights, gender, corruption
etc.
A major part of the SSR, as stated in the stated in the Poverty Reduction
Strategy, is to rationalise the security apparatus. Thus there is the intention to
’repeal the laws that created the National Bureau of Investigation and the Drug
Enforcement Agency and transfer some of their related duties, responsibilities
and operations to the [Liberian National Police] LNP.’83 It also seeks to do away
with the Ministry of National Security and merge its operational functions and
re-vetted personnel with the National Security Agency in order to eliminate
excessive duplication and overlapping of functions, reduce bureaucracy, and
increase law enforcement efficiency and accountability.’84 This is still yet to be
accomplished, and raises the question if this streamlining will improve the
different agencies ability to combat crime and drug trafficking in particular.
81
See Malan, M. “US Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement.” Refugee International.
July 2008.
82
Ibid. 21.
83
Poverty Reduction Strategy. Op. Cit., 2008. p. 52.
84
Ibid.
34
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3.11.1 Current Capacity
Liberia National Police
According to UN reports, police reform and restructuring efforts have made
significant progress, while major challenges still remain. The LNP did not recruit
and vet an entirely new staff, but focused on training existing LNP officers. An
interviewee engaged in the police reform has indicated that the LNP did not need
a root and brunch restructuring as the AFL, but simply better working conditions,
consistent pay, training, discipline and equipment.85 As of October 2010,
approximately 4000 LNP officers were trained, equipped and deployed, out of an
initial target of 3,500. UNMIL also reported that operational capacity within the
LNP remains weak. Thus any LNP deployment to the field – more so outside
Monrovia - faced severe constraints as the LNP lack basic infrastructure, police
equipment, vehicles, fuel, and communication equipment.86 This has led to the
UNPOL providing back-up to the LNP in carrying out daily operations to
maintain law and order and sustaining stability in Liberia.87 Disciplinary
challenges have also appeared in the LNP with the UN reporting high rates of
absenteeism and corrupt practices involving judicial and law enforcement
officials. The limited effectiveness of the LNP and other justice sector operations
is related to the incidents of mob violence and vigilante justice which have been
common.88
While a total restructuring of the army may have been necessary, it is also
important for Liberia to make sure it is not simply creating another platform for
underpaid military officers to “pay-themselves.” An International Crisis Group
report states that: ‘A freshly trained, scrupulously vetted Liberian private earns
$84 per month after taxes and medical insurance. A lieutenant who has passed
basic training, NCO training and Officer Candidate School and has a university
degree earns $200. By contrast, an UNMIL driver earns some $600. Serving in
the army only makes sense in the context of the sacrifices that accompany a
commitment to serving one’s country …’89
85
Interview: Monrovia, October 18, 2010.
See Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia.
UN Security Council. S/2009/411. 10 August 2009.
87
See Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in
Liberia. UN Security Council. S/2008/553. 15 August 2008. See also Sixteenth progress report of
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. UN Security Council.
S/2008/183. 19 March 2008.
88
See periodic reports on UNMIL and Liberia by the U.N. Secretary-General; Andreas Mehler, The
Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African
Republic, GIGA Working Paper; and Cook, N. “Liberia's Post-War Development: Key Issues and
U.S. Assistance.” Congressional Research Service. May 19, 2010. p. 30.
89
See also International Crisis Group. Op. Cit., 13 January 2009. p. 14.
86
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Security Sector Services
During the time of the transitional government (between 2003 and 2005), the
SSS, which is the security force used to protect the President and Vice President,
underwent the same limited vetting process as the police, and it has maintained
its bad reputation. They have been described as reckless, abusive and with agents
who point their weapons at motorists.90 An ‘SSS officer allegedly was arrested
with 750 kilograms of marijuana in his possession but was not imprisoned.’91
Emergency Response Unit
The Emergency Response Unit (ERU) is part of the LNP, and is a specialisttrained armed branch to deal with situations requiring the controlled use of
arms.92 Training has begun and the first 340 officers of the proposed 500 officer
unit have become operational.93 This is the only Police unit that will be armed.
The ERU will deal with crime situations that may require the use of firearms in
the arrest of armed criminals, hostage situations and violent crimes in progress,
as well as armed terrorist activities. The unit will additionally handle riot control,
anti-crime patrol in high crime areas and will provide assistance in major disaster
situations.94 To date, the ERU has focused exclusively on the Monrovia area.
A Police Support Unit is being proposed that will contain officers that are not as
highly trained and specialised as the ERU, but lightly armed and deployed
nationwide. This is to enable the LNP to quickly respond and contain the
sporadic and unpredictable violent out bursts, before they get out of control. The
proposed targets are to have 600 by June 2011 and 1000 by December 2011 PSU
trained and deployed officers.
Other Security Sector Agencies
Liberia has developed a coast guard and the field program is coordinated and
carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard, with some assistance from the U.S. Navy.95
The coast guard is still in its infancy and is part of the AFL. It is operational and
has to date even saved several lives along the coast.96 Liberia is part of the
Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), and is working in
cooperation with MOWCA, though this is still at a very early stage.
90
Ibid. p. 21.
Ibid.
92
Poverty Reduction Strategy. Op. Cit., 2008. p. 52.
93
Interview: Monrovia, October 18, 2010.
94
UNMIL press release conference on the Graduation of Liberian National Police Officers. 4th
October 2008.
95
See Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010. p. 27.
96
Interview: Monrovia, October 18, 2010.
91
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It appears that too much focus on the LNP and the AFL has left other agencies
neglected. Among others, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation (BIN)
and the National Fire Service are yet to benefit from the security sector reform
process.’97 At present, there are approximately thirteen thousand weak border
points in Liberia.98 This presents a serious difficulty with regards to international
criminal networks trafficking drugs, arms and terrorism, which are operating in
Liberia. These challenges and many of the proximate risk factors explored in the
next chapter, require agencies that can engage in strategic intelligence gathering,
which is under developed in Liberia.99
In addition to the current national capacity, as of late December 2009, UNMIL
had a total force strength of 8000 peace keepers.100 UNMIL will retain all of its
peace keepers up until the 2011 elections, before it begins its scheduled draw
down. However, this will need to be reviewed in the aftermath of the 2011
elections and the security challenges facing the country then. It is anticipated that
both the Liberian National Police and the Armed Forces of Liberia will not be
operating at full or desired capacity immediately after the elections. In light of
the increasing challenges the trafficking of illicit drugs is bringing to Liberia and
the region, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is looking
to open an office in Liberia in 2011.
97
Zounmenou, D. Op. Cit., 7 July 2008. p. 7.
Interview: SSR Professional in Monrovia. October 17, 2010.
99
Ibid.
100
Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010. p. 4.
98
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4 Proximate Security Risks
Empirical evidence has shown that almost half of all fragile and poor states that
emerge from civil conflicts relapse into conflict within ten years.101 Liberia’s
civil conflict officially ended eight years ago and thus fits into the time-scale
where a relapse into conflict is a real risk.
As Liberia moves towards the 2011 elections there are a number of proximate
conflict risk factors that could lead to instability and undermine the relative
stability this fragile state is currently enjoying. This chapter builds upon the
foundation of the structural challenges presented in the previous chapter, being
the possible causes for instability in Liberia. This chapter provides an additional
layer, and focuses on the proximate conflict risk factors that could act as triggers
for potential instability within Liberia over the next two years. It also discusses
potential future security scenarios.
The proximate conflict risk factors providing the most serious threats to stability
in Liberia are: elections, socio-political and economic instability including
corruption, high youth unemployment, poverty, land disputes, ethnic and
religious tensions and violent crime, especially armed robbery.102 Furthermore,
the compounding effect created by all of these risks occurring simultaneously or
as a result of each other in a domino effect, heightens the risk of instability over
the next two years.
4.1 Elections (2011)
The previous elections in 2005 provided an important turning point for Liberia
and ushered the country in a positive direction towards both peace and
democracy. However, elections have always acted as a catalyst for violent
confrontation in Liberia. With the political stakes placed high and Liberia
experiencing a fragile peace (with weak electoral and security institutions), small
disturbances could have a relay effect that escalates to the extent that it triggers
instability.
The 2011 elections will almost certainly be hotly contested between the two main
parties United Party (UP) and the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) with
the ruling party by no means assured of victory. A clear indication that the 2011
101
102
See Collier, P. “Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places.” 2009.
These proximate conflict risk factors have also been identified by the Liberian TRC. See
Republic of Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Volume II: Consolidated Final
Report. June 30 2009. See also African Economic Outlook.
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/west-africa/liberia/
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elections will be tough is that of the five by-elections held since 2006, CDC has
won four of them and as a result clawed back any ground they may have lost in
2005. This culminated in the late 2009 by-election held in Montserrado County,
home county to the capital Monrovia. ‘The CDC candidate emerged as the victor
during the run-off, garnering 56 % of votes cast against 44 % for the UP
candidate. Although the election reportedly featured a low voter turn-out’103
nearly half of Liberia’s electorate was eligible to participate in it.’104
Montserrado is a key constituency and the opposition winning it is an indication
of their popularity. This may serve as a “wake-up call” to the UP and ensure they
run an aggressive campaign in 2011. The stakes will certainly be raised at these
elections as no sitting President in Liberia has ever lost an election. According to
Lansana Fofana, this is mainly due to widespread rigging and the use of state
sponsored violence and suppression.105 There have been no allegations of either
George Weah or Ellen Johnson Sirleaf having instigated violence. However,
neither of them have total control over their party members and particularly the
elites in both parties. The constant political struggles President Johnson Sirleaf
has to engage in within her own party – as was illustrated in the case of
corruption reforms – is an indication of her limited control over her senior party
members. This is more so with regards to George Weah and the elite within
CDC. The CDC leader, George Weah, is extremely popular amongst the youth
who make up the largest electoral constituent. They also have the most energy
for electioneering and are usually at the forefront of any civil or mob violence in
Liberia. The risk of certain party members in both parties initiating forms of
election violence as and when required to secure victory cannot be ruled out. The
Presidential elections will generate more interest and participation from the
electorate and this may also raise the intensity of the campaigning and its
associated violence.
While a straight fight between the two major parties is expected, Liberia has a
plethora of political parties and presidential candidates which can complicate the
election proceedings further. A commentator in Liberia has said:
‘The problem in Liberia is that everyone wants to be President.
Even people in the Diaspora just think they can come down for the
campaign period and become President. The other problem with
103
See NEC, Statement by Hon. James M. Fromayan, Chairman of the National Elections
Commission (NEC) on the Occasion of the Announcement of the Final Results of the
Montserrado County Senatorial By-election Run-Off, November 26, 2009; See also IFES-Liberia,
"Briefing Note on Liberia's Successful Senatorial By-election," December 4, 2009; and IFES,
"IFES Returns to Work with Liberia’s National Elections Commission," October 7, 2009.
104
Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010. p. 10.
105
See Fofana, L. ”Awaiting Liberian elections.” February 2010.
39
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everyone wanting to be President means that most parties, once they
gain some momentum and smell some success, they end up splitting
up just before the final election, because inside the party there will
be three or four people who sense victory and decide that they
should instead be the President. The internal fighting starts as they
start to challenge the leader of the party for the leadership. So the
party ends up splintered and those who have spent their money on
electioneering turn to violence as a last resort to try and win at least
a seat.’106
Thus, while the Presidential candidates may not engage in political violence, the
individuals seeking election to the legislative houses may well use political
violence and intimidation as an electioneering tool. The risk lies in the clashes
between two rival groups spilling over into society and escalating.
4.2 Justice & Impunity
As pointed out in the “Current Situation,” the President and many others in
government and the opposition were named and recommended to be barred from
official public office for thirty years. At this juncture the report does not have
any legally binding obligations to have its recommendations carried out.
However, there is a moral obligation and this should not be taken lightly. This is
an issue that will be raised continuously throughout the campaign as an act of
impunity and may even be used to incite civil unrest.
The Labour Party opposition leader, Charles Brumskine, said that the president
has decided to sweep the TRC report under the rug because she is not concerned
about the rule of law in Liberia. He continued: “The issue is not whether one
agrees with the commission as such, but they (its members) must be commended
because for the first time in our living history we had men and women who were
courageous enough to look at the facts and indict a sitting president.”107
To augment the tension around the TRC report, the heads or representatives of
these fighting factions (NPFL, INPFL, LURD and MODEL), were all named for
prosecution and the thirty year ban in the TRC report. They are all active on the
current political stage and have all vociferously criticised the TRC. This was to
the point where they were almost making security threats. Their criticism was so
fierce such that the US Ambassador had to seek assurances from them that there
106
107
Interview with a political activist. Monrovia, August 30, 2010.
See Liberia's President Sirleaf Announces She Will Seek a Second Term in 2011. James Butty.
Washington, DC, 26 January 2010 http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/butty-liberiapresident-reelection-26jan10-82658982.html
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would be no further action taken. However, the constant flirting with violence
and veiled threats also runs the risk of going over particularly in a society that
still vividly remembers the conflict and the insecurity it brings. Pre-emptive
attacks become a real risk.
What is clear is that there will be no implementation of the TRC
recommendations – with regards to barring prominent politicians from public
office – before the elections in October 2011. Thus, how President Johnson
Sirleaf deals with this throughout the campaign and how forcefully the
opposition take it up will determine its affects. However, she will have to tread
carefully as the TRC issues are some of the unresolved issues of the conflict that
many people feel strongly about. The leader of the New Deal (ND), has stated
that: ‘there will be no peace in Liberia if the root causes for war in the country
are not identified and squarely dealt with; if the perpetrators of war are
continuously rewarded with political power; and if war criminal suspects are not
prosecuted, and aggrieved people of our country not attended to.’108 Nonimplementation of the report’s recommendations may be seen as a continuation
of the past and invoke a negative reaction.
4.3 Ownership & Identity
Land is one of the most explosive issues in Liberia today. The disputes over land
mainly originate from claims and counter claims of ownership to particular
pieces of land that were either left vacant during the conflict for various reasons,
or were forcefully acquired by ex-combatants. In many cases, during the conflict
and post-conflict period the vacant land was occupied by new people and in
many instances ex-combatants and youth who now adhere to the new political
narratives of injustice that they have been schooled in during the conflict. They
also operate within the new modes of social interaction and value systems. Thus,
when a claimant makes a claim on a piece of land that is occupied, the claimant
is met with resistance that can appear in various forms from counter claims, and
traditional forms of settlement to physical violence being visited upon the
claimant. An unfortunate development has been that as a land conflict escalates,
the parties tend to raise issues of ethnicity and question the right of certain ethnic
groups to the privilege of owning land, despite the fact that they have
documented evidence of a long history of generations in that particular place.
The Mandingos in Lofa have suffered this fate and many are still under threat.109
This has also sparked violent clashes and riots in Nimba county in 2008, 2009
108
New Deal Condemns Ugly Situation in Lofa County. Press Release, March 10, 2010. Presented
by Dr. George K. Kieh, Leader of the New Deal Movement.
109
See Corriveau-Bourqure, A. Op. Cit., 2010. p. 15.
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and 2010, which took on religious tones (the Mandigos being predominantly
Muslim) as churches and mosques were burnt down, people died and over 200
people were injured.110
These shifts to ethnic positions are also related to the history of the conflict in
Liberia where, in Nimba county for example, the Mandigo’s supported the Doe
regime as he attacked the Gio and Mano ethnic groups who originate from that
area. In turn, the Mano and Gio supported NPFL against Doe, and later the
Mandigo’s joined LURD who fought against NPFL. Thus, by invoking ethnicity
or religion, the conflicts become much more intense for they relate to the recent
brutal conflict, and the roles played by the different groups. Furthermore, at the
end of the conflict the UN peace-keepers were not deployed in Ganta, Nimba
County. Instead it was protected by various fighting factions and it is these
fighters from these factions that now occupy the land which is contested by the
returnees from Guinea. But the young fighters are willing to fight for the land
and not give it up to someone else.111 The land issue has multiple layers of
complexity to it including the “right to return” promoted by the UN.112
A man interviewed in Lofa county explained: “Liberia was founded by
Christians and therefore this is a Christian country. Now I do not understand how
a stranger, like a Mandingo who is a Muslim, can a create a “confusion”113 over
land in Liberia when he has no land here?!”114 A member of the LNP has said:
“This land problem is a serious issue here in Nimba county, a very sensitive issue
that could lead to serious security problems if not handled properly.”115
The disputes over land are increasing and so is the violence associated with these
disputes. Between 2008 and August 2010 there have been incidents of large scale
violence in Nimba and Lofa counties including Voinjama, February 2010;
Margibi county, June 2008; Maryland county in May 2008; Bong county, April
2008; and throughout 2008 many Mandingoes were expelled from the
commercial area of Ganta and Nimba counties.116
110
See “Violence Erupts in Lofa.” Daily Observer (Liberia). February 27, 2010; also ”Lofa Violence
was Planned, Country on Time Bomb.” Daily Observer (Liberia). March 3, 2010.
111
See Rincon, J. M. Op. Cit., 2010. p. 17.
112
See United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution (2005, 2.1) For a
comprehensive assessment of the land issue including the different legal apparatus available as
well as the various forms the disputes take on, see Corriveau-Bourqure, A. “Confusions and
Palava: The Logic of Land Encroachment in Lofa County, Liberia.” Norwegian Refugee Council
Report. 2010.
113
The word ”Confusion” used in this context in Liberia relates to ”a problem.” Thus, if there is a
”Confusion” then that means there is a problem.
114
Interview with a man in Lofa County, 30 August 2010.
115
Seprintendent Robert Kamei. Quoted in the ”Agency France Press”, 08 July 2009.
116
See International Crisis Group. Op. Cit., 13 January 2009. p. 8.
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A further dimension to the land issue is the occupation of rubber plantations by
ex-combatant gangs. In Gunthrie, a major rubber tree plantation in western
Liberia, occupied mainly by former LURD ex-combatants is still problematic.
Even though the UN managed to take Gunthrie over from the ex-combatants, in
February 2010 UNMIL reported that: ‘The situation in and around Liberia’s
rubber plantations continued to be of concern. Labour disputes, including over
salary and severance payments, prompted demonstrations at the Guthrie and
Cavalla plantations, with the conflict over control of rubber at Sinoe Plantation
continuing to be a major security concern.’117 In addition, in November 2009 the
president and general manager of a large-scale rubber plantation and rubber
processing firm, who also served as the chairman of Liberia’s national Public
Procurement and Concession Commission was murdered, “allegedly by
disgruntled workers” near the firm’s work site.’118
As Liberia battles with trying to renegotiate its social structures and forms of
authority in this post-conflict era, security threats appearing in the form of
sporadic and unexpected violence, riots, demonstrations and vigilantism all
express themselves in the “access to land” problems. These, struggles and
disputes in post-conflict Liberia over land and belonging appear to be not
exclusively about land, but also issues of authority, legitimacy and belonging to a
moral community.’119 If these issues are not kept in cheque, they could escalate
and act as triggers to larger scale instability. Many Liberians are mindful of the
ability for small disturbances to escalate and they often refer to the 1979 “rice
riots,” which are remembered for starting Samuel Doe’s revolution, take over
and the eventual fourteen year conflict.
4.4 Vigilantes & Informal Securities
The local security provided at community level by neighbourhood watches and
vigilante groups holds the risk of creating violence that spirals out to a stage
where it constitutes a security threat. Amid widespread fears about the level of
organisation behind the increasing armed robberies and other crimes, as well as
the demonstrated ineffectiveness of the LNP to fill the gap, many local
communities have taken matters to hand and are policing large tracks of Liberia
on their own. However, this is not enough as the culture of impunity and
corruption mean that both those accused of a crime and those actually convicted
117
(S/2010/88, February 17, 2010).
Cook, N. “Liberia's Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance.” Congressional
Research Service. May 19, 2010. p. 21.
119
Rincon, J. M. Op. Cit., 2010. p. 10.
118
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of crimes in the formal system are often released.120 This has led citizens who are
angry with the police and justice sector failures, to storm and burn down police
stations in Lofa and Maryland counties in early 2008, in order to mete out mob
justice because they see known criminals being returned to the street.121 The deep
sense of injustice has now encouraged many of the self-defence-patrols in
neighbourhoods in Monrovia, to be given orders by the community to kill thieves
when they catch them.122
A growing attachment to informal security services (Community Watch Forums)
with a licence to kill, raises the risk of violence at community level and
simultaneously heightens the possibility of these vigilante groups developing into
a security threat. Examples in West Africa and elsewhere show such vigilantism
may become a security threat in its own right. In Nigeria for instance, groups
such as the Bakassi Boys and the Odua People’s Congress that began as law-andorder vigilantes, sometimes with a measure of ethnic nationalist politics, have
become criminal elements, preying on ordinary citizens and serving as judge,
jury and executioner to those who run afoul of them.123 Such civil unrest is also
dangerous, in part because it may cover destabilising violence by groups opposed
to the government and also lead to growth of parallel organisations (vigilante
groups or civil militias) that could become more powerful than the security
forces.124 In fact many have accused vigilante and youth groups of creating chaos
in order to advance their own criminal activities of looting and robbery.
4.5 Youth, Arms & Drugs
Youth unemployment remains high in Liberia and with 70 % of the population
being under thirty five years, which means the majority of the population is
unemployed. Many former combatants have not received the adequate amount of
socio-psycho therapy and still remain associated with the command structures
from the conflict period.125
120
Isser, D. H., Lubkemann, S. C. and N’Tow, S. (With A. Addison, J. Ndebe, G. Saye, T. Luccaro).
Looking for Justice: Liberian Experiences with and Perceptions of Local Justice Options. (United
States Institute of Peace). Peaceworks No. 63. 2009. p. 45; See also International Crisis Group.
”Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform.” Africa Report No. 148. 13 Jan 2009.
121
International Crisis Group. Op. Cit., 13 January 2009. p. 7.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid. p. 20.
125
In mid-2009, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that ‘many of the 14,000 deactivated Armed
Forces of Liberia soldiers also maintain viable command and control structures, which are
utilized to organize recurrent, sometimes violent, demonstrations to challenge the legality of their
deactivation or demand benefit arrears owed by the Government’. See S/2009/299, June 10, 2009.
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With no means of making a living and many embracing the new value systems,
joining drug trafficking can be seen as a lucrative get-rich-quick scheme. The
greatest danger posed by cocaine is its enormous value compared to the small
size of the local economies. With the amounts of money the business generates –
US$6bn in 2008 in west Africa – and with the socio-economic conditions that
prevail, drug trafficking can easily penetrate to the very highest levels of
government and the military in order to use Liberia as a transit point. In
neighbouring Sierra Leone, the minister of transport allegedly provided landing
clearance to a plane carrying 700 kilograms of cocaine, and there are similar
reports of senior level police officers involved in cocaine trafficking from Guinea
Bissau, Guinea,126 Benin, Nigeria, and Ghana.127
However, drug trafficking is intrinsically violent and can easily increase violent
behaviour in a post-conflict setting. This is especially so in a context where most
ex-combatants remain unemployed and exist in a society in a state of flux as it
tries to re-establish itself in a new order and while violence is still seen as part of
the normal forms of social interaction. Studies have shown that ‘when violence
within one criminal activity rises, all crimes can become more violent, gangs
proliferate, and frustrated citizens may resort to mob justice including lynching
criminals. [...] in short, a culture of violence emerges.’128 However, this does not
end here as the violence can reach much more dangerous levels where drug
gangs fight not only between themselves but also engage in armed combat with
state security in order to protect and expand their business. The example of Drug
Wars in Jamaica where in just three days over seventy people were killed in
clashes and gun battles with the Police and army in May 2010, is dwarfed by the
example of Mexico, where drug-war related deaths in 2008 alone reached an
estimated 9000.129
In terms of large scale armed violence, vital finances to support rebel groups
have come through cocaine trafficking and the examples of Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia and Shining Path in Peru are
but two examples. It is also reported that FARC is involved in the cocaine trade
126
See Vincent, L. Guinea-Bissau: Cocaine and coups haunt gagged nation. Paris: Reporters without
Borders, November 2007.; See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ”Destabilizing
influence of drug trafficking on Transit Countries: The Case of cocaine.” World Drug Report.
2010.
127
For Sierra Leone case see Jalloh, T. "Kemoh Sesay Sacked for Police to Arrest," Concord Times,
August 5, 2008. See also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ”Destabilizing influence of
drug trafficking on Transit Countries: The Case of cocaine.” World Drug Report. 2010.
128
See O'Regan, D. “Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the
Caribbean.” Africa Security Brief: a Publication of the Africa Centre For Strategic Studies. No. 5
/ July 2010.
129
Ibid.
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in West Africa. When placed together with independent reports stating that
‘terrorist and armed groups in West Africa’s Sahel region are entering the drug
trade’ one sees the direct link where these rebel insurgencies can start a trade in,
and transfer of, strategies, tactics and weaponry with potential rebel groups in
Liberia.130 Liberia today sustains many of the conditions that enabled and fanned
narcotics-related violence and conflict in Latin America and the Caribbean, and
as such, illicit drugs trafficking poses one of the most serious potential security
threats to Liberia.
The drugs trafficking and possible drug wars are also connected with access to
fire arms. Apart from the arms trafficking prevalent in Liberia, many weapons
are still in the hands of former soldiers. UNMIL and the UNDP continue to trace,
collect and destroy residual weapons and ammunition long after the DDRR was
declared officially completed.131 Thus, the availability of small arms and light
weapons in Liberia is still high enough to constitute a threat. 132
The old guard from the army and police who have been disbanded, may also
pose a threat of violence for they have everything – arms, training, connections
and good logistical and other knowledge of the country which would make it
vulnerable to attacks orchestrated by them, ‘particularly when the government
does not keep a record of their whereabouts. Also, a number of ex-combatants
have retained arms and remain in inaccessible rural areas. Some, (for example,
MODEL with its full chain of command) have crossed borders in an attempt to
join various armed groups in the region. The porosity of national borders
facilitates arms trafficking, which is one of the greatest threats to security in
West Africa.’133
An important aspect of arms trafficking is that arms are durable and reusable.
Thus, once the market is saturated, there is no need to continue the trafficking
flow of arms in order for it to constitute a problem. Therefore, even when
evidence of trafficking of arms is low, this does not mean that there are no arms
in that particular area. In 2007, Jörgel and Utas wrote that, ‘An estimated eight
130
See Wyler, L. S. & Cook, N. “Illegal Drug Trade in Africa: Trends and U.S. Policy.”
Congressional Research Service. September 2009; and See also United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime. “Cocaine Trafficking in Western Africa.” Situation Report. October 2007. See also
O'Regan, D. “Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean.”
Africa Security Brief: a Publication of the Africa Centre For Strategic Studies. No. 5 / July 2010.
131
Zounmenou, D. Op. Citt,. 7 July 2008. p. 7.
132
The UN report further stated that “the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the subregion is a matter of serious concern, in particular as it relates to the phenomenon of youth
violence. See Mehler, A. The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from
Liberia and the Central African Republic. (German Institute of Global and Area Studies [GIGA].
Violence and Security Programme, No. 114. November 2009.
133
Zounmenou, D. Op. Cit., 7 July 2008. p. 13.
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million light arms are circulating in West Africa, according to Jeanine Jackson,
US Ambassador to Burkina Faso. Several reports argue that the Guinea Forest
Region is a crossroads for the trafficking of small arms. International actors have
asserted that such weapons are sometimes made locally by well-organized
criminal rings.’134 Thus, the low levels of arms trafficking today does not
necessarily serve as an indicator that there are no arms in circulation in Liberia.
134
Jörgel, M. and Utas, Mop. Cit., December 2007. p. 91.
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5 Potential Security Developments
There are a number of scenarios that could take place over the next two years
including peaceful and democratic elections, a speedily and acceptable resolution
to the land crisis, and a total cessation in the drugs and arms trafficking trade.
However, since this document focuses on the potential security developments, it
develops potential security scenarios.
The strategic importance of national security is based upon the national securities
capacity to deal with possible security risks. With all the above mentioned
challenges facing Liberia, the question becomes: What would the security risks
be, and do the current security forces have the capacity and competence to deal
with those risks, were they to occur?
5.1 Scenarios
Against the backdrop of the analysis made, this paper identifies two possible
proximate security scenarios that could create instability in Liberia and would
need a firm response from the military and security forces in order to deter,
control or combat such threats to stability:
II.
The fight for Land;
III.
Election Violence, Vigilantism and Drug wars.
5.1.1
Scenario I: The Fight for Land
Proximate risk factors
Ownership and Identity; Vigilantes and informal securities, election violence.
Triggers
Contested ownership of land and the subsequent violence that derives from it will
be the main triggers in this scenario.
Areas most affected
The conflicts and fighting in this scenario will mainly occur in the rural areas
with the Nimba, Lofa and Bong counties being the main sites for violence. Other
counties bordering neighbour countries may also be affected.
Fighting for land
Because the access to land issues provoke almost end-of-the-line battles about
who occupies the land, who has authority and who does or does not belong, these
can and indeed escalate into serious violent conflict. While access to land issues
are contentious in all parts of Liberia, the main sites of serious contention have
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been Lofa and Nimba counties. Both counties house many ex-combatants from
the rival factions of LURD and NFPL and still have remnants of the violent
culture. Both counties border the volatile country regions of Forestiere in Guinea
and area controlled by the Force Nouvelle in Cote D’Ivore. This raises the risk of
cross border violence with the potential to recruit and join forces with the rebel
groups in both countries which could develop into large scale armed threats.
Conversely, an outbreak of violence in either of the neighbouring countries
volatile areas would constitute a major security threat to those two counties as
well as Bong County bordering the same area. (See map 1 below).
The election period and its attendant violence will allow certain groups in these
counties that are mobilised for political violence, to use this platform to settle for
once and for all issues of land ownership and who belongs. Many people will be
physically beaten, some may die and others displaced as their perpetrators go
with impunity. Because the Liberian National Police and judiciary does not have
sufficient control over its counties or enforcement of the law, groups under the
protection of politicians will be able to perpetrate violence and create temporary
laws that they also enforce throughout this election period.
Depending on how the other groups respond (particularly groups that have
connections to neighbouring countries such as the Mandigo in Nimba country),
this could escalate into large scale, cross border violence and instability for the
country. While the battles here will start with batons, cutlasses, sticks and such,
there is the propensity for them to escalate and introduce small arms which are
readily available in and around Liberia.
With the movement and access to small arms and light weapons135 readily
available in Liberia and neighbouring countries, and a large pool of unemployed
ex-combatants to draw from (many of whom still remain in close contact with
their former command structures), recruiting and arming them could take place
rapidly. As these post-modern forms of conflicts often take on new dimensions,
the diamond resources in the area - in both counties as well as Bong county
which is sandwiched between the two, (see Map 1 below) - could also become a
site for contention. Because of the increase in the trafficking of illicit drugs in
Liberia and the sub-region, the porous borders, in particular in the north and
north east where Lofa and Nimba counties border the volatile areas of Guniea
135
Small arms and light weapons are arms mainly used for guerrilla warfare as they are small and
light and thus easy to transport and even be carried by soldiers. These consist mainly of pistols,
rifles most popularly the AK47 or Kalashnikov, mortars, surface to air missiles, RPG’s and
rounds of ammunition.
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136
Map 1 illustrates the close proximity of the counties likely to experience instability (Lofa,
Nimba and Bong) to the neighbouring countries of Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire, and the
unstable areas there of Forestiere and Confidence Zone respectively. It also shows the
diamond resources in Liberia are found in those counties which could bring a different
dimension to the conflict. Their proximity to Monrovia is also of concern.
Forestiere and the area controlled by the Force Nouvelle in Cote D’Ivore which
also form a passage to the Sahel desert in Mali, these areas are fertile ground for
drugs and arms trafficking, as well as connections to terror networks. Outside
Montserrado county, Lofa, Nimba and Bongo hold the largest population groups
136
Map 1 designed by Sofia Sundström. Konfront.se
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accumulatively being 1 067 121 people.137 Thus there is a huge population in this
area.
Army and Police response
In order to contain these crises in their infancy or as they rapidly escalate, the
military would need to be able to combat insurgencies in high numbers armed
with small arms and light weapons in the northern and north-eastern border areas
- so fighting could become cross border - and probably within at least three
counties simultaneously - Lofa, Bong and Nimba counties. Depending on the
different dimensions the conflicts take, the military may have to combat three or
more adversaries simultaneously. One group to stake a claim over the land,
another to protect and extract diamond resources, a third to protect its drugs and
arms trafficking, with some or all of these parties receiving support from
neighbouring rebel groups with ethnic ties or mercenary groups who simply join
in the looting. It would be expected to see these groups organised along similar
command structures from the time of the conflict, if only loosely, but they will
have an element of organisation about them. Guerrilla tactical warfare will be
their main strength.
The military will also have to contend with armed groups and fighting factions
who may not only be well armed, but have strength in numbers as well as
equipment (vehicles, mobile telephones and connections to high-level officials)
that rival the military. Because of the densely populated area, the military will
have to contend with large displacements of people both internally and
externally.
The military has undergone a thorough reform process and while it has cleaned
the military it has also left it very low on numbers - currently 2000 soldiers - and
an almost non-existent officer corps or other senior and experienced military
personnel. Supported by UNMIL and the US forces on the ground, the Military
may be able to counter and combat - though most probably not successfully - an
insurgence in one county. This would absolutely stretch the military and the fact
that they may be coming up against battle hardened former combatants, illicit
drugs networks and possible rebels and mercenaries from neighbouring
countries, would make it impossible for the AFL to successfully move into all
three counties simultaneously.
137
A breakdown of the three counties populations is: bong, 328 919; Lofa, 270 114; and Nimba 468
088. The total population in Liberia being 3,489,072. See Statoids statistics:
http://www.statoids.com/ulr.html
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5.1.2
Scenario II: Election Violence, Vigilantism & Drug Wars
Proximate Risk Factors
Elections; youth unemployment, illicit drugs and arms trafficking; and vigilantes
and informal securities.
Triggers
The election campaign process and the violence in the urban settings that is
associated with it will trigger riots and demonstrations whose violence will bring
the other issues to the surface.
Areas Most Affected
This scenario would be played out mainly in the urban settings of Monrovia,
Ganta and Voinjama.
Urban Violence
Triggered by the election violence, riots, demonstrations, election violence, drug
wars and vigilantism could be played out in the more urban settings of Monrovia,
Ganta and Voinjama, and where they may not escalate as rapidly to out and out
conflict, but would need to be contained so as not to eventually escalate that far.
The violence here will be characterised by small skirmishes between different
groups mobilised for political violence against some vigilante groups, urban
youth and possibly the LNP. The availability of small arms and drugs in the
urban settings means that these arms will be used as well as other close contact
arms such as cutlasses, sticks/batons and chains. These groups will be made up
of mostly loosely organised vigilante groups, gangs of youth and even
characterised by individual households protecting themselves. There is a high
population density in Monrovia in particular and this will further complicate
issues.
The risk increases in light of the increase in drug addiction and trafficking in
Liberia. Unemployed, desperate youth can easily be recruited into criminal
cartels if there are no other alternatives in sight. This is particularly sensitive
after the elections when the politicians no longer have any use for them and
abandon them. Furthermore, with the presence international criminal networks
trafficking illicit drugs in Liberia, these youth groups will provide a fertile
ground for these criminal network to establish forms of security for their
operations. This opens Liberia up to having features of a “Narco-State” even if it
does not actually become one.
Police Response
This would require the intervention of the LNP with the capacity to carry-out
crowd control and exercise proficiency - in terms of numbers and equipment - to
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counter and contain these disturbances. Looking at the LNP’s current capacity, as
well as personnel including those in the ERU, it would appear that this would be
a task beyond the LNP, especially if it has to deal with two or more urban areas
simultaneously.138 The LNP reform has been engaging and involving, but it has
not yielded the results it ought to have over this period of reform. As mentioned
in the current situation, many deficiencies still remain. The LNP did not go
through the rigorous vetting system the military did and to a large extent retained
its old personnel. Thus the problems inherent in the old LNP – corruption,
brutality and abuse of office being the main ones – remain intact and make the
police more of a menace than security to the public.139 The LNP cannot be
legally armed at present - save for the ERU who have a maximum allowed
contingent of 500 but are still well below that mark. The LNP does not have any
support equipment in terms of vehicles and radio equipment and will find it
impossible to access the various densely populated areas in Monrovia such as
Red Light, Duala and Paynesville on foot. Combined with the fact that the LNP
are lowly paid - which contributes to low morale - as well as the drug trades high
profitability means that the LNP are extremely susceptible to being corrupted and
thus not take a stand.
While the NEC handled the November 2009 elections in Montserrado very well
and with most observers viewing it as a test run for the 2011 elections, the low
voter turnout, and the geographical proximity of all of Mountseraddo mean that
the NEC was not actually tested nearly as much as they should have been. The
2011 election which will be nationwide, and will include an electorate that is ten
times larger than the one that voted in November 2009, and will also have to deal
with a much bigger and much more aggressive electoral campaign. NEC’s
capacity to deal with these elections will prove vital to the post election peace as
any irregularities will be challenged to the full this time round. The main
geographical areas NEC will need to manage the elections not only in the
Montserrado county, but also the three big population counties of Lofa, Bong and
Nimba simultaneously.
138
The majority of the Liberia National Police (LNP) officers were assigned to areas in and around
the capital Monrovia, leaving only 676 police personnel to patrol the country’s remaining 14
counties (UNMIL, 2007). See Zounmenou, D. Managing Post-War Liberia: An Update. Institute
for Security Studies, Situation Report. 7 July 2008. p. 5.
139
See Mehler, A. Op. Cit., November 2009; and Jörgel, M. and Utas, M. Op. Cit., December 2007.
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6 The Role of the International
Community
Liberia is still a protectorate of the UN Security Council, under a Chapter VII
mandate and is still in a UN phase three security phase. All security matters are
still taken care of by the UN and the US as the former colonial master140 plays a
major role in the reconstruction of Liberia today.
The United Nations has a great presence in Liberia and has taken the lead in
driving the political agenda from the international community through UNMIL.
The UN has aligned all of its programmes to Liberia’s Poverty Reduction
Strategy (PRS) and articulated in the UN Development Assistance Framework
(UNDAF).141 Its focus is on Liberia’s four pillars: enhancing national security;
revitalising the economy; strengthening governance and rule of law; and
rehabilitating infrastructure and basic social services. The UN is also engaged
with the political parties, strengthening the legislative houses, providing support
to the elections through the National Electoral Commission and continued
collection of arms from various communities. Youth employment has also taken
a central part the UN’s programme as has youth crime watch. While the security
presence of UNMIL has been and continues to be a crucial element of stability in
Liberia, steps into practical peace-building are being taken and the award of a
$15m grant from the UN’s Peace-Building Fund in 2007 is illustrative of this.
Work on most of these projects has begun in 2009.
The World Bank is active in the infrastructure sectors in both urban and rural
settings as a means to slow down the youth urban migration. The World Bank is
also investing heavily in youth employment and is supporting the government in
its land sector reforms, in order to resolve the tensions around land. Support is
being given to the extractive industries, public finance management, judicial
reform, economic governance and institutional reform in order to strengthen the
existing institutions.142
Support from the US has centred on fostering peace and security including the
SSR programme with the AFL. Strengthening democratic institutions by
increasing good governance practices through capacity building; strengthening
the judicial system through the Judicial Training Institute (JTI); support to the
140
Not colonial in the strictest sense as Liberia was never a direct colony of the US. However, their
historical ties and semi-colonial relationship earns it the status as former colonial master.
141
The UNDAF is designed to run between 2008 and 2012.
142
See also
http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=356226&pagePK=141155&piPK=141
124&theSitePK=356194
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Anti Corruption Commission; election support; and support to civil society
organisations. Rebuilding the economy through first and foremost the GEMAP,
as well as its Financial Management and Capacity Building Programme
(FMCAB), with investments in the agricultural sector, natural resources
management, the energy sector, national infrastructure as well as education and
health development. The US has also been heavily engaged through its Drug
Enforcement Agency on combating the drug trafficking trade in Liberia.143
The European Union (EU) is trying to build the national infrastructure in order to
reduce the levels of poverty as well as prepare the economy to expand, create
industry and thus create jobs and consolidate peace. To this end, the EU is
developing an Electricity Grid including Cross-border Supply of Electricity to
rural communities, Integrated Water Resources Management and Planning,
Agro-economic recovery assistance to rural farmers including post-conflict forest
management, cultural exchanges in West Africa and the development of the
educational system.144
Currently, Sweden has a Security Sector Reform Coordinator who has just
recently been posted in Monrovia, (in September 2010). The SSR Coordinator is
exploring ways to expand the partnership between Sweden and Liberia within the
SSR process and develop specific sectors within the LNP.
143
144
See also Cook, N. Op. Cit., May 19, 2010; also O'Regan, D. Op. Cit., July 2010.
See also The European Union and Liberia
http://www.dellbr.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_liberia/eu_and_liberia_table.htm
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7 Conclusions
This report discussed the potential security developments in Liberia by first
analysing the current situation and structural challenges. Based upon the current
situation, it then identified the proximate conflict risk factors facing Liberia over
the next two years before developing potential future instability scenarios.
There are a number of issues affecting Liberia currently and the key issues are:
political tensions; justice and impunity issues; corruption; weak institutions;
ethnic and land conflicts; the struggle for normative authority; socio-economic
improvement; and security. All these issues each contribute to the tensions and
fragility found in Liberia and when combined with the proximate conflict risk
factors of the 2011 elections; land and ethnic conflicts; poverty; youth
unemployment; and illicit drug trafficking, there is a real cause for concern going
into the next two years.
The 2011 elections provide an increase in political tensions. The formation of
coalitions may help to reduce the number political parties and presidential
candidates, and by proxy, reduce the number of contending voices, making the
process easier to manage. However, as stated, the coalitions provide for stronger
blocks and thus stronger opposition to an election process or results that are not
in their favour.
The Liberian state needs to strengthen its institutions and extend its authority –
both normatively and as the monopoly of force – across the country and in
particular the border regions. Failure on the part of the state to re-insert itself and
shape the normative processes could result in internal instability being the
greatest security concern. Customs and policing institutions are of critical
importance if Liberia is to resist the forming of a “Narco-State” with fertile
ground for the trafficking of drugs, arms and terror that will extend far beyond
the Liberian state borders.
The greatest long-term challenge for the Liberian Ministry of Defence and
associated ministries is to do more with less. As the U.S. and UN gradually
disengage from SSR, managerial and financial responsibilities will mount
rapidly. There are fears that Liberia will be sitting on a time bomb – a well
trained and armed force of elite soldiers in the AFL, who are used to good pay
and conditions of service, which may be impossible for the government of
Liberia to sustain on its own. The response must be both political and technical,
with civilian control established and political manipulation avoided.
The almost absolute dependence of Liberia on external resources for the
implementation of its reconstruction and development programmes, puts
additional pressure on the government. As so often happens, there may be a lack
of convergence in government priorities vis-à-vis the population of the country
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and donors’ interests, which could cause the deterioration of the citizens’
confidence in national authorities.
The international community has to date sought to stabilise the Liberian state in
Monrovia, without addressing issues of citizenship, land access and political
power at the local level. Common solutions have not yet been found, but their
tendency to escalate over time toward large-scale clashes indicates that
interventions by administrative and police officials are often inadequate. The
slow pace of consultation and decisions about land policy at the national level
has also contributed to this problem. As this analysis has shown, these issues
have a variety of interlinked potential sources of destabilisation, each susceptible
to escalation, particularly in combination. The Liberian state’s sovereign powers
over its territory including its air space and coastline, as well as many other
governance matters is yet to be established. Until then, a latent danger for a
resurgence of armed conflict strongly lurks in Liberia.
7.1 Recommendations
There are a plethora of issues that need to be addressed in Liberia and because
there are so many of them, one may not know where to start and this could lead
to nothing happening. However, one can always improve on doing nothing, and
therefore some recommendations are presented here in relation to the security
aspects in Liberia.
In order to have clear strategic goals and goals that can be measured, it is
important that the National Defence and National Security Strategies are
completed. At present, an absence of these two has led to an uncoordinated
approach to SSR. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) states that there
be a SSR process but does not state how the security sector institutions should be
strategically developed to counter both internal and external threats. Thus, the
organisations engaged in SSR are helping build and strengthen the institutions in
different ways that do not necessarily focus on a particular common strategic
end. These strategies in place will help focus the SSR interventions as well as
align them with the contextual security threats presented in the west African
region. Together with these documents, concrete plans need to be articulated as
to how the soldiers in the AFL’s salaries will be sustained after the US draws
back from the SSR programme. Under or unpaid soldiers will present a future
security threat to Liberia.
With the elections in 2011 approaching, the Liberian National Police (LNP) need
to have their capacity built to manage these elections. The LNP need extra
personnel as the 4000 deployed police can not manage a population of three to
four million people across the country. The LNP need additional crowd control
training and crowd control equipment (batons, shields, helmets, and more). The
roads in Liberia are in very bad condition and make it very difficult for the LNP
to increase its mobility. The LNP have very few vehicles and thus need
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additional four-by-four vehicles to improve their reach. They also need general
policing equipment: uniforms, communications equipment, barracks, offices,
accommodation outside Monrovia, and more. Support could also be given to the
establishing and running of the proposed Police Support Unit to be deployed
outside of Monrovia.145
Many of the threats highlighted in this document show that Liberia faces both
internal and external threats (see regional memo). Defence against many of risks
(land and ethnic violence, illicit drug trafficking, informal securities, elections),
do not necessarily require a big military response. What they require is better
intelligence gathering that can support national policies and strategies to combat
these risks through preventative measures and strategic security placements.
Thus, a greater focus on organising, developing and strengthening the
intelligence sector is required. This is of course a sensitive area due to how these
agencies were used under the Charles Taylor Presidency. A total dismantling
and rebuilding from scratch as was done with the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)
could be a way around this. However, there is not enough time to start and
complete this process before the elections in 2011. A medium could be found
with the use of security service personnel from for example the new AFL or
LNP. A further challenge this presents is that these agencies are already low on
capacity and taking from them would only serve to weaken them. Again, as
stated above, one can improve on doing nothing.
Legislation on the control of small arms which is still being drafted needs to be
finalised and passed through the legislature in order to aid the LNP and UN in
their efforts to control the trafficking of small arms and light weapons in Liberia.
A reduction in the number of weapons in circulation in Liberia will
simultaneously reduce the risk of small scale violence escalating to a point where
it gets out of control. A tighter control on the availability of arms reduces the
ability of international criminals to provide arms for their drug trafficking
cohorts in Liberia. This goes hand in hand with the tightening of the Liberian
borders, immigration and customs.
The recommendations above are directly related to the army and security sector
institutions. However, these need to be carried out simultaneously with the other
socio-economic issues concerning youth unemployment, economic growth,
corruption, impunity, access to land and poverty. Dealing with the army and
security institutions and processes alone will not reduce the security risks
presented in this document. These recommendations will help manage and thwart
some of them erupting into large scale violence and eventual instability. Their
resolution lies in the political, social and economic realms of Liberia’s
development.
145
Interview: SSR Expert in an International Organisation in Liberia. October 17, 2010.
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Acronyms & Abbreviations
AFL
Armed Forces of Liberia
CPA
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG
Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group
GEMAP
Governance and Economic Management Program
INPFL
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
LNP
Liberia National Police
LURD
Liberians United
Democracy
MODEL
Movement for Democracy in Liberia
NPFL
National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPP
National Patriotic Party
SALW
Small Arms and Light Weapons
ULIMO
United Liberation Movement of Liberia
ULIMO-J
United Liberation Movement of Liberia - Johnson
ULIMO-K
United Liberation Movement of Liberia – Kromah
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for
Reconciliation
and