Barbara Kunz
Baltic and East European Graduate School
Södertörns högskola, Huddinge, Sweden
[email protected]
Power, Vision and Order in World Politics:
A Neoclassical Realist View
Paper to be presented at the NISA-conference
Power, Vision, and Order in World Politics
Odense, University of Southern Denmark
May 23 – 25, 2007
Work in progress – please do not quote
I.
II.
INTRODUCTION
3
A BRIEF OVERVIEW: NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND ITS CORE TENETS 4
“INFLUENCE” AS A STATE OBJECTIVE
EXERTING INFLUENCE IN CONTEXT: DEFINING THE SYSTEM
“THE MISSING LINK”
CONCLUDING REMARKS: ON LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
4
6
7
11
ON ENEMIES: THE REVISIONIST STATE
13
THE REVISIONIST STATE IN IR THEORY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION
THE REVISIONIST STATE: THE LEVEL-OF-ANALYSIS PROBLEM
REVISIONISM AND ENMITY
BEING REVISIONIST – BUT AGAINST WHOM?
13
16
17
20
IV. ON FRIENDS: LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY, PRESTIGE, AND
BANDWAGONING FOR PROFIT
22
FRIENDSHIP AMONG STATES: ALIGNMENT IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
“BANDWAGONING FOR PROFIT”: NEOCLASSICAL REALISM
LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY AND PRESTIGE
22
23
24
V.
27
III.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
28
2
I.
Introduction
Instead of categorising states in absolute terms as revisionist or status quo powers, it is
more fruitful to adopt an approach based on the idea that each state is in fact confronted with
its very own set of “friends” and “enemies”. Nonetheless a theoretical framework in which the
ability to exert influence is considered the chief state objective, researchers cannot logically
adopt an entirely systemic perspective on state intentions - as would be the case with the
traditional, Classical Realist concept of revisionist versus status quo states.
The present paper is built upon Neoclassical Realist premises for the study of international
politics. One of the core tenets of Neoclassical Realism is that states do seek neither power
nor security, but influence. Influence implies a relational understanding of power. In power
relations, power is by definition a reciprocal phenomenon. As shall be argued, the researcher
is therefore required to reconsider levels of analysis: if power is a relation, states cannot
logically be categorised in absolute terms on the system level (e.g. as a “revisionist” or “status
quo power”), but only in relation to other states. For that reason, each state will be confronted
with its very own set of “friends”, “enemies” and “undecided” fellow states. The
categorisation of other states will be crucial for the design of strategies.
Such an understanding of international politics has consequences on how to perceive the
international system as being the consequence of state interaction. Most importantly, the
question arises whether the system level, itself thus a dependent variable, is an appropriate
level of analysis.
The first section of this paper therefore sets out to introduce Neoclassical Realist tenets, with
a special emphasis on the key state objective, defined as “influence” and the ability to “shape
and control the environment”, followed by a discussion of the level-of-analysis question. The
second section shall then be dedicated to the phenomenon of the revisionist state and enmity,
whilst the third section deals with “friendship” in international politics.
3
II.
A brief overview: Neoclassical Realism and its core tenets
“Influence” as a state objective
The term “Neoclassical Realism” was coined by Gideon Rose in his 1998 article in
World Affairs. The label refers to an attempt at reasserting Classical Realism, incorporating
insights gained since the emergence of Neorealism and the subsequent debate between
Neorealists and their critics. What primarily defines research carried out under its premises is
the idea that
[i]nstead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical realists assume that
states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and
shape their external environment. Regardless of the myriad ways that states may
define their interests, this school argues, they are likely to want more rather than less
external influence, and pursue such influence to the extent that they are able to do
so.1
As the chosen label hence indicates, Neoclassical Realists see themselves in line with the
tradition of political Realism. However, it parts company with Classical Realism and
Neorealism in a number of important points. Among them is, firstly, that Neoclassical realists
assume that states strive for neither power nor security, but primarily for influence - in order
to shape and control their environment. Neoclassical Realists consequently object to the
Neorealist idea that states primarily seek “security”, but at the same time, they do not return to
Morgenthau’s concept of “power”. Instead, “influence” is centre of attention. As shall be
discussed, the focus on “influence” also implies consequences for the view on the “system”.
Different ideas about the “system”, especially its being a dependent or independent variable is
thus a second distinguishing feature.
“Influence” nevertheless suffers from the same weakness as “power” and “security”:
its definition is, to say the least, not entirely clear. Kalevi Holsti defines “influence” as an
‘(aspect of power) [that] is essentially a means to an end. […] States use influence primarily
for achieving or defending other goals, which may include prestige, territory, souls, raw
materials, security, or alliances.’2 Influence is furthermore linked to resources, which a state
1
Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, in: World Politics, vol. 51 no. 1 (1988),
p. 152.
2
Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics. A Framework for Analysis, 7th edition, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
1995, p. 118 [emphasis in the original].
4
can use or mobilise in order to influence another state, a resource being ‘any physical or
mental object or quality available as an instrument of inducement to persuade, reward,
threaten or punish’.3 Finally, Holsti suggests to ‘break down the concept of power into three
distinct analytic elements: Power comprises (1) the acts (process, relationship) of influencing
other states; (2) the resources or leverage used to make the wielding of influence successful;
and (3) the responses to the acts.’4 In other words, in order to be able to exert influence, a
state needs resources of whatever kind on which the claim to influence is based in a credible
way. The degree and intensity of the influence a state may exert depend therefore on
capabilities and power. However, given the lack of a direct link between capabilities and
influence, influence may take different forms under different circumstances, and these forms
need not be directly proportional to the amount of capabilities available.5 It is thus obvious
that the Neoclassical Realist concept of “influence” is much closer to a relational concept of
power than to the capability-based concept of “security” put forward by Neorealists. Max
Weber saw power as ‘any chance to impose one’s own will in a social relationship, even
against resistance, regardless of the basis on which this power rests’.6 Classical realists such
as Hans J. Morgenthau and Raymond Aron shared this view on the phenomenon – though it is
questionable whether they managed to build their analyses of real-world politics on their
theoretical assumptions on the nature of power.7
3
Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics, p. 118.
Ibid., p. 119 [emphasis in the original].
5
for an illustration, see e.g. Henry Kissinger’s remarks on Bruno Kreisky, The White House Years, London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979, p. 1204.
6
Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 3rd edition, Tübingen: Mohr 1947, 1. Teil, p. 28. = digital version on
Gallica, Bibliothèque nationale de France, cf. http://gallica.bnf.fr ‘Macht bedeutet jede Chance, innerhalb einer
sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel, worauf diese Macht
beruht.’ [my own translation in the text]
7
cf. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed., London: McGraw Hill,
2006, p.11: ‘Its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment.
Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all
social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which
one mind controls another. Power covers the domination of man by man, both when it is disciplined by moral
ends and controlled by constitutional safeguards, as in Western democracies, and when it is that untamed and
barbaric force which finds its laws in nothing but its own strength and sole justification in its aggrandizement.’;
Raymond Aron, Paix et Guerre entre les Nations, 8th ed., Paris: Calman-Lévy, 2004, p. 58: ‘Au sens le plus
général, la puissance est la capacité de faire, produire ou détruire. [...] J’appelle puissance sur la scène
internationale la capacité d’une unité d’imposer sa volonté aux autres unités. En bref, la puissance n’est pas un
absolu mais une relation humaine.’
4
5
Exerting influence in context: defining the system
The state objective of influence has to be achieved in context. That context may vary
in relevance and be termed in different ways (“system”, “environment”, “milieu”), or be
termed the same way but with different meanings: “system” is indeed a tricky concept, given
that intuition tells that e.g. Morgenthau and Waltz do obviously not mean exactly the same
when using it. The character of that context hence varies in different strands of Realism.
Whereas the Classical Realist understanding of the “system” could be described as the sum of
interactions and practices among states, Neorealists see the “system” as independent or
detached from state interaction and determined by polarity.8 Scant attention is usually paid to
these differences in IR literature, where the term “system” is generally used without
discrimination. These differences notwithstanding, all Realisms somehow recognise that
states act in a specific setting or environment. In other words, states have to deal with their
fellow states in order to position themselves within what may be termed “the international
system”.
Quite unsurprisingly, the role context plays in explaining foreign policy behaviour in different
Realist approaches differs in terms of its importance as well as in terms of the direction in
which causality is considered to occur. Moreover, “context” is located at different levels of
analysis. In Neorealism, states are treated like units and power is measured in terms of
capabilities: the environment being the same for all units, polarity caused by the distribution
of capabilities becomes the crucial variable, yielding an international system on which units
only can exert influence through the acquisition of capabilities. However, for capabilities to
have an effect, other states must know (or perhaps still better: doubt) about other states’
capabilities. According to Waltz, states will then balance against any disequilibrium, restoring
the balance of power.9 Even Neorealists should therefore feel compelled to take state
interaction into account, that is, devote attention to how states interact with other states in
their environment. This is however not where their analytical focus lies.
8
The idea that the system is the result of state interaction is of course also explicitly present in Waltz’ writings,
cf. for example “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, in: Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44 No. 1
(Spring 1990), p. 29. Nevertheless, state interaction is then no longer at the centre of Neorealist interest, whose
analytical focus lies on the ways in which systemic conditions and factors determine state behaviour. Interaction
driven by state intentions is not a Neorealist concern, given that states are “like units”. If the system were solely
the result of state interaction, the analytical focus would be the opposite, namely, on how state interaction
determines the system structure.
9
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 126.
6
In Neoclassical Realism, “context” has a different meaning. Emphasising “influence” and the
objective of “shaping and controlling the environment” necessarily implies a focus on
relations. A phenomenon to be termed “the system” may exist, but – and this is crucial – that
“system” cannot exist independently from the states forming it. The system is in fact the result
of interaction between states, the formal and informal practices that emerge over time. The
distribution of the capability to exert influence over other states certainly has a decisive
impact on a state’s role within that system. Nevertheless, the Classical and Neoclassical
Realist system can never exist in total independence from the actors, i.e., the states. This,
however, means that the system does not exist as an autonomous entity.
In other words, while Neorealists see the system as the independent variable, Classical and
Neoclassical Realists see it as the dependent variable. Dependent variables are characterised
by the fact that they cannot be influenced immediately: all influence to be exerted on a
dependent variable has to be exerted via an intervening factor. In the present case, this means
that a state cannot influence the system directly: all influence on the system has to be exerted
via other states. A state can only interact with other states, but not with the system – although
interaction with other states may lead to modifications of the system. For that reason,
explaining variables for foreign policy behaviour cannot be found at the system level either:
foreign policy behaviour may of course yield effects on the system level, but it originates on
the state level and becomes manifest in interaction between states. The level of analysis on
which “context” is to be taken into account consequently is the domestic level.
“The missing link”
Having established the necessity of analysing state interaction, students of
international relations must necessarily focus on how states behave (towards their fellow
states). In other words, states’ foreign policy behaviour is centre of attention – and it cannot
be inferred from systemic conditions only, as Neorealists would claim. Neoclassical Realists
therefore ‘point out that there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material
capabilities to foreign policy behavior.’10 Foreign policy behaviour cannot, they argue, be
understood from a perspective exclusively considering the system level and the distribution of
power in terms of capabilities yielding polarity. The Neorealist practice of “black-boxing” and
considering states “like unites” must necessarily lead to unsatisfying results, perhaps fulfilling
the criterion of parsimony, but eventually not carrying relevance for the explanation of
10
Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, p. 146.
7
foreign policy.11 If one rejects the idea of one single conceivable state objective (“security”),
then explanations for different types of state objectives engendering different types of foreign
policy behaviour have to be found.
The transmission belt has logically to be found somewhere in between capabilities and
behaviour. If scholars are to understand ‘the links between power and policies, [this] requires
close examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and
implemented.’12 The context, in turn, is equivalent to states’ domestic level. Neoclassical
Realism consequently ‘places domestic politics as an intervening variable between the
distribution of power and foreign policy behavior’.13
Domestic features are, however, relevant in not only one, but two respects as far as the
process of foreign policy design is concerned. A relational concept of power does in fact
imply that this context must involve at least two actors. States do not act in a vacuum and a
foreign policy is no one-way phenomenon: foreign policies are always designed by one state,
received by others. Goals of foreign policies can either be narrowly bilateral, i.e. related to
one other state only, or defined in a wider sense, i.e., the bilateral relations with one state are
part of a more comprehensive Grand Strategy. In either case, the foreign policy has both an
“emitter “ and one or more “receivers”. The sum of all states’ foreign policies towards each
other yields the international system, and this sum therefore comprises both foreign policy
emission and reception. Conceptualising the international system as the sum of all intra-state
relations consequently implies an emphasis on reciprocity. Not only a state’s foreign policy
has an impact, but also other states’ reactions to it matter. Given this element of reciprocity,
not only does the “emitting” state’s domestic level matter, the “receiving” state’s dynamics
will also play a decisive role.
For that reason, and given the elusiveness of the concept of power, foreign policy is
best understood when not trying to analyse the essence of power (“capabilities”), but when
instead acknowledging that what actually matters are perceptions of power. This is
nonetheless true if “influence” replaces “power” as the key term. An objective view on
11
To the Neorealist argument that Neorealism is not about foreign policy, Neoclassical Realists would respond
that the system is in fact not the independent but a dependent variable, making an explanation of foreign policy a
necessity.
12
Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, p. 147.
8
capabilities is of course not impossible: cruise missiles are cruise missiles and the exercise of
influence does, after all, need to be based on credible grounds. Yet, because power (in Aron’s
terms) is not absolute but relative, an actor is “powerful” only if perceived so by one or more
other actors. Material assets (“capabilities”) may help to create the impression of
powerfulness, but they are merely a precondition (among others) and no sufficient variable.
Leadership beliefs and perceptions by decision makers are therefore crucial variables. As
political decisions are taken by humans, human perceptions do matter. If men define
situations as real, they are real in their consequences. In that sense, although perceptions by
no means need to be “true”, they nevertheless become “objective facts” through the
consequences they entail.
Among the most useful definitions of “perceptions” for the present context is the
following:
Perception means the gathering and interpreting of information against the
background of [one’s] own understanding of values, the judgment of the
situation as based on interests and the way in which an actor sees the state of
interests and power in other systems (as for example states and international
organizations).14
In light of the understanding of the system introduced above – i.e., interaction among states
yields the system – a state’s perceptions of other states become centre of attention. This is
especially true if considering that the Neoclassical Realist concept of “influence” to a large
extent is built on reciprocal elements. Influence cannot simply be emitted (as can power in
terms of capabilities), it has to be received as well. A relational concept of power
acknowledging the significance of perceptions thus requires the analyst to take more than one
dimension into account. The context of foreign policy behaviour is in fact twofold: not only
does the domestic context of the foreign policy designing state matter, also the domestic
context of the receiving state(s) as well as its (or their) perception of the emitting state are
relevant.
13
Stephen M. Walt, “The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition”, in: Ira Katznelson / Helen V. Milner
(ed.), Political Science. State of the Discipline, New York / London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002, p. 211.
14
Alexander Siedschlag (ed.), Realistische Perspektiven internationaler Politik, Opladen: Leske & Budrich,
2001, p. 51: ’Perzeption bezeichnet […] die Aufnahme und Bewertung von Informationen vor dem Hintergrund
eigener Wertverständnisse, die interessenbedingte Lagebeurteilung und die Art, in der ein Akteur die Interessenund Machtlagen in anderen Systemen (zum Beispiel Staaten und internationalen Organisationen) sieht.’
[emphasis in the orginial; my own translation in the text]
9
Literature on perceptions in international politics is abundant. Literature on
perceptions in international politics within the Realist paradigm, however, is a scarce
phenomenon. The obvious explanation of that fact is the lack of a relational concept of power
in much of the Realist literature. IR theory in a wider sense has of course been dealing with
perception and its relevance in explaining international politics, mostly confined to the
subdiscipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). Foreign Policy Analysis does however not
serve the present ambition; understanding foreign policy is not considered to be an end in
itself. A large amount of work has been dedicated to the question of whether perceptions are
congruent with reality, that is, to analysing and explaining misperceptions.15 Cognitive
approaches are another genre in the perception-based strand. These do, however, often lack
the explicit reference to state objectives and power politics.16 In other words, cognitive
approaches - and, for that matter, foreign policy analysis in general - seldom do justice to the
strategic character of international politics, whilst it is centre of attention for Realists. To say
it in Morgenthau’s terms, international politics is still about realising interests, for which
power is a tool. A more recent approach based on perceptions of power and more in line with
Realism is William Curti Wohlforth’s The elusive balance.17 Wohlforth claims that in order to
understand foreign policy (in this case: Soviet, and, to some extent, U.S. foreign policy), it is
necessary to have information on how the respective actors perceive (1) the elements of
power, (2) the distribution of power, (3) the mechanics of power and (4) the present hierarchy
of prestige.18 His argument is indeed simple: ‘If power influences the course of international
politics, it must do so largely through the perceptions of the people who make decisions on
behalf of states’.19 A focus on perceptions becomes necessary because ‘power cannot be
measured in the best of circumstances; [...] the variable is simply too imponderable to be of
much utility for understanding international politics.’20
15
The main representative of this tradition is of course Robert Jervis.
Yuen Foong Khong (Analogies at War. Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965,
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), for instance, provides interesting insights in the role
analogies play in decision-making. The weakness of Khong’s book nevertheless is that the decision-making
process is portrayed as an end in itself, i.e., the overarching issues at stake in decision-making are not
considered. The why-question is thus only answered in the sense of “how come that result?”, i.e. “how was this
decision reached?”, but not in the sense of “what for?” in terms of Weberian Zweckrationalität and strategy.
What is analysed is how decisions are reached, not what purposes they are intended to serve.
17
William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1993.
18
Ibid., p. 26/28.
19
Ibid., p. 2.
20
Ibid., p. 15.
16
10
Wohlforth’s focus lies on how Soviet leaders saw the balance of power during the Cold War,
and their understanding of capabilities and the way in which those are linked to power. Still,
Wohlforth’s study is not based on a relational concept of power, although he is interested in
perceptions of relative power (that is, Soviet perceptions on Soviet power as compared to U.S.
power) and the consequences those perceptions had on Soviet foreign policy behaviour.
A certain emphasis on perceptions notwithstanding, it is however important to note
that Neoclassical Realism is not exclusively about perceptions. Considering perceptions is
however unavoidable when basing the approach on influence as the main state objective.
Concluding remarks: on levels of analysis
Two conclusions may be drawn from the arguments presented and discussed above,
and both pertain to the level of analysis-question and the use of the concept of “influence” as
synonymous to a relational understanding of “power”.
First of all, one of the implications of a relational concept of power applied to International
Relations theory is that the so-called system level does not qualify as an appropriate level of
analysis. Although effects of whatever action may become manifest on the system level, the
explanation of the causes yielding those effects lies on the domestic level. This does of course
by no means imply that the system level is irrelevant, on the contrary: the system level is the
very matter of interest to the IR scholar. Being the dependent variable, it just is not the most
appropriate level of analysis.
Secondly, a relational concept of power – unfortunately complicating things – requires the
analyst to regard international politics as the interaction among states. It is therefore not
enough to merely concentrate on the “emitters” of foreign policy; receivers are just as
important. This is nonetheless due to the fact that a relational concept of power heavily rests
on the idea of perceptions of relations as a crucial variable, that is, how states perceive each
other. It can thus be concluded that every state will have to deal with its very own set of
“enemies” and “friends” and possibly “undecided” states. This is an idea which, for example,
can be found in Michael Mastanduno’s predictions for post-Cold War U.S. strategies: ‘[…]
we should anticipate that the United States will adopt policies of reassurance toward status
quo states, policies of confrontation toward revisionist states, and policies of engagement or
11
integration toward undecided states.’21 The next sections of this paper therefore set out to
discuss the phenomena of “enemies” and “friends” in international relations, based on the
more traditional IR-theory concepts of revisionist and status quo states.
21
Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment. Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the
Cold War”, in: International Strategy, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), p. 63.
12
III.
On Enemies: The revisionist state
In common understanding, a revisionist state is a state discontent with its current
position in the international system. The term has been coined by E.H. Carr and is one of the
key features in Classical realist analyses of international politics. The concept of revisionist
states requires a system perspective, i.e., a perspective on a level located above the state level.
Surprisingly enough, this approach is seldom questioned. However, for revisionism to have an
effect, the revisionist state’s fellows have to take note of its revisionism: clandestine
revisionism would remain unnoticed and thus without effect, as much as secret power could
hardly be transformed into influence without being revealed. For that reason, the first level on
which revisionism has an impact is other states’ domestic level. This does not mean that a
system-based perspective on the revisionist state is wrong. What it does mean is that the
exclusive focus on the system level is not enough. In short and in more abstract terms, the
argument is therefore that the system is insufficient as the level of analysis of the phenomenon
of the revisionist state. If working with a relational concept of power, revisionism is first and
foremost a matter to be analysed at domestic levels.
The revisionist state in IR theory: a short introduction
State objectives may vary, and among all thinkable state objectives, there may be
some that are irreconcilable with the maintenance of the status quo. For that reason, Classical
Realists generally divide states into categories, with one category comprising those states
content with the current shape of the international system, the other category or categories
comprising the ones that are dissatisfied, agreeing ‘that states differ along two dimensions:
the goals they pursue and the power required to achieve those goals. These unit-level
variations were considered an essential element in the construction of a theory of international
politics.’22 Edward H. Carr introduced the concepts of “status quo” and “revisionist states”23,
Hans Morgenthau reasoned in terms of “imperialist” versus “status quo policies”. Whereas
22
Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s status-quo bias: What security dilemma?” in: Security Studies, Vol. 5,
no. 3 (Spring 1996), p. 99 [note omitted].
23
See Edward H. Carr, The twenty years' crisis 1919-1939: An introduction to the study of international
relations, London: Macmillan, 1981, especially Part Four, “Law and Change”.
13
status quo policies aim at maintaining the ‘distribution of power as it exists at a particular
moment in history’, the objective of imperialist policies is to overthrow that status quo.24
There are, however, no permanent or essential criteria permitting to detect “imperialism”,
‘[…] the evaluation of imperialistic tendencies and, consequently, of the policies countering
them is never definitive. Both policies and counterpolicies are ever subject to reevaluation and
reformulation.’25 Morgenthau distinguishes different types of imperialism, depending on its
origins and circumstances, the goal always being preponderance (global, continental or
local).26 Most interestingly, imperialism may also be served by three different methods,
namely military imperialism, economic imperialism and cultural imperialism. The latter is
defined as the ‘conquest or control of the minds of men as an instrument for changing the
power relations between two nations.’27 Whilst this variant of imperialism certainly is the
most subtle and, in a certain sense, elegant, it is also the variant that seldom works without
recurring to one or both of the other two methods. Hence, ‘[t]he typical role cultural
imperialism plays in modern times is subsidiary to the other methods. It softens up the enemy,
it prepares the ground for military conquest or economic penetration.’28
System stability is highly dependent on the prevalence of status-quo states, just as
Aristotle already argued that the number of citizens wishing to maintain the state must be
superior to the number of those who do not want so. One may therefore conclude that
intentions emanating on the domestic level do indeed play a crucial role in international
politics. Despite the anarchical character of the international system, state behaviour cannot
be inferred from systemic factors. Instead, there is something like a relatively “free will” of
states, allowing for the existence of different intentions. Those intentions must not necessarily
be “good”; the very meaning of the term Realism obliges Realists to consider the possibility
of “bad” intentions. This is a point Neorealism – strangely – misses. The world described by
Waltz should logically be a rather stable one (one of the reasons being that balancing is far
more common than bandwagoning), eventually arriving at a status of Pareto-optimality.
Originally, however, in Morgenthau’s and other’s writings, ‘[e]xternal threats – potential,
imagined, or real – drive the realist model. It is surprising, therefore, that revisionist states are
scarcely mentioned by contemporary neorealists. Instead, neorealists discuss threats as if they
24
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 54
Ibid., p. 82.
26
Ibid., whole chapter 5
27
Ibid., p. 69 – 74; definition of “cultural imperialism” on p. 71.
28
Ibid., p. 72.
25
14
came from nature (the hand of God), not from other states in the international system.’29 In
other words, claiming that states seek maximum security instead of maximum power makes
‘contemporary neorealists ignore the very states that activate the systems and behaviours they
wish to explain.’30 It is this Randall Schweller calls the status quo bias of Neorealism, arguing
that the emphasis put on threats is in reality illogical from a Neorealist perspective.
Contrary to Neorealists and in line with Classical Realists, Neoclassical Realists
believe that the revisionist state should have its place in International Relations theory.
Schweller’s critique of Neorealism presented above has its roots in this conviction and his
argument against the so-called status-quo bias of Neorealism: ‘staying in place is not the
primary goal of revisionist states. They want to increase, not just preserve, their core values
and to improve their position in the system.’31 In his definition,
revisionist states value what they covet more than what they currently
possess, although this ratio may vary considerably among their ranks; they
will employ military force to change the status quo and to extend their
values. For revisionist states, the gains from nonsecurity expansion exceed
the cost of war. Needing preponderant power to overturn the status quo,
dissatisfied states band together precisely when it appears that they will thus
be stronger than the conservative side, for it is only then that they can
expect to succeed in their expansionist aims.32
Schweller’s perspective is, by necessity, a systemic perspective as well. He does nevertheless
include a domestic-level variable by stating that within the system, balancing and
bandwagoning are the two options states face, and their choice for either option will be
dictated by their ambition to establish a balance of interest. States do therefore not engage in
balancing power (or capabilities), but instead join the side with which they share an interest.
This includes the possibility of states pursuing interests directed against other states and other
states’ status within the international system. By stating that the main ordering factor
regarding the structure of the international system is interest, the focus obviously lies on the
domestic level: as discussed previously, interests may be formulated in many different ways.
State intentions are a crucial aspect in analysing revisionism.
29
Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s status-quo bias: What security dilemma?”, p. 115.
Ibid., p. 91.
31
Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in”, in: International
Security, Vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 87.
32
Ibid., p. 105.
30
15
The Revisionist state: the level-of-analysis problem
The conclusion to be drawn is that revisionism is a phenomenon with roots on the
domestic level. A state discontent with its current place in the international system may
consider itself to be so disadvantaged that it turns revisionist, i.e., that state aims to undermine
or overthrow the existing order. However, in light of what has been discussed above, the
question to be asked is: How useful is it to solely focus on states’ attitudes towards “the
system”? More concretely, how can there be cases of revisionism explicitly directed towards
“the system” given the assumption that it does not exist as an independent variable, the
system being a result of state interaction? How can one detect revisionism directed towards
the system without resorting to an analysis of the revisionist state’s policies towards other
states? In other words, what is the appropriate level of analysis for revisionism within a
theoretical framework based on power as relational?33
As discussed above, whilst the revisionist state is not an object of Neorealist theorising, it
occupies a prominent place in Classical Realism. Randall Schweller deserves the credit for
bringing it ‘back in’ to Neoclassical Realism. However, Schweller’s discussion of the
revisionist state is limited to the localisation of revisionism’s origins on the domestic level.
What Schweller thus does not discuss are revisionism’s effects other than in terms of its
consequences for balance (of interests) on the system level. Even Schweller does therefore not
deal with the relational and reciprocal aspects of revisionist policies. His approach takes the
Neoclassical Realist idea of the missing link into account on one side, without considering it
on the other side. Revisionist policies need however to become manifest in some way that
allows other states to react to them. Although the structure of the system may be the eventual
target of revisionist policies, the system can only be influenced via the states forming it.
Revisionism must be hence understood as a bi- and/or multilateral phenomenon, depending on
the number of states involved.
As becomes clear in Morgenthau’s discussion of the phenomenon, imperialism (his term for
what is here referred to as “revisionism”) clearly is directed towards other states – with the
33
In that context, see also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, especially
chapter 1, “Perception and the Level of Analysis Problem”. Jervis does however not discuss “both ends” of the
perception chain in a power relation.
16
objective of overthrowing the status quo - whilst the imperialist (or revisionist) state still is
mostly considered to be a system-level problem. Morgenthau is very clear about the fact that
revisionism primarily is a bilateral issue: ‘This question concerns the character of the foreign
policy pursued by another nation and, in consequence, the kind of foreign policy that ought to
be adopted with regard to it.’34 For Morgenthau, it is hence not only important to analyse the
sources of revisionist policies, but also their consequences where they appear for the very first
time. Both the origins and the effects of revisionism are therefore to be analysed on the
domestic level. As stated above, in order to affect the system level, revisionist states can only
have an impact via the intermediate of one or more other states’ domestic level. This does by
no means imply that revisionism does not affect the system level, but it is merely effects of
revisionism that will become manifest there. Causes for revisionism lie elsewhere, as do
reactions to it. What is observable at the system level is in fact nothing more than the result of
successful revisionism, leading to a change in the overall system structure. This is the
consequence of an understanding of the international system as a dependent variable. An
analyst wanting to detect mere revisionist ambitions, anti-revisionist strategies and countered
revisionism must therefore look at the domestic level.
Revisionism and enmity
If arguing that revisionism ought to be looked upon in bilateral terms, the question that
arises is in which way revisionism differs from simple enmity. Throughout history, politics
have not only been conceptualised, but also - and above all - been carried out along the lines
of the archaic concepts of “friends” and “enemies”: wars are fought against enemies, alliances
formed with friends.
The Classical Realist theories on revisionism do not really provide an answer to the question
in what way enmity is different from revisionism. Unfortunately, neither do theoretical
approaches focusing on enmity. Yet, enmity is obviously not automatically synonymous to
revisionism. The U.S. policies that lead to the American attack on Iraq in March 2003 are a
good illustration: Whilst Iraq qualified as an “enemy” from a Washington perspective, U.S.
diplomatic efforts where actually aimed at convincing (potential) allies that Iraq is not merely
an enemy of the United States, but in fact a state with system-overthrowing ambitions. Given
that most other Western states did not themselves have issues with Saddam (at least not to an
extent they thought could justify a war), the U.S. desperately needed to position his regime as
34
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 74.
17
dangerous “in general” and not only to American interests. In other words: Washington had to
convince its fellow states that Iraq was a revisionist state. That U.S. diplomacy had managed
with that task in the case of Afghanistan, but much less so in the case of Iraq, is the chief
explanation for considerable international support in the Afghan war since 2002 and the
relative lack thereof in Iraq since 2003.35 The causes for America’s allies’ doubts about the
revisionist character of the Saddam regime could also be reformulated in the following way:
there was disagreement as to Saddam’s capabilities and intentions. Whilst probably no-one
came to doubt that Saddam was an enemy of the United States, convictions about his
revisionist intentions where considerably less widespread.
The distinction between a mere enemy and a truly revisionist state is thus an important
one. For that reason, a closer look at the concept of enmity in politics is necessary. The
classical theorist of friendship and enmity as the basic pattern of the Political is of course Carl
Schmitt: ‘The specifically political distinction, on which the political acts and motives are
based, is the distinction between friend and enemy.’36 However, Schmitt’s categories of
“friends” and “enemies” are not characterised in moral terms.37 Rather, the concepts are to be
understood on the most basic level: ‘The terms of friend and enemy are to be understood in
their concrete and existential sense, not as metaphors or symbols, not blended or weakened by
economical, moral or other ideas, and least in a private-individualistic sense in a
psychological way as an expression of private feelings and tendencies.’38 It is important to
understand that the essence of enmity does not consist in different “opinions“ on religious,
35
This conclusion is at least the one to be drawn from the debates in both France and Germany. Then German
defence minister Peter Struck made a whole nation look up Eurasian mountain ranges in their atlantes when
stating that Germany was to be ‘defended in the Hinduskush’, asserting that the Taliban regime indeed
represented a danger to German security – thereby positioning Afghanistan as a “generally dangerous”
revisionist state.
36
Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1987, p. 26 [emphasis in the original].
‘Die spezifisch politische Unterscheidung, auf welche sich die politischen Handlungen und Motive zurückführen
lassen, ist die Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind.’ [my own translation in the text]
37
Ibid., p. 27. He writes: ’Die Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind hat den Sinn, den äußeren Intensitätsgrad
einer Verbindung oder Trennung, einer Assoziation oder Dissoziation zu bezeichnen; sie kann theoretisch und
praktisch bestehen, ohne daß gleichzeitig alle jene moralischen, ästhetischen, ökonomischen oder anderen
Unterscheidungen zur Anwendung kommen müßten. Der politische Feind braucht nicht moralisch böse, er
braucht nicht ästhetisch häßlich zu sein; er muß nicht als wirtschaftlicher Konkurrent auftreten, es kann vielleicht
sogar vorteilhaft scheinen, mit ihm Geschäfte zu machen. Er ist eben der andere, der Fremde, und es genügt zu
seinem Wesen, daß er in einem besonders intensiven Sinne existentiell etwas anderes und Fremdes ist, so daß im
extremen Fall Konflikte mit ihm möglich sind, die weder durch eine im voraus getroffene generelle Normierung,
noch durch den Spruch eines ”unbeteiligten“ und daher ”unparteiischen“ Dritten entschieden werden können.’
38
Ibid., p. 28. ‘Die Begriffe Freund und Feind sind in ihrem konkreten, existentiellen Sinn zu nehmen, nicht als
Metaphern oder Symbole, nicht vermischt und abgeschwächt durch ökonomische, moralische und andere
Vorstellungen, am wenigsten in einem privat-indivisualistischen Sinne psychologisch als Ausdruck privater
Gefühle und Tendenzen.’ [my own translation in the text]
18
moral, economic, ethnic or other issues, although ‘every religious, moral, economical, ethnic
or other opposition is transformed into a political opposition if it is strong enough to
effectively group human beings as friends and enemies’.39 This means, in other words, that
not differences per se are the reason for enmity, but a choice that is made, elevating the
controversial to a rank that makes it political: it yields a distinction of friends and enemies on
the basis of sides taken regarding that specific issue.
Schmitt’s friend/enemy-scheme comprises a considerable constructivist element. What makes
an issue “political”, i.e. leads one political entity to consider another political entity in terms
of friendship or enmity, is to a large extent a matter of perception. Herein lies the connection
between Schmitt and more recent approaches in International Relations, especially the socalled Copenhagen School. Their analyses of “processes of securitisation” do not aim at
finding out how social groups identify “enemies”, but at understanding how something can
come to be perceived as a threat.40 The Copenhagen School approach obviously involves
perception as a key element. Despite the introduction of the concept of Regional Security
Complexes (RSCs)41, the School is heavily focused on the domestic level in the sense that it
does not really seem interested on system-level consequences of securitisation processes
(besides the fact that the latter determine the shape of and membership in RSCs).42 Moreover,
it lacks a concern for actorness in the sense that it is much less interested in the part emitting a
(potential) threat than in the part identifying a (potential) threat and engaging in subsequent
processes of securitisation. Although the approach deserves credit for opening up security
studies to non-state threats, it therefore is of limited use to the analyst interested in systemic
patterns. In addition to that, both Schmitt’s and the Copenhagen School approaches, though
not normative per se, imply a focus on content. In both cases, what leads to the classification
as an “enemy” or securitisation respectively, is linked to a specific content in a policy or
39
Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p. 37. ’[j]eder religiöse, moralische, ökonomische, ethnische oder
andere Gegensatz verwandelt sich in einen politischen Gegensatz, wenn er stark genug ist, die Menschen nach
Freund und Feind effektiv zu gruppieren.’ [my own translation in the text]
40
Cf. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A new framework for analysis, Boulder/Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publications, 1998. That threat is then supposed to represent a danger to something else that has
become a referent object of security.
41
An “RSC” is defined as ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so
interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.’ See
Buzan / Wæver / de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis, p. 201.
“Securitisation” is defined as ‘the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is
constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object,
and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat’, cf. Barry Buzan and Ole
Wæver, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003, p. 491.
19
“threat”. Enmity is therefore the consequence of an escalated disagreement in a specific issue,
elevated to the level of being “political” (in Schmitt’s understanding of the term).
The answer to the question of what differentiates revisionism from enmity can be
found in an approach based on Morgenthau’s assertion that international politics is the realm
in which interest is defined in terms of power. If one were to apply Schmitt’s categories to
this realm, it becomes evident that what has the potential to become “political” (again, in
Schmitt’s meaning) is anything related to power.43 In other words, disagreement on a wide
array of issues – ranging from different opinions on the Kyoto protocol to “banana wars” – is
nothing but disagreement, as long as it does not pertain to the crucial category of power (in
terms of capabilities, influence and all a relational concept of power comprises, that is: power
primarily defined as the capacity to exert influence on others). A disagreement, however,
pertaining to the very matter of power has the potential to become “political”. It is at this
precise moment enmity turns revisionist: disagreement in one (or several) issue leads a state
to question another state’s position in the international system. It no longer accepts the other
state’s range of influence and ceases to consider that influence as legitimate. Not accepting a
state’s range of influence equals to not accepting this state’s place in the international system.
For this very reason, a state cannot be categorised as “revisionist” in absolute terms. Not only
can its intentions never become manifest in any other way than through interaction with other
states, the very content of enmity leading to revisionism may furthermore be subject to change
over time.
Being revisionist – but against whom?
The revisionist state in traditional IR literature seems to be revisionist without being
anybody’s enemy in the first place. Whilst enmity is possible without revisionism,
revisionism is not possible without enmity. Enmity must not necessarily be first and evolve
into revisionism. Even purely revisionist ambitions, that is, ambitions only formulated in
terms of a desired position in the system, will lead to enmity with states opposed to a specific
state occupying/striving for the desired position. In other words, in an international system
defined by interaction, a revisionist state must necessarily be someone’s antagonist.
42
It is moreover worth noting that the operationalisation of this idea proves to be extremely difficult.
20
The states most likely to react to revisionism are therefore the main supporters of the system,
i.e., the states who actually built the system. ‘[C]hanges in the power structure will not, in and
of themselves, bring war about. Satisfied great powers are not likely to interpret advantages
gained by satisfied lesser powers as threatening. Moreover, the powerful and satisfied do not
start wars. Only if the great powers think that the changing system challenges their positions,
or if they no longer like the way benefits are divided, should the shifts be deemed
dangerous.’44 Whether a great power will consider other states’ acts as revisionist will largely
depend on whether they judge those actions as (potentially) endangering their own position
within the international system, nonetheless in terms of their capacity to exert influence.
43
Or, in Copenhagen School terms: power as the referent object for security. For a similar argument, see
furthermore Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 97.
44
A.F.K. Organski / Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980, p. 23.
21
IV.
On Friends: Legitimate Authority, Prestige, and Bandwagoning for Profit
The conceptual opposite of the revisionist state traditionally is the so-called status quo
state. For E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau and others, a status quo state is a state satisfied with
the current shape of and its current position in the international system, hence a state wishing
to maintain the status quo. Nevertheless, if – as discussed earlier – states cannot be
categorised in absolute terms, qualifying specific states as “status quo powers” makes as little
sense as calling them “revisionist”. Instead, status quo ambitions will translate in the same
way than revisionist ambitions do, that is, first and foremost in bilateral relations. For that
reason, it is much more useful to not classify states in absolute terms, but instead focus on a
state’s “status quo” attitudes towards other states and their position in the international
system: a status quo state can be expected to be on friendly terms with other status quo states.
Friendship among states: alignment in international politics
The idea of states’ “friends” exists in various conceptualisations and with various
connotations. The analytical focus generally lies on the “friend” to be, with researchers
aiming to explain ‘how states choose their friends’.45 “Friendship”, in that context is mostly
understood as alignment, mostly in relation of balance-of-something theories.
For classical Realist Hans J. Morgenthau, alliances are ‘a necessary function of the balance of
power operating within a multiple-state system’.46 Alignment is considered a possible strategy
to improve a state’s relative power position; both through adding another state’s power to its
own power and through withholding that other state’s power from an adversary.47 The
classical Realist approach to alliances is thus essentially similar to the Neorealist view and
sharing the concern for the balance of power. Waltz distinguishes two types of alignment
behaviour, namely bandwagoning (i.e., alignment with the strongest) and balancing (i.e.
alignment against the strongest in order to restore the balance of power) with Neorealism
45
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 2nd edition, Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1990, p. 1.
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 193.
47
ibid. To determine which is the case is likely to be complicated in reality; see also William Curti Wohlforth,
The Elusive Balance, p. 27.
46
22
predicting that balancing should be far more common.48 Among the most important
contributions on the question published in recent years is moreover Stephen M. Walt’s The
Origins of Alliances from 1987.49 Walt’s main contribution consists in refining balance-ofpower theory by proposing balance-of-threat theory, suggesting that ‘states ally to balance
against threats rather than against power alone’.50 Here again, two very different hypotheses
are conceivable within that context: alignment as balancing behaviour and alignment as
bandwagoning behaviour. Whilst balancing implies that two or more states become allies in
order to restore the balance of power / threat disrupted by another state, bandwagoning
implies that a state aligns with the issuer of the threat. In either case, alignment is considered a
reactive type of behaviour, triggered by a (perceived) threat emanating from another state.
The perception of being in danger is thus at the origin of alliance formation in traditional
conceptualisations. For that reason and as far as the alliance itself is concerned, the focus also
generally lies on the aligning (that is, bandwagoning) state. How to attract allies is in turn
rarely centre of attention. This, however is an aspect that should be crucial for every state
seeking to exert influence.
“Bandwagoning for profit”: Neoclassical Realism
The Neoclassical Realist balance of interest-theory is helpful in overcoming the bias
on the aligning state. Randall Schweller argues that balancing and bandwagoning should not
be seen as concepts in polar opposition. Kenneth Waltz, and especially Stephen Walt, use the
term of “bandwagoning” in a meaning that comes ‘very close to the concept of capitulation’.
Schweller instead argues for the conventional use of the concept, defining ‘a bandwagon as a
candidate, side, or movement that attracts adherents or amasses power by its momentum’.
This use opens up for the possibility of bandwagoning by free choice, regardless of the
existence of a threat (imminent or not).51 Instead, states are likely to bandwagon for reward,
or they may ‘bandwagon with the stronger side because they believe it represents “the wave
of the future”’.52 The ability to give rewards and to appear as “the wave of the future” will
thus increase a state’s attractiveness and induce others to bandwagon with it. Consequently,
48
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 125 – 126 and 128.
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances. For an overview over existing literature until 1990, cf. pp. 6 – 11.
50
Ibid., p. 5.
51
cf. Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit”, p. 80 f.
52
Ibid., p. 96.
49
23
that state’s ability to exert influence (as a means to achieve its own objectives) will increase
as well. Although Stephen M. Walt argues that foreign aid is not likely to be ‘the principal
cause of alignment or a powerful instrument”, he admits that military or economic aid are
“believed to give the suppliers significant leverage over recipients’.53 If aid and alignment
increase a state’s relative power and lead to its being better off than other states, it has an
interest in getting engaged in cooperation. A smart state does not resort to physical violence in
the first place, but tries to make use of different, both softer and cheaper (nonetheless in terms
of opportunity costs) tools at his disposal. In an extreme form, the use of such tools may even
lead to what Geir Lundestad qualifies as “empire by invitation”.54 It will be able to practice
“cultural imperialism” (Morgenthau) and to fully make use of its soft power resources (Nye).
Nevertheless, appearing as the wave of the future is more than merely a PR-coup. By stating
that bandwagoning need not necessarily presuppose the existence of a threat, the whole
decision by one state to bandwagon with another loses in urgency. In other words, a state
wanting to attract bandwagoners needs good arguments in order to attract allies. Thus,
‘[a]lliance choices, however, are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger,
by appetite as well as fear. […] When profit rather than security drives alliance choices, there
is no reason to expect that states will be threatened or cajoled to climb aboard the bandwagon;
they do so willingly. The bandwagon gains momentum through the promise of reward […].’55
Schweller goes on to develop the concept of balance-of-interest theory based on this idea. In
the balance-of-interest approach, interest is what determines how states choose their friends. It
is thus through considering those interests a state can make another state want to be its friend.
This, however, is not sufficient per se.
Legitimate Authority and Prestige
Given the fact that power is a relation between at least two actors, the sole focus on
one of the parts involved is too short-sighted. States pursue interests. Anything that enhances
a state’s chances to pursue its interests should therefore please that state. In order to be able to
pursue interests, states are dependent on being able to exert influence. States will seek to
53
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 41.
See Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945 – 1952”, in: Journal
of Peace Research, Vol. 23, No. 3 (September 1986), pp. 263 – 277. Furthermore: Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by
Integration. The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.
54
24
realise their interests at the cheapest price possible, striving for an ideally effortless pursuit of
what they aspire to. Having easy-to-talk-to friends and getting help is one way to do so.
Weaker states profit from strong friends, and even strong friends do at least avoid enmity with
any state they can count among their friends. Moreover, friends are much more prone to
consider a strong state’s power as legitimate, thus reducing the strong state’s costs in its
exercise of power. In short, all states should take a considerable interest in maximising the
number of friends. For that reason, it is not only relevant to understand how states choose
their friends. How states make other states want to be their friends is at least equally
important. It is however clear that friendship cannot logically be the result of coercion.
Congruence of interests is important, but still not enough for submission to leadership. For a
state to be willing to be another state’s friend, that other state must be able to exert legitimate
authority.
The name most associated with the idea of legitimate authority is of course Max
Weber’s, who distinguishes between three types of legitimate authority (or Herrschaft, in the
difficult to translate German original). These three types are ideal-types, introduced in his
masterpiece Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft of 192256, where he distinguishes between rational or
legal, traditional, charismatic authority. Rational authority is based on the belief in the legality
of the established order, included the belief that those exercising authority on behalf of this
order do so legally. Traditional authority, in turn, is based on the every day-belief in the
holiness of ancient tradition, included the belief in the legitimacy of those ruling by virtue of
this tradition. Charismatic authority, finally, is based on the extraordinary dedication to the
holiness or heroic power or the exemplarity of a person and the order revealed or created by
that person.57 Given that those types of legitimate authority are ideal types, they cannot be
observed in their pure forms in reality. In any case, the legitimacy of the order is in the eyes of
the observer.
More closely related to International Relations theory, Robert Gilpin is discussing
“governance” of the international system as composed by three components: the distribution
of power, the hierarchy of prestige among states and the rules of interaction in the system.58
55
Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit”, p. 79.
Online version available at the homepage the French National Library, cf. http://gallica.bnf.fr . An ideal type is
a theoretical – though non-normative – construct of an “ideal picture” of a phenomenon. They are based on the
exaggeration of specific features, serving the purpose of representing the characteristics of the phenomenon
portrayed. An ideal type is therefore not a definition.
57
See Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Kap. III, 1, § 2.
58
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 29 ff.
56
25
Whilst Gilpin simply means capabilities when referring to “power”59, his concept of
“prestige” deserves further attention. A state discontent with its position in the international
system and willing to change this position must challenge all three: it must be opposed to the
current distribution of power (in terms of capabilities), it must reject the current distribution of
“prestige” (i.e., the current distribution of the capacity to exert influence), and it must be
unwilling to accept the current rules of the game. The three components of governance are, in
any case, interrelated: the capacity to exert influence is – to some extent – dependent on
capabilities, and the rules of the game are indeed very likely to have been set by the state(s)
with the most prestige. The states with the largest amount of prestige are also the ones most
“powerful” in the sense of a Weberian concept of power. Gilpin’s way of counting the
hierarchy of prestige as one of the three defining features of the international system is
obviously related to Max Weber’s idea of legitimate authority. Indeed, Gilpin claims that in
international relations, it is ‘the functional equivalent’ of the role of authority in domestic
politics.60 His argument is based on Ralf Dahrendorf’s definition of the term, itself very close
to Weber’s definition of power. For Dahrendorf, authority (or prestige, in Gilpin’s terms) is
the ‘probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group
of persons ‘.61 Given the closeness to Weber’s concept of power, “prestige” also contains a
large amount of perception factors. Just like monetary currencies and their strength, much is
in the eye of the observer, although resources and material assets play an ever so important
role:
In short, numerous factors, including respect and common interest, underlie
the prestige of a state and the legitimacy of its rule. Ultimately, however, the
hierarchy of prestige in an international system rests on economic and military
power. Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular.
Whereas power refers to the economic, military, and related capabilities of a
state, prestige refers primarily to the perceptions of other states with respect to
a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power.62
In that sense, Gilpin’s concept of prestige is compatible with a Neoclassical Realist approach
to “influence” as relational power. It implies the reciprocity of influence, included the idea
that for influence to be exerted in a smooth way, a certain amount of acceptance is a
prerequisite.
59
Robert Gilpin, War and Change, p. 13.
Ibid., p. 30.
61
Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959,
p. 166; quoted in: Gilpin, War and Change, p. 30.
62
Robert Gilpin, War and Change, p. 30/31.
60
26
V.
Concluding remarks
If one were to explain international politics in terms of market Economics, the
situation could be described as follows: the international system is similar to a market, on
which states are competing for the scarce goods of friends. Therefore, even great powers can
never rest, lest it looses its friends or its competitors make too many friends. A reasonable
number of friends are necessary for the pursuit of every state’s interest (defined, by
Neoclassical Realists, as being able to ‘shape and control the environment’). But not only do
states need friends, they logically should moreover take an interest in maximising their
number. A maximum of friends allows for cheaper policies whilst increasing the potential of
successfully exerting influence. At the same time, the number of antagonists must be limited
as much as possible, since the worst that can happen to a state is a revisionist state, i.e. an
antagonist with system-changing ambitions. A state must therefore acquire the capacity to
exert legitimate authority and convince other states that they share interests.
The very concept of “legitimacy” does only make sense in a reciprocal setting. It implies the
idea that an existing phenomenon – a certain type of political order – is considered acceptable
and authoritative by the subjects of that order. For that reason, an analysis built upon a
relational concept of power requires attention devoted to the question of legitimate authority.
The belief that something is legitimate can never be imposed, and an actor wishing to be
perceived as legitimate must honestly earn that perception. This is also an important factor
when it comes to the exercise of influence. For influence to be exerted in ways other than
violent, the receiving part of it must in fact be willing to yield to that influence, i.e. at least not
fight it. Two factors may explain this acceptance: the influence exerted may either be
considered legitimate, or there may be a congruence of interest. Given that legitimacy and
congruence of interests lie in the eye of the observer, perceptions of power and legitimacy
therefore come to play a crucial role in determining World Order.
27
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