Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No. 7, 1185–1202, 2000
New Regions in England and Germany:
An Examination of the Interaction of
Constitutional Structures, Formal Regions and
Informal Institutions
Tassilo Herrschel and Peter Newman
[Paper Ž rst received, January 1999; in Ž nal form, May 1999]
Summary. This paper examines the stark contrasts in regional governance arising from the
different constitutional and political contexts in England and Germany, but argues that there are
also differences within formal regions in the two countries. Recent developments in Germany
show the uneven emergence and acceptance of informal policy-making institutions concerned
with economic development and planning within the Länder and within formal planning regions.
In England, the paper examines a process of continuing local and regional adjustment to
centrally imposed institutional reforms. The paper argues that, whilst constitutional differences
are clearly important factors, to understand directions of change in regional governance and, by
extension, broader prospects for a ‘Europe of regions’, we need to examine the dynamics of
formal regional government and informal institutions.
1. Introduction
In Europe, regions attracted the attention of
academics and policy-makers throughout the
1990s. Academic work stresses the link between regional economies and new forms of
governance. Scott (1998), for example, argues that new regionalised economies need
to develop new regional institutions which
should foster co-operation and collaboration.
There is a general view that having the right
set of governance institutions contributes to
effective policies and to the competitive advantage of cities and regions by giving some
relative autonomy from the forces of globalisation. There is a strong suggestion in the
literature not only that new sets of institutions are needed at regional level, but also
that all regional and city governance should
be moving in the same direction. Networked
forms of governance are to be preferred to
old hierarchical structures (see, for example,
Cooke and Morgan, 1994) as are new forms
of ‘interactive’ and ‘associative’ governance
(Amin and Hausner, 1997; Hirst, 1993) linking the national to the regional and local. The
‘learning region’ (Florida, 1995; Morgan,
1997), it is argued, holds lessons for those
regions which are stuck in old ways of policy-making.
In practice, the evidence for the development of new governance institutions according to these prescriptions is not so clear.
Some countries have attempted to formalise
a new regional level of governance, but with
varying success (le Galès, 1998). It seems to
Tassilo Herrschel is in the School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Westminster, 309 Regent Street, London,
W1R 8AL, UK. Fax: 020 7911 5106. E-mail: [email protected]. Peter Newman is in the School of the Built Environment, University
of Westminster, 35 Marylebone Road, London, W1 5LS, UK. Fax: 020 7911 5171. E-mail: [email protected]
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0042-0980 Print/1360-063X On-line/00/071185-18
Ó 2000 The Editors of Urban Studies
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TASSILO HERRSCHEL AND PETER NEWMAN
be the more urbanised regions, often focused
on a metropolitan core, which through public–private alliances and marketing, have
forced themselves into prominence as sites of
effective, ‘Europeanised’ sub-national governance. Other cities, in economic decline, or
groups of smaller towns and cities, have
failed to develop new governance institutions
and continue to depend upon higher levels of
government for both economic and policy
support. Strong cities may promote ‘cityregions’, whereas national governments may
seek manageable areas for regional administration and implementing their own policies.
Given such very different circumstances, it is
not surprising that the concept of ‘region’
continues to be difŽ cult to pin down.
Actual changes in regional governance
seem to be more complex than the preferred
path outlined by recent academic work. National differences, constitutional and political, clearly account for some of the
difference in regional institutions. We begin
this paper therefore by contrasting two national contexts. England and Germany illustrate extremes in Europe between unitary and
federal states, between highly centralised and
regionalised governance, and this is manifested in a stark contrast between the formal
institutions of regional government in the
two countries. However, there are clearly
also differences within formal regions. To
explain such variation, we need to go beyond
constitutional differences and formal regional structures to examine the complex
interactions of intergovernmental and public–private relationships (Keating, 1997;
Mayntz, 1992). In Germany there is growing
evidence of institutional variety at sub-regional level (Wood, 1997; Weichart, 1996;
Danielzyk, 1998; Benz, 1998) and some authors point to German regions as exemplars
of new,  exible, networked styles of governance (Cooke and Morgan, 1994; Collinge
and Srbljanin, 1997). Despite the very different constitutional frameworks, there is also
some clear evidence of informal institutional
innovation in England in the range of regional and sub-regional partnerships and intergovernmental alliances (Harding et al.,
1996; Bentley and Shutt, 1997; DETR,
1998a).
Therefore, in addition to those differences
in regional institutions arising from national
constitutional contexts, we focus in this paper on the forms, relative permanence and
role in regional governance of informal institutions within the formal regions of England
and Germany. By informal institutions we
mean those public and private actors, organised interests and intraregional networks
pursuing development objectives but which
are not incorporated into the formal structures of regional government. The emergence
of such institutions will re ect both economic and political factors and histories of
regional institution-building. Contemporary
understandings of processes of urban governance make a similar analytical distinction
between formal institutions of government
and the more or less permanent alliances of
interests which attempt to guide or in uence
development. At a theoretical level, Stoker
(1995) makes a distinction between the positional power of government actors and the
coalition power of informal groupings. At
both urban and regional levels, relationships
between governance institutions clearly have
many dimensions. Intergovernmental, public–private relationships and party political
factors will in uence directions of change.
Our discussion in this paper is for the most
part limited to intergovernmental relationships—that is, interaction between local, regional and national institutions—but without
in any way denying the impact, from time to
time, of pressure from private-sector actors
or political ambition in reshaping regional
institutions.
Our central interest is in how such informal institutions interact with formal regions
in the different constitutional settings. Over
time, interaction may lead to the incorporation of some informal groupings into the
formal arrangements of regional government,
or to processes of mutual adjustment of policy aims, or to con ict and the resistance of
formal regional institutions to external challenge. At urban or regional level, it is the
interaction of institutions which drives for-
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NEW REGIONS IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY
ward policy agendas and reshapes governance. In our perspective, regionalisation
should be viewed as a dynamic process involving the complex interactions over time
of emerging informal institutions, formal regional government and national constitutional and political contexts.
To be effective, the institutions of regional
governance need access to budgets and the
ability to set policy directions. National constitutional factors clearly play a role here in
contributing to the degree of autonomy of
regional actors and the scope of formal institutions to encourage or hold back informal
regional initiatives. We start the next section
of the paper, therefore, by outlining two contrasting sets of constitutional arrangements.
The German cases examined show the uneven emergence and acceptance of informal
policy-making institutions at sub-regional
level. In England, we examine a process of
continuing local and regional adjustment to
centrally imposed institutional reforms. Our
view is that we can better understand directions of change in regional governance and,
by extension, broader prospects for a ‘Europe
of regions’, through examination of the dynamics of formal and informal institutions. A
comparative approach allows us to assess the
relative weight of basic constitutional differences in these processes and to illustrate
some of the variety of governance in different European regions.
Institutional change in both countries is of
course in uenced by wider changes in governance within the European Union. The subnational level is variously seen as a third path
of decision-making (Tömmel, 1997) or as a
dimension of ‘multilevel governance’
(Marks, 1993). Actual responses to increasing international co-operation and EU grant
regimes re ect constitutional structures and
national political projects—but also, as we
shall see, these responses vary within regions, as constitutional contexts interact with
formal regions and informal groupings pursuing development objectives.
The next section of the paper gives a brief
review of formal regional structures in the
two countries before going on to examine
1187
examples of emerging informal institutions.
We then examine institutional developments
concentrating on regional planning and economic development issues. In this part of the
paper, we concentrate particularly on eastern
Germany, taking examples from Land
Brandenburg and in England we focus on the
Yorkshire and Humberside region. We do
not attempt a direct comparison of institutional arrangements in these two spatially
and economically very different regions but,
rather, use developments in the two regions
to illustrate general aspects of the interaction
of formal and informal institutions in the two
countries. Whilst the regionalised government system in Germany may appear to give
more encouragement to informal institutional
developments, we shall see that there is considerable variation in resulting forms of regional governance. England also shows
considerable intraregional variation. Relationships between urban, regional and national levels remain contested. Our analysis
develops from a series of interviews with
ofŽ cials at local, regional and state levels
which sought to elicit views on the effectiveness of existing institutional arrangements
and on current and future directions of
change. There were, not suprisingly, differences of view on ideal decision-making
structures and the scope of regional development policies. The discussion in the Ž nal part
of the paper explores some of the reasons for
these differences and draws conclusions from
the examination of the interaction of formal
structures, informal institutions and constitutional arrangements in the two countries.
2. Constitutional Arrangements
Formal Institutions
and
2.1 Regions, Planning Regions and Informal
Regions in Germany
Germany’s federal structure provides for a
strong regional tier of government mediating
between local and national government tiers
(Wollmann and Lund, 1997). The responsibility for establishing regions and their governance rests with the Länder governments.
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TASSILO HERRSCHEL AND PETER NEWMAN
The Länder operate regional policy and planning, including implementation of EU policies. The federal government for the most
part takes a back seat, providing strategic
guidance in national development aims and
collaborating with the Länder in joint
Ž nancing of regional development policies,
including those funded by the EU.
Strong Land governments interact with
conŽ dent local governments which hold a
considerable policy-making autonomy (kommunale Selbstverwaltung; Petzold, 1994).
Whilst on the one hand, Länder may have a
keen interest in using sub-regions as a device
to implement their own policy goals at a
local scale and exercise a degree of control
on the contents of local planning and development policies, at the same time, they have
to acknowledge strong ‘bottom-up’ policy
bargaining with local government as part of
the Gegenstromprinzip (the principle of
counter ow of policy-making pressures).
Within a Land, there may be strong locally,
especially urban, in uenced policies and
more centrally determined policies to support
lagging rural areas. In more urbanised areas,
Chambers of Commerce also tend to play a
stronger part in debate about policy. Not
surprisingly, the result is a rather
“heterogeneous regional level” (Benz, 1998,
p. 128) with inevitably somewhat unclear notions of what constitutes a region.
The 1964 Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz, ROG) encouraged a top-down approach by requiring the Länder to create
further sub-divisions in formal planning regions which then constitute the statutory regions and serve as basis of institutionalised
regional planning and policy. Effectively,
therefore, two types of region exist with considerable differences of scale: the Länder as
centres of regional government and the planning regions (Planungsregionen ) as territorial containers for the administration of
planning policy. These planning regions,
about 3 –5 in each Land, develop regional
plans through their Regional Planning Associations (RPA) which consist of members of
the participating local authorities and are, to
varying degrees, attached to the Land admin-
istration—for example, the regional ofŽ ces
(Regierungsprä sidien). The RPAs have no
constitutional powers and operate through
the participating Kommunen, but offer a good
bargaining base in dealings with the Land.
All local authorities are represented either
directly or through groupings (Kreise) of
small authorities. Not surprisingly, the urban
authorities and strong city mayors tend to
have a substantial in uence, often leading to
political controversies between urban and rural interests. Political party linkages may,
however, temper such city–suburban, or urban–rural, political con ict. Relations between levels of government can also be
mediated through party channels. One clear
example of this was in the political bargaining process between the Ruhr city of Duisburg, the Land North-Rhine Westphalia and
the federal government, in the face of local
mass redundancies (Rommelspacher, 1988).
In this instance, the Social Democrat (SPD)
party controlled both the local council and
Land parliament, which allowed more effective bottom-up bargaining around responses
to the issue.
The strength of local, in particular urban,
economies seems to play a strong role in
shaping bargaining positions within intergovernmental
relationships.
Economically
stronger localities seem to be more
in uential in shaping their regions, whereas
the smaller, economically weaker, authorities
seem to be less sure about regional interests
and identities (Herrschel, 1997, 1998).
The 1998 review of the ROG shifted emphasis towards more informal, networkbased and locally deŽ ned regionalisation.
This review indicated the institutional acceptance at national level of innovative policies and projects developed by Land
governments. Examples include the Regional
Conferences pioneered in North-Rhine Westphalia as platforms of informal regional
collaboration between (largely industrial)
agglomerations (Heinze and Voelzkow,
1997), and the Regionalverbände (regional
associations) in Baden-Württemberg, particularly that focused on its capital, Stuttgart.
Such informal approaches to regional
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NEW REGIONS IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY
1189
Figure 1. Regionalisation in eastern Germany: Länder and Planning Regions.
policy-making are now also gaining attention
in eastern Germany—for example, in Saxony-Anhalt—with the Land-facilitated formation of Regional Conferences and
Regional Forums as informal, network-based
collaborations between groups of local authorities which have identiŽ ed common interests. In fact, experiences with the
top-down deŽ nition of regions in eastern
Germany has encouraged the review of regional planning policy. In Saxony-Anhalt,
new, locally deŽ ned and network-based ‘regions’ are now being established as ofŽ cial
planning regions. These replace the ones initially established by the Land on purely administrative grounds when the former east
German government institutions were exchanged for those of the west. These formal
planning regions were much less responsive
to cultural, historical or geographical identi-
ties than the new Länder themselves, perhaps
a sign that they were seen as more of an
administrative rather than a governmental
feature. In particular, there was little sensitivity to economic territories, as the economic region of Leipzig and Halle
demonstrates. Here, the two Länder, Saxony
and Saxony-Anhalt, had to agree a treaty to
enable cross-border co-operation in regional
planning to enable the addressing of issues
affecting the whole economic region (see
Figure 1).
Existing administrative boundaries and,
particularly in eastern Germany, political
sensitivities about references to old East German territorialisation, have in uenced the
drawing of regional boundaries by the Länder. The picture of regionalisation is thus
varied, circumscribed by each Land government’s willingness to allow local initiatives
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1190
TASSILO HERRSCHEL AND PETER NEWMAN
to become ‘ofŽ cial’ policy. Nevertheless,
there seems to be general growth of more
informal, network-based forms of regional
co-operation, irrespective of the forms of
ofŽ cial Land-deŽ ned regions. The Regional
Development Concepts or Regional Conferences, encouraged nationally by the federal
government (BFLR, 1997), are strategies to
facilitate interlocal collaboration within functionally deŽ ned regions. Such concepts are
not part of the formal planning and policymaking instrumentation, but represent a new
initiative to facilitate regional economic audits as a basis of regionally deŽ ned, and
explicitly
economy-related,
policies
(Scholich, 1994) to utilise indigenous potential. The focus is on collaboration between
local authorities to develop regions that are
more homogeneous in their social and economic geography, and which possess greater
functional coherence, than could be expected
from a centrally deŽ ned, artiŽ cial region
(Schmitz, 1995). Each Land has followed
this road to new regional institutions in its
own way, with differences largely concerning arrangements for the dual nature of the
ofŽ cial planning regions between Land control, mainly exercised through their regional
ofŽ ces (Regierungsbezirke), and local
government through locally based planning
associations, consisting of delegates from the
unitary urban authorities and higher-tier local
authorities (Kreise). Some Länder, such as
Brandenburg, operate without regional
ofŽ ces and all Land input into the planning
regions remains centralised. Working
through local associations promises a
stronger regional identity than could be expected from a conventional top-down deŽ ned
approach (Schmitz, 1995).
2.2 Centralisation
England
and
Devolution
in
The division of responsibilities between central and sub-central government in Britain
provides much less support for regions.
However, at the end of the 1990s, the establishment of assemblies in Scotland and
Wales opened possibilities for new forms of
regionalisation in these historic nations. In
England, the boundaries of ofŽ cial, administrative regions have changed from time to
time since the enthusiasm for national and
regional planning in the early 1960s. Government interest in regions has always concentrated on economic management and
planning. At the end of the 1960s, however,
the focus shifted from the larger regional
scale to the level of newly deŽ ned metropolitan regions around the big cities. This tier of
regional government was subsequently abolished in 1986 and since then in the main
urban areas there has been no formal tier of
government between individual local authorities and the centre. The rest of the country
has a mixture of single and two-tier local
government.
These changes re ect an historical distrust
of lower-level government by the centre and
the periodic interventions of party political
projects. The Conservative governments of
the 1980s and 1990s installed new types of
economic development and city regeneration
bodies, by-passing the remaining level of
elected local government. Training and
Enterprise Councils (1989) took over subregional training programmes and local
Urban Development Corporations (between
1981 and 1998) and the national body
English Partnerships (from 1993) manage investment in land and property. Regional
planning has had some institutional continuity in joint local government planning
boards, but these were assigned few staff and
regional plans were heavily in uenced from
the centre. In the metropolitan areas, Regional Planning Guidance is issued by central government. The main characteristics of
the British state have thus been centralisation, multiplication of development agencies
and, since the 1980s, a much more visible
role for business leaders in city and regional
governance. Since the 1960s, the emphasis
has clearly shifted towards a localised, especially urban, perspective, to the detriment
of the region.
There were two signiŽ cant changes in the
early 1990s. Both can be seen in differing
ways as responses to the increasing in uence
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1191
NEW REGIONS IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY
Y&H
B
L
Humber
West Yorks
South Yorkshire
S
0
Scotland
km
Humber
Key
B = Bradford
L = Leeds
S = Sheffield
Objective 2 Area
50
Y&H
Wales
Y&H = Yorkshire and Humberside.
Boundaries show Standard Regions.
Patterns show Government Office Regions.
0
km
200
Figure 2. Regionalisation in Britain: Standard Regions and Government OfŽ ce Regions. (Insert map:
Objective 2 sub-regions in Yorkshire and Humberside.)
of European regional policy and sources of
funding. In contrast to Germany, it is central
government which manages the relationship
with Brussels. However, this process required an increasingly regionalised, if cen-
trally deŽ ned and controlled, administration.
The Integrated Regional OfŽ ces set up in
1993 and in operation as Government OfŽ ces
for the Regions (GORs) from April 1994,
gave central government a revived regional
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1192
TASSILO HERRSCHEL AND PETER NEWMAN
structure based largely on old boundaries (see
Figure 2). The Government OfŽ ces aimed to
co-ordinate government functions—planning,
inward investment, training and transport. In
fact, many core budgets were not devolved
from the centre, and the GORs manage only
a small part of state expenditure in the regions. The GORs do manage the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) investment
programme and work with local government
in framing bids under the structural funds.
However, control over European bids and
budgets is retained at the centre. The GORs
were encouraged to develop better central–local relations and can be seen as a limited
attempt at better regional co-ordination of
central programmes. Local authorities were
sceptical of the new regional administration
and, following a decade of aggravated central–local con ict in development policies,
such mistrust (or even cynicism) does not
come as a surprise. The Ž rst change in the
1990s was therefore this increased, if limited,
regionalisation of central state machinery.
The second development was regionalisation through various bottom-up initiatives.
Largely in response to the perceived centralisation of Conservative central governments,
local authorities began to co-operate more
positively in informal regional structures. Regional Associations operated as informal arrangements between local authorities in the
nine English Regions, aiming at including
regional considerations in local planning, albeit to varying extent (see Mawson, 1997a,
for a review). New arrangements for cooperation included the creation of regional
identity through more promotional and lobbying objectives with a clear emphasis on marketing to attract new investment. Regional
identity was also seen to be an important part
of successful lobbying for European funds.
The boundaries of areas eligible for funding,
however, also necessitated intraregional, locally based co-operation (see inset, Figure 2).
The overall impacts of EU funding on
government are not clear. Both central and
local levels of government can be argued to
have gained in uence through the process of
seeking and winning European funds (see
Martin, 1998; Bomberg and Peterson, 1998).
However, driven by European ambitions, regional associations of local government, led
by the big cities, formed a strong lobby within
the Labour Party and, in the mid 1990s,
regional reform came back onto the political
agenda. There was also strong pressure from
Scotland and Wales. The stronger regional
agencies operating in Scotland and Wales
gave the English regions a model to work on.
In 1997, the new Labour government began
a series of reforms. There was no equivalent
in England of the elected regional government proposed for Scotland and Wales. The
main approach was administrative reform
geared to economic development and these
reforms can be seen as a necessary political
response by the Labour Party leadership to
demands from the English regions. Mawson
(1997b), for example, argued at the time that
something had to be offered to the English
regions in order to ensure parliamentary approval of the government’s proposals for regional government in Scotland and Wales.
New Regional Development Agencies
(RDAs) operational from 1999 were to ‘build
up the voice of the regions’ giving a ‘sharper
regional focus’ (DETR, 1997a, p. 7 and preface). The RDAs, based on 12 regions, have
centrally determined constitutions and budgets. Their executive boards are appointed by
government from the business sector and
civic leaders and typically include university
and trade union representation. RDAs have to
promote competitiveness, innovation and investment, and develop comprehensive regional development strategies (DETR,
1998b), but with only limited control of resources. Rivalries between government departments and particular ministers mean that
some existing regional development programmes—for example, Regional Selective
Assistance (RSA) to relocating companies—
remain under central control (the bulk of
these funds, however, support projects in
Scotland and Wales). The strong emphasis
on competitiveness raises the possibility
of RDAs competing against each other and
exacerbating the existing interregional
competition over RSA.
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NEW REGIONS IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY
New Regional Chambers made up of local
authority and business leaders have a limited
oversight role and give some local legitimacy
to the RDAs, although the RDAs’ Ž rst responsibility is to central government ministers. Local government representatives in
Regional Chambers give some local accountability to the new bodies but, at the same
time, the government is seeking to reform
democratic structures in English cities
(DETR, 1998c). Those cities which change
their executive arrangements and adopt
strong mayors may have a more in uential
voice at regional level. The Chambers also
have strong business representation and this
institutionalised emphasis on business interests is much stronger than in Germany where
there is a more universal approach to regional policy and planning.
The new government’s reforms aimed for
speed and, in order to avoid lengthy debates
over the deŽ nition of regions, existing administrative boundaries were, for the most
part, maintained. In London, the boundary of
the former metropolitan authority created in
the 1960s was used to deŽ ne the scale of the
RDA. Different arrangements in London
gave control of the RDA to the new mayor.
The surrounding economic region, until recently subsumed by one region, was split
between two new RDAs (see Figure 2). New
administrative regions were deŽ ned by expediency rather than by regard for functional
boundaries.
The existing informal regional and subregional alliances which had developed in
the 1980s and 1990s tended to be sceptical
about the potential of RDAs given their limited budgets and the unclear relations between RDAs and Chambers (DETR, 1998a)
and, before the RDAs became operational, it
was clear that such informal bodies had begun to adapt themselves to take advantage of
these new formal arrangements.
3. The Interaction of Formal
Informal Regional Institutions
and
There is a complex picture of regional institutions in the two countries, with indications
1193
that in both regionalisation can operate
through different avenues of region-building:
territorially Ž xed and institutionalised from
‘above’, and informally with  exible
boundaries from ‘below’. Constitutional and
statutory regulations are obviously crucial in
providing the framework for the respective
institutional machinery. In the following sections, we look at the emergence of locally
deŽ ned institutions and their interaction with
formal regional government.
3.1 Prignitz-Oberhavel Region and Land
Brandenburg
One of the main instruments of formal regional planning in Germany is deŽ ning central places as centres of development, with
the understanding that Land investment priorities will follow planning-deŽ ned priorities. In reality, however, funding decisions
may not lend sufŽ cient support to plans, and
thus reveal the limits of formal regional planning. Such problems are identiŽ ed by regional and Land planners in Brandenburg
(RPA questionnaire survey, 1998).1 One of
the main reasons for this is the Land’s reluctance to cede powers to the RPAs, thus restricting their effectiveness. Against this
background, informal arrangements through
local collaboration seem to offer an alternative, allowing regional interests to use local
self-government to in uence the formal policy-making machinery. Forms of collaboration in Brandenburg re ect the heterogeneity
of the Land. The experience of the RPA
Prignitz-Oberhavel reveals a distinct selfinterest among the local authorities of the
region’s inner area. Prignitz-Oberhavel in
north-west Brandenburg is one of Ž ve planning regions in the Land of Brandenburg (see
Figure 1). The Land stretches from the outskirts of Berlin some 150 km into an economic periphery and thus encompasses areas
of considerable growth potential next door to
those suffering from decline and depopulation. Despite being part of a single formal
region, individual local authorities seek to
maximise the beneŽ ts from being situated
closer to Berlin, regardless of the situation of
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1194
TASSILO HERRSCHEL AND PETER NEWMAN
their ‘cousins’ in the more distant parts of the
region. There are few signs of sharing among
the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in terms of development prospects. Feeling left behind, a
sense of shared grief among the local authorities of the outer area, including Prignitz, has
encouraged informal arrangements in the
Städtenetz Prignitz in the outer part of the
planning region of Prignitz-Oberhavel.
The Prignitz network is one of a handful
of examples within eastern Germany of best
practice in  exible and innovative regionalisation supported by the federal competition
‘Regions for the Future’ (BFLR, 1997;
BBR,1998). The ‘Prignitz’ grouping, includes seven small to medium-sized towns
(3 000 –25 000) and is based on the traditional, cultural-geographical region of Prignitz, a name which the respective local
authorities hope will be more readily recognised by outside investors than the individual
names of the participating localities. The
main objective of this alliance, set up in
1995, is to maximise the use of indigenous
potential as the basis of sustainable development. This includes developing environmental quality, new technology and more speciŽ c
factors such as traditional cultural regional
identity and entrepreneurial/skill potential
(ARP Prignitz-Oberhavel, 1997). The Land
contributes Ž nancially through regular funding of development projects promoted by the
grouping, but does not explicitly Ž nance this
informal region.
A second urban network, the North-west
Brandenburg Initiative, consists of local authorities along a railway line to Berlin. This
rail link is being upgraded into a rapid transit
line to attract suburbanisation from Berlin.
This network brings together local authorities
from both parts of the planning region, the
immediate Berlin agglomeration and the rural areas further aŽ eld. The Land is using the
existence of the Initiative as a justiŽ cation of
its regional policy of integrating ‘strong’ and
‘weak’ areas (ARP Prignitz-Oberhavel,
1997), but there has been no Ž nancial support for the Initiative which is based entirely
on collaboration between the six (more recently, seven) participating local authorities.
The Initiative is seeking a higher public
proŽ le as a city network through publishing a
quarterly report. With half of the rail link
nearing completion, the Initiative is now
shifting some of its attention to implementing projects of sustainable economic development along this line. Some of the local
authorities belong to both the Prignitz and
the North-west Brandenburg Initiative and
are thus effectively members of three overlapping regions, each with its own ‘milieu’
(Danielzyk, 1998): the ofŽ cial formal planning region, and the two informal regions
based on interlocal collaborative networks in
policy-making.
Despite such initiatives, the Land government maintains a distinctly centrally directed, ideology-driven form of regional
regulation allowing only limited local input
into regional planning strategies. In eastern
Germany, there was a resigned acceptance of
the often-artiŽ cial nature of the established
RPA boundaries and no desire for another
upheaval of territorial identities (RPA questionnaire survey, 1998).
In Brandenburg, and in other areas of eastern Germany, considerable discrepancies
have emerged since the early 1990s between
established regulative and newly forming
economic regions. Alternative forms of informal regionalisation, driven by pragmatic
assessment of economic realities, are thus
emerging as self-help solutions. They are
based on identiŽ ed common interests, or
problems, between neighbouring local authorities. The development of a range of
informal, network-based regions with
sufŽ cient policy-making effectiveness is institutionally possible. At least two models
can be identiŽ ed. The Ž rst, as in Brandenburg, involves local response to in exible,
state-imposed and maintained, regionalisation. In the second model, in Saxony-Anhalt,
the Land government realised the inappropriateness of the existing territoriality of the
regions and itself facilitated a more problemdeŽ ned and purpose-based deŽ nition of regions. A third possibility is illustrated by the
‘Thuringian model’ where the Land envisages informal instruments of regionalisation,
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NEW REGIONS IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY
based on ‘cross-sectional, future oriented and
marketing-focused development concepts’
(Hosse and Schübel, 1996, p. 239). As implied by this swarm of buzz-words, the new
model is meant to overcome deŽ ciencies
identiŽ ed in the existing formal provisions
for regionalisation and the gaps it leaves in
local –regional communication. Thus, local
planning and development interests are to
take a stronger role in shaping regional objectives and are to be more inclusive of the
various regional actors and their strategic
outlooks for regional development. Nevertheless, despite guidance by the Land to initiate new, interlocal co-operation as the basis
of regionalisation, there has been no real
departure so far from the continued reliance
on established institutional structures and
practices, which may include working with
entirely artiŽ cial, centrally deŽ ned formal
planning regions (interview, Ministry of
Planning, Thuringia Land Government, June
1998).
3.2 Yorkshire and Humberside Region
In the Yorkshire and Humberside region,
there is an array of new regional institutions
all operating within the same boundaries.
The Regional Assembly (1996) developed
from local government initiative. The
Government OfŽ ce (1994), Regional Chamber (1998) and Regional Development Agencies (1999) are imposed from above. Their
most important common feature is the distinct marketing and business-oriented remit
to attract EU funding and inward investment,
in line with central government objectives
and policies. The EU-funding-oriented Single Programming Document developed by
the Government OfŽ ce for Yorkshire and
Humberside (GOYH) precedes the regional
strategy to be developed by the RDA and
exists as a “shopping list for EU funds”
(interview, GOYH, 6 July 1998). The RDA
institutionalises a business-led approach to
regional planning rather than a more traditional approach. As in the other English
regions, new strategies are being written in a
hurry and in conformity with government
1195
guidelines (DETR, 1998b). There is concern
in the cities that the uniformity of regional
policy-making will not re ect intraregional
differences (interview, Leeds Development
Agency (LDA), 17 September 1998; interview, GOYH, 6 July 1998). The emerging
Regional Strategy may also be little more
than a government-approved shopping list of
projects and funding.
Yorkshire and Humberside is a heterogeneous region (Mawson, 1997a) with varying
development prospects, and thus region-wide
policies will not everywhere be appropriate.
Intraregional differences are re ected in the
position of the two main cities of the region,
ShefŽ eld and Leeds. ShefŽ eld, as part of a
South Yorkshire sub-region, qualiŽ es for Objective 2 funding in the (1994–99) programme along with the sub-regions of West
Yorkshire and the Humber estuary. Conspicuously, the old industrial conurbation of
Leeds, now the relatively best-performing
economic area in the region, does not qualify
for EU funding. Given these very different
circumstances, there are calls for a more
locally based regionalisation, led by the cities
(such as envisaged by the Chief Executive of
Bradford (Mawson, 1997a). Not surprisingly,
there are different views of how this might
develop. With little to gain from the wider
region, Leeds considered itself a selfcontained city-region (interview, LDA, 17
September 1998), all but ignoring any regional dimension beyond its immediate hinterland. The Leeds Initiative linked public
and private interests in the city. The idea of
‘region’ does not feature once among the
main development objectives of the city’s
current economic development strategy
(LDA, 1996). However, in response to the
new RDA framework, a regional focus is
being written into the strategy (LDA, 1998).
In addition, in recent years, councillors have
become more involved in regional networks.
The city is attempting to work out a response
to the new regional structures. But, at the
same time, national regional reform has
prompted Leeds to join other large English
cities which form the Capital City Network
with the aim of in uencing government
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1196
TASSILO HERRSCHEL AND PETER NEWMAN
policy from another direction. The city has
responded to regional reform by taking more
interest in sub-regional issues, in informal
alliances and in national networks.
In ShefŽ eld, a more immediate and
stronger regional outlook exists, facilitated
by the availability of EU funding for the
sub-region of South Yorkshire, crucial for
the city’s regeneration projects. Regional
identity and policy-making in South Yorkshire, however, are not strongly developed
(interview, ShefŽ eld City Council (SSC), 24
September 1998). At present, Objective 2
status encourages some communication between local authorities in the area. Drawing
down European funds has become the main
regionalising force. Sub-regional cooperation and alliances may well change as
new priorities and boundaries are set for the
structural funds (Shutt and Colwell, 1997).
Rather than encouraging new regional initiatives, these new boundaries may strain existing alliances and the coherence of the wider
region. The economic sub-region of South
Yorkshire offers only limited coherence in
policy-making ambitions. Localist attitudes,
rooted in ‘old Labour’ (interview, SCC, 24
September 1998), developed during the
1980s despite the history of co-operation in
the South Yorkshire County Council.
ShefŽ eld has moved away from ‘old Labour’
politics towards a more entrepreneurial, business-oriented local policy, leading to a distinct contrast in political culture between
‘new labour’ city politics and ‘old Labour’
sub-regional politics. Political animosities
are reinforced by the anxiety that ShefŽ eld is
potentially too domineering in the sub-region. So far, and not surprisingly, informal
collaboration between ShefŽ eld and the other
localities in its immediate region has been
weak (interview, SCC, 24 September 1998).
Nevertheless, ShefŽ eld sees future possibilities in developing links with other urban
localities for the network-based pursuit of
new policy objectives—in a ‘tourism region’,
for example.
Whilst such horizontal linkages are undeveloped, there are strong vertical connections
between city and national government. The
local Labour member of parliament, Richard
Caborn, was Labour Party spokesman on
regional affairs before the 1997 election and
subsequently the minister with direct responsibility for regional institutional reforms.
Viewed from London, the economic performance of the regions was the main concern, the deputy Prime Minister wanting
regions to ‘punch their weight’ in a global
economy (DETR, 1997b). The sorts of regional institutions emerging in response to
the RDA economic strategy were a lesser
consideration.
In Yorkshire and Humberside, there seems
little room for locally led and customised
policy-making, and few provisions for such
links to be institutionalised. Existing informal networks in the cities are seeking ways
of responding to new regional institutions.
Local development objectives may well succeed because the new RDA needs to prove
its effectiveness and good projects from the
cities will help to achieve that aim. There is
uncertainty about the RDA and disappointment that the more comprehensive powers of
the Scottish Development Agency were not
given to the region and, particularly, that the
powers being given to London were not
given to other big cities (LDA, 1998).
Differentiation within the region and fragmented regional strategies are to some extent
a distinctive feature of Yorkshire and Humberside. Within the West Midlands Region,
economic integration and strong regional
identity, focused on Birmingham, create a
different picture of regionalisation. Like the
GOYH, the Government OfŽ ce for the West
Midlands is mainly interested in maximising
EU money. The main role of the new Regional Chamber is publicising and marketing
the region as a whole. However, Birmingham
is also a founder of the Eurocities local authority network, seeking to become a “great
European city” (Bentley and Shutt, 1997,
p. 127) and stressing the strong city-region
within the wider formal region.
A further variation in English regionalisation is, of course, evident in London. Here
the business agenda of existing London-wide
public –private partnerships and numerous
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NEW REGIONS IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY
sub-regional bodies (Newman and Thornley,
1997), is being given a democratic legitimacy through the Mayor and London Development Agency. In the other cities, mayors
may come into con ict with RDAs, but in
London the institutions are united. The cityregion scale contrasts with the wider regional
scale in the rest of England. The questions in
the London region relate to the continued
vitality of sub-regional institutions and the
weakness of co-ordination across the functional economic region which extends far
into adjoining formal regions. The policy
debate over housing in the green belt or on
‘brown’ Ž elds, for example, exposes the need
for interregional co-ordination. The new
RDA boundaries cut across existing arrangements for co-operation on regional planning
and the local planning authorities have considered forming a ‘super’ region forum
covering the south-east and eastern regions
(Planning, 1999).
In all regions, existing informal alliances
and partnerships want greater recognition for
themselves and in particular for the subregional differences which many such networks tend to represent (DETR, 1998a).
4. Explaining Differences in Regionalisation
In both countries, there is evidence of informal co-operation between institutions at both
the regional and the sub-regional scales. In
addition, shared interests take cities beyond
local and regional networks and into national
and European networks of collaboration.
The cases conŽ rm understandings of basic
differences between the countries. Each Land
sets a different context for regionalisation. In
England, by contrast, central government sets
a single framework, although a unique set of
arrangements operates in London. The German examples sit in a context of a more
balanced bargaining process between subnational governments. Moves towards a
more open,  exible, less territorially Ž xed
regionalisation develop in both countries, but
the different contexts lead to these informal
developments being variously encouraged,
1197
facilitated or ignored. The ‘organic’ regionalisation in England in the early 1990s (Harding et al., 1996) met with not regional
devolution, but reforms which at best deconcentrate central state power and, as we have
seen, subsequently there have been different
degrees of enthusiasm for regional and subregional co-operation. The key difference between the two national contexts is thus the
extent to which informal linkages between
local and regional partners are encouraged,
suppressed or ignored by formal institutions
and national political objectives.
Germany’s region-focused federalism may
appear a blueprint for locally devolved
government in a Europe of regions. Its threetier government hierarchy suggests greater
complexity but also more variety in policymaking than in Britain with its centralised
and largely standardised approach to regional
governance. However, whilst local developments have more reality in Germany, we
must remember that the Länder still control
regional development budgets and access to
EU funds. Regionalisation in Germany is
therefore not automatically more localised.
As Benz observes,
regionalisation in Germany is promoted by
pragmatic considerations rather than political ideologies, by administrative concerns rather than political con icts (Benz,
1998, p. 129).
There is a question about whether the more
recognised informal institutions in the German regions can move beyond being another
level of ‘talking shop’ and actually in uence
budgetary and development decisions. Subregional groupings may only be allowed certain functions—marketing, for example
—whilst core economic development and
transport planning decisions remain with the
formal tier of government.
There were clear differences in attitudes to
regional co-operation within both English regions and German Länder and their planning
regions. The capacity to make and implement
policy or to in uence other levels of government depends on formal powers and Ž nancial
resources, but also on the process of nego-
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1198
TASSILO HERRSCHEL AND PETER NEWMAN
tiation and bargaining between local, national and supranational governments and between government, business and others
(John, 1996). The perceived strength of local
and regional economies also affects attitudes
to regional co-operation and the prospects of
informal institutions. We noted the different
ways in which local groupings in Germany
came together around economic objectives,
and the contrast between the independent
stance of Leeds as opposed to the greater
dependence of ShefŽ eld on externally
deŽ ned regions. Weaker localities may want
to be rescued by regional government and
become more involved in European policy
networks as a means of ensuring  ows of
funds (Benz, 1998, p. 124). In stronger city
and sub-regional economies, local policymakers may want more control over their
destiny. In those cases where there seems to
be a mismatch between institutionalised regions and economic and policy ambitions,
informal regional alliances with varying territorial boundaries are more likely to emerge
(Danielzyk, 1998). Institutional innovation in
city and regional governance responds in part
to the continuing problem of the lack of Ž t
between economic and administrative
boundaries (Bennett, 1997) and to the search
for effective policy-making scales. But creating effective institutions is not an abstract
process and bargaining processes are often
contested. The city-region in England is such
a contested space. Outside London, central
government now prefers to manage economic development at a wider regional scale
and the cities have to adjust—through forming local, national and European alliances,
for example—to this new scale of administrative power. The deŽ nition of ‘regions’
should be seen as an outcome of negotiation
around the perceived interests of governmental and other actors.
Institutional reform does not inevitably resolve con ict and, as we saw in the German
cases, new boundaries can soon become barriers to effective economic policy. Viewed
from above, regionalisation can be heralded
as devolution, but from below new regional
institutions may be seen as further inhibiting
local aspirations. Gallent et al. (1998) argue
that regional reform may expose problems of
political legitimacy at various levels of
government, particularly where local government views are overlooked. In England, the
legitimacy of regional governance  ows
from both the popularity of national government and the local authority brought to Regional Chambers by indirectly elected local
government leaders. For the present, Labour
Party electoral dominance at local and national levels, and national leadership of regional reform by politicians from an
economically weaker region—John Prescott
(Hull) and Richard Caborn (ShefŽ eld)—give
the regionalisation process a political legitimacy. The continuing legitimacy of regional
reforms, however, depends on the potentially
unstable outcome of continuing co-operation
and bargaining between national and local
levels.
Some Länder encouraged new subregional forms of alliance around realistic
economic boundaries; others preferred topdown regional policy. Institutional integration and the Gegenstromprinzip give more
stability to intergovernmental relationships.
Party political links between local members
of the Land parliament and cities in the
Prignitz-Oberhavel region also contribute to
co-ordination. Regionalisation needs to be
seen as a continuous process of bargaining
and adjustment between both governmental
and public and private actors. Currently,
there are more than 400 such actors actively
expressing their views on various aspects of
the regional planning process in PrignitzOberhavel (interview, RPA Prignitz-Oberhavel, 25 June 1998). It is clear from our
cases that the regional scale of governance is
far from Ž xed institutionally or spatially. In
Prignitz, some local authorities located themselves in several overlapping regions. In
England, cities are in the process of adjusting
to new regional administration and forming
spatial alliances and other networks to
in uence bargaining over regional resources.
The deŽ nition of regions should be seen as
an attempt to stabilise these processes and
we should continue to expect the concept
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NEW REGIONS IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY
of region to continue to have many meanings.
Some authors are able to discern some
overall direction to these complex contemporary processes of change in governance.
For example, Amin and Hausner (1997) and
Hirst (1993) envisage stronger sub-national
governance supported by guiding and ‘interactive’ higher levels. In Britain, central
government has not yet taken this direction.
Strong budgetary controls and limited political devolution maintain a Ž rm central hand
on the tiller of regional governance. It is
much easier to see intergovernmental relations in Germany as ‘interactive’ (Heimpold
and Junkernheinrich, 1995). However, whilst
in some Länder there is support for new
local –regional initiatives others hang on to
traditional ways of doing things. It is not
easy, therefore, to perceive a single direction
in the institutional dynamics of regionalisation. Whilst new network forms of governance have been heralded, it is fairer to
conclude that there is “no general pursuit of
a ‘network paradigm’ ” (Collinge and Srbljanin, 1997, p. 28). Ultimately, regions, as
states, may be temporary constructs of
changing interactions, with no Ž xed
boundaries, and may overlap and interconnect in many different ways (Weichhart,
1996).
Our cases illustrate the continuing interaction between formal structures of regional
government and informal institutions. The
effect is a repeated reshaping of regional
institutions and territories which produces
different forms of regional governance in
different places. Our cases suggest that there
is not a single path of institutional development. However, there is currently substantial
interest in transferring lessons in institutionbuilding from apparently successful regions.
Within Europe, there is both indirect transfer
of lessons (through city and regional networks) and some ‘direct coercive transfer’
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) in EU and national funding rules. Such lesson-learning,
though, has to acknowledge the very different and shifting bases of regionalisation.
Hudson et al. (1997) argue that the institu-
1199
tional forms of successful regions cannot
simply be grafted on to others, pointing—
among other limiting factors—to basic constitutional differences. We support such
conclusions. The complexity of intergovernmental relations and contested deŽ nitions of
regions makes such policy transfer all the
more hazardous. One lesson, however, may
be that there seems to be no inevitable gain
for local policy-makers from greater devolution and no necessary loss if higher-level
governments continue to manage local policies. The more effective forms of regionalisation may be those based on co-operation
rather than the perception that regional governance is a zero-sum game.
It is clear that different types of regionalisation can exist within the same formal region. In eastern Germany, new forms of
regionalisation contrast with the top-down
planning which was a feature of post-war
governance in both England and Germany. In
some places, more policy-oriented, informal
regionalisation develops as the most promising answer, while in others older styles of
regional planning prevail. Different styles of
regionalisation are equally apparent in other
countries. Balme and le Galès (1997) contrast, largely urban, ‘stars’ with rural ‘black
holes’ in the ‘galaxy’ of French regions.
Trends in regionalisation across Europe are
far from clear. What is apparent at present,
however, is the variety of models of governance at sub-national level. Clearly, attempting to identify regions at a scale between the
national and the local is fraught with
difŽ culty. Some of our English cities operate
through perceptions of city-regions, funding
regions, formal regions and city networks.
Some of the German cases illustrated local
involvement in multiple regions. In attempting to understand European trends in governance, some authors offer alternatives to the
metaphor of scales. Bennington and Harvey
(1994) envisage overlapping ‘spheres’ of
European governance institutions and le
Galès (1998) a ‘polycentric’ governance of
public or private, central or local decisions.
Such analyses tend to stress, as our cases
make clear, the processes of bargaining and
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1200
TASSILO HERRSCHEL AND PETER NEWMAN
adjustment around deŽ nitions of regions. In
this paper, we have concentrated on changing
intergovernmental relationships. What distinguishes regionalisation in different countries
are not constitutional differences, or the culture of public –private sector relations, or
party political projects or intergovernmental
relationships alone, but the processes of interaction between these factors. We have indicated some of the complexity of dynamic
relationships between formal regional governments and informal institutions which
produce ‘regions’ with more or less permanence, varying institutional memberships and
varying ability to pursue policy objectives.
Note
1.
Questionnaire survey of Regional Planning
Associations in eastern Germany, 1998.
(authors’ manuscript).
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