Selecting and electing women to the House of
Representatives: Progress at last?
Dr Jennifer Curtin and Kelly Sexton
Politics Program
School of Political and Social Inquiry
Monash University
Refereed paper presented to the
Australasian Political Studies Association Conference
University of Adelaide
29 September - 1 October 2004
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
Discussions of the political representation of women have increasingly recognised the
importance of political parties in the equality equation. While there can be no doubt
that the choice of electoral system matters to women’s representation, it is also clear that
proportional representation cannot be seen as the end point to achieving gender
equality in national and sub-national parliaments. Electoral system change (from
majoritarian to proportional representation) is unusual in modern democratic states.
Moreover, no electoral system can be understood “in isolation from the political system
of which it is a part” (Butler 1981, 8). So, while a particular electoral system may
determine the coherence, structure and number of parties that compete, the
characteristics, behaviour and strategic choices of these political parties may in turn
determine the extent to which gendered representation is institutionalised within the
parliamentary arena.
In an effort to explore further the relationship between the electoral system,
political parties and the institutionalisation of gender equality in politics, this paper
considers the recent impact of the Australian Labor Party’s quota on women’s
candidacy rates in elections to Australia’s national House of Representatives. The aim is
to reveal not only the extent to which the quota rule has led to more Labor women being
selected, but whether there is evidence of an indirect influence on the other major
political actor, the Coalition and its propensity to select women as candidates. Research
suggests that contagion effects are more likely to result in proportional representation
systems (Matland and Studlar 1996) and single member districts are said to undermine
the selection of women as candidates because of intra-party competition. Thus, it may
seem counter-intuitive to seek a contagion effect in a majoritarian system, like that of
Australia’s federal lower house. However, in recent years, political parties have
experienced declining membership, there is little connection between party elites and
the grassroots membership, and there has been an increase in electoral volatility
(Pennings and Hazan 2001). In the case of Australia, all of these features are evident
(Ward, 1991; Bennett, 1998) and, when combined with the existence of compulsory
Page 2
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
voting and preferential (alternate ballot) voting in the lower house, any perceived
electoral advantage, including that of wooing additional women voters by appearing
open to women’s representation, may induce the opposing party to become more open
to women’s candidature (cf Kolinksy 1991; Matland 1993).
What impact Gender Quotas?
There has been much discussion in recent decades about the obstacles women face in
achieving gender equality in the parliamentary sphere (Burrell 1985; Lakeman 1976;
Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Norris and Lovenduski 1995; Norris 1996; Rule 1987;
Sawer and Simms 1993; Shredova 1998). At the systemic level, proportional
representation has been identified, both within nation states and in cross-national
analyses as a key factor in promoting women’s representation. Political culture appears
to matter, particularly when measured in terms of the voice and influence of the
women’s movement. With respect to political institutions, political parties have been
identified consistently as the primary gatekeepers to increasing women’s election to
parliament. The importance of parties applies in both majoritarian and proportional
representation systems. Yet it was not until the mid-1980s that the idea and
implementation of quotas by parties began to attract serious scholarly attention. By the
mid-1990s around 84 parties in 36 nations had adopted gender quotas (IPU in Caul
2001) and research into the success or otherwise of such strategies have begun to
flourish.1
Candidate gender quotas can be categorised into three broad strategies: as
reserved seats for women; as national legal quotas introduced via legislation or
constitutional amendment; or as political party quotas. Some initiatives have been
enshrined in law, with financial penalties applied to parties that do not conform, while
others have been voluntarily adopted by (usually) left-leaning parties. Most research
suggests that the important aspect to a successful quota strategy is the setting of a target
percentage of women to be selected, usually to winnable positions, achieved within a
There are obviously some exceptions, see for example Dahlerup’s (1998) summaries of the Nordic experience of
quotas.
1
Page 3
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
certain time frame (Curtin 1997a; Dahlerup 1998; IPU 1994; Studlar and McAllister
1998).2
The use of quotas as a strategic intervention is not without its critics. At a
theoretical level, debate primarily centres on the model of representation that best
informs good democratic practice and whether equality of representation should feature
as a legitimate claim for change (Phillips 1995; Sawer 2001). At a more practical level,
some argue that while the adoption of a quota requires organisational change on the
part of parties, as a remedy quotas fail to address the discriminatory practices and
institutionalised sexism embedded within political systems (Dahlerup 1998; Edwards
and McAllister 2002; Sawer 2000). Others contend that quotas limit women’s
representation to the target set; that implementation relies on women’s preparedness to
put themselves forward (Dahlerup 1998); or that quotas undermine the notion of
selection on the basis of merit (Henderson 1999).
On the other hand, there is an argument that while the hidden biases may not
initially be addressed by the advent of quotas, the more women are elected, the more
likely that the gendered nature of parliamentary norms and practices will be diluted and
ultimately a political career will become more attractive to women. The likelihood of
such substantive change occurring is however, dependent in part on a critical mass of
women being elected to parliament (Broughton and Zetlin 1996; Childs 2002; Grey
2002). Moreover, for the political parties that adopt a quota, they also choose,
advertently or not, a more proactive role in recruitment if they are serious about
increasing the candidacy rates of women. As a result, it becomes necessary for the
internal party machine to direct financial and other resources towards attracting women
candidates and educating party officials to become more open to women as potential
recruits. Research indicates for example that increasing the number of women officials
within the party bureaucracy also has an influence on women’s parliamentary
representation (Caul 1999; Gelb 1989; Lovenduski and Norris 1993), primarily for two
reasons: 1) because these women gain political capital by working for the party and go
For a detailed definition of these three categories of candidate gender quotas see Krook, M. 2003. ‘Candidate Gender
Quotas: A Framework for Analysis’, Paper presented at the 2nd General Conference of the ECPR, Marburg, Germany,
2
Page 4
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
on themselves to contest an election and 2) these women actively facilitate and support
the adoption and implementation of gender quotas within the party.
Two further points regarding the implementation of a gender quota are worth
mentioning here. The first concerns the format of party selection procedures: that is,
whether they are centralised or localised. Matland and Studlar (1996) argue that
centralised procedures allow party leaders to respond to (internal and external)
pressures for increasing diversity in representation, often resulting in the adoption of a
gender quota. In addition, centralised procedures also enable party hierarchies to
intervene, where necessary, to ensure the quota rule is implemented. By contrast,
localised selection processes (which are more prominent in non-PR systems) are less
easily influenced by either the central party organ, or by a concerted and organised
women’s movement working from outside the party system.
However, this perspective could become more complicated by an emerging trend
towards democratisation of the selection process. In theory, democratising candidate
selection means that more people are involved in the process of selection, while central
party organs release much of their control. While primaries are a traditional means for
voters to directly select candidates, there also appears to be a trend towards political
parties allowing their members to have more direct input into candidate selection and
conference delegate and party executive elections (Pennings and Hazan 2001; see also
ALP 2002). This has the potential to be a difficult issue for women party activists. While
male domination of a party’s national executive and conferences has been the norm,
often making it difficult for progressive rules to be debated and agreed to, centralised
control has also provided the means for ensuring implementation of the gender quotas
once they have been adopted.
The second point of note is the issue of incumbency. Incumbents are more likely
to be re-elected, and there is a drag effect associated with the supply of women as
potential candidates and the availability of seats. Cross-national evidence suggests that
high incumbency rates in seats have a negative impact on the election of women to
parliament (Darcy et al 1994; Matland and Studlar 1996). Quotas are a direct way of
September 18-21.
Page 5
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
undermining the drag effect, but can lead to problems with implementation if sitting
members have to face disendorsement.
Despite these obstacles early research suggests that there is a significant increase
in women’s representation where gender quotas have been adopted. While this increase
is not uniform across nation states (Krook 2003), it is evident that gender-related rules
are one of the most direct means by which the representation of women can be
increased (Caul 1999; 2001; Inglehart and Norris 2002; Kolinsky 1991; Norris 2002).
To what extent then might we expect the adoption of quotas to produce a
contagion effect? While the contagion theory, and its off-shoots (catch-all parties or
party policy imitation) has been referred to by numerous authors in the past (for
Australia see Jaensch 1983), it is Matland and Studlar (1996) that apply the theory to
explaining the differential representation of women in parliaments. Matland and
Studlar hypothesise that contagion occurs when a small party (usually leftist) stimulates
other (larger) parties to nominate more women candidates. In doing so, the smaller
parties highlight the lack of electoral penalty associated with selecting women
candidates, while also threatening to take at least some votes from the largest party
closest to them on the political spectrum. Once one large party begins to nominate more
women, the nature of party competition will ensure that other parties, out of political
necessary, adopt their own gender equality strategies. The authors draw on the cases of
Norway and Canada to explore their theory: both are multi-party polities (albeit with
different electoral systems), and feature progressive smaller parties that have a history
of actively promoting women’s political representation.
Matland and Studlar argue that while contagion is likely to be evident in both
single-member (Canada) and proportional (Norway) systems, its impact will be more
effective in the latter type of system because 1) minor parties need to be politically
innovative, 2) minor parties are a real electoral threat; and 3) ticket balancing along
gender lines is politically palatable because selection is less competitive where district
magnitudes are large.
Matland and Studlar suggest that when there is no third or minor party to
challenge the major parties, women party activists are left with only equity arguments,
Page 6
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
rather than strategic arguments about potential vote loss. The latter argument is
expected to have more traction with major party decision-makers. However, this
assumes that their votes are only lost to minor parties, and not between the two major
parties. In the Australian context, the gender gap in electoral behaviour suggests that
historically women were more likely to vote Liberal than Labor, although this has not
been fixed over time (Curtin 1997b; 2003; Lawrence 2000; Leithner 1997). As such
winning the women’s vote has become an effective strategic argument for Labor women
party activists seeking a gender quota rule.
Thus, whether a multi-party or a two party system, if one party adopts a gender
quota, competing parties may still fear losing women’s votes if they do not also act to
promote women’s representation (although this may not be in the form of a quota rule).
In other words, if party competition is intense, then a (macro)3 contagion effect is highly
probable.
Data and context
Our analysis centres on women’s candidacy rates for Australian House of
Representative elections between 1975 and 2001. The numbers of women candidates are
examined at each election between 1975 and 2001 in order to draw attention to the
impact of several affirmative action initiatives and to identify changes of government.
The numbers of women candidates have been collected according to party (major and
minor) although the focus of this paper is on the major parties. Data has been divided
into winnable, marginal and unsafe (suicide) seats.4
While this paper focuses on the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the Coalition,
it is worth noting that the Australian Democrats and the Greens have far surpassed the
Matland and Studlar (1996) distinguish between a micro and macro contagion effect. Micro refers to the district
level, where a woman is nominated in response to a competing party nominating a woman. Macro contagion occurs
when one party responds by increasing the overall number of women selected. It is the latter form of contagion that
is the focus of this paper.
3
4 There have been two methods employed by electoral behaviourists in Australia when examining notional seat status
and candidates selected. One scholar uses the election result for the election in which the candidates stood as the
means for determining the seat status (Hughes, 1983a; 1983b), while another uses the notional seat status from the
previous election, taking into account any redistributions (Mackerras, 1975; 1980; 1983; 1990). We have chosen the
former method for this paper, but are collating an additional data set to allow for an alternative analysis. We hope
this additional data will enable us to further investigate the extent to which women candidates might be vote
winners.
Page 7
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
major parties in their preselection of women candidates (Figure 1). However, as
candidates from these two minor parties have yet gain a seat in the House of
Representatives at a general election, we have excluded them from this analysis. This
does not mean they have not in some way prompted the major parties to review their
practices on gender inclusiveness. Moreover, because the Democrats and the Greens are
important in determining the balance of power in the Senate, their practices would be
worthy of exploration.
With respect to the House of Representatives, it is fair to focus primarily on the
parties who actually gain representation: ALP and the Coalition. Given this, evidence
of a contagion effect of a gender quota on women’s candidacy rates theory might seem
unlikely for several reasons. First, while the minor parties have been proactive in their
selection of women (see Figure 1), historically they have rarely threatened the major
parties in lower house seats, and so are unlikely to induce any imitation.
Figure 1: Number of Women Candidates, House of Representatives Elections
80
70
60
50
number
ALP
Liberal
National
Dems
Greens
40
30
20
10
0
1972
1974
1975
1977
1980
1983
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1998
2001
election year
Sour
ces: Mackerras Election Guides various years; AEC correspondence 1984; Hughes in Penniman 1983; AEC
Electoral Pocket Books 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001; Sawer and Simms 1993.
Page 8
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
Second, because Australia’s system features single-member districts, intra-party
competition for selection has always been intense. Moreover, while we still do not
know everything about the candidate selection processes (otherwise known as the Secret
Garden of Politics5), it is the case that the percentage of fairly safe/safe seats (those held
by more than a 5 percent margin) contested at each election is declining as a result of
electoral volatility in recent years.6 A likely outcome is that selection for a winnable seat
has become even more highly competitive.
Third, as Matland and Studlar have argued, turnover in single member systems is
lower than in proportional systems, making it more difficult to implement a gender
quota without seeking to remove an incumbent.7 In the House of Representatives
turnover is likely to be low because it is a single member system but also because since
1931, no government at the federal level has been turned out after only one term in
office. Governments are given at least two terms: more in the case of the Menzies (19491972) Hawke-Keating (1984-1996) and Howard Governments (1996-2004).
Yet, we might expect to see a contagion effect in a two party system like Australia’s
given the following: the vote margin between winning and losing government is within
a narrow band;8 intense competition for the middle ground of the political spectrum will
force parties towards more innovative and inclusive electoral strategies;9 polling and
other research demonstrates that women’s votes can swing and ultimately influence an
election result. Moreover, perceptions (justified or otherwise) of women candidates as
see M. Gallagher and Michael Marsh (1988), Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective. The Secret Garden of
Australian Politics, London: Sage.
5
While party identification remains the most significant factor in why people vote the way they do, the percentage of
first preference votes for the major parties has declined in both the Senate (which should be less surprising given it
has a proportional representation system) but also in the House of Representatives (Bennett, 1998).
6
Although this is not the case with the Australian Senate, where elections are conducted using a form of Single
Transferable Vote, but with the introduction of above the line voting in 1983, the likelihood of voters listing the
candidates individually has diminished substantially. Now, around 94 per cent of voters choose to vote above the
line, turning what is technically a Single Transferable Vote system into a quasi-party-list system. This means senators
are more likely to lose their protected position on the ballot paper because of party machinations than being punished
by voters.
7
In Australian House of Representative elections, governments have tended to win or lose on a 5 percent margin, but
their seat majority is often significantly inflated because of the majoritarian electoral system.
8
A version of Downs theory of the rational voter (M. Harrop and W.L. Miller, 1987. Elections and Voters. A
Comparative Introduction, Basingstoke: Macmillan).
9
Page 9
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
vote-losers have long since been identified as erroneous in the case of Australia
(Mackerras 1977; Summers 1983; Costar and Economou 1992).
The Australian Labor Party Quota
Women in Australian politics have made demands for party and parliamentary
representation in various ways over the last one hundred years. Many early women
political activists were anti-party, and women showed their support for this position by
standing as independent candidates and/or by voting independently, demonstrating
they could not be assumed to vote the same way as their husbands! (Curtin 2003;
Leithner 1997). However, once the ‘two party’ system was established, women on both
sides of the political spectrum began to work within their respective parties to have their
interests addressed. Liberal women negotiated themselves ongoing representation on
the federal executive of the Party as early as 1945, while Labor women were only
partially successful in maintaining women’s networks and national women’s
conferences within the party (Sawer 2000). Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that the
ALP considered itself a party for working men, with women, let alone feminists, being
seen as peripheral, if not damaging, to the electoral aspirations of the party (ALP 1978;
Sawer 2000).
In the post WWII period, women’s political representation at the federal level (see
Figure 2 over) was minimal to say the least and little cross party activity occurred to
politicise the issue. Outside of parliament, the Women’s Electoral Lobby, was
influential in drawing attention to women’s policy issues as well as their rates of
representation, and its membership often included women who went on to become
candidates for election. However, it was not until the mid-1980s that a steady (but
hardly substantial) increase in the number of women elected to federal parliament
becomes evident.
In the case of Australia, pressure for an affirmative action initiative on the part of
women did not come from a minor party to the left of the ALP but from women activists
both inside and outside the party (Sawer 2000; Summers 1983; Zetlin 1996). In 1978, the
ALP conducted a Committee of Inquiry to examine the Party’s future attraction to the
Page 10
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
changing demographics and aspirations of Australian voters. The Committee was made
up of 15 party members, two of whom were women (and who were included only after
protest). The discussion paper on Women in the ALP canvassed a number of
affirmative action strategies. For example that each state branch “might be required to
endorse a woman candidate for one safe seat at each federal election until women are
represented in the federal parliament in proportion to their membership of the party in
that state” (ALP 1978, 36). They even went on to suggest the possibility of women-only
short-lists: “a mechanism by which this recommendation could be implemented is to
declare that nominations for a specified safe seat will be accepted only from women”
(ALP 1978, 36).
Figure 2: Women’s Representation in the House of Representatives, 1972-2001
25
20
15
number
ALP
Liberal
National
10
5
0
1972
1974
1975
1977
1980
1983
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1998
2001
election
Source: Australian Parliamentary Handbook, http://www.aph.gov.au/library
No change resulted immediately following the release of the report. However, at
the 1981 ALP National Conference, affirmative action principles were endorsed
whereby women were to be represented across all party structures in proportion to their
overall membership. This win was considered a surprise to both party supporters and
Page 11
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
journalists (Hughes 1983a, 242). The resolution set a target of 30 percent women in the
parliamentary party by 1990. However, this first attempt at affirmative action was
inherently flawed (Moar 2003). The Conference decision requested rather than required
state branches to implement the strategy and it did not explicitly refer to candidate
selection for winnable seats. Furthermore, Conference requested the National Executive
to monitor branch progress, but did not give them the right to intervene to ensure
implementation. So while an important first step, it remained a largely rhetorical
strategy making little impact on the number of Labor women elected to parliament.
The second affirmative action strategy was the adoption of a gender quota at the
ALP National Conference in 1994. What became known as Rule 12 in the Constitution
stated that thirty five per cent of the parliamentary party, members of party committees
and conference delegates were to be women by 2002, at both federal and state level. The
target of 35 percent was commonly cited as reflecting women’s proportion of party
membership but was also recognised by women party activists as the point at which
women would become a critical mass and able then to overcome the structural and
cultural obstacles that remained within the party (Moar 2003; Sawer 2002). The eight
year time schedule was based on the expiry of three electoral terms, in recognition that
such a time frame is necessary for implementation through natural replacement rather
than deposing sitting members (Dahlerup 1988; Hughes 1983a; Zetlin 1996).
State Branches10 were designated responsibility for ensuring the gender quota
was met and progress reports were to be delivered at National Conference ensuring a
level of accountability. The National Executive was able to intervene in preselections if
the quota was not met, with all seats then declared open, potentially threatening
incumbent men with the possibility of being disendorsed. There is no doubt that this
would have acted as a significant punitive incentive to state branches. In 2002, a Special
Rules Conference extended the quota target to 40 percent to be achieved by 2012.11 Both
Candidates are selected for federal elections by state branches so is a decentralised process in both the Labor and
Liberal parties. State Branches have relative autonomy in deciding who to select. The new rule does not provide
Labor’s national executive with the authority to intervene during the selection process, only after the event.
10
11 The ALP adopted an affirmative action model of 40:40:20 whereby a minimum of 40 percent of relevant positions
shall be held by either gender. This also applied to union delegates to party conferences. The quota increase had
been recommended by the Hawke-Wran Report on the ALP commissioned by the Party. The authors appeared
Page 12
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
these targets were largely the result of women’s action within the party and by party
women working within the independent organisation Emily’s List.12
Elsewhere others have detailed the battles that these women fought in order to
achieve this success: the difficulties and tensions associated with the institutionalisation
of factions which began to divide women within the party; the difficulties with bringing
recalcitrant trade unions into line given their influence at party conference; and forcing
the party hierarchy to recognise the value of attracting more women voters to the ALP
(Gillard, 2000; Hennessy, 2000; Lawrence, 2000; Sawer, 2000; 2002; Summers, 1983). For
example, Zetlin argues that the adoption of the ALP quota in 1994 was a “well
orchestrated tactical campaign” by women in the Party. While women were able to “get
the numbers” (usually a job for the men), she also argues the campaign represented the
development of a more sophisticated form of feminist politics, one which focused less
on individual women working outside the system, to one which challenged the
institutions themselves as being the source of barriers to more gender equality in
representation and participation in politics (Zetlin, 1996: 120). So while gender quotas
themselves may not undermine directly the obstacles facing women, the fight to achieve
the quota offered the ALP a challenge to reflect on its own culture of equality.
So what progress has been made within the Labor Party since the adoption of
affirmative action principles? The number of female candidates nominated by the ALP
has steadily risen over the last thirty years, reaching double figures in 1977 and
averaging around 21 over the following decade (Figure 3). However, prior to the
adoption of the 1994 gender quota, the data in Figure 3 indicate that women were
seldom endorsed in winnable seats (defined here as those with a margin of more than 5
percent). It is clear that the adoption of the affirmative action principles in 1981 made
some difference in terms of the total number of women selected, with four women
influenced by the submissions they received from Emily’s List and the Labor Women’s Network, plus a copy of the
motions carried at the previous National Labor Women’s Conference. It is worth noting that in 1981, at the time the
first Affirmative Action measure was adopted, neither Emily’s List nor the Labor Women’s Network existed to
support or promote the issue of women’s selection.
12
EMILY’s List was established in Australia in 1996 and aims to promote the election to parliament of Labor
women who demonstrate a commitment to a range of women’s rights. Women candidates preselected for winnable
seats are provided with a range of resources and support during their campaign (see Sawer, 2004).
Page 13
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
selected to safe seats. Moreover, the target of 30 percent of women in the parliamentary
party by 1990 remained elusive (it stood at 9 percent).
Page 14
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
Figure 3: Number of ALP Women (S)elected for House of Representative elections
1975-2001
70
60
50
Number
40
30
20
10
0
1975
1977
1980
1983
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1998
2001
Election Year
Total women candidates
Women in safe seats
Women Elected
Sources: see Figure 1
At the time, psephologist Colin Hughes predicted that achieving such an outcome
would be difficult:
At the next three elections only seven Labor MHRs who held safe seats in 1980 are
due to be .. compelled to retire; all of them come from [the state of] New South
Wales. Only two in marginal seats could be expected to step down over that period
because of age.
Thus affirmative action to the level proposed will require the
removal of sitting members, or else a very high proportion of winnable seats being
assigned to female candidates who then win them in sufficient numbers to assure
continuous Labor governments from 1983 onward (Hughes 1983a, 243).
While the ALP did govern continuously from 1983, the nomination of women to
winnable seats was insufficient to meet the target. Five women were nominated in 1984
Page 15
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
to winnable seats, but as a percentage this represented a decrease in the rate of
nomination because the number of parliamentary seats had increased by 23 just prior to
the 1984 election, 19 of which were classified as winnable Labor seats. By 1987, the
number of women nominated to winnable seats had dropped to just two. Since the
adoption of the 1994 quota the number of female candidates nominated has more than
doubled from 26 to 59, while the number of those selected for winnable seats almost
quadrupled from 4 to 15. Clearly this has had an impact on the parliamentary presence
of Labor women, with women now making up 30 percent of Labor MPs at the
Commonwealth level, despite Labor being in opposition.
While winnable seats were not designated explicitly in the ALP quota rule,
implementation necessarily requires the party focus on selecting women for winnable
seats. Particularly important is that the party used their time in opposition to achieve
their target. In both the 1980 and 1996 elections, the only seats won by women were the
winnable seats. In elections where Labor was in government, the proportion of Labor
women represented in parliament was bolstered by their success in marginal seats.
However, what is also evident about Labor’s time in opposition is that this is when the
biggest increases in the number of women nominated occur (1975-83; 1996-01).
Comparisons across the political spectrum
Ideologically, the Liberal-National Coalition parties in Australia would consider
themselves opposed to the introduction of a gender quota. Quotas have been labelled
tokenism and undermining selection on the basis of merit (Henderson 1999). Although
the Liberal Party has had a history of electing a greater number of women to federal
parliament, provided special representation for women on their Federal Executive and
had a higher proportion of women party members, there has been less of a demand for
strategic intervention on the part of women.13 In addition, it appeared that during the
Menzies term as Liberal Prime Minister (1949-1966), the women’s vote had been
consolidated by the Liberal Party, and little challenge was apparent from the ALP.
13 The Liberal Party also has a number of women’s networks which focus on providing support, skills training and
mentors to aspiring candidates.
Page 16
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
While Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam was later praised for initiating a range of
progressive policy measures on behalf of women during his term (1972-1975), including
the establishment of an Office for the Status of Women located within the Department of
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, this did little to ensure a significant percentage of the
women’s vote shifted from Liberal to Labor (Aitkin 1982). Indeed, the Liberal-National
Coalition that replaced the Whitlam Government in 1975 was the first to appoint a
woman to Cabinet with portfolio responsibilities (as distinct from the Ministry. Senator
Margaret Guilfoyle was Minister for Social Security and then Minister for Finance).14
Thus, while the Liberal Party has a history of policy conservatism in the area of
women’s issues, it has been a party that has portrayed itself as open to women, often
more so than the trade-union dominated ALP. The National Party, perhaps not
surprisingly given it is a rural-interest party, was even slower to recognise the interests
of their women constituents.
In terms of candidate selection, especially during the 1970s, the Coalition’s record
on nominating women was dismal (Figure 4). It is not until 1983, that a steady rise in
the number of Coalition women candidates begins to emerge. At that election, the
Liberal Party lost a considerable number of seats, and many within the party suggested
“its apparent lack of sympathy for women’s issues had cost it votes” (Hughes 1983b).
By the 1984 election, the number of Coalition women selected had doubled to 22, and
from the 1990 election onwards the number has continued to rise steadily to reach the
mid 30s by 2001. Between 1984 and 1998, the Coalition has been competitive with, if not
surpassing the ALP in terms of the number of women selected. Since 1998 there has
been no increase in the number of women, while the ALP’s quota has pushed up its
gender candidacy rates significantly. Interestingly, and similarly to the ALP, the points
at which the Coalition makes headway with increasing its number of women candidates
are also the periods during which it is in opposition (between 1983 and 1996).
14
Enid Lyons was the first Liberal woman in Cabinet but she did not hold a portfolio position.
Page 17
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
Figure 4: Number of Women Candidates from Major Parties 1972-2001
70
60
50
40
number
ALP
Coalition
30
20
10
0
1972
1974
1975
1977
1980
1983
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
election
1998
2001
Sources:
Sources: see Figure 1
So how do the two major parties compare in terms of the seat status contested by
women candidates in both parties? We have broken down the data into winnable seats
(those with a margin of more than five percent), marginal seats (those with a margin of
between -5 and 5 percent) and suicide seats (those that are considered opposition safe
seats).
Several points emerge as interesting. Looking first at winnable seats (Figure 5)
we see that prior to 1998, the Coalition had a depressing record, with no women selected
for a safe seat prior to 1984, and the increase from then was only slight. Indeed, while
the Coalition began to show a significant increase in selecting women, throughout the
1980s most of these were being nominated for suicide seats.
Page 18
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
Figure 5: Numbers of Women Preselected to Winnable Seats, 1975-2001
16
14
12
Number
10
Labor
Coalition
8
6
4
2
0
1975
1977
1980
1983
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1998
2001
election year
Sources: see Figure 1
While Labor selected more women than the Coalition over the same period, their
record in winnable seats was only marginally better, peaking at 5 in 1984 but then
remaining at 4 until 1998. Although the total number of Labor women candidates
increased unevenly over this period, almost all of the increases were absorbed by
women standing in suicide seats.
It is during the 1990s that new directions are visible in both parties. While we have
already mentioned the substantial increase in Labor women nominated to safe seats in
both the 1998 and 2001 elections, clearly a result of the 1994 quota rule, what is also
apparent is a quadrupling in the number of Coalition women nominated for safe seats
over the same two elections: elections in which the Coalition was re-elected to
government. This can be partly explained by the large number of women who won
marginal seats in the 1996 election and then went on in the 1998 election to turn these
Page 19
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
into fairly safe Coalition seats.15 It might also be an indication of how valuable women
candidates are in winning constituent support.
Moreover, while Labor stood significantly more women than the Coalition, most of
the increase is again absorbed by a doubling of the number of women contesting suicide
seats. By comparison, the number of Coalition women standing for seats in this
category falls away steadily after 1990 (Figure 6). In addition, both parties register
considerable and comparable increases in the number of women nominated for
marginal seats.
Figure 6: Numbers of Women Preselected to Suicide Seats, 1975-2001
30
25
number
20
Labor
Coalition
15
10
5
0
1975
1977
1980
1983
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1998
2001
election
Sources: see Figure 1
What then might this tell us about the contagion effect of quotas in the Australian House
of Representatives? It appears that the ALP Inquiry in 1978 and the adoption of an
affirmative action strategy in 1981 resulted in an increase in the total number of women
See R. Whip, 2003. ‘The 1996 Australian Federal Election and its Aftermath: A Case for Equal Gender
Representation.’ Australian Feminist Studies, 18, 40: 73-97, for an analysis of the influx of Coalition women into
parliament after the 1996 election.
15
Page 20
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
candidates but was ineffectual in ensuring that 30 percent of these women were
nominated to safe seats over the following three elections. From 1983 onwards, a similar
steady increase in the total number of women is evident within the Coalition parties, but
again with little impact on the nomination of women candidates to winnable seats.
The adoption of the ALP quota in 1994, and its more explicit application and
regime of adherence has ensured that within three election cycles the number of women
nominated to winnable seats had increased substantially, and this increase has
continued. Over the same time period the number of Coalition women selected for safe
seats has also risen significantly, suggesting that it wants to be seen to be competitive
with the ALP in terms of its commitment to political gender equality. Thus, while the
chances of women being selected for winnable seats in single member districts remains
an event that is fraught with politics, the evidence presented here suggests that
candidate gender quotas initiated by one party in a tightly contested two party system
can ensure an increase in women’s nomination across the political spectrum.
Conclusions
It is argued that three election cycles are needed for the impact of a candidate gender
quota to become visible, but we would argue that the impact of a quota is enhanced if it
coincides with a time of rebuilding while in opposition. That is, incumbents either lose
their seats in the election as a result of the swing against the government, or they hold
their seats but the desire to remain in parliament as an opposition backbencher for at
least two terms (the usual minimal period of government in the Australian case) holds
little attraction, especially if the incumbent has been a government minister with all the
perks, power and status that brings. However, our results also suggest that inroads into
winnable seats can be made by women even while their party is in government,
particularly where an increasingly volatile electorate can result in an unpredictable
number of safe and marginal seats.
It would be valuable to revisit this data after the current Coalition has been in
opposition for at least one term, particularly given it was successful in having many of
its marginal women candidates elected alongside the women selected for safe seats. We
Page 21
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
are also undertaking further research on women’s selection for the Senate, where
proportional representation is used, thereby allowing for a comparison of the contagion
effect in two different electoral systems operating simultaneously within one electorate.
Irrespective of these caveats, it appears that both major parties have begun to
recognise the importance and electoral advantage of having more women elected to
parliament, and the implementation of the ALP gender quota is clearly part of the
reason why this change has occurred. Whether the increase in the quota to 40 percent
will have a similar effect remains to be seen, but while winning vote margins remain
tight in the Australian House of Representatives, then the perceived electoral advantage
of women candidates may continue to promote the parliamentary presence of women.
References
Aitkin, D. 1982. Stability and Change in Australian Politics. 2nd edition, Canberra:
Australian National University Press.
ALP. 1978. Australian Labor Party National Committee of Inquiry: Discussion Papers.
APSA Monograph No. 23, Adelaide: Flinders University.
ALP. 2002. National Constitution of the Australian Labor Party adopted at the Special
National Rules Conference, 5-6 October.
Australian Electoral Commission, http://www.aec.gov.au
Australian Electoral Commission, Electoral Pocket Book, AEC Canberra (1990, 1993, 1996,
1998, 2001).
Bennett, S. 1998. The Reduction in the Size of the Tasmanian Parliament Research Note 2,
Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary Library.
Broughton S. and Zetlin, D. 1996. ‘Queensland ALP Women Parliamentarians: Women
in the Suits and Boys in Factions’ International Review of Women and Leadership, 2(1):
47-61.
Burrell, B. 1985. ‘Women’s and Men’s Campaigns for the US House of Representatives,
1972-82: A Finance Gap?’ American Politics Quarterly, 13.
Butler, D. 1981. ‘Electoral Systems.’ In Democracy at the Polls. A Comparative Study of
Competitive National Elections, eds. D. Butler, H.R. Penniman et al Washington:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
Caul, M. 1999. ‘Women’s Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties.’
Party Politics, 5(1): 79-98.
Caul, M. 2001. ‘Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A CrossNational Analysis’, The Journal of Politics, 63 (4): 1214-1229.
Childs, S. 2002. ‘Hitting the Target: Are Labour Women MPs ‘Acting for’ Women?’,
Parliamentary Affairs, 55 (1): 143-153.
Page 22
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
Costar, B. 1997. ‘Electoral Systems’ in Government, Politics, Power and Policy in Australia,
6th Edn. Eds D. Woodward, A. Parkin, J. Summers, South Melbourne: Longman,
225-239.
Costar, B. and Economou, N. 1992. ‘Elections and Electoral Change 1982-1992’, in Trials
in Power. Cain Kirner and Victoria 1982-1992, eds. M. Considine and B. Costar,
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 247-264.
Curtin, J. 1997a. Women and the UK Election Research Note 47, Canberra: Department of
the Parliamentary Library.
Curtin, J. 1997b. The Gender Gap in Australian Elections, Research Paper No. 3, Canberra:
Dept. of the Parliamentary Library.
Curtin, J. 2003. ‘White Women and the Federal Vote, 1902-1949: Challenging the Idea of
Women’s Conservatism’, in Selective Democracy. Race, Gender and the Australian
Vote, eds. J. Chesterman and D. Philips, Melbourne: Circa, 112-126.
Dahlerup, D. 1998. ‘Using Quotas to increase women’s political representation’ in
Women in Parliament: Beyond the Numbers, ed. A. Karam. Stockholm: IDEA
Publications.
Darcy, R. Welch, S. and Clark, J. 1994. Women, Elections and Representation, Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press.
Edwards,J. and McAllister, L. 2002. ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Women in the
Two Main Political Parties in Wales’, Parliamentary Affairs, 55 (1): 154-166.
Gelb, J. 1989. Feminism and politics: a comparative perspective, Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Gillard, J. 2000. ‘The future is female: pursuing change in the Labor Party’, in Party Girls:
Labor Women Now, eds K. Deverall, R. Huntley, P. Sharpe, and J. Tilly, Sydney:
Pluto Press, 238-251.
Grey, S. 2002. ‘Does Size Matter? Critical Mass and New Zealand Women MPs’,
Parliamentary Affairs, 55 (1): 19-29.
Henderson, A. 1999. Getting Even: Women MPs on Life, Power and Politics. Sydney: Harper
Collins.
Hennessy, J. 2000. ‘Natural Selection and the Political Animal’, in Party Girls: Labor
Women Now, eds K. Deverall, R. Huntley, P. Sharpe, and J. Tilly, Sydney: Pluto
Press, 223-237.
Hughes, C. 1983a. ‘A Close-Run Thing’ in Australia at the Polls. The national Elections of
1980 and 1983. ed. H.R. Penniman, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 216-247.
Hughes, C, 1983b. ‘An Election about Perceptions’, in Australia at the Polls. The national
Elections of 1980 and 1983. ed. H.R. Penniman, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 281-318
Inglehart R. and Norris, P. 2000. ‘The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap:
Women’s and Men’s Voting Behaviour in Global Perspective’, International Political
Science Review, 21 (4): 441-462.
IPU, 1994. Plan of Action to Correct Present Imbalances in the Participation of Men and
Women in Political Life, Geneva: Interparliamentary Union.
Jaensch, D. 1983. The Australian Party System, Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Kolinsky, E. 1991. ‘Political Participation and Parliamentary Careers: Women’s Quotas
in West Germany.’ West European Politics 14 (1): 56-72.
Page 23
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
Lakeman, E. 1976. ‘Electoral Systems and Women in Parliament.’ The Parliamentarian 57:
159-162.
Lawrence, C. 2000. ‘The Gender Gap in Political Behaviour’, in Party Girls: Labor Women
Now, eds K. Deverall, R. Huntley, P. Sharpe, and J. Tilly, Sydney: Pluto Press,
2204-222.
Leithner, C. 1997. ‘A Gender Gap in Australia? Commonwealth Elections 1910-1996’,
Australian Journal of Political Science, 32 (1): 29-37.
Lovenduski, J. and Norris, P. 1993. Gender and Party Politics London: Sage.
Mackerras, M. 1977. ‘Do Women Candidates Lose Votes?’, Australian Quarterly, 49 (3): 611.
Mackerras, M. 1975. Elections1975, Sydney, Angus and Robertson.
Mackerras, M. 1980. Elections 1980, Sydney, Angus and Roberston.
Mackerras, M. 1990. Elections 1990, Sydney, Angus and Robertson.
Matland, R. 1993. ‘Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National
Legislatures: The Case of Norway’, Journal of Politics, 55 (3): 737-755
Matland R. and Studlar D. 1996. ‘The Contagion of Women Candidates in SingleMember District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and
Norway.’ Journal of Politics 58 (3): 707-733.
Moar, G. 2003. To Be or Not to Be – Women as a Critical Mass on the Australian Political
Stage. Honours Thesis, Politics, Melbourne: Monash University.
Norris, P. 1996. ‘Legislative Recruitment’ in Comparative Democratic Elections, eds. L.
LeDuc, R. Niemi and P. Norris, London: Sage.
Norris, P. and Lovenduski, J. 1995. Political Recruitment: Gender Race and Class in the
British Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pennings P. and Hazan, T. 2001. ‘Democratising Candidate Selection. Causes and
Consequences’, Party Politics, 7 (3): 267-275.
Phillips, A. 1995. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rule, W. 1987. ‘Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women’s Opportunities for
Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies.’ Western Political Quarterly
40 (3): 447-498.
Sawer, M. 2000. ‘Women and Labor: a question of heartland? In The Machine. Labor
Confronts the Future, eds. J. Warhurst and A. Parkin, Sydney: Allen and Unwin,
264-280.
Sawer, M. 2001. ‘A matter of simple justice? Women and Parliamentary Representation’
in Speaking for the People. Representation in Australian Politics, eds. M. Sawer and G.
Zappala, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 162-190.
Sawer, M. 2002. ‘The Representation of Women in Australia: Meaning and Make
Believe’, Parliamentary Affairs, 55 (1): 5-18.
Sawer, M. 2004. ‘”When women support women…” EMILY’s List and the substantive
representation of women in Australia’, Paper presented to the Meetings of the
Canadian Political Science Association, 3-5 June, Winnipeg, Manitoba.
Sawer M. and Simms, M. 1993, A Woman’s Place. Women and Politics in Australia. 2nd edn.
Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Shredova, N. 1998. ‘Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament’, in Women in
Parliament: Beyond the Numbers, ed. A. Karam. Stockholm: IDEA Publications.
Page 24
JenniferCurtin and Kelly Sexton, Selecting and Electing Women
Studlar D.T. and McAllister, I. 1998. ‘Candidate Gender and Voting in the 1997 British
General Election: Did Labour Quotas Matter?’, Journal of Legislative Studies 4 (3):
72-91.
Summers, A. 1983. ‘Holding the Balance of Power? Women in Australian Electoral
Politics’, in Australia at the Polls. The national Elections of 1980 and 1983. ed. H.R.
Penniman, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 124-139.
Ward, I. 1991. ‘The Changing Organisational Nature of Australia’s Political Parties’,
Journal of Comparative and Commonwealth Politics, 29 (2): 153-174.
Zetlin, D. 1996. ‘We’re here because we’re here: Women and the ALP Quota’, in Gender
Politics and Citizenship in the 1990s, eds. B. Sullivan and G. Whitehouse, Sydney:
University of New South Wales Press, 120-129.
Page 25