State Feminism in Ortega's Nicaragua Raly Chakarova Queen’s University Abstract: The re-rise to power of the revolutionary Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) government in Nicaragua promised a shift in power relations that could advance the influential women's movement agenda towards gender equality. However, instead of meaningful participation, the centralization of power in the executive instituted a form of state feminism directed at increasing women's political participation and poverty alleviation. Examining the government's initiatives in these areas through mainly primary research in-country, this paper concludes that the FSLN’s state feminism is conceptual, but not practical. The FSLN gender policy was designed and promoted as a populist strategy meant to consolidate and expand an electoral base and maintain political power, rather than challenge gender roles and power relations between men and women. Introduction The state is instrumental in the fight for gender equality due to its lawful authority to dictate socially accepted behaviour, allocate resources, and privilege certain interest groups over others. This is why the rise of the ‘new’ left or ‘pink tide’ in Latin America has captured the attention of academics and feminists for its potential to produce progressive social transformation and expand democratic representation in the region (Cameron & Hershberg, 2010; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Weyland, Madrid & Hunter, 2010). Its goal of social justice has raised the hopes of women’s movements, since an increase in social programs disproportionately alleviates women’s responsibilities, while its inference of a shift in power relations among social actors could increase women’s formal and informal power over the state (Cameron & Hershberg, 2010; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Weyland, Madrid & Hunter, 2010). These were the expectations of the influential women’s movement in Nicaragua when in 2006 Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) won the presidency for the first time since their revolutionary government in the 1980s. The FSLN was the foundation for women’s mobilization and the expansion of women’s economic, political, and social rights in the 1980s (Molyneaux, 1985; Randall, 1994; Isbester, 2001). The FSLN is now claiming back important areas of state responsibility, such as the provision of basic services and new social programs for the poor, a stark contrast from 16 years of neoliberal governments (Isbester, 2001). As a populist leader, Ortega has engaged in the restructuring of state power, centralizing it in himself, while hollowing out the independent power of horizontal institutions. This centralization of power and strong statist vision has resulted in a gender policy of 'state feminism'. In this paper, I assess FSLN’s state feminism in women's political participation and the government's two pillar poverty reduction programs - Hambre Cero and Usura Cero. I argue that the FSLN's state feminism is only conceptual and not practical, designed to legitimize the political discourse of the government and secure votes, instead of meaningfully advance women’s rights. Ultimately, these policies perpetuate systems that maintain women’s subordinate status and do not address the biggest obstacle to women's empowerment - machismo. Methodology The paper is based mainly on primary research through interviews, focus groups, TV and newspaper analysis, and personal observations while residing in Nicaragua for a year. A total of 15 interviews in Spanish were conducted with actors in diverse aspects of social and political life, which were chosen based on their knowledge or direct involvement with women’s rights and politics. Those included the directors of leading women’s organizations in the country, government officials at the local level, international NGOs, research institutes, and university professors1. Four focus groups, two for each program, were also carried out with beneficiaries of the programs Usura Cero and Hambre Cero on Ometepe Island. It is important to note that the extreme political polarization along Sandinista and anti-Sandinista lines, and the more recent division between Orteguismo and anti-Ortega, prejudiced the opinions of all Nicaraguan sources. FSLN State ‘Feminism’ The state is in the best position to devote public resources to women’s needs and break down the structural barriers of their subordination. I define state feminism as a government’s strategy to introduce top-down programs that promote women’s rights and gender equality. This is usually done through changes in the legal code and the passage of legislation, which are essential for women’s status in society and their strategic interests. The government has the ability to increase women’s political and economic opportunities and give access to state services, such as health and education, to previously marginalized women. State feminism can be seen as a contradictory concept, considering the view of many feminists that the state is patriarchal. However, the state can also be viewed as a third party enforcer of gender equality and a fundamental component in normalizing accepted social relations, and therefore gender equality. In the case of Nicaragua, women’s increased opportunities were not complemented by initiatives to address their institutionalized traditional roles or their sexual and reproductive rights. Rather, the social programs initiated by the FSLN solidified gender relations and left women precariously dependent on the state. 1 Details of interviews can be found in Appendix A. Some participants chose to remain anonymous, fearing government retaliation. The exclusion of women’s organizations from the policy making process and the centralization of power in Ortega has allowed the FSLN government to advance its own gender agenda, embodying a top-down state feminism that focuses mainly on women’s practical and not strategic interests. Considering Ortega’s power over all government institutions, the presence of political will to advance women’s rights could produce important benefits for women. Although it lacks a clear gender policy, through its fiery rhetoric, the FSLN executive has committed itself to achieving gender equality in Nicaragua. As an example of this dedication, Rosario Murillo (Ortega's wife and First Lady of Nicaragua) always complements the masculine Spanish language with feminine counterparts in all of her public speeches (e.g. ‘todos y todas’). The FSLN executive, together with its ministries, has held hundreds of fairs, public demonstrations, and marches, to show their commitment and educate women on their rights. Women's Political Participation The political participation of women is an important contributing factor towards gender equality, since women can contribute to the policy discussion and advocate for policies and programs that address women's needs. While there are no mandatory political quotas for women in Nicaragua, each political party has established its own voluntary guidelines. The FSLN has a 30% quota for women, which was the result of pressure from now Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS) members in the mid-1990s. The MRS party has a 40% quota for women, while the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) has a combined quota for youth and women at 40% (Quota Project, 2009). However, following his rise to power, Ortega promised to introduce 50-50 division of political power between men and women in the FSLN at the national, as well as the local level. Although, no reforms to the law or party statutes were made to institutionalize this promise or make it obligatory for other political parties, the significant increase of female representation in the 2011 elections surpassed that 50% commitment. Out of the members elected under the FSLN banner, 33 of 62 were women, making them a majority at 53%. The total percentage of women in the National Assembly increased to 40.2% (European Union Electoral Observation, 2011). Since the 2006 election, women have also been appointed to important positions of power, heading the traditional ‘feminine’ ministries, such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health, but also typically ‘masculine’ ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Labour, and the Chief of Police. This impressive increase in women’s descriptive representation at the national level is deeply contrasted to the stagnant percentages for female mayors at the local level (Table 1). To improve female representation at the municipal level and comply with his 50-50 commitment, Ortega has authorized that if an elected FSLN mayor is male, then the vice-mayor should be female. While this is a form of affirmative action, it questions democratic accountability and the legitimacy of those female vice-mayors. Table 1: Percentage of Women in the National Assembly 1990 1998 2000 2005 2008 2011 % of Women in the National Assembly 14.8 10.8 9.7 20.7 18.5 40.2 % of Female Mayors …… 6.3 9.9 10.5 8.6 8.6 Source: CEPAL, 2011 While this important increase in women’s representation is commendable, descriptive representation is necessary but not sufficient for gender-friendly state policies. What is fundamental is substantive representation, which embodies the willingness and commitment of women in power to meaningfully advance women’s rights. In the Ortega administration, this type of representation is absent at best, and regressive for women at worst. One important reality that is masked behind the statistics above is the high turnover of women in positions of power at the national level. For example, in the first three months of Ortega’s first presidency, he removed three cabinet ministers, all of which were women (Gooren, 2010). This use of Ortega’s discretional power and centralization of control of the FSLN continued throughout his presidency to assure partisan compliance. The Ministry of the Family, Adolescents and Children and the Women’s Institute (INIM) both changed five different ministers, Nicaragua’s Cultural Institute changed four different directors, and the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources changed two different ministers (Alvarez, 2011). All of these officials, and others in lower bureaucratic positions, were women who were removed and replaced by Ortega and, in a few rare instances, quit as a show of defiance to Ortega’s militant control. The high turnover for women in the FSLN government is an indication of Ortega’s centralized control and the overall environment of obedience and conformity. The fear of repression or expulsion from the party also makes it impossible to know how much power these women really wield, although some examples demonstrate that it isn’t much. In interviews with women’s NGOs, the women expressed their initial excitement when women with ties to civil organizations were elected at the national level in 2006. That enthusiasm was quickly dampened when those women were removed from their political positions or when they turned their backs on the women’s movement and its demands. The women who remained in their positions were criticized for “thinking like men” (Interview #1, 2, 4, 9). This meant that instead of women in the National Assembly protecting and advancing women’s rights they sided with their male counterparts, failing to provide needed political support for the proposals and demands of women’s organizations. This is indicative of strict partisan politics, whereby the executive dictates the opinions and stance of its politicians and severely restricts their ability to initiate bills contrary to Ortega’s objectives. As Azahalea Solis from Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres (MAM) points out, the “women who are included in party posts and those who retain their appointments are the ones that do not challenge the status quo and do not criticize the rules of the game”. Sofia Montenegro further added that “one piece of paper doesn’t move without the consent of the first lady [Rosario Murillo], everything has to be consulted with her, and everyone is prohibited from speaking in public or you can talk but at your own risk”. In this case, women's descriptive representation at the national level does little to advance the goals of the women’s movement, since those in power are more willing to defend the party’s interests over the strategic gender interests of women. An illustrative example is INIM, which is the main government agency looking after women’s interests. It pledges to eradicate all forms of gender-based discrimination, monitor the application of laws, policies, and programs and ensure that they promote women’s interests and gender equality. However, INIM does not provide any evaluations of government programs or laws, or follow-up on its own recommendations to different departments. Even if links to progress reports are available on their website, those are either broken or do not load. Furthermore, the institute’s lack of autonomy from the FSLN is apparent in their bulletins and statements. INIM does not criticize the FSLN or suggest proposals or improvements for gender policies. Instead, it supplies updates of government initiatives, which are always presented in a favourable light. National women’s organizations also report that the institute refuses to engage them in policy consultations or allocate funding. Therefore, rather than being a meaningful check on the FSLN executive gender policy, INIM is a vehicle for FSLN propaganda that aims to legitimize the government’s discourse. Social Programs: Hambre Cero & Usura Cero The FSLN’s strongest focus and largest financial contribution to its gender agenda is its social programs directed exclusively to women, which also fit in the ‘new left’ redistributive approach. Hambre Cero (Zero Hunger) and Usura Cero (Zero Usury) are the FSLN’s pillar programs to combat poverty in both rural and urban areas respectively, through diversifying and improving women’s economic opportunities. According to the FSLN, women are the drivers of social change and development and these programs empower and help them to fulfill their practical needs and improve the lives of their families. Hambre Cero was originally designed and implemented in Brazil with great success in eliminating poverty and reducing child malnutrition. With some changes, it was introduced in Nicaragua in 2007 by the FSLN and it aims to help rural women and their families by providing them with agricultural seeds, a cow, a pig, six chickens and a rooster, three months worth of feed and medications, and construction materials to accommodate the animals. In total, each ‘productive bonus’ totals $1500 per beneficiary and is designed to provide them with a source of income from selling animal offspring and by-products and garden produce. The program is also complemented with agricultural training for the women and technical assistance from employees of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAGFOR) who manage the program. The requirements for beneficiaries is that they must be women in need, have at least one manzana2 of land for the establishment of the garden and the animals, form a collective with the other beneficiaries in the community, and save 20% of the value of the ‘productive bonus’ to develop access to capital (Interview #13). Usura Cero is a microcredit program financed by ALBA-Caruna and administered by the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MIFIC) to improve the access to credit for urban women in need. Each woman can take out a loan of up to $240, which has to be paid in six to eight months by the group as a whole. The interest rate is extremely low at 4% and the group acts as collateral if one of the women cannot afford to repay. After they have been approved for the 2 Equivalent to 1.72 hectares loan, each group of five to ten women receives two days of training to develop their business plan before receiving the money. Each loan is meant to be used to start a new business or expand an existing one. Groups can receive subsequent loans after they have paid off the previous one (Interview #14). The concept of both programs is a good one, with the potential to significantly reduce poverty and improve the lives of impoverished women. However, the reality and intentions behind the programs’ implementation, monitoring and continuation are suspect. Civil society organizations have denounced the programs as clientalistic, traditionalist, and simply as handouts to buy votes. The following evaluation of the programs suggests that these allegations are accurate. A comprehensive analysis of the programs and their impact on a country-wide basis is extremely difficult, since the government does not publish any of the evaluation reports it allegedly carries out and because some of the beneficiaries of the program also benefit from other NGO programs in their communities. The following assessment of the programs is based on interviews, newspaper articles and four focus groups with beneficiaries of both programs on Ometepe Island. On a national level, the execution of Hambre Cero has been fraught with inconsistency, instability, and controversy. In his presidential campaign, Ortega promised to deliver 100 000 ‘productive bonuses’ to women beneficiaries and their families. However, by the end of 2010 only 48 053 families had benefited from the program. In 2011, coincidentally an election year, 33 300 families received a productive bonus (Table 2)3. Table 2: Number of Families Beneficiaries by Hambre Cero 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 TOTAL 5 000 14 000 15 000 14 053 33 300 81 353 Source: IEEPP, 2011 In reality, MAGFOR as an institution is not equipped to manage the scope of this program at the national level. It doesn’t have strong coverage and networks around the country, or the sufficient number of qualified staff necessary to efficiently implement and monitor the 3 IEEPP is the only independent, holistic report available for the program programs. For example, by the middle of 2010 MAGFOR had spent only C$125 9094, from its annual budget of C$180 million, a common trend each year (Figure 1). Paradoxically, at the same time the program owed C$5.3 million to 45 small and medium poultry farmers from purchases made the year before. This weak capacity to implement the program could be due, in part, to the high turnover in MAGFOR’s administration. In the first two years of Hambre Cero there were four different program directors and a high turnover of MAGFOR delegates at the departmental level, further stalling the implementation of the program (Interview # 13). Another likely reason is the FSLN’s tendency to disregard the experience of local NGOs and refuse their cooperation in the program’s implementation (Interview # 2, 5, 11, 13). Figure 1: The Difference between the Assigned Budget (dark blue) and the Spent Budget (light blue) for Hambre Cero Source: IEEPP, 2011 The quality of the program has also come into question. There are reports that many women do not receive the full $1500 worth of the bonus but only a portion, estimated now at around $500 (Figure 2). Sometimes the animals are delivered either sick or infertile, without the proper medicine, or without the materials needed to construct their shelters. Combined with the insufficient number of technical assistants who are unable to provide the comprehensive training, monitoring and support needed, some beneficiaries end up consuming or selling the animals. This would be considered a failure of the project, since those animals are meant to provide a new economic opportunity for the women. 4 C$ indicates that the value is in Nicaraguan cordobas The land requirement makes it difficult for women in extreme poverty or those who do not have title to their own land to meet the requirements of the program. FIDEG (2011) finds that in 2008 only 13.7% of women owned land, and 7.7% owned land as a couple. This contrasts starkly with the 73.8% of land owned by men. Therefore, the ability of the program to reduce extreme poverty is jeopardized, also leaving the essential problem of gendered land ownership unaddressed. Although the program encourages women to sell their extra produce, no markets are established to help facilitate that in the communities, so women are expected to cope with this difficulty individually. Furthermore, feminist groups have criticized the nature of the program as solidifying women’s traditional roles. Women are given an economic opportunity that complements their household and child-caring responsibilities, and therefore further justifies and consolidates their ‘place’ in the home. Figure 2: Average Value of ‘Productive Bonus’ per Family Source: IEEPP, 2011 The strongest criticism against the program is its clientalistic nature, as it is believed beneficiaries of the program tend to be FSLN supporters. Following such initial criticisms, the program was expanded to benefit people who support opposition parties, but the majority of beneficiaries remain FSLN sympathizers. One of the discrete ways this is accomplished is through the discretional documentation of the population. It was revealed that during election time the Electoral Council (CSE) refused documentation, known as a cedula, to people who were not recognized FSLN supporters. One of the requirements of Hambre Cero is that applicants present documentation for official records. As a result, it is more likely that FSLN supporters would be able to qualify for the program. Indicative of the clientalistc nature of the program is the discrepancy in municipalities between their level of poverty and the number of ‘productive bonuses’ delivered. As can be seen from Table 3, FSLN-headed municipalities with lower percentage of poverty have received significantly higher number of bonuses than PLC-headed municipalities with higher percentage of poverty (IEEPP, 2011). Table 3: Discrepancy between Poverty Rates and ‘Productive Bonus’ Deliveries Municipality Delivered ‘Bonuses’ 2010 Poverty Rate Party in Power Jinotega 1 422 45.7 % FSLN Matagalpa 1 180 37.1 % FSLN Rosita 795 77 % PLC Cua-Bocay 669 65.5 % PLC Source: IEEPP, 2011 The strongest indication of the program's clientalistic nature is that beneficiaries are selected by the Citizens’ Power Councils (GPC) in each community. GPC is a parallel structure to the elected municipal government that oversees social programs, participatory budgeting and the distribution of government aid, answering directly to the FSLN executive rather than the electorate. The membership of these councils tends to be primarily Sandinista, which politicizes the distribution of material benefits, taking away the requirement of need and supplementing it with political affiliation. This was evident in the focus groups with Hambre Cero beneficiaries, all of which were FSLN supporters. From the 34 women who had benefited from the program, one was the wife of the Ministry of Education delegate to the island, three were the wives of GPC leaders, seven were GPC members, and five were employed in the mayor’s office or were teachers. This indicates that almost half of the beneficiaries have direct ties to the FSLN government and some do not meet the requirement of necessity since they have relatively wellpaid and stable jobs. Additionally, in terms of losing, consuming, or selling their animals, six women no longer had the chickens, four no longer had their cow, and twelve no longer had their pig. The most predominant reason given was the lack of food for the animals, which directly competes with the supply of food for the family. Nevertheless, the beneficiaries systematically praised the FSLN and Ortega, agreeing that no other government had addressed their needs and vowed to always support the FSLN. In terms of the Usura Cero program, there are even fewer studies and evaluations of its implementation and management. This is partly because it is administered through ALBA, and therefore Venezuelan funds, which do not enter the national budget and are spent discretionally by Ortega. The program is not as plagued by a clientalistic strategy, because loans are given on a collective basis. Therefore, it is harder for GPC, who again are the ones who select the beneficiaries, to force women to be in a group with other women they do not trust to repay their loans. Nevertheless, the program still suffers from important limitations and deficiencies. One is the lack of repayment by beneficiaries. Because this program was introduced slightly after Hambre Cero many women thought the loan was a gift from the government that did not need to be paid back. Therefore, by the beginning of 2009 repayment of loans was less than half and the program was suffering a C$7.2 million deficit. In this case the groups acted against their collateral purpose, because they remained in solidarity but against paying the loan. After engaging in an educational campaign to ensure that beneficiaries know their repayment obligations, loan returns allegedly improved. However, there are other reasons for non-payment that were reported by the departmental office in Rivas. The employee interviewed revealed that sometimes women’s businesses collapse, sometimes instead of investing in their business women buy things for the house or use the money to repay other loans, and on few occasions the group leader, charged with repaying the group loan, had simply kept the money. As well, there have been some corruption allegations against GPC members and administrators in MIFIC for pocketing the money of women’s groups. This is possible because of the unclear criteria established for repayment and the weak capability of MIFIC to monitor beneficiaries and the process as a whole. All the women in the two focus groups had started businesses selling cooked food, or buying and reselling cosmetics, clothes, or groceries. All of these are extremely small-scale and carry high risk of volatility in revenues, if not complete collapse of the business. These start-ups are also done in women’s homes, so they induce the same traditionalist critique that Hambre Cero does regarding women’s 'place' in the home. It was rare that members of the two interviewed groups had a firm grasp of their business plan and how they would invest their loans in order to most efficiently grow their investments. This was telling of the low level of training they received before acquiring their loans. Most importantly, these businesses still marginalized women to the informal sector, where women are disproportionately represented, and which has grown considerably since 2005 (Table 4). The informal sector is characterized with precarious employment, void of any labour rights and benefits. Table 4: Informal Sector of Employment (National) 2005 2009 2010 Women 68.4 73.7 78.4 Men 65.5 72.1 73.3 Total 66.8 72.4 75.3 Source: FIDEG, 2011 Examining the FSLN’s two pillar social programs, the best financed portion of their gender agenda, demonstrates that while some women have undeniably benefited, improvements remain momentary and marginal. The scope of the programs is simply not large enough to address the chronic problem of poverty in the country and improve economic opportunities. For example, in a study by FIDEG (2011) only 23.7% of participants said they had benefitted from any government programs, while 42.2% said they had lost their employment. Neither program is sustainable because they are not institutionalized and they depend highly on who’s in power. To a large degree, this explains Ortega’s landslide victory in 2011. Dependency on the FSLN is further strengthened because the programs do little to change the structural conditions behind poverty, such as high unemployment, precarious employment, weak social security, and women’s subordinate status. Lastly, both of these programs are largely funded by Venezuelan investment, making their continuation dependent on the political and economic climate of the Venezuelan government. Considering Machismo: Women’s Biggest Obstacle in Nicaragua In Nicaragua, machismo is a sociocultural patriarchal system with no one specific English word to describe it. Machismo represents an androcentric practice of systematic subordination of women, which privileges masculinity while excluding and relegating female experiences and perspectives. It is a form of hyper-masculinity that idolizes women’s bodies and identities as wives and mothers, but also reduces women to sexual objects and property that can be controlled. While it emphasizes positive characteristics in males such as honour, dignity, strength, and responsibility to provide for the family, it also positions women as vulnerable, and in need of protection and a spouse. Therefore, machismo locks both men and women in static gender roles and power relations not only in the family, but also in acceptable types of employment and decision-making positions. Machismo tends to be more pronounced in rural areas, or where women have low economic power and education. The machista perception of women as property implies that they can be controlled and that they don’t need to be consulted, taking away their agency to make decisions regarding their bodies and lives. The criminalization of therapeutic abortion in 2006 is the best example of the institutionalization of this view at the state level (Kampwirth, 2006; Kane, 2008). What makes machismo so static and embedded in Nicaraguan culture is that it is present in both individual behaviour and manifested and reproduced in political, judicial, and social institutions. These institutional structures are responsible for creating and promoting public policies and laws which allows them to shape and dictate gender, power, and state-society relations. The FSLN has largely maintained this system of oppression, secluding women to the private sphere and encouraging their traditional roles as mothers and guardians of the family unit. All women interviewed identified machismo as the biggest or one of the biggest obstacles to women’s emancipation and advancement. Ortega’s populist style of governance erodes the relative autonomy of the state and embeds it into society. The more the state penetrates society, the more likely it would be to perpetuate machista attitudes. This is likely one of the reasons why it is uncommon for female mayors to be elected at the local level where state and society are most intertwined in everyday life and where machisa views are strongest. On the contrary, a state that is institutionally stronger and autonomous from social relations will have more power to act upon society to change such corrosive social conceptions. It is important to acknowledge that machismo is not a static system, but it manifests itself differently throughout time and space, and the level of its influence varies depending on the variables present. Conclusion Instead of challenging gender roles and power relations between men and women, the FSLN has perpetuated a culture of machismo through its policies, marginalizing women to the private sphere and emphasizes their roles as wives and mothers. This familist strategy subordinates women’s individual interests and demands to the conservation and protection of the family unit and allows economic activity that is compatible and secondary to women’s primary household responsibilities. The FSLN’s two pillar social programs for women exhibit this conservative ideology and reduce women’s emancipation to economic reductionism. Even if they do satisfy women’s practical needs, an imperative with the high rate of poverty in Nicaragua, these programs are paternalistic and unsustainable, creating dependency on the government and voter deadlock. Instead, a policy approach is needed that recognizes poverty as multifaceted, especially allowing for women’s control over their own bodies, decision making, and life. The FSLN initiatives seem to be designed and promoted as a populist strategy meant to consolidate and expand an electoral base and maintain political power. The FSLN’s state ‘feminism’ is conceptual, but not practical. Although Nicaragua is the second poorest country in Latin America, financial restraints cannot justify the FSLN’s poor gender performance. The presence of sufficient finances is clear from the budgets of Hambre Cero and Usura Cero. What is needed is better allocation of those resources and the partnering with civil organizations to take advantage of their expertise and experience and eliminate the duplication of efforts. Social programs and policies should be designed with the goal of expanding women’s rights, strengthening institutions, and deconstructing social systems of oppression, such as machismo. However, a focus on structural changes is not as visible to voters as material hand-outs. So, those initiatives might be genderfriendly, but they are not voter-friendly. Another necessary requirement is the opening up of the political system and the nourishment of a secular democracy, which would meaningfully incorporate women’s voices and reflect their needs and demands. 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Appendix A List of Interviews Interview Position & Organization Interview # 1 Lawyer and social worker at AMNLAE (Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses ‘Luisa Amanda Espinoza’) Interview # 2 Professor at UCA (Universidad Centroamericana) Interview # 3 Ana Margarita Vijil, lawyer and member of MRS (Movimiento Renovador Sandinista) Interview # 4 Employee at FEV (Fundación Entre Volcanes) Interview # 5 Azahalea Solis, vice-president of MAM (Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres) Interview # 6 Economist & sociologist at FIDEG (Fundación Internacional para el Desafió Económico Global) Interview # 7 Vice Mayor & Director of GPC (Gabinete del Poder Ciudadano) Interview # 8 Sofia Montenegro, journalist and director of CINCO (Centro de Investigación de la Comunicación) Interview # 9 Maria Joseta Rivera, Director of MEC (Movimiento de Trabajadoras y Desempleadas ‘María Elena Cuadra’) Interview # 10 Maria Elena Dominguez, Lawyer and member of RMCV (Red de Mujeres Contra la Violencia) Interview # 11 Program Director, Oxfam Intermon Interview # 12 Deborah Grandison, Procuradora Especial de la Mujer Interview # 13 Employee at MAGFOR, Ometepe (Ministerio Agropecuario y Forestal) Interview # 14 Employee at Caruna, Rivas Interview # 15 Tabatha Parker, Executive Director of NDI (Natural Doctors International) Focus Group #1 Beneficiaries of Hambre Cero, Balgue Focus Group #2 Beneficiaries of Hambre Cero, Santa Cruz Focus Group #3 Beneficiaries of Usura Cero, Moyogalpa Focus Group #4 Beneficiaries of Usura Cero, Altagracia
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