J. OF PUBLIC BUDGETING, ACCOUNTING & FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, 24 (3), 397-428
FALL 2012
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL
DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Larita J. Killian and Kimdy Le*
ABSTRACT. Special districts comprise over 40% of local governments,
prompting debate on the merits of general versus special entities. Previous
research focused on relative cost-efficiency and tended to ignore how
special districts impact government accountability. This study fills a critical
need by testing how type of government (general versus special) impacts
citizen awareness of and familiarity with government, a precondition for
accountability. Drawing from two theoretical perspectives (institutional
reform and public choice), we used survey research to assess familiarity with
the goals and performance and financial practices of local governments in
Indiana. Our study participants were more aware of and familiar with
general than special governments, which supports the institutional reform
perspective more than public choice. We conclude that efforts to improve
accountability should be expanded to include special districts.
INTRODUCTION
Special districts are the growth area of government. Between
1952 and 2007, the number of independent school districts in the
United States decreased by 81% and the number of general purpose
local governments increased by just 5% (all growth was among
municipalities), yet the number of special districts increased over
200%. Per census data, special districts now comprise nearly 42% of
all local governments (U.S. Census Bureau, 1992; 2007a).
The
remarkable proliferation of special districts has prompted scholars
-----------------------* Larita J. Killian, Ed.D, CPA, is an Assistant Professor, Division of Business,
Indiana University at Columbus. Her teaching and research interests are in
governmental accounting, special districts, and accounting pedagogy.
Kimdy Le, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Psychology at Indiana
University at Columbus. His teaching and research interests are in
personality theory, statistics, and measurement.
Copyright © 2012 by PrAcademics Press
398
KILLIAN & LE and policymakers to debate the relative merits of general-purpose
and special district governments. But a critical aspect of the debate,
the relationship between local government structure and democratic
accountability, suffers from a lack of empirical evidence. This study
addresses that problem by testing citizen familiarity with the generalpurpose and special district governments that serve them -- a
precondition for government accountability. Of course, the fact that
citizens are aware of and familiarity with the governments that serve
them does not guarantee accountability, but without such awareness
and familiarity, citizens cannot hold governments accountable.
This study uses the U.S. Census Bureau (2002a) definition of
special districts, which includes many entities with “authority” in their
titles. Several factors account for the growth of special districts,
including inflexible or unsuitable municipal annexation laws (Bollens,
1957; Foster, 1997); the desire to circumvent debt limitations or
personnel policies imposed on general-purpose governments
(Bollens, 1957; Smith, 1969; Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) 1987; Leigland, 1990; Axelrod,
1992); the desire to attract technical experts who prefer to avoid the
glare of partisan general elections (Smith, 1969); and federal
government policies that direct funds to special districts (Smith,
1969; Foster, 1997). Wood (1961) referred to tradition and political
style as factors behind the increase of special districts. For instance,
a growing community may face a critical decision on provision of
water services for a new housing development: the new development
can be annexed into the previous municipality, or a special water
district can be created. Whatever course is chosen sets a precedent
and becomes a learned response for future decisions. “As time goes
on, the alternative first adopted tends to become a governmental
tradition, a political style, and even may crystallize into law” (Wood,
1961, p. 66). Regardless of the explanations for the growth of
special districts, a democracy cannot afford to ignore the impact on
accountability.
Government accountability is a multi-faceted and evolving
concept. Most observers agree that accountability begins with
adequate financial reporting, and in recent years, the need for
performance reporting has gained acceptance (Harris, McKenzie &
Rentfro, 2011). Ingram and Copeland (1981) found that accounting
information is useful to voters in deciding whether to retain
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
399 incumbents. Guo, Fink and Frank (2009) found that financial
reporting is a critical foundation of accountability and that the
contemporary political and economic environment requires a higher
quality of financial disclosure. They conclude, however, that the lack
of norms (such as trend data or comparisons with referent groups)
detracts from the ability of financial reports to enhance accountability
(Guo, Fink & Frank, 2009). Lowery (2001) found that for citizens to
exercise meaningful democratic control, they must have valid
information on what government is doing and how well it is doing it.
He asserted that a fragmented (versus consolidated) government
structure provides more opportunities for public officials to
manipulate reported information and thus weaken democratic
accountability (Lowery, 2001).
While adequate financial and performance reporting is necessary
for accountability, it is not sufficient.
Most definitions of
accountability involve a dynamic exchange of information between
government and citizens.
If the exchange is ineffective,
accountability is not achieved. The Governmental Accounting
Standards Board (GASB) included the notion of active discourse in its
definition of accountability: it includes the citizens’ “right to know”
and to receive facts about government costs and operations that may
“lead to public debate by the citizens and their elected
representatives” (GASB, 1987). Wells and Scheff (1992) identified
six measures of accountability, including “public accountability” which
is indicated by the level of citizen participation in government affairs.
Per Wells and Scheff, other measures of accountability include
market accountability, political accountability, bureaucratic
accountability, legal accountability, and professional accountability.
Chan and Rubin (1987) wrote that governmental accounting and
financial reporting stem from the normative theory of democracy
which commends citizens to be well-informed; further, per demand
models of government, public policies emerge from the direct and
active demands of citizens. Williams (2002) found that accountability
involves more than the provision of technical economic facts; it
implies a moral imperative and “permits making explicit who is
accountable to whom and for what” (2002, 5). Sen (1999)
acknowledged the dynamic nature of accountability when he wrote
that political participation is intrinsic to human well-being; to be
prevented from participation is a “major deprivation.” Further, Sen
(1999) found that public discussion and exchange of information are
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KILLIAN & LE required for identifying and prioritizing economic needs and for
keeping democratic governments responsible and accountable.
From the above, we can identify key elements of government
accountability. It involves the exchange of information between a
government and its citizens; discussion or debate that serves to
identify and prioritize civic needs; and voter judgments regarding the
responsiveness of government officials. Government accountability is
a growing concern, especially in the current climate where budget
crises are forcing trade-offs and cutbacks in services, and where
states such as Indiana, New York, and Ohio are working to streamline
government and improve responsiveness.1 Efforts to assess or
improve accountability, however, have tended to focus on generalpurpose governments and to by-pass special districts (Killian, 2011).
Our research fills a critical need by extending the investigation of
accountability to special districts.
There are reasons to question the relative accountability of
special districts as compared to general-purpose governments. After
studying compliance with generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) among state and local governments, GASB (2008) estimated
that special districts have the lowest rate of financial reporting
compliance of all local governments. Special districts also have a
lower profile with regard to performance reporting. For instance, the
Association of Government Accountants (AGA) posts information
about performance reporting on its website, listing entities that have
recently earned certificates of excellence for Service Efforts and
Accomplishments (SEA) reporting and entities that have voluntarily
submitted citizen-centric reports; special districts are rarely found on
these lists. The U.S. Census Bureau reported that special districts
had the lowest response rate to the organization survey for the 2002
census of governments (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002a). In short, while
accountability is a concern for all types of government, citizens may
be even less familiar with the finances and performance of special
districts. This would magnify the “accountability deficit” for special
districts relative to general-purpose governments.
Most research on general versus special government has
addressed the relative cost-efficiency of providing a given service
through general or special government; questions of accountability
have been vigorously debated but generally ignored in research. This
situation obtains, in part, because it is more difficult to assess
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
401 accountability than to measure cost-efficiency (Lowery, 2001). We
agree with Lowery (2001) that direct measures of accountability are
difficult to obtain. We can contribute to the debate, however, by
measuring a precondition for accountability: citizen familiarity with
their governments. The key elements of accountability (information
exchange between citizens and government, discussion and debate
about priorities, voter judgments of officials) require citizen
awareness of and familiarity with the governments that serve them.
By comparing citizen familiarity with general-purpose and special
district governments, we can test whether the form of government
impacts this prerequisite for accountability.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Several theoretical perspectives have been applied to
comparisons of general-purpose and special district governments
(Foster, 1997). The “institutional reform” and “public choice”
perspectives are most relevant to our research. Both perspectives
compare general-purpose and special district governments along
three dimensions: economy and efficiency of operations, policy
alignment and allocation of resources, and democratic accountability.
While a thorough analysis of these competing perspectives is beyond
the scope of this paper, a brief summary is provided below.
The institutional reform perspective originated with scholars such
as Bolens (1957) and Smith (1969). It arose in response to the
increasing fragmentation and layering of government that became
apparent during the 1950’s and which continues, though at a
reduced pace. Institutional reformers believe that a complex,
fragmented government structure increases the total cost of
government through increased administrative and coordination costs.
Moreover, a fragmented structure confuses citizens and reduces their
ability to hold public officials accountable. Institutional reformers
often propose the consolidation of government entities to reduce
fragmentation and improve efficiency. This perspective enjoyed early
acceptance, though actual efforts to consolidate governments have
usually ended in failure (Faulk and Hicks 2009). In recent decades,
the public choice perspective has been ascendant. However,
scholars such as Barlow (1991) and Lowery (2001) kept the
institutional reform argument alive. Lowery (2001) identified an
emergent, “neoprogressive” perspective that is grounded in the
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KILLIAN & LE institutional reform tradition but places greater reliance on social
science methods and empirical tools to combat the public choice
argument. Recent efforts at government consolidation, such as
proposals to consolidate or eliminate townships in Indiana (Indiana
Commission on Local Government Reform (ICLGR), 2007)
demonstrate that the institutional reform perspective retains
currency.
In contrast, public choice advocates believe that consolidation
and centralization lead to monopolistic government with the power to
force certain services upon citizens and require them to pay for the
services, even if the services do not correspond to citizen
preferences. The public choice argument stems from the famous
Tiebout hypothesis. Tiebout (1956) argued that there is a market in
governments, just as there is a market for commercial goods and
services. Citizens have the power to “vote with their feet” and move
to the community that offers the basket of government services they
prefer at a price (tax levy) they can afford. Building upon the Tiebout
hypothesis, public choice scholars such as Delorenzo (1981) and
Mehay (1984) argued that the proliferation of governments results in
the best value for consumer-citizens, if not always the lowest price.
For instance, citizens might choose to pay more for higher quality or
increased quantity of service. When institutional reformers claim that
consolidated governments can provide services at less cost due to
economies of scale, public choice scholars reply that small,
specialized governments can also achieve economies through jointcontracting or service agreements. Moreover, Bish and Ostram
(1973) found that some services, such as education and police
protection, are highly sensitive to local conditions and that
consolidation of these services on a large scale could lead to
diseconomies.
After decades of research, the argument between institutional
reform and public choice is inconclusive. Studies can be found to
support both perspectives; this is not surprising given the complexity
of the subject matter, varying local contexts, and variations in state
enabling laws for general and special governments (McCabe, 2000).
Foster (1997) conducted a meta-analysis and reported that the
preponderance of evidence supports the institutional reform
perspective. A continuing problem, however, is that prior research
has emphasized the cost-efficiency dimension while other
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
403 dimensions, such as the impact of government structure on
accountability, remained virtually unexamined.
Focus on Democratic Accountability
As shown in the introduction, accountability involves the
exchange of information between a government and its citizens;
discussion or debate to identify and prioritize needs; and voter
judgments regarding the responsiveness of government officials. At a
minimum, this requires citizen awareness of which government
entities are responsible for which services. Critics charge that the
proliferation of special districts confuses citizens and detracts from
democratic accountability. For instance, Bollens (1957) referred to
fragmented local government as a three-ring circus that sows
confusion and indifference among citizens, especially regarding
special districts. “Twice removed” from special district officials,
citizens are frequently unable to bring direct action against them
(Bollens, 1957). Axelrod (1992) wrote that special districts insulate
officials from voters; normal, democratic checks and balances do not
apply. Peddie (2007) found that special district elections do not
coincide with general elections, draw little voter interest, and are
usually uncontested. Spitzer (2007) concluded that many citizens
are simply unaware of the existence of special districts.
The opposing, public choice argument is offered by scholars such
as Wagner and Weber (1975), Mehay (1984), and the later ACIR
(1987).2 They conclude that citizens can monitor small, specialized
units of government more effectively than large, general
governments. Wagner and Weber (1975) noted that a fragmented
and overlapping government structure is preferable to having a
reduced number of general governments that can act as monopolistic
(and thus unresponsive) rather than competitive suppliers of services.
Mehay (1984) found that citizens may be less able to monitor
officials in general purpose entities because the (presumably) larger
bureaucracy associated with general governments is harder to
penetrate.
In 1987, ACIR took a nuanced and carefully stated
position: ACIR found that citizens can monitor a single, special district
government with ease, though the proliferation of special districts
exacerbates the accountability challenge.
In summary, institutional reformers and public choice advocates
agree that public awareness of service outcomes and costs, and the
404
KILLIAN & LE ability of voters to judge government officials, are essential to
democratic accountability. They disagree, however, on the optimal
government structure to achieve these ends. Our research addresses
this problem by comparing citizen familiarity with general-purpose
and special district governments.
Research Questions
In testing for comparative awareness and familiarity, we
distinguish between a government’s goals and performance and its
finances. GASB (1994) noted that citizens need information about
government performance as well as government finances. Sanders
(1994) agreed that citizens need both types of information, but noted
that due to “fiscal illusion” citizens are more likely to have
information about performance than finances. For instance, citizens
can often experience or observe the quantity and quality of services
provided, but they may lack information on the cost of those services.
The problem is exacerbated when several small, overlapping taxing
entities are consolidated onto a single county tax bill (Sanders,
1994).
Since there is no objective standard for adequate civic
information, we ask citizens to rate their own level of familiarity with
the governments that serve them.3 This is appropriate for our
research because the absolute level of familiarity is not the issue;
rather, we are concerned with the comparative levels of familiarity
regarding general-purpose and special district governments. We also
want to test whether citizens perceive they have enough information
about the governments that serve them, so we include questions on
the ideal level of familiarity for a given government. Finally, we want
to test whether the disparity between actual and ideal familiarity
differs between general-purpose and special district governments.
These goals lead to the following research questions:
Goals and performance:
Question 1: Do citizens differ in their familiarity with the goals and
performance of general-purpose versus special district
governments?
Question 2: Do citizens differ in their perceptions of ideally how
familiar they should be with the goals and performance of
general-purpose versus special district governments?
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
405 Question 3: Is the disparity between actual and ideal familiarity with
goals and performance different for general purpose versus
special district governments?
Finances:
Question 4: Do citizens differ in their familiarity with the financial
resources of general purpose versus special district
governments?
Question 5: Do citizens differ in their perceptions of ideally how
familiar they should be with the financial resources of general
purpose versus special district governments?
Question 6: Is the disparity between actual and ideal familiarity with
financial resources different for general purpose versus special
district governments?
METHODOLOGY
The distribution of special districts varies appreciably from state
to state, as do the powers granted to special districts in state
enabling laws (McCabe 2000; Foster, 1997).
This situation
constrains the potential for valid, cross-state research. For this pilot
study, we limited our sample to a single state, choosing the state of
Indiana. In recent years, there have been high-level studies on how to
streamline and improve Indiana government (ICLGR, 2007; Faulk and
Hicks, 2009), and proposals to restructure local government have
been repeatedly introduced into the state legislature. However, these
past studies and proposals usually focused on general-purpose
governments and bypassed special districts. A study that compares
how general and special governments impact a precondition for
accountability brings needed attention to this issue and contributes
to the ongoing policy debate. Further, we live and work in Indiana
and our university strongly encourages service to the region. By
focusing on special districts in Indiana for this initial study, we are
upholding an important institutional value.
Research Instrument
We designed an instrument to measure citizen awareness of the
goals and performance and financial resources of local governments,
shown in Appendix A. Our instrument is adapted from a survey that
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KILLIAN & LE was commissioned by the Association of Government Accountants
(AGA) in 2008. (AGA has since repeated the survey). The AGA survey
addressed three levels of government (national, state, and local) but
did not differentiate among entities at the local level (AGA, 2008).
Our survey addresses local government exclusively and separates
general purpose from special district entities. Like the AGA survey,
our instrument uses a 10-point Likert-type response scale; this scale
provides ample flexibility to participants yet avoids neutral (numerical
middle) responses. We conducted a validity test of our instrument,
and it was reviewed by academic staff members of the Center for
Evaluation and Education Policy at Indiana University.
Our analysis includes two general-purpose and two special district
governments that serve every citizen of Indiana.4 The generalpurpose entities are counties and townships. Indiana is unique in
that every citizen is served by both county and township government.
Townships are distinct from cities and towns. All citizens are served
by counties and townships, and some are also served by cities or
towns. To minimize bias in research design (i.e., to avoid the more
obscure special districts) we included two of the most common
special districts in the state, solid waste management districts and
soil and water conservation districts. The boundaries of these special
districts coincide with county boundaries, though in a few cases
several adjacent counties are joined in a single, solid waste
management district. Indiana has 92 counties, 92 soil and water
conservation districts, and 68 solid waste management districts (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2007b). The counties, townships, and soil and water
conservation districts are governed by an elected board or council;
solid waste management districts have appointed boards comprised
of officials who were elected to other posts. For instance, one
member of the solid waste management board is appointed from
elected members of the county council.
For each government entity, the survey asks, Are you served by a
(entity)? Participants indicated Yes, No, or Uncertain. The Uncertain
option was included to prevent guessing and because the literature
suggests significant confusion among citizens regarding which
entities serve them (Axelrod, 1992; ICLGR, 2007; Spitzer, 2007; New
York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency and
Competitiveness (NYSCLGEC) 2008; Sanders, 1994).
Thus,
uncertainty is a legitimate response and a forced choice between Yes
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
407 and No would be invalid. When participants selected No or Uncertain
to being served by an entity, they were prompted to move on to the
next entity. When they selected “Yes” to being served, they were
asked to rate their familiarity with the goals and performance of the
entity and their familiarity with how the entity obtains and uses
financial resources (separate questions). Responses were captured
with a Likert-type response scale where 1 meant “Not at all familiar”
and 10 meant “Very familiar.” Using the same scale, participants
also indicated the ideal level of familiarity the average person should
have with the goals and performance and financial resources of the
given entity.
To ensure participants were not influenced by order effects, each
survey alternated presentation of general and special entities
(general, special, general, special). We also created three different
sequences (A, B, and C) of entity presentation. For both hard-copy
and internet surveys, the three sequences were judiciously
represented. The hard-copy surveys were collated so each sequence
was presented in turn (A, B, C, A, B, C, etc.) For internet data
collection, participants were randomly directed to one of the three
sequences; there were 71 responses for sequences A and B, and 69
responses for sequence C. The research instrument also collected
demographic data: gender and citizenship status were captured using
simple checklists; educational attainment and household income
were captured as interval data using checklists; and participants
entered their zip code and age.
The survey instrument was pretested on 40 diverse participants
to determine whether it was too long, whether it was clear, whether
participants would be willing to answer the questions honestly, and to
examine whether the questions asked were reliable and valid and
whether they correlated with each other in expected ways. Within
each entity, familiarity ratings for goals and performance and
financial resources were moderately to highly correlated, indicating
that people who were familiar with one aspect of a particular
government (goals and performance) were familiar with other aspects
(financial resources). However, there were low correlations between
government entities, indicating that knowledge of one government
did not relate highly to knowledge of other governments. Thus, the
pretest of the survey instrument yielded high internal consistency and
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KILLIAN & LE some discriminant validity. We would not expect this pattern of
results if participants were answering randomly to the questionnaire.
Participants and Sample Size
We collected responses from voting-eligible residents of Indiana
using hard-copy and internet (electronic) surveys; both formats
contained identical questions. We used a convenience sampling
technique and gathered responses from several venues to obtain as
large and diverse a population as possible. Hard-copy data were
collected from volunteer participants at seven venues (an outdoor
farmers’ market, a bingo game at a fraternal organization, a seniorcitizen center, a large grocery store, a non-profit community services
center, a working-class shopping mall, and a college campus). For
the internet questionnaire, we invited participants to respond via links
in an online newspaper and via emails sent to a college alumni
mailing list. Hard-copy participants received modest food incentives
(snack bars); internet participants received no incentives. We strove
for balance in our data collection: hard-copy collection on a college
campus was balanced with hard-copy collection at a weekly bingo
game, a human services center, and a shopping mall in a workingclass neighborhood. The alumni mailing list from a small public
college (both graduates and drop-outs) was balanced with the mailing
list of a popular regional newspaper.
We collected responses from 444 participants (hard-copy and
internet combined). To limit the survey to voting-eligible residents of
Indiana, we excluded responses from six participants who were less
than 18-years of age; from 75 participants who were not United
States citizens or who provided no citizenship status; and from 16
participants who provided no zip code, provided a non-Indiana zip
code, or provided a zip code found in Marion County. (As explained in
Note 4, residents of Marion County were excluded from this study.)
Finally, we excluded responses from 12 participants whose
educational attainment was less than a high school diploma or
equivalent: due to their low number, they constituted outliers, and we
felt that excluding these outliers was appropriate even though it
exerted upward pressure on educational attainment of the sample.
The resulting data set contains responses from 335 participants, 190
hard-copy and 145 internet, drawn from 21 Indiana counties.
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
409 We tested for demographic differences between the hard-copy
and internet samples to see if, statistically, they were significantly
different from each other. We conducted an independent samples ttest to test for age differences and chi-square tests to test for
whether gender, educational attainment, and household income were
different for the two samples. The only statistically significant
difference occurred with age: the internet participants (Median age =
52) were a few years younger than the hard-copy participants
(Median age = 55). Generally, the two groups did not differ
demographically. Next, we tested to see whether the two samples
differed from each other on familiarity ratings. There were no
statistically significant differences in familiarity scores between the
hard-copy and internet participants, so we combined them into a
single sample for analysis.
Appendix B summarizes the demographic profile of our sample
and provides comparative data for registered and reported voters in
Indiana, where available. “Reported voters” are those who indicated
having voted in the 2008 general election when responding to the
U.S. Census Bureau’s November 2008 Current Population Survey.
Where Indiana-specific data are not available, we show comparative
data for all registered and reported voters in the United States. The
comparative data in Appendix B are from the U.S. Census Bureau
(2008). The median age of our sample (52.3) falls within the median
age range for registered and reported voters in Indiana (45-64).
Likewise, the gender distribution of our sample (54% female)
corresponds to the gender distribution of Indiana registered and
reported voters (52.8% and 53.2% female, respectively). We do not
have access to education and income data for Indiana voters, so
Appendix B shows education and income data for all registered and
reported U.S. voters. The median household incomes of our hardcopy and internet participants ($50,000-$74,999 and $75,000$99,999, respectively) correspond to the median household incomes
of registered and reported U.S. voters, respectively. The median
income of our total sample ($75,000-$99,999) corresponds to the
median income of all U.S. voters.
The U.S. Census Bureau (2009a) reports that median income for
all Indiana households, not just voters, is $45,000-$49,999. This is
below the median income for all U.S. households ($50,000-59,999),
so we conclude that our participants, whose incomes correspond to
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KILLIAN & LE all U.S. voters, have incomes somewhat above all Indiana voters. The
educational attainment of our participants is above the educational
attainment for all U.S. registered and reported voters. Since
educational attainment in Indiana is slightly below the national
average (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009b) we conclude that the
educational attainment of our sample is above educational
attainment for all Indiana voters.
In summary, our survey participants correspond to all Indiana
voters in both age and gender distribution; they have household
incomes that correspond to U.S. voters but are somewhat above
household incomes for Indiana voters; and they are more highly
educated than the medians U.S. and Indiana voter. As explained in
the Discussion section, we believe the demographic profile of our
sample strengthens our conclusions.
RESULTS
Awareness of Government Entities
For every government entity on the survey, the initial screening
question is, Are you served by a (entity)? Results for this question are
shown in Tables 1 and 2. All participants included in the analysis are
served by all four entities. Yet as shown in Table 1, only 73
participants (22%) were aware of being served by all four entities.
Twenty-one participants (6.3%) were unaware of being served by any
of the entities, and about half (46%) were aware of being served by
only one or two of the entities.
TABLE 1
Positive (Yes) Responses on Being Served by One, Two, Three, or Four
Entities (Frequency and Percent)
N=
(%)
0 Entity
21
(6.3%)
1 Entity
59
(18%)
2 Entities
95
(28%)
3 Entities
87
(26%)
4 Entities
73
(22%)
Table 2 shows the Yes, No, and Uncertain responses for
individual entities. With a sample of 335 individuals and an analysis
that covers two general and two special governments, there were 670
opportunities for a Yes response on general governments and 670
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
411 opportunities for a Yes response on special district governments.
However, general entities received a total of 458 Yes responses and
special entities received a total of 344 Yes responses. In the
aggregate, citizens are more aware of being served by generalpurpose than by special district governments.
TABLE 2
Awareness of Being Served by Individual Entities (Frequency and
Percent)
County
N*
314
Township
314
Solid Waste
Management
Soil & Water
Conservation
307
309
YES
269
(85.7%)
189
(60.2%)
203
(66.1%)
141
(45.6%)
NO
22
(7%)
65
(20.7%)
43
(14%)
45
(14.6%)
UNCERTAIN
23
(7.3%)
60
(19.1%)
60
(19.5%)
123
(39.8%)
Note: * Number of valid responses varies because some participants
did not respond to prompts regarding every entity.
The aggregate pattern of awareness (i.e., citizens are more aware
of being served by general than special governments) does not apply
for each individual entity. Awareness of being served ranges from
85.7% for counties to 45.6% for soil and water conservation districts.
However, 60.2% of respondents were aware of being served by
townships while 66.1% were aware of being served by solid waste
management districts. Interestingly, the highest No response was for
townships, with 20.7% incorrectly saying they were not served by
townships. The Uncertain responses for townships and solid waste
management districts were comparable. Soil and water conservation
districts received the highest “Uncertain” response (39.8%).
Familiarity with Government
Participants who responded “Yes” to being served by a specific
entity were prompted to answer questions regarding their familiarity
with that entity. Table 3 shows mean familiarity scores aggregated by
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KILLIAN & LE type of government (general versus special), and Table 4 shows mean
familiarity scores for individual entities. Since there is no objective
standard for the appropriate level of familiarity, a single familiarity
score lacks significance in isolation, but comparative scores allow us
to assess relative familiarity with general and special governments.
Tables 3 and 5, which show aggregate results, contain data from
citizens who recognized being served by at least one general and at
least one special entity. This ensures a robust comparative analysis
of familiarity by type of government.
As shown in Table 3, participants who recognize being served by
at least one form of general and at least one form of special
government are more familiar with general governments, and the
differences are statistically significant. On a 10-point scale, the mean
familiarity with the goals and performance of general governments is
4.84 while the mean for special district governments is 3.98. The
mean familiarity with how governments obtain and use financial
resources is 4.76 for general governments and 3.35 for special
district governments.
TABLE 3
Familiarity Ratings by Type of Government (General versus Special)
Familiarity with Goals and Performance of
Significance Test
(Entity Type)
N
Mean Std. Deviation
General 233
4.84
2.28
t(232) = 5.98, p < .05
Special
233
3.98
2.29
Familiarity with How (Entity Type) Obtains
Significance Test
and Uses Financial Resources
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
General 232
4.76
2.36
t(232) = 10.43, p < .05
Special
232
3.35
2.11
Note: To be included in Table 3 analysis, participants must have
responded “Yes” to at least one general entity and “Yes” to at
least one special district entity. Therefore, the N is smaller than
the total number of participants.
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
413 When individual entities are considered, in Table 4, the direction
of results is the same: for both goals and performance and financial
resources, citizens report more familiarity with general than with
special entities. Participants are most familiar with counties, which
received the highest, mean familiarity scores for both goals and
performance (5.30) and financial resources (5.25). The familiarity
scores for townships, on both goals and performance (4.36) and
financial resources (4.3) are lower than for counties. Still, for both
goals and performance and financial resources, participants are more
familiar with townships than with the special districts. These results
have face validity: counties score highest on awareness of being
served (Table 2) as well as familiarity (Table 4), while soil and water
conservation districts score lowest on awareness of being served and
on both familiarity measures.
TABLE 4
Familiarity Ratings for Individual Entities
Familiarity with Goals and Performance of (Entity)
N
Mean
Median
Std. Deviation
County
268
5.30
5
2.39
Township
188
4.36
5
2.63
Solid Waste Mgt. 202
4.31
5
2.63
Soil & Water
141
3.62
3
2.40
Familiarity with How (Entity) Obtains and Uses Financial Resources
N
Mean
Median
Std. Deviation
County
268
5.25
5
2.53
Township
189
4.3
4
2.59
Solid Waste Mgt. 202
3.55
3
2.55
Soil & Water
141
3.18
3
2.28
Tables 5 and 6 show results for the ideal level of familiarity “the
average person” should have with various governments. Per Table 5,
the mean ideal familiarity with goals and performance of general
governments is 7.50 while the mean for special district governments
is 6.85. The mean ideal familiarity with the financial resources of
general governments is 7.64 while the mean ideal for special district
governments is 6.87. These differences are statistically significant,
414
KILLIAN & LE yet they converge more than the aggregate scores for actual
familiarity.
TABLE 5
Ideal Familiarity Ratings by Type of Government (General versus
Special)
Ideal familiarity with Goals and Performance
of (Entity Type)
N
Mean Std. Deviation
General
233
7.50
1.92
Special
233
6.85
2.06
Ideal familiarity with How (Entity Type) Obtains
and Uses Financial Resources
General
232
7.64
1.90
Special
232
6.87
Significance Test
t(232) = 6.48,
p<.05
Significance Test
t(231) = 7.65,
p<.05
2.14
Note: To be included in Table 5 analysis, participants must have
responded “Yes” to at least one general entity and “Yes” to at
least one special district entity. Therefore, the N is smaller than
the total number of participants.
Table 6 shows the ideal familiarity ratings for individual entities.
In comparing the data in Tables 4 and 6, two important points should
be noted. First, whether the topic is goals and performance or
financial resources, and whether referring to general or special
entities, citizens believe the ideal level of familiarity is higher than
their actual level of familiarity. Second, the mean scores in Table 4
vary more than the mean scores in Table 6: there is more variation in
actual than in ideal familiarity. Participants tend to converge in their
perceptions of ideal levels of familiarity, but their actual scores are
more varied due to their lower familiarity with special districts.
Table 7 shows the results of gap analysis. The familiarity gap for
each entity is computed by subtracting the actual familiarity score
(Table 4) from the ideal familiarity score (Table 6). The familiarity
gaps are statistically significant. The smallest gap (2.36 on a 10point scale) pertains to goals and performance for counties. The
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
415 TABLE 6
Ideal Familiarity Ratings for Individual Entities
Ideal Familiarity with Goals and Performance of (Entity)
N
Mean
Median Std. Deviation
County
269
7.66
8
1.90
Township
188
7.53
8
2.04
Solid Waste Mgt.
202
7.05
7
2.12
Soil & Water
141
6.99
7
2.22
Ideal Familiarity with How (Entity) Obtains and Uses
Financial Resources
County
269
7.88
8
1.93
Township
188
7.65
8
2.11
Solid Waste Mgt.
202
6.90
7
2.30
Soil & Water
141
7.14
8
2.45
TABLE 7
Gap Analysis: Mean Familiarity minus Mean Ideal Familiarity
Gap Between Actual and Ideal Familiarity* (on 10-point scale)
Goals and Significance Test Financial Significance Test
Resources
Performance
County
2.36
Township
3.18
Solid Waste
Management
Soil & Water
2.74
3.38
t(267) = 15.77,
p < .05
t(186) = 15.06,
p < .05
t(200) = 14.61,
p < .05
t(140) = 15.32,
p < .05
2.63
3.36
3.35
3.97
t(267) = 16.33,
p < .05
t(187) = 15.46,
p < .05
t(201) = 17.22,
p < .05
t(140) = 16.22,
p < .05
Note: *Perceived information gaps are computed using data from
Tables 5 and 7.
largest gap (3.97) relates to how soil and water conservation districts
obtain and use financial resources. For goals and performance,
participants report a larger familiarity gap for townships than for solid
waste management districts (3.18 and 2.74, respectively), though
these entities have similar familiarity gaps on financial resources
(3.36 and 3.35, respectively).
416
KILLIAN & LE Table 7 reveals several important points. For every entity, the
familiarity gap related to financial resources is greater than the gap
for goals and performance. Further, the familiarity gaps for townships
resemble special districts as much as they resemble counties.
Finally, while participants place the “ideal” bar lower for special
districts than for general governments, they perceive significant
familiarity gaps for all entities in this analysis.
DISCUSSION
For citizens to hold their governments accountable, they must be
aware of and familiar with the governments that serve them.
Awareness and familiarity do not guarantee accountability, but where
they are absent, accountability cannot ensue. We compared citizen
familiarity with general purpose and special district governments in
Indiana. The participants in our sample correspond to Indiana voters
in both age and gender distribution; have incomes that correspond to
all U.S. voters but are above the median for Indiana voters; and have
educational attainment that is above the median for Indiana and U.S.
voters. Since participation in political processes, whether voting or
more active behavior, is positively associated with age, education,
and income (Lijphart, 1997, U.S. Census Bureau, 2004 and 2008),
the demographic profile of our participants strengthens the results.
On measures of familiarity with the governments that serve them, it is
reasonable to expect our participants to be as familiar as the general
population, if not more so.
We gathered responses using a pre-tested survey instrument.
Table 1 indicates that the level of confusion among citizens is high
and the awareness of being served by various local governments is
low. Only 22% of participants recognize being served by all four
entities, and less than half (48%) recognize being served by at least
three of the four entities. Confusion is associated with both general
and special governments, though Table 2 indicates that in the
aggregate, citizens are more aware of being served by generalpurpose than by special district governments. The aggregate results
do not apply to all individual entities; participants are more likely to
recognize being served by solid waste management districts than by
townships. The overall level of confusion is disconcerting, given that
the boards or councils of these entities are comprised of elected
officials, that three of the four entities can levy property taxes, and
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
417 that the fourth (soil and water conservation districts) can levy special
assessments.
In the aggregate (Table 3) participants who are aware of being
served by at least one general-purpose and at least one special
district government are more familiar with general-purpose
governments. This finding applies for both goals and performance
and financial resources, and the differences are statistically
significant. When individual governments are considered (Table 4)
the pattern holds: participants are more familiar with the goals and
performance and financial resources of general-purpose
governments. Tables 3 and 4 also support Sanders’ (1994) thesis on
“fiscal illusion,” discussed earlier. In the aggregate and for individual
entities, participants are less familiar with government finances than
with government goals and performance.
In terms of the ideal level of familiarity (Tables 5 and 6)
participants set the bar higher for general-purpose entities. Across
the board, however, participants want more information about the
governments that serve them. There is more convergence on ideal
than actual levels of familiarity. Ideally, participants want their
familiarity with special districts to more closely resemble their
familiarity with general-purpose governments.
Table 7 shows the comparative gaps between actual and ideal
familiarity. An important finding for government accountants and
financial managers is that for each entity in this study, the familiarity
gap on how the entity obtains and uses financial resources exceeds
the gap on goals and performance.
It is important to note that this study intentionally includes two of
the most prominent types of special districts in the state.5 Solid
waste management districts and soil and water conservation districts
serve every citizen in Indiana and have boundaries that correspond
with county boundaries. Thus, we expect them to be among the most
familiar of the 25 types of special districts in the state (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2002b). The recognition and familiarity levels for the special
districts in this study do not bode well for the more obscure special
districts.
This research has near-term, practical significance. Every year
from 2004 through 2011, bills were introduced into the Indiana
legislature to reform or eliminate townships. In turns, the draft
418
KILLIAN & LE legislation called for consolidation of smaller townships into larger
entities, or elimination of townships and transfer of their
responsibilities to counties (Indiana Township Association (ITA,
2011). The drive to consolidate or eliminate townships is motivated
by a desire to make government more visible and accountable and to
reduce operating costs (ICLGR, 2007; Faulk and Hicks, 2009).
Township defenders have managed to block reform efforts for eight
consecutive years, and the ITA and other associations maintain a
strong defense of township government. Yet only 60% of the
participants in this study, whose demographic profile places them
among the more politically active citizens, recognize being served by
townships. This suggests that townships may be unable to mobilize
sufficient public support to withstand reform efforts indefinitely.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study support the institutional reform
perspective more than the public choice perspective. Public choice
advocates assert that citizens can monitor smaller, specialized
governments more effectively than larger, generalized governments,
but our results contradict this claim. Participants were more familiar
with the goals and performance and financial resources of generalpurpose than special district governments. Since this study included
two of the most prominent special districts in the state, we expect the
results would be even more pronounced for less prominent special
districts. Further, institutional reformers assert that the proliferation
of special districts leads to confusion among citizens as to which
governments serve them, and we found this to be true in the
aggregate: participants were more likely to recognize being served by
the general-purpose than the special district governments. This was
not always true at the individual level: participants were more likely to
recognize being served by solid waste management districts than by
townships.
Citizens, public officials, and scholars who want to improve
government accountability should pay more attention to special
districts. At the very least, they should exert pressure on specialdistricts to publish financial reports that comply with GASB standards.
As noted earlier, special districts have the lowest compliance rate for
all local governments (GASB 2008). Of course, compliance needs to
be improved among all local governments. Efforts to increase
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
419 performance reporting and citizen-centric reporting, such as the
programs sponsored by the Association of Government Accountants
(AGA), should be expanded to include special districts. Since external
reports are of limited use without norms to support trend analysis and
comparisons with other entities (Guo, Fink and Frank, 2009),
scholars could make a significant contribution by developing norms,
or at least regional benchmarks, for special districts as well as
general governments. We note, however, that since accountability
requires a dynamic exchange between citizens and their governments
(discussed in the Introduction), good reporting is necessary but not
sufficient: it must be accompanied by dialog and participation.
We could add that civics education in public schools and other
voter education programs (such as programs sponsored by the
League of Women Voters) need to be more effective in promoting
awareness of and familiarity with various governments. Ultimately,
however, the problem may be structural. This study shows that it is
challenging for citizens to monitor (even be aware of) multiple local
governments, and that they are less familiar with special districts
than general-purpose governments. As citizens and public officials
consider structural changes to improve accountability and costefficiency, and as they weigh proposals to consolidate local
governments, they should examine all local governments. Thus far,
Indiana has devoted most of its time and energy to townships. It is
time to examine the role and impact of special districts.
Limitations
The participants in our sample resemble “all Indiana voters” in
age and gender and exceed “all Indiana voters” in income and
educational attainment. As discussed earlier, we believe this
strengthens our conclusions. To the extent that our participants are
unaware of or unfamiliar with local governments, we expect the
median Indiana voter to be even more so.
The legal, political, and economic contexts for local government
and the powers granted to general and special governments vary
from state to state (McCabe, 2000; Foster, 1997). This limits the
potential for cross-state conclusions and creates the need for local
and regional research. Our research has direct implications for
Indiana, and can inform and motivate research in other states. While
the results cannot be generalized to other states, our research
420
KILLIAN & LE instrument can be adapted to measure awareness of and familiarity
with local governments elsewhere.
NOTES
1. The Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform was
established in 2007, as was the New York State Commission on
Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness.
Ohio
established its Commission on Local Government Reform and
Collaboration in 2008.
2. Throughout its existence, the U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental
Relations
(ACIR)
adopted
differing
perspectives on special districts. In its 1987 report, ACIR
endorsed policies consistent with the public choice perspective.
3. No objective norms have been established for how much citizens
“should know” about government performance and finances,
though secondary education standards might be a start. Selfreported familiarity is adequate for our research goals. Citizen
perceptions would be inadequate for comparing actual costefficiencies of various governments.
4. Since 1970, the City of Indianapolis and Marion County have
been merged under Uni-Gov. Marion County is included in the
total count of Indiana counties (92), but due to Uni-Gov, Marion
County does not share the same characteristics as all other
Indiana counties. Therefore, residents of Marion County are
excluded from this study.
5. We asked the Associate Director of the Indiana Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to help us select the
most common special districts to minimize inherent bias. She
suggested solid waste management districts, soil and water
conservation districts, and library districts (Palmer 2009).
Library districts were excluded from this analysis because they do
not serve every citizen, as do the other entities.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are indebted to Howard Frank, Patricia Patrick, and to
anonymous reviewers for beneficial suggestions and for some
references in this paper.
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APPENDIX A
Research Instrument
Are you served by a
select your answer)
a.
b.
c.
(Entity) government?
(Circle the appropriate letter to
Yes (please answer the questions below)
No (skip to next page)
Uncertain (skip to next page)
1. How familiar are you with the goals and performance of your (entity)?
Not at all
Very
Somewhat Familiar
familiar
familiar
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2. Ideally, how familiar should the average person be with the goals and
performance of your (entity)?
Not at all
Very
Somewhat Familiar
familiar
familiar
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
3. How familiar are you with how your (entity) obtains and uses financial
resources?
Not at all
familiar
1
2
Somewhat Familiar
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
4. Ideally, how familiar should the average person be with how
obtains and uses financial resources?
Not at all
Somewhat Familiar
familiar
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Very
familiar
10
your (entity)
Very
familiar
10
426
KILLIAN & LE Demographic Data
This information will tell us about the citizens who complete the survey. If
you are not comfortable with providing any of the information, you may leave
it blank.
Are you male or female?
Male
Female
Please enter your Zip Code __________
What is your age in years? __________
What is your household income, per year? (Check appropriate box)
Less than $15,000
$15,000 to $24,999
$25,000 to $34,999
$35,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $74,999
$75,000 to $99,999
$100,000 or over
Prefer not to answer
Place a check next to your education level.
Less than high school
Some high school
High school diploma or equivalent (e.g., GED)
Some college, but no college degree
Associate's degree
Bachelor’s degree
Some graduate school, but no graduate degree
Graduate degree (e.g., M.S., M.D., and Ph.D.)
Prefer not to answer
What is your citizenship status?
Note: Identical questions were repeated for each type of government.
Demographic questions appeared at the end of the survey. For the
online survey, “skip logic” automatically progressed to the next entity if
the participant selected No or Uncertain to being served by the given
entity.
CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF GENERAL-PURPOSE AND SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS
427 APPENDIX B*
Demographic Data for Survey Participants and Registered and Reported
Voters
Percent (%) Educational Attainment
High School or Some College Bachelor’s Advanced
Equivalent
or Associates Degree
Degree
15.8
35.3
25.8
23.2
6.2
16.5
42.8
34.5
11.6
27.2
33.1
28.1
Hard-Copy Sample
Internet Sample
Total Sample
U. S. Citizen
Permanent resident, but not citizen
Other
Indiana Registered
Indiana Voters
All U.S. Registered
28.6
All U.S. Voters
27.3
31.4
31.6
Median Household Income
Hard-Copy Sample
Internet Sample
Total Sample
Indiana Registered
Indiana Voters
All U.S. Registered
All U.S. Voters
$50,000-74,999
$75,000 - 99,999.
$75000-99,000
21.1
22.4
10.9
11.8
Gender (%)
M
F
42
58
51
49
46
54
47.2 52.8
46.8 53.2
Median
Age
55
52
52.3
45-64
45-64
$50,000-74,999
$75,000-99,999
*Descriptions for Appendix B Data Elements.
Indiana Voters and All U.S. Voters are those who reported voting in the 2008
general election in response to questions in the U.S. Census Bureau’s
November 2008 Current Population Survey (CPS).
Data for registered and reported voters in Indiana, and for all U.S. registered
and reported voters, were extrapolated from various tables in the U.S.
Census Bureau (2008), Voting and Registration in the Election of November
2008 - Detailed Tables. The specific tables are identified below. Where
Indiana-specific data are not available, we report all U.S. data.
Educational Attainment. Education attainment of our sample (shown for
hard-copy, internet, and total) can be compared to educational attainment of
all U.S. registered and reported voters. The “All U.S.” percentages are
calculated from Table 5: Reported Voting and Registration, by Age, Sex, and
Educational Attainment. We do not have access to data for education
attainment for registered and reported voters in Indiana.
428
KILLIAN & LE Household Income. Median household income of our sample (shown for
hard-copy, internet, and total) can be compared to median household
income for all U.S. registered and reported voters. The “All U.S.” income is
from Table 9. Reported Voting and Registration of Family Members, by Race,
Hispanic Origin and Family Income: November 2008.
Gender. Gender of our sample (shown for hard-copy, internet, and total) can
be compared to gender of registered and reported voters in Indiana. The
Indiana data is from Table 4b: Reported Voting and Registration of the
Voting-Age Population, by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin, for States.
Age. Participants in our sample (shown for hard-copy, internet, and total)
entered their age in years into a blank box on the survey. The median age
for our sample can be compared to median age for registered and reported
voters in Indiana, which is provided as interval data in Table 4c: Reported
Voting and Registration of the Total Voting-Age Population, by Age, for States.