Weak Coalitions and Policy Making in the Ecuadorian Congress
(1979-1996)
Andrés Mejía-Acosta
Department of Government and International Relations
University of Notre Dame
217 O’Shaughnessy Hall
Notre Dame, IN 46556
amejí[email protected]
Draft. Please do not quote or cite.
Paper prepared for the 2000 Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association. The Hyatt Regency Hotel, Miami,
March 16-18. The Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Indiana, financed the research for this paper, with the
collaboration of the Corporacion de Estudios para el Desarrollo (CORDES), Quito. I thank David Altman, Octavio AmorimNeto, John Carey, José Antonio Cheibub, Michael Coppedge, Juan Linz, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, José Sánchez -Parga
and Francisco Sánchez for their useful comments and advice.
1
Weak Coalitions and Policy-Making in the Ecuadorian Congress: 1979-1996.
I. Introduction
Ecuador is a basket case of Executive-Legislative conflict in Latin America. In spite of its high
presidential prerogatives (veto powers and the capacity to issue legislation by decree) (Mainwaring and
Shugart 1997), the executive has not been able to bypass the political opposition in congress. In turn,
legislators have used and abused veto and impeachment powers to block the executive agenda. At the
end of the day, the frequent antagonisms and the apparent unwillingness of presidents and assemblies to
cooperate has affected overall economic performance of this country and in several occasions it has
threatened the survival of the democratic regime. In 1998, after a serious constitutional crisis that led to
the (legislative) ousting of President Bucaram, a National Assembly was elected to change the 1979
Constitution. Reformers adopted several political institutions that promised to strengthen the powers of
the president vis-à-vis the legislature. With the notion of increased governability as a guiding principle,
the assembly approved or sponsored: the adoption of a new electoral law that favored majorities, the
elimination of mid-term elections to ensure continuity, the increase of legal thresholds to prevent
congressional impeachments, some legislative provisions to endow presidents with automatic majorities
in congress, and some legislative reforms to punish party defections. Ironically, this impressive package
of simultaneous institutional reforms was not sufficient to provide president Mahuad with a comfortable
and stable legislative majority. After 18 months of confrontations with the legislature, in which time he
tried to form a stable alliance with every possible party in the ideological spectrum, Mahuad could not
control the political and economic crisis and was forced to resign in January 1999.
This paper tests what are the relevant variables that explain legislative support for the president between
1979 and 1996. The dependent variable measures the rate of success of executive-initiated bills. The
model does not lend support to the classical argument that a large party contingent is a crucial factor for
gathering support for the president in congress (Jones 1995, Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). The model
also finds that a partisan cabinet composition is not relevant for increasing presidential success in the
case of Ecuador. However, the model does find that the presidential calendar is a strong predictor of
success (or lack of thereof). Also the rate of success seems to be influenced by previous ExecutiveLegislative interactions. In the end, the model shows that legislative majorities can be formed in
fragmented Ecuador and suggests that presidents have increased their chances of success when they
were able to combine both, formal and informal mechanisms in the coalition formation process.
The paper proceeds as follows: the first part reviews the existing literature on coalition formation in
Latin America; the second part proposes a model for measuring presidential success in the legislature;
the third part tests the model and interprets the findings; and the fourth part explores presidential
success beyond formal institutions. The fifth part concludes.
II. Building legislative coalitions in presidential regimes
For several years, important scholarly works advanced the hypothesis that presidentialism, combined
with proportional representation was a dreadful combination for the survival and consolidation of
democracy (Linz 1994; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Sartori 1994). The underlying assumption was that
some specific features of a presidential regime, such as proportional representation formulae,
multipartism or non-concurrent elections, had a negative impact on the likelihood of forming legislative
2
majorities that would support the agenda of the president (Mainwaring 1992, Jones 1995, Carey 1997,
Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).1
In contrast to presidentialism, a parliamentary democracy provides institutional mechanisms to deal with
deadlock. Since there are no fixed terms in office, the origin and survival of the executive is closely
dependent on the stability and direction of the legislative coalition (DiPalma 1977, Shugart and Carey
1992, Strom 1990). The executive does not have incentives to adopt a belligerant attitude vis-à-vis the
parliament, because a majoritarian coalition could pass a vote of no confidence on the executive and
replace the government. It is also argued that the members of the governing coalition have more
incentives to cooperate with the government, because they are part of it. Their political success and
prospects for future electoral gains depend, to a large extent, on the successful performance of the
government. Juan Linz, a convinced advocate of parliamentary regimes, has emphasized that
parliamentary governments have the flexibility to change and adjust governments to meet political
challenges and changing socioeconomic conditions (Linz, 1994).
In presidential regimes, especially in a context of multiparty politics where the president does not hold
the majority of seats in congress, the incentives for Executive-Legislative collaboration are less clear. At
the heart of the debate, the relevant question for legislators is why support a president (and a
government) if they are not part of the government? Thus, it has been argued that party leaders can use
selective incentives to induce collective action by punishing and/or rewarding members of the legislative
coalition (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Mayhew 1974). The argument of institutional maintenance
however, seems to be less effective in the context of Latin American presidentialisms. Political conflicts
have not been uncommon and the rigidities of presidential regimes have reduced the available
mechanisms to solve political impasses between the executive and the legislative. In the last decade,
political conflicts have resulted in presidential impeachments (Collor de Melo in Brazil, Carlos Andrés
Pérez in Venezuela), closing of congress (Alberto Fujimori in Peru), presidential resignation (Jamil
Mahuad in Ecuador) or another form of metaconstitutional solution to the conflict (like the legislative
ousting of president Abdala Bucaram of Ecuador on the grounds of mental insanity) (Pérez-Liñán 1999).
Despite the extensive debate on regime change in the early 90’s, it seems that presidentialism has come
to stay in Latin America.2 Thus, recent academic contributions have gone beyond structural/static
explanations of Executive-Legislative deadlock and proposed more dynamic explanatory variables.
These studies have turned attention to the changing nature of the party systems (Coppedge 1998,
Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, Figueiredo and Limongi 1995a), the use of strong presidential
prerogatives over congress (Cheibub 1999, Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, Carey and Shugart 1998), the
incentives for coalition formation (Deheza 1997, Amorim-Neto 1998a, 1998b, Altman 1998), and the
interaction of “anticipated reactions” between the Executive and the Legislative powers (Cox and
Morgenstern forth).
Some recent contributions have challenged conventional ideas about Executive-Legislative relations in
Latin America. In the first place, the notion that a large party contingent in the legislature was crucial to
provide support for the president (Mainwaring 1992, Mark Jones 1995, Deheza 1997) has to be qualified.
The works of Amorim Neto (1998) and Altman (1998) point in the direction that the size of the president’s
party does not matter in the formation of legislative coalitions in Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela. If
anything, the consolidation of effective legislative majorities would depend on the discipline of its coalition
More recently, Cheibub has acknowledged the potential of divided governments for conflict, but “whether they induce
(Executive-Legislative) deadlock, or affect (democratic) performance, however, is another question” (Cheibub 1999: 3).
2 With the exception of Bolivia (where the president is elected by a legislative majority), most attempts at constitutional
reform in Latin America during the nineties have reinforced the role of presidential institutions.
1
3
members. Even in Brazil or Ecuador, conventionally characterized as inchoate and fragmented party
systems, it has been shown that there are patterns of discipline and loyalty that vary according to the
relative size and ideological tendency of the legislative parties (Figueiredo and Limongi 1995a,
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1998, and Mejía-Acosta 1999). Amorim-Neto has argued that different
patterns of cabinet formation have a significant impact on legislative cohesion and presidential performance
(forth: 132). Finally, it has been shown that the timing of the presidential calendar has a large impact in
explaining coalition formation and support for the president (Altman 1998).
Gathering legislative support has been the nightmare of every Ecuadorian president. It has been argued
that the powers of Ecuadorian presidents rank among the highest in Latin America, with strong
prerogatives for using decree authority, issuing total, partial and pocket vetoes and having the authority
to call for a plebiscite (Carey, Amorim-Neto and Shugart, 1997). Ironically, the literature has argued that
presidents are impaired by the lack of a loyal party contingent, high levels of party fragmentation, and
loose patterns of coalition formation (Conaghan 1994, Mejía-Acosta 1996, Sánchez-Parga 1998,
Burbano and Rowland 1998). In fact, from a comparative study of 10 American nations between the
1950s and the 1990’s, Deheza (1997) has shown that Ecuadorian presidents have had the lowest average
support in the legislature between 1958 and 1994 (32.10%). In 1995, the presidential party literally
disappeared from Congress when the only two deputies affiliated to the Conservative Party. In 20 years
of democratic rule, the Ecuadorian pugna de poderes (Executive-Legislative conflict) has been characterized
by the ousting of one president, the resignation of another, the impeachment of a vice president, and
several episodes of major constitutional crises in 1987, 1997 and 2000. Congress has issued 190 threats
of cabinet impeachment, carrying out 38 of them and censuring 19 ministers. The relevant literature
however, has portrayed the conflict in terms of a “structural and irreversible conflict that that constraints
and marginalizes political actors to engage in non-cooperative games” (Sánchez-Parga 1998:55).3 But not
much has been said about the elements that are crucial for understanding Executive-Legislative
cooperation.
III. Measuring Presidential Success in Congress
Most literature on Executive-Legislative relations, has focused on specific events of impasse between the
branches: when does the executive use decree power to gets his way around the legislature (Carey and
Shugart 1998), or what are the relevant conditions for the legislative impeachment of a president. In any
case, the conventional perspective has depicted Latin American legislatures reacting in a “venal,
subservient or recalcitrant” manner vis-à-vis the initiatives of the president. As Cox and Morgenstern
have stated, “what this conclusion misses is that most Latin American presidents at one time or another
do make policy concessions as a part of their overall strategy for getting their way” (forth).
This essay focuses on the “ordinary (non-crisis) policy making process” by which the Executive and
Legislative have to engage in permanent strategic interactions. Following Frederick’s “law of anticipated
reactions”, the success of the Executive could be determined by his ability to anticipate the preferences
of the legislature (especially vetoes) and devise the most effective strategies (punishments or rewards) for
gathering the necessary votes to approve her initiative (Cox and Morgenstern, forth). Conversely, they
argue that the most inefficient strategy is for Presidents to pretend that the legislature “does not exist and
propose whatever policies he likes, then react spasmodically when the legislature refuses its assent”.
Following Cox and Morgenstern’s principle of “anticipated reactions”, I agree that there is an optimal
presidential response for each strategy of the legislature. The interaction creates a four-fold typology for
As I have argued elsewhere, Executive-Legislative deadlock has not been an exclusive feature of the current democratic
period: the most illustrative case is Mr. José María Velasco Ibarra who in 1933 led a legislative ousting of the Executive,
and he dissolved Congress when president in 1946 and 1970 (Mejía-Acosta 1996b: 155).
3
4
Latin American legislatures4: a) to a recalcitrant assembly corresponds an imperial/impotent president, b)
to a workable assembly opposes a coalitional president, c) to a venal or parochial assembly corresponds a
nationally-oriented president, and finally, d) a subservient assembly is best utilized by a dominant
president (Cox and Morgenstern forthcoming).
I propose to test the applicability of the typology by looking at different patterns of strategic interaction
between the Executive and the Legislative. To that effect, I look at legislative output as my dependent
variable, measured through the rate of presidential success in the legislature. Presidential success is
measured by the number of executive-initiated bills approved in the legislature, divided by the total
number of bills introduced by the executive. One common criticism to the use of legislative productivity
is that it is a kitchen-sink indicator that includes all kinds of bills, ranging from inconsequential
resolutions, awards and minor amendments to previous laws, to more controversial issues such as
privatizations, economic measures or constitutional reforms. While I am willing to acknowledge some
truth to this claim, a closer examination of the Ecuadorian data shows that less controversial bills are
more likely to be initiated and approved by the legislature itself and are not directly included in the
presidents agenda. Conversely, the advantages of using the legislative output as dependent variable are: a)
we can capture the regular interaction between the president and Congress, measuring both crisis and noncrisis situations, both controversial and unanimous bills, b) the available data will allow to test differences
between expected and observed rates of success, thus providing some insights on the strategic calculations
considered by the president when sending bills to Congress, and c) the rate of presidential success is a
comparable measure among countries given that presidents have similar prerogatives to initiate legislation.
This next section explores rates of presidential success in comparative perspective.
a) Comparing Presidential Success in other Latin American Legislatures.
Given the typology of presidential-legislative relations, the rate of presidential success can be used as an
indicator of the presidential strategy vis-à-vis the legislature. If an extremely high percentage of
executive bills are approved, the relationship could be characterized by a dominant president/subservient
assembly. On the other hand, extremely low rates of success would indicate that the executive faces a
recalcitrant assembly, and the president has chosen to bypass the legislature through the use of decree
powers (imperial) or s/he is simply not able to do much about the blockade (impotent). Chart 1 reports
the relationship between the number of bills proposed by the executive and the number of executive-led
laws approved in Mexico, Venezuela, Chile, Brazil and Ecuador. It also reports the same equivalent
indicator for legislative-originated bills.5
[Insert chart 1 here]
The chart confirms the typology proposed by Cox and Morgenstern (forth). Mexico clearly stands out as
a case of dominant president with a subservient (rubber stamp) assembly approving an average of 98%
If the president believes that he stands little chance of success before the legislature, he will use his prerogatives (i.e.
decree powers) to bypass the opposition and get the policies passed (Carey and Shugart, 1998). If he lacks such powers
he will be impotent. If on the other extreme, the president knows that s/he has enough support in the assembly, the
optimal strategy would be to dictate policies in a dominant way. The other two types of strategies involve some degree
of compromise and negotiation between the branches, depending on the policy preferences of legislators (i.e. if
legislators are locally oriented, the president would adopt a nationally-oriented role and lead national policy). Cox and
Morgenstern further argue that the choice of the optimal strategy will depend on the variability of the presidential
support in Congress, the career ambitions of legislators, and the presence of ideological parties.
5 Needless to say, each country and legislature has a different manner of aggregating legislative data, for different
periods, types and sources of bills. For all cases, I have considered ordinary laws discussed by Congress. In Brazil, the
rate of success includes regular bills as well as medidas provisorias, but it does not include budgetary laws (or leis
orcamentárias).
4
5
of his agenda, even during the so called “more democratic years:” 1994-1997 (Casar forthcoming). In
contrast, the legislature –-where the opposition is mostly represented-- has a low success rate of 14.9%.
The Aylwin administration in Chile (1990-1993) and the Venezuela of the Pacto years (1989-1989), both
stand in the middle category of coalitional president vs. workable assembly. While it is not surprising to
find a low success rate for the Chilean legislature (6.4%), its Venezuelan counterpart has an impressive
success rate of 76.6% (Siavelis forthcoming). Part of the explanation could be found in the fact that
Venezuelan presidents have weak constitutional powers compared to other Latin American countries
(Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, Shugart and Carey 1992) and the legislature has a tradition of tight
disciplined parties (Coppedge 1994, Amorim-Neto 1998).
As expected, Brazil and Ecuador are cases of recalcitrant assemblies with imperial or impotent
presidents. Brazil clearly illustrates the unbalance between the President and Congress. The success rate
of ordinary executive-initiated bills in Brazil is 46.2%. If medidas provisorias were included in the total
count of introduced bills by the president, the average success rate would significantly drop to 35.1%.
Paradoxically, the use of constitutional tools to strengthen the power of the president has a negative net
impact on the approval rate of executive bills. On the other hand, the Brazilian Congress has a dismal
rate of legislative success: of 9454 bills introduced between 1989 and 1994, it only approved 176 (an
average of 2.9% per year).6
b) Proactive vs. successful presidents.
An alternative way to measure the predominance of the legislative or the executive agendas, is by
differentiating a proactive from a successful president. Consider two countries: Brazil and Ecuador. While
the Ecuadorian legislature approves 8 of 20 executive-initiated bills in a given year, the Brazilian
president gets approved 80 out of 228 submitted bills. In both cases, the agenda of the presidents is
42% successful (41.8% and 42.6% to be precise), but the two presidents have significantly different
shares of impact on the overall approved agenda as it is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Yearly Average Legislative Productivity in Brazil and Ecuador
Brazil
(1989-1994)
Executive origin
Approved
Not
Total bills
Ecuador
bills
approved
introduced
(1979-1996)
Executive
origin
80
148
228
Legislative origin
29
1547
1576
Legislative origin
Total
109
1695
1804
Total
Sources: Figueiredo and Limongi (1995b). Sanchez-Parga (1998).
Approved
bills
8
30
38
Not
approved
12
189
201
Total bills
introduced
20
219
241
In Brazil, the total number of presidential bills approved, including the total number of ordinary laws,
medidas provisorias and budgetary laws, account for nearly 80% of the total agenda.7 The legislature
contributes with an average of 15.3% of the public agenda.8 In Ecuador, the average rate of presidential
success between 1979-1996 is 42.7%, but the president only is responsible for 22.9% of the total number
of approved bills by Congress in a given year. Ecuadorian legislators are responsible for more than 77%
The large amount of initiated bills in Brazil could be a function of the large number of deputies and senators who
pursue particularistic and clientelistic benefits for their districts. However, the low success rate shows that the massive
amounts of introduced bills in Brazil only contribute to clog the legislative agenda in Brazil. But this could also be a
favorable factor to help approve the bills that come from the executive.
7 However, if we would only consider the total number of executive-led ordinary laws approved in Congress, this only
accounts for 20% of the overall approved agenda. Calculus based on Figueiredo and Limongi (1995b: 182).
8 In this table I only report the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative. The remaining share of the
agenda is submitted by the judiciary in Brazil.
6
6
of the approved bills in average. I define a proactive president when he is responsible for a larger share of
the total agenda approved by all branches in a given year. This measure is obtained by calculating what
percentage of the overall approved agenda (originated in both the legislative and executive branch in a
given year) comes from the Executive. Recall that the measure of presidential success is measured by
dividing the number of executive- approved bills between the number of executive-proposed bills.9
[Insert chart 2 here]
Chart 2 compares the proactive and success rates for Ecuador. The two variables are highly related and
significant (r = .748), meaning that a higher percentage of bills introduced is associated with a higher
rate of presidential bills approved. To this generalization, there are important differences on a year to
year basis: for instance, successful presidents obtained 64.7% and 65.2% of their agendas approved in
1985 and 1992 respectively, but only contributed to 22.5 and 40% of the total agenda. President Hurtado
filled 50% of the total legislative agenda in 1982 and congress approved over half of his own agenda
(51.6%). Surprisingly, all these presidents had low party contingents in the legislature (under 16% of the
seats). This apparent paradox leads us to believe that, against the traditional belief that privileged the size
of president’s party in the legislature, there might be other factors explaining congressional support for
the president.
c) The balance between the Executive and the Legislative
It has been shown that there are at least two indicators of the Executive’s performance vis-à-vis the
legislature: the success rate (number of executive initiated approved bills divided by the total number of
executive initiated bills) and the proactive rate (number of executive initiated approved bills divided by
the total number of approved bills in a given year). I consider the first to be a measure of the strategy
used by the Executive when facing Congress. The second is a measure of the overall influence of the
Executive in shaping the policy-making agenda. The degree of Executive influence on the overall
agenda is closely related to how successful the legislature would be in passing its own initiatives. As it
was observed in the case of Brazil, if the legislature issues a large number of bills could become an
inefficient body vis-à-vis the powers of the president.
To this extent, we need a measure to evaluate the combined impact of the executive and the legislative.
We use Yule’s Q coefficient to compare differences in success between President and Congress (Agresti
1996: 258, Anderson 1966: 50). Let us reconsider the chart of legislative productivity:
Case
Executive origin
Legislative origin
Approved bills
A
C
Not approved
B
D
Success
A/B
C/D
The Yule's Q coefficient is given by the ratio of (AD - CB)/(AD + CB). The nice feature of this
coefficient is that Q ranges from -1 ≤ Q ≤ +1. A value of Q close to 1 would mean absolute
predominance of the Executive over the Legislative, (because of higher success rates and higher
influence on the overall agenda). Conversely, negative values approaching to –1 would mean legislative
predominance over the president. Values approaching zero would mean a balance between both
branches. If we use Yule’s Q to compare Brazil and Ecuador, we find that the average coefficient for
Brazil is .83, while in Ecuador is .54. This means that presidents in Brazil are de facto more powerful than
Ecuadorian presidents. While the former could be mildly successful (42%) they are very influential in
the overall agenda (nearly 80%). In the case of Ecuador, there is extreme volatility in the balance of
Proactive = (#of executive-led bills that were appproved / # of overall bills approved by the legislature).
Success = (#of executive-led bills that were appproved / # of total bills submitted by the president).
9
7
powers, with the president being extremely successful despite weak party support (in 1993) or with the
legislature being much more powerful than the president (1986)
[Insert chart 3 here]
Chart 3 shows the Q values for each legislative period in Ecuador. While the overall trend is of
Executive predominance, there are large and significant variations in the relationship. A quick evaluation
of the trend would indicate that the overall balance of Executive-Legislative relations in Ecuador is
somewhat consistent with the electoral cycle, with strong presidential predominance at the beginning of
each term and declining presidential power towards the end of her mandate. The Febres Cordero
administration (1984-1988) is an important exception to this rule. Nevertheless, there seems to be little
or no relationship with the size of the party or coalition support for the President in Congress. The next
section would test existing models to explain the success of presidential initiatives in Congress.
IV. Building a model for Presidential Success
a) Model specification
The model explains the rate of approved legislation that has originated in the Executive, or the Executive
legislative productivity (EXECUTIV). The dependent variable measures the yearly rate of presidential
initiatives approved between 1979 and 1996 (N = 18).10 Appendix 1 summarizes the data table used in
this model. Here I describe the independent variables of legislative success of the President.
Following Deheza (1997) and Amorim-Neto (1998), a first explanatory variable is the size of the
legislative support for the president. I define the existence of a legislative coalition taking onto account
the number of votes that elected President of Congress at the beginning of each legislative year.11 First
of all, I look at the size of the presidential contingent in Congress in terms of the share of seats held by
the president’s party (PSHARE) in a governing coalition (Altman 1998). I expect that a larger presidential
share in the coalition would have a positive impact on the rate of legislation approved. An alternative measure would
be to look at the size of the legislative coalition. However, in the Ecuadorian fragmented legislature not
every governing coalition is majoritarian and not every majority supports the president. For that
purpose, I create a dummy variable (SUPPORT) that reports if a coalition is both majoritarian (when the
coalition has over 50% of the seats in Congress) and governing (when the president’s party is part of the
coalition).12 The variable codes 1 for governing-majoritarian coalitions and 0 for everything else. I expect
that a combination of a larger-governing coalition would have the greatest positive impact on the rate of executive legislative
approval.
A second explanatory variable looks at cabinet formation as a proxy of legislative support for the
presidential agenda (Amorim-Neto 1998b). Amorim-Neto has shown for Brazil and Venezuela that the
existence of partisan cabinets does increase the probability of passing a presidential bill through the
legislature (1998b). The variable measures the congruence between the cabinet and the legislative party
I dropped the recent years form the sample because the reported data from Congress is not reliable.
From 1979 until 1998 the Ecuadorian Constitution established that the President of Congress should be elected by
simple majority at the beginning of each legislative year, in August. A 1998 reform has ruled that the President of
Congress should come from the larger party in Congress and extended the mandate to two years.
12 In a fragmented legislature there could be found at least four types of coalitions: governing-majoritarian (GM),
governing-minoritarian (Gm), minoritarian-opposition (gm), and majoritarian-opposition (gM). Assuming these can be
ordered according to the degree of expected support for the president, we would expect to find GM > Gm > gm > gM.
To control for the effect of each coalition, I created three alternative dummies, but none of them was found to be
significantly larger than the others. Alternatively, I controlled for two other dummies, MAJORITY and GOVERNIN
but found no significance either. I thank Anibal Pérez-Liñán for pointing this relationship to me.
10
11
8
(CABPARTY)13 and it calculates the difference between share of cabinet seats held by a party and their
share of seats in the legislature. The index goes from 1 (total cabinet party congruence) to 0 (nonpartisan cabinets). We expect that higher cabinet-party congruence increases the chances of success of the president in
congress.
The analysis also considers a variable for the elapsed time of the presidential mandate (LAME) measured
as the percentage of elapsed presidential mandate at each legislative year.14 It has been argued that,
without the possibility for presidential reelection, the president becomes a lameduck towards the end of
his/her administration and legislators have decreasing incentives to cooperate with the president
(Coppedge 1994, Amorim-Neto (forthcoming), Altman 1998). We hypothesize a negative impact of the
time variable as the next election approaches, that is, the elapsed time of the administration will have a negative
impact on the presidential success.
Finally, according to the argument of anticipated reactions, I use a proxy (based on the Yule’s Q
coefficient) to measure the perceived state of the relationship between the president and the legislature.
I assume that presidents will take into account a measure of previous success in the legislature (t – 1)
when calculating their strategies for the current year (t = 0). The variable is the lagged balance between
the executive and the legislative (YULEQ_1). The variable ranges from –1 to +1. Negative values
would indicate strong legislative dominance and positive values indicate strong dominance of the
president. We expect to find a positive impact of the lagged variable: perceived previous success of the president
in the legislature will inspire higher optimism for presidential success in the present, and viceversa.
Thus, the proposed model for the rate of Executive-legislative productivity looks like this:
EXECUTIV = CONSTANT + PSHARE + SUPPORT + CABPARTY + LAME + YULEQ_1.
I use a (OLS) model of linear regression to test the model. The reduced number of cases appeared to be
a serious constraint for the strength of the statistical analysis. Aware if such limitation, I decided to use
the model as a measure of yearly variance of presidential success.15 The existence of multicollinearity
between the independent variables is ruled out in appendix 2.
b) Regression analysis
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates of the OLS regression. In the first model I test the classical
argument that the legislative success of the President will depend on the size of his legislative contingent,
the congruence between the cabinet and the party representation in Congress, the time variable and the
Presidents’ perception of the pugna de poderes (Executive-Legislative balance) in the previous year.16 The
model is significant (0.066) with an adjusted R-square of 0.445. Surprisingly, PSHARE and CABPARTY
This indicator is based on Rose’s index of proportionality (1984).
President Roldós was elected for a five year term in 1979, but he died in 1981. Vice President Hurtado took office
and governed for the remaining three years. After passing a constitutional reform in 1983, the presidential mandate was
shortened from 5 to 4 years. After 1984, the presidents have been elected for four-year terms.
15 One way of “increasing” my number of cases was to consider each proposed bill in this period, and determine the
impact of the institutional variables on the probability of passing a bill (FATE). My objection to this alternative model is
that I lack the necessary data to measure individual variance in the passing of each bill (i.e. what exact coalition approved
or rejected each bill at any given time). Thus, using the available variables, the logit model could only offer an
“environmental” explanation of the institutional context that surrounds the approval of each bill. Nevertheless, the
testing of the model with an inflated N reported similar results than those reported by the OLS model.
16 The variable YULEQ_1 gives a missing value for the first year of each administration: since there is no presidential
reelection, we assume that the incoming president does not have any information on the anteceding period.
13
14
9
are not significant variables. LAME is significant and of the expected sign, and YULEQ_1 is also
significant but of the opposite sign. The second model does not lend support for two other common
explanations of presidential success. In both cases, LAME and YULEQ_1 are still significant
explanatory variables. Model 2a replaces PSHARE by SUPPORT. The model estimates find no
significant evidence that the existence of a majoritarian-governing coalition matters on the success rate
of the President, regardless of the size of the Presidents’ party. The model however, significantly
increases the explanatory model (with an adjusted R-square of .466). Part 2b of the model illustrates that
more cabinet congruence (CABPARTY) also yields a higher explanatory power of the model (adjusted
R-square of .473), but this variable is not significant.
Table 2. OLS Regression for Legislative Presidential Success (EXECUTIV)
Ecuador, 1979-1996.
Independent Variables
Constant
PSHARE
Model 1
Model 2a
Model 2b
Model 3
98.273**
(17.717)
-21.254
(28.609)
97.049**
(19.301)
97.367**
(17.230)
99.112**
(15.988)
2.059
(9.469)
SUPPORT
CABPARTY
39.584
(47.396)
11.293
(27.506)
DIST
LAME
YULEQ_1
Adjusted R-square
N OF Obs.
-65.367**
(18.496)
-29.607*
(13.754)
-57.739*
(19.464)
-28.182*
(13.223)
-60.673**
(16.945)
-29.205*
(13.397)
-59.827**
(16.105)
-28.115*
(12.574)
.445
.466
.473
.517
18
18
18
18
* Significant at a 0.05 level.
** Significant at a 0.01 level.
Model 3 reports the significant variables only and yields an adjusted R-square of .517. This model
confirms the hypothesis that Presidential will have decreasing chances of success as the duration of their
mandate nears the end (lameduck effect). The lagged Yule Q is again significant and of the opposite
sign, confirming the existence of a “learning factor” that weights in the present decisions of the
president, but it is less clear how the learning takes place throughout time. The combination of the
lameduck effect (LAME) and the adjusted expectations of success (YULEQ_1) explain over 50% of the
success rate of the presidential agenda in Congress in Ecuador.
V. Explaining presidential success beyond formal institutions.
The model partially challenges the conventional idea that party size matters for providing legislative
support to the president. In the fragmented context of Ecuadorian politics, the size of the president’s
party seems to be less relevant for the formation of majorities that support the agenda of the executive.
Presidents with weak parties in Congress like Febres Cordero in 1985 (12.68%) and Durán Ballén in
10
1992 (15.58%) sponsored a majoritarian coalition that approved a higher percentage of bills (64.71% and
65.22% respectively) than President Borja, whose party represented 42.25% of seats in Congress in 1988
(and it approved 53% and 56% of his agenda). But even if we look at presidents who lacked a clear
government-majoritarian coalition (Durán Ballén in 1993 and 1994), we find that the government was
able to pass a higher percentage of initiatives (55% and 44%) than his antecessor Borja who commanded
a government-majoritarian coalition in 1991 (and Congress only approved 25% of his agenda).
This section explores the apparent paradox of: How can some presidents that commanded a majoritarian
coalition in Congress could be equally or even less successful than others that had smaller party support?
A proposed answer would consider the interaction between formal and informal institutions in providing
selective incentives (or bargaining chips) that could increase the possibilities of presidential success in the
legislature.
a) The learning curve
The model confirms that Presidents take into account a criteria of past performance when assessing their
current chances of success in the legislature. There seems to be an adjustment of future expectatives of
legislative success with the passing of time, a tendency that I call the learning curve. Passing a high rate of
bills in the first presidential year could inspire optimism on the executive making the president more
likely to send more bills to Congress in the second year, as it was the case of Roldós, Borja and Durán
Ballén. After midterm elections renewed 85% of congress, presidents Borja and Durán Ballén had to
win the support of a new legislative majority. With dimmer expectations of success, the optimal strategy
would have been to “play safe” and submit fewer initiatives to Congress, as they in fact, did. During the
last presidential year, the proximity of the next election has a strong negative impact on the chances of
presidential success. The lameduck president could choose to: a) minimize damage, by sending fewer
but carefully-crafted legislative initiatives to Congress (Durán Ballén), or b) bombard congress with
several last-minute bills to obtain large defeats (Hurtado and Borja).
The Febres Cordero administration is an interesting case of an abrupt learning curve. Facing a large
opposition in Congress from the start, Febres Cordero quickly adopted a dominating strategy and
declared war on Congress. The first incident took place only a few months after inauguration when the
opposing majority appointed Supreme Court Judges. Unhappy with the appointments, Febres Cordero
refused to remove the sitting judges and ordered the military to prevent the new ones from assuming
their responsibilities. The political deadlock lasted for three months until the legislators agreed to
compromise with the president and new judges were elected (Ortiz 1987). To his “imperial” strategy (of
bombarding Congress with bills and decrees during the first year), the legislature responded by blocking
his agenda and approving less than 27% of it. In the second year, Febres Cordero strengthened his
strategy of “divide and conquer” politics: he disbanded the opposition by intimidation or co-optation, he
abused of his constitutional prerogatives over Congress, he manipulated the legislative internal elections
and even the counting of votes in legislative sessions (Burbano and Rowland 1998: 58). His success rate
skyrocketed to 65% during this period. After the 1986 midterm election, a new contingent of legislators
reorganized the opposition and counterattacked the president. Several cabinet ministers were impeached
by Congress and the legislative majority in the hands of the opposition only approved 10% of his
agenda. The next year was marked by a major constitutional crisis, with the president being held hostage
by military officers in the military base of Taura.17 This episode was crucial to lower Febres Cordero’s
expectations from congress, during the last year of his administration. The “lion” (the English translation
In 1987 Congress had approved amnesty for Gral. Vargas Pazzos and a group of military officers accused of
insubordination. When Febres Cordero refused to release the accused, he was kidnapped in a military based and forced
to fulfill his word and promise not to prosecute his captors.
17
11
of the president’s name) had been finally tamed: he submitted a surprisingly low number of bills (9) and
congress approved 5 of those (55%).
The theory of anticipated reactions suggests that successful presidents would be more likely to exercise
conditional leadership when adjusting their expectations of success vis-à-vis the legislature (Cox and
McCubbins 1993, Shugart and Carey 1992). But in a context of multiparty fragmented politics like
Ecuador, it seems that presidents will have a more difficult time correctly predicting the preferences of
the median legislator, perhaps due to high information uncertainty (Amorim-Neto 1998: 149). The
model shows that presidents have little time available to learn to make correct predictions about the
expected support in the legislature. If this learning does take place however, it can not be carried on to
the next administration because of constitutional limitations for presidential reelection (and legislators
too, until 1994).
b) Running against the clock
Another relevant finding is the strength of the time variable. This relation confirms the notion that in a
presidentialist setting with no reelection, the legislative incentives for supporting the president decrease
over time (Altman 1998, Amorim Neto 1998). In the case of Ecuador, the proximity of an election has
helped transform the legislative arena into a platform for electoral campaigning. Many legislators (Febres
Cordero, Borja, Nebot, Mahuad, and Castello) adopted anti-government strategies in their last year in
office before they became presidential candidates in the next election.
The model for presidential success shows that time is a stronger predictor than any other explanatory
variable, including party support. If tested alone, the dummy for governing-majoritarian coalition
(SUPPORT) has a positive and significant impact on presidential success. But when the model includes
the time factor (LAME), this variable has a stronger negative impact on success that eclipses the effect of
a governing-majoritarian coalition. The strong positive relationship between LAME and SUPPORT
appears to be a spurious correlation.
Chart 4 plots the combined impact of SUPPORT and LAME on the dependent variable. We can
observe that, while the existence of a favorable coalition in Congress has a linear positive impact on the
increasing rate of presidential success, the time factor produces a more dramatic impact. The graph
shows that presidents are more likely to get a higher percentage of legislation passed (up to 65%) in the
second-to-third quarter of their presidential term. After the midterm elections, and as the next
presidential election nears, the legislative support for his agenda falls dramatically to 30% or lower.18
[Insert chart 4 here]
While the lameduck effect seems to explain a large part of the presidential success, there is a need to explore
other legislative dynamics that are closely related to this effect and might contribute for a more accurate
model. Recent reforms have allowed for legislative reelection (1994) and eliminated mid-term elections
(1998). It will be useful to test what would be the effect of adopting longer time horizons for the legislators
and how this affects their relationship with the Executive.
c) The making of ghost alliances
Arguably, the time variable LAME has a better fit when modeled as a cubic function and ran separately against the
dependent variable. But the significance fails to hold when new variables are added. In any case, this is an interesting
point to consider in future research.
18
12
It is a well-known fact that Ecuadorian presidents have one of the lowest average levels of party support
in Latin America. It is also well known that governing-majoritarian coalitions are not sustainable in the
long run in the Ecuadorian Congress.19 This model does not lend strong support to the claim that
presidents who lack governing-majoritarian coalitions have not being able to pass bills. In other words,
there is evidence that some minoritarian presidents did form coalitions that supported their agenda.
Here I suggest that there are many strategies available to presidents to compensate for the lack of
legislative majorities. It seems that minoritarian presidents who have acted as facilitators and articulators
of a coalition have had higher chances of success than those who commanded obedience from Congress.
In spite of the dramatic erosion of its party contingent, the Roldós-Hurtado administration was able to
cut partial legislative agreements with a “ghost alliance”: a pro-government coalition where no member
would acknowledge its membership to it (Mills 1984: 87). The Executive obtained over 50% of its
agenda approved, both in 1981 and 1982. The Durán Ballén administration (1992-1996) was also able to
cut legislative deals in spite of weak party support, by sponsoring a “divide and conquer” strategy. The
Executive relied on the support of “independent deputies” to approve their legislative initiatives.20
During 1993, party defections reached the top level: 1 out of every 4 deputies had abandoned their party
organizations and/or joined another at the end of that legislative year (Mejía-Acosta 1999). When asked
the motivations for defecting the party, one independent legislator explained that (breaking the party
boundaries and cutting deals with the Executive) “it is the only way Provincial Deputies can obtain the
approval of some priority policies that would serve our peoples”.21 As I have reported elsewhere, in
many cases, independent deputies, especially from center parties and smaller districts, were willing to
trade their support and form new legislative coalitions in exchange for goods for their districts (MejíaAcosta 1999).
If the evidence suggests that the Executive was able to form legislative coalitions by breaking party
loyalties, then it is important to rephrase the notion of party support in fragmented politics. In the first
place, the question no longer seem to be about the possibility of forming coalitions but what is the cost
of gathering legislative support? In June 1995 there was a large scandal when there were mutual
accusations between the leadership of the Social Christian party and the Vice-president Dahik for
corruption and buying of votes to pass the Modernization laws in Congress. Two outcomes resulted
from this conflict: the impeachment and later resignation of Vice President Dahik and the constitutional
reform that cut the use of discretionary funds available to the Executive.22
d) Cabinet formation revisited
The evidence reported for Ecuador is not conclusive to support the notion that the degree of
partisanship in a cabinet has a positive impact on the success of executive-initiated bills (Amorim-Neto
1998a). To begin with, Ecuadorian presidents have hardly considered partisan criteria when appointing
their cabinet ministers. Quite the contrary, Conaghan has argued that during the first years of
Several deputies and party leaders interviewed in Quito during july of 1999 have shared this opinion.
In fact, independent deputies –with no party allegiances- acquired legal status through a constitutional reform
sponsored by the executive and approved by plebiscite in 1994.
21 Nelson León (former ID deputy), “Crece el número de desafiliados”. Diario El Comercio, 13 de agosto de 1993.
22 In late 1998, the congressional majority approved a Code of Ethics in an attempt of erasing all signs of corruption from
Congress. According to this law, individual party defections and party undiscipline can be punished under the request of
a party leader, and a simple majority in Congress can take away the seat of the legislator (Interview with Ramiro Rivera,
Leader of the governing Popular Democracy party. Quito, July 22, 1999). This mechanism was sponsored by the
leaders of the governing coalition in 1998 under the idea that it would be easier to reach agreements with the leaders
rather than negotiating bills with each legislator. It remains to be confirmed if this is an effective mechanism to ensure
party discipline in Congress and increase support for the president, or it will further restrain his ability to make short
term coalitions.
19
20
13
democratic rule, and before the large debt crisis and the need for economic adjustment, presidents
choose to isolate their cabinets from the political realm and staff their ministries (especially those dealing
with economic themes), with technocrats accountable to the president only. Hurtado has best illustrated
this attitude when he argued that he and three other cabinet ministers only administrated economic
policies... and later they notified to other cabinet members: “I appointed all my economic cabinet based
on the fact that they were not from the DP party. I did not want that (the discussion of) economic
policy would fall in political hands”.23
But even if the Executive included some partisan criteria in the formation of cabinets, I argue that
ministers became pawns of the Executive-Legislative conflict and they were impeached and sacrificed by
Congress every time legislators needed to make policy amendments to the presidential agenda. Although
President Borja had the highest rate of Cabinet-Party Congruence in the past two decades (.58 and .42),
he also had the highest number of legislative-dismissed cabinet members: from 19 ministers dismissed by
Congress between 1979 and 1996, 7 where dismissed in the second half of his mandate.24
An alternative way used by presidents to gather legislative support of parties was the distribution of
political offices or Troncha among potential coalition members.25 In the past, some key political
appointments like the Electoral Tribunal, Supreme Court Judges, Constitutional Tribunal members,
Customs administrations, and the administration of State-Owned enterprises were used as bargaining
chips when gathering support form the parties. Some party leaders recently defended in a nostalgic
mood, that “this was a legitimate and healthy way to negotiate political power”.26 Some inaccuracies in
the availability of data on distribution of posts and appointments, did not allow to test this argument
properly, but it remains to be explained what has been the impact of trading political posts for increasing
support for the presidential agenda. With the recent reforms, the processes of political nominations
became highly regulated and, in the case of the Electoral Tribunal, the appointments are done in an
automatic way based on the proportion of seats held by the party representations in Congress, leaving
less room for negotiating support.
A third available arena for distributing political power among potential coalition members would be the
committee structure within the legislature. It has been argued that presidents can rely on the work of
party leaders pushing his agenda through key legislative committees (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Santos
1999). In Ecuador however, no consistent evidence has shown that political leaders have channeled
legislative efforts through key legislative committees, especially regarding budget and constitutional
matters.27 At the individual level, there is no evidence that being a consecutive member of a committee
has any weight in the legislative career decision of a legislator (Mejía-Acosta 1996a). The apparent
Osvaldo Hurtado, interviewed by Catherine Conaghan, Quito, March 29, 19986. (1994: 275). Many years later,
Finance Ministers Rodrigo Paz and Pedro Pinto ran for political positions with the DP party: Paz to the Presidency of
the Republic in 1996 and Pinto became Congressman in 1998.
24 The game of cabinet appointments and removals also reveals the key role that the President of Congress plays in
smoothing or increasing the amount of conflict. During the first half of the Borja administration, President of Congress
(PC) Wilfrido Lucero was a crucial figure in providing legislative support to the Executive. After the mid term elections,
Borja had a tough time dealing with the leader of the opposition coalition Averroes Bucaram who disregarded the
presidential authority. The pro-Borja coalition in Congress dismissed Bucaram two months after the election, and Borja
himself ordered the police to lead Bucaram outside the office of the PC. Interview with Rodrigo Borja, Quito, 2 July
1999.
25 With no literal translation to english, the term Troncha was invented by the colorful Asaad Bucaram in 1979 and it was
depicted by cartoonists as a juicy chunk of (political) meat that all politicians craved for.
26 At least two deputies interviewed in July 1999 agreed on this statement but requested anonymity.
27 Every year, legislators were appointed to 5 (later 6) Permanent Legislative Committees to form the Plenario de las Comisiones.
This body was in session throughout most of the year and processed the legislative initiatives distributed by the President of
Congress.
23
14
weakness of the committee system in Ecuador until 1996 is confirmed by the fact that no legislator or
former president interviewed in my sample regarded the committee system as a strategic space for
negotiating policy initiatives.28 It remains to be confirmed if recent legislative reforms can make the
committee system an effective platform for discussing and gathering political support for the presidential
agenda.
VI. Conclusions: Coalition Formation, Presidential Success and Policy Implications
This paper shows that presidential success in the legislature is explained by a fragile combination
between the timing of the presidential cycle and a retrospective function of expected success vis-à-vis the
legislature. The model lends support to what David Altman calls “the tyranny of the presidential
calendar”: Ecuadorian presidents have little time available to learn to make correct predictions about the
expected support to their policies in congress and gather legislative majorities. After midterm elections,
and as the presidential term nears the end, legislators find little incentives to cooperate with the proposed
agenda of the president. The model shows that the size of the party contingent that supports the
president, or the existence of a majoritarian coalition are not significant factors to explain presidential
success. Nor it is significant the existence of a more partisan cabinet that is congruent with the party
composition of the legislature.
The most interesting contribution of this work is that it shows that presidents who want to approve their
policies in congress, can use some informal mechanisms (like sponsoring independent deputies or
sponsoring party defections) to compensate for the lack of some formal institutions of legislative support
(like stable party majorities or partisan cabinets). Consistent with the framework of anticipated reactions,
imperial presidents seem to be a recipe for disaster in fragmented polities like Ecuador. When
presidents bypassed or undermined the decision-making authority congress, legislators counter attacked
to block or veto his policies or the cabinet.29 Ecuadorian legislators (from governing and opposition
parties) have insisted that it would be foolish for the president to expect the formation of automatic
majorities in congress.30 They have also resented that presidents have not made an effort to previously
discuss and amend proposed bills with his own party, before they sent them to the whole congress.
More fine work is needed to reveal the intricacies of how presidents can successfully sponsor
controversial bills despite adverse legislative conditions. Two questions are relevant for future research.
If legislative majorities are made possible by buying the votes of multiple legislators across parties and
regions, then it is relevant to ask what has been the aggregated cost of coalition formation in a
fragmented context? The second question deals with the expected impact of reforms intended to ensure
party discipline. Would recent legal provisions that prevent party switching ensure a larger, more
dependable support for presidents in the future, if past successes have precisely depended on the
possibility that presidents were able to break party loyalties?
“The President would only submit laws that have previous agreement in Congress”. Deputy Alexandra Vela (DP), Interview,
Quito, Aug-1998.
29 When asked about the making of economic policy, former president Rodrigo Borja admitted that he did not included the
opinion of the legislature: “sometimes is unevitable to hurt congressional sensitivities, but legislators do not have the relevant
information to draft policy proposals.” (Interview, Quito, 2 July 1999). Ironically, congress impeached and dismissed his two
finance ministers.
30 Interviews. Paco Moncayo (party leader of Izquierda Democrática), Quito, 6 July 1999. Nina Pacari (leader of the
Pachakutik party), Quito, 14 July 1999. Ramiro Rivera (leader of the governing Christian Democratic party), Quito, 12 July
1999.
28
15
VII. Bibliography
Abranches, Sergio H. Hudson de. 1988. “Presidencialismo de Coalicao: O Dilema Institucional Brasileiro.” Dados 31:538.
Agresti, Alan. 1996. An Introduction ot Categorical Data Analysis.Wiley Inter Science. New York.
Altman, David. 1998.”Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies: The Case of
Uruguay (1989-1997)”. Paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of APSA, Boston, September 1998.
Amorim-Neto, Octavio. 1998a. “Cabinet Formation in Presidential Regimes: An Analysis of 10 Latin American
Countries”. Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association. Chicago.
Amorim-Neto, Octavio. 1998b. “Of Presidents, Parties and Ministers: Cabninet Formation and Legislative DecisionMaking Under Separation of Powers.” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. University of California, San Diego.
Amorim-Neto, Octavio. Forthcoming. “Presidential Cabinets and Legislative Cohesion in Brazil” in Scott Morgenstern
and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America (forthcoming). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Anderson, Lee, Meredith Watts, Allen Wilcox. 1966. Legislative Roll-Call Analysis. Northwestern University Press.
Evanston.
Arteta, Gustavo. 1997. Efectos de las Instituciones Democráticas en la Política y la Economía. Documento de
Trabajo No. 6. CORDES: Quito.
Budge, Ian, and Hans Keman. 1990. Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning
in Twenty States. New York: Oxford University Press.
Burbano de Lara, Felipe, and Michel Rowland García. 1998. “Pugna de Poderes: Presidencialismo y Partidos en el
Ecuador: 1979-1997”. Working Paper # 7. Proyecto CORDES-Gobernabilidad, Konrad Adenauer
Foundation and Spanish Cooperation. Quito.
Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral
Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Carey, John M., and Mathew S. Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral
Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14:417-439.
Carey, John M., and Mathew S. Shugart. 1998. “Calling out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms?” In Executive Decree
Authority, eds. John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Casar, María Amparo. (forthcoming). “Executive-Legislative Relations: the case of Mexico.” in Scott Morgenstern and
Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America (forthcoming). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cheibub, José Antonio. 1999. “Divided Government, Deadlock and the Survival of Presidential Regimes” Paper
presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta.
Close, David (ed.). 1995. Legislatures and the New Democracies in Latin America. London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
Conaghan, Catherine. 1994. “Loose Parties, Floating Politicians and Institutional Stress: Presidentialism in Ecuador:
1979-1988”. In Linz and Valenzuela (eds.). The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Coppedge, Michael. 1994. Strong Parties and Lame Ducks. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
__________. 1998. “The Dynamic Diversity of Latin American Party Systems.” Party Politics4: 547-568.
Cox, Gary and Morgenstern, Scott. (forthcoming). “Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents: A Typology of Latin
American Presidents and Legislatures” in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin
America (forthcoming). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cox and McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Deheza, Grace Ivana. 1997. “Gobiernos de Coalición en el Sistema Presidencial: América del Sur.” Unpublished
Doctoral Dissertation, European University Institute.
DiPalma, Guiseppe. 1977. Surviving Without Governing. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fenno, Richard. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown.
Figueiredo, Argelina and Limongi, Fernando. 1995a. “Partidos Politicos na Camara dos Deputados: 1989-1994” Dados
38: 497-524.
Figueiredo, Argelina and Limongi, Fernando. 1995b. “Mudança Constitucional, Desempenho do Legislativo e
Consolidaçâo Institucional” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 28: 175-200.
Jones, Mark. P. 1995. Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies. Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press.
Linz, Juan J. 1994. “Presidential versus Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” In The Failure of
Presidential Democracy. Comparative Perspectives, vol. 1, eds. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
16
Linz, Juan J. and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.). 1994. The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Comparative
Perspectives, vol. 1, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott. 1992. Dilemmas of multiparty presidential democracy: the case of Brazil. Working paper #
174. Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies. Notre Dame, In.
Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully (eds.). 1995. Building Democratic Institutions. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew (eds.). 1997. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mainwaring, Scott, and Aníbal Pérez Liñán. 1997. “Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress.” Legislative
Studies Quarterly, XXII, 4, November 1997.
Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mejía-Acosta Andrés. 1996a. “La No-Reelección Legislativa en Ecuador” in Este País. Mexico.
__________. 1996b. ¿Una Democracia Ingobernable? Arreglos constitucionales, Partidos Políticos y Elecciones
en Ecuador, 1979-1996. B.A Thesis, Technological Autonomous Institute of Mexico (ITAM). Mexico.
__________. 1999. “Indisciplina y Deslealtad en el Congreso” ICONOS 6: 13-21.
Morgenstern, Scott. 1996. “The Electoral Connection and the Legislative Process in Latin America: Parties, Factions,
and Alliances in Theory and Practice.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego.
Morgenstern, Scott and Benito Nacif (eds.) Legislative Politics in Latin America (forthcoming) Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ortiz Crespo, Gonzalo. 1987. “Ecuador, Semillas de Inconstitucionalidad.” Nueva Sociedad: 92.
Samuels, David J. (forthcoming). “Progressive Ambition, Federalism, and Pork Barreling in Brazil.” in Scott
Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America (forthcoming). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Sánchez-Parga, José. 1998. La Pugna de Poderes. Quito: Abya-Ayala Ediciones.
Santos, Fabiano. 1999. “Party Leaders and Committee Asignments in Brazil.” Paper presented at the 1999 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Ingeniería Constitucional Comparada. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Shugart, Matthew S., and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral
Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Siavelis, Peter. (forthcoming) “Exaggerated Presidentialism and Moderate Presidents: Executive-Legislative Relations in
Chile” in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin America (forthcoming).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strom, Kaare. 1990. Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Valdospinos, Rothman (ed.) 1997. Síntesis Legislativa del Congreso Nacional. Quito.
17
Chart 1. Yearly Average Presidential and Legislative Success Rates
in five Latin American Legislatures
Percentage of Bills Approved
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
Executive
0.6
Legislative
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Mexico
Venezuela
Chile
Brazil
Ecuador
(1982-2000)
(1959-1989)
(1990-1993)
(1989-1994)
(1979-1996)
Sources: Mexico: María Amparo Casar (forth). Venezuela: Octavio Amorim-Neto (1998b). Chile: Peter Siavelis (forth). Brazil: Limongi and
Figueiredo (1995b). Ecuador: Síntesis Legislativa (1997).
Chart 2. Proactive Presidents vs. Successful Presidents
National Congress of Ecuador (1979-1996)
70
65.22
64.71
60
56.52
55.56
Percentage of legislation approved
52.94
53.57
52.94
51.61
48.39
50
44.44
40
44.44
38.46
30
27.27
26.92
25
20
17.65
15.38
10.71
10
0
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Legislative period
Success rate
Proactive rate
Source: Legislative Synthesis , National Congress of Ecuador.
18
Chart 3. Yule's Q Values for Executive Legislative Balance in Ecuador
(1979-1996)
1
0.93
Executive dominance
0.72
0.71
Balance between the Executive and the Legislative
(Yule's Q)
0.91
0.5
0.09
0
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
-0.24
-0.32
-0.5
Legislative Dominance
-1
Legislative period
Chart 4. Legislative Support, Lame duck effect and Presidential Success. Ecuador (1979-1996).
Sources: Legislative synthesis. National Congress of Ecuador.
19
Appendix 1. Data of Legislative Productivity. National Congress of Ecuador. 1979-1996.
Administration
Year President
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Jaime Roldós
Jaime Roldós**
Osvaldo Hurtado
Osvaldo Hurtado
Osvaldo Hurtado
León Febres Cordero
León Febres Cordero
León Febres Cordero
León Febres Cordero
Rodrigo Borja
Rodrigo Borja
Rodrigo Borja
Rodrigo Borja
Sixto Durán Ballén
Sixto Durán Ballén
Sixto Durán Ballén
Sixto Durán Ballén
Abdalá Bucaram
Legislative
Legislative Support
Executive-Legislative Productivity Cabinet-party
coalition***
Party # seats % seats Governin Majority Support? submitted # approved Success Proactiv congruence
g
e
CFP
29
0.42
1
1
1
13
5
38.46
7.69
0.08
GR
12
0.17
1
0
0
31
15
48.39 31.25
0.08
DP
6
0.09
1
1
1
17
9
52.94 33.33
0.25
DP
9
0.13
1
0
0
31
16
51.61 50.00
0.25
DP
9
0.13
1
0
0
26
4
15.38 11.76
0.25
PSC
9
0.13
0
1
0
26
7
26.92 22.58
0.33
PSC
9
0.13
1
1
1
17
11
64.71 22.45
0.33
PSC
14
0.20
0
1
0
28
3
10.71
6.38
0.17
PSC
13
0.18
0
1
0
9
5
55.56 38.46
0.17
ID
30
0.42
1
1
1
17
9
52.94 25.00
0.58
ID
30
0.42
1
1
1
23
13
56.52 31.71
0.58
ID
14
0.19
1
1
1
12
3
25.00 10.00
0.42
ID
14
0.19
1
0
0
17
3
17.65 11.54
0.42
PUR
12
0.16
1
1
1
23
15
65.22 40.54
0.07
PUR
10
0.13
0
0
0
28
15
53.57 32.61
0.07
PUR
2
0.03
0
1
0
18
8
44.44 16.67
0.23
PUR
0
0.00
0
1
0
11
3
30.00
6.52
0.23
PRE
18
0.22
1
1
1
9
4
44.44 13.79
.
YulesQ LAME
0.54
0.57
0.64
0.71
-0.24
0.51
0.72
-0.32
0.93
0.85
0.80
0.37
0.09
0.91
0.70
0.74
0.34
0.78
0.20
0.40
0.33
0.67
1.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.25
** President Roldós died in an accident in 1981. Hurtado took office and governed until 1984.
*** Measured in terms of votes that elected President of Congress
Sources: Legislative Synthesis, National Congress of Ecuador.
20
Appendix 2. Correlation coefficients of the Executive-Legislative productivity model.
LAME
YULEQ_1
Variables
PSHARE
SUPPORT CABPARTY
PSHARE
SUPPORT
CABPARTY
1.000
.
.597**
.009
1.000
.
.555*
.021
.351
.167
1.000
.
LAME
YULEQ_1
-.338
.171
-.609**
.007
.037
.889
1.000
.
.187
.541
.200
.513
.167
.586
-.346
.246
1.000
.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
N = 18
21