THE POLITICS OF SUPPRESSION: EAMON DE VALERA'S GOVERNMENT
AND THE IRA, 1938-1941
By
Grant Alexander Lombard
B.A. University of Maine, 2007
A THESIS
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
(in History)
The Graduate School
The University of Maine
May 2011
Advisory Committee:
Stephen Miller, Professor of History, Advisor
Janet TeBrake, Lecturer of History
Richard Blanke, Professor of History
THE POLITICS OF SUPPRESSION: EAMON DE VALERA'S GOVERNMENT
AND THE IRA, 1938-1941
By Grant Alexander Lombard
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Stephen Miller
An Abstract of the Thesis Presented
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Masters of Arts
(in History)
May 2011
This thesis is a work of political history that examines Eamon de Valera's Fianna
Fail Party between 1938-1941 and investigates how de Valera responded to challenges in
the Dáil Eireann and military challenges at home and abroad. The Irish Republican Army
of this period, led by Sean Russell, engaged in a series of operations that directly
questioned the legitimacy of the Fianna Fail Party's central ideology of diplomatic
republicanism and the legal standing of the Houses of the Oireachtas. To re-establish his
party's political authority, de Valera sought to suppress all parties of opposition in the
Irish Government and the Irish Republican Army. This was accomplished through the
passage of five authoritarian legislative acts and the utilization of wide powers by the
Garda Siochana, which together rendered political debate in the Irish Government
impotent and destroyed the operational capability of the Irish Republican Army.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1
1.THE OPPOSITION IN IRELAND: THE FINE GAEL AND LABOUR
PARTIES OF THE 10 t h DAIL
12
2.THE OPPOSITION IN IRELAND: SEAN RUSSELL AND THE IRISH
REPUBLICAN ARMY
26
3.THE OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE ACT AND BILL, 1939
35
4.THE OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE ACT AND THE IRA
51
5.THE EMERGENCY POWERS BILL AND ACT, 1939
64
6.THE EMERGENCY AND THE IRA
77
7.THE EMERGENCY POWERS (AMENDMENT) BILL AND ACT, 1940
93
8.THE OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE (AMENDMENT) BILL AND
ACT, 1940
109
9.THE EMERGENCY POWERS (AMENDMENT) (NO.2) ACT
117
10.THE POLITICAL SUPREMACY OF THE FIANNA FAIL PARTY
126
CONCLUSION
133
BIBLIOGRAPHY
141
BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR
145
1
INTRODUCTION
The history of Irish politics in the twentieth century has been defined traditionally
by several periods of intense conflict. The incidents that have dominated the focus of
Irish political history are the Easter Rising of 1916, the two wars that followed it from
1919-1923, and the period known as The Troubles, which stretched throughout the 20th
century's latter half and hit an apex of hostility in the 1960s and 1970s.1 The fertile
ground represented by the violence and political upheaval of these events has accordingly
resulted in fewer interpretative analyses of other periods of twentieth-century Irish
history that lack the same level of dramatic action and accompanying momentous change,
but which are nevertheless highly complex and important to understand.
This work seeks to rectify one such oversight within current Irish political
historiography through an examination of the period of 1938-1941. The de-emphasis on
Ireland in the late 1930s and early 1940s has resulted in articles and books that typically
either incorporate the period into much larger studies of the twentieth century or choose
to concentrate on a narrow aspect of Ireland's political actions. It is this work's
1
For a recent overview of the Irish historiography see, Mary McAuliffe, Katherine O'Donnell and Leeann
Lane, eds., Palgrave Advances in Irish History (Basingstroke: Palgrave McMillian, 2009).
2
Numerous histories of Ireland in the 20th century exist such as, Tim Pat Coogan, Ireland in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2004); Paul Bew, Ireland: the Politics of Enmity (Oxford, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007); and, John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century (Dublin:
Gill and Macmillian, 1975). Political works that cover the period of 1938-1941, but do not make the
significant connections to policing and terrorism that this work seeks to include, Richard Dunphy, The
Making of Fianna Fail Power in Ireland 1923-1948 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Alan J. Ward, The
Irish Constitutional Tradition: Responsible Government and Modern Ireland, 1782-1992 (Washington
D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1994); and, Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe 1919-1948 (Dublin: Gill
and Macmillian, 1988).
2
contention, however, that the politics of Ireland as represented by the Fianna Fail Party's
control of the Irish Government was inexorably intertwined with the actions perpetrated
by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its persecution by the Garda Siochana or Gardai',
and therefore is best understood when examined in conjunction with these two groups.
This work's central thesis is that the Irish Republican Army's reckless and violent
attempt to de-legitimize the Irish Government from 1938-1941 provoked a defensive
response from Taoiseach Eamon de Valera to secure his party's unquestioned political
supremacy. De Valera's achievement of that goal was accomplished by a series of
powerful and authoritarian legislative acts, which cumulatively suppressed all political
opposition in the Oireachtas and eliminated the dangers posed by the IRA.
The central thesis of this work will be substantiated using a methodological
approach which alternates its focus between the politics of Ireland and the actions of the
IRA and Gardai that shaped it, arranged chronologically from 1933 to 1944. The
presentation of evidence in this manner will allow for the nature of the Fianna Fail Party,
the Gardai, and the IRA's actions from 1938-1941 to be properly articulated, while
providing invaluable contextual information. Specifically, it will allow for a
comprehensively multi-faceted examination of the time period, which accentuates close
and detailed assessment of the motivations of political parties and leaders in relation to
one another and to the IRA and Gardai.
This work relies on the papers of the 10th Dail Eireann, the primary political arena
•
•
of the Irish Government, and key written records documenting de Valera's ambition.
3
3
The Dail is the lower of the Houses of the Oireachtas and holds the vast majority of the legislative and
legal power in the Irish Government. The ratio of its authority to the upper house, Seanad Eireann, is
comparable to that of the British House of Commons to the House of Lords. The Seanad, as reformed in the
1937 Constitution, plays a largely advisory role to the Dail and can only recommend changes to legislature
3
The 10th Dail Eireann sat from 30 June 1938 to 31 May 1943, during which time Fianna
Fail controlled the majority of the political debate.4 These years not only witnessed the
IRA's substantial challenge to the Irish Government but also demonstrated de Valera at
his most politically adept in securing the supremacy of his party against all opposition.5
The historical literature concerning this period is overwhelmingly concentrated on
Eamon de Valera, as he was a co-founder of the party and occupied the position of
Taoiseach. The wide-ranging nature and amount of works that focus on de Valera reflect
the longevity of his political life and importance as the leader of the Fianna Fail Party
from 1926-1959. Other prominent members of the Fianna Fail Party in the 10th Dail that
will be referenced in this work, such as P.J. Ruttledge, Gerald Boland, and Frank Aiken
have had a lack of scholarly attention and analyses focused on their actions. Instead, their
contribution to Irish politics has been traditionally viewed through broader histories of
the Fianna Fail Party or in relation to the decisions of party leaders like de Valera.6
or delay its passage into law for a short time. Conversely, the Dail is entrusted with the greatest and most
important of the governmental powers, including the passage of legislation, the appointment or dismissal of
the Taoiseach, and the power to declare war. It is the main theater of debate, compromise, and ideological
conflict on any act, amendment, or controversial issue within the Irish Government.
4
The papers of the Dail Eireann and Seanad Eireann cited within this work were accessed from
http://www.oireachtas.ie. between 03 January 2008 and 15 May 2010. The legislative acts of the Houses of
the Oireachtas cited within this work were accessed from http://www.irishstatuebook.ie between 05 March
2008 and 23 October 2010.
5
The composition of the Dail is determined by Article 16.2.2° of the 1937 Constitution, which states that
"the total number of members of Dail Eireann shall not be fixed at less than one member for each thirty
thousand of the population, or at more than one member for each twenty thousand of the population."
The tie between political representation and Ireland's population means that there is a fluidity to the
number of seats in the Dail and to the constituencies from which they are elected. The (0th Dail had 138
seats dispersed over 34 constituencies, whose number of representatives were determined by the
concentration of peoples within the area. All but seven of those seats were held by members of major
political parties, with those outstanding filled by independents or minor parties. Irish Statue Book,
"Constitution of Ireland," Office of the Taoiseach.
6
Examples of works that focus on Fianna Fail history and include prominent party members such as
Ruttledge, Boland, and Aiken are as follows, Richard Dunphy, The Making of Fianna Fail Power in
Ireland 1923-1948 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Kieran Allen, Fianna Fail and Irish Labour. 1926 to
the Present (Chicago: Pluto Press, 1997); Mark O'Brien, De Valera, Fianna Fail, and the Irish Press
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001); Iseult Honohan, Republicanism in Ireland: Confronting Theories
4
The most common way that scholars have approached de Valera's complex
political life is through biographies, which typically extend from his involvement in the
Easter Rising of 1916 until his retirement from political life in 1973.7 However, the
breadth of that period has led many writers to break de Valera's involvement in politics
into eras that more directly reflect Ireland's own turbulent change from a revolutionary
minded member of the British Commonwealth to an accepted independent republic.
Specifically, de Valera's political life is frequently divided into three periods. The first
period of 1916-1925 concerns his early radical beginnings and rise to prominence. The
second period of 1926-1949 covers the creation of the Fianna Fail Party, his
transformation into a legitimate politician, and the foundation of the Irish Republic. The
third period of 1950-1973 concentrates on his time as an elder Irish statesman, during
which he relinquished control of the Fianna Fail Party and transitioned to the position of
President of Ireland.
o
and Traditions (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008); and, Phillip Hannon and Jackie
Gallagher, Taking the Long View: 70 Years of Fianna Fail (Dublin: Blackwater Press, 1996).
The few works that directly address prominent members of Fianna Fail, other than de Valera, are almost
completely scholarly articles. Examples of these include, Norman MacQueen, "Frank Aiken and Irish
Activism at the United Nations, 1957-61," The International History Review Vol. 6, No.l (May 1984):
210-234; A.S. Cohen, "Career Patterns in the Irish Political Elite," British Journal of Political Science Vol.
3 No. 2 (Apr. 1973): 213-228; Joseph L. Rosenberg, "The 1941 Mission of Frank Aiken to the United
States: An American Perspective," Irish Historical Studies Vol. 22 (Nov. 1980): 162-177; and, Mike
Cronin, "The Blueshirt Movement, 1932-5: Ireland's Fascists?," Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 30
No. 2 (Apr. 1995): 311-332.
7
Biographies of Eamon de Valera are too numerous to provide a complete list, but a short list of prominent
examples include, Tim Pat Coogan, De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow (London: Random House,
1993); Tim Pat Coogan, Eamon De Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland (New York: HarperCollins, 1995);
T. Ryle Dwyer, Eamon de Valera (Dublin: Gill & MacMillian, 1980); Owen Dudley Edwards, Eamon de
Valera (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987); Diarmaid Ferriter, Judging Dev. A
Reassessment of the Life and Legacy of Eamon de Valera (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 2007); T. Ryle
Dwyer, De Valera: The Man & The Myths (Dublin: Poolbeg, 1991); Frank Longford, Eamon de Valera
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971); and a collection of biographical essays from numerous historians
published in the Irish Times a year after his death in 1976 entitled Eamon de Valera: The Controversial
Giant of Modern Ireland (Dublin: Irish Times, 1976).
8
Examples of works that involve de Valera's early political career include, Oonagh Walsh, Ireland's
Independence 1880-1923 (London: Routledge, 2002); Joseph M Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State,
1921-1923 (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1980); and, Michael Laffan, The Resurrection of
5
The historiography of de Valera can also be viewed apart from the biographical
approach and through the lens of individual political issues that he encountered. The most
prominent of these issues was international relations, specifically the Irish Government's
relationship with the United Kingdom as it concerned partition.9 Scholars have also found
the Irish Government's relationship with the United States highly relevant, because under
the American born de Valera its strength was carefully maintained.10
A secondary issue that has recently come to greater prominence concerns de
Valera's economic policy and strategy in the 1940s and 1950s. These have questioned de
Valera's responsibility for the economic stagnation and lack of post-war development.
Scholars in the 1970s and 1980s viewed Fianna Fail's losses in the elections of 1948 and
1954, along with statistical evidence of meager growth as evidence of de Valera's
economic incompetence and conservatism, while modern revisionists have attributed the
slow development to a wider variety of factors.11
Ireland: the Sinn Fein Party, 1916-1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Examples of
works that involve de Valera's rise to political prominence in Ireland through the creation and electoral
popularity of Fianna Fail include, Mary Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation (New York:
Noonday Press, 1953); T. Ryle Dwyer, De Valera's Finest Hour: In Search of National Independence
(Dublin: Mercier Press, 1982); and, Mike Cronin and John Regan, Ireland: The Politics of Independence
1922-1949 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). Examples of works that involve de Valera's role as elder
Irish statesman include, Barry Flynn, Soldiers of Folly, The IRA Border Campaign 1956-1962 (New York:
Collins Publishers, 2010); and, Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh, De Valera's Irelands (Dublin: Mercier
Press, 2003).
9
The amount of works concerning the issue of Anglo-Irish relations and partition as it pertains to de Valera
is innumerable, however the following is a short list of examples that highlight the extensive
historiography, John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question, 1917-1973 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983); Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster, and The Price of Neutrality (Philadelphia:
Philadelphia University Press, 1983); Deirde McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists: Anglo-Irish
Relations in the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); and, Ian McCabe, A Diplomatic History
of Ireland, 1948-9: the Republic, the Commonwealth, and NA TO (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1991).
10
Works that detail Irish-American relations under a de Valera Government include, T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish
Neutrality and the USA, 1939-47 (Dublin: Gill & MacMillian, 1977); Troy Davis, Dublin's American
Policy: Irish-American Diplomatic Relations, 1945-1952 (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of
America Press, 1998); and, T. Ryle Dwyer, Strained Relations: Ireland at Peace and the USA at War,
1941-45 (Dublin: Gill & MacMillian, 1988).
11
Works that have contributed to the examination of de Valera's economic policy and the issue of his
responsibility for Ireland's slow growth in the 1940s and 1950s include, Kiernan Anthony Kennedy,
6
Fianna Fail leadership in the Dail was secured in the election of 1938 through the
•
12
capture of seventy-seven seats, or fifty-six percent of the total available. The party's
majority status provided not only its leader, de Valera, with the Office of the Taoiseach,
but also prominent members with Cabinet positions that put them in charge of External
Affairs, Defense, Justice, and, later, the Coordination of Defensive Measures, which was
created at the beginning of World War Two.13 The Fianna Fail Party's control of these
offices allowed its high-ranking members the ability to introduce and issue orders that
protected the legitimacy of the Irish Government's rule.
The desire to validate the Fianna Fail Party and the Irish Government's legitimacy
against threats posed specifically by the IRA, through establishing a uniformity of
political opinion under the Taoiseach, was directly impeded by the two minority
oppositional parties in the 10th Dail, the Fine Gael and Labour Parties. These parties
possessed rival political ideologies and significantly different perceptions of the situation
in Ireland, which directly opposed Fianna Fail ambitions and its responses to the IRA.
The particular nature of these objections and impediments to the policy decisions
of Fianna Fail Teachta Dalas (TDs), and how the majority party ultimately suppressed
them to achieve a single-party opinion within the Dail, will be demonstrated through a
careful examination of the official government record. These records have hitherto been a
woefully underutilized source in the historiography, relegated largely to a few
Economic Growth in Ireland: the Experience Since 1947 (Dublin: Gill & MacMillian, 1975); John Kurt
Jacobsen, Chasing Progress in the Irish Republic: Ideology, Democracy, and Dependent Development
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and, Bernadette Whelan, "Adopting the 'American Way':
Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-57," History Ireland Vol. 16 Issue 3 (2008): 30-33.
12
The seventy-seven seats won in the 1938 election matched the party's 1933 electoral victory. Also in the
1938 election, Fianna Fail captured 51.9 percent of the total vote, one of only two times in history it has
achieved over fifty percent, and easily the highest in its history to that point in time.
13
The Cabinet contained 12 positions at the beginning of the 10th Dail, but was expanded to 14 following
the outbreak of World War Two. The Fianna Fail Party held each position, thereby completely controlling
the Cabinet.
7
supplementary quotes from TDs. This work will attempt to correct that oversight and
demonstrate Fianna Fail's deliberate efforts to silence the opposition between 1938-1941.
The conservative Fine Gael Party will be presented as the most complex obstacle
to Fianna Fail's ambition in the 10th Dail. The four-year period that preceded the 10th Dail
was critical in determining the nature of the party from 1938-1941, because it
encompassed Fine Gael's tortured creation following the disastrous election of 1933 and
its immediate aftermath. The prominent inclusion of quasi-fascist individuals in the
uncomfortable marriage of electoral convenience that established Fine Gael haunted the
party throughout the 1930s because it established an ideological splintering and decline in
popularity that made Fine Gael a weakened and volatile participant in 1938.
The debilitating inter-party division, which separated ultraconservative and
moderately conservative TDs, resulted in different responses to de Valera and his
Cabinet's introduction of authoritarian legislation that justified their requests for such
unprecedented powers. Ultimately, the divided and sometimes unpredictable nature of
Fine Gael undermined the party's legitimacy because too many of its members were
willing to agree with the government and vote in favor of legislation without extensive
debate, effectively eliminating its ability to shape the political debate.
The introduction of two major pieces of legislation by Fianna Fail in 1939, the
Offences Against the State Bill (OASB) in February and the Emergency Powers Bill
(EPB) in September, along with amendments to each the following year, exploited the
ideological division within the shrunken Fine Gael Party and ultimately caused the
suppression of its opposition in the Dail by mid-1940. Each new legislative bill provoked
a defection of its more moderate members to Fianna Fail, which increased the majority
8
party's authority and discouraged opposition. The loss of moderate objections within Fine
Gael left only a small ultraconservative rump that persevered due to its ideological
conviction. The party's eventual suppression through the overwhelming acquiescence of
its membership and the nearly absolute accumulation of power generated by Fianna Fail,
ended its viability as an opposition party.
The Labour Party proved to be a different obstacle to Fianna Fail and de Valera.
Although it was smaller than Fine Gael, it was a much more cohesive group with a clear
vision. The party's meager representation in the Dails of the 1930s was because of its
limited platform and Fianna Fail's entry into Irish politics in the late 1920s, which
reduced its number of TDs to single digits.14 Its ineffectualness eventually led to its
decision to join the Fianna Fail Party from 1933-1937.15 This period of attempted
cooperation resulted in a series of electoral and ideological conflicts that deeply alienated
Labour leadership, particularly during the election of 1938, and led to a united front of
dislike and distain for de Valera and Fianna Fail TDs during the 10th Dail.
Because of its ideological unity and smaller size, Fianna Fail suppressed Labour
using slightly different means than it used against Fine Gael. The rapid co-opting of
Labour members' allegiances was an impossibility and therefore de Valera and his
Cabinet overwhelmed party TDs with a forceful legislative assault which quickly
demonstrated Labour's difficulty in preventing de Valera's accumulation of power. As a
result, the pointed and personal attacks on Fianna Fail's ideology and membership from
Labour were slowly suffocated from 1938-1941, ultimately resulting in TDs voting with
14
The Fianna Fail Party first ran for elected office in June 1927. Prior to its entry into the Houses of the
Oireachtas, Cumann na nGaedheal was the majority party and Labour its primary opposition.
15
The Fianna Fail Party was initially able to establish a minority government within Ireland through the
political goodwill of the Labour Party. As such, they did not formally establish an inter-party government,
but rather were ideological and political allies in opposition to the Fine Gael Party.
9
the majority party and offering no objections in the Dail to the content of the introduced
legislation.
The critical importance placed by de Valera and the Fianna Fail Party on
subduing oppositional political opinion in the 10th Dail, as argued within this work's
central thesis, stemmed from a perceived threat to its central ideology and legitimacy of
rule as posed by the IRA's actions from 1938-1941. The IRA openly challenged the
diplomatic republicanism of de Valera and Fianna Fail with its militant republican
beliefs, which advocated that negotiated solutions for Irish independence were a fallacy
and that violent force was the only true path to the creation of an Irish republic. The IRA
also publicly questioned the legality of the Ministerial positions in the Cabinet and
ultimately the Houses of the Oireachtas itself, because of the continued ties between
Ireland and the British Government in the 1930s and early 1940s.
The IRA's intent to engage Fianna Fail provided the motivation for de Valera to
suppress political opposition and ultimately achieve the unquestioned supremacy of his
party. The Taoiseach's political desire was established due to his belief that opposition
directly undermined Fianna Fail's authority, and because his party was already faced with
the more tangible and dangerous threat offered by the IRA, such inter-governmental
dissent was simply unacceptable. The incorporation of Labour and Fine Gael TDs into a
single-opinion government, whose ideology was dictated by Fianna Fail, conclusively
demonstrated the majority party's strength and provided a unanimous consent to its
authoritarian measures against the IRA.
The particular nature of the IRA's actions and persecution by the Gardai, which
was intertwined with de Valera's movement against oppositional political parties and the
10
organization itself, will be demonstrated in this thesis. Works that have predominated
twentieth-century Irish historiography on the subject of policing and terrorism, with
respect to the Gardai and IRA, such as The I.R.A. by Tim Pat Coogan and The Secret
Army: A History of the IRA 1916-1974 by J. Bowyer Bell, will be examined as will
newspaper accounts and interviews, along with speeches made by prominent IRA
members. Rather than focus on the minutia of the IRA, this work will concentrate on how
the organization's ideologies and plans of action directly challenged the Fianna Fail
Party, thereby provoking de Valera's overwhelming legislative response and the Gardai's
actions.
To properly understand the IRA's activities from 1938-1941 and de Valera's
response, this work will provide contextual information about the changes that the
organization underwent as a result of Sean Russell's rise to Chief of Staff in April 1938.
Russell represented an energetic hard line militant republicanism in the organization,
which propelled him into the leadership position because of broad dissatisfaction in the
IRA created by its mid-1930s lethargy of inaction and incompetence. Under his direction
and leadership, the IRA was transformed into an energetic and highly antagonistic body
that forced a response from the Fianna Fail led Irish Government between 1938 and
1941.
The first half of this work will focus on the IRA from 1938-1941 and will deal
primarily with a series of public proclamations and strategies employed by Russell during
1938-9 that jumpstarted the legislative process against the organization. On three separate
occasions the IRA issued statements, through either newspapers or public bulletins,
which in succession claimed that the organization represented the legitimate Government
11
of the Republic of Ireland, that it accordingly possessed the power to declare war against
Great Britain, and that therefore such a state of war existed. The IRA's belief that it
represented the true Irish Republic, which was at war with Great Britain, allowed for the
republican legitimization of Russell's order in January 1939 to take violent action against
targets within England through a series of bombings known as the Sabotage Plan.
The seriousness of these actions, as perceived both domestically and
internationally by Fianna Fail with respect to their possible de-legitimization of the
Cabinet and the party as a whole, were what led directly to the crackdown against the
IRA. The latter half of this work will concern itself with the increasingly intense
persecution of IRA members by the Irish Government and the Gardai, through
legislatively granted authoritarian powers. In particular, areas that have previously been
overlooked, such as the Taoiseach's circumvention of judicial authority and antagonistic
forms of IRA resistance, will be thoroughly addressed and examined. The final
suppression of the IRA in late 1941 through pressures applied by the Irish Government
and Gardai, which created catastrophic internal discord, signaled the triumphant
completion of Taoiseach de Valera's ambition and the temporary loss of an organization
that had been a critical component of Irish history for over twenty-five years.
These momentous changes in the political history of Ireland from 1938-1941 form
the foundation of this work and its central thesis. The interconnectedness of the Irish
Government under the majority rule of the Fianna Fail Party, the Gardai, and the IRA's
actions during this time period requires that they be examined together and understood as
a causal relationship. Ultimately, this focus makes the work a unique contribution to Irish
historiography.
12
1. THE OPPOSITION IN IRELAND: THE FINE GAEL AND LABOUR PARTIES
OF THE 10™ DAIL
Taoiseach Eamon de Valera's determination to secure Fianna Fail's political
supremacy during the 10th Dail required the suppression of the rival Fine Gael and
Labour parties. De Valera and his Cabinet responded to each party's challenge with a
unique combination of legislative authority and political discourse, which redefined all of
the parties' roles and responsibilities in the Dail. This chapter will examine the Fine Gael
and Labour Parties in the early to mid-1930s. This period contained critical shifts in their
identities and behaviors that determined the characteristics of their opposition in the 10th
Dail.
Fine Gael was the largest party of opposition in the 10th Dail with 45 elected
representatives or seats. It was created from the merging of Cumann na nGaedheal, the
National Centre Party (NCP), and the Army Comrades Association (ACA), better known
as the Blueshirts, following Fianna Fail's decisive victory in the 1933 election.1 Each of
these groups was politically conservative compared to Fianna Fail, drew a significant
portion of their support from farmers and the rural community, and championed
constitutional rights and protections as an issue of paramount importance.
The party-centric concern about the rights and protections afforded by the Irish
Free State Constitution and later the Constitution of 1937 was the preeminent
characteristic of the opposition put forth by TDs in the 10th Dail. The powerful and
1
Following the 1933 election defeat, Cumann na nGaedheal held 48 seats in the 8th Dail and the National
Centre Party held 11.
authoritarian nature of the legislation introduced by de Valera's Cabinet provided ample
opportunity for certain representatives to argue that the majority party's actions infringed
or eliminated constitutional rights. Fine Gael representative Richard Mulchany
exemplified this point in 1939, when, in response to Fianna Fail's introduction of the
Offences Against the State Bill, he argued that "I would ask them to realize that their
responsibilities are, no doubt, to preserve the State, but.. .there is no use in this State or
this Constitution being preserved except it can so preserve the liberties of our people."2
The overall strength of Fine Gael was severely compromised by the differences
between its founding members. The inability of Cumann na nGaedheal, the NCP, and the
ACA to form a strong ideological bond prevented a united response to Fianna Fail. Fine
Gael's dysfunction stemmed mostly from the ACA, and its leader Eoin O'Duffy, who
assumed the leadership of the party at its inception in 1933. The ACA was not a political
party like Cumann na nGaedheal and the NCP, but a quasi-fascist paramilitary
organization whose ultimate goal was the creation of an authoritarian regime and the
promotion and security of conservative ideas.4 The radical nature of O'Duffy's rhetoric
and the ACA's actions, created an irreconcilable schism in Fine Gael between the
ultraconservative and conservative elements, which turned members against one another.5
2
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 03 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage (Resumed)," Houses of the Oireachtas (HO).
3
It is characteristic of the internal differences within the Fine Gael Party that initially they could not agree
on a new name for the party itself. For a short time it was known as the United Ireland Party before it
changed to the even broader Fine Gael, which means "Irish Race."
4
The organization's fascism was particularly evident in appearance, as they wore a St. Patrick's blue
uniform from which their name was given, adopted the straight-arm salute of the Nazis in May 1933, and
sought to emulate Mussolini by marching on Dublin and the Dail to demonstrate their power and promote
their purpose.
5
Cumann na nGaedheal's leadership originally envisioned the ACA's role in the Fine Gael Party as one
similar to the IRA-Fianna Fail relationship at the time.
The problem of disunity was exemplified in the tension between O'Duffy and
W.T. Cosgrave, a lifelong politician who had been President of the Executive Council
from 1922-1932 and was the leader of the Fine Gael TDs in the Dail.6 Cosgrave's ability
to work with de Valera and Fianna Fail was severely undercut by the radicalism of
O'Duffy, whose words inflamed violence and generated controversy. This was
demonstrated during the fall sitting of the 8th Dail on 9 October 1933, when O'Duffy
addressed a group of republicans at a rally in Ballyshannon. He declared that "whenever
Mr. de Valera runs away from the Republic and arrests you Republicans, and puts you on
board beds in Mountjoy, he is entitled to the fate he gave Mick Collins and Kevin
O'Higgins.. .He does not understand this country, he is a half-breed."7 The public
pronouncement of O'Duffy's interpretation of history, racism, and belief that de Valera
deserved assassination, colored all of Fine Gael as dangerously radical, and led to a
difficult working relationship for Cosgrave and other more moderate TDs with Fianna
Fail.
The ACA and O'Duffy became even more problematic for Cosgrave and the unity
of Fine Gael, when in 1933 de Valera officially declared the ACA to be an illegal
organization and then banned the wearing of their titular blue shirts the following year.8
The measures heightened the inter-party tension and placed significant pressure on
O'Duffy as both Fine Gael party leader and ACA founder. He responded in September
1934 by resigning from the party, without alerting any other Fine Gael members. The
assumption of the party's leadership by Cosgrave provided a short term settling of the
6
Michael Gallagher, Political Parties in the Republic of Ireland, (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1985), 46.
7
Ibid, 227.
8
The Wearing of Uniform (Restriction) Bill, 1934 was passed into law by a vote of 77-61 within the Dail.
15
sharp conflict within the party, but the consequences of the ideology that O'Duffy had
pursued and contributed to Fine Gael, dramatically reverberated throughout the 1930s
and into the early 1940s.
The most damaging effect of the O'Duffy era to Fine Gael was the continued
ideological divide within the party. The differences in opinion among party members
made the formulation of any party-wide agenda very difficult, and therefore
compromised the party's ability to meet unfavorable legislation with a united
oppositional stance. Additionally, Fianna Fail regularly exploited the fascist legacy of the
ACA, which helped to maintain inter-party differences within Fine Gael and weakened
the party's electoral popularity.
The lingering and damaging presence of an ideological divide within Fine Gael
was exemplified by John Costello TD, a high ranking member of the party who had
served as Attorney General from 1926-1932 and would serve as Taoiseach twice in the
1940s and 1950s.9 He argued during the mid-1930s that "the Blackshirts were victorious
in Italy and.. .the Hitler Shirts were victorious in Germany, as, assuredly.. .the Blueshirts
will be victorious in the Irish Free State."10 Patrick McGilligan, another prominent Fine
Gael member who served as Minister for Industry and Commerce from 1924-1932 and in
the 1940s and 1950s as Minister for Finance, defended the organization in 1936, arguing
that "the Blueshirts.. .helped to get freedom of speech and liberty of meeting when these
were being endangered by the supineness of the Government. They certainly can rest well
9
Costello served as Taoiseach from 18 February 1948 to 13 June 1951 and again from 2 June 1954 to 20
March 1957.
10
Dail Debates, "Ddil Eireann-Volume 51-14 March 1934- Wearing of Uniform (Restriction) Bill, 1934Fifth Stage," HO.
content that they did their work."11 Loyalty and support for the ultraconservative
Blueshirt ideals remained in Fine Gael even after fascist regimes in Germany and Italy
became clear and present dangers in 1939. As Sean Broderick, Fine Gael TD, proclaimed
during a debate over the OASB that "I happened to be a director of the Blueshirt
1 ""J
organization in the West. I am not a bit ashamed of it, in fact I am very proud of it."
Although some Fine Gael TDs saw political advantages in using fascist rhetoric,
Fianna Fail considered it a political liability and continually paired Fine Gael and the
Blueshirts to illustrate that the party was dangerous or simply ignorant and incompetent.
The legislation that de Valera and his Cabinet had directed at the ACA allowed for the
connection between the Blueshirts and Fine Gael to remain a relevant political question
in Irish politics. The rhetoric employed by party members in the Dail, such as referring to
a "Blueshirt conspiracy," "the menace of the Blueshirt organization," and "the deluded
Blueshirts.. .who, [acted] on the advice of and with the motor car driven and paid for by
1
Fine Gael," continued the Blueshirt-Fine Gael link throughout the 1930s.
A primary consequence of Fianna Fail's efforts to connect Fine Gael with the
quasi-fascist Blueshirts, and the continued ideological division within the party, was that
Fine Gael suffered a significant decline in popularity. Its share of the popular vote
decreased in every general election from its creation until 1948. In total, the percent of
11
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 62- 28 May 1936- Constitution (Amendment No. 24) Bill, 1934Motion of Enactment," HO.
12
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 02 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage (Resumed)," HO.
13
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 75- 10 May 1939- Financial Resolutions- Committee on FinanceVote 52-Agriculture (Resumed)," HO; "Dail Eireann- Volume 63-13 August 1936- Adjournment Motion,"
HO; and "Dail Eireann- Volume 60- 11 March 1936- Sugar (Control of Imports) Bill, 1936," HO.
the vote Fine Gael captured slid from 34.8 to 19.8 percent and its TD total declined from
48 to 28 representatives.14
Ultimately then the Fine Gael Party saw overall electoral losses and became a
weakened party that was unable to unify in opposition to the actions of de Valera and his
Cabinet in the 10th Dail. This meant that it was unable to provide a unanimous response
to the introduction of authoritarian legislation. As a result, when such legislation was
debated in the Dail, some moderate Fine Gael TDs broke from the ultraconservatives and
supported its passage and legalization.
The willingness of moderate Fine Gael TDs to readily accept the arguments put
forth by de Valera and his Cabinet severely compromised other more conservative
members of the party and led to the party's suppression. The strength of the
ultraconservative TDs' oppositional arguments was rapidly diminished by the
amenability of moderate party members, who were culpable in facilitating the Irish
Government's accumulation of power and authority. As a result, the potency of Fine
Gael's opposition steadily declined from the introduction of the OASB onward because
of the continuous defection of moderate members, which ultimately rendered the
ultraconservative rump's arguments pointless. Consequently, in the span ofjust a year
and a half, Fine Gael's opposition to Fianna Fail's legislation failed completely and could
not prevent de Valera from achieving his aims.
The smaller party of opposition in Ireland was Labour, who held 9 seats in the
10th Dail.15 The party stood in stark contrast to Fine Gael, because of its size, ideological
14
Brian Maye, Fine Gael 1923-1987: A General History with Biographical Sketches of Leading Members
(Dublin: Blackwater Press, 1993), 65.
unity, and uniform dislike for de Valera and Fianna Fail. These characteristics allowed
for Labour to provide a rigid and unified opposition to legislation, and a resistance to the
possibility of a single-opinion government. Accordingly, Labour TDs unanimously voted
against the OASB and EPB, along with the first amendments to each, and utilized their
party-centric ideologies and past relationship with Fianna Fail to maintain an independent
and separate voice.
The party's small size was representative of the limited range of issues and
concerns that it championed and campaigned on. Unlike the much broader platforms of
Fine Gael or Fianna Fail, Labour's progressive social and economic programs focused on
issues such as trade unionism, workers' rights, unemployment, and poverty. It was a
progressivism whose overarching theme was the defense of individual liberties and
freedoms, which were seen as under attack from powerful business interests and
governmental indifference. The party's aspirations, as voiced by its leader William
Norton on the occasion of the transition to a Fianna Fail led government in 1932 and de
Valera's election to President of the Executive Council, were as follows,
What are the problems that we as a Labour Party are concerned with? The problem
which transcends all others to my mind is the problem of unemployment. Here
to-day we have the festering sore of 80,000 unemployed men and women willing and
anxious to work, but denied the opportunity of work in the land that gave them birth.
There can be no effective solution of the unemployment problem except along the
lines o f developing our industry and our agriculture, and in taking every possible
step to ensure that our home industry supplies the home demand for all those
commodities which to-day we are compelled to import.
I hope instead that they will endeavour to introduce a new conception o f industry,
a conception of industry which will take the form of planning the ordered
15
The party captured 10 percent of the total vote in the 1938 election. This number of seats was on par with
what the party had controlled throughout the 1930s, but was a decrease from the 1920s, when it provided
one of the main oppositions to Cumann na nGaedheal.
19
development of our industries and introducing into industry the humanising factors
which are absent from industry to-day. The worker must not be regarded as a tool
for the creation of wealth or for the making of profit.
And I hope the new Government will use all its energies and all its resources, all the
wealth and all the wealth-creating instruments within the country, in the endeavour to
build up an Ireland which will be an example to the world, an Ireland wherein every
man and woman who renders service to the nation shall be guaranteed by the nation
a full, free, and happy life.16
Norton's words reflected his party's decade long opposition to Cumann na nGaedheal,
17
and its shifting political position in response to Fianna Fail's rapid rise in popularity.
Following the 1932 general election, Labour joined the Fianna Fail Party because of its
common ground on issues of social and economic policy, and the belief that progress in
such areas could best be achieved if allied to a strong majority party.18 That decision led
to limited success with accomplishments such as the expansion of industrial employment
and passage of several legislative acts that targeted Labour concerns and constituencies
throughout the mid-1930s.19
The successes achieved by the Fianna Fail-Labour led government were undercut,
however, by a decline in Labour's popularity from 1932-1936 as a consequence of this
alliance. The passage of legislation that benefited the party's base of voters, principally
the working class, was consistently attributed by them to the efforts of Fianna Fail and
not Labour. This was because of voter ignorance that identified all governmental acts and
actions with the majority party, and deliberate misrepresentation on the part of Fianna
16
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann-Volume 41-09 March 1932- Nomination of the President of the Executive
Council," HO.
17
Norton additionally said of the shift in power from Cumann na nGaedheal to Fianna Fail in 1932, "so far
as the Labour Party is concerned.. .they can bid adieu to the outgoing Government with no feeling of regret
whatever and with no kind wishes for their early return." Ibid.
18
Emmet O'Connor, A Labour History of Ireland 1824-1960 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillian, 1992), 128.
19
These included the Conditions of Employment Act of 1936, Unemployment Assistance Act of 1933, and
the Control of Manufactures Act of 1932.
20
Fail, who regularly campaigned on accomplishments created or achieved by Labour. As a
result, Labour lost voters during its time in government with Fianna Fail and had its
public identity become increasingly obfuscated.
Alienated and embittered, Labour began to extricate itself from its alliance with
Fianna Fail and established a clear and independent voice that would become its primary
characteristic throughout the 10th Dail. One of the first major points of divergence that
demonstrated Labour's desire to maintain an ideological separation from Fianna Fail was
its opposition to the Executive Authority (External Relations) Bill of 1936. The purpose
of the legislation was to bring Ireland into line with the rest of the Commonwealth in
accepting King Edward VIII's abdication of the throne.
Labour strongly objected to the
Bill and utilized language colored with anger and bitterness to represent the party's
dissatisfaction with its contents and the motivation for its introduction. Norton said of it
that,
We have here, at all events, a situation where we are being asked for the first time
voluntarily to appoint as King of Saorstat Eireann the same person who has been
appointed as King of England and King of the other countries in the Commonwealth.
No previous Government in this country has ever voluntarily appointed a King. No
previous Government in this country has ever voluntarily appointed King of Saorstat
Eireann one and the same person who was King of England. Here, by rushed legislation,
panicky legislation, the House being asked to meet on Saturday, in a few short hours
we are to provide not merely for the abdication of one King but for the appointment
of a successor.... I cannot understand what grounds of urgency can be pleaded for
legislation of that kind. The only thing one can imagine is that Fianna Fail seems to
want a King to play with for Christmas.21
20
King Edward VIII abdicated the throne on 10 December 1936 after ruling less than one year. The
decision was the consequence of his desire to marry a divorced American woman named Wallis Simpson.
The suddenness of his decision created a constitutional crisis throughout the Commonwealth that
necessitated the creation of special legislation in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and South Africa that
shifted their allegiance to whomever would replace him.
21
Dail Debates,"Dail Eireann- Volume 64-12 December 1936- Executive Authority (External Relations)
Bill, 1936-Second Stage," HO,
The independence of Labour was further exemplified in the debates over de Valera's
election to the position of President of the Executive Council and Taoiseach following
the General Elections of 1937 and 1938. As majority party leader de Valera's success in
each case was assured, but Norton used the opportunity to clearly establish the character
and attitude of the Labour Party to proposed legislation and each of the other two parties,
in much the same way as he had in 1932.
In 1937 at the beginning of the 9th Dail, Norton's delineation of his party's
character and ideologies demonstrated the distance that it had already put between itself
and Fianna Fail in just one year. He declared that "in this Dail [Labour] will pursue its
own policy on these matters, supporting every proposal calculated to remedy these
problems, and opposing any proposal calculated to make these problems worse than they
are to-day."22 Norton then followed that statement with another that even more forcefully
removed Labour from the shadow of Fianna Fail, noting that "statements of policies,
which were made during the recent election, disclosed that there is a wide gap in policy
and a wide gap in outlook between the Labour Party and other Parties in this House."
Norton's rhetoric became sharper the following year in 1938, as he established
what would be Labour's oppositional nature throughout the 10th Dail. He warned both
Fine Gael and Fianna Fail that legislation introduced which was "of a non-progressive or
restrictive character.. .will beget the uncompromising opposition of the Labour Party."
Labour representatives then demonstrated their uniformity of opinion and distrust of
Fianna Fail by voting against de Valera's proposed elevation to Taoiseach at the first
meeting of the 10th Dail "as a protest against the deliberate misrepresentation and
22
Ibid.
Dail Debates,"Dail Eireann-Volume 69- 21 July, 1937- Election of President of the Executive Council,"
HO.
23
<Ka
scurrilous attacks on the Labour Party by the Fianna Fail Party in the recent election."
The action severed the last remaining vestiges of the Fianna Fail-Labour alliance and
clearly demonstrated the independent and actively oppositional stance that the party
would represent in the 10th Dail.
It was Labour's ideological unity, advanced through its smaller size and more
focused agenda on individual rights, along with its bitterness towards Fianna Fail, which
made it a strong party by 1938. Accordingly, the Fianna Fail Party's suppression of
Labour required a different strategy than used with Fine Gael.
The lack of Labour culpability in the rapid accumulation of power by the Fianna
Fail Party required de Valera and his Cabinet to silence further opposition to their efforts
through a position of overwhelming legislative strength. Fianna Fail achieved this
through the Offences Against the State Act (OASA) and Emergency Powers Act (EPA).
Unable to prevent their passage, Labour could only attempt to weaken the Acts.
Moreover, the similarities in content for the Amendment Bills of 1940 to these initial
Acts, increasingly isolated and disenfranchised Labour's objections, rendering them
fruitless. As a result, when Labour was confronted in June 1940 with the Emergency
Powers (Amendment) (No.2) Bill, the party collectively buckled under the weight of
Fianna Fail's accumulation of power and determination, because the continued struggle
to fight alone against the Bill's passage was ultimately a wholly futile action.
De Valera's relationship to the Irish Government as Taoiseach and head of the
majority Fianna Fail Party in the 10th Dail was one of policy and opinion maker, and it
was he who was ultimately responsible for the suppression of the IRA and the
representatives in the parties of the opposition. The amount of power that was
24
Dail Debates,"Dail Eireann-Volume 72- 30 June, 1938- Election of Taoiseach," HO.
concentrated in de Valera's hands from the period of 1938-1941, both within his own
party and in the Irish Government as a whole, was the consequence of the manner in
which Fianna Fail had been constructed and run and also the increasing authority
invested in the Cabinet through legislative acts.
The Fianna Fail Party was founded in 1926 for the purpose of uniting republicans
and harnessing their energies into a politically viable force to achieve the creation of an
independent Irish republic. In his address to the inaugural meeting of the Fianna Fail
Party on 16 May 1926, de Valera stated this point clearly by noting that "the duty of
Republicans, to my mind is clear. They must do their part to secure common action by
getting into a position along the most likely line of the nation's advance." The Fianna
Fail Party was built to secure such common action through the leadership of individuals,
just as previous republican movements had from 1916-1925. As historian Richard
Dunphy has noted regarding the party's structure and organization "what the [Fianna Fail
Party] developed was not simply a cult of de Valera, but a structurally anchored cult of
leadership.. .this structural orientation is a facet of the legendary Fianna Fail discipline."
The concentration of authority in the hands of the Fianna Fail leadership at the
party's inception in 1926 was carefully maintained by de Valera throughout his tenure as
Taoiseach in the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, "de Valera led the party with superb tactical
judgment" and imposed "a collective self-discipline on its members that few would have
dreamed of imposing individually on themselves."27 The possibility "of dissent or critical
25
"De Valera's Address to the Inaugural Meeting of Fianna Fail, La Scala Theatre, 16 May 1926,"
http://www.fiannafail.ie.
26
Richard Dunphy, The Making of Fianna Fail Power in Ireland, 1923-1948 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995), 76-77.
27
Joseph Lee, Ireland, 1912-1985: Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
336.
elements [within Fianna Fail] were quickly neutralized without any real possibility of
mustering significant support for their position." The continuous suffocation of
alternate viewpoints in Fianna Fail led to greater deference and acquiescence to leaders
like de Valera, which ultimately came to mean that in the party "political accountability
extended no further than the elite's articulation of [the party's] vision."
The authority de Valera wielded in Fianna Fail in the 10th Dail
was further
amplified by a number of factors, which included the successful passage of a new Irish
Constitution in 1937, the party's success in the election of 1938, and the outbreak of war
on 1 September 1939. These events increased the power and prestige of de Valera and
strengthened the traditional conviction that Fianna Fail's policy and direction should be
set by its leader. The Irish Government of 1938-1941 was indeed de Valera's
Government.
The Fine Gael and Labour Parties of the 10th Dail represented two different types
of opposition, born from experiences in the early to mid-1930s that forged their
ideologies and character, which the Fianna Fail Party suppressed to secure its political
supremacy. The methodology employed to end each oppositional party's resistance
differed as a result of their natures, which determined how members reacted to Fianna
Fail's legislation and de Valera's arguments for a single-opinion government in Ireland.
Fine Gael's ideological schism between moderate and ultraconservative members,
created at its inception by the ACA, along with the exploitation of the party's ties to the
quasi-fascist organization by the Ministers throughout the 1930s and its overall electoral
weakness, meant that TDs were unable to provide a unanimous opposition to Fianna Fail.
28
Dunphy, The Making of Fianna Fail Power in Ireland, 1923-1948, 76.
Jeffrey Prager, Building Democracy in Ireland: Political Order and Cultural Integration in a Newly
Independent Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 216-7.
29
The culpability of moderate party members in facilitating Fianna Fail's accumulation of
power made them unable to provide further resistance and undermined those who desired
to argue against the actions of the Cabinet. The weakening stance of its party's position
created defections which accepted Fianna Fail's legislation, and quickly eroded its
capacity to oppose the government, ultimately leading to its suppression in mid-1940.
The Fianna Fail Party's response to Labour followed a different path because of the
party's coherent ideological unity. Fianna Fail's increasing authority gained in 1939
through the OAS A and EPA, and smaller Amendment Bills in 1940, combined with de
Valera and his Cabinet's continuous arguments about the need for a single-opinion
government to increasingly isolate and disenfranchise Labour's united resistance to such
a high degree that continued opposition was entirely fruitless. The final and simultaneous
suppression of the Fine Gael and Labour Parties in the 10th Dail during mid-1940,
represented the Fianna Fail Party's completed desire for a single-opinion government,
and fulfilled the first half of its aspiration to secure political supremacy.
26
2. THE OPPOSITION IN IRELAND: SEAN RUSSELL AND THE IRISH
REPUBLICAN ARMY
Between 1938 and 1941, the Irish Republican Army directly challenged the
legitimacy of the Irish Government led by the Fianna Fail Party. This challenge led to its
own suppression. The IRA's aggressive nature was a consequence of the strategy of
republican hardliner Sean Russell, who took control of the organization in April 1938.
Under his direction, a strong dislike for Taoiseach Eamon de Valera combined with a
radical republicanism to create a number of ill-advised measures such as proclamations
that claimed IRA control of the Irish Government and the sabotage bombing campaign
against the United Kingdom known as the S-Plan. These actions and the subsequent
responses they provoked from de Valera and his Cabinet exemplified the shortsighted
drive of the IRA under Russell to champion the creation of an Irish republic at the
expense of the current Irish Government.
Russell's rise to the most powerful position in the IRA, the Chief of Staff, was the
result of the organization's stagnation in the mid-1930s. During that time, the ERA lacked
a clear agenda and was plagued by "splits, the corrosive effects of covert politics, [and]
the rounds of responsibilities that led nowhere," that were in part created by the Irish
Government.1 State actions, such as the establishment of a volunteer force and the
1
J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1974 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1970), 146.
passage of the Military Pensions Act, encouraged moderate members to leave the IRA,
which undermined the organization's strength.
The government's policies and the IRA's lack of direction led to a drop in total
membership from 8,036 in September 1934 to 3,844 by November 1936.2 This loss of
manpower gave the most radical men in the organization, whose "focus was on
completing the revolution by action, military or agitational, that would impose itself on
the state governed by Fianna Fail" more of an influence.3 Russell, who was a
"professional revolutionary of an intensity, commitment, and endurance unusual even
with the republican movement," gained more prominence in the organization as a result
of these changes.4
The strength of Russell's militant republicanism was attributable to his hatred of
de Valera, who had abandoned the IRA and its ideologies in the 1920s, and shifted to
diplomatic republicanism as a means to end partition. The intensity of Russell's feelings
and his willingness to pursue republican goals at the expense of the government's
legitimacy was solidified during a meeting between him and de Valera in 1935. On that
occasion, Russell lobbied for an end to partition and the establishment of a true Irish
republic by asking the President of the Executive Council to use his position of influence
and simply declare its existence as a fait accompli. De Valera flatly refused Russell's
plan and restated his commitment to a diplomatic solution. The rebuke greatly upset
Russell, who believed that the revolutionary de Valera of the 1920s had transformed into
a corrupted politician in the 1930s. He expressed this opinion the following year in an
2
Richard Dunphy, The Making of Fianna Fail Power in Ireland, 1923-1948 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1955), 185.
3
Henry Patterson, The Politics of Illusion: A Political History of the IRA (London: Serif, 1997), 83.
4
Eunan O'Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish State and Its Enemies Since 1922 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 127.
28
interview with the Daily Mirror, during which he also demonstrated his support for the
IRA to take confrontational action.
You know, of course, that de Valera has betrayed the trust of the Irish nation by
becoming the tool of Great Britain. Instead of fighting, as he promised, for the
Republic of Ireland, he has been content to allow her to be a nation subject to a
foreign King.
Republican forces are awaiting an opportune moment to fight...
When the moment will come I do not know. It may come when the British
become embroiled in a European conflict.. .Then over in England, where we
shall also take the offensive, we have another secret of Irishmen.. .Our Air Force
may be small, but is reasonably efficient. When hostilities start we shall
certainly send planes to bomb England.5
The April 1938 General Army Convention that installed Russell as Chief of Staff
was a highly contentious affair and saw his detractors arrive armed and claiming that he
was not even an IRA member because of his nonconformity to the established
leadership's positions.6 Led by former Chief of Staff Tom Barry, the prevailing opinion
among those who opposed Russell was to continue the IRA's current plan of action, the
most radical element of which was to renew the bombing campaign in Northern Ireland,
which had fizzled out in 1937.7 Russell dramatically countered Barry and his supporters
at the Convention, with the more radical idea to bypass Northern Ireland entirely and
instead directly attack England. The increased influence of like-minded men in the
organization and the previous failure of Barry's plan meant that at the end of an all-night
session of fiery debate, Russell's ideology and proposals had won out. The fallout from
the decision was considerable, as five appointed members of the Executive immediately
quit, along with the General Headquarters' staff in Dublin and the outgoing Chief of
5
6
7
Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History (Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1993), 89-90.
Ibid, 90.
O'Halpin, Defending Ireland, 127.
o
4
Staff, Mick Fitzpatrick. These defections removed any significant counterbalance to
Russell's ambition. As a result, the new Chief of Staff had an unobstructed hand to direct
the organization in accordance with his beliefs and vision.
Russell's newfound freedom to pursue his agenda shifted the IRA into direct
confrontation with the Fianna Fail Party and the Irish Government as a whole. He did not
understand the complexities of politics and international relations, and instead was only
interested in simplistic and ultimately shortsighted actions that were favorable to likeminded members of the IRA, but which de-legitimized the government. Ultimately, his
policies proved to be the IRA's undoing.
The construction of the S-Plan, in both its targets and method, to achieve the
creation of an Irish republic demonstrated Russell's lack of perspective. The plan, which
was constructed at Russell's request by Seamus O'Donovan, the organization's leading
expert on chemicals and explosives, called for the bombing of several locations in
England, particularly industrial and economic points of interest.9 IRA members from
domestic and international branches were to be trained in Ireland, and then transported to
England where local commanders would choose targets, and aid the bombers with the
storage of explosive material and housing.
The plan's effective execution required resources and coordination that the IRA
simply did not possess and could not hope to gain once the plan had been enacted. The
ability to train individuals in Ireland, move them into England, and maintain safe houses
and dumpsites was a practical impossibility because of the organization's lack of
8
Mick Fitzpatrick's resignation from the IRA following the General Army Convention was the result of the
ideological shift in the organization and his loss of the Chief of Staff position to Russell.
9
Michael Lawrence Rowan Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican
Movement (New York: Routledge, 1995), 63.
experience. The IRA's loss of leadership following the General Army Convention, and
depletion of manpower throughout the 1930s, left it bereft of veteran membership that
was experienced in organizing large-scale operations. The possibility of the S-Plan's
success was further diminished because Russell failed to account for any sort of police or
government intervention, which could inhibit the already problematic operation.
The endgame of the S-Plan was even more impractical, as it required the
capitulation of the British Government to the IRA, and the transfer of Northern Ireland's
six counties to the Government of the Irish Republic for their reunification. Russell
believed that the bombings would paralyze the British economy and society to such a
degree that Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain would have no choice but to alter his
Conservative Party's position on partition and forsake Northern Ireland.10 The absolute
senselessness of this idea clearly demonstrated Russell's complete lack of understanding
of the political or international relations reality of the late 1930s. Accordingly, it was
ultimately Russell's failure to view partition, the British and Irish Governments, and his
own organization, with any semblance of adequate vision or perspective, which doomed
the S-Plan to failure.
Russell's limited vision was not confined to the S-Plan, but also was
demonstrated by three public proclamations made from 1938-39, which positioned the
IRA as the true government of Ireland and its subsequent bombing campaign as a legal
wartime act. The purpose of the proclamations was to garner popular support for the
IRA's shift towards aggressive action against the United Kingdom from moderate
members of the organization and republican sympathizers in the Irish public. The content
10
Clair Willis, That Neutral Island: A Cultural History of Ireland During the Second World War (London:
Faber and Faber, 2007), 37.
of the proclamations and the manner in which they were promulgated throughout Ireland
were perceived by the Fianna Fail Party as direct challenges to its authority.
The first of these proclamations was the most subversive to the State, as it laid the
foundation for the IRA to assume authority over the government. In late 1938, Russell
convinced several republicans who had been members of the Second Dail to publicly
hand over their power to the Army Council and establish it as the de facto Government of
the Republic of Ireland.11 The perceived authority of the Second Dail lay in its
importance to the republican movement. The deliberative body had sat from 16 August
1921 to 16 June 1922 and was the last Dail to exercise legal and political authority under
an Irish republic. The consequences of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, particularly Ireland's
acceptance of its dominion status, nullified the legitimacy of the Dail from 1922 onward
for the IRA. Accordingly, the transfer of power from the 2nd Dail to the 1938 IRA Army
Council was both a legal and highly symbolic passage of the republican torch.
The agreement between the two sides was published in the Wolfe Tone Weekly on
17 December 1938, with the headline "I.R.A. Take Over the Government of the
Republic." It was preceded by a short article describing the significance of the agreement,
stating that "one of the most memorable events of our time took place on December 8,
the anniversary of the Four Martyrs, when the Government of the Republic of Ireland
was taken over from the Executive Council of the Dail Eireann by the Council of the Irish
Republican Army."12 The text of the agreement followed thusly,
11
Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and The Price of Neutrality 1939-45 (Dublin: Gill &
MacMillan, 1985), 85.
12
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage," HO.
32
In consequence of armed opposition ordered and sustained by England, and the
defection of elected representatives of the people over the periods since the
Republican Proclamation of Easter, 1916, was ratified, three years later, by the
newly inaugurated Government of the Irish Republic, we hereby delegate the
authority reposed in us to the Army Council, in the spirit of the decision taken
by Dail Eireann in the Spring of 1921, and later endorsed by the Second Dail.
In thus transferring the trust of which it has been our privilege to be the
custodians for 20 years, we earnestly exhort all citizens andfriendof the Irish
Republic at home and abroad to dissociate themselves openly and absolutely
from England's unending aggressions; and we urge on them utterly to disregard
England's recurring war scares, remembering that our ancient and insular nation,
bounded entirely by the seas, has infinitely less reason to become involved in the
conflicts now so much threatened than we have the neutral small nations lying
between England and the Power she desires to overthrow.
Confident in delegating this sacred trust to the Army of the Republic that, in their
every action towards its consummation, they will be inspired by the high ideals
and the chivalry of our martyred comrades, we, as Executive Council of Dail
Eireann, Government of the Republic, append our names.
Signed on behalf of the Republican Government and the Army Council of Oglaigh na
hEireann (Irish Republican Army):—
Stephen Hayes, Patrick Fleming, Peadar OTlaherty, George Plunkett, Lawrence
Grogan, Sean Russell.13
The ERA's assertion that it was the legitimate government of the Republic of Ireland was
followed by another General Army Convention to secure the allegiance of individuals for
the S-Plan.14 After establishing support for the operation, Russell proceeded to exercise
his self-granted position as the political authority in Ireland by sending an ultimatum to
the British Government on 12 January. It was directed to the Prime Minister and his
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Halifax, and stated that,
13
Ibid.
The second General Army Convention of 1938 took place near Green Cinema, St. Stephen's Green. It
was far different than then April meeting as there was no contention or election of a Chief of Staff.
14
33
I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Irish Republic, having
as its first duty towards the people the establishment and maintenance of peace and
order, herewith demand the withdrawal of all British armed forces stationed in
Ireland. These forces are an active incitement to turmoil and civil strife not only
in being a symbol of hostile occupation but in their effect and potentialities as an
invading army.
It is secondly the duty of the Government to establish relations of friendship
between the Irish and all other people. We must insist on the withdrawal of British
troops from our country and a declaration from your Government renouncing all
claims to interfere in our domestic policy.
We shall regret if this fundamental feeling is ignored and we are compelled to
intervene activity in the military and commercial life of your country as your
Government are now intervening in ours. The Government of the Irish Republic
believe that a period of four days is sufficient for your Government to signify its
intentions in the matter of the military evacuation and for the issue of your
declaration of abdication in respect of our country. Our Government reserve the
right of appropriate action without further notice if on the expiration of the period
of grace these conditions remain unfulfilled.15
The four-day window imposed by the IRA in its message to the Prime Minister
and the Foreign Secretary closed without a reaction from either the British or Irish
Governments, and on 16 January the S-Plan was officially put into motion and war was
declared on Great Britain. The declaration invoked the Easter Rising, the establishment of
the Republic of Ireland in 1919, and the continuing British occupation of the Six
Counties, to demonstrate the glory of the republican dream and its continual dashing by
British cunning and weak Irish politicians. The declaration concluded by saying that,
The time has come to make that fight. There is no need to re-declare the Republic
of Ireland, now or in the future. There is no need to re-redeclare the Declaration
of Independence. But the hour has come for the supreme effort to make both
effective. So in the name of the unconquered dead and of the faithful living, we
pledge ourselves to that task.
We call upon England to withdraw her armed forces, her civilian officials and
institutions, and representatives of all kinds from every part of Ireland, as an
essential preliminary to arrangements for peace and friendship between the two
15
Coogan, The IRA: A History, 95.
34
countries; and we call upon the people of all Ireland, at home and in exile, to assist
Us in the effort we are about to make in God's name, to compel that evacuation
and to enthrone the Republic of Ireland.16
The declaration of war was followed on the same day by seven major explosions in
England.17 The IRA's assumption of the legitimate political authority in Ireland and
subsequent ultimatum and declaration of war forced the Irish Government to respond.
The direct challenge to its position of power, which could have previously been ignored
as the idle threats of a stagnant organization, was now a direct assault on its domestic and
internationally perceived legitimacy. Russell's escalation of the IRA's message required
a similarly direct response to contain the organization and secure the political supremacy
of the Fianna Fail led Irish Government.
Sean Russell's victory at the General Army Convention in April 1938 and his
revitalization of the IRA from its directionless state in the mid-1930s renewed older
attempts at establishing a militant republic. The exodus of moderate IRA leaders and men
of experience created an organization where the "level of competence had been lowered,
and the intellectual resources.. .depleted," which were both necessary for it to carry out
Russell's vision.18 The lack of any check on the Chief of Staffs agenda resulted in the
three proclamations of 1938-9 and the S-Plan. These actions established the foundation of
the organization's confrontational relationship with de Valera and his Cabinet, which
provoked an increasingly powerful response in the form of legislation and rhetoric that
began with the Offenses Against the State Bill introduced a month later in the Houses of
the Oireachtas.
16
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State- Second Stage," HO.
The seven explosions consisted of two in London, three in Manchester, one in Birmingham, and one in
Alnwick. They resulted in one death.
18
Bell, The Secret Army, 147.
17
35
3. THE OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE BILL AND ACT, 1939
The Fianna Fail Party's suppression of the oppositional parties in the Dail and the
IRA began with the introduction of the Offenses Against the State Bill on 8 February
1939. The Bill was a direct response to the IRA's actions in December and January.1 The
justification for it made this clear as de Valera and his Cabinet focused on the IRA's
proclamations and S-Plan as direct challenges to the authority of the Houses of the
Oireachtas. The passage of the Bill provided powers that allowed for the government to
not just begin persecuting the IRA, but also to take action against the Fine Gael and
Labour Parties in an effort to secure its political supremacy.
P.J. Ruttledge, the Minister for Justice, laid out his party's central argument for
the OASB, saying that,
As Deputies are aware, a proclamation was issued, on 8th December last, by a
certain body which purported to hand over what it maintained it held, that is,
certain Government functions. It described itself as a Government and it
purported, under that proclamation, to hand over to the Irish Republican Army,
as they call it, those functions of Government. That is a position which the
Government is not going to tolerate and that matter will be dealt with, amongst
others, under this Bill.2
Ruttledge emphasized the danger that the IRA posed by reading the organization's
agreement with the 2nd Dail and the subsequent declaration of war against Great Britain.
For Fianna Fail, the IRA's actions constituted a direct threat to the Houses of the
1
The long title of the Bill demonstrated that it was a response to the IRA, as it proscribed the legislation's
creation as "in relation to actions and conduct calculated to undermine public order and the authority of the
State." Irish Statue Book, "Offences Against the State Act, 1939," Office of the Attorney General.
2
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 02 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage (Resumed)," HO.
Oireachtas, as they attempted to usurp its position. Accordingly, the Minister warned that
the organization's ambition was a danger to every political party.
It is all very well to treat proclamations and documents of that kind lightly when
one is satisfied that there is not the will, or the force, or the power behind it do
anything about which the Government, as custodians of the people's interests
and the people's rights, need worry, but it has gone further than that. This body
has assumed the right apparently to declare war. That is a right which is not vested,
under the Constitution, even in this Government. It is a right which is vested in this
House, and in this House solely.3
As a consequence of the IRA's actions during the previous two months, Ruttledge
asserted, there was "sufficient indication to the responsible Government that the
peaceable condition is not going to continue unless the Government steps in and takes the
necessary steps to preserve that position" as the organization "has been training and
organizing.. .for the explicit and sole purpose of using that position militarily."4
The warnings about the IRA were part of Fianna Fail's difficult task of both
demonstrating the threat posed by the organization and, at the same time, assuring the
other parties in the Dail that it was strong enough to continue to govern. Accordingly,
Ruttledge followed his initial arguments by positing that the IRA's ambition and
operations were in far excess of its abilities or resources. He described the IRA as "not a
very large group, or very large body" and that "there is no hope whatever of those people
succeeding in achieving anything by violent means." 5 While the IRA's actions were a
threat to the government, the state of the organization meant that "at the moment [it] is
not of a terribly serious character." Still Ruttledge and others tried to impress upon the
3
Ibid.
Ibid.
5
Dail Debates, "02 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage (Resumed)," and "Dail
Eireann- Volume 74- 07 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second Stage (Resumed),"
HO.
4
Dail that it should be "sufficient at least to indicate to any responsible.. .Government that,
if the situation is not dealt with, then it is going to be a serious situation."6
The authority that the Fianna Fail Party believed was necessary to suppress the
IRA and retain "peaceable conditions" was made manifest in the OASB.7 Each section
and article within the Bill represented a particular concern that it had with the IRA and
the dangers that the organization posed to the party's legitimacy.
The third section of the OASB concerned the classification and handling of illegal
organizations; it took on the IRA directly. Article 18 gave the government the power to
declare an organization illegal if it conformed to any treasonous activity, as outlined in
six subsections.8 The designation of an organization as illegal allowed the Cabinet to
issue a suppression order against it, which meant that the Minister for Justice could seize
"all the property (whether real, chattel real, or personal and whether in possession or in
action) of such [an] organization" and hold it indefinitely or sell it. 9 A suppression order
on an illegal organization could therefore eliminate its threat by sapping its resources and,
in the case of the IRA, this also meant the permanent confiscation of its safe houses.
The fourth section of the Bill provided the government with a range of powers
that further impaired an illegal organization's ability to operate effectively and maintain
its manpower. The first of these was a prohibition on any public meeting deemed to be
"by arrangement or in concert with an unlawful organization."10 This effectively crippled
6
Dail Debates, "07 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill," HO.
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 02 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage," HO.
8
These sections included the use of force or violence, if the organization defined itself as a military force,
or committed any criminal offence. The IRA of 1939 fulfilled all of these criteria.
9
Irish Statue Book. "Offences Asainst the State Act. 1939." Office of the Attornev General.
7
38
the public life of an illegal organization and its ability to propagandize through marches,
rallies, and speeches.11
Further articles in the section provided for the issuing and execution of warrants
and the arrest or detention of suspects. Prominent among these were articles 29 and 30,
which allowed for searches of suspected properties of an illegal organization and the
arrest of individuals on the premises.12 Any person arrested through such a search could
be held up to forty-eight hours, during which time the Gardai were free to interrogate the
suspect at will.
The most powerful article within the fourth section was the 30th, which allowed
for an officer to "without warrant stop, search, interrogate, and arrest any person.. .whom
he suspects of having committed or being about to commit or having been concerned in
the commission of an offence."13 The wide-ranging nature of this article allowed for
considerable interference and harassment of IRA members and greatly hindered the
ability of the organization to operate covertly.
The last two sections of the Bill that empowered the government to act against the
IRA were the fifth and sixth, which unlike the previous sections, were emergency powers
that required a proclamation from the government that conditions existed within Ireland
that necessitated their implementation. The fifth, which dealt with the establishment and
rules of a Special Criminal Court, was only required when "the Government is satisfied
11
The prohibition of public meetings was provided for within Article 27 of the legalized Act.
Specifically the first subsection of Article 29 states that "Where an officer of the Garda Sfochana, not
below the rank of chief superintendent is satisfied that there is reasonable ground for believing that
documentary evidence of or relating to the commission or intended commission of an offence under any
section or sub-section of this Act or any document relating directly or indirectly to the commission or
intended commission of treason is to be found in any particular building or other place, the said officer may
issue to a member of the Garda Sfochana not below the rank of inspector a search warrant in accordance
with this section." Irish Statue Book, "Offences Against the State, 1939," Office of the Attorney General.
13
Ibid.
12
that the ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration of justice
and the preservation of public peace and order."14 Likewise the sixth, which established
the powers of internment, was only to be used when the government believed that such a
measure was "necessary to secure the preservation of public peace and order."15
The Special Criminal Court, unlike the other parts of the Irish judiciary, was an
almost completely self-contained entity that had the "power, in its absolute discretion, to
appoint the time and place of its sittings" and "control of its own procedure in all
respects," including issuing summonses, bringing suspects before it, and producing
documents.16 The extent of the Court's powers was fully utilized by government
prosecutors and allowed the party to eliminate certain loopholes open to defense
lawyers.17 As Secretary to the Department of Justice, Stephen Roche noted of the Court
and its uneven distribution of power, "to ask the Special Court to do its work effectively
and at the same time to do it with the same attention to forms of procedure and the law of
18
evidence as is required of an ordinary court is to ask an impossibility." Accordingly, the
Court had the highest conviction rate in Ireland, and was the central venue for the
persecution of the IRA's most dangerous members.
14
Ibid.
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
The jurisdiction of the Court was also greatly widened to ensure the unobstructed tunneling of dangerous
individuals to its more favorable procedures. The Attorney General, who was traditionally a member of the
majority party, decided which suspects were brought before the court. Under his authority, suspects who
were to be tried before the District Court on scheduled or non-scheduled offences could have their trials
shifted to the Special Criminal Court or he could select which suspects were brought to the Court directly.
Each of these decisions was based on the same criteria that allowed for the government to create the Court
in the first place, namely that the ordinary courts were inadequate to try them. This meant that the Attorney
General could reasonable argue the need to try any person before the Special Criminal Court, because its
very existence proved the necessity to do so.
18
Dermot Keogh and Mervyn O'Driscoll, eds., Ireland in World War Two: Neutrality and Survival (Cork:
Mercier Press, 2004), 46.
15
The sixth section of the Bill was its most powerful component. Internment, as
defined by the Bill, meant the continuous holding of a person arrested by the Gardai at
the direction of a Minister of the State.19 In effect, it was the indefinite extension of the
forty-eight hour window proscribed in Article 30, for suspects where, as Ruttledge
described it, "there is a moral certainty, although legal proof is lacking" that they
represented a danger to the security of the State.20 The process of arrest and internment
circumvented the traditional judicial and legal authorities in Ireland. It was the most
common method that the Irish Government used to hold IRA suspects and suppress the
organization.21
In their totality, the sections and articles of the OASB represented a series of
powerful laws that the government could employ to protect the legitimacy of its
authority. The party viewed the IRA's proclamations as a clear challenge and threat,
which could possibly escalate into domestic violence and chaos if the organization was
able to gain greater resources. Ireland in early 1939 was, as described by Ruttledge, in "a
position that, I suggest, if it is allowed to develop, is bound to deteriorate until in a very
99
short time this country would find itself in a catastrophe." Therefore, it was necessary
for the Fianna Fail Party to exploit the gap between the IRA's ambition and its
realization, through the legalization of the powers and authority within the OASB, which
would enhance its ability to suppress the organization.
19
Article 55.1 states that "whenever a Minister of State is satisfied that any particular person is engaged in
activities calculated to prejudice the preservation of the peace, order, or security of the State, such Minister
may by warrant under his hand order the arrest and detention of such person under this section." Irish
Statue Book, "Offences Against the State Act, 1939," Office of the Attorney General.
20
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
21
This was demonstrated in the years that followed, as the number of men interned within Ireland became
so great that internment camps were built throughout the country to house them.
22
Diiil Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
41
The Bill was met with the strongest opposition of any similar piece of legislation
from 1939-1940. Both Fine Gael and Labour, at least at first, raised significant
objections. Their TDs challenged Fianna Fail's arguments with an array of questions that
represented their parties' unique character and ideologies. The result was a considerably
longer Second Stage of consideration than witnessed with subsequent legislation, and a
two-part Committee Stage where Fine Gael and Labour TDs proposed eighty-one
23
amendments.
Fine Gael and Labour were able to bridge their fundamental differences to resist
the passage of the OASB. William Norton, the leader of the Labour Party, spoke first,
condemning the majority party's position, arguing that "the House listened this evening
to probably the feeblest effort ever made by a Minister for Justice in commending this
Bill to the Legislature" and then further questioned Fianna Fail, asking "what is the
necessity for the Bill? Not a single reason was given during the Minister's speech as to
why the country should be asked to pass a Bill of this kind."24 James Hurley echoed his
party leader's words in his own speech, declaring that "the case which has been made by
the Minister for Justice is not in any way a convincing case. I do not think he was
convinced himself by the arguments he put forward in support of this Bill." Fine Gael
TD Sean Broderick dismissed Ruttledge's arguments by stating, "I am not convinced of
23
In Irish parliamentary procedure, the Second Stage is the main arena for debate and oppositional
speeches on the nature and characteristics of proposed legislation. It concludes with a vote on whether to
agree in principle on the proposed bill. A successful result moves the Bill to the Committee and Report
Stages. These two stages can consist of TDs proposing amendments before a final vote is taken and the bill
became a legalized act. The Second Stage of the Offences Against the State Bill took place over a five-day
span, from 2 March to 7 March. Debate was held on the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th during that period. On those three
days, the Dail sat for a total of four separate sessions to consider the Bill before finally voting it through on
the
The Committee Stage on 19 April was split into two different sessions, because of the high number
of proposed amendments.
24
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
25
Ibid.
42
the necessity for this Bill at present. In fact, I do not see sufficient evidence in the
statement of the Minister that there is really any reason for the Bill."26
Fine Gael and Labour's united rejection of the Bill was followed with a bifurcated
debate in which each party of opposition voiced its specific issues and objections. For the
purposes of this work, these two strands of debate will be examined separately so that the
character and particular nature of each party's concerns are understood clearly.
Norton was particularly forceful in his denunciation of the Bill. He stated that to
pass the Bill was to "to give them these unusual powers, these dictatorial powers, these
powers which give the citizen liberty only when the Government does not desire to take it
away from them."27 He underscored those words by adding that it was a Bill in which
"enormous tyrannical powers such as are placed in the hands of this Government by this
legislation... [which] has the resources at its disposal to exercise that power in the most
28
despotic way." Norton concluded his opening remarks by coldly referencing Labour's
shared history with Fianna Fail and questioning the motivation of its leaders, by arguing
that "in ancient Rome, when the people cried for bread, they were offered circuses. Here,
when our people look for work, we offer them Public Safety Acts and Coercion Acts that
are indistinguishable from any of those Acts that went before."29
Labour was very active in the debate over the Bill and Norton's harsh criticisms
were picked up by others. Jeremiah Hurley advised caution to members of the Dail, as he
warned that "there is always a danger in a measure like this, where the liberty and, shall I
say, the individuality of the citizen is curbed" and then continued on behalf of his entire
26
Ibid.
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
27
43
party, saying that "we see dangers in this measure, dangers to the freedom of the
-if)
individual and even to the law-abiding individual.
To that end, James Everett turned
the tables and postulated that if Labour had introduced such legislation as a majority
party, Ruttledge and Fianna Fail's response would be that "we were betraying democracy
and that we were traitors."31
The broad condemnations by Labour were followed with a narrower focus on
specific articles that exemplified their concern with the protection of individual rights and
liberties. Articles 18 and 19, which dealt with the declaration of illegal organizations and
the issuing of suppression orders, in particular worried the party. Labour TDs believed
that de Valera and other Fianna Fail Ministers would unjustly use these powers to crack
down on or eliminate trade unions, which protected thousands of workers and were
pillars of strength for the party.32 Hurley argued against the articles, noting that "trade
unions have from time to time made themselves objectionable in a certain sense to the
authorities not only in this State but other States, and for a very slight pretext such a subsection as that could be put into operation against trade unions, and could, in fact, destroy
their whole ramifications."33
The Fianna Fail Party's attempt to counter Labour's assertion by maintaining that
trade unions would only be affected if they engaged in illegal activities was fiercely
30
Ibid.
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 03 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage (Resumed)," HO.
32
In Labour's estimation the broad nature of the powers within the OASB allowed for any organization to
be declared illegal for even minor infractions such as the encouragement of the obstruction or interference
with the enforcement of the law. Under these, or one of the five other sub-articles in the Bill, it was feared
that an action such as a union-led strike could provide grounds for the government to move against trade
unions with the full might of its powers. Moreover, while a legal recourse existed through articles 20 and
23 to reverse the government's decision through the High Court system, it came after the government had
an opportunity to interfere or suppress the organization, for which it needed only its own authority.
33
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939-Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
31
44
rejected by Labour and led to a series of blistering attacks launched against de Valera and
his Cabinet. The strength of the language employed by Labour underscored the severity
of its opposition to the OASB, and showed the vast differences between the two parties
that had been created since 1936. Norton led the barrage, arguing that
The Minister for Justice says that.. .all you have got to do when this Bill is passed, is
to be good and, therefore, it will not affect you. Be good. All you have to do is to be
good and then the Legislature can pass all the Public Safety Acts it likes, and you will
not be affected by them so long as you are good. It is a wonder that Deputy
Breathnach and his Party did not give the same advice in 1931, because if you were
good and sufficiently wormish—to use Deputy Hugo Flinn's expression—in 1931
there was no chance that you would be interned or brought before the Military
Tribunal. All you had to do was to be good and sufficiently wormish—to use Deputy
Flinn's expression again—and make no attempt to claim any of your rights as a
citizen or criticise, in any way vigorously, the Executive Council...and then nothing
would happen to you and you could be quite satisfied that the Bill was all right.34
William Davin continued his party's attack, arguing that Articles 18 and 19 "could be
understood in Germany or under any system of dictatorship prevailing to-day," and that
"the people who vote for this Bill.. .will give [Fianna Fail] further dictatorial powers such
as were never given before to any Executive by any previous Dail."
James Everett
concluded Labour's objections, by noting that "trade unionists... have also made many
sacrifices for the country and, no matter what this Bill may provide, they are not going to
allow any Government—whether a Fine Gael Government, a Fianna Fail Government or
34
The Constitution (Amendment No. 17) Act of 1931, or as it was commonly known, "Article 2A," was a
measure introduced by Cosgrave's Cumann na nGaedheal Government that contained similar authoritarian
measures as the Offences Against the State Bill and was vehemently objected to by de Valera and the
minority Fianna Fail Party. The expression that Norton refers to was made by Hugo Flinn TD during the
debate over the Constitution (Amendment No. 17) Bill. Specifically, Flinn said of the legislation, "this law
is not respectable. It is a law for worms; it is a law for crawling things." Dail Debates, "Dail EireannVolume 40-15 October, 1931- In Committee on Finance- Constitution (Amendment No. 17) Bill, 1931Money Resolution," and "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
35
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," and "07 March, 1939Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage (Resumed)," HO.
45
a Labour Government— to exercise such powers as are sought under this section to
prevent trade unionists protecting the rights of their members."36
Labour's attempt to limit the articles in the Committee Stage to exclude trade
unions was fiercely resisted by Fianna Fail. Compromise was not on the table. The
position of strength that Fianna Fail desired precluded weakening the OASB, as it would
both soften the image of the party and reduce its ability to act at will. Ruttledge dismissed
all of Labour's efforts on the issue, saying of them that "[they] cannot be accepted for a
moment, I think it is absurd."
The animosity between the two parties continued throughout the Committee Stage
and concluded with Labour voting unanimously against the Bill. Its complete rejection of
the OASB demonstrated the intensity of the party's opposition to Fianna Fail in early
1939. However, the resistance was futile. Labour was not strong enough to stop the Bill's
passage and ultimately its inability to do so, even when united, demonstrated the erosion
of any influence it had in the Dail. Accordingly, the passage of the OASB signaled the
beginning of the isolation of Labour and the political disenfranchisement of the party.
The complexion of Fine Gael's opposition in the Dail was much different than
Labour's. Despite being at its strongest in early 1939, Fine Gael was undercut by internal
division as some moderate members accepted Fianna Fail's justification for the Bill. The
OASB, therefore, helped to split Fine Gael and make the party unable to resist Fianna
Fail's accumulation of power.
The willingness of moderately conservative Fine Gael TDs to acquiesce to Fianna
Fail's demands without excessive debate was not done without any qualms however.
36
Dail Debates, "03 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage (Resumed)," HO.
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 75-19 April 1939- Committee on Finance- Offences Against the
State Bill, 1939-Committee Stage," HO.
37
W.T. Cosgrave, the leader of Fine Gael, set the begrudging tone for these members,
noting of the OASB, "on the general principle in the Long Title of this Bill I propose to
support it, with some reluctance."38 Thomas O'Higgins further demonstrated the
uneasiness of voting with Fianna Fail for party members, as he expressed his feelings for
the OASB by saying that "I support this Bill with very considerate hesitation and with a
on
very great degree of reluctance."
Other moderately conservative TDs undercut the strength of the party's
opposition even further by offering endorsements of the legislation that were similarly
hesitant, but which acknowledged the superior position of Fianna Fail and its right to
request whatever powers it deemed necessary. James Hughes exemplified this sentiment,
saying that "if the responsible Minister, in the exercise of his duty.. .says that, in order to
preserve and maintain [the people's] rights and privileges, it is necessary to get this
extraordinary measure through, then I think it is the duty and responsibility of the
Deputies of this House to give that power to the Government."40 Daniel Morrissey
demonstrated a similar motivation in his decision to vote for the Bill, arguing that "if a
responsible Minister of the Government.. .tells me, that he requires those particular
powers to preserve law and order and uphold the institutions of the State, then I am going
to vote for that Bill."41
The amenability of moderately conservative party members was not fatal to Fine
Gael's opposition in early 1939, and more radical TDs provided a number of objections
to the Bill. James Dillion, who resigned from the party in 1942 due to strong ideological
38
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
Ibid.
40
Dail Debates, "03 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage (Resumed)," HO.
41
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage (Resumed)," HO.
39
differences with its moderate leadership, opened Fine Gael's opposition to the OASB by
arguing that Fianna Fail sought to "use the very privileges conferred by the Constitution
for the purpose of destroying the Constitution itself."42 General Sean MacEoin further
echoed those words by asserting that the Constitution had been legalized less than on year
ago, and that "no sooner has that been done than this Bill is brought in to reduce all the
things that have been guaranteed under the Constitution."43 Patrick McGilligan compared
the American Constitution to the Irish Constitution under the Bill, and asked members of
the Dail if they should "send [the Bill] over to the Americans and say that that is our idea
of how fundamental rights and liberties ought to be preserved in peaceful conditions?"44
The condemnations of the Bill's infringement on constitutional rights was
followed by a narrower focus on particular articles that Fine Gael believed egregiously
exemplified their concerns. Article 27 prohibited public meetings at the discretion of the
Gardai and was seen as a severe blow to free speech and the continued existence of
political opposition, both of which were foundational elements of the Constitution. James
Fitzgerald-Kenney opened his party's opposition to the article, arguing that in the event
of a political meeting's suppression, he would personally be liable for "a fine of £50 and
three months in jail because I refused to give up my common law right and constitutional
right of addressing the people of this country or the people of my own constituency.
Where, might I ask, does the Minister find any section like that in the legislation of any
country?"45 John O'Sullivan dramatically extended the argument further, noting that the
possibility for unchecked abuse by the Gardai meant "an end to democratic government,
42
Dail Debates, "03 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage (Resumed)," HO.
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
44
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage (Resumed)," HO.
45
Ibid.
43
48
a complete end to it, quite as much as if you allowed a free hand to the people against
whom Part V is directed."46
The fifty-fifth amendment proposed within Committee by ultraconservative Fine
Gael TDs sought to alter Article 27 by restricting the prohibition of public meetings
solely to illegal organizations, thereby allowing politicians to practice their basic and
fundamental constitutional rights.47 Unlike Labour's wholly futile attempts to alter the
Bill, Fianna Fail conceded to Fine Gael's demands, and the article was stripped of its
highly generalized and widely applicable language. The compromised solution
demonstrated some small flexibility in Fianna Fail's resolve in early 1939, but the basic
power desired by the majority party remained in the article.
Fine Gael's capability to create compromised changes in legislation during this
time was further demonstrated by its concern with the powers of the Special Criminal
Court. The inability of a convicted person to appeal his decision from the Court was seen
as unconstitutional and antithetical to a democratic and free nation. The seventy-seventh
proposed amendment in Committee sought to remedy the situation by allowing for "an
appeal.. .to the Court of Criminal Appeal from every sentence, verdict, decision, order, or
act of the Special Criminal Courts."48 Ruttledge counter-argued that "when the Special
Courts are in operation would be a time of emergency.. .to deal with a situation like that
you must act quickly and not be held up by appeals to the Court of Criminal Appeal," but
46
D&il Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
Fine Gael sought to remove "It shall not be lawful to hold a public meeting which disturbs public order
or causes or leads to a breach of the peace," completely from the Bill, and "would disturb public order or
cause or lead to a breach of the peace or" from the third subsection, which dealt with the manner in which
the Garda determined the danger of the meeting itself. Irish Statue Book, "Offences Against the State Act,
1939," Office of the Attorney General.
48
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 75- 19 April 1939- Committee on Finance- Offences Against the
State Bill, 1939- Committee Stage (Resumed)," HO.
47
the continued pressure of Costello and O'Sullivan eventually produced a last-minute
compromise that allowed for appeals under very limited circumstances.49
The minor successes achieved by Fine Gael's ultraconservatives in the Committee
Stage were overshadowed by the chronic issues that handicapped the party's ability to
provide a sustained and united opposition to the Bill. Fine Gael's overall weakness and
ideological fracturing meant that moderate members became culpable in Fianna Fail's
accumulation of powers by voicing their reluctant but open support for the OASB, while
more conservative TDs had to seek compromise instead of outright rejection. The
willingness of some party members to aid in the passage of the OASB represented the
first step in undermining Fine Gael's ability to oppose legislation in the Dail.
The OASB was the first attempt by the Fianna Fail Party to secure its
unquestioned authority and political supremacy. These powers allowed de Valera and his
Cabinet to limit the ability of the IRA to operate within Ireland as a military organization.
Ultimately, the Fianna Fail Party desired to show that the IRA's rhetoric was the hollow
boasting of a reckless minority that posed no realistic threat to its legitimacy and its
position of power.
The OASB also began the process of eliminating oppositional opinion in the 10th
Dail. Labour's fruitless but united and rigorous desire to reject the Bill because of its
bitter history with Fianna Fail and concern for individual rights, along with Fine Gael's
weakened and ideologically fractured status that compelled it into successful
compromises to mitigate the erosion of constitutional protections, represented the
49
Dail Debates, "19 April 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Committee Stage (Resumed)," HO.
Specifically, an appeal from the Special Criminal Court was only possible when defendants acquired "a
certificate that the case is a fit case for appeal or, where such Special Criminal Court refuses to grant such
certificate, the Court of Criminal Appeal on appeal from such refusal grants to such person leave to appeal
under this section." Irish Statue Book, "Offences Against the State Act, 1939."
50
heightened state of political opposition in the Dail in early 1939. Within a year and a half,
however, opposition to Fianna Fail would be almost completely suppressed.
51
4. THE OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE ACT AND THE IRA (JUNE 1939AUGUST 1939)
The Offences Against the State Act became law on 14 June 1939 and ushered in a
summer of IRA perpetrated domestic threats and international violence that challenged
the authority of the Fianna Fail led government. The escalation of the S-Plan in England
and political activity in Ireland created new pressures on the Houses of the Oireachtas
and the British Government that gave greater motivation for de Valera and his Cabinet to
assert their political superiority. The strength of the IRA led the opposition parties to
question the competency of Fianna Fail and its ability to provide security for the people
of Ireland. As a result, the Fianna Fail Party spent the summer of 1939 monitoring the
situation at home and abroad, and utilizing the powers of the OAS A to undermine the
IRA's leadership. Although it achieved some limited success, the continued operational
ability of the IRA showed that it was not yet in an absolute position.
De Valera and his Cabinet's perception of the international situation was that the
bombings in England demonstrated to the British Government that either they
deliberately allowed the republican organization to exist or they failed to suppress it,
neither of which was acceptable. The formulation of the S-Plan, the technical training in
explosives, and much of the manpower, had all come from Dublin. The ability of the
organization to operate directly under the nose of the Houses of the Oireachtas
undermined its authority and legitimacy, and every further IRA bomb reaffirmed that
belief.
The IRA and its S-Plan represented the militant republican ideology that had been
held by many previous party members, including de Valera. This now clashed with
Fianna Fail's diplomatic republicanism at a time of fragile hope for peace and goodwill
between the two nations. De Valera had attempted to build upon the Anglo-Irish Trade
Agreement of 1938 and improve relations between the two countries in order to end
partition and achieve independence. In his St. Patrick's Day address in 1939, he spoke of
the agreement to end the war, describing it as "a step towards those good relations
between Ireland and Britain which are desired by the majority of the people in both
islands."1
The IRA's violence completely undermined these diplomatic goals and soured
Anglo-Irish relations. Future Minister for Justice Gerald Boland noted that because of the
IRA, "our name was mud in England," and that the S-Plan was "wanton murder [which]
was disgusting."2 More importantly, it reminded Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and
prominent British Conservatives like Winston Churchill of the recent conflict between
the United Kingdom and Ireland, and that Taoiseach de Valera had less than twenty years
ago been the leader of the anti-Treaty forces during the Irish Civil War. The resurgence
of such bitterness as a result of the IRA's actions brought questions about the competency
of Ireland's leadership and the viability of Irish independence back into the forefront of
British political thought.
1
Maurice Moynihan ed., Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera, 1917-73 (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1980), 379.
2
Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and The Price of Neutrality 1939-45 (Dublin: Gill &
MacMillan, 1985), 87.
53
On the domestic front, the government believed that the S-Plan represented a
precursor to IRA attacks at home. This concern had considerable merit, as eleven days
after the introduction of the OASB a speech was given at a rally in County Cork that
proclaimed the IRA's defiance of governmental measures.
The I.R.A. are reorganising to carry on the fight for the establishment of the republic.
They have not taken any aggressive action against the forces of the State for the past
two years, but if de Valera now tries to crush us with his new Coercion Act, then, all
I can say is, may God help him. He will endeavour to enforce his new Coercion Act
with the aid of his murder gang and the remnants of Cosgrave's murder gang. They
will never suppress the I.R.A. We beat them in 1922, 1931 and 1936, and we will
beat them again in 1939.3
In addition to speeches, the leadership of the IRA and the vast majority of its members
were in Ireland and, given Russell's willingness to recklessly engage in violence to obtain
republican goals, de Valera and his Cabinet believed that operations would be conducted
at home.
Indeed, this belief had already been expressed as a central contention of their
justification for the OASB. In his remarks during the Second Stage, Ruttledge had noted
of the powers requested in the Bill that, "what we are doing under those measures here is
to prevent this country from being precipitated into a civil war," and maintained that with
regard to the IRA, "we want to see normal, peaceful conditions continue in this country,
and while there is a threat.. .there can be neither social nor political freedom in this
country." 4 The dire prognostications from the Minister for Justice and the newly granted
3
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 07 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage (Resumed)," HO.
4
Dail Debates, "D&il Eireann- Volume 74- 02 March 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage," HO.
powers of the OASA demonstrated the seriousness with which the Fianna Fail Party
viewed the domestic situation.
Although De Valera was unwilling to intervene directly in the international
theater through speeches or proclamations, he did meet the domestic situation head on in
an effort to weaken the IRA and demonstrate his government's strength. On 23 June, the
Taoiseach declared the organization illegal and issued a suppression order against it
under Articles 18 and 19 of the OASA.5 The date was chosen in part because he wished
to stop the IRA's annual march to Wolfe Tone's grave in Bodenstown. This event was of
significant importance to the organization, as it occupied "a position in the Republican
calendar, analogous to that of Easter in the Christian religion" and took place every year
on the first Sunday after Tone's birthday, 20 June. 6 In 1939 the march fell on the 26th,
three days after the organization was made illegal.7
The suppression of such a historically important republican event demonstrated de
Valera's determination to eliminate the IRA's domestic presence. The powers conferred
to the Fianna Fail led government by the OASA meant that henceforth the IRA's ability
to propagandize and move freely throughout the country were completely restricted.
Marches and rallies were nearly impossible, and training exercises such as drilling invited
5
The Unlawful Organization (Suppression) Order, 1939 stated that "It is hereby declared that the
organisation styling itself the Irish Republican Army (also the I.R.A. and Oglaigh na heireann) is an
unlawful organisation and ought, in the public interest, to be suppressed." Irish Statue Book, "Unlawful
Organization (Suppression) Order, 1939," Office of the Attorney General.
6
Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History (Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1993), 177. The IRA's
ceremony included a march to Bodenstown, the laying of a wreath on the grave of Wolfe Tone, and
speeches. In 1939, the featured speaker was set to be Count Plunkett who was the father of Joseph Plunkett,
a man executed by the British after the Easter Rising of 1916.
7
To enforce the Taoiseach's wishes that the march not proceed, Gardai Commissioner Michael Kinnane
officially prohibited it under Article 27 of the OASA and ordered officers and soldiers to prevent any
attempt to carry it out.
blanket arrests and detentions. Accordingly, until its effective suppression in 1941, the
IRA was an underground organization that relied on covert actions.
Restrictions at home did not immediately impact the IRA's ability to act in the
United Kingdom and actions there continued to undermine the authority of the Fianna
Fail Party. The S-Plan reached a new height of destruction on 24 June, the day after the
IRA was declared an illegal organization in Ireland, with a series of bombings that
targeted three banks adjacent to Piccadilly Circus.8 The attacks injured twenty people and
created chaos in the very heart of London as they "brought thousands of persons rushing
out of theaters, hotels, and restaurants" and "those who were in subways tried to get out
into the streets, and those in the streets tried to crowd into the subways."9
The political fallout from the Piccadilly bombings both in the United Kingdom
and Ireland was considerable, as the British Government reacted with significant force to
suppress the IRA and restrict the immigration of all Irish citizens, which subsequently
provoked pressure in the Houses of the Oireachtas on de Valera. The deepening tensions
placed the government's competency and loyalties into question, and consequently
heightened its determination to suppress the organization throughout the summer.
The British Government's actions were led by Samuel Hoare, the Conservative
Home Secretary, who introduced the Prevention of Violence Bill (PVB) on 24 July 1939.
The Bill was the rough equivalent of the OASA with respect to the expanded powers of
the police to search, seize, and arrest, but was tailored to the British situation with its
8
The first bomb was thrown from a taxicab at around 10 in the evening and three more explosions followed
within the next couple of hours. The structural damage to the area was moderate, with the greatest amount
occurring to the front of Midland Bank, which was reduced to rubble in the streets. Additionally, windows
for blocks around each explosion were shattered and Madame Tussaud's wax figure of Henry VIII was
destroyed.
9
"4 Blasts in London Terrorize Crowds," The New York Times, Jun 25, 1939, 1.
numerous articles restricting immigration and redefining alien status. Under the PVB,
Hoare was authorized "to deport, exclude, and detain any persons who he was satisfied
were engaged in the IRA campaign" and "all Irish citizens on the mainland were also
required to register with the police."10 The blanket inclusion of all Irish in the Bill, and
not just those individuals who were suspected of criminal activity, demonstrated a further
souring of Anglo-Irish relations. This reflected very poorly on Fianna Fail and delegitimized its central ideology of diplomatic republicanism.
Before the final vote on the PVB was taken, and the consequences of its
legalization were realized in the United Kingdom and Ireland, the IRA unleashed a new
series of bombings that ensured the passage of the Bill and placed even greater pressure
on the Fianna Fail Party.11 The first attack occurred on 26 July at London's King's Cross
Station. A bomb in an unmarked case that was left at the station's checkroom exploded at
1:40 in the afternoon and killed one man.12 In the ensuing chaos, women and children
were trampled in the rush to empty the station, resulting in a total of fifteen people
1^
injured as a result of the bombing. Further bombs exploded on the same day at the
Mount Pleasant Post Office in Liverpool and at the Leeds-Liverpool Canal, which
brought the total number of bombings in the S-Plan to over 130.14
10
Jordanna Bailkin, "Leaving Home: The Politics of Deportation in Postwar Britain," Journal of British
Studies 47 (October 2008): 873.
11
A secondary motivating factor for the swift passage of the PVB was Hoare's display to MPs of a
document seized in a London raid, which contained the entire operational procedure of the S-Plan. He
noted of it contents that it was "not the kind of irresponsible melodramatic document that one sometimes
discovers in these police searches. It is a carefully worked out staff plan, the kind of plan that might be
worked out by a General Staff, setting out in detail the way in which an extensive campaign of sabotage
could be successfully carried out in this country." Ibid.
12
The man killed was Donald Campbell, Professor of Latin at the University of Edinburgh.
13
T.J. Hamilton, "2 London Bombings Kill One, Injure 18," New York Times, July 27,1939, 1.
14
Ibid.; "Abroad: Curbing the I.R.A.," The New York Times, July 30,1939,2.
57
The string of violent attacks and the British Government's consideration of the
PVB combined to increase the political pressure on de Valera to intervene in the
international theater to publicly affirm his anti-militant republicanism position. At the
conclusion of a debate on a Land Bill in the Seanad, only a few hours after the King's
Cross bombing, Senator Frank MacDermot moved a motion that "the country is entitled
to an explicit statement from the Government as to the justifiability and the expediency of
bombing activities in Great Britain by Irish citizens."15 MacDermot, who had been
appointed to his position by de Valera himself, invoked a series of highly troubling and
problematic issues of perception for the Irish Government in his justification for moving
the motion.
In introducing this motion I am asking the House and the Government to consider,
not the convenience or the interests of the English people, but the interests of the
Irish people.. .there is a widespread suspicion, both in this country and in England,
that the Government and the Government Party, if they do not actually approve what
has been going on, at any rate regard it with a considerable degree of complacency.
The other respect in which.. .the Government has done harm is that it has added to
the injury that these outrages have inflicted upon Irish interests. It has added, in other
words, to the unpopularity of Irishmen, because of the suspicion it has created that
Irish people in general are rather glad that these things are going on.16
The delineation of a widespread perception in Ireland and the United Kingdom, by a nonpartisan representative in the Houses of the Oireachtas, that Fianna Fail had some
measure of ideological complicity with the IRA's actions, demonstrated a serious and
direct threat to the party's legitimacy.17 The existence of such a belief in Ireland could be
destroyed with the continued utilization of the OASA, but its presence within the United
15
Seanad Debates, "Volume 23- 26 July, 1939- Bombing Activities in Great Britain," HO.
Ibid.
17
Frank MacDermot was appointed to his position in the Seanad by de Valera, but was an Independent.
16
Kingdom could not easily be removed, and therefore represented a severe problem. The
blurring of diplomatic and militant republicanism by British Conservatives, particularly
with respect to the motivations of Fianna Fail's leaders, further weakened Anglo-Irish
relations and therefore diminished any chance of an end to partition.
MacDermot continued his speech, pressing de Valera to act forcefully before the
diplomatic gap between the United Kingdom and Ireland grew greater.
I cannot conceive anything more likely to deepen the gulf between North and South
than these activities that have been taking place.... during the last few months all the
ground gained by reason and persuasion has been more than lost by the abominable
folly of what has been going on. The English have not been pleased by the close up
that has been provided for them—the close up view of Gaelic civilisation in action.
They have been far more ready to believe than they have been for a long time that,
after all, these violent Ulster men are right, and that there is some racial inferiority
about us in the South which makes it unreasonable to suggest that the Northern
Unionists should ever have anything to do with us.
But I have also noticed that if we are going to put our relations with England upon a
basis of force and hatred, then God help Ireland. I appeal to this House, and to every
individual in this House during the months that are coming, to do everything they can
to destroy any fragment of approval or complacency that may exist in this country in
regard to this terrorism.
The evil is not over. We have only to look at this evening's paper to read of a fresh
outrage in a London station when some more innocents were injured, perhaps injured
to death for all we yet know. For Heaven's sake, let us do everything we can to put a
stop to it.18
MacDermot's pressure at last forced De Valera to address the damage that the IRA was
doing to Anglo-Irish relations. He flatly denied MacDermot's insinuations about Fianna
Fail's murky motivations, stating that "I thought we had made our attitude quite clear
and, in fact, that if we were a Government at all here we could have only one attitude in
18
Seanad Debates, "26 July, 1939- Bombing Activities in Great Britain," HO.
regard to it."19 De Valera then continued, directly addressing skeptical Irish and British
citizens, along with active IRA members.
We are in the unfortunate position that the people in this country, and the people in
Britain, are each to be set in turmoil, to be set against each other, because there is a
certain group here in this country who are thinking selfishly of their own interests.
We believe that the present happenings can be of no value. Quite the opposite. So
far as we are concerned they have put us back.
I would have liked to appeal to the people who think that they are furthering Irish
interests by their present activities, to ask them how can they hope to get a decision
by methods of that kind? If they are thinking militarily, surely they must think of
bringing about a decision, and the only decision they can get must be an adverse
decision. I believe that they have completely misread and that they are completely
misreading Irish history in their present attitude, when they take no account
whatsoever of changed circumstances.
The reason the Government has taken these powers is that it wants to make sure
that the authority which has been given to the Government by the Irish people
will be maintained here and that no organisation here of a military character other
than the forces of the State will be permitted to exist if we can help it.
I hope they will take very seriously this whole matter and that they will realize
the direction in which we are going to travel if these things continue.20
De Valera's remarks, however, were not enough to end British suspicions about the
Fianna Fail Party's allegiances or its ability to lead the country. An article in Time
Magazine written in reaction to the speech, demonstrated the continued severity of that
concern, as it argued that there was a mingling of Fianna Fail and IRA support that could
imperil the domestic situation, and might ultimately prevent de Valera from suppressing
the organization.
19
20
Ibid.
Ibid.
60
Sad-faced Eamon de Valera, Prime Minister of Eire, looked unhappier than usual last
week as he lamented: "Last spring we created a favorable attitude in Britain toward
ending partition, but this campaign in England has put us back." So far, the Eire
Government, although it has outlawed the I.R.A., has not arrested any of its leaders.
Many Irish Government supporters secretly sympathize with the young hotheads.
Last week "Dev" hinted that he would take action to clear out the nests of plotters. If
he does, it might mean the end of more than his political career. The I.R.A. has
confined its current campaign to England and Northern Ireland. If hunted by the Eire
Government, it might turn on its own countrymen.21
The sincerity of de Valera's warning was put to the test two days later with the
legalization of the PVB, which altered the international and domestic situations by
sapping the momentum of the S-Plan and shifting the IRA's violence from England to
Ireland. Immediately upon the Bill's passage into law, British police began a nation-wide
roundup of Irish men, and Hoare signed nineteen expulsion orders. The British
Government's expanded powers allowed for the widespread suppression of the IRA in
the United Kingdom. Materials, manpower, and money ceased to flow. Accordingly, the
number of bombings declined significantly in early to mid-August, and with the
exception of the Coventry bombing on the 25th, the S-Plan became increasingly
ineffective.
The intensity of the British Government's crackdown created a mass exodus of
Irishmen from the United Kingdom. Many left to avoid arrest, while others feared that
they would be falsely accused of being in the IRA. The initial rush was so great that at
8:40 PM on the day the PVB came into power, three trains to Dublin were completely
full and ticket sales had to be suspended until the following day.22 The flood of IRA men
entering the country created a crisis for the government because, as The Times noted on
31 July, those returning would be "quite free to roam the highways and byways of Ireland
21
22
"Great Britain: Irish War," Time Magazine, August 7, 1939.
"Many Irish Leave London To Escape Terrorist Roundup," The New York Times, July 29, 1939, 1.
at their will.. .Ireland's peace may be the sufferer.. .England's opportunity in getting rid
of the Irish malcontents has become Ireland's difficulty."
De Valera and his Cabinet reacted to that difficulty, and the danger it posed, with
an aggressive execution of their authority through the powers of the OASA. Gardai
officers, utilizing the fourth part of the Act, conducted a series of raids on IRA safe
houses during mid-August in an effort to capture members of the organization's
leadership. The most prominent of these occurred on 14 August, when the Gardai stormed
multiple Dublin addresses following a meeting by individuals recently deported from the
United Kingdom.24 The men arrested included George Plunkett, Joe Clarke of the Wolfe
Tone Weekly, Myles Heffernan, and several other leaders within the Dublin unit of the
organization.25 The direct targeting of the IRA's leadership represented a new level of
intensity in the Fianna Fail Party's campaign to suppress the organization within Ireland
and handicap its operations in the United Kingdom.
Chief of Staff Sean Russell gave the Fianna Fail Party even further cause to act
aggressively against the IRA by openly espousing anti-government rhetoric and
reaffirming his belief in violence as the means to achieve an end to partition. Despite the
prospect of both the Irish and British Governments acting against his organization,
Russell remained determined to continue with his S-Plan until it achieved a solution. He
justified the campaign in mid-August stating that "the bombings are being carried out by
the army and will continue. The bombings are not our choice. If any speech would give
us our freedom, we would willingly make it," and that they sought to "put the people to
23
"The First Irish Deportees," The Times, July 31, 1939, 12.
"Four IRA Leaders Arrested in Dublin," The New York Times, August, 15, 1939, 8.
25
George Plunkett was originally scheduled to give the keynote address at the Bodenstown ceremony.
J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1974 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1970),
161.
24
62
the maximum amount of inconvenience without taking lives." Russell concluded by
placing the blame for the S-Plan and its violence on de Valera and the Fianna Fail Party
because they were "compromisers and they deal with the enemy," and therefore the
27
achievement of a republic necessitated their subversion.
De Valera's warning in the Seanad about the use of further measures against the
IRA if the organization continued in the direction it was headed was fulfilled by Russell's
challenging words set amidst the backdrop of more IRA men arriving in Ireland
everyday. On 22 August, the government issued two proclamations and activated the
emergency provisions of the Special Criminal Court and powers of internment in the
OASA.28 The acquisition of the Act's complete powers represented the end result of the
Fianna Fail's summer-long campaign to suppress the IRA.
The summer of 1939, which began with the legalization of the OASA and
concluded with the implementation of its full powers, represented a period of domestic
disharmony and international violence that challenged the legitimacy and authority of the
Fianna Fail led government. Domestically, the anti-government rhetoric espoused at the
February rally in Cork and in August by Russell, along with the influx of IRA members
as a result of their persecution in the United Kingdom, made Ireland a theater of
simmering tension and potential violence. The IRA's violent militant republicanism and
26
"Russell Defends English Bombings," The New York Times, August 13, 1939,14.
Ibid.
28
Unlike the first four sections of the Act, the government could not move as swiftly in utilizing the
emergency portions. The Special Criminal Courts did not physically exist within Ireland, and the Justices
that were needed to preside over them had to be selected by the government. The rules of the Courts also
needed to be established, as the OASA laid out only the parameters of the powers. They were eventually
laid down in S.I. No 266/1939-Offences Against the State Act, 1939. Rules of Special Criminal Court,
1939. This was followed by additional S.I. in the following months that revised and tweaked language of
the original. The powers of internment required an Internment Commission to be created, which would
review the cases of those that the government wanted to indefinitely send to camps or prisons. The
commission would not be established until 16 September through S.I. No. 344/1939-Offences Against the
State (Internment Commission) Order, 1939. These delays meant that while de Valera had invoked the
strongest of the powers of the Act, he was unable to utilize them immediately.
27
the questioning of de Valera's loyalty, directly challenged the Fianna Fail Party and the
security of the State.
The international situation was dominated by the IRA's S-Plan, which perpetrated
violence in England, and brought into question the competency and ideology of the
government. De Valera's hope that relations between the two nations could be improved
in the wake of the Anglo-Irish Trade War was wholly destroyed by the IRA. Moreover,
the possibility of collusion or sympathy with the IRA as articulated by Senator
MacDermot and Time Magazine, severely undermined the legitimacy of de Valera and
his Cabinet as the rulers of Ireland.
The end of the summer witnessed the Fianna Fail Party's admission that the
existing court systems in Ireland were inadequate to achieve justice and that the indefinite
holding of an individual without charge was needed to secure peace within the country.
These occurrences demonstrated the chilling perception of the dangers aligned against it.
However, that danger was to be elevated to an entirely new level just ten days after the
OASA's full implementation by the beginning of World War Two, which immediately
spurred a new request from de Valera for greater authority and power in the form of the
Emergency Powers Bill.
64
5. THE EMERGENCY POWERS BILL AND ACT, 1939
Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 and the start of World War
Two caused new problems for the Fianna Fail Party. The commitment of Great Britain to
the war was juxtaposed with the declaration of Irish neutrality, which placed the country
in a difficult position internationally. Yet, in the opinion of de Valera and his Cabinet,
Ireland's very survival in World War Two was predicated on an unerring adherence to
the policy of neutrality, which in turn required Fianna Fail's complete mastery of the
domestic situation. IRA violence demonstrated the majority party's lack of authority and,
some feared, gave pretext for foreign powers to impose their will on the Irish nation.
As a result of these concerns, the Emergency Powers Bill was introduced on 2
September. Fianna Fail demanded its quick passage and attempted to justify increasing its
authoritative powers. The eventual passage of the Bill was a critical step in securing its
unquestioned political supremacy.
The beginning of World War Two provided de Valera and his Cabinet with two
opportunities. One, they could argue that the war threatened Ireland's national security
and public order and therefore legislation like the EPB was necessary. Two, the uncertain
wartime situation encouraged the opposition parties to stand together with Fianna Fail to
face the potential danger.
The Taoiseach addressed the Dail on 2 September issuing a statement of Ireland's
neutrality in an effort to establish a baseline of unity and demonstrate his expectations for
the discourse he hoped would follow. The House agreed on neutrality, which de Valera
65
stated in a radio address to the Irish people that evening was because "we felt that no
other decision and no other policy was possible."1 He laid out his opinion on neutrality
and the manner in which it would be maintained during World War Two, thusly,
Now the policy of the Government.. .does not, I am sure, come either upon the
members of this House or upon the public, as a surprise.. .On another occasion, when
speaking in the House of that policy, I pointed out how extremely difficult it was
going to be. In a sense, it brings up for the Government of a nation that proposes to
be neutral in a war of this sort problems much more delicate and much more difficult
of solution even than the problems that arise for a belligerent.
It is not, as some people appear to think, sufficient for us to indicate our attitude, or
to express the desire of our people. It is necessary at every step to protect our
interests in that regard, to avoid giving to any of the belligerent any due cause, and
proper cause, of complaint. Of course, when you have powerful States in a war of
this sort, each trying to utilize whatever advantage it can for itself, the neutral State,
if it is a small State, is always open to considerable pressure... .Therefore, I stated,
when I was speaking of our policy of neutrality on a former occasion, that it was a
policy which could only be pursued if we had a determined people, people who are
determined to stand by their own rights, conscious of the fact that they did not wish
to injure anybody, or to throw their weight, from the belligerent point of view, on the
one side or the other.2
De Valera followed this discussion with an explanation of why the passage of the EPB
was essential to Ireland's security. He expressed his belief in the "extreme urgency for
the passing of these measures," which he believed should not be impeded by "any
responsible member of the Opposition, or any responsible member of the Labour
Party.. .because they must all understand, as we understand, the magnitude of the
problems that will have to be met." 3 The dangers faced by Ireland necessitated such a
unified opinion under Fianna Fail in de Valera's view, as he further argued "the only way
in which we can effectively face these problems and solve them—if a solution is
1
Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Years (New York: Crane, Russak & Company Inc, 1975), 12.
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 77- 02 September, 1939- First Amendment of the Constitution
Bill,1939-First Stage," HO.
3
Ibid.; Dail Debates, "02 September, 1939- Emergency Powers Bill- Second Stage," HO.
2
66
possible—is by getting the public representatives to stand behind whatever Government
is here when taking any powers that may be necessary in the interests of the nation and in
the interests of public safety."4 Therefore, the Taoiseach placed the legislation he was
about to introduce, with "the good sense of the members of the Dail, and to the cooperation of other Parties, which we confidently expect, [will] facilitate us in getting
these measures through."5
De Valera reminded the opposition of the limited time considerations and reiterated
the situation facing Ireland.
For a considerable time past, I am sure all Deputies, like the Government, have been
looking anxiously at the European situation and hoping against hope that it was not
going to lead to another European war.. .Our desire not to put members of the House
to the inconvenience of coming here unnecessarily, and also the desire not to create
any undue public anxiety has left us with very little time, now that the emergency has
come, to give notice of the measures that we think should, in the national interests,
come into law during the crisis. We are, therefore, asking Deputies to come here at
short notice, and we are asking them also to facilitate the Government by giving us
these essential measures with all possible speed.6
He noted of the EPB, "it is true that this Bill gives powers for what is tantamount to
legislation by decree or by order, but the States that have been threatened already with
war have, in advance of us, taken measures of that kind—even the democratic States."7
He aligned Fianna Fail's accumulation of power through the Bill with other wartime
nations, arguing that "the ordinary working of democratic constitutions is not possible
[with] very serious danger to the State in time of war, or in time of emergency
4
Ibid.
Dail Debates, "02 September, 1939- First Amendment of the Constitution Bill- First Stage," HO.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
5
tantamount to war."8 The Taoiseach concluded with a final justification, admitting that
the EPB, "does undoubtedly confer on the Government very extensive powers" but that
their strength was such that "a representative Government of a democratic State could ask
for only in times of emergency such as that in which we are."9
De Valera succeeded in swaying the Dail. He attained unanimous consent for the
First Amendment of the Constitution Bill.10 It amended Article 28.3.3° of the
Constitution, which made any law created by the Oireachtas during a time of war
unchallengeable in the judiciary system, provided that it was "for the purpose of securing
the public safety and the preservation of the State."11 The reason for the alteration was to
bring the article into line with the current situation, which was deemed necessary for legal
19
reasons. De Valera and his allies were not convinced that neutrality during a war
constituted a "time of war" for the nation. Ireland's non-belligerent status meant that if
the Constitution was not amended, the possibility existed for any legislation subsequently
passed under the Article to be repealed through the court system.
De Valera followed this success by announcing to the Dail that "arising out of the
armed conflict now taking place in Europe, a national emergency exists affecting the vital
interests of the State."13 This represented the beginning of the period known as the
8
Dail Debates, "02 September, 1939-Emergency Powers Bill- Second Stage," HO.
Ibid.
10
De Valera additionally noted of the Bill in its introduction that it was "a very simple measure," and that
with regard to the voting within the Dail, "I hope we will be unanimous." Dail Debates, "02 September,
1939- First Amendment of the Constitution Bill- First Stage," HO.
11
Irish Statue Book, "Constitution of Ireland," Office of the Attorney General.
12
The First Amendment of the Constitution Bill legally inserted the following into the Constitution, "in this
sub-section 'time of war' includes a time when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is
not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that,
arising out of such armed conflict, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State."
Irish Statue Book, "First Amendment of the Constitution Act," Office of the Attorney General.
13
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 77- 02 September, 1939- Existence of National Emergency," HO.
9
68
Emergency, which allowed for the Fianna Fail Party to introduce and pass legislation
unfettered by the constraints and protections of the Constitution.14
Next, de Valera introduced the EPB to the Houses of the Oireachtas, which
sought "to make provision for securing the public safety and the preservation of the State
in time of war, and, in particular, to make provision for the maintenance of public
order."15 The Bill proposed giving the government wartime powers to further suppress
political opposition and eliminate violent domestic threats like the IRA.
In order to suppress political opposition, the Bill would extend the government's
power over censorship. Frank Aiken, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive
Measures, described this measure as necessary to "keep the temperature down," by
suppressing opinions that diverged from the party's policy.16 Thomas J. Coyne, the
Controller of Censorship, further noted that censorship was only to prevent "sharp
17
controversy," which would have "no other value than to inflame passions."
In addition to giving the Fianna Fail Party the ability to censor forms of
communication such as press, publications, radio, theater, along with postal, telegraphic,
and telephonic,
the EPB provided for specialized forms of political censorship within
1Q
subsection I. Specifically, it allowed for the Cabinet to "make provision for preserving
14
The existence of a national emergency meant that "nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to
invalidate any law enacted by the Oireachtas which is expressed to be for the purpose of securing the public
safety and the preservation of the State in time of war or armed rebellion, or to nullify any act done or
purporting to be done in pursuance of any such law." Irish Statue Book, "Constitution of Ireland." Office of
the Attorney General.
15
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 77- 02 September, 1939- Emergency Powers Bill,1939- First
Stage," HO.
16
Donal O Drisceoil,'"Moral Neutrality': Censorship in Emergency Ireland," History Ireland 4 (1996): 47.
17
Ibid.
18
These forms of censorship were provided for under subsection H of the Act, which "authorize[d] and
provided for the censorship, restriction, control, or partial or complete suspension of communication by
means of all or one or more of the services maintained or controlled by the Minister for Posts and
Telegraphs or by any other means, whether public of private, specified or indicated in such emergency
order." irish Statue Book, "Emergency Powers Act, 1939," Office of the Attorney General.
and safeguarding the secrecy of official documents and information and for controlling
the publication of official information and for prohibiting the publication or spreading of
subversive statements and propaganda, and authorize and provide for the control and
censorship of newspapers and periodicals."19 This meant that the doors to the Houses of
the Oireachtas were sealed and any opinion expressed by a Fine Gael or Labour TD had
to be approved by Fianna Fail before it was disseminated to the public. Accordingly, not
only could IRA declarations like those in the Wolfe Tone Weekly be stopped, but
newspapers that were run or closely aligned to oppositional parties were also subject to
having their sources of information curbed or eliminated. The power to control the
political discourse in Ireland meant that Fianna Fail's ability to represent its own policies
as the entirety of Irish political opinion was significantly enhanced.
The second major focus of the EPB was the suppression of domestic threats, such
as the IRA, which challenged the government's authority and invited international
skepticism about de Valera and his Cabinet. The unique characteristic of the Bill that
demonstrated its enhanced wartime powers was the ability given to the Cabinet, via an
order carried out by the Gardai, to specifically target members of the organization or their
material possessions. It was placed within a number of the Bill's powers that were similar
to those established in the OASA, but which were now concentrated directly in the
Cabinet and free from judicial review.20
19
Ibid.
Article 2.1 of the EPA states, "The Government may, whenever and so often as they think fit, make by
order (in this Act referred to as an emergency order) such provisions as are, in the opinion of the
Government, necessary or expedient for securing the public safety or the preservation of the State, or for
the maintenance of public order, or for the provision and control of supplies and services essential to the
life of the community." Ibid.
20
The first of these was subsection G of Article 2.2, which dealt with the
confiscation of property. It provided for the "acquisition, taking possession, control or
use (either by agreement or compulsorily) by or on behalf of the State of any land or
other property whatsoever."21 The Article was a more powerful version of the OASA's
Article 25, because it allowed for the seizure of whatever property was deemed necessary
for the preservation of order and the security of the state, without needing to establish
suspicion or connection with an illegal organization. However, unlike the OASA, the
Fianna Fail Party had unilateral control in determining the necessity to apply the power
and what property it selected.
Two subsections in Article 2.2 allowed for the adoption of aggressive measures in
the pursuit and detention of suspects through an emergency order. The first of these was
subsection K, which allowed for the Gardai to detain any person "where such detention
22
is, in the opinion of a Minister, necessary or expedient in the interests of public safety.
It was coupled with subsection L, which authorized the "arrest without warrant" of any
person "whose detention has been ordered or directed by a Minister." These two
powers, which could be applied to both Irish and non-Irish persons, were the strongest in
the proposed Bill.
The last important power in relation to the issuing of emergency orders and the
suppression of the IRA was subsection M, which allowed for the arrest without warrant
of any person that had committed, was about to commit, or was concerned with any
crime that violated the public order, or "any other specified crime or offence."24 The
21
22
23
24
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
broadness of the power meant an effective end to warrants. The practical consequence of
their elimination was that under the direction of the Cabinet, the Gardai could move
swiftly, unfettered by any legal restrictions or delays. That freedom permitted them to be
more effective in thwarting the actions of the IRA, as officers were allowed to perform
blanket arrests at roadblocks or indiscriminately arrest any individual, thereby making it
substantially easier to capture members of the organization. This set the stage for the
violent confrontations between the Gardai and ERA throughout the Emergency.
The EPB met with little opposition. Each of the Bill's stages were completed on 2
September and the number of amendments proposed within Committee declined from
eighty-one for the OASB to twelve.25 Ultimately, all members of the Dail voted in favor
of the EPB at the Report Stage. Despite the decreased opposition to the Bill, the basic
structure of the debate within the Second Stage and the proposal of amendments in the
Committee Stage was similar to that of the OASB. A generalized, albeit weakened,
resistance coached in language that was specific to each party flowed into individual
issues with articles that reflected party-centric ideologies and concerns.
The bitter willingness of Labour TDs to support their ideological rival in the
passage of the EPB was demonstrated by William Norton who acknowledged that "we all
recognise from the situation in Europe to-day that a state of emergency exists and it is
probably that consideration and that consideration only which induces the House to
approach the consideration of this Bill calmly and with understanding."25 The party
leader was then followed by William Davin, who further conceded that "it is with
25
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 77- 02 September, 1939- Emergency Powers Bill, 1939- Committee
Stage," HO.
26
Dail Debates, "02 September, 1939- Emergency Powers Bill- Second Stage," HO.
considerable reluctance that [we] are prepared to give the Government most of the
powers at any rate they are seeking."27
Labour's inclination to accept much of the Bill and ultimately vote for its passage
did not wholly eliminate the party's general opposition to its strengthening of
governmental wartime powers and their consequences on individual freedoms. Norton
argued that the powers in the EPB meant, "every vital.. .guarantee so far as the ordinary
citizen is concerned is abrogated.. .when this Bill is on
the Statute Book.'"0 Timothy
Murphy described the Bill as an "abrogation of the rights of the citizens.. .which, I
believe ought not to be granted to a Government."29 He then concluded Labour's
arguments by noting that "the powers in the Bill, and particularly those provisions
dealing with the invasion of houses, arrests without warrant, and all the other drastic
powers that are conferred on the Government and on the Government servant, represent
an invasion of the last rights of the citizen."
Labour's subsequent presence in the Committee Stage was severely limited
because the issues it had with the curbing of individual liberties in the EPB were
fundamental tenets of its ability to suppress dangers that threatened the Fianna Fail led
government. Accordingly, any proposal that severely altered them or lessened their
power, was very difficult for the Cabinet to accept. The only contribution by Labour to
the Bill's final version was the first proposed amendment, which sought to include the
provision "that nothing in this Act shall authorise the declaration of war or the
participation by the State in any war without the assent of Dail Eireann," into the EPB.
27
Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
28
De Valera and his Cabinet accepted the amendment because it did not conflict with the
Bill in any fundamental way, and their policy of neutrality significantly decreased the
necessity to have unilateral control over the ability to declare war.31
Fine Gael's resistance to the EPB differed from Labour, and even its own
previous response to the OASB, due to the exacerbation of the party's ideological
differences with Fianna Fail. Ireland's international insecurity compelled a greater
number of moderates, and for the first time ultraconservative members, to express their
support for the Bill. The consequence of which was the alienation and undercutting of
TDs who wished to argue against the constitutionality of the Bill in the Second Stage and
curb its powers in Committee.
The willingness of more Fine Gael members to openly support the Bill, also
importantly increased the party's culpability in aiding in the Fianna Fail Party's
accumulation of power. Unlike Labour, Fine Gael's resistance had no resiliency and its
political losses were irrevocable. The acquiescence of moderates and some
ultraconservatives to Fianna Fail's request for unprecedented power, made the
subsequent introduction of smaller amendments in 1940 very difficult to provide
resistance against in the Second and Committee Stages. Accordingly, the passage of the
EPB represented a significant step for the Fianna Fail Party in suppressing political
opposition from Fine Gael, and ultimately providing a complete end to objections or
resistance from the party.
The moderate and ultraconservative members who supported the EPB were led by
James Dillon. Dillon had previously fought against the OASB, but defected to a position
of support for Fianna Fail. He argued that, "we have got this fact, that the Government of
31
Ibid.
74
this country...is entitled to ask for exceptional powers... the present Executive Council is
entitled to the exceptional powers they look for." 32 Several more moderate members
echoed that theme, as George Bennett remarked that, "the Government of the day in a
democratic country like ours ought to get any powers that they think reasonably
necessary."33 James Ryan offered even stronger support for Fianna Fail, stating that "I
unhesitatingly approve of every act done in this crisis by the people of the Front Bench
to-day," and that specifically, "I approve very strongly even of the power of arrest which
the Minister is taking under this Bill."34
The limited resistance produced by Fine Gael was initiated by Thomas O'Higgins
on constitutional grounds. He strongly objected to the manner in which de Valera was
forcing the Bill through the Dail. He believed "in five minutes we are stripping the people
naked of any constitutional rights," and that "we are giving now, or are asked to give
now, far more powers than any Irish Government ever exercised; or are asked to give, a
blank cheque."35 Likewise, Patrick Belton argued that the EPB was "practically
abrogating the whole Constitution and handing over the whole destiny of the country to
the Executive Council."36 Timothy Linehan warned of the Bill's consequences to
Ireland's democratic system. He argued that the EPB was "an entire abrogation of
democratic government because the passage of this Bill by the Dail means that for the
•2*7
period set out in the Bill there is going to be government by decree in this country."
32
Dail Debates, "02 September, 1939- First Amendment of the Constitution Bill- Second Stage," HO.
Dail Debates, "02 September, 1939- Emergency Powers Bill- Second Stage," HO.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
33
Fine Gael was significantly more active in Committee than Labour, but its ability
to shape the EPB was limited. It proposed eleven of the twelve total amendments, but
only one was of significant importance. It was the 2nd amendment to the Bill, proposed by
John Costello, which inserted the phrase "other than natural born Irish citizens" into
subsections K and L of Article 2 to limit internment strictly to aliens. The power to intern
non-Irish peoples was accepted by the party as a component of the wartime effort to
defend the nation against possible foreign infiltrators, but the inclusion of Irish citizens in
38
the Bill was an unacceptable extension of that power.
The Cabinet was willing to accept Costello's proposed amendment, because they
retained the ability to intern Irish members of illegal organizations under the OASA, and
therefore the wider ability to include all Irish in the EPB was not an issue on which
Fianna Fail desired to engage in prolonged debate. However, de Valera was not happy
with the compromise and he angrily chastised Fine Gael.
We know exactly what we are doing... It must be understood that we cannot come
along here at short notice to amend provisions that have been thought out carefully.
Simply because there is suspicion of the Government that it will do absurd things,
there is grave danger of leaving them without the powers which are considered
necessary. The only reason for giving away this is to try to prevent the Opposition
from thinking that we have some ultimate absurd reason, some willful reason, for
putting in these things.39
Costello responded to the Taoiseach with an equally harsh statement, noting of the
compromise that "he has given away practically nothing and before he gave away the
things he did give, he should have considered the matter. We are not asking him to give
away anything that we think it is reasonable for him to have.. .It seems that the Prime
38
Patrick McGilligan TD stated the argument simply in Committee Stage by asking "is it intended to use it
for the purpose of the internment of citizens? I do not mind it being used for aliens." Dail Debates, "02
September, 1939- Emergency Powers Bill, 1939- Committee Stage," HO.
39
Ibid.
76
Minister has got, suspicious in a vague general sort of way."40 His words demonstrated
that a spark of opposition remained, but it was subdued by the reality that Fine Gael had
only been able to propose a single successful amendment in Committee.
The outbreak of World War Two strengthened the Fianna Fail Party's desire to
establish its complete and unquestioned political authority domestically. The Taoiseach
and his Cabinet's perception of the dangers posed by the IRA and political dissent in the
Dail were seen as severe challenges to Fianna Fail's legitimate authority and an invitation
for foreign powers to impose their will against Ireland. The party's determination to force
the passage of the EPB demonstrated that Fianna Fail meant business. The Bill was
passed in the Houses of the Oireachtas in less than fourteen hours.41 Neither Fine Gael
nor Labour could do anything to prevent its passage. Indeed, both parties were compelled
to vote in its favor. The decision to do so weakened their ability to shape political
arguments in the future and ultimately allowed Fianna Fail to further pursue its desire for
an unquestioned political supremacy in Ireland.
40
Ibid.
The Dail formally convened to discuss the First Amendment of the Constitution Bill and the Emergency
Powers Bill at 3:00 pm on 2 September. The final stage of consideration for the EPB concluded at 4:55am
on 3 September.
41
77
6. THE EMERGENCY AND THE IRA (SEPTEMBER 1939-DECEMBER 1939)
The IRA launched a series of three challenges to the Fianna Fail Party during the
Emergency in 1939. The organization's actions were a direct response to the
promulgation of the OASA and EPA's authoritative powers. Due to several political
miscalculations made by Taoiseach Eamon de Valera, the IRA met with success,
temporarily challenging the authority of the Fianna Fail led government, and rendering its
legislation either inoperative or insufficient.
The IRA's campaign utilized two different tactics: prison hunger strikes and the
legal contesting of the OASA's constitutionality. De Valera struggled in countering both
of these maneuvers. Already reeling, the Fianna Fail Party was next hit by an IRA raid on
the Phoenix Park Magazine Fort on 23 December. The Christmas Raid, as it came to be
known, resulted in the theft of over a million rounds of ammunition from the Army's
reserves and was the IRA's most powerful blow against the government throughout the
entire Emergency. The organization's willingness to directly engage the Irish Army in
Dublin represented a hitherto unprecedented challenge to the legitimacy of the Fianna
Fail led government. The success of the operation changed the relationship between the
two sides because it erased any uncertainty or doubt from the Taoiseach that he needed to
suppress the IRA. Accordingly, early IRA successes were met by ultimate Fianna Fail
victory because the swift passage of twin amendments in early January repaired and
expanded the Fianna Fail Party's abilities, permanently shifting the balance of power in
its favor and giving it the power to suppress the IRA.
The hunger strike, which represented the IRA's first direct challenge to the Fianna
Fail led government, was the direct consequence of the incarceration of so many of its
members under the OASA and EPA. The man responsible for the arrests was Gerald
Boland, who was installed as the Minister for Justice on 3 September.1 Boland was a
veteran of the 1916 Easter Rising and a hardliner against militant republicans, who, on
his first full day as a Minister, directed the Gardai to storm the suspected safe house of
the IRA's General Headquarters in Dublin.2 It was a bold attack on the very heart of the
IRA's leadership and proved more fruitful than the previous series of raids in August, as
it succeeded in capturing a number of highly important members. The most important of
these were Larry Grogan and Peadar O'Flaherty, who had been signatories of the IRA's
declaration of war against Britain, and Patrick McGrath, the principal bomb expert for the
S-Plan.3
Seventy more arrests followed thanks to Boland's internment warrants. A
government communique justified the arrests by noting that "there is in possession of
unauthorized persons in this country a quantity of arms and explosives. ..the government
1
De Valera's first significant action following Great Britain's declaration of war on 3 September was a
reshuffling of his Cabinet, which included the Boland appointment. As previously noted, Frank Aiken
assumed the newly created Cabinet position of the Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures,
while Oscar Traynor became the new Minister for Defense and future Taoiseach Sean Lemass moved to the
Minister for Supplies. Boland's assumption of the Minister for Justice position meant that P.J. Ruttledge
was moved to the Minister for Local Government and Public Health.
2
Boland concurrently used the EPA to strengthen the Gardaf, which gave them a greater presence in
Ireland to more effectively suppress the IRA. One of the first in the 7,864 emergency powers orders that the
Irish Government issued from the beginning of September 1939 until April 1946, was the Emergency
Powers (Temporary Special Police Force) Order, 1939, which created the An Taca Sfochana. It was a
reserve force for the Gardaf that served to supplement their ranks when it was necessary to take broader
actions against the IRA. The force initially only possessed 228 members, but its numbers continued to grow
until it was assimilated into the regular Gardai near the end of World War Two. J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret
Army: The IRA, 1916-1974 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1970), 168.
3
The Gardai barely missed capturing future Chief of Staff Stephen Hayes in the raid. He vaulted over a
neighbor's wall and then ran through the streets of Dublin to elude the police.
has decided to take steps to provide against the possibility of [a] serious disturbance of
the peace."4
The hunger strike was the most effective type of resistance available to these new
prisoners. A traditional form of republican protest, the ultimate goal of the hunger strike
in 1939 was to gain the prisoners' freedom by portraying de Valera's Government as
abusive and acting against the best path to achieve Ireland's independence. Framed
within that context, the deteriorating health of the prisoners was a march towards
martyrdom and the immortal defiance of their persecutors. It was a journey that elicited
attention and sympathy for the militant republican cause.
The IRA's hunger strikes proved a difficult problem for the government to
overcome. They directly challenged the perception of the Cabinet as an agency which
protected the nation from dangerous individuals who would drag Ireland into a war with
foreign powers. Moreover, the hunger strike's utilization of popular forces placed
tremendous strain on Fianna Fail and made any decision by de Valera on the deteriorating
health of the prisoners damagingly controversial and divisive.
The first option open to de Valera was to continue the internment of the hunger
strikers by ignoring their protest and the sympathies it produced. This option created a
number of problematic political issues that struck at the very heart of Fianna Fail's
history and de Valera's career. The formation of Fianna Fail in 1926 and de Valera's own
rise to political prominence were built on the legacy of the Easter Rising, the Anglo-Irish
War, and the Irish Civil War. De Valera's unwillingness to sign the Anglo-Irish Treaty
and his estrangement from the recognized Irish Government until his party's formal entry
into the Dail in 1927 had made him a strong leader in the republican movement. Indeed,
4
Hugh Smith, "Dublin Declares Emergency State," The New York Times, September 16,1939, 3.
de Valera had once proclaimed that "the Oireachtas is not the law and the legislature of
Ireland," and ordered the release of IRA prisoners.5 Consequently, his declaration that
the IRA was an illegal organization and his attempts to suppress it seriously cut into his
credentials as a Republican. The hunger strikes therefore highlighted for many de
Valera's hypocrisy and his betrayal of his ideological and political roots.
The decision to continue the strikers' incarceration was further complicated by the
Prevention of Violence Act. The most destructive action perpetrated by the IRA in
England during the fall of 1939 was the bombing of mailboxes, which resulted in
damaging 200 letters, hardly reminiscent of its targeting banks near Piccadilly Circus or
planting bombs in suitcases at King's Cross Station.6 These meager incidents produced
the perception that IRA men were hardly killers but instead foolish and incompetent
patriots who were now victims of an overzealous government.
The second option open to de Valera was to relent to the hunger strikers' situation
and release them. This option presented the government with a separate set of issues that
dealt directly with its legitimacy. De Valera's government had forcefully argued
throughout 1939 that the IRA represented a threat to the safety and security of the
country. This rhetoric had been used to justify the introduction of the OASB and EPB. As
P.J. Ruttledge had explained during the Second Stage of the OASB, the situation with the
IRA was such that "we have reached a position that, I suggest, if it is allowed to develop,
is bound to deteriorate until in a very short time this country would find itself in a
catastrophe."7 To release men arrested under such established laws and arguments would
5
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- Second
Stage," HO.
6
"Mail Fires Laid to I.R.A," The New York Times, October 14, 1939, 6.
7
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill- Second Stage," HO.
have severely undermined the government's legitimacy by demonstrating its lack of
resolve against the IRA and invalidating the justification for the legislation it had
introduced.
In particular, the release of the hunger strikers would have meant considerable
complications to the government's policy of neutrality. De Valera sought to avoid any
possible act that could be construed as collusion with militant republicanism or even
sympathy to its cause. The problem for the Taoiseach was exemplified by Winston
Churchill, the future British Prime Minister, who openly expressed his belief that the IRA
was likely involved with Nazi Germany. On 5 September, under his power as First Lord
of the Admiralty, Churchill ordered a special report "upon the questions arising from socalled neutrality of the so-called Eire," which dealt with the possibility of a Nazi-IRA
partnership, as he asked of the organization "if they throw bombs in London, why should
they not supply fuel to U-boats? Extreme vigilance should be practiced."8
Under an international cloud of suspicion, neutrality and the authority the Fianna
Fail Party derived from it could only be maintained by de Valera with the most serious
attention on how he engaged the IRA. The Taoiseach had to publicly embody the ideals
of nonpartisanship that he had argued were critical to Ireland's survival in his declaration
of neutrality before the Dail. The release of IRA prisoners, including individuals who had
participated in the S-Plan, was wholly antithetical to that stance and de Valera's needed
to appear completely opposed to militant republicanism. The consequences of
antagonizing the British Government and worsening the already sour Anglo-Irish
relationship was made clear by Patrick Belton, Fine Gael TD, who argued that
8
Winston Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1948),
428.
82
We are hemmed in. We are depending for our very living on what others will
transport across the sea to us and we have only one people to transport that to us. We
are entirely in their hands and grip. If those people say to us to-morrow: 'Get down
off your pedestal of neutrality or we will starve you', we have no option but to do so.9
The government's initial reaction to the hunger strikers was to maintain the determination
it had demonstrated against the IRA since the introduction of the OASB.10 The Labour
Party directly confronted the Cabinet on the issue for the first time on 19 October by
bringing the case of Con Lehane to the Dail.11 It saw his continued internment without
charge as a gross violation of individual rights.12 Labour leader William Norton voiced
this concern to Boland thusly,
Mr. Norton: Does the Minister consider it fair, and in accordance with our conception
of the liberty of the subject under the Constitution, that a man who is detained in
military custody and against whom no charge has been preferred should be
compelled to resort to these extreme measures in order to demonstrate hisrightto be
released or tried by his own peers?
Mr. Boland: There is no compulsion on anybody to go on hunger strike or thirst
strike. If prisoners avail of the facilities provided for appeal, they can have their case
heard.
Mr. Norton: Am I to understand that hunger strikes or thirst strikes of this nature
which were right in 1922 and 1923 are wrong in 1939?
Mr. Boland: The Deputy can assume anything he likes.13
9
Dail Debates, "02 March, 1939- Emergency Powers Bill- Second Stage," HO.
In addition to the potential international political fallout and undermining of the Irish Government's
legitimacy as a consequence of releasing the hunger strikers, the pressures initially placed on de Valera
were not nearly great enough to force an alteration of policy. Ultimately, sympathy for the strikers, and
accordingly the pressure placed on the government for their release, was inversely proportional to their
health. The closer to serious illness or death a republican was, the more tyrannical and hypocritical de
Valera and his party looked by not intervening in the matter.
11
Con Lehane started his hunger and thirst strike on 12 October, and was being held in military custody
without charge.
12
According to the Minister for Justice Gerald Boland, Lehane was held in accordance with Part Six,
Article 55 of the OASA.
13
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 77- 19 October 1939- Private Notice Question- Prisoner On
Hunger Strike," HO.
10
83
While debates in the Dail continued, so too did the hunger strikes, as the strikers had no
other recourse through which to gain their freedom or to propagate the militant
republican message. Accordingly, four more IRA members began their strikes around 31
October. One of them, Patrick McGrath, promised to continue until his death if
necessary.14 This threat produced a great amount of sympathy for the IRA's cause, in
part because of the history surrounding the deaths of past strikers.
The last men to die on hunger strike were Terence McSwiney in 1920, who
perished in Braxton Jail, London, and Denny Barry and Andrew O'Sullivan, who died
shortly after the conclusion of the Irish Civil War in Mountjoy Prison.15 The locations
and times of the deaths evoked bitter memories of British oppression and the failures of
Cumann na nGaedheal Governments, both of which de Valera had hoped to permanently
banish with Fianna Fail ascension to power in 1932. The likelihood of more hunger strike
deaths, this time under a Fianna Fail led government, could potentially stir the passions of
republican sympathizers in Ireland and bring de Valera's history further into the light of
discussion.
McGrath's commitment to political martyrdom spurred Labour to pass an interparty resolution on 9 November, objecting to the imprisonment of hunger strikers and
calling for their release. In response, de Valera issued a Ministerial Statement to the Dail
on the same day that sought to justify the inaction of Fianna Fail and demonstrate its
14
The other three men in addition to McGrath were Jeremiah Daly, Richard McCarthy, and John Lynch.
"4 Irishmen Dying on Hunger Strike in Jail; De Valera Tells Dail They Cannot Be Freed," The New York
Times, November 10, 1939, 1.
15
unwavering resolve to suppress the IRA. He announced, with a face that was described as
"lined and overcast with grave responsibility"16 that,
The Government's attitude in this matter is this. There are no means by which the
Government can secure the safety of the people here except the powers of arrest and
detention of those who are in a position to bring this country to disaster. The policy
of the hunger strike is aimed at taking away these meansfromthe Government, and
once these means are taken away what is to happen is obvious. You are going to have
organisation to such an extent that the only way in which ultimately the supremacy of
the people can be established is by arms. We know perfectly well that if arms have to
be used many lives are going to be lost, and that the only way that is left to prevent
thatfromhappening is to restrain— because that is what is being aimed at —those
who are bent on courses which will undoubtedly lead to disaster.
We do not want to see any Irishman die... The alternatives we are forced to face are
the alternatives of two evils, one to see men die that we do not want to see die if we
can save them, the other, to permit them to bring the State and the community as a
whole to disaster. But they have put us in that position—it is not we who have done
it—they have put us deliberately in that position.... These are the considerations
which have determined the Government not to release the prisoners. Therefore the
answer I have to give to the Labour Party is that we regret we cannot release them.17
De Valera's speech demonstrated that he was out of options. His statement immediately
came under attack from republicans and those who were sympathetic to their cause. This
included death threats from republicans, which necessitated an armed guard to protect the
18
Taoiseach wherever he went.
De Valera was overwhelmed and forced to find a compromise on the issue. His
willingness to modify his position and establish a middle ground between the two evils he
had described in the Ministerial Statement was his first major political misstep during the
16
Ibid.
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 77- 09 November, 1939- Prisoners On Hunger Strike: Ministerial
Statement," HO.
18
At a rally outside Mountjoy Prison, which was in response to de Valera's speech, an unnamed speaker
proclaimed to the crowd that "if any of the men on hunger strike die, then de Valera will also die." "Threats
Are Made To Kill De Valera," The New York Times, November 11, 1939,4.
17
85
Emergency in 1939, as it invited further compromises and demonstrated that his
determination against the IRA was not absolute.
The compromise crafted by de Valera on 11 November, just two days after his
seemingly inflexible statement, was to grant any prisoner who was willing to stop his
hunger strike an immediate release. It was hoped that this new position would provide a
measure of political relief for the Fianna Fail Party by demonstrating its dominant
position, while simultaneously alleviating republican pressure.19 Instead, men like
McGrath immediately exposed its flaw by refusing to concede a position of inferiority
and subordination. The compromise had unwittingly put the government in the untenable
position of denying freedom to the physically weakest and most sympathetic republicans,
while concurrently releasing others and creating public expectations of further
compromises.
The situation spiraled out of control and, on 14 November, de Valera took the first
step in completely dismantling his Ministerial Statement. He ordered the transfer of
hunger strikers Richard McCarthy and John Lynch from Mountjoy Prison to a military
hospital and, four days later, their release. That same day, McGrath suffered "a bad attack
of weakness," which necessitated a quick decision by de Valera on the fate of the most
hardened and politically dangerous of the strikers.20 However, in reality he had already
made his choice on 11 November. McGrath was moved from prison to Jervis Street
Hospital, where he stayed until his release on 4 December, thereby completing the full
reversal of the Fianna Fail Party's original stance on the issue.21
19
The new position was successful with one hunger striker, Jeremiah Daly, who accepted its terms and was
released on 14 November.
20
Ibid.
21
Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History (Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1993), 108.
The complete success of the hunger strikes represented the IRA's first major
victory during the Emergency. Over the course of just five days, the Taoiseach had to
reverse his position. De Valera's willingness to contradict himself constituted a major
error in judgment that weakened his position of authority by demonstrating that his
determination against the IRA could be subverted and that the government's arguments
about the dangers of the organization were ultimately exaggerated.
The IRA's second successful challenge to the government was a legal case that
sought to invalidate the sixth section of the OASA. Much like the hunger strikes, the case
was a response to Fianna Fail's legislative powers and, in particular, the use of
internment warrants. James Burke exemplified the problem internment caused the
organization, as he was arrested for the possession of seditious documents on 15
September in one of Boland's raids, and subsequently interned to avoid any legal
difficulties. In the aftermath, Burke's brother applied for an Order of Habeas Corpus in
November to challenge the constitutionality of the government's policy of internment.
The government was vulnerable to such legal challenges because of two major
oversights by de Valera. The Taoiseach's first mistake was his lack of consideration
about the power of the District and High Courts because they had been rendered as
subordinate second-tier institutions that dealt infrequently with republicans as the result
of legislation that largely circumvented the traditional court system. The establishment of
the Special Criminal Court and the unchallengeable powers of the EPA, meant that de
Valera assumed in much the same way as he did with political opposition in the
Oireachtas, that the lower courts would simply mirror their opinions.
22
Fergal Francis Davis, The History and Development of the Special Criminal Court 1922-2005 (Dublin:
Four Courts Press, 2007), 76.
87
The Taoiseach's second mistake was a fundamental misunderstanding of what
powers the Constitution bestowed on the High Court. De Valera's interpretation of
Article 34 was that if "there should be finality in a decision on constitutional matters, as
to the repugnancy of any law to the Constitution, [it] is given by the Supreme Court.
Running right through the whole Constitution, it is clear—it seemed to us to be clear—
that the final decision as to whether an Act was or was not constitutional lay with the
Supreme Court." 23 Therefore, de Valera did not think the lower court had the ability to
stymie the government's application of its powers.
Burke's case before the High Court, The State (Burke) v. Lennon, was heard by
Justice Gavan Duffy, who had a history of sympathetic rulings on issues of individual
liberty and freedom at the expense of the government.24 Duffy produced a "tour de force
ruling" against the government, which declared that the power of internment in the
OASA was unconstitutional and therefore immediately inoperative. Duffy found the
legislation incongruous with Article 55 of the Constitution, which states that "whenever a
Minister of State is satisfied that any particular person is engaged in activities calculated
to prejudice the preservation of the peace, order, or security of the State, such Minister
23
Article 34.3.2° of the Constitution of 1937 granted that "the jurisdiction of the High Court shall extend to
the question of the validity of any law having regard to the provisions of this Constitution, and in all cases
in which any such matter shall come into question the High Court alone shall exercise original
jurisdiction." Irish Statue Book, "Constitution of Ireland," Office of the Attorney General.; Dail Debates,
"Dail Eireann- Volume 78- 03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill, 1940- Second Stage,"
HO.
24
Originally the case was to be heard in the High Court by Justices Duffy, Maguire, and O'Byrne, but
Burke's counsel disagreed with that proposed lineup. They argued that it was "a fundamental right of a
citizen bringing a habeas corpus application to select the judge before whom he would move his
application." The purpose behind the objection was to remove Maguire and O'Byrne from the case,
because it was believed that they would vote in the government's favor, while Duffy had a history of
supporting constitutional challenges. Indeed, from 1937-1951 Justice Duffy presided over seven of the ten
cases brought before the courts of Ireland in which the law being challenged was declared unconstitutional.
Gerald Hogan, "The Supreme Court and the Reference to the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill
1940," Irish Jurist (2000): 259.
25
Davis, Special Criminal Court, 75.
88
may by warrant under his hand order the arrest and detention of such person under this
section."26 The subjectivity of the phrase "satisfied" was unacceptable to Duffy, who
argued,
The Minister has to be 'satisfied'. There must be countless occasions in the official
life of a Minister of State on which he has to be satisfied as to particular facts before
taking course, occasions on which nobody would for a moment expect him to act
judicially in order to be satisfied.
The authority conferred on a Minister by section 55 is an authority, not merely to act
judicially, but to administer criminal justice and condemn an alleged offender
without charge or hearing and without the aid of a jury. The administration ofjustice
is a peculiarly and distinctly judicial function, whichfromits essential nature does
not fall within the executive power and is not properly incidental to the performance
of the appropriate functions of the executive; consequently a law endowing a
Minister of State, any Minister, with these powers is an invasion of the judicial
domain and as such is repugnant to the Constitution.27
De Valera's next misstep was an unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court to
overturn the High Court's ruling and reinstate the power of internment. The Supreme
Court ruled against his appeal, declaring that it did not have the authority to overturn a
habeas corpus decision.28 The inability to further contest Duffy's decision meant that de
Valera was faced with the inevitability of every single IRA prisoner appealing his case.
As a result, the Taoiseach was forced to endure one final highly public failure, the preemptive release of fifty-three interned IRA men on 2 December.29
26
Irish Statue Book, "Offences Against the State Act, 1939," Office of the Attorney General.
G.M Golding, George Gavan Duffy, 1882-1951: A Legal Biography (Irish Academic Press, 1982), 103.
28
Chief Justice Sullivan of the Supreme Court said in his ruling against the Fianna Fail Government that "It
follows that, in my opinion, an appeal does not lie to this Court from an order of the High Court made
under Article 40.4 discharging a person from illegal custody... [In] this Court counsel for the Attorney
General relied upon certain articles of the Constitution as indicating that an appeal should lie to this Court
in any case in which the validity of any law is involved, having regard to the provisions of the Constitution.
But that consideration cannot affect the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain an appeal from an order under
Article 40.4 discharging a person from custody." Hogan, "The Supreme Court," 266.
29
Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939-1998, "The Hederman Report," 2002.
27
The Fianna Fail led government's inability to intern Irish-born individuals or to
arrest the released IRA men due to a lack of strong evidence against them was a
significant handicap that de Valera took no steps to address for the rest of 1939. His
determination to suppress the IRA and demonstrate the political legitimacy arid
superiority of Fianna Fail had been halted by his failures. This left de Valera on unsure
ground with no idea how to respond next.
While de Valera vacillated, the IRA struck again, raiding the Phoenix Park
Magazine Fort. The government and the Gardai had depleted the organization's military
resources through a combination of confiscation and making it more difficult to smuggle
weapons into Ireland. As the largest repository of weaponry and ammunition for the Irish
Army, the Magazine Fort contained the much-needed supplies to rearm the IRA. The
execution of the raid on 23 December was accomplished without violence as a result of
good planning and poor security.30 In a little over just one hour, the IRA loaded thirteen
lorries with 1,084,000 rounds of ammunition and an unknown amount of firearms, all
without alerting suspicion.31 The Gardai and Army were only tipped off to the theft when
one of the lorries refused to stop at the nearby Islandbridge Barrack's gate and shots were
exchanged between soldiers and the IRA. Ultimately, all thirteen lories escaped in the
organization's boldest challenge to the Fianna Fail led government during the
Emergency.
The raid on the Magazine Fort, the IRA's third successive victory during the
Emergency in 1939, was a failure of unprecedented severity for de Valera and Fianna
Fail. It sparked a firestorm of criticism against the Taoiseach and his party. De Valera's
30
The Magazine Fort was protected by a small compliment of soldiers. Its Commanding Officer had been
assigned to his position in 1924.
31
Bell, The Secret Army, 174.
errors in handling the IRA were emphasized by his opponents. Fine Gael and Labour TDs
called for the resignation of Ministers Frank Aiken and Gerald Boland, while Fine Gael
party leader W.T. Cosgrave questioned the legitimacy of Fianna Fail's position as the
head of the Irish Government. In a strongly worded verbal attack he said, "this
Government does not appear to me to be likely to last very long. In fact, if they had any
decency, if they had any sense of responsibility, if they had a spark of patriotism, they
would not alone retire from office but retire from public life.. .The people of the country
from the incidents of the last few weeks, have had one more example of Ministerial
incompetency."32 John Costello, a ultraconservative Fine Gael TD, also argued against
Fianna Fail's continued operation of the most important Cabinet positions, by reflecting
on the debilitating de-legitimization of the majority party as a result of de Valera's
failures.
We cannot afford to have the Government make another mess such as they have
made... in the administration of law and justice. The country cannot afford to have
the Government again made a laughing stock, because it will not merely reflect upon
the existing Government but will reflect upon the existing institutions of the State,
render any Government impossible in [the] future, and give afillipto those enemies
of the State whom we are all trying to curb and whose activities we all wish to see at
an end.33
The Christmas Raid may have been an IRA success but it pulled de Valera from
his temporary vacillation and intensified his determination to establish his government's
political supremacy. Gerald Boland best summed up Fianna Fail's desire to regain its
footing, as he said that
32
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 78- 03 Januaiy, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill,
1940- Second Stage," HO.
33
Ibid.
91
Deputy O'Sullivan said that we were lax in not coming back at Christmas. Perhaps
that is so. If you like we took a chance. We thought perhaps that these people having
beaten us in the courts, and having lauded our Constitution, that that would be all, but
we were foolish. I quite admit that we should not have waited, but should have
brought Deputies back before Christmas. Unfortunately we did not, and perhaps to
that extent we are blameworthy. We hoped that things would have lasted over
Christmas, but unfortunately we were caught out. We are doing the best we can to see
that it will not happen again.34
Almost immediately after the raid de Valera planned the introduction of new legislation
to repair the damage done by Justice Duffy and further extend Fianna Fail's powers to
allow for the more rapid suppression of the IRA. Amendments to both the OAS A and
EPA were proposed in an emergency session of the Oireachtas after New Year's, because
as the Taoiseach described it, "there is such a body active and able to take action of a
certain kind and that it is necessary for the Government to have certain powers.. .it is
oc
essential for the safety of the State."
The introduction of a new legislative cycle concluded a disastrous period for de
Valera and his party, which had begun with the declaration of an Emergency on 2
September and seen three consecutive successful challenges to their authority from the
IRA. The organization's victories were the result of multiple errors in judgment
committed by the Taoiseach. The first two were created by de Valera's willingness to
completely contradict his own stated policy on the prisoner hunger strikers after only four
days and his oversight of the High Court's powers that led to the invalidation of the
OASA's sixth section, which together eliminated clear choices on how to proceed against
the IRA and halted his determination against the organization. The subsequent Christmas
Raid, which occurred as a result of the conditions created by de Valera's inaction and an
34
35
Ibid.
Ibid.
IRA emboldened due to his errors, produced severe political consequences for the
Taoiseach that created within him a renewed determination to suppress the organization
and secure the Fianna Fail Party's political supremacy within Ireland.
93
7. THE EMERGENCY POWERS (AMENDMENT) BILL AND ACT, 1940
The introduction of the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill on 3 January 1940
was Taoiseach de Valera's renewed attempt to establish the Fianna Fail Party's complete
authority in Ireland in the wake of his setbacks in 1939. The Bill's passage through the
Dail in less than eleven hours represented the further erosion of Fine Gael and Labour's
opposition, which moved each party closer to Fianna Fail's agenda.1 Moreover, the Bill's
success in overcoming the damage done by The State (Burke) v. Lennon demonstrated
that the IRA was now almost completely out of options.
The Bill was an amendment to the EPA that removed the phrase "other than
natural-born Irish citizens" from subsections K and L of Article 2. The stipulation that
Irish citizens were exempt from internment in emergency legislation was the product of a
Fine Gael amendment within the Committee Stage of the EPB, which had been accepted
by Fianna Fail because it retained the ability to intern IRA members under the sixth
section of the OASA. Justice Duffy's decision, which stripped the government of that
power and the IRA's successful Christmas Raid compelled the Cabinet to sidestep the
court's decision and regain the ability to intern Irish citizens and to prevent any further
judicial challenges on this issue.
The IRA's victories in 1939 shook the government but did not break its resolve to
establish its complete authority. The Minister for Justice, Gerald Boland, opened the
Second Stage of the Bill by emphasizing its importance. He was followed by de Valera
1
The First Stage of the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill commenced at 3:00 pm on 3 January, and
the Committee Stage finished at 1:50 am on 4 January.
2
Irish Statue Book, "Emergency Powers (Amendment) Act, 1940," Office of the Attorney General.
94
who placed a particular emphasis on the IRA's threat to neutrality and the organization's
challenge to his government.
Deputies are aware of the reason for summoning the Dail before it was due to
assemble in February next. The Government believed they had the power of
internment. As the House is aware, it has been decided by the court that they have not
that power now. The Government is absolutely convinced that they must have that
power. By accepting the amendments proposed in this Bill, we are satisfied that we
will have that power for the period of the emergency.
There is nobody who doubts for a moment that there are arms in the country in the
hands of private individuals and groups. There is nobody who is ignorant of the fact
that a certain group have issued proclamations taking it upon themselves to declare
war in the name of our people, and, generally, they do not recognise the institutions
which have been clearly set up here by the majority of the people of this community.
They are prepared, apparently, to use these arms, whenever it suits them, without any
question of getting powerfromthe Irish people to do so, and they are prepared to use
them, apparently, against the organised forces here in this State. They are prepared to
embroil this State, if they think it accords with their purposes, with neighbouring
States. Now there can be only one Government in this part of Ireland—in this
community, and there can be only one Army, and only one Legislature.3
Fianna Fail offered captured documents and lists of supplies that had been found in
various safe houses as proof of the IRA's threat, which according to Boland meant that
the organization "in certain counties, from the information we have, is very highly
organized and I should say is pretty efficient. It is very dangerous where it is in a position
that it could be mobilized."4 The evidence included an IRA dispatch that referred to the
Irish Army as "enemy forces," another message that requested bomb-making materials, a
requisition order for guns and ammunition, and a description of a discovered IRA
3
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 78- 03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill, 1940Second Stage," HO.
4
Ibid.
95
laboratory that held gelignite, test tubes, a handbook on oxy-acetylene, and aluminum
powder.5
Boland argued that the IRA possessed such materials in order "to invade the
North and... [also] to bring off coups here."6 De Valera agreed and further pointed out
that "the position here is that a group within the country take upon themselves the right to
say that they represent the nation and that what they want to do is the right thing to be
done. That is not possible."7
The main evidence offered to justify the Bill was the Christmas Raid, because it
demonstrated the IRA's strength and the threat it posed to the government's ability to
function. Sean MacEntee, the Minister for Industry and Commerce, described the
Christmas Raid as "an attack, an attack by armed persons, upon the forces of this
State.. .It was an act of armed rebellion."8 Boland argued that "the raid on the Magazine
Fort, should have brought it home to everybody that there is here a body of persons who
are highly organized," and that "what we want to do is to get these arms and to get the
people that are trying to use them, and not to let them go until we are satisfied that it is
5
The document that described the Irish Army reads as follows, "Oglaigh na hEireann, 6th September.
Drogheda Battalion to Department of Intelligence. Report on enemy forces in area."
"(1) As far as I am aware there are about 20 'Free State' troops posted at Drogheda railway station
ostensibly for the purpose of guarding communications. According to a report a strong force of 'Free State'
troops are about to be billeted in the Whitworth Hall for the purpose of garrisoning the town.
-Battalion Adjutant."
The IRA request for bomb-making materials reads as follows, "Please supply electrical detonators, delay
action, red oxide iron, aluminum powder, sulphuric acid carbon disulphide and phosphorous, gas bomb.
The training officer has given me this list of materials he requires for his classes."
The complete requisition order was for "one Thompson sub-machine gun with two butts, drum magazines,
2L, 2C type, 20 Lee-Enfield service rifles, 10 revolvers, 8 Webley, 1 Colt, 1 Smith and Weston and 4
automatics, 10,000 rounds of .303 and 4,000 rounds of .45 revolver, 50 rounds of Peter Painter, 6 grenades
charged and primed, 2 grenades for lectures and throwing practice, 2 signal outfits, buzzers, lamps,
telephones, flags and wire, complete instruction on signalling and first aid." Dail Debates, "03 January
1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
96
safe for them to be at large."9 He further described its consequences on the government,
arguing that "we have had a shaking up that will serve us for many a long year to
come... We want to see that that will not happen again, and Deputies may be assured that
we will tackle this job and that we will see this organisation will not be in a position to
carry out a stunt of that nature again.. .1 hope, whatever members of the Dail may think or
say about the Government in this whole matter, that they will not unduly delay the
passing of this Bill, because it is very urgent."10
To win support, de Valera exaggerated the strength of the IRA and the dangers it
posed to Ireland's security. "The question of the Magazine," he argued, "[demonstrates]
there is such a body active and able to take action of a certain kind and that it is necessary
for the Government to have certain powers."11 De Valera became even more forceful
when questioned about the Bill's constitutionality. He expressed his frustration to the
opposition as he asked "are we to go on here talking about legal niceties when, in fact,
there is happening something which can end this Institution and end the liberties of the
individuals that we are trying to protect?" De Valera then punctuated his justification for
the Bill by flatly stating of the IRA's activity, "it certainly cannot be permitted. Any
1?
commonsense community would not allow it to continue."
Fianna Fail's discussion in the Dail next turned to the issue of internment. Boland
argued that internment, as opposed to trial, allowed for the holding of a suspect when the
government was "not in a position to bring evidence that will satisfy a court to deal with
all these people," but were "quite satisfied that they are engaged in activities hostile to the
9
Ibid.
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
10
I3
State, and that they are a menace and a danger." He discussed the case of The State
(Burke) v. Lennon and the Christmas Raid, providing a concrete example of the
importance of internment, by arguing that "I am satisfied that had it not been for the
decision of the courts.. .that raid would not have occurred," and noting of the fifty-three
men released, "they are now at large and we have got to get them and perhaps others into
safekeeping until we are satisfied that it will be safe for the community."14 He concluded
by further linking the Christmas Raid to the Bill, by noting that "this is a very important
Bill... what we are doing now is asking the House to give us power to see that the like of
[the raid] will not recur, that we will have power of internment."15
The government's portrayal of the IRA as a dangerous organization was presented
to the Seanad as well. In response, some Senators proposed a coalition or national
government as a solution for strengthening the government's hand. Specifically,
Senator Frank MacDermot expressed his belief that the creation of such a government
would accomplish "the tranquillization of this country."16 De Valera, however, was
adamant that the policy of the government was dictated by its majority party and that it
represented the entirely of Irish political opinion. He rejected all power-sharing models.
The Taoiseach: When Senator Tierney talks about Coalition Government and all
the rest of it, there is a fundamental difficulty in the way of anything of that sort,
and that is, that there are two sets of people who believe in the different lines they
took in the past, that they were justified in taking those lines.
Mr. MacDermot: That does not matter now
The Taoiseach: It does not matter now.
13
Ibid.
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Seanad Debates, "Seanad Eireann- Volume 24- 04 January 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) BillSecond Stage," HO.
14
98
Mr. M Hayes: Certainly not.
The Taoiseach: And I wish to heavens it was generally accepted that it does not
matter.
Professor Johnston: But there is a very important difference now.
The Taoiseach: No group in this country has any right to speak for the people
except the duly elected Government.
Professor Johnston: And the duly elected Opposition, too. They have a right to
speak for their section of the people.
The Taoiseach: There is only one national policy.
Professor Johnston: And does the Opposition not contribute to that, too?
The Taoiseach: There is only one national policy at any time.... We are the greater
part of the nation and the only people who can decide general national policy. There
cannot be two national policies at the same time and there cannot be two directing
heads. The only head that is possible is the head which is responsible to the elected
representatives of the people and none other... .If we are going to have any peace, any
progress in any direction here, it is essential that the majority should make their will
effective in that particular matter.17
De Valera presumed that Fine Gael and Labour shared Fianna Fail's perception of the
dangers, arguing that "I do not think that it is necessary to convince this House that there
is a [situation] which needs the active intervention of the Executive, and of the powers
which it can command, to control," and he claimed, despite clear evidence to the contrary
from Labour, that "I have not heard anybody suggest we should not have those powers to
deal with the situation."18 He saved his most intense comments in discussing the role of
the judiciary. In remarks described by historian John Kelly as "a vein less plaintive and a
good deal more disquieting" than his response to Senator MacDermot, the Taoiseach
expressed his opinion about The State (Burke) v. Lennon and the High Court, arguing that
17
Seanad Debates, "Seanad Eireann- Volume 24- 04 January 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) BillSecond Stage (Resumed)," HO.
18
Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
99
"if we cannot get some common ground.. .then we certainly cannot get on. If the
Legislature and the judiciary are going to be at loggerheads in that way we shall have to
change the situation."19 He continued further, hinting "that the whole system of judicial
review might have to be re-considered if the judiciary were to continue to surprise the
Government," by declaring that "if [we] cannot carry on in harmony, which is the
premise upon which I am talking.. .1 say there is an end to working in that particular way.
It cannot be done." 20 De Valera concluded his warning to the judiciary with a veiled
threat to the assembly, declaring that "if the various organs of the State here, which are
intended to fulfill certain purposes.. .serve quite a contrary purpose then they cannot carry
on."21
The Minister for Finance, Sean MacEntee, echoed de Valera's position. He
argued that "this Government has been elected by the people, whether for good or ill, to
determine what our policy is going to be," and that "we are the servants of the people,
99
and the people are our masters, and therefore it is in the people's name that we speak."
He then concluded his remarks in the Second Stage with a lengthy address on the issue,
which climaxed with his declaration that,
It is for the people that we determine policy and it is the people who ultimately
control that policy, whether it be domestic or external. But of whatsoever sort or kind
it may be, that policy cannot really be effective until the people of this country, and
the members of this House who speak for the people, and who are responsible to the
people of this country, make up their minds that there is only going to be one
Government in this countiy, that there is only going to be one Executive in this
19
John Kelly, Fundamental Rights in the Irish Law and Constitution (Dublin: Allen Figgis & Co., 1967),
25.; Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
20
Gerald Hogan, "The Supreme Court and the Reference to the Offences Against the State (Amendment)
Bill 1940," Irish Jurist (2000): 256.; Dail Debates, "03 Januaiy, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment)
Bill- Second Stage," HO.
21
Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
22
Ibid.
100
country, and that there is only going to be one army in this country, and that that
army is not going to be the army of the enemies of this State.23
The response of the opposition to Fianna Fail was significantly muted. Fine Gael
fragmented into three distinct groups, each responded differently but were, on the whole,
amenable to voting with Fianna Fail. Conversely, Labour remained united in opposition
and became increasingly isolated and disenfranchised in the Dail.
Fine Gael's response to the Bill was further proof that the party could offer little
resistance to Fianna Fail legislation. W.T. Cosgrave demonstrated this point by
acknowledging, "on more than one occasion the powers which have been asked for have
been generously given."24 The willingness of many moderate Fine Gael members to pass
comprehensive and authoritarian legislation like the OASB and EPB made it difficult for
those same members to now stand up and oppose the Bill, thereby prompting more
defections to Fianna Fail and undercutting ultraconservative resistance further.
Of Fine Gael's three factions, only one was ready to offer significant resistance.
This group was comprised of ultraconservative party members, who were limited to
sparse participation in the Second Stage and had no voice in Committee because of their
small size. Patrick McGilligan set the tone for this group, focusing on Fine Gael's
ideological concern with constitutional rights, arguing "the Minister asks us to destroy
the Constitution."25 John O' Sullivan pushed the issue further, reminding TDs of Duffy's
decision and the Taoiseach's fundamental disagreement with the interpretation of the law.
He warned that "I cannot see how the present Bill can be brought within the provisions of
the Constitution. I know the Taoiseach thinks it can, and that, therefore, if the judges
23
24
25
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
101
differ from him, they are perverse." O'Sullivan then turned to the consequences if de
Valera was once again proven wrong by the court system, arguing that "we shall be in a
nice situation if the Government proceed against people on certain lines... and are then
told that they have acted unconstitutionally. The Taoiseach says he is prepared to risk
that. He is always prepared to risk the good name, the prestige and the safety of this
State."26
Patrick Giles, a former Army Captain, provided this group's strongest attack on
Fianna Fail and de Valera. By ignoring constitutional concerns and instead targeting the
legitimacy of the majority party and the Cabinet, Giles provided remarks that were more
suited to Fine Gael's Blueshirt period and Eoin O'Duffy's 1933 Ballyshannon speech, as
he passionately argued in the Second Stage that,
Captain Giles: There are men on the Front Bench of the Government who ought to
resign. One man whose name is bandied about in the country should speak—and
speak with a loud voice. He should state his case and where he stands, because his
name is not held in any honour in my county to-day.
I will not be a party to passing new or fresh legislation for a Government which has
proven incompetent and inefficient and which has heaped injustices on the heads of
the Irish fanners.. .You are a band of "besters".. .You are really the curse of the
country—you and your Taoiseach who should never be in this country.
An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: The expression "besters", which is a term of
opprobrium, was used by Deputy Giles and I must ask him to withdraw it.
Captain Giles: I will withdraw nothing.27
The ultraconservatives' condemnations, which represented the only sustained Fine Gael
resistance to the Bill, were ultimately rendered irrelevant through a combination of de
Valera's political agility and an overall lack of support from the rest of the party. The
26
27
Ibid.
Ibid.
constant stream of denials and accusations made by de Valera, such as arguing that "I did
not say anything of the kind," to O'Sullivan's statement, or that the opposition "can turn
and twist words" to their political advantage, before ultimately describing the group's
overall arguments as "balderdash," demonstrated his staunch determination to pass the
Bill.28 More importantly, the majority party's response to the ultraconservatives went
unchallenged by the other two Fine Gael groups. The most striking example of this
abandonment of the ultraconservative wing was Cosgrave's absence from the debate, as
he only provided brief remarks on the Christmas Raid and the introduction of a
compromise-seeking amendment. Moderate Fine Gael TDs followed their party leader's
example and similarly ignored the plight of their right wing.
A second group represented the majority of Fine Gael members, including the
party's leadership, and was willing to grant de Valera the powers he requested but sought
to delay consideration of the Bill.29 This group asked de Valera to first ensure the
constitutionality of the Bill by accepting that
Dail Eireann being of opinion that the objects aimed at in this Bill can only be
effectively secured by an amendment of Article 28 of the Constitution adjourns the
consideration of the Bill until the Government have introduced a Bill to amend the
Constitution by extending the scope of Article 28, Section 3 to meet the existence of
a domestic emergency.30
28
Ibid.
Cosgrave and others believed that the legalization of internment for all Irish citizens was incompatible
with the emergency powers created under Article 28, and therefore could be successfully challenged in the
court system. The party leader noted of the incongruity, and Justice Duffy's decision, that "we do not see
any great prospect of a different decision begin given by the courts from that already given in that case that
was brought before them...it is necessary to get from the fountainhead, the Constitution, powers to take
extraordinary statutory authority." Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment)
Bill- Second Stage," HO.
30
Ibid.
29
Members of the second group stood in stark contrast to the ultraconservatives in the
party. Their position was in line with the party's overall concerns about the
constitutionality of the powers requested by Fianna Fail, but it was directly antithetical to
its tradition of championing freedoms and liberties. The limited resistance which the
leadership offered demonstrated the degree to which Fine Gael's opposition had
crumbled and its identity had been lost. Instead of attempting to curb the powers of the
legislation, as most members had with respect to the OASB and EPB, the compromisers
had become enablers for Fianna Fail's continued accumulation and centralization of
power. The amendment's immediate defeat in the Second Stage by a vote of 65-33,
ultimately silenced Fine Gael's second group, and all of its members eventually voted in
favor of Fianna Fail's version of the Bill.31
Fine Gael's third group also provided very little resistance to the Bill, as its
members only sought to alter the appeals process in relation to internment. Fianna Fail
had proposed an appeals commission of no less than three persons, all of whom were
appointed by the Executive, with at least one member being a Judge of barrister of no less
than seven years experience. The commission was unacceptable to these Fine Gael
members, because they believed that Fianna Fail would appoint commissioners friendly
to its interests. Specifically, they noted that "the other two members of the commission
can be anybody at all-a member of the Fianna Fail organisation, an officer of the Army,
or an officer of the police force." Accordingly, the government was entreated to
establish a system in which the interned individual "can have no cause of complaint, and
31
The entire Labour Party abstained from the vote because it did not support the amendment, but refused to
vote in concert with Fianna Fail.
32
The character and nature of the commission was modeled after one established in the Public Safety
(Emergency Powers) Act, 1926, by W.T. Cosgrave and his Cumann na nGaedhael Government.
33
Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
104
do not let them have it to say that you loaded a court in order to get a decision against
them."34
The solution proposed by members of the third group was the elimination of the
appeals commission and, in its place, an ability for interned individuals to appeal directly
to the High Court, which in their opinion would "secure that an innocent, honest man will
have his remedy if, at any time, an order of internment should be made against him."
Duffy's ruling had sufficiently demonstrated to these TDs that the High Court retained a
measure of autonomy, and therefore was a far more suitable body to decide internee's
cases, then one controlled by the Fianna Fail Party that could include two members with
no legal knowledge whatsoever.36 Boland completely rejected the proposed amendment,
and the proposal went nowhere. This concluded the complete and total failure of the Fine
Gael Party to affect any change to the Bill.
The Labour Party demonstrated a return to its united resistance against Fianna
Fail in the debate over the Bill, but its members lacked a strong voice in the Second Stage
and were completely absent from Committee. Labour attempted to convince the Dail that
Fianna Fail was accumulating too much power and that the comprehensive natures of the
34
Ibid.
Ibid.
36
The proposed amendment specifically had the following four provisions,
"(1) Any Irish citizen whose detention has been ordered or directed by a Minister under the powers
contained in Section 2 of the Principal Act shall have the right to appeal to the High Court against such
order, direction and detention.
(2) On the hearing of such appeal such person shall submit himself to cross-examination on oath by counsel
for a Minister or the Attorney-General.
(3) After hearing any evidence that may be submitted by or on behalf of such person and such crossexamination as aforesaid and such evidence as may be submitted by a Minister or the Attorney-General the
court shall determine whether or not there are reasonable grounds for the continued detention of such
person or may order his release.
(4) Such release as aforesaid shall not be ordered unless the court is satisfied that the person appealing was
not a member of or associated with an unlawful association or was not engaged in unlawful activities or
that he has ceased to be a member of such organisation and that he undertakes to refrain from all unlawful
activities and enters into a recognisance with satisfactory sureties to keep the peace." Ibid.
35
OASB and EPB were proof of this. In order to express this opinion, Labour concentrated
on the issue of internment.
William Norton summarized Labour's position in his opening remarks, by
touching on the party's interest in individual rights and liberties.
No set of conditions in the country to-day justifies the Government in seeking, either
in this Bill or any other Bill, to utilize a recent set of circumstances, some within their
control, others perhaps out of their control, to take the step of abrogating the
fundamental right of the citizen; his right, before he can be deprived of his liberty, to
be charged and tried by his own countrymen.37
Jeremiah Hurley returned to the issue of de Valera's problematic past as a means to
contrast the nation's revered struggle for independence and the curbing of liberties
proscribed by the Bill. He argued that "the fight in this country for generations was a
fight for individual liberty as well as for national liberty," and that the passage of the Bill
meant "the curtailment of the liberty of the subject and of his right to be charged and tried
for an offence alleged against them."38 In the opinion of Hurley and Labour, the
legalization of the right to intern any Irish citizen was a fundamental betrayal of the
values and principles that had built Ireland.
Labour additionally utilized broader historical comparisons to contemporary
Europe to demonstrate their resistance to internment, as it argued that the loss of
fundamental individual rights as a consequence of the Bill's legalization would liken
Ireland to dictatorships such as Joseph Stalin's USSR and Adolph Hitler's Nazi
Germany. William Norton specifically argued during the Second Stage that
37
38
Ibid.
Ibid.
106
This Bill is not a Bill in the ordinary sense to establish law because it is a Bill
founded on suspicion, and the speeches we have heardfromthe Government side
clearly demonstrate that. It is based on suspicion, and not on any basic principle of
law.. .1 suggest that there is a deficiency in the Bill, because, in order to carry out that
idea of suspicion to its logical conclusion, there should be some form of Gestapo or
Ogpu set up in the country. I understand that that is usual in dictatorship countries
where this form of law, or so-called law, is in operation. We have the power given to
dictators to intern, to imprison and to put into concentration camps people of whom
they are suspicious, and that is the basic principle of this Bill, that not alone can
aliens be interned, as was provided in the original measure, but that citizens, by the
deletion of certain words may also be interned. That obtains in countries in which
dictatorships have been set up.39
Labour's general concerns about internment were followed with a more narrowed focus
on the issue of the government's potential misuse of its power against the unemployed
and trade unions. The argument, which was voiced in its entirety by Hurley, consisted of
two components. The first focused on the consequences of the government's abuse of
internment; the second, on the likelihood of such abuses occurring based on perceived
injustices since the legalization of the OASA. Hurley argued that from the perspective of
the Cabinet, there was a lack of difference between members of a trade union or the
unemployed and individuals that constituted a legitimate danger to the State.40 He
believed that any person who agitated against the Fianna Fail Party, whether he was a
worker or a violent IRA member would ultimately be placed into an internment camp,
because it was in the self-interest of the Cabinet to eliminate any potential threat to its
authority. Hurley argued that
I have rather a suspicion that there may be more behind this Bill than the suggestion
of the Government that it is designed to deal with certain armed resistance in the
country. I have in mind the fact that there are other causes of unrest which may call
39
Ibid.
The former Minister for Justice P.J. Ruttledge's assurances during debate over the OASB that trade
unions would not be declared illegal and its members interned was rendered void as a result of the Bill's
scope. It would not be necessary under the amended EPA to demonstrate any connection to an illegal
organization to intern an individual.
40
for the operation of the Bill against other people, and against other forces which may
not have arms and against whom the suggestions that are made with regard to the
people the Bill is supposed to deal with cannot be made. It is no secret at the present
that the economic unrest in the country through unemployment, rising prices and the
general disregard of the utility of this House by the people will be a very serious
matter in the near future, and probably the Government, in its wisdom, sees that point
of view and are taking the necessary steps in this measure, because there is no doubt
the Bill can be used against such organisation, legal or illegal, in the countiy.
It could also be used against a trade union organisation. If the Minister thinks that an
agitation for an increase in wages or for better conditions of employment justifies
him in putting this Bill into operation, when it is passed, against the leaders of a trade
union, he can do so. There is nothing to distinguish between the type of people to be
interned under this Bill.41
The second component of Hurley's argument, which he believed demonstrated that
Labour's concerns were grounded in reality and not political acrimony, was to highlight a
meeting for the unemployed that had taken place in November. The meeting was deemed
illegal by the Cabinet and suppressed through the powers of the OASA. The Gardai
arrested seventeen individuals, four of whom were convicted before the Special Criminal
Court of intimidation and unlawful assembly.42 It was the opinion of the TD that these
incidences showed that "the first people who will suffer as the result of any turmoil in the
country are the poor."43 Accordingly, the willingness of the Cabinet to widely expand the
parameters of political subversives to the unemployed and farmers, demonstrated that the
power to intern any Irish-born person could likewise be used inappropriately against any
one.
The lack of any involvement in the Committee Stage, however, brought Labour's
participation in the debate to an abrupt end. In total, the party had exhausted all of its
resistance to the power of internment with two harsh comparisons and a caution that the
41
42
43
Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill, 1940- Second Stage," HO.
Gerald Hogan, "Supreme Court," 260.
Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill, 1940- Second Stage," HO.
108
government could misapply it. The inability of Labour to formulate any further
arguments, despite their united opposition to the Bill, demonstrated both their weakness
and Fianna Fail's strength. The single issue of internment was simply not complex or
large enough to generate the sort of extensive arguments and debate that Labour had
produced for the OASB and the EPB. It was increasingly apparent that it was fruitless to
object to Fianna Fail's legislative measures.
The Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill demonstrated the Fianna Fail Party
and de Valera's renewed determination to assert their political superiority in the wake of
the IRA's political and judicial victories during the Emergency in 1939. The right to
intern Irish-born citizens allowed for a new level of authority, which could be used
against the organization. The government's motivation was made clear by its extensive
arguments in the Dail. Its perception of the danger that the IRA posed made it undeniable
in the Cabinet's mind that, as de Valera claimed, "they are usurping authority here, and
they cannot be permitted to do so. The State must be in a position to defend itself against
them."44
The opposition in the Dail was unable and, at times, unwilling to challenge Fianna
Fail's further accumulation of power. Fine Gael's disunity prevented any sustained
opposition, and, despite its united position, the Labour Party also failed to prevent the
Bill's passage. Ultimately, the Fianna Fail Party drew closer to the complete suppression
of their opposition in the Dail by mid-1940.
44
Ibid.
109
8. THE OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE (AMENDMENT) BILL AND ACT,
1940
The Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill was debated in the Dail on 4
January, the day after the passage of the EPA's Amendment Bill, and represented the
final stand of Fine Gael and Labour's opposition to a single opinion Irish Government
controlled by the Fianna Fail Party. The purpose of the Bill was similar to the previous
Amendment Bill, as it sought to repair the legal damage caused by The State (Burke) v.
Lennon and regain the authority lost from the Christmas Raid.1
Fianna Fail had little trouble with the opposition in passing its legislation. The
massive party defections in Fine Gael placed great pressure on the holdout
ultraconservative faction, pressure which it ultimately could not be resist. The Labour
Party retained a united opposition, but was unable to find a new strategy to stop the Bill.
Ultimately, the impotence of both Fine Gael and Labour represented the almost
completed unification of the Houses of the Oireachtas under the ideology and opinion of
its majority party.
The specific purpose of the Bill was to repeal the OASA's unconstitutional sixth
section and replace it with a slightly altered version The most significant change in the
newly revised section was Article 55, which had been the focus of Justice Duffy's ruling
that the power of internment was illegal. The Bill altered a Minister's legal motivation for
1
Minister Aiken remarked that the Bill was introduced to "get over some legal difficulties that have been
raised in the courts," so that "such a state of affairs as existed on the Saturday before Christmas will never
occur again in this country." Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann-Volume 78- 04 January, 1940- Offences Against
the State (Amendment) Bill, 1940- Second Stage," HO.
110
issuing an internment order, from when he was "satisfied" that an individual was engaged
in activities that endangered the State to when he was simply "of the opinion" that it was
dangerous. The change was minor, but as P.J. Ruttledge explained "it has been construed
that, having the word 'satisfied' in the existing Act, the Minister was exercising some
judicial functions." Consequently, the slight alteration to the language was believed to
circumvent the court's ruling and give the power of internment back to the government.
An additional benefit provided by the Bill to Fianna Fail was that the OASA was
-a
permanent legislation. The ability to intern Irish-born citizens under the EPA was a
temporary power because the legislation required a time of war to exist. Accordingly, the
Act had to be renewed by the Fianna Fail Party every twelve months or it would cease to
be operational. The OASA, however, was fixed peacetime legislation that only needed a
one-time proclamation of the necessity for its emergency powers.4 Minister Boland
explained the difference to the Dail,
2
Ibid.
In particular, de Valera and his Cabinet wanted Article 56 of the OASA to be part of the permanent law of
Ireland. This article states that,
"(1) It shall be lawful for any member of the Garda Sfochana to do all or any of the following things in
respect of any person who is arrested and detained under this Part of this Act, that is to say:—
( a ) to demand of such person his name and address;
( b ) to search such person or cause him to be searched;
( c ) to photograph such person or cause him to be photographed;
( d ) to take, or cause to be taken the finger-prints of such person.
(2) Every person who shall obstruct or impede the exercise in respect of him by a member of the Garda
Sfochana of any of the powers conferred by the next preceding sub-section of this section or shall or refuse
to give his name and address when demanded of him by a member of the Garda Sfochana under the said
sub-section or shall give a name or an address which is false or misleading shall be guilty of a
contravention of the regulations made under this Part of this Act in relation to the preservation of discipline
and shall be dealt with accordingly." Irish Statue Book, "Offences Against the State Act, 1939," Office of
the Attorney General.
4
Following the passage of the Bill through all stages of consideration in the Houses of the Oireachtas on 4
February, additional measures were taken to ensure that the constitutionality of its contents was
unquestioned and that the Fianna Fail Government was secure in its power. The first was undertaken by
President Hyde, who upon receiving the Bill for his signature, utilized the power granted to him by Article
31.3 of the Constitution for the first time, and convened a Council of State. No record of the Council's
meeting exists, but ultimately the decision that came from the proceeding was to refer the Bill to the
Supreme Court to establish its constitutionality and legality. On 14 February, the Supreme Court officially
3
Ill
Although the [Emergency Powers] Act can run for 12 months, still if, by some
chance, the war in Europe were over, which everybody would be glad to see, I do not
think it would be desirable to proceed under that Emergency Act. The Government
does not think so, and would prefer to have the Offences Against the State Act or
some permanent measure under which to proceed.5
The Minister for Defense, Frank Aiken, provided very brief arguments for the Bill's
passage. His sole focus was on the international situation, particularly on how the IRA
damaged the government's ability to negotiate with the United Kingdom and preserve
Ireland's neutrality. He chose this tactic because Boland and the Taoiseach had exhausted
a discussion of the domestic situation the previous day.
The continued operation of the IRA in both Ireland and the United Kingdom
directly threatened Fianna Fail's core ideology that legitimized it as a political entity.
Aiken championed Fianna Fail's diplomatic republicanism as the only realistic and
sensible solution for an end to partition and argued that any alternate ideology that
damaged it could not be tolerated. The power of internment was therefore justified as
necessary because it gave the government the ability to effectively suppress the IRA.
Specifically, Aiken argued in favor of internment, noting that
upheld the constitutionality of the Bill. The subsequent Act was not challenged because of the safeguard
granted to it by the Court, and on 31 May 1941 the Second Amendment of the Constitution was legalized
which declared that any law deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court was permanently established as
such, and could not be challenged any further. Accordingly, the power of internment, whether stated in the
OASA or the EPA, was solidified as a legal power of the government as long as they required it to suppress
the IRA. The possibility for a repeat of either the challenge that Burke had presented, or a tour de force
legal ruling, was now impossible and the government's authority unquestionable.
5
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann-Volume 78- 03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill, 1940Second Stage," HO.
112
Any body of men that is going to make progress here for the complete recovery of
our national territory or for the advancement of this country politically, economically
or in any other way, must do it on the basis of fair play, justice and truth. We have
certain portions of our territory to recover, and over that question we have certain
difficulties with our neighbour. We have told our neighbour that she was responsible
for it, but the Government has also told the people of this country, and those who are
anxious to see our territory re-united, that we do not believe in force as a solution of
it.6
Aiken further justified internment by elucidating the dangers that the IRA posed to
Ireland's neutrality and reiterating the policy's importance to the nation's survival. He
began by declaring the meaning of neutrality to Ireland, stating that "the people of this
country should thank God that in this crisis in the world's history... we can keep the
biggest portion of the nation out of this disastrous war."7 He acknowledged that the
position was predicated on the continued goodwill of both the United Kingdom and
Germany and this meant that Ireland could not demonstrate favoritism to either side. The
IRA's anti-British actions, along with its connections to Nazi Germany, could provoke a
British response and therefore placed the nation in danger. Aiken concluded his party's
justification for the Bill by noting that
If, unfortunately, the powers of internment and the powers ofjailing do not put an
end to illegal activities and revolutionary activities worse consequences may befall
the country. I hope that parents throughout the country and those who have influence
with young people will keep them out of such organisations, that they will point out
to them that we are a small nation, and that in these days small nations should have
discipline, that small nations are falling like nine-pins over the world, and that if this
small nation is to survive it must have discipline, and the Government elected by the
people must have at least the support of all good citizens in seeing that no
revolutionary action will take place here.8
6
Dail Debates, "04 January, 1940- Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
7
113
Aiken's arguments were followed by a brief debate in the Dail. The weakened
state of the oppositional parties precluded extended discussion. Moreover, the
government's determination to pass the Bill resulted in the Cabinet completely rejecting
any proposed amendments or even other viewpoints. The result was that all stages of
consideration for the Bill were completed in a total of seven and a half hours, the shortest
time period for any similar legislation that had previously been passed.9 Its swift passage
and the inability of either opposition party to provide noteworthy resistance, ultimately
demonstrated the significant progress made by the majority party since February 1939 in
securing its political supremacy.
The willingness of most Fine Gael TDs to vote with Fianna Fail on more
comprehensive and powerful legislation, or on nearly the exact same issue the previous
day, kept them from providing objections in the debate over the Bill. Even the small
number of ultraconservative holdouts gave in and either supported the legislation or
simply abstained from the Dail completely. The end of the Blueshirt legacy demonstrated
that Fine Gael was teetering on total collapse.
The inability of ultraconservative members within Fine Gael to speak out was
exemplified by James Dillon, who had previously been supportive of the EPB, but was
strongly against other Fianna Fail legislation and even claimed during debate over the
EPA Amendment Bill that de Valera was responsible for "the greatest treachery to
Ireland of which any man was ever guilty" as Taoiseach.10 Dillon described his reaction
to the current Bill, along with the rest of the Dail, thusly, "in this House and in this
9
The Second Stage began at 3:00 pm on 4 January and ended at 10:30 pm.
Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
10
114
Oireachtas...[we] present an unbroken front."11 His observation was evidenced by further
ultraconservative Fine Gael members who supported the Bill. John O'Sullivan, a major
opponent of Fianna Fail, noted that "I feel that real liberty can only be preserved if
certain organisations are dealt with... I am compelled to give my support to this Bill."12
And James Hughes argued that "if any subversive element in the community
challenges.. .and attempts to usurp the power of Government, it is the solemn duty and
•
13
responsibility of the Government to destroy such an organization."
The only source of resistance came from a small number of moderate TDs, who
had technical concerns about the application of internment. Their objections and
questions were coached in diplomatic language that did not directly challenge the
Cabinet. Thomas O'Higgins demonstrated this position clearly, arguing that
We are giving these powers quitefreely,as I say, but we would venture to give
advice to the Government, and to give advice as people who introduced and
administered internment Bills such as these, and as people who are always quite
agreeable to learn by experience. We merely make one request, and that is: that a
prisoner, when locked up, should have arightto appeal to the court for his release,
and that the onus of proof should be there to show that he was engaged in illegal
activities or a member of an illegal organisation.14
Richard Mulcahy questioned why Fianna Fail had not, in conjunction with their
application of internment, made "it known to the British Government that they are
watching the situation here and that they are going to prevent damage being done?"15
Patrick McGilligan, who had previously voiced his opposition, was the last Fine Gael
speaker that provided any sort of resistance to Fianna Fail. He argued about the
u
Dail Debates, "04 January, 1940- Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
12
115
conflicting domestic and international components of the EPA and OAS A Amendment
Bills, that
I think it is always the right of this House, and certainly at times it is its duty, when
Deputiesfindthe courts have given a decision which is not in accord with the
legislative will of the people, that they should amend that and try to establish what
they think is in accordance with the views of the people whom they represent.... We
did put on the Statute Book in June, 1939, the Offences Against the State Act. We are
now repealing a certain part of that and endeavouring to re-establish it with a few
changes. But the main bulk of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, is still law in
this country. What is the situation with regard to everybody in the country arising out
of yesterday's legislation? Very little distinction for the future is to be made between
the national and the non-national.16
The Labour Party uniformly voted against the Bill at the end of the Report Stage,
but its objections to the legislation were confined entirely to just a handful of speeches
from William Norton during the Second Stage. There was little they could do. The fact
that internment had been debated only one day prior, eliminated any new arguments that
Norton might have made against the legislation. The isolation of Labour's opinion in the
Dail disenfranchised its political value and rendered further resistance fruitless.
Therefore, its united but ultimately very quiet objections to the Bill demonstrated the
heavy strain placed on Labour by the majority party's accumulation of power. This
portended its complete collapse with the introduction of the next similar Bill in mid-1940.
William Norton's brief remarks demonstrated his party's usual concern with
individual rights and utilized similar language as his opposition of the previous
Amendment Bill. Specifically, he argued that with the legalization of the Bill, "we
are.. .trampling underfoot the most vital principles in any organised community, the right
of a person to be regarded as innocent until such time as he is proved guilty."17 Norton
16
17
Ibid.
Ibid.
116
then rapidly concluded his party's objection by arguing that the Bill's passage would turn
Ireland into the sort of fearful and oppressive totalitarian state seen elsewhere in Europe.
There is no difference in my view in a supposedly democratic State, and the
detestable regimentation of totalitarian States, when both of them possess the right to
arrest citizens, to throw them into jails or concentration camps, and to keep them
there, feeling all the time that they will never be called upon to prefer a charge
against those who have been arrested, or to bring them for trial before those who are
capable of administering justice in an impartial and unbiased fashion. Because I
believe these things, and because I am opposed to that kind of tyranny, I propose to
vote against the Second Reading of this Bill.18
The swift passage of the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill
demonstrated Fianna Fail's renewed determination to accumulate power and suppress the
opposition. Proof of this was the overall lack of resistance provided by Fine Gael and
Labour. Most Fine Gael members voted for the legislation and even its ultraconservative
wing succumbed to Fianna Fail's pressure. Labour remained united in its rejection of the
legislation, but it too could do little to stop it. Ultimately, Fianna Fail's near-complete
suppression of its political opposition and restored powers to act against the IRA, placed
it in a position to finally fulfill de Valera's ambition for the full assertion of its political
authority and supremacy in Ireland.
18
Ibid.
117
9. THE EMERGENCY POWERS (AMENDMENT) (NO. 2) BILL AND ACT
Taoiseach Eamon de Valera achieved his government's desire to attain political
supremacy by expertly leveraging the perceived dangers the IRA posed to national
security in 1940. The overall increase in legislative power, including the implementation
of the power to intern native-born Irish, unraveled the IRA. Accordingly, its challenges to
the Fianna Fail led government's authority were reduced to failed hunger strikes and
sporadic murder. The Emergency Powers (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill, which represented
the Fianna Fail Party's completed accumulation of power, was introduced on 5 June
under a fiery promise to eliminate the organization altogether; it encountered absolutely
no opposition in the Dail. This success represented the fulfillment of de Valera's year and
a half long struggle to establish his party as the unquestioned voice of the Irish
Government and people.
The IRA's use of hunger strikes in 1940 as a form of resistance to the Fianna Fail
led government gave de Valera a second chance to take the organization head on. The
success of previous IRA hunger strikers like Patrick McGrath and the increasing number
of jailed organization members led to a new cycle of hunger strikes in February. Tony
D'Arcy and Jack McNeela were the most important participants in the renewed strikes
because of their declared intention to continue until death unless all interned IRA men
were recognized as prisoners of war and not members of an illegal organization.1
1
The four other men were John Plunkett, Thomas MacCurtain, Thomas Grogan, and Michael Traynor.
The Minister for Justice, Gerald Boland, had established his party's revised
position on the issue of hunger strikes following the Christmas Raid, which was that "the
intention certainly is to hold them, hunger strike or no hunger strike because things have
gone too far altogether."2 The damage de Valera suffered to his authority as a result of
the rapid about-face on the hunger strikers in November, along with the successive
failures that followed it, had demonstrated to him the necessity in maintaining a difficult
but hard line against the IRA. When confronted with the issue for a second time in
February 1940, de Valera refused the hunger strikers' demands, even when it meant the
possibility of republicans dying in Irish prisons.
In a letter to the wife of James Dillon TD, the Taoiseach explained his position,
arguing that "the government did not want the hunger strikers to die...[but] they had
made up their mind, however, that they could not yield to the demands which the
prisoners sought to enforce by means of the hunger strike."3 He further dismissed the
men's status as soldiers in a separate letter to the widow of Tom Clarke, where he stated
that the demand from members of the organization that they "should 'serve their sentence
in military custody', and thus be treated as they were members of a military force
engaged in legitimate warfare," was impossible for the government to allow.4
Tony D'Arcy died on 16 April, his 52nd day of fasting, and became the first Irish
hunger striker to die since 1923. The violence and political outrage that had been feared
as a response to McGrath's possible demise in 1939 was wholly absent following
D'Arcy's death. The Labour Party, who had previously been the champion of the hunger
strike cause in the Dail, was so enfeebled that it remained completely silent on the issue
2
Seanad Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill, 1940- Second Stage," HO.
Joseph Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 222.
4
Ibid, 223.
3
119
during the entire duration of the strike. Moreover, the IRA's difficulty in organizing any
sort of operation negated the possibility for a rally, march, or immediate violent
retribution. Instead, Boland issued a Ministerial Statement that struck a defensive tone,
and argued that "it can hardly be questioned that every reasonable thing was done and
every consideration given to ensure that the men knew what the conditions in Mountjoy
were," accordingly, "if they had in fact gone on strike without knowing the facts then
they would have behaved with great folly."5
The five remaining hunger strikers were undeterred by the government's
determined stance on the issue and recklessly continued their protests; Jack McNeela died
four days later. De Valera's second refusal to intervene and save a republican's life sent a
clear message to the remaining strikers, who abandoned their protest immediately.
Ultimately, the Taoiseach's willingness to allow the hunger strikers to die and to "resist
the demands made upon [him]," as reported by The New York Times, was a highly public
display of his determination against the IRA.6 It clearly established his absolute refusal in
the spring of 1940 to compromise on the complete suppression of the organization.
De Valera's unyielding stance led to more arrests and the internment of an already
weakened IRA leadership, including the capture of thirteen high-ranking members in
Dublin. The removal of experienced leaders left the organization with a young
membership that had little training and patience. It was therefore significantly more likely
to resort to sporadic and sometimes random violence as a means to demonstrate both its
value and further its agenda, the creation of a republic in Ireland. Fine Gael TD John
O'Sullivan and the Minister for Defense, Frank Aiken, explained this situation in the
5
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 79- 18 April, 1940- Committee on Finance- Prisoners on Hunger
Strike- Ministerial Statement," HO,.
6
"Irish Strike Off," The New York Times, April 20, 1940, 5.
120
Dail, noting, "you have a few people with a definite intent and a certain amount of
technical qualifications. Then you have a mob whose minds are affected by a lot of the
legacy of thought" and that "I hope that the people and the newspapers who have been
trying to get these young men to believe that they have a moral justification for their
n
activities on that basis will cease that sort of disastrous propaganda."
The IRA's new tactics led to a sharp rise in incidences of violence throughout
1940. In the summer of that year, there were twenty-six separate conflicts involving the
IRA and the Gardai, in what Irish historian, J. Bowyer Bell, called a period of
"provocation, retaliation, and vengeance."8 The most important of these incidents
occurred on 7 May. On that date, a group of Gardai detectives transporting mailbags to
Sir John Maffey, the British High Commissioner to Ireland, were ambushed in downtown
Dublin by six IRA men who opened fire with submachine guns, killing two of the
detectives.9 The location and violence of the attack was reported to have caused "a panic
as adults dragged school bound children to safety."10
The killings provoked a nationwide radio address the following day, in which de
Valera warned of the IRA's danger and positioned the government to take any power it
wanted for use against the organization. The carefully engineered carte blanche
demonstrated not just a desire to suppress the IRA, but also to finally establish a singleopinion government, as neither Fine Gael nor Labour were mentioned or alluded to
throughout the entire speech. Instead, de Valera emphasized the need to protect neutrality
7
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann-Volume 78- 04 Janurary, 1940- Offences Against the State (Amendment)
Bill, 1940- Second Stage," HO.
8
J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1974 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1970), 183.
9
"IRA Gunmen Foiled in Mail-Theft Raid," The New York Times, May 8, t940,13.
10
Ibid.
121
and the validity of diplomatic republicanism as the only possible means to procure a
solution on partition.
This moment, when small nations throughout Europe are devoting all their effort to
strengthening national unity in order the better to defend their independence, is the
moment that a group in this country has chosen to attempt to destroy our organized
life.
In the past few years, as you know, every obstacle has been removed which could in
any way be used to justify a recourse to violence... The use of violence is therefore
not only unjustifiable; it is a wonton attack upon the whole community, engaged in
with a cynical disregard of the vital need to keep our people strong and united in the
face of universal danger.11
De Valera argued that his government had shown too much leniency over the years. He
admitted that this policy was a failure and he now called for harsher and more powerful
force than had hitherto been utilized to completely suppress the organization. He assured
his listeners he would not again hesitate to act against the IRA.
The Government, for many years, has shown an extraordinary patience towards these
people—I am afraid that I must say, now, an excessive patience. Putting our hope in
patience, w e punished mildly and with reluctance, and we forgave easily.. .But as
regards the men who are now in hiding and planning new crimes, the policy of
patience has failed and is over.
Danger threatens now from within as well as from without. Although only a small
number is involved, a deadly conspiracy exists which does not hesitate to call the
people's representatives 'the enemy' and to declare war on the Government which
the community has freely elected. 12
The Taoiseach concluded his speech with a promise that his government would now
pursue whatever powers were necessary to completely suppress the organization. The
forceful stance was focused wholly on the will of Fianna Fail, and ignored Fine Gael and
11
Maurice Moynihan ed., Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera, 1917-73 (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1980), 433-4.
12
Ibid.
122
Labour entirely, which demonstrated that de Valera saw the IRA's increasing violence as
a means to impose unilateral policy-control and opinion-making on the Dail.
I have said that our policy of patience is over. I warn those now planning new crimes
against the nation that they will not be allowed to continue their policy of sabotage.
They have set the law at defiance. The law will be enforced against them. If the
present law is not sufficient, it will be strengthened; and in the last resort, if no other
law will suffice, then the Government will invoke the ultimate law—the safety of the
people.13
On 23 May, the safe house of German spy, Hermann Goertz, was discovered in
the Dublin suburb of Templeogue. Gardai officers found an opened parachute, documents
that contained information about Ireland's harbors, bridges, and other potential military
targets, and a codebook that related to wireless communication.14 Goertz's presence in
Ireland, along with the nature of the captured items in his safe house, was an alarming
development. De Valera believed that it established a connection between the IRA and
Nazi Germany.15 A proven Nazi-IRA link would damage Fianna Fail's reputation and
endanger the Anglo-Irish relationship, which was already troubled by the elevation of
Winston Churchill to British Prime Minister just thirteen days earlier. Churchill held a
significantly harder line against de Valera and Ireland than his predecessor, Neville
Chamberlain. He was hardly going to overlook a Nazi safe house near Dublin.
De Valera took advantage of the Goertz discovery to move against the opposition
parties. The creation of a National Defense Council on 28 May sought to remove Fine
Gael and Labour opinion from the open Dail to a closed committee. De Valera
13
Ibid.
Hugh Smith, "Parachute Found in Dublin Spy Raid," The New York Times, May 25, 1940,4.
15
Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History (Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1993), 161.
14
123
announced that the purpose of the council was to present a unified front to Ireland's
dangers.
In view of the dangers that confront us, I am sure all our people will be united as one
man behind the Government, ready to meet aggression from whatsoever quarter it
may come.
I have asked the leaders of the Opposition Parties to join in a conference o f three
members of the Government, three of the principal Opposition, and two of the
Labour Party, to meet each week and at such other times as may be necessary, to
consult and advise on matters of national defense. They have agreed.
Thus Dail Eireann gives a lead which I hope all our people will follow. We must all
be brothers in one holy cause, and no voice of dissension should be heard amongst
us. The liberties of which we in this Parliament are the trustees have been dearly
bought. Let there not be found in this land anywhere one treacherous hand to give
them away. We are a small people, but if we are true to ourselves, and courageously
defend our rights, with God's help we shall survive the present dangers as we and our
fathers survived no less grievous ones in the past.16
De Valera's stated stance against the formation of a national or coalition government
negated the possibility of any actual egalitarianism in the Council. Indeed, the
overwhelmingly authoritative position of Fianna Fail made consultation with Fine Gael
and Labour completely unnecessary and counter-productive to the complete suppression
of the IRA. Consequently, the Council's true purpose was to mollify the last vestiges of
political opposition in the Dail through an advisory-like access to the policy decisions of
the Taoiseach.
W.T. Cosgrave, the leader of Fine Gael, acknowledged his party's subordinate
position, as he stated that "we are willing to accept our full share of the responsibility for
policies on which there has been consultation .. ..It is obviously the duty of a Government
with a majority support in Parliament to decide the way in which that united national
16
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 80- 28 May, 1940- Committee on Finance- National SecurityMinisterial Statement," HO.
124
action can best be brought about."17 William Norton, the leader of the Labour Party,
accepted participation in the Council with more steadfast language, as he stated that
within Labour there was "a determination to serve to the uttermost limits of our
individual capacity the Motherland...something for which no sacrifice is too great."18
The National Defense Council's unification of Labour and Fine Gael under the
Taoiseach provided the political conditions necessary for the final suppression of
opposition in the Dail. On 5 June the Minister for Justice, Gerald Boland, introduced the
Emergency Powers (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill with just a single sentence of justification.
He stated to the opposition that "the Government would not have brought in any such Bill
if they did not think it was absolutely essential in a time like the present."19
The Bill eliminated non-military persons' exemption from trial before a military
court or tribunal under Section 2 of the EPA. Instead, it allowed that
The Government may, by an Order under section 2 of the Principal Act, make
provision for the trial, in a summary manner, by commissioned officers of the
Defense Forces, of any person alleged to have committed any offence specified in
such order, and, in case of the conviction of such person of such offence, for the
imposition and the carrying out of the sentence of death, and no appeal shall lie in
respect of such conviction or sentence.21
17
Ibid.
Ibid.
19
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann - Volume 80 - 1 9 June, 1940-Emergency Powers (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill,
1940- Second Stage," HO.
20
Specifically it stated that, "Sub-section (5) of section 2 of the Principal Act is hereby amended by the
deletion there from of the words 'or the making of provision for the trial by courts-martial of persons not
being persons subject to military law' now contained therein." Irish Statue Book, "Emergency Powers
(Amendment) (No.2) Act, 1940," Office of the Attorney General.
21
Ibid.
18
The Bill represented an authoritarian measure whose purpose was to allow the
government to try IRA members, who were recognized as civilians, before a military
court. The military court provided two major advantages for the government over the
Special Criminal Court, which were that its decisions could not be appealed and the only
punishment issued was the death penalty. The willingness of de Valera to try IRA
members before it, and ultimately be responsible for the execution of republicans,
demonstrated in the clearest possible terms how much the government's determination
had intensified since November.
The Second and Report Stages, much like the Defense Council, met with
absolutely no resistance or objections. The fragmented Fine Gael was unable to muster
any resistance. The Labour Party was completed isolated and did not participate in either
the Second or Report Stage. The massive accumulation of power generated by Fianna
Fail, the legislation's narrow power-seeking nature, and de Valera's complete
determination to obtain its powers, made further objections and resistance to the Bill
entirely fruitless. De Valera now had the unobstructed ability to utilize his full legislative
powers for the suppression of the IRA and final achievement of his Fianna Fail Party's
supremacy in Ireland.
126
10. THE POLITICAL SUPREMACY OF THE FIANNA FAIL PARTY
The IRA's final suppression in Ireland was completed by the end of 1941. The
decimation of its leadership through constant raids and mass arrests placed tremendous
pressure on the organization, which created chaotic conditions in its ranks. The increased
decentralization of command, confused loyalties, and tension between the Belfast and
Dublin General Headquarters eliminated the IRA's operational abilities and allowed for
the unquestioned political supremacy of the Fianna Fail Party.
Fianna Fail refused to let up on the IRA. This was exemplified by two separate
actions during the summer of 1940. The first occurred on 3 June, the day before the
introduction of the Emergency Powers (Amendment) (No.2) Bill, when the Minister for
Justice, Gerald Boland, issued 400 internment orders for IRA members, the largest single
amount ever simultaneous drafted.1 This massive amount of orders, much like the seventy
issued in September 1939 after the passage of the EPA, allowed for the Gardai to act with
impunity against the IRA. The important difference between the two situations was that
the murder of Gardai detectives in May had already set the police campaign against the
organization at a heightened intensity. Raids were conducted in Dublin, Counties Cork,
Monathan, Tipperary, Dundalk, and other suspected sites of IRA activity, which led to
100 arrests and the capture of several members in the organization's leadership. All of
the men were interned in Curragh under the newly reinstated sixth section of the OASA.3
1
2
3
Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History (Colorado: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1993), 245.
"100 I.R.A. Men Arrested," The New York Times, June 4, 1940, 3.
Coogan, The IRA : A History, 245.
The second action taken against the IRA was the execution of both Patrick
McGrath and Tom Harte on 6 September for the murder of two Gardai detectives.4 The
men had killed the police officers during a raid on 16 August and were tried for their
crimes before a military court under the newly amended EPA.5 Subsequent appeals by
each man to the High Court, which challenged the government's legal right to transfer
their cases to a military court, were summarily rejected.6
The deaths of McGrath and Harte demonstrated the Taoiseach's determination to
suppress the IRA. The refusal to commute either man's sentence showed de Valera's
willingness to act unencumbered by public opinion or his own political history.
Ultimately, the executions sent a very clear message that the Fianna Fail Party would not
hesitate to impose its will.
The IRA was further weakened by the death of its Chief of Staff, Sean Russell, on
"t
15 August aboard a U-Boat, 150 miles off the Irish coast. The location of his death and
his subsequent burial at sea, meant that the IRA could not be certain of his fate, and for
the latter half of 1940 he was deemed missing and presumed dead. The first confirmation
of Russell's death did not arrive at the IRA General Headquarters in Dublin until
December 1940, but it was accompanied by the wild rumor that British agents in
Gibraltar had killed him.8 The months of uncertainty over the death of its leader, a man
who had transformed the organization, left the IRA confused and disorganized both
physically and ideologically.
4
J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916-1974 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1970), 187.
5
The raid took place at 98a Ruthgar Road in Dublin, which was a known IRA safe house.
6
Harte and McGrath's trial was moved to the military court as a result of Ministers issuing the Emergency
Powers (No. 45) Order.
7
Bell, The Secret Army, 191.
8
Ibid.
Russell's tenure as Chief of Staff from 1938-1940 was followed in the same
measure of time by no less than seven men, the first and most important of which was
Stephen Hayes, whose forced departure from the position in the summer of 1941
demonstrated an internal conflict within the IRA.9 Hayes inherited an organization that
was unable to pose a significant challenge to the Fianna Fail Party because it was
disorganized, undisciplined, and had few men of experience. Hayes later remarked that
his ascension to Chief of Staff was simply "because there was no one else" to take the
position.10 Hermann Goertz, a German spy who had contacts within the organization,
described the poor state of the IRA in the middle of the 1940 thusly,
Their internal means of communication were as primitive as boys playing police and
brigands. They got no further than the open message in the sock of a girl.. .There was
no code—they did not want to learn the most simple code, they preferred to sacrifice
their men and women... .they made no attempt to learn message discipline; their
military training was nil.. .In spite of the fine qualities of individual I.R.A. men, as a
body I considered them worthless.11
The organization was unable to launch any coordinated attacks or significant operations.
That stagnancy created a growing tension between the Dublin and Belfast General
Headquarters. Northern Ireland leaders' unwillingness or inability to understand the
reality of the IRA's situation in Ireland led them to suspect that the constant Gardai raids
and arrests were the result of informers in the organization.
9
Men who served as IRA Chief of Staff in 1940-1942 after Russell included, Stephen Hayes, Pearse Kelly,
Sean Harrington, Sean McCool, Eoin McNamee, Hugh McAteer, and Charlie Kerins.
10
Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 57.
11
Coogan, The IRA: A History, 160.
129
The Adjutant-General of the Northern Ireland IRA, Sean McCaughey, was the
first to suspect a traitor within the organization and accused Hayes of supplying the
government with information.12 The accusation against Hayes was not accompanied with
any known evidence that supported it, and therefore has to be viewed as a witch-hunt. No
doubt, the government's success in suppressing the IRA helped ferment internal dissent.13
Nonetheless, McCaughey and Charles McGlade traveled to Dublin in May 1941 to
investigate the situation further, only to discover that the General Headquarters of the
IRA was barely functioning. It possessed no Army Council or formal Government of the
Irish Republic and had a staff that was largely made up of young errant boys.14
Furthermore,
more than anything else, McCaughey and McGlade had been disgusted by Hayes
himself. He simply bore no resemblance to their image of an IRA Chief of
Staff.. .They had expected a dynamic, dedicated successor to Russell—another hard
man without personal flaw or second thoughts. Instead, they found a soft, uncertain
temporizer whose character appeared weak.
Under his leadership the IRA had descended from failure to failure. Most of the men
of reputation were in prison. McGrath, D'Arcy, and McNeela were dead.. .The
English campaign had floundered in toy explosions. The German contact had
produced nothing.15
The state of disorganization confirmed to McCaughey and McGlade their belief that
Hayes was willfully destroying the IRA. They refused to consider the possibility that the
Gardai and the government were responsible. The following month, the Northern Ireland
IRA focused its energies entirely on Dublin. This caused de Valera to deliver another
nation-wide radio address on 2 June, proclaiming of internal dissent in Ireland that "we
12
McCaughey's conservatism and adherence to the militant republican ideology of the IRA was later
demonstrated with his death from a hunger strike in 1946.
13
Coogan, The IRA: A History, 150.
14
English, Armed Struggle, 55.
15
Bell, The Secret Army, 200.
must not let that obstacle to national unity defeat us here.. .then our neutrality would be
violated and the country made a cockpit of war. Our homes would be leveled and our
people slaughtered."16
On 30 June Northern Ireland IRA members staged a stunning coup d'etat on the
Dublin General Headquarters, kidnapping Stephen Hayes. This was the most severe
incident of organizational in-fighting during the entire Emergency. Hayes' forced
removal as Chief of Staff demonstrated the completely disorganized and chaotic nature of
the IRA. As a result of its decentralization, the news of Hayes' arrest was only slowly
disseminated through the IRA's ranks. More confusion followed because Hayes'
innocence or guilt was completely unknown to anyone. As one republican noted of the
situation, "for the IRA the Stephen Hayes case was a Catch-22 situation. If he was guilty
it did them harm in a public relations sense, if not it was even worse."17
The conclusion of the Stephen Hayes incident marked the final end of the IRA's
challenge to the Fianna Fail Party's legitimacy and authority. On 8 September, after over
two months of torture and coerced confessions, Hayes threw himself out the window of
the safe house where he was being held, and dragged his body into the nearest Gardai
station for protection from the very organization he had formally led.18 The surrender of
Hayes was both a literal and symbolic representation of the complete suppression of the
IRA.
The three major characteristics of the IRA beyond September 1941, which
demonstrated its critically weakened state were an instability of leadership, lack of
operational capacity, and the lessening of violent confrontations with the Gardai. The
16
"De Valera Warns of Peril to Ireland," The New York Times, June 2, 1940, 4.
English, Armed Struggle, 58.
18
Bell, The Secret Army, 207.
17
131
most important part of the IRA's constantly shifting leadership was the tumultuous Chief
of Staff position. The inability of one man to hold the position for any significant length
of time after Hayes reflected the continued governmental pressure and internal conflict
within the organization. Five successive Chiefs of Staff held the position, on average, for
six weeks and each of their tenures ended in arrest or death. The seventh and last Chief of
Staff during the Emergency, Charlie Kerins, was executed by the government on 1
December 1944. His death and the complete decimation of the IRA left the position
unfilled for the first time in the organization's history.
In addition to the leadership problems, the IRA faced inner turmoil as it moved its
primary base of operations from Dublin to Belfast. The Dublin General Headquarters had
always been the site of its command center. However, the infiltration and seizure of the
Headquarters by McCaughey and his allies shifted all IRA control to the North. The
complete removal of the organizational and leadership infrastructure from Ireland, clearly
demonstrated the government's success in its persecution of the organization and the
crippling effect Hayes' removal from Chief of Staff had on the IRA in Ireland.
Hayes' surrender to the Gardai ended the IRA's operational capacity in Ireland.
He provided the State with intelligence that allowed the Gardai to move swiftly against
the Northern Ireland conspirators. The arrest of McCaughty and others eliminated any
republican capable and willing to organize an operation in Ireland. Accordingly, the
IRA's only notable actions from 1942-43 in Ireland were a declining number of violent
confrontations with Gardai agents.19 These incidences sustained the persecution of the
19
The only high profile violent incident perpetrated by the IRA from 1942-1944 was the assassination of
Gardai Detective Denis O'Brien. His death "greatly increased public feeling against the IRA, particularly
as the murder was carried out in view of his wife," and resulted in Chief of Staff Kerins' execution in 1944,
thereby ending any real presence of the organization in Ireland. Coogan, The IRA: A History, 192.
IRA by the government through arrests and internment, which ultimately prompted an
inter-organization proclamation in 1943 to halt all operations in Ireland, thereby officially
ending even the illusion of an organized operational capacity and further reducing violent
confrontations with the Gardai.
The IRA's complete breakdown caused by internal strife and the Taoiseach's
actions represented the final achievement of the Fianna Fail Party's political supremacy.
The renewed determination demonstrated by de Valera and the continued application of
the government's fully accumulated powers against the IRA resulted in a pressure on the
organization that it could no longer resist. The chaotic self-destruction of the IRA in late
1941 ended any threat that the organization posed to the Fianna Fail Party. De Valera's
two and a half year campaign, which utilized new legislation and authoritarian powers
against the IRA to suppress the organization within Ireland, had reached its wholly
successful conclusion.
20
Bell, The Secret Army, 232.
133
CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined Ireland's political history from 1938-1941 through
detailing the manner in which the Irish Government under Fianna Fail perceived and
reacted to the IRA. It has argued that the violent and reckless behavior of the IRA
directly challenged the Fianna Fail Party's authority as the legitimate ruler of Ireland and
provoked Taoiseach Eamon de Valera to suppress the organization. Similarly, it has
explained the political history of the Dail and Fianna Fail's effective elimination of
opposition in the 10th Dail. The ambition shown by de Valera during this period has been
largely overlooked in current Irish historiography, and this work has attempted to fill that
gap in the existing literature.
The Fianna Fail Party's ultimate achievement of an unquestioned supremacy in
late 1941 was accomplished through processes specifically designed to most effectively
suppress its political opposition and the IRA. In the Houses of the Oireachtas, Fianna Fail
instituted five authoritarian legislative acts from 1939-1940, which proved instrumental
in eliminating challenges in the Dail from the Labour and Fine Gael Parties. Throughout
Ireland, de Valera and his party successfully met the challenge of the IRA by extending
powers to the Gardai to conduct an aggressive campaign against the organization's
leadership and its rank and file members through a tough policy of arrests and
internment.
The process employed by de Valera to achieve his political ambition, as argued in
this work, encompassed the introduction of the OASB and EPB, along with their
accompanying amendments and arguments intended to cajole the opposition parties to
vote with de Valera and his Cabinet. These measures secured for him a single-opinion
Irish Government. Accordingly, the Taoiseach statement in the Seanad that "there is only
one national policy at any time" and that "if we are going to have any peace, any progress
in any direction here, it is essential that the majority should make their will effective in
that particular matter" became a reality in 1941.1
The Fianna Fail controlled Cabinet matched de Valera step by step throughout
1938-1941. Crucial to his plans was the role of the Minister for Justice, a position
occupied by P.J. Ruttledge and Gerald Boland. Ruttledge continually demanded tough
action against the IRA, while simultaneously arguing in favor of a single-opinion
government. Addressing the IRA, Ruttledge noted that "it described itself as a
Government and it purported, under that proclamation, to hand over to the Irish
Republican Army, as they call it, those functions of Government. That is a position which
the Government is not going to tolerate." His successor, Gerald Boland, was likeminded. He correlated the Christmas Raid with the need for more authoritarian powers
and pushed for the passage of the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill. He said that
1
Seanad Debates, "Seanad Eireann- Volume 24- 04 January 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) BillSecond Stage," HO.
2
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann- Volume 74- 08 February, 1939- Offences Against the State Bill, 1939- First
Stage," HO.
135
"this is a very important Bill.. .what we are doing now is asking the House to give us
power to see that the like of [the raid] will not recur, that we will have power of
internment."3
The legislative foundation established by Fianna Fail in 1939 through the OASA,
which was passed over the strenuous objections of Fine Gael and Labour, and the EPA
whose unanimous consent was compelled by the beginning of World War Two, gave the
Cabinet wide-ranging authoritarian abilities that only required further amendments as
responses to IRA actions or judicial difficulties. Accordingly, debate in the Dail over the
Amendment Bills in 1940 was brief because the passage of earlier legislation either made
opposition members culpable in Fianna Fail's accumulation of power and therefore
unable to seriously challenge the legislation, or stripped arguments of their relevancy and
made them fruitless. The result of the correlating upward trajectory of Fianna Fail power
and the downward capacity for opposition in the Dail was that the Emergency Powers
(Amendment) (No.2) Act of July 1940, which completed the majority party's
accumulation of powers, was passed unanimously.
The histories of Labour and Fine Gael in the Dail from 1933-1938, as outlined in
the work, provide a roadmap to understanding how a democratically elected party can
amass authoritarian power. Neither Labour nor Fine Gael could mount an effective
resistance to Fianna Fail. The Labour Party, led by William Norton, was an ideologically
united but highly alienated group because of the falling electoral fortunes it had suffered
while working closely with the Fianna Fail Party during the mid-1930s. The Fine Gael
Party was ideologically troubled because of the merger between Cumann na nGaedheal,
3
Dail Debates, "Dail Eireann-Volume 78- 03 January, 1940- Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill,
1940- Second Stage," HO.
136
the NCP, and the ACA that had formed it in 1933. The immediate tension between Eoin
O'Duffy and W.T. Cosgrave, which had climaxed with the former man's departure from
the party in 1934, established a divide between ultraconservative and moderately
conservative members in the party that weakened it considerably and produced a range of
different responses to Fianna Fail's actions.
The Labour Party's small size, ideological unity, and contested history with
Fianna Fail made it significantly more difficult to suppress. Its often vitriolic responses to
the Cabinet's requests for more powers stood in stark contrast to the subtle compromises
sought by Cosgrave and other moderate Fine Gael leadership members. Indeed, Labour
members largely abandoned the Committee Stage of all proposed legislation to voice
their party-centric concerns with individual rights and liberties in the Second Stage before
unanimously voting against the passage of a bill.4 Labour's opposition was nonetheless
slowly suffocated from 1939-40 through the accumulation of powers gained by the
government from successful legislation.5 The period that Labour was most marginalized
and ultimately disenfranchised as a legitimate opposition entity in the Dail was early
1940, during debate over the first Amendment Bills to the OASA and EPA. The party's
involvement in the Committee Stage for these amendment bills ceased entirely, and
arguments made during the Second Stage were confined to repetitive points that had
already been ignored in previous debates. The eventual reduction of Labour's opposition
during the Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill to a couple of speeches, demonstrated
how ineffective the party had become.
4
All Labour TDs voted against the OASB and the first amendment bills to Fianna Fail's legislative
foundation of power in early 1940.
5
The use of extensive and forceful argumentation regarding the necessity for a single-opinion government
in Ireland was only effective with the Fine Gael Party, as a consequence of Labour's bitterness and
ideological unity.
The Fine Gael Party's ideological fragmentation made Ireland's largest party of
opposition seem far smaller and meeker than its representative numbers indicated, and
was the main cause for its failure to stop Fianna Fail's legislation in the 10th Dail.
Cosgrave's acknowledgement in 1940 that "on more than one occasion the powers which
have been asked for have been generously given," demonstrated Fine Gael's reluctance to
resist de Valera and his Cabinet.6 Only the party's ultraconservative faction provided a
coherent voice against Fianna Fail's accumulation of powers, but it was too small to
affect any change to the majority party's ambition. Therefore, just as Labour ultimately
proved unable to resist Fianna Fail's legislation by mid-1940, and saw its members
reluctantly acquiesce to de Valera and his Cabinet on the Emergency Powers
(Amendment) (No.2) Bill, so to was Fine Gael left impotent.
As in the Houses of the Oirachtas, de Valera also sought to prevent opposition in
the public arena. His determination to suppress the IRA was realized by five authoritarian
legislative acts from 1939-40. The authority derived from the legislation eroded the
IRA's operational capacity to a level that sparked civil war within the organization,
thereby providing the conditions for its final suppression at the end of 1941. The
conclusion of the dangers posed by the IRA placed the Fianna Fail Party in a position of
unquestioned political supremacy, as all possible challenges to its legitimacy of rule and
Fianna Fail ideology had been suppressed.
6
Dail Debates, "03 January, 1940- Emergency Powers (Amendment) Bill- Second Stage," HO.
The initial success of the IRA from 1938-1939 was the product of hard liner Sean
Russell who seized the position of Chief of Staff at the April 1938 General Army
Convention.7 Russell transformed the directionless organization of the mid-1930s, into an
energetic and ambitious one that utilized violence to force a solution on the issue of
partition and the creation of an Irish republic. The bombing campaign against the United
Kingdom known as the Sabotage Plan was the main feature of the IRA's new direction,
but it was supplemented by rhetoric which produced sympathy for agents of the Irish
republic as well as the violence of the Christmas Raid. The scope and forcefulness of
these actions, which represented the ideology and character that had allowed Russell to
seize control of the IRA, far exceeded the organization's meager abilities in 1938. As a
result, the operations conducted under his tenure were stumbling failures, whose violence
and direct de-legitimization of the Fianna Fail Party, caused the organization's
suppression in just three years.
The IRA's hostility to the Fianna Fail Party and the Irish Government it
controlled was first demonstrated in the three proclamations issued by the organization
between late 1938 and early 1939. Russell's decision to publicly assume the authority of
the Government of the Republic of Ireland from republican members who had served in
the 2nd Dail, and intimate that it was the only true political body in Ireland, directly
challenged Taoiseach de Valera, his party, and the Irish Government as a whole. The
subsequent utilization of its proclaimed authority through an ultimatum to British Foreign
Secretary Lord Halifax demanding the immediate removal of all forces from Northern
7
Sean Russell's death in 1940 aboard a U-boat off the coast of Ireland did not create any significant
deviation in policy or operations for the IRA. The organization was committed to his particular brand of
hard line militant republicanism because it lacked any further strong leaders to redirect its orientation or
establish a completely different path towards the goal of an end to partition.
Ireland and a declaration of war against Great Britain, demonstrated the IRA's firm belief
•
8
that it fully controlled the reigns of governmental power in Ireland. The shortsightedness
of the organization's actions was quickly made apparent by the government's reaction, as
it provoked the introduction of the OASB and began the legislative accumulation of
power that ultimately suppressed the IRA.
The organization's escalating rhetoric and action at home and in the United
Kingdom threatened the government's legitimacy. De Valera perceived the IRA's
operations as undermining his authority and, in particular, its challenge to the British
Government as a threat to Irish neutrality after World War Two erupted. The possibility
that the Fianna Fail Party could be seen as colluding with an IRA that was connected to
Nazi Germany, or simply unable to ensure domestic security, ultimately threatened its
position of authority.
The government responded to the IRA's actions with the passage of the EPA,
along with three further amendments. These legislative acts gave the government and
Gardai more power to prosecute the IRA. The Gardai specifically stepped up its
operations against the IRA, raiding safe houses, seizing property, and assaulting the
organization's operational structure to create a level of authority that was simply
impossible for the IRA to resist. The end result of the extraordinary pressures placed on
the IRA by the Fianna Fail Party and the Gardai was an internal tension between the
Ireland and Northern Ireland General Headquarters that ultimately tore the organization
apart. The Dublin General Headquarters' inability to plan or execute even the most
rudimentary operation was ignorantly misinterpreted by Belfast IRA members as willful
8
The IRA's assumption of government's most sacred right, and its extension of presumed authority to
England, established the Fianna Fail Government's bifurcated perception of the organization, which would
dramatically increase in intensity through World War II.
140
treason to the militant republican mandate and led to the kidnapping and torture of Chief
of Staff Stephen Hayes in June 1941. The inter-organizational confusion that followed
eliminated the possibility that the IRA could provide anything more than sporadic
violence in the streets of Ireland from late 1941 onwards.
The Fianna Fail Party's triumphant suppression of the IRA secured the political
supremacy of the Fianna Fail Party and diplomatic republicanism in Ireland. Taoiseach
de Valera successfully utilized authoritarian legislation to eliminate all opposition in the
10th Dail and decimate the IRA's operational capacity in Ireland. By late 1941, de Valera
and his party stood as the unquestioned rulers of Ireland and were able to maintain the
nation's precarious neutrality internationally and impose their authority domestically. The
Taoiseach, at last, had succeeded in realizing his political aims.
141
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BIOGRAPHY OF THE AUTHOR
Grant Lombard was born in Bangor, Maine on May 15, 1985. He was raised in
Veazie, Maine and graduated from Orono High School in 2003. He graduated Summa
Cum Laude from the University of Maine in 2007 with a Bachelor of Arts in History and
High Honors from the Honors College. He is a member of Phi Alpha Theta, the
International Honors Society in History, and the Phi Beta Kappa Society. Grant is a
candidate for the Masters of Arts degree in History from the University of Maine in May
2011.