DISCUSSION DRAFT Ȃ New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification Ȃ September 3, 2010 Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
SEC. 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO
THE CONDITIONS IN SECTION 2, THE
UNDERSTANDING IN SECTION 3, AND THE
DECLARATIONS IN SECTION 4.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, done at Prague April 8, 2010, with Protocol, including Annex on
Inspection Activities to the Protocol, Annex on Notifications to the Protocol, and Annex on
Telemetric Information to the Protocol, all such documents being integral parts of and
collectively referred to in this UHVROXWLRQDVWKH³1HZ67$577UHDW\´7UHDW\'RFXPHQW±5),
subject to the conditions of section 2, the understanding of section 3, and the declarations of
section 4.
SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the New START Treaty is subject
to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
(1) REDUCTIONS.²
(A) ENTRY INTO FORCE.²The New START Treaty shall not enter into force until
the instruments of ratification have been exchanged in accordance with Article XIV of
the Treaty.
(B) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.²If the New START Treaty does not enter into
force, and if the President plans to implement reductions of United States strategic
nuclear forces below those currently planned and consistent with the Moscow Treaty,
the President shall²
(i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such reductions on the
national security of the United States; and
(ii) take no such reductions until he submits to the Senate his determination that
such reductions are in the national security interest of the United States.
(2) PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION AND REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.²Not
later than 90 days after the entry into force of the New START Treaty, the President shall
certify that United States National Technical Means, in conjunction with the verification
activities provided for in the Treaty, are sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of
compliance by the Russian Federation with the provisions of the Treaty. This certification
shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate indicating how United States National
Technical Means, including collection, processing, and analytic resources, will be utilized
to ensure effective monitoring. Such report may be supplemented by a classified annex.
1 DISCUSSION DRAFT Ȃ New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification Ȃ September 3, 2010 SEC. 3. UNDERSTANDING.
The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to
the following understanding, which shall be included in the instrument of ratification:
(1) STRATEGIC RANGE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS.²It is the understanding of the
United States that²
(A) The United States will not consider future, strategic range non-nuclear
weapon systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of this Treaty to be
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(B) Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article V of the Treaty, if one Party deploys a
new kind of strategic range arm for delivering non-nuclear weapons that it asserts
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Party challenges that assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt
to resolve the issue within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission.
(C) There is no requirement in the Treaty for the deploying Party to delay
deployment of the new system pending such resolution.
SEC. 4. DECLARATIONS.
The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the New START Treaty is subject to
the following declarations:
(1) MISSILE DEFENSE.²
(A) UNITED STATES POLICY.²Pursuant to the National Missile Defense Act of 1999
(P.L. 106-LWLVWKHSROLF\RIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV³WRGHSOR\DVVRRQDVLV
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of
defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack
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(B) GENERAL LACK OF LIMITATIONS ON DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILE DEFENSES.²The
New START Treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missile
defenses other than the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article V of the Treaty, which
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the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on
those defensHV´
(C) NEW START TREATY NOT AN IMPEDIMENT TO MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM
DEVELOPMENT.²The director of the Missile Defense Agency testified to the
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the development of the misVLOHGHIHQVHSURJUDPLQVHYHUDODUHDV´DQG³GRHVQRW
constrain our plans to execute the U.S. Missile Defense program.´
(D) UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION WILL NOT INHIBIT UNITED
STATES.²The unilateral statement issued by the Russian Federation on missile defense
does not impose a legal obligation on the United States and will have no practical
2 DISCUSSION DRAFT Ȃ New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification Ȃ September 3, 2010 impact.
(E) NEW START TREATY CONSISTENT WITH NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT.²
The New START Treaty will not impede any missile defense deployments that are
currently planned or might be required during the life of the Treaty, and it is therefore
fully consistent with United States policy as established by the National Missile
Defense Act of 1999.
(2) AMENDMENTS AND THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION.²
(A) Article XV, paragraph 1 of the Treaty provides that amendments to the Treaty
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WKLV7UHDW\´ZKLFKPHDQVWKDWDOODPHQGPHQWVWRWKH7UHDW\VKDOOEHVXEPLWWHGWRWKH
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
(B) Pursuant to Article XV, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, the Bilateral Consultative
Commission may reach agreement without resorting to the procedure in paragraph 1
only on changes to the Protocol, and only if such changes do not affect substantive
rights or obligations under the Treaty.
(C) The Bilateral Consultative Commission thus cannot bring into effect any change
that affects substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty without the advice and
consent of the Senate.
(3) UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS ENSURING THE SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCES.²The United States is committed to ensuring the
safety, reliability, and effectiveness of its nuclear forces. To this end, the Senate declares the
following:
(A) The United States is committed to proceeding with a robust stockpile
stewardship program, and to modernizing nuclear weapons production capabilities, for
the purposes of ensuring the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of the United States
nuclear arsenal at the New START Treaty levels and meeting requirements for hedging
against possible international developments or technical problems, in conformance
with United States policies and in order to underpin deterrence.
(B) The United States is committed to maintaining United States nuclear weapons
laboratories and protecting the core nuclear weapons competencies associated with the
laboratories.
(C) The United States is committed to providing the resources needed to achieve
these objectives at a minimum at the levels set forth in the 10-year plan provided to
Congress by the President pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111±84; 123 Stat. 2549), as
adjusted periodically to adapt to updated understandings of costs and requirements.
(4) PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE.²The Senate declares that the New START Treaty should
not and will not inhibit the United States from the development of technically and
financially effective options for conventional prompt global strike or the deployment of
such systems, when ready, in the numbers needed for United States national security.
3 DISCUSSION DRAFT Ȃ New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification Ȃ September 3, 2010 (5) RAIL-MOBILE ICBMS.² It is the sense of the Senate that any ICBM that was designed
to be launched from a rail-mobile launcher would be counted as an ICBM under this Treaty,
and any rail-mobile launcher for such an ICBM would be counted as an ICBM launcher
under this Treaty.
(6) COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION.²The Senate affirms that the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) Program has made an invaluable contribution to the safety and security of
weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and
elsewhere, and that the President should continue the CTR Program and CTR assistance to
the Russian Federation, including for the purpose of facilitating implementation of this
Treaty.
(7) ASYMMETRY IN REDUCTIONS.²It is the sense of the Senate that, in conducting the
reductions mandated by the New START Treaty, the President should regulate reductions in
the United States strategic nuclear forces so that the number of accountable strategic
offensive arms under the New START Treaty possessed by the Russian Federation in no
case exceeds the comparable number of accountable strategic offensive arms possessed by
the United States to such an extent that a strategic imbalance endangering the national
security interests of the United States results.
(8) COMPLIANCE.²
(A) IN GENERAL.²The New START Treaty will remain in the interests of the United
States only to the extent that the Russian Federation is in strict compliance with its
obligations under the Treaty.
(B) ANNUAL REPORT.²As full and faithful implementation is vital to realizing the
benefits of the New START Treaty, the Senate calls upon the President to submit to the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than
January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 2012, a report providing²
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the Treaty entered into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports,
during the previous calendar year;
(ii) a certification that the Russian Federation is in full compliance with the terms
of the Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian
Federation, the military significance of such noncompliance, and the implications of
such noncompliance for continued United States adherence to the Treaty;
(iii) an assessment of the operation of the transparency mechanisms of the New
START Treaty, including the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric
information; and
(iv) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the
national security interests of the United States.
(9) EXPANDING STRATEGIC ARSENALS IN COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION.²It is the sense of the Senate that if, during the time the New START Treaty
remains in force, the President determines that there has been such an expansion of the
strategic arsenal of any country not party to the New START Treaty that the supreme
4 DISCUSSION DRAFT Ȃ New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification Ȃ September 3, 2010 interests of the United States are jeopardized, the President should consult on an urgent
basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to the New START Treaty remains in
the national interest of the United States.
(10) TREATY INTERPRETATION.²The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the
constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition (1) of the
resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum of
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Senate on May 27, 1988, and condition (8) of the resolution of advice and consent to the
ratification of the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE ) of November 19, 1990 (commonly referred
to as the "CFE Flank Document´, approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997.
(11) TREATY MODIFICATION OR REINTERPRETATION.²The Senate declares that any
agreement or understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or reinterprets
obligations of the United States or the Russian Federation under the New START Treaty,
including the time frame for implementation of the Treaty, should be submitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
(12) SELF-EXECUTION.²The New START Treaty is self-executing. The Treaty does not
confer private rights enforceable in United States courts.
(13) CONSULTATIONS.²Given the continuing interest of the Senate in the New START
Treaty and in continuing strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels
consistent with national security requirements and alliance obligations of the United States,
the Senate expects the President to consult with the Senate prior to taking actions pursuant
to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article XIV of the Treaty.
(14) TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.²
(A) SECURITY AND REDUCTION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.²The Senate calls
upon the President to pursue, following consultation with allies, an agreement with the
Russian Federation that would address the disparity between the tactical nuclear
weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States and secure and
reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner.
(B) ENGAGEMENT WITH RUSSIAN FEDERATION.²Recognizing the difficulty the
United States has faced in ascertaining with confidence the number of tactical nuclear
weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the security of those weapons, the
Senate urges the President to engage the Russian Federation with the objectives of²
(i) establishing cooperative measures to give each party to the New START
Treaty improved confidence regarding the accurate accounting and security of
tactical nuclear weapons maintained by the other party; and
(ii) providing United States or other international assistance to help the Russian
Federation ensure the accurate accounting and security of its tactical nuclear
weapons.
5 DISCUSSION DRAFT Ȃ New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification Ȃ September 3, 2010 (15) FURTHER STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS.²
(A) IN GENERAL.²Recognizing the obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July
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of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmameQWXQGHUVWULFWDQGHIIHFWLYHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQWURO´DQGLQ
anticipation of the ratification and entry into force of the New START Treaty, the Senate
calls upon the other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early consideration to
corresponding reductions of their own nuclear arsenals and calls upon the President to
seek agreement on further mutual nuclear arms reductions to the extent consistent with
United States national security interests and alliance obligations.
(B) FORM OF FURTHER OBLIGATIONS.²The Senate declares its intention to consider for
approval international agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit
the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner
only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States.
6