Improving the management of
emergencies: enhancing the ICS
R
are indeed is the emergency that a
single emergency service can manage totally independently without
some form of cooperation or assistance from other emergency services or
supporting agencies. At many incident
scenes, two, three or more agencies must
work together cooperatively to provide the
emergency response.
Achieving the necessary level of cooperation between agencies can be problematic:
each will have developed its own unique
operating procedures, protocols and methods for managing their response to emergencies. The result can be unnecessary
confusion, doubt, duplication and missed
opportunities.
As an attempt to overcome these problems, in the late 1980’s, the then Australian
Association of Rural Fire Authorities
(AARFA, 1989) introduced the Australian
Inter-service Incident Management System
(AIIMS). The core of the AIIMS is the
Incident Control System (ICS) that aims to
provide an integrated structure to manage
the response to any emergency incident that
can be used by any organisation involved in
the response. The AARFA (1989, p. 6)
promoted the AIIMS as enabling ‘managers
to more effectively utilise the combined
resources of co-operating fire and emergency services’.
In the decade since introduction of the
AIIMS, its acceptance and use has not been
without controversy and debate. The author
clearly remembers a heated debate at the
Australian Institute of Emergency Management between two senior officers on the
merits or otherwise of the ICS. One was a
senior police officer and the other a senior
fire officer, both from the same state. The
fire officer argued passionately on the merits
of the AIIMS ICS, while the police officer was
equally adamant in his statements on its
faults. The debate continued off and on for
several days without resolution.
The purpose of this article is to present a
case for introducing an enhanced model of
the ICS component of the AIIMS that has
the potential to overcome some of the
concerns held by emergency managers on
the functionality of the ICS, both here in
Australia but also internationally.
To achieve this, the first step will be to
examine the origins of the ICS and its
adoption in Australia, discuss its key features
22
by Julian Yates
and identify some key issues that it does not,
in its present form, adequately cater for and
then present an enhanced model for consideration. The enhanced model, it will be
argued, offers considerably improved functionality without losing any of the key
features of the ICS and does not require
significant change to existing ICS training,
nomenclature or procedures. Because the
model is based on an enhancement implemented in California, it will also be argued
that it has been proven through overseas
experience.
Origins of the ICS
Problems with the absence of integrated
management systems for emergencies and
disasters were highlighted by series of
wildfires in California in the late 1960s
where deficiencies in management systems
for multi-agency responses were identified
(Coile, 1996). As a result, a system for
managing the response to emergencies
when multiple agencies were involved was
developed. This system was known as the
Incident Command System or ICS. The ICS
envisaged a single Incident Commander
supported by four functional sections:
operations, planning, logistics and finance.
The importance of developing the ICS to
the United States can be found in its system
of providing emergency services. Unlike
Australia, in the US many emergency service
agencies are provided by municipal councils
as well as by the state and federal governments. The US Department of Justice (1998)
estimates that there are over 18,700 state
and local law enforcement agencies, while
the United State Fire Administration (1999)
reports over 30,000 fire departments nationwide. The result of this is that multiagency responses to emergencies are very
frequent. It is not uncommon to have several
separate police forces, fire services and
ambulance agencies all responding.Without
a common incident management system,
the potential for chaos was high.
By 1980, the Californian ICS had been
widely adopted by fire departments and had
become part of a national initiative called
the National Interagency Integrated Incident Management System or NIIMS (National Response Corporation, undated). The
use of the ICS received statutory backing
when US Federal Law required its use for
the response to hazardous materials emergencies (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, 1998). States such as California
(Coile, 1996) and Alaska (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1997) made its
use mandatory by state agencies and local
governments wishing to receive state assistance during emergencies and disasters. The
use of the ICS also spread internationally
with British Columbia in Canada, for example, introducing a variant of the ICS for use
by all provincial agencies (Government of
British Columbia, 1997).
Adoption in Australia
The Australian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS) was developed by
a committee under the auspices of the then
Australian Association of Rural Fire Authorities (1989), since amalgamated into the
Australasian Fire Authorities Council
(AFAC), in the late 1980s. The system
developed by the AARFA was based on the
NIIMS with modifications to suit the Australian environment. One of the most significant of these was to call the core operational
component of the AIIMS the Incident
Control System, in contrast to the North
American Incident Command System1. This
change was to make the terminology used
in the AIIMS compliant with existing
Australian definitions of command and
control. Since command was defined as
functioning vertically within organisations
and control as functioning horizontally
across organisations, the use of control was
more appropriate in the Australian context.
To support implementation of the AIIMS,
the AARFA developed a comprehensive
series of training manuals and videos
together with operational guides and materials for use in the field at incident sites.When
AFAC came into being, it took over the
production and distribution of AIIMS
materials.
The AIIMS has been widely adopted by
most Australian fire services. Its use outside
the fire services is difficult to determine
precisely on the information available,
although it appears from anecdotal evidence
that only a few non-fire services have
1. In this article, the abbreviation ICS will be used for both
the Incident Control System (Australian) and the Incident
Command System (USA). The context of the usage will
indicate which is being referred to.
Australian Journal of Emergency Management
adopted it. Non- fire organisations that have
include Sydney Water and Taronga Zoo and
several other NSW based agencies are
evaluating it (Parsons, personal communication, 3 May 1999). As noted above, heated
arguments over the merits or otherwise of
the AIIMS and its ICS operational element
have been observed between members of
services that do and do not use it.
The AIIMS/ICS in Australia
It is appropriate at this point to provide a brief
discussion of AIIMS and the ICS as adopted
in Australia. The discussion is based on the
description of the AIIMS and the ICS
provided by the AARFA/AFAC in its publication The Australian Inter-service Incident
Management System: Teamwork in Emergency Management, initially published in
1989, but now in its 3rd edition (AFAC,
1994a), and the AFAC AIIMS Operating
System Manual (AFAC, 1994b). ICS training
materials produced by the Fire Services
Division of the Fire & Emergency Services
Authority of Western Australia and the US
Federal Emergency Management Agency
(1998) are also drawn on to provide additional information where needed.
The AIIMS is a set of five sub-systems: the
ICS itself, a Training system, a Qualifications
& Accreditation system, a Publications
Management system and a Supporting
Technology system. It is only intended to
discuss the ICS element in this paper. This is
because the other four sub-systems are
supportive to and dependent on the ICS and
are not directly relevant to a discussion of
enhancing the operational capability of the
ICS.
The ICS is the operational heart of the
AIIMS. It is intended to provide a common
management structure and vocabulary that
can be applied to any form of emergency and
can be used by any agency. The AARFS stated
that the AIIMS ‘can be used to respond to
public emergencies . . . such as floods,
cyclones, earthquakes . . . storms, major
aircraft accidents and hazardous materials
spills.’ (AARFA, 1989, p 6).
Two important concepts are embodied in
the ICS. The first is Unity of Command—
this concept specifies that a person can only
report to one supervisor and that supervisor
in the ICS structure need not be from the
subordinate’s parent organisation. Closely
associated with this is the span of control
that a supervisor should have—the ratio of
one to five is considered optimal and one to
seven is the maximum allowable. The second important concept is that of Unified
Command—this is where there is an identified and agreed strategy or set of strategies
being used by all participants to combat the
emergency. In other words, everyone will be
Winter 1999
Incident
Controller
Information
Officer
Safety
Officer
Liaison
Officer
Planning
Officer
Resources
Situation
Documentation
Demobilisation
Technical
Specialist
Operations
Officer
Divisions
Logistics
Officer
Air
Operations
Communications
Medical
Catering
Supply
Facilities
Finance
Sectors
Strike
Teams
Task
Forces
Single
Resources
Figure 1: Basic ICS structure (Source: AFAC, 1994b)
working to the same game plan, promulgated
through a single supra-organisational management structure. Figure 1 shows the key
structure of the ICS.
As much or as little of the ICS structure is
activated as needed to respond to the
emergency. The Incident Controller is
responsible for the overall management of
the operation and is normally appointed by
the agency with primary responsibility for
managing the emergency. For many smaller
incidents the Incident Controller will not
need to establish any subordinate positions,
being able to undertake all of the duties
personally. As the complexity and size of the
emergency increases, the Incident Controller establishes subordinate positions as
required to meed the needs of the situation.
Exceeding the span of control criteria of one
to five often forces the establishment of a
new subordinate position to bring the span
of control back into line. For example, the
Incident Controller may decide to personally
provide the Logistics and Planning functions, whilst appointing an Operations
Officer to manage the operations of several
strike teams and task forces.
Similarly, as the span of control, complexity, distance, etc, requires, the head of a
function, such as the Operations Officer, may
need to establish subordinate positions. In
Figure 1, the Operations Officer has Division
Commanders managing Sector Commanders who in turn manage strike teams, task
forces and single resources2. Conversely, as
an operation winds down, subordinate
positions may be progressively amalgamated
with their peers or superiors as operational
complexity or size reduces.
The Incident Controller plus the heads of
each of the three functional areas (Planning,
Operations and Logistics) form the Incident
Management Team (IMT). The role of the
IMT is to formulate, under the direction of
the Incident Controller, the plan for the
management of the emergency, including
the development of strategies, goals and
objectives to be achieved. For larger incidents
the plan should be written and formally
disseminated so that all participants, particularly those in management positions,
know what their role is and the expectations
being placed on them are. For smaller
incidents, a verbal plan may be all that is
required. For those incidents where the
Incident Controller provides all of the
management structure personally, then the
plan may a mental concept only.
Personnel for each position should be
appropriately trained for the position, both
in terms of understanding the ICS and in
terms of the specific skills needed for the
position. In theory, it does not matter which
organisation a person comes from—provided they have the requisite skills they can
fill any position. In practice, however, the
agency with primary responsibility is likely
2. A Strike Team is a set of resources of the same type e.g.
a set of fire vehicles and a leader. A Task Force is a set of
differing resources brought together to undertake a task
e.g. two fire vehicles, a bulldozer and a water tanker, plus
a leader. A Single Resource is an individual unit, including
personnel and a leader, undertaking a task e.g. a police
vehicle closing a road.
23
to provide the majority of the personnel for
positions in the Operations hierarchy if only
because it is their personnel who are likely
to have the necessary operational skills.
National developments
In 1998, following a consultative development process with the States and Territories,
Emergency Management Australia (EMA)
released its Guide to Multi-Agency Incident
Management (EMA, 1998). The guide’s aim
is ‘to provide . . . the emergency services
involved in multi-agency response with
guidance on incident management that is
compatible with State emergency management plans and arrangements and which
facilitates national inter-operability.’ (EMA,
1998, p 1).
The guide also notes ‘some of the material
within the guide may appear similar to
elements of the AIIMS. However, the material contained in this document is drawn
from a number of sources and no preference is inferred.’ (EMA, 1998, p. ix). This
guide is not obligatory on any Australian
emergency service.
The systems in the Multi-Agency Incident
Management Guide are very similar to the
AIIMS, although the Incident Controller
becomes an Incident Manager and there are
six functional sections not four (Planning,
Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Communications and Media; Finance is excluded
as a functional section). The manual also
briefly covers issues such as establishing
field headquarters and operational decisionmaking. Figure 2 shows the management
structure proposed in the guide.
The structure proposed in the MultiAgency Incident Management Guide does
not consider the arrangements needed for
subordinate levels below the functional
level, leaving that to be determined by the
States and the needs of the operation.
International developments
Based on experience in recent major flood
response operations in North America, there
has been discussion on altering the structure of the North American version of the
ICS to add a new ‘Information’ function to
the existing four functional sections: operations, planning, logistics and finance (Parsons, personal communication, 3 May
1999). It is argued that the demands for
public information in large-scale emergencies are becoming so demanding that
Information should be a discrete function
in its own right. It remains to be seen if this
debate will result in change to the ICS used
in North America. It is pertinent to note that
the Australian Multi-Agency Incident Management Guide already accepts this need by
recommending the establishment of a
discrete Media function.
24
Incident
Manager
Planning
Officer
Operations
Officer
Logistics
Officer
Communications
Officer
Intelligence
Officer
Media
Officer
Figure 2: Australian Multi-Agency Management
Structure (Source: Multi-Agency Incident
Management Guide, EMA 1998)
ICS critique
As has been mentioned previously, the ICS
has its proponents who argue vehemently
that it can be used in any circumstance or
any operation. Indeed, the AARFS has stated
that it can be applied to manage virtually any
hazard, be it a tropical cyclone or a vehicle
accident. There is a countering view, however, that argues that the ICS is a bureaucratic
imposition designed to impose a rigid, quasimilitary command and control structure illsuited to managing the complex interactions required in community response to
disaster. No less an authority than E. L.
Quarantelli (1997, p 48) has stated:
‘The spread of the Incident Command
System (ICS) as a model for managing disasters is a contemporary manifestation of the
thinking that such occasions must be
‘controlled’. Yet research shows that the ICS
is not a good way to manage the situation,
despite its recent faddish adoption among
some American emergency organisations.’
Like most things, the truth probably lies
somewhere in between the extreme positions. The ICS, in its American variant, is
widely used by a large and diverse range of
agencies, albeit that many are fire services,
to manage the response to emergency
incidents of all types. It is endorsed as the
national management system by the US
Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) who offer a range of ICS training
courses, some accessible over the Internet.
It is unlikely that a system that had any
fundamental flaws would have received such
wide acceptance or so high a level of
endorsement.
This is not to say that the ICS cannot be
constructively criticised. Coile (1996) has
noted that in the United States, the ICS has
been perceived as primarily a fire service
system and as result is not used by all
agencies, particularly the police. It also had
limitations in that it was designed to cope
with incidents—its primary focus was on
providing a management structure at the
incident. It did not articulate into higher
level structures, if any; nor did it cater for
multiple incident events. It is pertinent to
point out that the British Columbian ICS
system expressly states that it is intended for
use in the field at the site of the emergency
(Government of British Columbia, 1997).
These issues were addressed in California
in the early 1990s. The California State
Legislature passed an ordinance requiring
the use of a revised version of the ICS for all
multi-agency emergencies. It was compulsory for all state agencies and local governments were also required to use it if they
wished to access state financial assistance
post-disaster. The new system was called the
‘Standardised Emergency Management
System’ or SEMS.
SEMS builds on the ICS, retaining its
incident level structure, with the addition
of four successively higher levels of response
that provide an organised structure as
needed to manage multi-incident events.
The levels are: Field (the original ICS level),
Local Government, Operational Area,
Regions and State.
The basic ICS structure of an Incident
Commander and the four functional sections is retained at each level with the
exception that the Incident Commander
becomes the Incident Manager in each of
the four levels above Field. This was because
the term ‘Manager’ better described the
functions of the position. Each Incident
Manager can have one or more Incident
Managers or Commanders from a lower
level reporting to them. Figure 3 shows the
outline SEMS structure as used in California.
At each level in the SEMS structure,
common subordinate structures, terminology and procedures are used. As far as
practical, the commonality extends across
levels, thus allowing common training and
the ability for to work at any level with
minimal additional training. Levels can be
activated as required depending on the
needs of the situation. It is quite practical to
activate the higher levels without necessarily
activating subordinate levels. For example,
strike teams can be directed by the Local
Government level without necessarily
establishing the Field level. Once again, span
of control, complexity and size determine
when a higher or lower level is established.
The requirement to use the SEMS is
established in law and is obligatory on all
Californian state agencies and is required to
be used by local governments if they wish to
access state assistance.
The Californian SEMS addresses many of
the issues considered problematic with the
original ICS. Firstly, it recognises the importance of using a management focus as
Australian Journal of Emergency Management
State Level
Incident Manager
State EOC
Regional Level
Incident Manager
Regional EOC
Operational Area
Incident Manager
Operational Area EOC
Regional Level
Incident Manager
Regional EOC
Operational Area
Incident Manager
Operational Area EOC
Local Government
Incident Manager
Local Government EOC
Local Government
Incident Manager
Local Government EOC
Field Response
Incident Commander
at incident site
ICS used
Figure 3: Californian Standardised Emergency Management System (Source: adapted from Coile, 1996)
opposed to a control focus when managing
a disaster or emergency at the community
level or higher. The management focus at the
higher levels is appropriate because those
levels should be taking a more strategic view
rather than the tactical or control focus used
in the field. This also goes some way towards
addressing Quarantelli’s (1997) concerns
over the imposition of a command and
control culture to manage disasters, although he may still take issue with the SEMS
concept of one person at each level being
responsible as either the Incident Commander or Controller, or the Incident
Manager.
Secondly, the SEMS establishes a management structure that builds on top of the ICS.
This is important because the ICS by itself
does not provide clear and unambiguous
links into higher level structures. The ICS
training manual issued by FEMA (1998, p
1–14), for example, notes the need for the
ICS to work with Emergency Operations
Centres (EOC), but the following extracts
from the manual leave doubt about how this
is to happen:
Most jurisdictions maintain an EOC as part
of their community’s emergency preparedness program. The proper interface between
the EOC and the on-scene management
should be worked out in advance, if possible.
The ICS structure and the EOC function
together with the same goals, but function
at different levels of responsibility. The ICS
operation is responsible for on-scene
response activities, and the EOC is resWinter 1999
ponsible for the entire community-wide
response to the event.’
California’s SEMS provides a comprehensive hierarchical system that builds on
the ICS, using its principles and establishing
the systems for interaction between the field
or scene oriented ICS and the community
and management focus of the higher levels.
This overcomes the uncertainty evident in
the FEMA ICS manual referred to above by
establishing and defining the links between
the levels before the disaster strikes.
Thirdly, the SEMS is compulsory for use
by all state agencies and is effectively so for
local government, thus overcoming the
problem of the system not being universally
adopted. The SEMS is also supported by a
comprehensive set of training materials to
enable personnel to become proficient in its
use.
Finally, the SEMS correctly locates the ICS
component at the field or incident scene
level. This addresses one of the key problems
associated with adopting the ICS and attempting to use it to cope with all forms of
natural and man-made 3 emergencies.
Although it is claimed that the ICS can be
used for all emergencies (see for example
the discussion of the AIIMS above), these
claims have always been contentious. The
effective management of a widespread
flood emergency, for example, may require
the following.
• High-level regional management that
considers the entire floodplain with
numerous communities, coordinating
warnings, levee maintenance, evacuation
planning and the like. This level will often
be activated well in advance of any direct
flood impact given adequate warning.
• municipal or community level management focussing on the needs of a specific
community or associated group of communities. This level may also commence
functioning prior to the on-set of the
actual emergency provided sufficient
warning is available.
• emergency incident management at the
site of rescues, levee failures, food and
fodder resupply and the numerous other
events that require urgent attention
during the flood. These incidents will tend
to move with the flood as it progresses
down the river system. The magnitude of
the flood event and the effectiveness of
pre-impact prevention and preparedness
activities will influence the number and
scale of the incidents.
To apply the standard ICS to the management of the above event is difficult. It is not
practical to have a single Incident Controller
attempting direct operations at all levels,
neither would it be good practice to have a
series of independent Incident Controllers
working at each level and incident site. The
SEMS, however, provides for a system of
hierarchical Incident Managers managing
activities at their level, coordinating and
cooperating sideways, upwards and downwards together with Incident Controllers
attending to specific incidents and reporting
to a higher level Incident Manager. Because
the nomenclature, procedures and skills are
common across the levels, appropriately
trained staff from any agency can work in
SEMS operations centres or ICS command
posts at any level.
An Enhanced Australian Incident
Management System
The ICS critique above indicates that there
is room to enhance the ICS as it currently
stands to provide a truly integrated system
for managing emergency incidents. The
need to provide a system that caters for
multi-incident operations and that integrates into a hierarchical structure was
demonstrated through the example of the
Californian SEMS.
The possibility of implementing integrated systems to manage emergencies and
disasters is one that should be seized in
Australia. The days of parochialism being an
acceptable practice are past. The ability of
3. In the absence of any generally accepted gender-neutral
term that describes hazards that result from the direct actions
of humans. Alternatives such as technological hazards or
socially-induced hazards do not adequately cover the full
range of events caused by human activity that can result in
emergencies or disasters.
25
all agencies involved in emergency response
to work together in an integrated management structure offers many benefits: improved coordination, greater productivity,
best-person for the job, better training,
common language and procedures. These
are all possible if a common system is
introduced.
Direct adoption of the Californian SEMS
without modification is not likely to provide
a completely satisfactory result. The SEMS,
while it addresses the problems with the ICS,
is based on a different political system and
could not be directly implemented without
modification to fit into the Australian
environment.
The vision
An integrated system for the management
of all multi-agency emergencies used by all
response agencies in Australia, providing a
common management structure, systems
and training for use by all. The system would
be compatible with and articulate into the
relevant national training competencies.
The system would retain the ICS as the field
or incident site management system, but
would integrate it with a compatible higher
level structure to cater with larger, multiagency multi-incident emergencies. For the
purposes of this discussion, the system is
called the Enhanced Australian Incident
Management System (EAIMS).
The Integrated System
The AIIMS ICS would remain the basis of
the EAIMS, as it is an effective system for
use at the field operational level, retaining
most of the existing terminology, systems
and procedures. The functional sections of
the ICS have been adjusted to comply with
the new Australian Multi-Agency Incident
Management Guide, but this is not critical.
This is because the EAIMS can work with
either the existing ICS set of functional
sections or the sections proposed in the
Australian Multi-Agency Incident Management Guide. For those emergencies and
disasters that require management at levels
above the field operational level, successively
higher Incident Management levels would
be activated. The basic terminology, systems
and procedures used at these higher levels
would be the same as for the ICS with the
substitution of the term ‘manage’ in place
of ‘control’ e.g. there is an ‘Incident Manager’ for each level above the field operational level. The agency with primary
responsibility for managing the response
would appoint the Incident Controller and
Managers. Staff for the functional sections
at each level would come from any organisation so long as they are trained for the
function. Figure 4 shows the structure and
levels proposed for the AIEMS.
26
State Level
Incident Manager
State EOC
Regional Level
Incident Manager
Regional EOC
Local Government
Incident Manager
Local Government EOC
Regional Level
Incident Manager
Regional EOC
Local Government
Incident Manager
Local Government EOC
Field Response
Incident Controller
at incident site
ICS used
Planning
Operations
Intelligence
Logistics
Communications
Media
Divisions
Sectors
Strike Teams
Task Forces
Single resources
Figure 4: Enhanced Australian Emergency Management System
Figure 4 only shows the expanded structure for the field level. Each higher level in
the system can also activate the functional
areas needed to manage the response
operation at that level. As many or as few of
the functional areas can be activated at the
discretion of the Incident Manager at that
level. Responsibility for ensuring the function is discharged lies with the Incident
Manager who is also responsible for ensuring that appropriate liaison between the
functional areas takes place. It should be
noted that it is important for the smooth and
efficient functioning of the system that
liaison between functions across levels takes
place to avoid overloading the Incident
Controllers. This liaison does not, however
replace or supplant the responsibility for
decision-making and strategy setting that
lies with the Incident Controllers.
In addition to the ability of higher level
Incident Managers to activate functional
sections at their level, they can also deploy
and control strike teams, task forces or single
resources so long as span of control is not
exceeded and there is no interference with
a subordinate level’s operations. It would,
for example, be appropriate during a flood
operation for a local level Incident Manager
to dispatch a strike team to conduct a specific task without necessarily activating the
field level. It would not be appropriate,
however, for a regional incident manager to
deploy a task force under direct command
to the scene of an incident where there is an
established Incident Controller. In this case,
the higher level should allocate the task force
to the Incident Controller.
Figure 5 shows a notional structure for
an emergency that requires activation of two
of the higher levels plus two separate
Incident Controllers (and associated response elements) managing separate incidents within the same larger emergency or
disaster.
The AIEMS retains the term Incident
Controller for the field level. Consideration
was given to replacing it with Incident
Manager as used in the Guide to MultiAgency Incident Management. The change
was not made for several reasons. Firstly, it
would require considerable re-education of
the many personnel already familiar with the
ICS. Secondly, it provides a clear delineation
between the field ICS level and the higher
management levels. Thirdly it reduces the
possibility of confusion over which Incident
Manager is being referred to. As the regional
and state levels will be comparatively infrequently activated when compared to the field
and local levels, for the majority of emergencies there will be an Incident Controller
at the scene and an Incident Manager at the
local level. Finally, the California SEMS
Australian Journal of Emergency Management
Regional Level
Incident Manager
Regional EOC
Logistics
Media
Local Government
Incident Manager
Local Government EOC
Operations
Field Response
Incident Controller
at incident site
ICS used
Planning
Operations
Logistics
Field Response
Incident Controller
(Remaining structure
not shown)
Intelligence
Logistics
Communications
Media
Liaison Links
Communications
Media
Divisions
Sectors
Strike Teams
Task Forces
Single resources
Figure 4: Enhanced structure for notional emergency
retained the Incident Controller or Incident
Manager dichotomy for similar reasons.
The AIEMS should retain the Incident
Management Team (IMT) concept used in
the ICS, applying it to each level.Whenever a
level is activated, the relevant Incident
Manager or Incident Controller should form
an IMT composed of the Manager or
Controller and the heads of any other
functional areas established at that level. The
role of the IMT is to develop the strategy and
plan for that level to combat the emergency.
Subordinate AIEMS levels would need to be
responsive to strategies and plans developed
by the higher level. Equally, the superior
AIEMS levels need to be responsive to the
requirements of the subordinate levels and
must avoid attempting to supplant the role
of subordinate levels. Flexibility and adaptability will be required particularly in the
early stages of an operation as it is highly
likely in many circumstances that a lower
level will be established prior to the higher
level. In this situation, it is imperative that
the higher level takes account of strategies
and plans implemented by subordinate
levels.
The benefits of implementing the AEIMS
are:
• retaining the existing ICS systems and
procedures, thus retaining the existing
considerable wealth of experience and
Winter 1999
investment in training. If the modifications to the functions proposed in the
Guide to Multi-Agency Incident Management are accepted, some modification is
needed to the ICS. The concept of the
AEIMS can be implemented irrespective
of this, however.
• Implementing common terminology,
procedures and training for use at all
levels for all types of emergencies.
• Implementing an integrated management
system that can be scaled up and down to
meet the needs of the situation and that is
compatible with the hierarchical structure
used in all Australian states to manage the
response to emergencies.
• More effective use can be made of the
personnel available to fill positions in the
management structure. Provided they
have completed the relevant training, a
person from any agency can fill any
position other than the Incident Manager/
Controller’s. This is because the agency
responsible for managing the response to
the hazard must retain the right to place
one of its officers in these positions. Some
other positions, particularly those in the
operational chain are also likely to require
specialist skills that will be limited to the
responsible agency, thus limiting the field
of people who can fill these positions.
Many generic positions however, such as
in the Logistics, Communications, Media,
Intelligence and Planning functions
could come from any agency.
• Implementation of a common national
training regime linked to national competencies. This would provide immediate
economies of scale as most material and
courses would be common to all states. It
would also enhance the ability of skills to
be transferable from one state to another.
• The AIEMS, being based on proven systems (the ICS and the SEMS) should have
a high probability of success if developed
consultatively and effectively implemented (e.g. adequately resourced).
Implementing the AEIMS should be
undertaken at a national level.While it would
be possible to develop it in a single state,
many of the benefits will only be fully
realised if the project is undertaken as a
national initiative. National initiatives of this
sort should be managed by Emergency
Management Australia using a consultative
process to engage all stakeholders and obtain
commitment to the system. This must
include commitment of funding to enable
development and implementation of the
system in each state.
Conclusion
The need for an integrated management
system to improve the ability of emergency
services to work cooperatively was identified
in the United States in the 1960s. This
resulted in the development of the ICS that
was adopted by many fire services and other
agencies in the US. In Australia, the ICS has
been widely adopted by the fire services, with
some modification, but its acceptance
beyond these services has been more limited.
Deficiencies in the ICS, related to limitations when multi-agency multi-level
emergencies were encountered together
with the limited acceptance outside the fire
services, were addressed in California
through introduction of the SEMS. The
SEMS retained the ICS and used its principles in a framework that provides a
hierarchical structure that cates for multiagency multi-level emergencies. The SEMS
was introduced through a statutory process
that effectively mandated its use by state and
local authorities.
Australia faces many of the same problems that the US does in terms of managing
multi-agency multi-level emergencies. At
present, no generally accepted management
system exists, despite the use of the ICS by
many fire services. Because the Australian
ICS is very similar to the US version, it has
the same deficiencies in terms of the lack of
a suitable higher level structure.
This article proposes a solution to this
problem. Using the SEMS as the basis, the
27
article has described a hierarchical management system that builds on the ICS and
uses its principles to provide for cooperative
and multi-level management of emergencies. The system, tentatively titled the
AIEMS, if properly developed and implemented offers a low-risk means of instituting a truly common, multi-agency multilevel management system that will cope
with all forms of emergencies.
Bibliography
Australian Association of Rural Fire Authorities 1989, The Australian Inter-service
Incident Management System: Teamwork in
Emergency Management, Ringwood East.
Australasian Fire Authorities Council.
1994a, The Australian Inter-service Incident
Management System: Teamwork in Emergency Management (3rd ed), Mt Waverley.
Book Review
British Columbia Emergency Response
Management System, available at http://
www.epix.sfu.ca/iepc/bcerms.htm.
National Response Corporation (undated), Incident Command System, available
at http//www.nrcc.com/ics97.htm.
Quarantelli E. L. 1997, ‘Ten criteria for
evaluating the management of community
disasters’, Disasters, Vol 21 (1), Mar 97, pp
39–56.
United States Fire Administration 1999,
Fire Departments, available at http://www.
usfa.fema.gov/nfdc/firedept.htm.
US Department of Justice 1998, Law
Enforcement Statistics, available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm.
R
fereed
by Ralph Salisbury
Management of Animal Health Emergencies, World Organisation for Animal
Health, Volume 18, No. 1, April 1999
The Paris-based World Organisation for
Animal Health, usually known to veterinarians and others as OIE (Office International des Epizooties) publishes three
volumes of its Scientific and Technical
Review each year. Usually, these consist of
valuable updates on occurrences and new
knowledge concerning major animal
diseases.
In Volume 18, No.1 of April 1999, the
Organisation has departed from this
format to produce a world review of the
Management of Animal Health Emergencies. This single volume will be a useful
reference for many years and it will be of
interest to readers well beyond official
veterinary organisations. Many of the
authors are Chief Veterinary Officers with
the responsibility for animal health emergency preparedness in their own countries.
In the Section ‘Generic Principles’ there
are three articles. The first ‘Model Framework and Principles of Emergency Management’ is from Australia and uses the
Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan
(AUSVETPLAN) as an example of comprehensive planning. It is worth noting that
the original concept for AUSVETPLAN
was suggested by Roger Jones at the
Australian Counter-Disaster College in
1980. It grew to become Australia’s national plan and this article proposes it as a
universal model. The article describes the
28
Australasian Fire Authorities Council.
1994b, Incident Control System: the Operating System of AIIMS, Box Hill.
Coile R. 1996, ‘California’s Standardised
Emergency Management System’, American Society of Professional Emergency
Planners Journal.
Emergency Management Australia 1998,
Multi-Agency Incident Management, Guide
1 of Volume 3 of Part III of the Australian
Emergency Manuals Series, Canberra.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
1998, Basic Incident Command System (ICS)
Independent Study IS-195, available at http:/
/www.fema.gov/emi/is195.htm.
Federal Emergency Management Agency.
1997, A Year Ago Today—the Miller’s Reach
Fire, available at http://www.fema.gov/
Reg_X/r10mit43.htm.
Government of British Columbia 1997,
elements that must be included in comprehensive planning. The core principles listed
include organisational, command, control,
coordination, information management,
timely activation and the need for the plan
itself to be routinely reviewed. It then lists
the key issues, which are more specific to
animal health plans (nature of diseases,
perceived risk of introduction, legal and
jurisdictional responsibilities, agreement on
definitions, stakeholder involvement,
resourcing, communication channels and
regional and marketing implications). The
article then describes how these arrangements are activated in phases from the initial
suspicion of an emergency to stand-down.
The other articles under ‘Generic Principles’
are from Europe and cover legal and international obligations, government-industry
interactions and funding arrangements for
major animal health emergencies.
The next section, ‘Prevention and Preparedness’, contains seven articles summarising the animal health emergency
preparedness situations in all of the world’s
major geographical regions and one article
describing the role of the UN Food and
Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) Emergency Prevention System. A further Section
‘Learning from Others’ contains five case
histories of outbreaks ranging from bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow
disease) in Switzerland to foot and mouth
disease in Taipei. These articles are of general
interest because they cover socio-economic
aspects of the outbreaks and the problems
and opportunities presented in providing
accurate public information. This theme is
further developed in another Australian
article on dealing with unexpected or
unknown emergencies. It contains cases
that will be familiar to all Australians,
including the equine morbillivirus (Hendra virus) outbreak, which killed both
people and horses. Such cases represent
the ultimate challenge in preparedness
because, before the cause is known, the
likely course of the outbreak cannot be
predicted. The value of all of these case
histories is that they were written when
the control campaigns were complete or
at least well established and the lessons
learned had been considered in detail.
There are two articles dealing with
aquatic animal health emergencies, one on
the role of veterinarians in natural disasters and one on the emergency management of disasters involving livestock in
developing countries. The Conclusion is
written by the Australian Chief Veterinary
Officer Dr Gardner Murray whose organisation played a large part in the development and completion of this publication.
All but two of the articles are in English
and the exceptions have English
summaries.
Copies are available at approximately
AUD $70 plus postage from Hunter
Publications, PO Box 404 Abbottsford Vic
3067, phone 03 9417 5361, fax 03 9419
7154 or email [email protected].
Ralph Salisbury was formerly Principal
Veterinary Officer, Counter-Disaster and
Exotic Diseases in the Victorian Department
of Agriculture.
Australian Journal of Emergency Management