CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WRITTEN EVIDENCE TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
CONSTITUTION
INQUIRY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF CIVIL SERVANTS
1. The Civil Service Commission’s interest in the accountability of civil
servants stems from our statutory responsibilities for ensuring that civil
servants are selected on merit on the basis of fair and open competition,
and for upholding the Civil Service Code values of integrity, honesty,
objectivity and impartiality in the way civil servants carry out their duties.
2. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, of which the
Commission was a strong proponent, put these principles and the role of
the Commission into primary legislation for the first time, over 150 years
after this was first proposed in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854. It
therefore provided legislative underpinning for the Civil Service as we
know it today: recruited on merit and committed to implementing the
policies of the elected Government, whatever its political colour.
3. The Act also drew on important distinctions between civil servants and
special advisers. It established in statute two distinct classes of people
who would be appointed to support the Government:
i.
civil servants, selected on merit on the basis of fair and open
competition under rules laid down by the Civil Service Commission and
bound by the principles in the Civil Service Code; and
ii.
special advisers, selected by Ministers personally, appointed for the
period of the Minister’s term of office, subject to their own Code as well
as the Civil Service Code but specifically exempted from the Civil
Service Code requirements of objectivity and impartiality.
4. In the Commission’s view this clear legal distinction in role and function is
important and reflects the nearest we get in the UK to a constitutional
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settlement on the role of the Civil Service. It protects the long held
principle of an impartial Civil Service, while recognising that Governments
also need support from personal appointees who share their political
objectives and philosophy. Part of the Commission’s role in regulating
Civil Service appointments and in hearing complaints under the Civil
Service Code, is to ensure that this distinction is maintained.
5. We address below those aspects of the Committee’s inquiry on which the
Commission has a view relating to the Civil Service Code and the question
of whether Ministers should be able to influence Civil Service
appointments. Before that, however, we want to make three general
points:
a. first, we believe that the 2010 Act was of great importance in putting
the Civil Service on a statutory footing and codifying the long-standing
principles that underpin it. In our experience that legislation is working
well and there is no evidence of the need for early revision or change;
b. secondly, the Act places on the Civil Service Commission the
responsibility for publishing Recruitment Principles which interpret the
requirement that selection for appointment to the Civil Service must be
on merit after fair and open competition. This gives us the flexibility to
enable the selection processes to evolve and improve to meet the
changing needs of a modern, professional Civil Service, while still
meeting the core requirement for selection on merit etc.; and
c. thirdly, as the number of open competitions for senior posts has
increased over the last 15 years, the Commission has encouraged
more professional recruitment practices and accepted that Ministers
have a legitimate role in the selection of the senior civil servants with
whom they will be working closely. But that has always stopped short
of allowing Ministers to make the choice of candidates themselves. In
the Commission’s view that could undermine the principle of merit-
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based appointments and be a step towards the politicisation of the Civil
Service.
6. We now turn to the Committee’s specific questions.
7. Question Three: Do the civil servants’ and special advisers’ codes of
conduct require amendment?
A. The Commission has a statutory role in hearing complaints from Civil
Servants under the Civil Service Code; and by agreement we assist
departments to uphold the Code, which in the last few years has included
auditing their policies and practices in promoting and upholding the Code.
The Commission does not have any role in relation to the special advisers’
code of conduct.
We have seen an encouraging growth in civil servants’ knowledge of the
Civil Service Code and understanding of the right to complain to the Civil
Service Commission over the past three years. We see no evidence of
the need for significant change to the Code. But we think it is important
that Government Departments continue to promote it actively and ensure
that civil servants are not discouraged or penalised for raising concerns
that its provisions are being breached.
8. Question Four: To what extent should the content of the civil
servants’ and special advisers’ codes of conduct be set down in
statute? If so, how might CRAG be amended to achieve this?
A. We believe the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 gets the
balance right. Under the Act the Civil Service Code must require civil
servants to carry out their duties for the assistance of the current
administration whatever its political complexion, with integrity, honesty,
objectivity and impartiality; but it need not require special advisers to carry
out their duties with objectivity and impartiality. The Act also includes the
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right to complain under the Code and to take a complaint to the Civil
Service Commission.
We believe these to be the core requirements. It would be onerous and
inflexible to include greater detail in the primary legislation. We have so
far seen no evidence that this is needed.
9. Question Six: What, if any, influence should ministers be able to
exercise over home civil service appointments? What are the
constitutional benefits and risks of allowing such influence? Are
there any particular civil service posts to which special
considerations might apply?
A. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 requires civil
servants to be selected on merit on the basis of fair and open competition.
It places the responsibility on the Civil Service Commission to interpret this
legal requirement in its Recruitment Principles.
From its inception in the 19th century, the merit principle was founded on
the belief that the Civil Service will only be effective and efficient if the best
person is selected for the job. That remains as relevant today as it ever
was. The Commission’s principal task is to encourage and enable
recruitment practices in Government Departments which get the best
candidate for any given job. This is best achieved through an open and fair
process where candidates are objectively assessed against the
requirements of the job.
These practices must also evolve as the needs of the Civil Service change.
In the last 15 years there has been a significant increase in the number of
external appointments to senior Civil Service roles. The Commission has
encouraged and supported this and helped Departments to develop new
ways of assessing the suitability of external candidates.
The Commission’s approach to Ministerial involvement in senior Civil
Service appointments has also evolved. We accept that, since the
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Secretary of State (or the Prime Minister) must ultimately agree the
appointment (and therefore has the power of veto), it is important that the
Secretary of State is involved in appointments in which he or she is
particularly interested. In the case of Permanent Secretary appointments it
has become normal practice for the Commissioner actively to encourage
the involvement, given the close working relationship which is necessary at
the top of a Department. In practice this means the Secretary of State
agreeing the job description, the key skills required, the terms of the
advertisement and the composition of the selection panel. He/she will be
updated at each stage and encouraged to meet the short-list and feedback
to the panel any concerns about the skills and experience of the
candidates, which the panel can then explore at interview.
This degree of involvement in the process, coupled with the ultimate power
of veto, is, we believe, a proper reflection of the Secretary of State’s
interest in the appointment and the accountability he/she ultimately carries
for the Department’s performance. However, in order to protect the
impartiality of the Civil Service, it stops short of giving Ministers a choice of
candidates. That decision remains with the panel, based on all the
evidence it has collected and assessed through the process.
We do not see the case for changing this position. Handing over the final
choice to one individual, whether a Minister or a civil servant, is unlikely to
further the merit principle and may lead to favouritism. Where the choice is
put in the hands of a Minister, there may be the perception – and
sometimes the reality – of politicisation which could eventually undermine
the ability of the civil service to serve successive administrations.
Civil Service Commission
June 2012
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