Europe at the Cross Roads. The dual demographic challenge of population ageing
and population decline
Nico van Nimwegen and Rob van der Erf
Author’s address: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, NIDI. P.O. Box 11650, 2502 AR The Hague
(www.nidi.nl).
Email: [email protected]
Nico van Nimwegen is a social demographer and Deputy Director of NIDI. He works on the interface of social and
demographic trends. His research focuses on the monitoring of demographic trends and their impact on society, and on
population-related policies. Rob van der Erf is senior researcher at NIDI working on comparative European
demographic and migration statistics
Europe at the cross roads: the dual demographic challenge of population
ageing and population decline.
Nico van Nimwegen1, Rob van der Erf2
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, NIDI
Abstract
Two demographic challenges are confronting Europe: population ageing and population decline.
These challenges are two sides of the same demographic coin. While low fertility and increasing
longevity cause populations to rapidly grow older, low fertility also leads to population decline.
This paper describes recent and expected changes in the size and composition of the European
population and the underlying demographic trends in fertility, mortality and migration. Although
international migration is now the major cause of European population growth, it is questionable
whether migration can prevent population decline. International migration spurs population
diversity in different ways across Europe, is the most volatile demographic phenomenon as it
depends on both push and pull factors and is therefore difficult to manage.
1. Introduction: the dual demographic challenge for Europe
Two related demographic challenges are confronting Europe. The most dominant challenge is
population ageing, while the second challenge is population decline. The social and economic
implications of population ageing are manifold and its impact on the social situation in Europe can
hardly be underestimated3. The same holds for the additional challenge of population decline. As is
1
2
3
Social demographer and Deputy Director of NIDI, PO Box 11650, 2502 AR The Hague (NL) (www.nidi.nl).
Senior researcher on migration and demographic trends at NIDI; correspondence to first author.
This paper is based on work of the first author as leader of the Demography Network of the Social Situation
Observatory of the European Union more in particular the Demography Monitors. These studies review the
demographic situation and related socio-economic developments in the Member States of the European
Union (EU). When referring to Europe, mostly EU countries are meant in the paper. The views expressed in
the paper are those of the authors.
3
the case with population ageing, Europe is also a frontrunner among the major world regions with
respect to population decline.
Compared to other world regions, population ageing is most advanced in Europe. While the
average (median) age of the world population is 28 years, it is 39 years in Europe as compared to
36 in the United States, 32 in China and 24 in India. The recent United Nations Ageing Index (UN
2007) which gives the share of persons 60 years or older relative to 100 persons 0-14 years of age,
ranked Europe first among all world regions, with an index value of 136. In Southern Europe (156)
and Western Europe (147), population ageing is more advanced than in Eastern (123) and Northern
Europe (124). Japan ranks highest on the UN index with a value of 201 followed by the oldest
European countries: Italy and Germany. By the year 2050 Europe would still rank highest on this
ageing scale, but the gap with other world regions would be much narrower. This illustrates that the
pace of population ageing will slow down in Europe and pick up in other parts of the world, mostly
in the less developed countries.
The second demographic challenge for Europe is population decline and also here, Europe will be
the first among the major world regions in breaking new ground. The pace of European population
growth is the lowest among the world regions. By the year 2050 the population of the European
Union is expected to have declined from its current 493 million inhabitants to 472 million; the
turning point will be around the year 2025. And although the share of the European Union in the
total population of the world will further decline, it will keep its current ranking as the third most
populous region in the world after China and India, and before the USA.
Population ageing and population decline are the two sides of the same demographic coin.
Populations which witness slow, declining and increasingly negative population growth, rapidly
4
grow older. The demographic root causes of population ageing are sustained low fertility and
increasing longevity. Low fertility, in the absence of major and sustained high migration surpluses,
also yields population decline. Together, population ageing and population decline will help shape
the future of Europe in the coming decades.
The paper discusses the main drivers of this dual demographic challenge. We describe current and
projected demographic trends at the regional and country level, compare trends and study intercountry differences illustrating Europe’s large demographic diversity. First the components of
population growth will be discussed, followed by a more extensive discussion of fertility, mortality
and international migration. We conclude with an outlook for the future.
2. The components of population growth
The pace of European population growth, of currently 0.4% per year, is the lowest among the
world regions. It is, for instance, significantly lower than the growth rates in the United States
(1.8%), China (1.2%) and India (2.9%), or of the world population as a whole (2.5%). With its
current almost 500 million inhabitants, the European Union of 27 Member States (EU-27) ranks
third after the world’s most populous country China (1.3 billion inhabitants) and India (1.1 billion)
and before the United States (301 million) (for these and other data see also Van Nimwegen 2008).
The patterns of population growth vary across the EU (Figure 1). On average the old Member
States of Western and Southern Europe still witness slow population growth, while the new
Member States from Central and Eastern Europe are already experiencing population decline.
Figure 1 about here
In 2007 “Gaelic Tiger” Ireland saw by far the fastest population growth in the EU (2.3%), but also
Cyprus, Spain and Luxembourg saw their populations grow by over 1%. Among the old Member
5
States, Germany saw a slight decline of its population, a pattern that is common for most of the
new Member States of Central and Eastern Europe like Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic States,
Poland and Hungary.
Looking at the two components of population growth, natural increase and the migration balance,
the impact of natural increase (the balance of births and deaths) on the growth rate has significantly
decreased over the past decades across Europe. International migration has become the main
engine of overall European population growth.
Natural population increase in the EU is currently highest in Ireland at 9 per thousand, followed at
a distance by France, Cyprus and Luxembourg (4 per thousand). Natural population decline (the
excess of deaths over births) is highest in Bulgaria (-5 per thousand) but is also witnessed in for
instance the Baltic States, Hungary, Romania and Germany. The overall EU level of natural
population growth is still positive but at less than one per thousand an all time low, reflecting its
ageing population.
As for net migration (the balance of immigration and emigration) Cyprus, Spain and Ireland
currently record the highest positive migration rates. A negative migration balance is observed in
the new Member States Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and the Baltic States. The Netherlands is the
only old Member State with a (small) negative migration balance in 2007. Some three quarters of
the overall annual population growth in the European Union of 0.4% can be attributed to
international migration. The relatively speaking high immigration into the European Union over
the past few years is mainly caused by large inflows of migrants into Spain and Italy to which
various regularisation programmes contributed importantly.
6
Looking at the future, the European Union will experience natural population decline from 2010
onwards, while from 2025 onwards overall population decline will set in. It follows that between
2010 and 2025 international migration will outnumber natural decline which reflects the growing
importance of international migration in European population growth.
Indeed, Europe seems to be on the cross roads of an ongoing process where population growth
gradually turns into population decline, while the process of population ageing continues and gains
momentum.
3. Declining fertility
The average number of children per woman, as measured by the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), is
about 1.5 in the EU as a whole. This is well below the so-called replacement level of 2.1 children,
signalling future population decline. The low fertility level of the European Union contrasts with
other world regions. The fertility level of the United States (2.1) for instance, equals replacement,
while China (1.7) is clearly below that level and Japan (1.3) even lower than the European Union.
The highest fertility levels are recorded for Africa (close to 5), while the world average is 2.7.
Also fertility levels vary across the EU (Figure 2). Currently the lowest TFR is recorded in
Slovakia (1.24) and the highest in France (1.98).
Since the 1980s, the average TFR in the European Union has declined by 0.4 children per woman.
During the same period, the mean age of childbearing has risen by 3 years to 28 years. This change
in the timing of fertility, also known as the tempo effect, has a direct impact on a period indicator
like the TFR and may have an impact on future fertility trends.
Figure 2 about here
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Postponement of births plays an important part in European fertility.
European women tend to have their children at older ages than before. While fertility rates of
women under 30 have declined since the 1970s, the fertility rates of women aged 30 or older have
risen since the 1980s. This indicates that part of the overall decline in fertility can be attributed to
the postponement of births. Despite this similar pattern across Europe, there are remarkable
differences between countries, both in the level and in the rate of change of fertility (Frejka and
Sardon 2004; Sobotka 2004). Looking at the timing of childbirths, three stages can be discerned in
the postponement process. In the first stage, the average age at childbearing increases due to a
decline of fertility at young ages. This decrease continues in the second stage, but in this stage
fertility at older ages starts to increase and a partial recovery of fertility sets in, while the age at
childbirth continues to rise. In the third stage, the fertility decline at young ages comes to an end,
while the rise in fertility at older ages gradually slows down and recovery eventually stops (c.f. De
Beer 2006).
With the exception of the Central and Eastern European countries, the postponement process in
most European countries seems to be near the end of the second or the beginning of the third stage.
As a consequence the decline in the overall fertility rate has slowed down in most countries.
Although in some countries the increase in fertility at older ages recently has slowed down too,
suggesting that the third phase is nearing its end, in most Member States a significant increase in
fertility at ages 30 and above (recovery) still continues. The combined effects of these trends
suggest that the overall fertility level in most countries may increase in the coming years when
foregone births will be recuperated. Indeed a modest but seemingly persistent increase in fertility
can be observed from the turn of the century. If all foregone births would indeed be recuperated,
the impact on period fertility rates is estimated by some authors to be quite substantive (up to a
8
10% increase in fertility according to some) (Bongaarts and Feeney), but these outcomes are being
disputed by others (Kohler et al 2002, Billari 2007).
The impact of policies on fertility is difficult to assess but seems limited in scope.
From a policy perspective it seems relevant to take the wide variety of fertility patterns and trends
across Europe into account (Caldwell and Schindlmayer 2004). Even though all Member States
have implemented “family-friendly” policies, there are major differences between countries in
policies affecting the choice to become a parent and/or to have an additional child. It is difficult to
assess the impact of these policies on fertility, as it is difficult to disentangle their impact from
other determinants of fertility, but if any, the “window of opportunities” for family friendly policies
may be as small as 0.1 to 0.2 children per woman (Gauthier 2007). There is an ongoing debate
whether policies can be effective in influencing the timing and level of fertility (see also
MacDonald 2006) but “single shot solutions” to increase fertility levels are not available.
Nevertheless, policies spurring economic growth and economic security and improving the
availability of suitable housing are likely to have a positive impact on the level of fertility, while
policies aimed at the reconciliation of work and family may have a positive influence on both
(female) labour force participation and fertility. In general it seems plausible that policies which
aim to accommodate ongoing trends (like the recovery of fertility), may be more effective than
policies which aim to reverse these trends.
The impact of international migration on fertility is limited.
Competing views on the impact of migration on fertility exist. On the one hand it is assumed that
socialization in the region of origin determines childbirth patterns of migrants, while the adaptation
hypothesis suggests that migrants will exhibit similar levels as non-migrants in the region of
destination (see for a discussion Kulu 2005). As regards international migration, migrants very
9
often have higher fertility than the indigenous population, although the impact of migrant fertility
on the national fertility level is minor as international migrants only form a small fraction of the
population (c.f. Héran and Pison 2007). For the level of migrant fertility, the region of origin of the
migrant, socio-economic characteristics and the duration of stay in the receiving country play an
important part. Migrant women from industrialised countries (usually also higher educated) tend to
have lower fertility than those arriving from non-industrialised countries. And also the fertility of
migrant women who have resided in the receiving country for a longer period such as second
generation migrants, tends to be lower than of first generation migrants. The convergence of the
fertility of migrant groups to the national average can be regarded as a dimension of integration and
seems to support the adaptation hypothesis. Also data on the impact of internal migration on
childbearing seem to support this hypothesis and further indicate an elevated fertility after
relocation arising from union formation (Kulu 2005).
4. Increasing longevity
Life expectancy has increased during the last decades (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002). Since 1980, the
average annual increase in longevity, measured as the life expectancy at birth, was slightly under
0.2 years. The average life expectancy at birth in the EU currently is about 79 years (80 years in the
old Member States and 74 years in the new Member States). Japan records the highest average life
expectancy (82 years) in the world.
Figure 3 about here
In all European countries, life expectancy is higher for women than for men, but the gender gap
gradually becomes smaller. In the EU life expectancy at birth for men ranges from a low of 65
years in Latvia and Lithuania to a high of 79 years in Sweden (Figure 3). Female life expectancy at
birth ranges from 76 years in Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania to 84 years in France and Spain. Also
the slowly closing gender gap in longevity has a clear East-West divide. On average European
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women may expect to live over 6 years longer than European men but the gender gap is smaller in
the old Member States (5.6 years) than in the new Member States (8.1 years). Gender differences
in life expectancy range from under 5 years in countries like Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Malta, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, to 8 years or over in the Baltic countries, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia. The origins of the gender gap have changed over time: in the 1960s the
gender gap widened due to the unfavourable development of male mortality. In the 1980s the
gender gap started to decrease in North Western Europe and in the 1990s it also became smaller in
Southern European countries and France. A slowing down of the growth of female life expectancy
and a stronger increase of male longevity are the causes of the narrowing gender divide.
Behavioural factors like harmful lifestyles play an import role in mortality conditions (e.g. Luy
2003).
In the first half of the 20th century the increase in life expectancy was mainly caused by the decline
in mortality from communicable diseases at younger ages. The second half of that century saw a
shift of mortality to older ages: degenerative and man-made diseases have become the main causes
of death.
A longer life does not necessarily mean a healthier life. Some of the “added years” may be spent in
good health and some in bad health. As most unhealthy years are spent at older ages, healthy life
expectancy may be calculated as a fraction of life expectancy at age 60. The ranking of countries
according to healthy life expectancy at this age differs from that of total life expectancy. For men,
Sweden ranks highest: 16.5 years of the total life expectancy at age 60 is spent in good health.
France is leading for women: at the age of 60, French women may expect to live another 25.7
years, of which 19.1 years will be spent in good health. In general European women enjoy both
more healthy and unhealthy life years than men (De Beer 2006)
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Life expectancy increases, but are we approaching the limits to the growth in longevity?
Even though a considerable increase in life expectancy has occurred over a long period of time,
there have been periods with less favourable developments as well, resulting in variation in the
pace of increasing longevity over time, across genders and across countries. The principle of
“diminishing returns” seems to be at play, as countries where life expectancy was high in the 1960s
generally experienced smaller gains in longevity than countries with lower life expectancy. In
almost all Member States, the average annual increase in longevity has been lower in recent years
than in previous decades. Although this does not necessarily imply that the limits to the growth in
longevity are approached (see for a discussion on breaking these limits Oeppen and Vaupel 2002),
a further linear increase in longevity should not be taken for granted.
One important determinant of the increase in longevity in the past decade has been the decrease in
mortality from cardiovascular diseases in late middle-age. As a consequence, death has
increasingly been delayed to more advanced ages and further substantial increases in longevity can
only be achieved through a strong reduction in mortality at advanced ages. But as mortality at older
ages cannot usually be attributed to one single disease but rather to frailty leading to so-called “comorbidity”, medical advances in the treatment of one disease may only lead to limited gains in
longevity. Nevertheless, ongoing medical advances and improvements of living conditions will
yield further gains in longevity, but unhealthy life-styles (smoking, diet, alcohol, lack of physical
exercise) may have a restraining impact. An ongoing increase in life expectancy seems plausible, at
least for some time to come, but there is no consensus among experts about the ultimate levels, nor
about the pathways towards these levels (De Beer 2006).
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International migration
International migration is the most volatile demographic process. International migration processes
are very difficult to document as reliable data are scarce. Comparative analysis is also hampered
because of varying definitions of key indicators. As was indicated above, international migration
currently is the main driver of European population growth. The 2007 contribution of international
migration to European population growth amounts to an average of 3.3 per thousand for the entire
European Union where the migration balance is positive at plus 4.7 per thousand for the 15 old
Member States, but negative at minus 1.8 per thousand for the 12 new Member States. However, in
2007 the highest population growth due to international migration has been observed for a new
Member State, i.e. Cyprus (19 per thousand), followed by Spain (15) and Ireland (14). On the other
hand, the two countries that lastly joined the EU, Bulgaria and Romania, show the biggest losses of
population by migration (4 and 5 per thousand respectively).
Economic conditions are among the major push and pull factors of international migration but
other factors play a role as well. Focussing on recent migration flows, immigration from (former)
colonies and labour migration from Mediterranean countries like Turkey and Morocco, later
followed by family reunion migration and family formation migration were the main sources. Most
strikingly, former migration sending countries like Spain, Italy and Portugal turned into major
immigration countries. The inflow of asylum seekers and refugees from Third World countries is
of a more recent date and also added to the growing ethnic diversity of the European population in
particular in the old Member States. As for the new Member States, the turmoil of the socioeconomic and political transition since the mid-1990s and the disintegration of the former Soviet
Union added to the migration dynamics. After the extension of the European Union, major intraEuropean labour migration flows emerged.
13
Where it is difficult to document current flows because of lacking data, the future course of
international migration is even harder to predict. Recently the total number of international
migrants worldwide was estimated at 191 million, some 15-20% of which are undocumented
migrants. The number of undocumented migrants in Europe as a whole is estimated at some 7-8
million.
The study of international migration flows in the EU is hampered by data availability, data quality
and data consistency. In response to the “..long history of inadequate, incomparable and missing
migration data…” several policy and research efforts were launched in Europe (see Raymer and
Willekens 2008, also for an extensive discussion of data, models and estimates on international
migration in Europe). As a follow up to these studies, the current MIMOSA project4 developed a
methodology to harmonise and correct for inadequacies in the available data and to estimate the
missing data (Raymer and Abel 2008). The outcomes indicate that the overall migration balance
for the EU-27 in 2005 amounted to 1.0 million, resulting from about 3.6 million immigrants and
some 2.6 million emigrants (Table 1). Almost two out of every three immigrants in the EU-27
arrived from outside the Union and consequently 1 out of 3 immigrants came from other Member
States. The large majority of immigrants, 3.1 million, settled in the old Member States while the
new Member States attracted 0.5 million immigrants. Somewhat less than half of the emigrants
from the European Union left for destinations outside the Union, and about the same proportion
went to one of the old Member States.
Table 1 about here
4
MIMOSA (MIgration MOdelling for Statistical Analyses) is a three-year project funded by Eurostat intended to
support the development and application of statistical modelling techniques for the estimation of missing data on
migration flows and foreign population stocks. The project is being coordinated by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary
Demographic Institute (NIDI) and involves experts on migration statistics from the Central European Forum for
Migration and Population Research (CEFMR), Southampton Statistical Sciences Research Institute (S3RI) and
Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL).
14
Again according to these estimates, in 2005 from all EU Member States immigration as a share of
the total population was highest in Luxembourg and Cyprus (at 34 and 22 per thousand
respectively), followed by Ireland (14) and Spain (13) (Figure 4). The lowest inflow of immigrants
was recorded for Romania (3 per thousand), Finland (4), Poland (4) and Bulgaria (4). As for
emigration, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Lithuania recorded the highest shares (at 40, 34 and 15 per
thousand respectively). Luxembourg stands out, both with respect to in- and outflow, as a centre of
international institutions. The relatively lowest shares of persons leaving the country occurred in
Italy and Finland (both 2 per thousand).
Figure 4 about here
European Union enlargement and labour migration
Basically there are two sets of legal regimes relating to (labour) migration in the European Union,
one regarding the rights of nationals of the EU and one relating to “third country” nationals.
Especially with respect to the first, the recent enlargements of the European Union in 2004 and
2007 changed the landscape of European migration (GDISC 2007)5. And although the freedom of
movement for EU citizens did not automatically entail immediate access to the labour markets of
all Member States due to restrictive transitional regimes that were introduced by some Member
States (until 2011 at the latest), the enlargement stimulated intra-European migration flows from
the new to the old Member States. The enlargement and transition agreements did not result in a
complete shift from “restrictive” to “receptive” countries. The post enlargement flows to a large
extent were a continuation of pre-enlargement patterns and thus the migration flows from the ten
new Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 were not evenly distributed among the old
Member States but reinforced existing patterns. Countries which attracted most of these migrants
in the period 2003-2005 were Ireland with a net immigration of over 100.000 (+ 90%) and the
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United Kingdom with a net immigration of just under 100.000 (+ 47%). Both countries had fully
opened their labour markets immediately after accession. Although Sweden did the same, this
country only recorded an increase of 30%. But Spain, which introduced a transition regime, saw
the number of immigrants from the new Member States increase by over 30.000 (+147%).
Contrary to the projections, which predicted that Germany would receive over half of the new
enlargement migrants, Ireland, Spain and the UK attracted the largest flows. However, Germany is
still the country with the largest number of people originating from the ten new Member States, a
stock of some 480.000 (GDISC 2007).
A recent survey among Immigration Services (GDISC 2007) showed that the overwhelming
majority of European nations positively evaluate the impact of labour migration on their labour
markets and economic development. Migration indeed helps to solve labour shortages in specific
occupations, sectors and regions. But both in the sending and receiving countries, the growth of
intra-European labour migration, also gives rise to concerns. Sending countries are worried that
labour emigration creates or exacerbates rising shortages and brain drain on their internal labour
markets. Receiving countries report social challenges created by labour immigration and the need
to absorb large inflows of migrants, avoid social exclusion, foster integration and ensure the
confidence of the general public. Many states note that population ageing would result in rising
labour shortages. But since population ageing impacts on all European countries, intra-European
labour flows alone will not solve these shortages. Hence, increased labour migration from outside
Europe is deemed to be necessary (GDISC 2007). Although immigration from the new Member
States is becoming more prominent than immigration from “third countries”, the migrant
population from these “third countries” continues to be the largest and is considered as an
5
In fact the freedom of movement of workers applies to the entire European Economic Area (EEA: EU plus Norway,
Iceland and Liechtenstein) and Switzerland.
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important labour potential. As for future “third country” migration, most countries are emphasizing
special programs for highly skilled migrants.
International migration spurs population diversity
Due to international migration, the composition of the European population has become more
diverse. It is estimated that currently citizens from at least 175 nationalities are living within the
boundaries of the European Union. Migration flows added to the already existing patchwork of
national minorities and cultural groups, making up the current population diversity. It is however
difficult to draw an accurate picture of this diversity (see for example Schoorl and Van Praag
2007). Most European countries have statistics on the migrant population (defined as those born
abroad) and/or the population with foreign citizenship. These statistics however are not sufficient
to describe the populations of foreign descent or ‘ethnic minorities’. On the one hand, statistics that
focus on foreign country of birth do not include the native-born descendants of the immigrants, the
so-called ‘second generation’. On the other hand, statistics that focus on foreign citizenship do not
capture the immigrants who have acquired citizenship of their country of residence, either by birth
or by naturalization.
To demonstrate the impact of the various definitions of diversity, the example of Denmark and the
Netherlands (the only Member States with statistics that allow capturing a wide ethnic diversity) is
illustrative. Denmark hosts 5% foreign citizens, while its current population of foreign descent
(residents born abroad and their native born children) is 8.8%. The case of the Netherlands is even
more striking with 4.2% of foreign citizens and 19.4% population of foreign descent (Schoorl and
Van Praag 2007).
Taking the limitations of this indicator into account, on average 5% of the population of the
European Union has foreign citizenship (Figure 5). The new Member States of Central and Eastern
17
Europe have relatively few inhabitants with foreign citizenship (less than 3%) with the exception of
Estonia and Latvia with their large minorities of people of Russian origin. Other Member States
with high shares of foreign citizens are Cyprus (12%), Ireland (10%) and Austria (10%).
Luxembourg as a centre of European institutions stands out with 40%.
Figure 5 about here
The composition of the foreign population is strongly influenced by proximity (Schoorl and Van
Praag 2007). In general, citizens from neighbouring countries rank high in the list of largest
immigrant groups. But also (post-) colonial and/or political ties, (former) labour migration
agreements and asylum policies play an important part. Southern Europe traditionally had small
shares of foreign nationals and in the 1950s and 1960s saw many nationals migrating to Western
Europe, but as was stated above, these countries nowadays serves as a refuge for migrants from the
African continent.
It must be noted that differences in naturalization policies and in the history of migration also play
an important part in shaping the foreign population. As regards the statistics on acquisition of
citizenship, the comparability of these statistics remains limited over time for the same country and
internationally, because of the following reasons (see Bauböck et al 2006 and Cantisani and Greco
2005):
• differences and frequent changes in national provisions;
• the presence or absence of a dual citizenship regime, making the acquisition of citizenship more
easy or more difficult;
• different acquisition requirements and procedures;
• limited or incomplete registration for some types of acquisition;
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Taking these limitations into account, figure 6 gives a rough picture of the differences between the
EU countries. Despite the data shortcomings, it may be concluded that in, for example, France and
the United Kingdom many more people are naturalised than in Germany and Italy. Other countries
with recent high rates of acquisition of citizenship are Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria and Cyprus. On
the other hand, rates well below the average are found in Luxembourg, Italy and Greece.6
Figure 6 about here
With respect to migration history, both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have large shares
of migrants coming from former colonies who usually held citizenship of the receiving country and
thus do not show up in data on foreign citizenship. Consequently the share of foreigners in the
population of these countries is rather modest.
Some 7% of the population of the European Union is born outside the country of residence and can
be considered as first generation migrant. Again Luxembourg stands out, followed by two Baltic
countries with large shares of inhabitants born abroad, presumably in what is now the Russian
Federation. Other Central and Eastern European countries have below EU average shares of first
generation migrants (Figure 7).
Figure 7 about here
6
A European project aiming at comparing the provisions for the acquisition of citizenship is NATAC (The
acquisition of nationality in the EU MS: Rules, practices and quantitative developments). This project is coordinated
by the Institute for European Integration Research of the Austrian Academy of Science, and carried out by the
European Centre for Social Welfare Policy Research (Austria), the Centre for Migration Law of the Catholic
University of Nijmegen (the Netherlands) and the Danish Institute for Human Rights (Denmark)
(http://www.eif.oeaw.ac.at).
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Demographic diversity is linked with socio-cultural diversity and in most European countries at
least part of the recently arrived migrants can be characterised by social arrears in relation to the
majority population. Higher levels of unemployment, lower levels of education and less favourable
housing conditions exemplify this. A degree of spatial segregation is present in most large
European cities with migrants occupying comparatively unattractive houses and neighbourhoods.
Such arrears may be unavoidable and even acceptable at the onset of migration when migrants
have to overcome language problems and when their education in the country of origin may not be
tuned to the demands of the receiving society. When such arrears persist and extend over
generations however, there is cause for alarm as integration seems to falter and lasting social
disparities pertain (Schoorl and Van Praag 2007).
Whether one looks at nationality, country of birth, migration history, language, religion and the
like, Europe is a patchwork of population groups. This demographic and socio-cultural diversity
remains difficult to document due to differing definitions, methodologies and statistical procedures.
As immigration flows have increased, but also because sometimes irregular or unconventional
channels (like asylum seeking, tourism overstaying) are being used by international migrants,
migration policies are becoming a higher priority among Member States, also because of
population ageing. Migration management is developing into a balancing act between openness
and control and searches for a proper mix of selected and non-selected migrants. It is to be
expected that population ageing, including the ageing of the (potential) work force, as well as
imminent population and labour force decline, will continue to function as a major pull factor for
international migration. Continuing high levels of population growth outside Europe will remain an
important demographic push factor, together with economic imbalances and political unrest.
Although international (labour) migration may serve a function in solving labour market shortages,
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it may not reverse the ongoing trends of population ageing and population decline since this would
involve unprecedented and continued mass migration at unsustainable levels.
5. Discussion: Outlook for the future; quantity or quality?
Population ageing and population decline will, to a large extent, determine the demographic
outlook for the future of Europe. The root causes of population ageing are firmly embedded in our
society and thus population ageing, in addition to being the natural outcome of ongoing and
structural demographic trends, basically is man-made. It can also be considered as a success story.
The root causes of population decline and thus of the structural changes in European demography
are also firmly embedded in European society. As regards the future course of the key processes of
demographic change that were discussed in this paper, the following may be hypothesised.
Sustained low fertility below the replacement level seems to have developed into a structural
characteristic of modern European society. Some recovery of fertility in countries where fertility
can be characterised as “lowest low” may occur, especially when economic security for the
younger generations will increase, housing conditions improve and, more general, the
compatibility of work and family life will increase. An overall societal context and institutional
framework which is more child/family friendly may also have an impact on the timing of fertility,
but major shifts in the number and the timing of children seem hardly plausible. Sustained below
replacement fertility implies slow population growth and imminent population decline in the
absence of large scale migration.
Longevity is expected to further increase, although future growth will most likely be slower as
future health gains will mainly have to obtained in combating chronic disease. Gains in (healthy)
life expectancy can be jeopardised by unhealthy life styles. Efforts to further reduce the gender gap
21
in longevity, as well as socio-economic differentials in mortality may substantially contribute to
future gains in life expectancy and quality of life.
International migration has already become the main driver of European population growth. Also
since the recent enlargements of the European Union, intra-European migration has gained
importance and is an important factor in economic development. Intra-European labour migration
can and will play an increasingly important role in solving labour market shortages which are
related to population ageing and population (and workforce) decline. But as most European
countries will experience population ageing and population decline, intra-European migration may
not suffice to solve these shortages which will further trigger immigration from outside Europe.
The international competition for highly skilled migrants most likely will further increase, both
within Europe and at the global level. In this respect it is worth mentioning that in its recent
statement on the demographic future of Europe, the European Commission explicitly included
policies for receiving and integrating migrants in its considerations; policy plans for legal migration
and a common agenda for integration were agreed upon (European Commission 2007).
International migration, both intra-European and from outside Europe, can and most probably will
play an increasingly important role in solving shortages at European labour markets and as such
will help accommodate population related challenges. International migration however cannot stop
or reverse population ageing. As has also been indicated by scenario studies on replacement
migration, which is the international migration needed to offset population decline and population
ageing, the numbers of migrants which are needed to offset declines in the working force are very
large. The numbers of migrants to keep the so-called support ratio (the population of pensionable
age –over 65- relative to the working age population), would have to be extremely large (see for
instance United Nations 2000, Bijak et al 2007). International migration delays the onset of
population decline in Europe but cannot reverse this imminent trend. It must be noted that
22
population decline will especially manifest itself at the regional level; shrinking regions are not the
destination of migrants, unlike growing regions. Because of international migration the population
of Europe will become more ethnically diverse, calling for more emphasis on integration and the
prevention of social exclusion.
It is evident that international migration is not the only strategy to address labour shortages and
maintain or promote economic growth. The economic potential embedded in the current
population can and should be put to better use, for instance by promoting higher labour force
participation and extending working life. Increasingly policies are being introduced and reinforced
to this end. An ageing and declining population and workforce specifically calls for additional
investments in education and (life long) learning to obtain productivity gains and increase
competitiveness.
When the current demographic trends of population ageing and population decline indicate that
human capital will become more scarce and “quantity’ tends to decrease, efforts to stimulate
“quality” should become a dominant policy perspective. Promoting quality may well be the most
effective response to the dual demographic challenge that Europe is facing.
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26
Figure 1. Population growth per 1 000 population, 2007
B ulga ria
R o m a nia
Lit hua nia
La t v ia
P o la nd
E s t o nia
H unga ry
G e rm a ny
S lo v a k ia
N e t he rla nds
P o rt uga l
A us t ria
F inla nd
G re e c e
E U- 2 7
C ze c h R e public
D e nm a rk
F ra nc e
S lo v e nia
M a lt a
Unit e d Kingdo m
B e lgium
S we de n
It a ly
Luxe m bo urg
S pa in
C yprus
Ire la nd
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
natural increase
20
net m igration
Source: Eurostat.
27
25
Figure 2. Total (period) fertility rate, 2006
S lo v a k ia
P o la nd
B ulga ria
S lo v e nia
R o m a nia
Lit hua nia
G e rm a ny
It a ly
C ze c h R e public
H unga ry
P o rt uga l
La t v ia
S pa in
Gre e c e
A us t ria
M a lt a
C yprus
E U- 2 7
E s t o nia
B e lgium
Luxe m bo urg
N e t he rla nds
D e nm a rk
Unit e d Kingdo m
F inla nd
S we de n
Ire la nd
F ra nc e
1.0
1.5
2.0
Source: Eurostat and NIDI estimates.
28
Figure 3. Life expectancy for men and women at birth, 2006
R o m a nia
B ulga ria
La t v ia
Lit hua nia
H unga ry
S lo v a k ia
E s t o nia
P o la nd
C ze c h R e public
D e nm a rk
Unit e d Kingdo m
Luxe m bo urg
N e t he rla nds
Gre e c e
M a lt a
E U- 2 7
S lo v e nia
B e lgium
Ire la nd
P o rt uga l
C yprus
G e rm a ny
A us t ria
S we de n
F inla nd
S pa in
F ra nc e
It a ly
60
65
70
75
m en
80
w om en
Source: Eurostat and NIDI estimates.
29
85
Table 1. Estimated EU migration flows, 2005 (millions)
To
From
EU-27
EU-15
NMS-12
Rest
Total
EU-27
EU-15
NMS-12
Rest
Total
1.4
0.8
0.6
2.2
3.6
1.1
0.6
0.5
2.0
3.1
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.5
1.1
1.0
0.2
2.6
1.8
0.8
NMS-12: 12 new Member States; EU-15: 15 old Member States.
Source: Raymer and Able, 2008.
30
Figure 4. Estimated immigration and emigration per 1 000 population, 2005
R o m a nia
F inla nd
P o la nd
B ulga ria
H unga ry
E s t o nia
N e t he rla nds
S lo v e nia
La t v ia
P o rt uga l
G e rm a ny
Gre e c e
Lit hua nia
B e lgium
S we de n
E U- 2 7
C ze c h R e public
Unit e d Kingdo m
It a ly
F ra nc e
D e nm a rk
M a lt a
A us t ria
S lo v a k ia
S pa in
Ire la nd
C yprus
Luxe m bo urg
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
im m igration
35
40
em igration
Sorted by immigration.
Source: Raymer and Able, 2008.
31
45
Figure 5. Population with foreign country of citizenship (% of total population), 1 January 2006
P o la nd
R o m a nia
B ulga ria
S lo v a k ia
Lit hua nia
H unga ry
F inla nd
S lo v e nia
C ze c h R e public
P o rt uga l
M a lt a
N e t he rla nds
It a ly
F ra nc e
D e nm a rk
S we de n
E U- 2 7
Unit e d Kingdo m
B e lgium
Gre e c e
G e rm a ny
S pa in
A us t ria
Ire la nd
C yprus
E s t o nia
La t v ia
Luxe m bo urg
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
EU27
35
non-EU27
Source: Eurostat and NIDI estimates.
32
40
45
Figure 6. Average annual rate of acquisition of citizenship (%)
G re e c e ( 0 3 )
It a ly ( 0 3 / 0 4 )
Luxe m bo urg ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
P o rt uga l ( 0 2 / 0 4 )
S pa in ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
Ire la nd ( 0 4 / 0 5 )
Lit hua nia ( 0 3 / 0 5 )
C ze c h R e public ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
E s t o nia ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
G e rm a ny ( 0 4 / 0 5 )
H unga ry ( 0 2 / 0 4 )
La t v ia ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
B e lgium ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
D e nm a rk ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
N e t he rla nds ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
P o la nd ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
F inla nd ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
R o m a nia ( 0 5 )
S we de n ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
Unit e d Kingdo m ( 0 3 / 0 5 )
F ra nc e ( 0 3 / 0 5 )
C yprus ( 0 5 )
A us t ria ( 0 4 / 0 5 )
S lo v e nia ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
S lo v a k ia ( 0 2 / 0 5 )
0
5
10
15
20
Source: Eurostat., NSIs and NIDI estimates.
Because of differences in rules, procedures and definitions the comparability of figures is hampered.
Acquisition of citizenship by newly-born children is generally excluded.
No data available for Bulgaria and Malta.
33
Figure 7. Population with foreign country of birth (% of total population), date last census
B ulga ria
R o m a nia
H unga ry
F inla nd
P o la nd
It a ly
S pa in
P o rt uga l
C ze c h R e public
D e nm a rk
Lit hua nia
Unit e d Kingdo m
S lo v e nia
N e t he rla nds
F ra nc e
Gre e c e
Ire la nd
B e lgium
S we de n
S lo v a k ia
A us t ria
C yprus
E s t o nia
La t v ia
Luxe m bo urg
0
5
10
15
20
25
EU27
30
35
non-EU27
Source: Eurostat.
Data are derived from last census, generally held in 2000 or 2001, or otherwise from population register on 1 January
2001. Exceptions: France (census 1999) and Ireland (census 2002)
No data available for Germany and Malta.
34