Pragmatics
7:1.69-81.
International
Pragmatics
Association
WHOSE BACKGROUND?
COMMENTSON A DTSCOURSE.ANALYTIC
RECONSTRUCTION
OF THE WARSAW UPRISING
Jan Blommaert
1. Introduction
DariuszGalasiriski'spaper on 'The making of history' (hagmarics, this issue) is
interestingand informativefrom a variety of perspectives.
On the one hand, it is a
fine pieceof political discourseanalysis,written by someonewho has masteredthe
art admirablywell. On the other hand, I believe the paper raises and illustrates
some crucial problems in critical discourseanalysis.lI will discussone central
problemin this paper: that of 'background'(facts,information,context) in critical
discourseanalysis.I do this largely in support of Galasifiski's ambition: to
demonstrate
that linguisticanalysisis capableof revealingthe assumptionsbehind
linguisticchoice. But as an footnote to Galasiriski'sposition, I take it that this
ambition could not be fully realized without taking into account the reflexive
dimensionof the endeavor.More specifically,
we needto ask:how'loaded'is critical
discourse
analysisas a set of linguisticchoicesin its own right? Which assumptions
do we take on board when analyzinglinguisticchoices(texts)?
of the problematicnature of background
Before embarkingon the discussion
information,I want to give some intertextual'background'to the kind of critique I
shall be formulating. A version of Galasiriski'spaper (exclusivelydealing with
Walgsa'sspeech) was presented during the Groningen workshop mentioned in
footnote 1, alongside analyses of the other speeches given during the
Commemorationevent of the 50th anniversaryof the Warsaw Uprising. The
workshopwas intended to present a discourse-analytical
reconstructionof the
Commemorationevent,and all the participantswere givena set of materialsin view
of preparationsfor the workshop. It now strikes me how similar the historical
backgroundinformation given by the workshop organizersis to the background
Galasiriskigives in section 1 of his paper. The workshop organizerssent us an
extractof a book on Polishhistory(Dziewanowski1977:129-139),which articulated
a versionof historyvery closeto the one adoptedby Galasinskiin his 'background'
section.I will discussDziewanowski'stext in section3 of this paper in connection
I This paper is part
of a larger discussionpaper, presentedat a workshop on the 50th
anniversary
of the WarsawUprising during the conference'Frame and perspectivein Discourse'
(Universityof Groningen,November1996),organizedby Titus Ensink and ChristophSauer.I am
indebtedto the participantsof the workshopandespeciallyto DariuszGalasiriskiand KlausSteinke
for importantcommentson the originalversionof the paper.
70
Jan Blommaen
with Galasiriski's
version.
2. Problems with background
what we do
I find the notion of 'background'increasinglyproblematicin assessing
as (critical) discourseanalysts.In my view, a particular use of 'backgrounddata',
'basic facts', or 'some preliminary observations',hides a number of major
methodologicalproblems. Of course, these problems are not new. Situated
discourse,as used for instancein anthropologicallinguisticsor discourseanalysisof
'real' texts/discourses,always involves a degree of definition, in which an
unproblematized(and unanalyzed)set of 'facts'is givenas settingthe sceneagainst
will appear as meaningfulcommunicativeacts or events.
which the texts/discourses
Providing 'backgroundfacts' is clearlya matter of framing and perspectivizing:the
background facts provide some knowledge necessary to understand the
text/discourseitself, and elementsof text/discoursemeaningare contextualizedby
these background facts.2
More and more, however, I experience this routine (and undoubtedly
necessary)practiceas either paradoxicalor at leastpartly inconsistentwith our own
analyticalambitions.Especiallyin critical discourseanalysis,where scholarsset out
to unravel and exposeideologicalfeaturesof discourseand communicativepractice,
the incorporation of 'backgroundfacts' risks drawing in a seriesof unquestioned,
ideologicallyneutralizedassumptionsabout the nature, statusand meaning of the
analyticalobject, the text/discourseitself. In other words: the critical analysisof a
text/discourserisks being undermined (and ideologicallyplied) by the uncritical
acceptanceof 'established'background facts related to the text/discourse.Our
criticalorientationthus becomespartial and methodologically
questionable,because
we exclude from critical analysisthe frame and perspectivein which we place our
object. We consequentlygrant these texts an authority which, from a critical
discourseanalysispoint of view, they should not be given a priori.
Often, this practice of using background facts in a neutralizing and
analyticallyunproblematizedfashionhasa dimensionof interdisciplinarity.
The facts
we cite as backgroundto the text/discourseare handed to us by other sciences-anthropology,sociology,history,descriptivelinguistics.They may includestatements
which
about culturalpractices,socialrelations,historicalevents,linguisticstructures,
then serve to explain aspectsof when, how, why the text/discoursewas produced.
The statementsare, however,rarely taken as a target of analysisin their own right;
they are generallytaken at face value,as 'facts'in the commonsense
meaningof the
term: thingswe know, about which we shouldno longerworry and which we should
not question,investigateor deconstruct.We thus neutralizethe socially-constructed
nature of scholarly practicesand results from other sciences,while being highly
critical and unassumingwith regardto our own results.We do not contextualizethe
'
ln a particular way often stipulated by discourseanalysts:context helps us to read texts; what
is in the texts becomes more transparent or meaningful by referring to context. That this assumed
pattern is not without problems should be clear from the discussionspresentedin Auer & Di Luzio
(eds. 1D2) and Duranti & Goodwin (eds. 1992). See also Bauman & Briggs (1990) for insightful
comments.
Wose background?
71
'facts'we
use to contextualizeour own object, and so avoid or overlook a quite
relevantquestion:when giving 'background'to our data, whosebackgroundare we
giving?Who produced these facts,when, how, why?
3. The historical account
lrt us now take a look at the backgroundoffered by Galasifiski.Galasiriskispends
four paragraphsdiscussingthe background.In the first paragraph,the Uprising is
chronologically
and politicallysituated.Galasiriskistresses
the intentionof the Home
fury to demonstratetheir prowessand importanceand, in the samemove, to preempt the Sovietinvasionof the city, which would have involved the establishment
of a Communistregime.The secondparagraphdelvessomewhatdeeper into the
militarydimensionsof the Uprising, emphasizingthe role of the Red Army as a
potentialally who by its (politicallyinspired)inertia becamea betrayer.Against the
hopesof the Home fu-y, the Soviets"stopped"at the Vistula, and "looked on as
Warsaw was gradually being destroyed".Stalin also acted uncooperativelyby
refusingthe Allies to use Soviet-controlledair bases.The third paragraphstresses
the historicalimportance of the Uprising as "one of the most remembered and
cherishedPolishmilitary operationsof the SecondWorld War". This importance is
saidto have been underscoredby the Communists'postwar downplayingof the
Uprising as an important event, since that would have highlightedthe negative
historicalrole of the Soviets.The final paragraphconnectsthe eventsof 1944to the
Commemorationevent of 1994,stressingthe controversialcharacterof inviting the
German and Soviet authorities. The whole 'background' section is written in
declarativesentencesand is presented as a factual historical account.3The
declarative,
matter-of-factstyleis arguablyan instanceof 'politicsof representation',
of "competitionover the meaningof ambiguousevents,people, and objects in the
world" (Mehan 1996: 253), in which Galasiriski metapragmatically marks the
information he provides as (clear unambiguous)facts, in other words, as an
authoritativeversion of reality. Argumentsfor this claim will be given throughout
the rest of the paper, but the point is this: Galasiriskipresentsas 'backgroundfacts'
(with all the above-mentionedconnotationsof the term) what is essentiallya highly
controversial,
ambiguousand obscure(i.e.'unknown')historicalepisode.Similar and
moreextensiveinstancesof this move could be found in Dziewanowski'stext, which
servedas the 'backgroundinformation' for the Groningenworkshop.
The extract from Dziewanowski (1977) provided us with an authoritative
historicalaccountof the WarsawUprising. It was taken from the kind of historical
book that would be perceivedby many among us as a standardreferencework: a
bookon Polishhistoryin the twentiethcentury(i.e.written by someonewho utilized
a wider than purely local perspectiveon the Warsaw Uprising), published by a
Polishscholar (i.e. involving assumptionsabout accessto Polish-languagesources
3 In the abstractoriginally
accompanying
Galasiriski'smanuscript,the factualmetapragmatic
qualificationwasmadeexplicit:"Of particularinterestis the mannerin which the speeches
handle
thefact that the SovietArmy did not preventthe deathsof morethan 2fi),fi)0 inhabitantsof Warsaw
".
[...]
72
Jan Blommaert
and eyewitnessaccounts,as well as a degreeof generalcredibility),and published
by a prominent Western academicpublisher,undoubtedlyafter detailedrefereeing
by other acknowledgedspecialists.The work is also rather old (it was publishedin
1977),which grants some prima facie credibility to the book. The use of this text
now, almost twenty years after its appearance,would suggestthat it is still a
standardaccountof Polish history,unmatchedby other, more recent works. This is
how I, at first, receivedand perceivedthis document.I read the colophon,decided
that it was 'good', then read the whole text and found it instructiveand balanced.
The story sketchedby Dziewanowskifocuses(i) on the optimisticperception
of the Soviet offensiveamong the Polishunderground(the Sovietswere irresistibly
moving towards Warsaw,while the German defencewas becomingweak), (ii) on
the political dimension of the decisionto unleashthe Uprising (the struggle for
supremacy by the l,ondon government, against the Communists), (iii) the
unexpectedhalt of the Soviet offensive,jeopardizingthe successof the Uprising,
combined with the refusal of help to the insurgentsby the Soviets suggestinga
deliberate move to let the pro-London forces bleed to death, and (iv) on the
altogether cynical attitude of Stalin towards the Uprising, and the fact that the
Soviet inactivitywas inspired by political rather than by military motives.
Looking closer at the text, two thingscan be noticed.First, it looks as if all
the movesand messagesof the Sovietswere ambiguousand allowedinterpretations
of encouragementto organizethe Uprising - and in hindsight,as encouragements
to commit suicide. There is an overdose of modal qualifications when the
information about Soviet actionsand intentionsprior to the Uprising is discussed.
The Red Army's offensive "appearedirresistible"; the Germans "sltowed signsof
exhaustionand demoralization";to the insurgents,"it seemedthat the Wehrmacht
would be unable to offer resistancealong the Vistula line"; a Sovietradio appeal to
the Polishpeople "apparently
indicatedthat the Sovietcommandwas about to launch
an assaulton Warsaw",hence the leader of the underground"judgedthe situation
,ipe for the uprising to begin". The Polish resistance makes a string of
interpretationsof Sovietactions,and usesthem as the basisfor planningthe precise
date of an offensivein Warsaw.This complexcalculationwould involve estimates
of the speedand scaleof the Sovietoffensiveand undoubtedlya few other technical
issues- a seriesof impressionsand appearances
would hardlyvindicatethe decision,
it seemsin hindsight.All the perceptionsof the Sovietmovesare clearlymarked as
conjecturalin the historicalaccount:thesemay have been the meaningsof Soviet
movesand messages,
but they might aswell havebeen different.Nevertheless,these
conjectures are plausible for the historian. Dziewanowskiinterprets the Soviet
communiqu6sayingthat MarshalRokossovsky's
armies"wereadvancingon'Warsaw"
as an unambiguousannouncementthat the troops "had been about to capture
Poland'scapital",thus sanctioningthe Home Army's estimateof the timing for the
Uprising as legitimate.
The secondremarkablepoint was the author'sselectivequoting.As a matter
of routine, I always take note of who is cited and how when reading politically
sensitivetexts.In this case,Dziewanowskiquotesthe commentsof (i) Arthur Bliss[ane, US Ambassador to Poland, (ii) Eisenhower(quoted by Bliss-Lane), (iii)
General Bor-Komorowski, (iv) an unidentified "Communistmember of the new
Polishgovernment"mediatedthroughBliss-Lane's
words,(v) GeorgeF.Kennan and
("i) Jan Ciechanowski,"a Western-orientedPolish historian"who revised the
Vl/hosebackground?
73
standardaccountof the Uprising.The statementmade by the Communistmember
of the new government (narrated by Bliss-l-ane)corroborates the thesis that
politicalrather than military considerationsguided the Soviet actions during the
Uprising.They corroborated,in other words, the post-waranti-communistversion
of the story. Similarly, Ciechanowski'samendment to the dominant historical
accountin which both Nazis and Sovietswere held responsiblefor the d6bacleof
the Uprisingis accepted,but servesas the startingpoint for a new line of argument
in which the Soviet actions are seen as foreshadowingan inevitable geopolitical
reshufflingof postwarEurope.The failure of the Uprisingwas a consequenceof the
Polish government'smisjudgment of international support, the Soviets having
bargainedbeforehandthat Polandwould becomepart of their sphereof influence.
Still,the agreementof Yalta had to be implemented,and so the Sovietsdecidedto
let the PolishHome Atmy be slaughteredby the Nazis -- a paraphraseof George
Kennan'sstatement. The "middle position", taken by the Polish historian, in
Dziewanowski'seyes does not take away the burden of guilt from the Soviets; it
merelyreformulatesthe nature of the guilty behavior.
Dziewanowskimentionsthe fact that the WarsawUprising gaverise to bitter
controversies
in which Communist historianswere pitted againstnon-Communist
historians.The Communist accountis not mentioned.Dziewanowskirefers to the
works of a Polish historian, Zenon Kliszko, who is qualified as "Gomulka's friend".
Thisis an interestingpoint, for it indicateshow DziewanowskiperceivesCommunist
historyasbiased(the historiansare friendsof the Communistleaders),while people
suchasBor-Komorowski,Bliss-l-ane,Eisenhower,Kennan or (when it comesto the
FriendshipTreaty) Brzezinskiare treated as historicalsourceswith some authority.
He callstheir camp of historiographythe non-Communistcamp, rather than the
ani-Communistcamp.We know that they are not Communists,but what are they?
Surely,Eisenhower, Kennan and Brzezinski, let alone Bor-Komorowski or BlissI-anecannotbe treated as ideologicallyneutral actorsin the story and its narrative
history?Is the non-/anti-Communistversion of a controversialhistorical issuer/re
undisputedversion?Then why is it controversial?
The point we have to take on board before we move any further is that the
'historicalbackground'offered in Galasiriski'spaper aswell as in the Dziewanowski
text is a particularhistoricalaccount,in itself worthy of deconstructionand critical
It is not somethingwe can simply base ourselvesupon in analyzingtexts
analysis.
commemoratingthe Uprising and hence crucially hinging on representationsof
history.Galasifiski'sand Dziewanowski'saccountof the Uprising are perfectly in
line with the historical representationof the Uprising articulated in the various
speeches,
becauseit is the anti-Communistaccount.The point is, however,that this
is broughtinto the discourseanalysisas a form of entextualization(Bauman & Briggs
1990;Silverstein& Urban 1996):it providesus with a preferred metadiscourseon
the variousspeecheswe are supposedto analyse.It is, in itself, an unintendedbut
quite common case of framing and perspectivizingdiscourseanalysis,a case of
an'obvious',unquestionedand unquestionable
suggesting
backgroundreadingto the
texts.Note alsothat, from a criticalperspective,a preferredmetadiscourse
is always
someone'smetadiscourse.Whose voice produces the metadiscourseattaching
authorityto one versionof history?Certainlynot that of the Soviets,as will become
clearin the next section.
74
JanBlomntaen
4. The absent voice
We have to delve somewhatdeeper into the issueof backgroundfacts. I hope to
have argued clearly so far that the entextualizationsuggestedin the background
facts represents- broadly speaking- an anti-Communistaccount of the Warsaw
Uprising. The background given by Galasiriskiin order to provide us with some
knowledge of what happened in 7944, represents one side in the historical
controversy.Its sympathy lies clearly with the Home Army (despite its admitted
naivity and its errors of judgment). The author is, however,adamantwith respect
to the Soviets'role as betrayerguidedby political strategiesrather than by military
ones.
When we look at the variousspeechesof the Commemoration,we see that
the roles sketched by Galasiriskiand Dziewanowskiare all to various degrees
incorporated in the speakers'views,includingthose of the Russians.The Russian
representativeFilatov is somewhatcircumspectwith regard to the issue,and calls
for historical investigation.At the same time, however, he refers to "old-time
mistakes"and "ignominiousblunders"in a way which is hard to detach from the
particular occasionand topic of the speech.Does this mean that the Sovietsare
acknowledgingtheir unfortunaterole of betrayer?
It has become a common trope to equate (post-1990)"Russians"with (p..1990) "Soviets",especiallywhen historicalperiods such as the SecondWorld War
are concerned.The simplefact, however,is that today'sRussiansare not yesterday's
Soviets,just as today'sGermansare not yesterday'sNazis.In fact, of all the parties
involved in the Warsaw Uprising, two are not represented during the
Commemoration:the Nazis (the "perpetrators")and the Soviets(the "betrayers").
In the caseof the Nazis,historicallogic is respected:the original perpetratorsare
still presentedas perpetrators;in the caseof the Soviets,however,a historicalrolereversalis performed, and from allies they have become 'betrayers'.Furthermore
(but related to this role reversal),whereas the German President only has to
acknowledgeguilt for one crime -- the crushingof the Uprising itself -- the Russians
have to acknowledgeguilt both for their betrayalduring the Uprising and for the
post-warimperial oppressionof Poland.The link betweenboth historicalevents,the
Uprising and the Communistrule, is constantlymade during the Commemoration,
and speakerscelebrateboth the heroismof 1944and the collapseof Communism
in 1990.
This trope has to be questioned.First, equating 'Russians'with 'soviets'
reducesa multi-ethnic complexsystemto one ethnicity.aStalin,to my recollection,
was a Georgian and not a Russian.It is also plausiblethat Zhukov's troops were
made up not only of Russians,but alsocountedByelorussians,
Lithuanians,Kazakhs,
Georgians, Ukrainians and so on. Where are they? And can the Russian
representative (though himself to some extent usurpating the legacy of Soviet
superpowerstatus)be called upon to accountfor Sovielactionsof the past? Is the
ethnicizationof the Sovietnot a first step in the reinterpretationof history (as it is
o
Thit is an emblematic move ideologizing the historical perception of the Soviet Union as
dominated by ethnic Russians,thus suggestinga (popular) line of explanationsfor the fall of the
Soviet empire as the result of oppressedethnicities. See Blommaert & Verschueren (1996).
Wose background?75
e.g.in the Baltic Statesor in other newly independentex-Sovietrepublics)?This is
connectedto the secondquestion.Is the link betrveen7944and 1990not already
basedon a rewriting of history, in which 'Russians'signify the liberated Soviet
people?Couldit be possiblethat the WarsawUprisingbecomessucha big historical
event,not becauseit possessed
an 'intrinsic'historicalimportancesuppressedby the
PolishCommunistregime (as Galasiriskibelieves),but preciselybecauseit can be
insertedseamlesslyas a trope or an exemplum in a contemporarydiscourseof
postcommunism
and legitimized anticommunism?It could certainly motivate an
allignmentof discourseparticipants,in which the Rrusrar?representativecan afford
to dismiss responsibility for the Soviet actions, because he embodies
postcommunism.
In that sense,and contraryto what Galasiriskisuggests,Filatov's
referenceto the need for historiographywould not be so much an attempt to dodge
difficult questions,but rather an expressionof the new postcommunistrelations
betweenhis country, Poland and the former Allies, guided by the spirit of
rationality,objectivityand honesty(here allseen in contrastto - Soviet-'ideology').
As for the events of. 7944,the absenceof a Sovietvoice is remarkable,the
more since the issue of guilt and responsibilitywith regard to the Uprising is
consistently
referred to as controversialand unclear.The reason for this absence
cannotbe the lack of availablehistoricalmaterial.I myselfhave bought quite a few
books published by Soviet publishers, and at least two of them contain
autobiographical
accountsof the WarsawUprising.Needlessto say,they provide a
quitedifferentaccountof the events.I shall quote and discussthesetwo sourcesat
somelength.
The first Soviet account I found in the memoirs of Marshal Georgi Zhukov,
the commanderof the Red Army in chargeof the operationson the Western front
(Zhukov 1974).Throughout these amazinglyinformative memoirs, great emphasis
is put on the frailty of the Soviet offensives.Nowhere do we meet the image (so
widespread
elsewhere,and alsopresentin Dziewanowski's
account)of an irresistible
steamroller,crushingall German oppositiononce it got moving. On the contrary,
Zhukovconsistentlyemphasizesthe precariousness
of the operations,the difficulties
encountered
in preparingmassiveoffensives,the immenselossesand above all, the
fierceoppositionof German troops.sIn Zhukov'saccount,wheneverthe Red At-y
stops,it is becauseof military-technicalreasons.l-et us now take a look at the
passage
in his memoirs in which he discusses
the operationsin the Warsawtheatre
in 1944(Zhukov 1974: 301ff.). Zhukov is very brief with regard to the Uprising
itself.I shall quote his words in full:
"As was established later, neither the command of the Front nor that of Poland's lst Army
had been informed in advance by Bor-Komorowski, the leader of the uprising, about the
forthcoming events in Warsaw. Nor did he make any attempt to coordinate the insurgents'
actions with those of the lst Byelorrussian Front [i.e. the Red Army Front closest to
Warsaw]. The Soviet Command learned about the uprising after the event from local
residents who had crossed the Vistula. The Stavka [=coordinated high mmmand] had not
been informed in advance either.
'
Thus, Zhukov repeatedly notes the fact that German crack SS troops were transferred to the
Eastern front after D-Day. The war on the Eastern front, as Zhukov lived it, was not a walk-over
from Stalingrad to Berlin. It was bloody hard work.
76
Jan Blommaert
On instructions of the Supreme Commander [= Stalin], two paratroop officers were
sent to Bor-Komorowski for liaison and coordination of actions. However, Bor-Komorowski
refused to receive the officers.
To assist the Warsaw insurgents, Soviet and Polish troops crossed the Vistula and
seized a section of the Warsaw Embankment. However, Bor-Komorowski again made no
attempt to make any reciprocal move in our direction. In a day or so the Germans brought
up considerable forces to the Embankment and began pressing our troops. A serious
situation developed, and our troops suffered healy losses.Having considered the situation,
and being convinced of theimpossibility of capturing Warsaw, the command of the Front
decided to withdraw the troops from the Embankment to its bank."
Zhukov thus emphasizesBor-Komorowski'sunwillingnessto accept coordinated
actions, the military efforts that were made by the Red Army (including airdroppings of food, ammunition and medicines)and the practical impossibilityto
capture Warsaw at that particular time. The Warsaw Uprising did not fit into the
Soviet strategictempo, and militarily it was doomed to failure.
These notes are fully coherentwith Zhukov's detaileddescriptionof all the
operationsin the direction of Berlin. All operationsare carefullyplanned,and very
little room is left for improvisationor revisionof plansonce they have been drafted
-- hence,Bor-Komorowski'sfailure to coordinateefforts with Rokossovskywas not
purely a matter of procedure, but was an essentialcondition for being able to
support the Uprising. Zhukov emerges as a technocrat who thinks in purely
operational terms. Thus, when discussingthe halt of the troops in the ModlinWarsaw sector,Zhukov advocatesa move to defensivepositions,given the degree
of exhaustionof the troops.When askedby Stalinwhether a continuedoffensivein
the Modlin-Warsaw area would be feasible.he answers:
"My opinion is that this offensive will yield us nothing but casualties (...) From the
operational viewpoint, we don't particularly need the area north-west of Warsaw. The city
must be taken by skirting it on the south-west,and at the same time dealing a powerful
splitting blow in rhe general direction of Lodz-poznan."
This probably meant the death warrant for the Warsaw insurgents.The fact is,
however, that Zhukov usesexclusivelymilitary argumentsfor his decision.The image
of the Red Army, sitting idle in waiting on the banks of the Vistula, complacently
watching the Nazis slaughter the Warsaw people, is far away. Zhukov was
particularly wary of crossingthe Vistula, fearing that the Germans might put up
heavy defensesand inflict terrible losseson the Red Army. In all his moves during
the offensivessinceStalingrad,suchoperationsare consistentlydealt with in a very
careful way, Zhukov being particularlyapprehensiveabout exposingflanks of his
At-y to enemy counter-attacks.The samegoesfor capturingmajor cities.Always
there is a period of halt and preparationprior to taking a city. So when the Red
Army stopped in front of Warsaw,it just might have been a matter of military logic.
This, at least, is the opinion of the Soviet commander.
The secondSovietsourceare the memoirsof a diplomat,Valentin Berezhkov
(Berezhkov 1982), an aide to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov.
Berezhkov took part in all the major diplomaticeventsof World War II, including
the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 and the conferencesof Teheran, Yalta and
Potsdam.He spendsa whole sectiondiscussingthe Warsaw Uprising (Berezhkov
1982: 356-365), recognizing that it was an event of major significancein the
Whose
background?77
diplomaticaffairs surroundingWorld War II.
Berezhkov'saccountis much more politicalthan Zhukov's,and his narrative
is more than Zhukov's littered with Sovietjargon ('reactionaries','revolutionaries',
'bourgeois'etc.).At the same
time, he providesus with an image of at least shared
guilt.He stressesthe fact that Poland had been assignedto the Soviet sphere of
influenceduring the Teheran Conference,and that, consequently,Roosevelt also
contributedto the underminingof the Polishgovernmentin London.Thus,when the
US Ambassadorto London, Harriman, visits Rooseveltand informs him of the fact
that Churchill changedhis mind on the Polishquestion,Rooseveltmerely
'repeated
to Harriman his previous position, the essence of which was that the Polish
6migr6 government must be reorganized so as to bring about conditions favourable to
lasting friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union.'
The discussionsbetween the Polish emigr6 leader Mikolajczik and the Soviet
diplomat lrbediev, granted great importance in Dziewanowski'saccount, are
nowherementionedin Berezhkov'saccount.What emergesis a picture in which the
Sovietgovernment consistentlysticks to the terms of the Teheran agreements,
supportedby repeated confirmationsof theseterms by Roosevelt.So there were,
in Berezhkov'saccount,no ambiguousmessages
given by the Soviets.The Soviets
emphasizedthe need to reach an agreement between the London 6migr6
governmentand the Polish Communistgovernment,and they saw the latter as the
mostrepresentativebody, "best informed about conditionsin Poland".
What then about the Uprising? Berezhkovshetchesa picture in which the
Polish6migr6 authoritiesattemptedto boycott the effectivenessof the activitiesof
the Communist government, thus trying to create a fait accompli in which their
could claim representativeness
of the Polishpeople.Realizingthat this
organization
strategywould clashwith Moscow'sand Washington'sdecisionsabout the future of
Poland,they "hastily took a number of countermeasures,
chief among which was
organisingthe Warsaw uprising", which coincided with Mikolajczyk's visit to
Moscow."Reactionarygroups in Poland hoped that the uprisingin Warsawwould
strengthenMikolajczyk'sposition at the Moscow talks".
As soon as the Sovietswere informed about the Uprising,they made it clear
that it was doomed to failure. Stalin himself told this to Mikolaj c4k, and a Soviet
communiqu6to the British Governmentof August 16 reaffirmedit. Berezhkovalso
elaborateson the military impossibilityof supportingthe Uprising in a way which
fullycorroboratesZhukov'sversion.The 1stByelorussianFront was exhaustedafter
a 40-dayoffensive,and the Germanshad put up new and strongerreinforcements.
Despitethat, units were sent to assistBor-Komorowskiand material was dropped
from the air. Also, part of the failure was due to the Polish command'srefusal to
coordinateactionswith the Sovietunits.The Sovietunits sufferedheavylossesand
withdrew,while air support continueduntil the capitulationof the Home Atmy.
Berezhkov calls the Uprising an "unconscionablegamble of the 6,migr6,
government",
addingthat "[o]n the one hand,the Warsawuprisingdemonstratedthe
selflessness
and heroism of the rebels in the struggleagainstthe occupyingforces;
on the other, it was a criminal act of an anti-Soviet policy pursued by the
governmentof Mikolajczyk and those leaders of the l.ondon 6migr6 government
who were in Poland". In other words. contrarv to Dziewanowski'sthesis that the
78
Jan Blommaert
Soviet actionswere inspiredby political motives,Berezhkovsuggeststhat the Polish
actionswere inspired by political rather than by military motives.
These two Soviet sourcespresent us with a perspectivewhich is radically
different from that presentedin the 'backgroundfacts' offered by Galasiriskiand
Dziewanowski.Of course, one can object that these two sourcesare biased, or
'propaganda'.
But this then begsthe questionas to why and by what standardsone
would call Kennan, Eisenhower, Brzezinski and others 'unbiased', or, why our
version would be a case of information', and theirsof 'propaganda'?The question
is therefore not which perspectiveis true and which is false. It is rather: whose
perspectivedid we adopt and grant authority when we acceptedone version of
history as the backgroundfacts necessaryto know what the speechestalk about?
The question is relevant, for we now know that there are different perspectives,
each of which should be tested as to its historicalaccuracv.
5. The background of postcommunism
I would venture that the background given by Galasiriskiand by Dziewanowski is
that of the postcommunist'new order'. The version of history in which the Soviet
voice is all but eliminated characterizesthe political-ideologicalenvironment in
which we now proceedto criticallyanalyzediscourseproducedon a historicaltopic.
It has become the defaultway in which we now entextualizethesespeeches,and the
reasons for which we entextualize them in this particular way are often
unquestioned.We do it because of political commonsense,ethical awareness,
ideologicalconviction,and a load of other reasonscommonlyseenas'unscientific'.
Commonsense, as we all know, is the locus of mainstream ideology, and
incorporatingcommonsenseassumptionsinto our own scholarlydiscourseis a way
of ideologizingit. We analyzethe speechesof the Commemorationin a way which
has taken on board all the assumptions,
all the acquiredhistorical'truths'whichare
articulatedin the speechesand which serveas a point of departurefor the various
speakersto developparticulardetailsof their historicalcontributionto the Uprising.
In this way, we can dive into the text/discourse,and be critical within the confines
of the text/discourse.What is outsidethe text/discourse,
what the text/discourseis
based on, is 'known'.
Our professionalvision as critical discourseanalystsconsistsnot only of
"[d]iscursivepractices(...) used by membersof a professionto shapeeventsin the
domains subject to their professionalscrutiny"(Goodwin 1994:606), but also and
simultaneously of elisions of potentially explosive questions that surround
texts/discourses.
We assume,within our small professionalcommunity,a great deal
of political, social,cultural and ethicalwisdom,which we can then keep outsideour
analytical practice. We can simply assumethat all our colleaguesshare the same
assumptionsabout factsof politics,societyand so on. For instance,critical discourse
analystsare typically'leftists',liberals-- at least,I haven't met a right-wingcritical
discourse analyst yet. Is this trivial? I don't think so. It may prove to be the
methodologicalAchilles' heel of the discipline,becauseit frameswhat we are doing
in ways that are hard to motivate, given our stated ambition to demonstrate
connectionsbetween discourseand socialpower structuresor ideologies.
Whose
background?79
6. ConclusionszQuid background?
But what to do with this 'background',this necessaryevil we need in order to give
groundingto the texts/discourseswe intend to analyze? Here, we touch upon a
problemof the definition of our object,in other words on a central methodological
questionof which we should be aware and which we should not avoid.
There is a tendencyto restrict'data'in criticaldiscourseanalysis(but also on
a more general level of pragmaticsand sociolinguistics)to linguisticallyidentifiable
data. Texts/discoursesare prototypically chosen on the basis of formal-linguistic
criteria:they need to be productsof language.And at this point, many of us take a
linguisticturn. Languageis still to variousdegreesthe autonomousobject defined
by Saussureand conflatedby some of his followersso as to make some contextual
elementscollapse into language. I-anguage,to linguists, never collapses into
somethingelse.They may claim it does,but in actualpracticethe relationshipis the
other way round. Dell Hymes' old observation,that "fl]inguistics,the discipline
centralto the study of speech,has been occupiedalmost wholly with developing
analysisof language as a referential code" (1974: 32) by and large still holds.
assumptionin section2 of his paper,"alongthe linesof critical language
Galasiriski's
study [...] that linguistic analysisis capable of revealingthe assumptionsbehind
linguisticchoices"(speciffing further that this should include an analysisof the
syntacticand lexico-grammaticallevels of a text), reveals more than just an
analyticalpreference.It revealsan adherenceto traditional conceptsof text and
linguisticstructurewhich cannotbe undoneby claimsto the contrary.In Galasiriski's
analysisof Walgsa'sand Filatov'sspeeches,processesof intertextuality,dialogism,
textualizationand so on are stopped and reduced to one textual event (in itself
reducedto one textual object) which is then supposedto tell the whole (political,
historical,cultural, ideological)story.This story is made explicit in section5 of his
paper,where he providesagain some 'background',illuminating,it seems,some of
the intertextuality,the motives for particular linguistic choices,and the wider
historical framing of Walgsa's and Filatov's speeches.But just like in the
introductorybackground
section,the informationprovidedhere is disconnectedfrom
the textual evidence offered in the analysis.It is not in the text, and neither is the
object-textreally made part of the wider perspectiveoffered in section 5. The
and the wider background in
introductorybackground,the linguistictext-analysis,
section5, are three juxtaposed narrativessaid to be connectedin the sensethat the
two'contextual'narrativesexplain - semantically- the object text.
The issueis a fundamentalone, and it is rooted in traditionsof constructing
the object of inquiry that are hard to get rid off. We need to explore other
dimensionsof textualitythan the oneswe are usedto dealingwith. The questionof
interdisciplinarityis implicit in my critique, though it needsto be formulated in a
specificway. I tend to agree with Dell Hymes' call for a revision of the scope of
various disciplines, by redefining the object of inquiry (.f. Hymes 1974: 32).
Interdisciplinarity,in other words, at the level of what we are analyzing,rather than
80
Jan Blommaert
at the level of how we analyze.6
My commentsin the previous sectionswere aimed
at demonstratingthat the scopeof our critical inquiry is drasticallyreduced when
we cut off the 'backgroundfacts' from the texts,and refuseto see the background
as a form of entextualizationin its own right. The object which I advocateis partly
text in the traditional senseof the term, and partly 'non-text'.Both are part of a
process of textualization,of 'doing text', of 'texting'. And a critical analysisof this
object should, for instance,also inquire into the reasonswhy we look at particular
texts in particular ways at this particular time in history,into what we bring along
into our analysisin terms of assumptions,images,attributionsand so on.
Does this solveour problems?Not completely,of course.But it allowsus at
least to distinguishbetween the various perspectiveswe apply - as a matter of
normalcy and embedded in an ideologyof our own professionalpractice - to our
'data'. It should be
clear that we very often Ju.p', not necessarilyto conclusions,
but certainlyto implicit acceptationsof motivesfor doing thingsin a particularway,
motives which need to be called into questionevery now and then as a matter of
critical reflection on our own practice.For instance,analystsoften 'step out' of the
object-text/discourse in order to explain why a text/discourse is political or
ideological. Texts/discoursesare then defined as political or ideological by
associatingthem with an apparently objectivelyexisting sphere of 'political' or
'ideological' practices,structuresor institutions (e.9. the common simplism that
political discourseis discourseproducedby politicians).In this way, rather than to
call into question the social order in which discourseappears and functions,we
adopt the basicstructureof this socialorder and integrateit into our way of viewing
our object.
I pray Galasifrskiand all thosewho might identifywith him as the objectsof
my critique to view the commentsmade here as friendly and constructive.I believe
we need to reinvestigateour joint claimsabout the deep embeddedness
of language
in social life, time and culture, and turn it into more than just a taken-for-granted
truth which allowsus to proceedwith linguisticbusinessas usual.When theseclaims
are taken seriously - and again I have to paraphraseHymes - texts, contexts,
linguisticstructuresand ultimately linguisticswill never be the same again.
References
Auer,
Peter
&
Aldo
Di
Luzio
(eds.) (1992) The contextualization
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language.
Bauman, Richard & Charles Briggs (1990) Poetics and performance as critical perspectives on
6
Hymes' appeals to a revision of the scope of the various disciplines involved with discourse
and speech appear in various places in his oeuvre, but have remained largely unnoticed. The essence
of his stance is that sociolinguistics should not become a new 'discipline' like linguistics or
anthropolory; rather it should be an interdisciplinary influence on both (and other) disciplines, and
the effect of sociolinguistics should be that linguistics and anthropology would be changed.
Linguistics would have adopted the social dimension of language as part of its object, and
anthropology would have adopted the importance of discourse and its social embeddednessas part
of its object. See Hymes (1971) for a particularly detailed argument.
Whose background?
81
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Berezhkov, Valentin (1982) History in the ntaking: Memoirs of lltorld War II diplomacy. Moscow:
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