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tAfS
POLICY RESEARCH
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PAPER
Implicationsof the Currency
Crisisfor ExchangeRate
Arrangementsin Emerging
EastAsia
Public Disclosure Authorized
WORKING
a
0
2502
Moreeffortshouldbe made
to developa frameworkfor
internationalmonetary
coordination,not onlyto
maintainstableexchange
ratesamongthe U.S.dollar,
theJapanese
yen, and the
euro,but to minimizethe risk
Masahiro Kawai
SbigeruAkiyama
of currencyand financial
crisesin emerging economies
in EastAsiaand elsewhere.
The World Bank
EastAsia and PacificRegion
Office of the Chief Economist
December 2000
P(I I(: RE-STFARCIIH
WORKING PAPER 2502
Summary findings
Kawai and Akiyama examine the implications of the East
prominent again since late 1998. It is too early for
Asian currency crisis for exchange rate arrangements in
conclusions, but the economies seem likely to maintain
thie region's emerging market economies. They focus on
the roles of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the
euro in the emerging East Asian economies' exchange
rate policies.
They claim that these economies are particularly
susceptible to large exchange rate fluctuations because
they have been pursuing financial deregulation, opening
more flexible exchange rate arrangements, at least
officially.
At the same time, these economies presumably will
continue to prefer to maintain exchange rate stability
without fixed rate commitments. They are better off
choosing a balanced currency basket system in which the
yen and the euro play a more important role than before.
markets, and liberalizing capital accounts, and because
they face increased risk of sudden capital flow reversals,
with attendant instability in their financial system and
foreign exchange market.
Kawai and Akiyama find that the dollar's role as the
dominant anchor currency in East Asia was reduced
during the recent currency crisis but has become
The ASEAN countries have a special incentive to avoid
harmful fluctuations in exchange rates within the region,
which could suddenly alter their international price
competitiveness and make prospective free trade
agreements unsustainable. So they may stabilize their
exchange rates against similar currency baskets, to ensurc
intraregional exchange rate stability.
This paper-a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, East Asia and Pacific Region-is part of a larger effort in the
region to study financial market development, capital flows, and exchange rate arrangements in East Asia. Copies of the
paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Athena Azarcon,
room MC9-142, telephone 202-473-6049, fax 202-477-0169, email address [email protected].
Policy Research
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.
The authors may be contacted
at mkawai@)worldbank.org or [email protected].
December 2000. (65 pages)
The PolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdbsseminates
the fRndingsof work in progressto encouragethe exchangeof ideasabout
devoeiopmtent
issiies.An objective of the seriesis toget thefindings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENCY CRISIS
FOR EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS
IN EMERGING EAST ASIA
By
Masahiro Kawai* and Shigeru Akiyama**
* Chief Economist, East Asia and the Pacific Region, World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C., USA.
**Consultant,East Asia and the Pacific Region, World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C., USA.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented to several conferences: the "Seminar on
Exchange Rate Issues in an Environmentof Volatile Capital Flows," which was co-hosted by the
Japanese Ministry of Finance and the SEACEN Centre, and held in Kuala Lumpur on May 30June 1, 2000; the International Symposium, "International Monetary and Financial System and
East Asia," which was organized by the Japan Research Center, Nankai University, and held in
Tianjin on September 9-11, 1999; and the NYU Technical Symposium, "International Finance
and Financial Institutions: Analysis of the Asian Crises," which was organized by the Center for
Japan-US Business and Economic Studies, Stem School of Business, New York University, and
held in New York on March 26, 1999. The authors are grateful to Patrick Honohan, Yusuke
Horiguchi, Richard Levich, Paolo Mauro, Paul Samuelson, Alexander Swoboda, several other
IMF economists, and many participants at the conferences above for constructive comments, to
Naoko Kojo for her earlier contributionand to David Bisbee for editorial assistance.
IMPLICATIONSOF THE CURRENCYCRISIS FOR EXCHANGE RATE
ARRANGEMENTSIN EMERGINGEAST ASIA
Masahiro Kawai and Shigeru Akiyama
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines implications of the East Asian currency crisis for the exchange rate
arrangements in the region's emerging market economies. In particular, it focuses on the
international roles of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro in the emerging East Asian
economies' exchange rate policies.
The East Asian currency crisis forced many economies in the region to shift away from
de facto US dollar-peggedregimes to flexible exchange rate regimes. The US dollar had played a
dominant role as an international anchor (reference) currency in East Asia until the outbreak of
the currency crisis in July 1997. During the crisis, the anchor currency role of the US dollar was
substantially reduced, at least temporarily. As the currency crisis subsided in the second half of
1998, however, the East Asian economies largely returned, in practice, to arrangements akin to
the pre-crisis, dollar-based exchange rate stabilization regimes. The question is whether or not
this apparent reversion to US dollar-based regimes is a long-term trend. This question is
important because it is often claimed that one of the causes of the East Asian currency crisis was
the de facto US dollar-pegged regimes of the pre-crisis period.
This paper argues that any emerging market economy, including those in East Asia, faces
a trade-off between the virtue of exchange rate stability and the need for flexibility, particularly
during a time of a crisis, to maintain international price competitiveness. The "two-corner
solution" approach of choosing either a free floating or a fully committed fixed rate regime (a
common currency, dollarization, or a currency board) does not appear to be realistic in many
emerging market economies, including East Asia, because these economies have strong
preferences towards exchange rate stability, though not necessarily rigidity. Given East Asia's
diversified trade and FDI relationships with the United States, Japan, and the European Union
and given the continued large exchange-rate volatility among the tripolar currencies, a reasonable
exchange rate policy for many East Asian economies would be to stabilize rates to a basket of
currencies consisting of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro. This paper proposes that
the East Asian economies should achieve real effective exchange rate stability by loosely tying
their rates to currency baskets during normnaltimes, while allowing enough room for flexibility
during a crisis.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II summarizes the nature of
"reported" and "observed" exchange rate arrangements for developing economies.
By
econometrically identifyingmajor currencies and their weights in a currency basket for almost all
developing countries, this section demonstrates that many authorities in these economies exhibit
a preference to stabilize their exchange rates vis-a-vis an international currency or a basket of
such currencies. Using further regression analyses, the observed weights in a currency basket are
explained by the country's share of trade with the relevant anchor countries or the currency areas
formed by such anchor countries. Section III briefly describes the process of the East Asian
currency crisis and contagion. It then empirically analyzes the importance of the US dollar, the
Japanese yen and the euro as an internationalanchor currency for the exchange rate behavior of
12 East Asian economies before, during, and after the currency crisis using daily exchange rate
data. It examines the changing roles of the tri-polar currencies in the 1990s and the changing
2
patterns of cross-country exchange rate co-movements.Section IV presents the argument that the
de facto US dollar-pegged exchange rate regimes were indeed one of the factors behind the crisis
and develops a scope for future exchange rate arrangementsin emerging East Asia. It proposes a
"soft" currency basket system where the US dollar, the Japanese yen and the euro play more
balanced roles than in the pre-crisisperiod. Section V summarizes the paper and offers an agenda
for future research.
11. EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTSOF THE LDC'S IN THE 1990S
This section reviews the exchange rate arrangements of almost all developing countries in
the world for the 1990s and obtains some stylized facts and general conclusions.' It focuses
particularly on the role played by the world's major currencies, such as the US dollar, the
Deutsche mark, and the Japanese yen, as international anchor currencies for other countries'
exchange rate stabilization.
1. "Reported"Exchange Rate Arrangements
The Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF) regularly publishes exchange rate arrangements
reported by its member countries according to its own classification scheme. Table 1 presents the
overview of the developing world's exchange rate arrangements reported by LDC members, for
the period December 1980 through September 1998.2Exchange rate arrangements are classified
broadly into three categories: (a) a fixed rate arrangement; (b) limited exchange rate flexibility;
3
and (c) a more flexible rate arrangement.
' See InternationalMonetaryFund[1997]fordiscussionsof exchangerate arrangementsin developingcountries.
2 This table is compiledfrom the IMF's International
FinancialStatistics(variousissues)by removingindustrialized
countries.
BeginningJanuary 1999,the IMF introduceda new classificationof categoriesthat include: exchangerate
3
First, the fixed rate arrangement includes a "peg to a single currency" and a "peg to a
basket of currencies." As target currencies for single-currency pegs, the IMF lists the US dollar,
the French franc, the Deutsche mark, the Australian dollar, the Indian rupee, the South African
rand, the Italian lira, and the Singapore dollar at end-September 1998.4 A peg to a basket of
currencies is further divided into a "peg to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR)" and a "peg to a
currency composite other than the SDR." While currency compositions of the SDR and their
weights are clearly defined by the IMF, those of other currency composites are specific to the
respective country and are in most cases not made publicly available. To find such information,
one must statistically analyze the observed exchange rate movements and estimate the basket
composition and currency weights.
Next, limited exchange rate flexibility refers to "flexibility limited in terms of a single
currency." Though not officially part of a "fixed rate arrangement," it is in reality a peg to the US
dollar.
Finally, the more flexible rate arrangement includes "other managed floating" and
"independently floating." The sub-category "other managed floating" suggests that the
authorities intervene frequently in the foreign exchange market to influence the level and/or
volatility of the exchange rate. The sub-category "independently floating" is supposed to
represent a textbook-style flexible exchange rate regime. Both of these sub-categories may
arrangements with no separate legal tender; currency board arrangements; other conventional fixed peg
arrangements (including de facto peg arrangements under managed floating); pegged exchange rates within
horizontal bands; crawling pegs; exchange rates within crawling bands; managed floating with no preannounced
path for exchange rate; and independently floating. The new classification, however, is not strictly comparable to
earlier classifications. For the sake of data continuity, this paper uses classification reported until September 1998,
the last period for which comparable information is available.
4 In the past, the IMF used to list also the UK pound, the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo (for their respective
former colonies), and the Russian ruble (for the newly independent, former Soviet republics soon after the collapse
4
possibly contain heavily managed, or even defacto fixed, exchangerate regimes.
While the number of IMF members in the developing world has increased over time
(from 118in 1980to 159 in 1998),the number of developingcountries under fixed exchange rate
arrangements has decreased (from 90 to 63), and the number of countries under more flexible
exchange rate arrangements has increased (from 25 to 92). As far as "reported" exchange rate
arrangements are concerned, developing countries have shifted from fixed to more flexible
arrangements since 1980.
Though the number of developing countries on "more flexible rate arrangements" reached
92 (58% of the total) in September 1998, quite a few developing countries still attempt to
stabilize their exchange rates. Indeed, 67 developing countries (42% of the total) were on "fixed
exchange rate arrangements," including "limited exchange rate flexibility." It is also possible that
some countries under "more flexible arrangements" have actually stabilized their exchange rates
vis-a-vis a certain currency or a basket of currencies.
Focusing on the fixed rate arrangements,as of September 1998, the US dollar is the most
popular target currency (for 24 developing countries including 4 countries under "flexibility
limited in terms of a single currency"), followed by the French franc (for 15 countries), non-SDR
currency baskets (for 12 countries), the SDR (for 4 countries), and the Deutsche mark (for 3
countries).5 It is noteworthy to observe that no country any longer pegs its exchange rate to the
UK pound sterling, particularly since 1986, or the Japanese yen throughout the period.
oftheSovietUnion)astargetanchorsforsingle-currency
pegs.
Othertargetcurrencies
forsingle-currency
pegsincludetheSouthAfricanrand(for3 countries),
theIndianrupee
(for2 countries),
theAustralian
dollar,thePortuguese
escudoandtheSingapore
dollar(forI countryeach).
5
2. "Observed"Exchange Rate Arrangements:Regression Analyses
The "reported" exchange rate arrangements provide useful information about the nature
of the arrangements as reported by individual developing countries. However, these reported
arrangements do not always describe the actual practice of exchange rate policies, nor do they
offer sufficient information as to which currency or basket of currencies is chosen as a target for
exchange rate stabilization. To understand what exchange rate arrangementsare actually in place,
one must statistically examine the behavior of observed exchange rates.6
Regression analyses. One way to do this is to find, through regression analyses, which
major currency or currency basket is chosen as a target for a particular country's exchange rate
stabilization and how closely such a relationship can be observed. Extending the studies by
Frankel and Wei [1993, 1994, 1995],Kawai and Akiyama [1998] conducted regression analyses
to identify specific currencies that comprise a basket used as a target for a particular country's
exchange rate stabilization and to find their weights in the basket. Exchange rate stabilization to
a single currency can be interpreted as a special case in which only one currency is identified
with a significantand large positive weight, while other currencies' weights are negligible.
Specifically, Kawai and Akiyama [1998] estimated the following type of regression
equation:
=
+ i1AeUSD P2 AeDMt+ p 3 Ae", +
p 4 AeFFt + P5Aeu
, +
(1)
where Ae',is the monthly change in the log exchange rate of currency j in month t, ocis a constant
term,
Pk
(k = 1, 2,...) is the coefficient on the monthly change in the log exchange rate of
currency k, and u, is the residual term. The estimated standard error of residuals is interpreted as
6A
more detailedstudywouldrequireanalysisof changesin foreignexchangereserves.
6
a measure of exchange rate volatility. Though the G-5 currencies (the US dollar, the Deutsche
mark, the Japanese yen, the French franc, and the UK pound) were mainly used as candidates for
potential targets for exchange rate stabilization, the SDR, ECU, and other relevant minor,
regional currencies were also tried as potential targets, depending on a country's economic as
well as non-economic (i.e., colonial, historical, cultural, and geographical) relationships. Using
information from the "reported" exchange rate arrangements, the Australian dollar, the Indian
rupee, the New Zealand dollar, the Portuguese escudo, the Singapore dollar, the South African
rand, and the Spanish peseta were included in the list of potential target currencies for certain
countries.7 Data used were monthly average exchange rates for the sample period of January
1990 through December 1996.5Following Frankel and Wei [1994], all the exchange rates were
expressed in terms of a numeraire currency,the Swiss franc.9
The underlying hypothesis is that every country attempts to stabilize its exchange rate to
a basket of multiple currencies. The coefficients on the right-hand side exchange rates,
pk,
are
interpreted as the weights in a currency basket assigned by the country's authorities. A single
currency peg is a special case, where the coefficient on the target currency for exchange rate
pegging should be unity, the coefficients on other currencies should all be zero, and the value of
The Russian ruble was not tried as a potential nominal anchor currency due to the lack of a sufficient number of
exchange rate data for the former Soviet republic countries.
8 The monthly average series of the exchange rates of G-5 currencies, a few regional currencies, SDR and ECU visA-visthe US dollar were obtained from the IFS data base (line code rf). Exchange rate data for Taiwan Province of
China (POC) were obtained from the Central Bank of China, Taiwan District, Financial Statistics, various issues. To
obtain meaningful regression results, data observations with values of log first differences greater than 0.1
(approximately a 10.5 percent change in both directions) were removed. This procedure was taken because
countries often devalue their currencies to accommodate persistent differences in inflation rates vis-&-vistheir
reference-currency country. Without eliminating the effects of such discrete currency devaluations (or revaluations),
the regression results could be too unstable to conclude the presence or absence of target/referencecurrency.
9 In other papers, Frankel and Wei [1993, 1995] use the SDR as a numeraire currency, but Kawai and Akiyama
[1998] did not follow this procedure because the SDR was regarded as a potential candidate for a reference
currency.
7
the standard error of regression residuals should be zero. If one country's currency is not pegged
rigidly, but is only loosely stabilized to another currency, the estimated coefficient for this target
currency should be statistically significantand close to unity. Also, the standard error of residuals
should take a sufficiently small value. If a currency is pegged or stabilized to a basket of multiple
currencies, several coefficients should be statistically significant and should approximately add
to unity. On the other hand, if a currency is on a purely flexible exchange rate regime, no
coefficient should be statistically significant, and the estimated standard error of the regression
residuals should be large."0
"Observed" exchange rate arrangements. Estimation results are summarized in Table
2.' The table classifies developing economies into three broad categories according to their
"observed" exchange rate arrangements,that is, pegged, intermediate, and flexible, depending on
the size of exchange rate volatility as measured by the estimated standard error of regression.
Countries are classified to be under the "pegged" arrangement when volatility is less than 0.005,
"intermediate" when volatility is between 0.005 and 0.015, and "flexible" when volatility
exceeds 0.015; where the value 0.01 is approximately a 1 percent change in monthly exchange
rates. The size of exchange rate volatility is shown next to each country's name. In each
category, the table further classifies countries into three groups, depending on what currency or
Interpretation of regression results, however, requires caution. The reason is that the exchange rate of a country
whose shocks are highly correlated with those of the anchor country and whose inflation objective is similar to that
of the anchor country authorities may appear to be stabilized vis-a-vis the anchor currency, even in the absence of
any conscious effort of exchange rate stabilization. Such examples for industrialized countries in the 1990s include
the Swiss franc vs. the Deutsche mark and the New Zealand dollar vs. the Australian dollar.
l The results in the table are obtained after extensive trial and error using many different combinations of the G-5
currencies, the SDR, the ECU, and relevant regional currencies as explanatory variables in each currency's
regression. For each country (or economy), a regression equation with the highest explanatory power, measured by
the R2-adjusted and with reasonable coefficient estimates was chosen and its results reported.
8
2 Countries in the
currency basket is assigned a significant weight in the regression equation."
"USD" group are those for which the US dollar appears as the only significant currency in the
regression equation. Countries in the "other single currency" group are those for which any other
single currency appears as the only significant currency in the regression equation, with the name
of the currency shown in parenthesis. Countries in the "basket of currencies" group are those for
which multiple currencies appear as significant in the regression equation, with the names of
currencies shown in parenthesis. The pound sign
"#"
is attached to a currency's name in
parenthesis if its estimated coefficient exceeds 0.80 on an adjusted basis. When the sum of the
estimated coefficients on multiple currencies is greater than unity, adjustments are made by
proportionally re-scaling the estimated coefficients downward so as to make the sum of the
adjusted coefficients equal to one.
The table provides interesting information on "observed" exchange rate arrangements
adopted by developing countries. While Table 1 indicates that an increasing number of
developing countries have shifted away from fixed towards more flexible exchange rate
arrangements, Table 2 reveals that almost all countries attempt to stabilize their exchange rates
against one currency or a currency basket, though the degree of rate stabilization varies
considerably across countries. Many countries regard the US dollar as the target currency even
though they do not formally peg their currencies to the US dollar. Indeed, some countries under
formal, flexible exchange rate arrangements do assign a large weight to the US dollar. Many
other countries are using currency baskets as their anchor without officially announcing it. In
addition to the French franc zone countries, there are other isolated cases where regionally
12The statistical significance level is 5 percent.
9
influential currencies such as the Australian dollar and the South African rand are used as target
currencies.
Exchange rate volatility and domestic price inflation. Cross-country data reveal that
developing economies that allow large exchange rate volatilities are those with relatively high
inflation rates. This is depicted in Figure 1 where exchange rate volatility (measured by the
standard error of regression reported in Table 2) is plotted against the inflation rate (average of
the log differences of monthly CPI series during January 1990 - December 1996). Since both
exchange rate volatility and CPI data are needed to draw this figure, the number of developing
countries is limited to 124. These economies are grouped into 6 regions: Africa, East Asia, South
Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that developing countries with high inflation rates tend to
have high volatility of exchange rates. Many developing countries in Africa, Europe, and Latin
America exhibit high inflation rates as well as large exchange rate volatility, although there are
several exceptions. Developing countries in the Middle East tend to have both low inflation rates
and small exchange rate volatility. Inflation rates of the East Asian emerging market economies
are generally low, thus enabling them to achieve relatively stable exchange rates.
3. Explaining the Estimated Currency Weights
Trade with the anchor country or the anchor currency area. What determines the
estimated G-5 currency weights in each developing country's currency basket? The hypothesis
tested here is that the estimated currency weights are explained either by (a) the country's share
of trade with the respective anchor country (direct-trade based share), or (b) the country's share
of trade with the currency area formnedby the respective anchor country (currency-area based
10
share). In addition, it is also postulated that non-economicfactors, such as geographical location
and former colonial relationship,may explain the currency weights.
The size of the currency area formed by an anchor country is calculated by assuming that
a G-5 country constitutes its own currency area; by decomposing every non-G-5 country into G-5
currency areas, based on the country's estimated G-5 currency weights; and by aggregating over
all decomposed G-5 currency areas. For each developing country, the volume of trade with each
G-5 currency area is computed according to this principle, and using bilateral trade data (average
3
exports plus imports for the 1990-96period) obtained from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics."
In explaining the estimated G-5 currency weights, we have used a set of dummy variables
that represent the country's geographical location and the past (or present) colonial status. First, 5
regional dummies are introduced: Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.
South Asia is the remaining regional dummy that is excluded to avoid linear dependence in
regressor variables. Second, 3 colonial dummies are introduced:the French colony, the UK
colony, and the former Soviet Union Republic dummy. Only when a country was a French or UK
colony in year 1950 or was part of the forner Soviet Union at the time of its breakup, is the
colonial dummy used.'4
" For example, the estimated G-5 currency weights in the basket for the Thai baht are 0.82 for the US dollar (USD),
0.11 for the Japanese yen (JY), 0.05 for the Deutsche mark (DM), and 0.02 for the UK pound sterling (UKP). This
means that 82 percent of Thailand belongs to the USD area, 11 percent to the JY area, 5 percent to the DM area, and
2 percent to the UKP area. Hence, any country that trades with Thailand is considered to trade with the USD, JY,
DM and UKP areas according to these proportions. A country's total volume of trade with each G-5 currency area
was obtained by summing up over all its trading partners' decomposed fractions of the G-5 currency area. See
Kawai and Akiyama [1998] for a detailed explanation of this computation procedure. When there were non-G-5
currencies in a currency basket, the currency area formed by each non-G-5 currency was recursively decomposed
into G-5 currency areas based on the latter's regression estimates.
14 It turns out that there were many countries that had colonial ties with France or the UK in 1950, but none with the
US, Germany or Japan. The data source is an electronic text version of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
The World Factbook, 1998.
11
Estimation results. In the regression analysis, all possible combinations of the abovementioned 13 regressors are tried as the right-hand side variables and, after excluding nonsensical combinations of regressors, the regression results that are considered to be the best
according to explanatory power, as judged by W2-adjusted,are chosen. Table 3 summarizes these
results using direct trade-based and currency area-based trade shares for a sample of 146
developing economies. Generally speaking, use of currency-area based trade shares seems to
explain G-5 currency weights better than does the use of direct-trade based variables: the more a
developing economy trades with one of the G-5 currency areas (rather than the G-5 countries),
the larger the weight of this anchor currency in the economy's exchange rate stabilization policy.
One notable exception is the case of the DM weight, where use of direct-trade based shares
produces better results, although there is no qualitative difference in the estimation results.
Another exception is the case of the UKP weight where use of currency-area based trade shares
does not yield an expected positive coefficient.
For the USD weight equation, use of currency-area data produces reasonable results with
an expected positive coefficient on the USD area. While the coefficient on the French colony
dummy is negative as expected, the model for the USD weight may not be completely
satisfactory because of the negative coefficients of East Asia regional dummies. For the DM
weight equation, the choice of direct-trade based or currency-area based trade share is not
important: a country's share of trade with Germany or with the DM area has the expected
positive sign in explaining the DM weight in a currency basket. For the JY weight equation, the
results are relatively weak: the coefficient on the JY area or Japan variable is statistically
insignificant, and explanatory power is the lowest among the 5 equations. Trading with the JY
12
area or with Japan does not necessarily increase the relative weight of the yen in a country's
exchange rate policy."5 For the FF weight equation, the estimation result is satisfactory because
the coefficient on the FF area or France variable is positive and statisticallysignificant, even after
the relevant dummies are included. Finally, for the UKP weight equation, the results are difficult
to interpret: the UKP weight is not adequately explained by the share of trade with the UKP area
or with the United Kingdom. Numerous specifications failed to produce meaningful results in
explaining the UKP weight.
4. Summary of Exchange Rate Arrangements
The results discussed above reveal that the "observed" exchange rate arrangements are
largely consistent with the "reported" exchange rate policies, with some exceptions. The
discussions in this section provide several stylized facts and general conclusions about the
individual developing countries' exchange rate arrangements.
First, many developing countries have shifted their formal exchange rate arrangements
from "fixed" to "more flexible" rate regimes. However, countries often exhibit preferences
toward stable exchange rates vis-a-vis a single currency or a currency basket. Countries facing
large exchange rate fluctuations against major international currencies are those in economic
transition in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union or those subject to chronically high
inflation.
Second, the US dollar is the most favored target currency for exchange rate stabilization
in the developing world (see Kawai and Akiyama [1998] for numerical estimation of the size of
the US dollar area). However, significant diversity exists across regions in exchange rate
15
Thus, the limited use of the Japanese yen as a reference/target currency for exchangerate stabilization is reflected
13
arrangements.Africa includes rigid exchange-rate peggers as well as free exchange-rate floaters,
and its major anchor currencies are the French franc, the US dollar, and the SDR. Asian
economies generally attempt to stabilize their exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar, the SDR
and a few regional currencies. The Japanese yen does not play a major role as an anchor currency
even in East Asia. Developing Europe has not experienced stable exchange rates in general,
while the US dollar, major Western European currencies, or a basket of these serve as loose
6 The Middle East includes countries that successfully stabilize exchange rates
anchor currencies."
vis-a-vis the US dollar and the SDR. It is one of the most stable regions in the world in terms of
exchange rate movements. The whole of Latin America is a de facto US dollar area, and cven
countries not officially pegging exchange rates to the US dollar do assign significantly positive,
and close to unitary, weights to the dollar.
Third, a developing country's choice of reference/target currencies for exchange rate
stabilization depends largely on which currency areas the country tends to trade with (excepting
the UKP area), as well as on the country's geographical location and its past colonial ties. That
is, a country that trades heavily with a particular currency area tends to choose this particular
currency as an anchor for exchange rate stabilization. By implication, a country that trades with
several currency areas with more or less equal shares is expected to choose a well-balanced
currency basket as its target for exchange rate stabilization.
III. THE EAST ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS AND EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS
1. Thai Baht Devaluation, Crisis Contagion, and Restoration of Stability
in the weak sensitivity of currency use to trade shares.
6 However, Eastern European countries willing to be EU members are expected to stabilize their currencies vis-avis the euro if they have not done so already (Honohan and Lane [ 1999]).
14
The Thai baht came under serious attack in February 1997. To support the peg, the Bank
of Thailand intervened heavily and issued some US$23 billion in forward foreign exchange
contracts at a time when foreign exchange reserves were hovering around US$25 billion. As
investor perceptions began to worsen, finance companies, whose loan portfolios had been
deteriorating in quality due to the bursting of real-estate and economic bubbles, came under
pressure, and the government continued to pump a large volume of liquidity to support them.
This led to further capital outflows and a decline in foreign exchange reserves. In mid-May,
Thailand announced capital controls, after facing selling pressure and massive intervention in the
forward markets.'7 Finally, on July 2, 1997, the government yielded to market forces and
abandoned the currency basket peg in which the weight of the US dollar was considered to be
dominant. The crisis that was to drive the rest of East Asia, as well as global financial markets,
into turmoil had begun.
The Thai baht devaluation triggered withdrawal of capital from the ASEAN region and
several other economies in East Asia as financial panic progressively set in. Developments in
Thailand caused investors to look more critically at vulnerabilities they had previously ignored
elsewhere. In the process, they discovered new information-especially about the problems of
the financial system and the magnitude of short-term external debt-that
amplified their
concerns. Market doubts were compounded by the lack of transparency in the financial and
corporate sectors, and hence, about the magnitude of non-performing loans in the banking sector.
Once investors lost confidence that foreign exchange reserves would cover short-term external
debt, both domestic and foreign investors scrambled to get out. The lack of a mechanism for
'7
This capital control was eliminated in early 1998.
15
orderly workouts of private external debt undoubtedly contributed to the full-scale financial
panic that swept Thailand, Indonesia,Korea, and Malaysia.
A quick review of its chronology illustrates the dynamics of the crisis, along with its
spillover effects. After Thailand devalued the baht, the Philippines allowed the peso to freely
float on July 11, and Malaysia abandoned the defense of the ringgit peg on July 14.18When an
IMF package was signed with Thailand on August 14, Indonesia allowed the rupiah to float.
Under exchange market pressure, Taiwan Province of China (POC) floated the new Taiwan
dollar on October 17, letting the currency depreciate. When the Hong Kong dollar was tested in
late October, the Hong Kong MonetaryAuthorityjacked up the interest rate in order to defend its
currency board, leading to a sharp fall in the Hang Seng index. This produced a shock wave felt
throughout the global financial markets, causing stock price declines in both Europe and on Wall
Street on October 27 and, then again, returning to East Asian markets.
Although an IMF rescue package for Indonesia was signed on November 4, 1997, it could
not stop the rupiah's depreciation. Korea was forced to widen its exchange rate band in midNovember and both stock prices and the won fell sharply. Following the signing of the IMF
financial package on December 4, Korea finally abandoned the band and moved to a floating
system in mid-December. The Korean crisis situation was contained by mid-January 1998, when
an agreement was reached between Korea and internationalcreditor banks to restructure Korean
banks' short-termnexternal debt. Between February and May of 1998, the most significant events
took place in Indonesia, with riots, looting and the resignation of President Suharto. The rupiah
fluctuated wildly during these political episodes.
8
In response to the increasing volatility, in early September 1997, the Malaysian authorities introduced restrictions
16
When the Japanese yen came under pressure in June 1998, exchange market tensions
developed in East Asia. Downward pressure on the Thai baht, the Chinese renminbi (RMB) and
other regional currencies mounted. However, cuts in US interest rates eased this pressure and
restored foreign exchange market stability in the region.
The financial market turmoil intensified again when Russia decided to devalue the ruble
and to impose a forced rescheduling of government debt on August 17, 1998. Russia's
devaluation and unilateral rescheduling led investors to reassess emerging market risks,
generating strong spillover effects on internationalfinancial markets. In response to this turmoil,
Malaysia decided to restore its US dollar peg policy by imposing selective capital controls and
prohibiting offshore ringgit trading on September 1, 1998. Its objectives were to isolate the
domestic financial market from the intemational financial turbulence and to prevent capital
outflows and speculation against the Malaysian ringgit.'9 In the fall of 1998, a US hedge fund,
Long-term Capital Management (LTCM), went into serious difficulties and posed a risk of
systemic crisis, but the problem was carefully managed and effectively contained by the US
authorities.
The series of events described above demonstratehow the crisis spread from one country
to another, and how the crisis and contagion swamped the entire East Asian region. Contagion
produced simultaneous falls in exchange rates in the region (see Figure 2) reflecting massive and
simultaneous capital outflows. Within the space of the last six months of 1997, capital outflows
from the region erased the inflows of the first semester, and turned the net flow negative by
on short sales of equities and forward sales of the ringitt. Shortly thereafter, some of the restrictions were removed
in response to a negative market reaction.
"9 The quantity-based capital controls were later modified through the introduction of a graduated capital gains tax
in February 1999, and were virtually eliminated in September 1999. The exit tax and the continued closure of the
17
US$20 billion for the East Asia-5 affected countries. Between 1996 and 1997, net capital flows
had reversed by more than US$100 billion for the ASEAN-4 (US$71 billion) and Korea (US$33
billion). Only after the Russian and LTCM's crisis subsided in late 1998, did the East Asian
exchange rates begin to stabilize.
2. The Currency Crisis and the Roles of the US Dollar, the Yen and the Euro
Let us examine the anchor currency roles of the US dollar, the Japanese yen, and the euro
during the East Asian currency crisis. To do so, we have decided to run the following simple
regression equation by using daily exchange rates:
Aet = a + piAeu t+ 02Ae', + p3e`°
+ u,
(2)
where Ae', is now the daily change in the log exchange rate of currency j on date t. Similar to
equation (l) discussed earlier in the previous section, this regression equation attempts to
determine how daily movements in each country's exchange rate are explained by the
movements of three major international currencies of the world, i.e., the US dollar, the Japanese
yen, and the euro.20 All exchange rates are expressed vis-a-vis the Swiss franc. This simpler
specification, rather than country-specific regression form, has been chosen because of the need
to compare the roles of the tripolar currencies across economies in East Asia as well as over time
for each economy. As in the previous monthly regression, the estimated coefficients are
interpreted as the weights assigned by the authorities to the corresponding currencies in their
exchange rate policies.21 Similarly, the estimated standard error of residuals can be interpreted as
a measure of exchange rate volatility.
offshore ringgit market are the only effective form of control that remained after September 1999.
20 For the sample period prior to the introduction of the euro on January 1, 1999, the European Currency Unit
(ECU), the predecessor of the euro, is used for the euro rate.
21 Again, this interpretation requires caution because the market, without conscious efforts on the part of the
18
Pre-crisis, mid-crisis, and post-crisis estimations. In order to examine possible shifts in
the "observed" role of the tri-polar currencies before and after the currency crisis, we have run
exchange-rate regressions (2) for twelve emerging East Asian economies, including the Asian
NIEs (Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan POC), the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand),the smaller ASEAN-3 (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam),
and China. In particular, to examine shifts in exchange rate arrangements,we consider the period
before, during, and after the Thai baht devaluation. Using daily exchange rate data up to
December 1999, we have chosen to divide the sample into the pre-crisis period of January 1996 June 1997, the mid-crisis period of July 1997 - December 1998. and the post-crisis period of
January 1999 - December 1999.
Regression results are summarized in Table 4. Results for earlier 18-month periods are
also reported, to compare with later periods. The table confirms that in the pre-crisis period
(January 1990 - June 1997), the estimated coefficients of the US dollar were statistically
significant and close to unity for all the economies studied (except for the smaller Indochina
countries). This again supports the propositionthat many East Asian economies were on de facto
US dollar-pegged systems until the time of the crisis. Nonetheless, the estimated coefficients of
the Japanese yen were significant, for some sub-sample periods, in Thailand (a maximum value
of 0.18 during January 1996-June 1997), Singapore(a maximum value of 0.10 during July 1994December 1995), Korea (0.08 during July 1994-December 1995), Taiwan POC (0.06 during July
1994-December 1995), Malaysia (0.06 during July 1994-December 1995), Hong Kong SAR
(0.01 during January 1996-June 1997), but were much smaller than the coefficients for the US
authorities, may have chosen the estimated coefficients.
19
dollar. In this sense, the Japanese yen played some role as part of a currency basket in the precrisis period.22 The euro also played an important role in Vietnam and some role in Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand though it was relatively insignificant in other countries.
Not surprisingly, many affected economies experienced noticeable declines in US dollar
weights in the mid-crisis period (July 1997-December 1998). This was particularly pronounced
in Indonesia (where the US dollar weight declined to a statistically insignificant level of 0.51),
Thailand (0.61), and Singapore (0.64). As the US dollar weights declined, the weights of the
Japanese yen rose in a significant way in some countries, particularly in Indonesia (0.69),
Singapore(0.34), Thailand (0.31), and Malaysia (0.30).23The weights of the euro were relatively
unaffected except for Vietnam where its role was relatively prominent in the pre-crisis period.
The overall implication is that the importance of the Japanese yen in the exchange rate policies of
several ASEAN countries rose during the crisis, while the euro's importance did not.24
The regression results for the post-crisis period (January-December 1999) indicate a
return to the pre-crisis pattern of exchange rate arrangements. That is, the coefficients on the US
dollar have become greater and significant again, and the R2 -adjusted level has become
substantially larger than in the mid-crisis period.25 The exception is Indonesia where the US
The observedrole of the Japaneseyen in a currency basket for some countries such as Singapore, however, may
reflect the fact that the authorities chose the SDR as a target for exchange rate management policy. The Japanese
yen is an important component currency of the SDR.
23 If the mid-crisis sample period is shortened to, say July 1997-August 1998, the decline in US dollar weights and
the rise in yen weights are much more pronounced.
24 Whether the greater importance of the yen in the mid-crisis period truly reflects a conscious policy on the part of
some ASEAN countries to target the yen remains debatable. This may simply reflect correlations between shocks
and news affecting ASEAN's foreign exchange markets and those affecting Japan's, thus creating the observed
statisticalresults.
2 The higher US dollar weights observed in the post-crisis regressions may indicate that the East Asian monetary
authorities have reverted to the pre-crisis pattern of US dollar-basedexchange rate stabilizationregimes despite their
stated objective of free floating (with the notable exception of Malaysia). Alternatively, the post-crisis pattern may
simply reflect either the decline in exchange rate volatility in the post-crisis period (January-December 1999), rather
20
22
dollar coefficient is still lower than the pre-crisis level (though it has become larger in size and
statistically significant in comparison to the mid-crisis period). Interestingly, the weight of the
Japanese yen continues to be significant in Indonesia (0.31), Thailand (0.12), and the Philippines
26
(0.10), even though the yen was never important in pre-crisis Indonesia or the Philippines.
Rolling regressions. Using 18-monthperiod data for July 1997-December 1998 as a midcrisis sample may be problematic because exchange market developments were quite volatile,
erratic, and dynamic during the crisis. Regional contagion,delayed currency attacks (Korea) and
large exchange rate depreciations at times of political uncertainty (Indonesia) may have altered
pattems of exchange rate movements over the course of events. Therefore, we next examine midcrisis exchange rate movements in more detail by dividing the sample into a series of 3-month
periods."
Figure 3 reports the results of such rolling regressions for the period January 1990 December 1999. The 10-yearperiod is divided into a series of 3-month sub-samples, by rolling
over the sample by one month each. More concretely,a total of 118 regressions are run, using the
first sub-sample period as January-March 1990, the second as February-April 1990, and so onall up to the final sub-sample period of October-December1999 (see the Appendix Table for a
2 8 Estimated regression coefficients of the US dollar, the
summary of the regression results).
Japanese yen, and the euro are plotted against time: a thick solid line for the dollar; a fine solid
than a conscious policy shift to exchange rate stabilization,or the authorities' concem about too rapid an
appreciationof the currencywhengrowthmomentumwas aboutto pick up. Whateverthe interpretation,it appears
that the authoritiescontinueto regardthe US dollaras the most relevantreferencecurrencyfor their exchangerate
policies.
26 Again,the observedpost-crisisimportanceof the yen may be the result of commonshocksand news affecting
Indonesiaandthe Philippineson the onehand andJapanon the other.
27 Ourpreliminary
experimentindicatedthat onemonth(withabout20 observations)wastoo shortto produce
statisticallysignificantresultsfor coefficientsotherthanthe USD.
2S No observations
havebeenremovedin this regressionanalysis.
21
line for the yen; and a dotted line for the euro.29
The figure clearly reveals that countries under a stable peg throughout the period, such as
Hong Kong SAR and China, have maintained US dollar weights at levels close to unity. The R2 adjusted is close to 1 and the estimated standard errors of regression are small and consistently
below 0.001, which is close to a 0.1 percent change in daily exchangerates.3"
In contrast, other affected economies exhibit different exchange rate behavior over time.
In these economies, particularly the affected East Asia-5, the weights of the US dollar were all
close to unity and significant in the pre-crisis period. But in the mid-crisis period, the dollar
weights began to fall and became insignificantfor 8 to 13 months depending on countries. As the
US dollar weights began to decline during the crisis, the weights of the Japanese yen and, to a
lesser extent, the euro began to rise and even became statistically significant in some countries.
Striking changes are observed in the R2 -adjusted;they were all high, with some close to unity, in
the pre-crisis period but became low in the mid-crisisperiod.
Singapore and Taiwan POC were less affected by the East Asian currency turmoil as
judged from the high US dollar weights maintained throughout the entire sample period. In the
mid-crisis period, however, the US dollar weights declined more significantly for the Singapore
dollar than for the new Taiwan dollar. An interesting observation is that the weights of the
Japanese yen for these two currencies became significant in 1998 (Singapore) or in the last few
months of 1998 (Taiwan POC). Furthermore, declines in R2 -adjustedin the mid-crisis period for
these two currencies were much less pronounced than those for the East Asia-5 affected
Since all estimated coefficients are shown in the figures irrespective of their statisticalsignificance, some plotted
lines show erratic behavior; the euro reveals this tendency. The US dollar plots also include some non-significant
coefficientvalues in the mid-crisis period.
This volatility is not directly comparable in size to the volatility reported in Table 2 where monthly exchange rates
29
22
currencies.
3. Co-movementsand Contagion
Figure 2 suggests the presence of strong co-movementsamong the East Asian currencies,
particularly among the currencies of the crisis-affected economies, even under the newly
introduced flexible exchange rate arrangements. What is the source of such cross-currency comovements? Is it a result of a conscious attempt on the part of the monetary authorities to
stabilize their exchange rates vis-a-vis other regional currencies, or is it a result of simultaneous
shocks hitting the foreign exchange markets and spontaneous market reaction to adjust to the
shocks?
The first panel of Figure 4 depicts correlation coefficients between the exchange rate
movements (the log first differences in the rate) for a crisis-affected currency and those for the
rest of the currencies in the region. They are calculated for each 3-month period in a rolling
fashion. The pre-crisis correlation coefficients were large, often exceeding 0.9, because of their
defacto US dollar-pegged exchange rate arrangements. The correlations naturally declined in the
mid-crisis period due to a shift to more flexible exchange rate arrangements. It is interesting to
note that, towards the end of 1998, some of the correlations began to return to the pre-crisis
levels, with the exception of the Indonesianrupiah whose correlationswith other exchange rates
have remained low.
What are the forces that determine patterns of correlation coefficients? To examine this,
exchange rate movements are divided into predicted and unpredicted components. Predicted
movements are the fitted values of regression equation (2), and unpredicted movements are the
were used.
23
estimated residuals of regression. It is interesting to see which factor is more important in
determining the cross-country co-movementsof exchangerates.
The second panel of Figure 4 depicts correlation coefficients between the predicted
exchange-rate movements of a crisis-affected currency and those of other regional currencies.
These cross-currency correlations of the predicted exchange-rate movements were all close to
unity before the crisis. During the crisis, correlationsof the predicted movements suddenly fell,
with large fluctuations during the period. Towards the end of 1998, correlation coefficients for
some currencies began to return to their pre-crisis levels. This is a sign of the restoration of more
stable exchange rate arrangementsin East Asia.
The third panel of Figure 4 depicts correlation coefficients between the unpredicted
movements of exchange rate pairs. These correlation coefficients are distributed around zero
before the crisis: essentially, systematic cross-currencycorrelations were absent in the pre-crisis
period as far as unpredicted movements of exchange rates are concerned. During the crisis, the
correlation coefficients tended to be distributed around some positive values, suggesting the
presence of systematic cross-currency correlations due to some common or causal shocks to the
system. The implication is that the perceived co-movementsof exchange rates during the crisis,
implied by Figure 2 and observed in the first panel of Figure 4, may well be the result of
unexplainedcommon or causal shocks, such as contagion, to the system.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR EXCHANGERATE ARRANGEMENTSIN EAST ASIA
1. The Role of the De-facto Dollar Peg as a Crisis Trigger
With free mobility of capital, exchange rate movements are susceptible to market
24
psychology and herding behavior, particularly in emerging market economies. Once investors are
convinced that the exchange rate is out of a perceived "equilibrium" level, massive, one-way
speculation can take place.
As discussed in the previous sections, many affected East Asian economies had attempted
to maintain relatively stable exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar. For example, Thailand had
been on a basket peg system until July 1, 1997, which required the Bank of Thailand to stabilize
the baht with respect to a basket of foreign currencies where the weight of the US dollar was
dominant. Similarly, other countries de facto stabilized their exchange rates against the US
dollar.
The East Asian currencies with a large weight on the US dollar in their currency baskets,
became overvalued on a real, effective basis due to both higher domestic inflation than in the
United States and the US dollar's appreciation since mid-1995 vis-a-vis the major industrialized
currencies, particularly the Japaneseyen and the Deutsche mark. The emergenceof real, effective
overvaluation of the currency was an important factor behind the mounting speculative pressure
that developed in the foreign exchange market in 1997. Hence, the defacto US dollar-peg system
was one of the underlying triggers of the currency crisis. We must discuss the "peg" part and the
"US dollar" part separately.
Pros and cons of a currency "peg" policy. The first issue is whether the affected East
Asian economies made a mistake by pursuing the de facto "peg" system, rather than a flexible
rate system, in the pre-crisis period. Exchange rate stability clearly benefited the East Asian
economies, by ensuring nominal anchor and price stability, creating stable environments for
trade- and FDI-driven economic development and growth, and avoiding regional beggar-thy25
neighbor policies of competitive depreciation. In fact, exchange rate stability was an important
factor behind the remarkable economic performance during the East Asian Miracle period of the
mid-I 960s through the mid-I 990s (McKinnon [2000]).
However, an argument can be made that adopting greater exchange rate flexibility in the
mid-1990s, for example in 1995 or the first half of 1996 in the case of Thailand, might have
reduced the volume of capital inflows because of the probable exchange rate appreciation.
Exchange rate appreciation would have raised the risk of undertaking continued foreign
borrowing, because of the increased probability of currency depreciation, thus limiting further
accumulation of short-term extemal debt. Instead, de-facto fixed exchange rate arrangements
provided a perception that foreign currency-denominated inflows posed little risks for both
domestic borrowers and foreign lenders. With high nominal interest rates at home relative to
foreign countries, large volumes of foreign capital continued to pour into Thailand (and other
economies). In addition, defending a pegged exchange rate at the time of severe speculative
attacks and massive capital outflows is a difficult and potentially counterproductive task. An
early adoption of exchange rate flexibility would have relieved such speculative pressure without
imposing large costs on the economy. In sum, even if countries may benefit from stable
exchange rates at nornal times, maintaining an overvalued exchange rate at a time of speculative
attack would be difficult and potentially costly.
Pros and cons of defacto US dollar-based exchange rate stabilization. The next issue is
whether the affected East Asian economies made a mistake by de facto pegging the exchange
rates to the wrong currency, the US dollar. There is no doubt that the East Asian economies had
enjoyed large benefits, for a long time until the mid-1990s, by choosing the US dollar as an
26
anchor for exchange rate stabilization.
First, the US dollar was used extensively as a trade invoicing currency for international
trade in East Asia and in other parts of the world.31 For each East Asian economy, stabilizing the
value of its trade in terms of the US dollar was a reasonable policy given that its neighbors and
many other countries in the world were using the dollar for trade invoicing.
Second, rapid economic development and growth in the Asian NIEs, the ASEAN
countries, and China in the fifteen years until the outbreak of the crisis had been stimulated by
their stabilization to the US dollar. In the face of rapid yen rate appreciation that began in the
mid-i 980s, the de facto US dollar-pegged system allowed these economies to receive foreign
direct investment from Japan and to integrate themselves with the regional and global trading
system. As Japan had already been gradually losing its international price competitiveness in the
low- to mid-tech manufacturing products, yen rate appreciation accelerated this process by
forcing Japanese firms to move their production sites to East Asia. From East Asian economies'
perspectives, their exchange rate depreciation vis-a-vis the Japanese yen helped transform these
economies into attractive production bases and platforms, for Japanese multinationals, to export
products to the US and European markets. This process promoted international division of labor
in the manufacturing sector within the region and helped these economies industrialize and grow,
at least until 1995 when the yen rate rapidly depreciated.
When the yen began to depreciate vis-a-vis the US dollar in the Spring of 1995, however,
the emerging East Asian economies started to see deterioration of their international price
competitiveness. Growth driven by Japanese FDI inflows began to lose its momentum. In
31Commodities
and primary products exported by many developing countries tend to be priced in the US dollar in
27
addition, yen depreciation began to dampen real economic activity in relatively advanced East
Asian economies (such as Korea, Taiwan POC, and Malaysia) that compete against Japan in
third markets (such as the United States and Europe). If the Japanese yen were to continue to
experience the "ever higher yen syndrome" (McKinnon and Ohno [1997]), then continued
exchange rate stabilization vis-a-vis the US dollar would have been attractive to emerging East
Asia. However, once the yen/dollar exchange rate began to go up and down and became volatile,
US dollar-based exchange rate regimes began to produce wide fluctuations of economic activity,
severely limiting its benefits. The reason for the close association between yen/dollar exchange
rate movements and East Asian economies' real activity is that these economies not only trade
with Japan, but also compete with Japan in third markets in certain products.
Table 5 summarizes the emerging East Asian economies' relationship with the United
States, Japan, the European Union, and the region itself in trade (exports and imports), FDI
inflows, and total stocks of inward bank loans in the pre-crisis year of 1996.The table shows that
for many East Asian economies, the United States is no longer the most dominant economic
partner and that the relative importance provided by Japan and the European Union is as large as,
and in some cases much larger than, that of the United States. Striking is the fact that the share
provided by emerging East Asia is the largest for exports, imports and FDI. Following emerging
East Asia, the United States is the most dominant as an export market, Japan is the most
dominant as an import and FDI source country, and the European Union is the largest bank
lender to East Asia.
The fact that the emerging East Asian economies have diverse linkages with the rest of
the global markets.
28
the world in trade and FDI suggests that exchange rate stabilizationvis-a-vis the US dollar alone
is not the best choice. Indeed, when the US dollar began to appreciate in the Spring of 1995, this
system resulted in a loss of international price competitiveness and an overvaluation of the
currencies on a real, effectivebasis.
2. Viable Exchange Rate ArrangementsReflecting DiverseEconomic Linkages
The recent currency crisis in East Asia created a common trend towards more flexible
exchange rates at least as a "formal" regime in the affected countries (except for Malaysia).
During the crisis, the role of the US dollar as an anchor currency clearly declined in the affected
East Asia-5 (Korea and the ASEAN-4). As the crisis subsided, East Asia's exchange rate
behavior began to revert to the pre-crisis pattern of assigning a considerable weight to the US
dollar. This trend implies that the role for the US dollar continues to be important in the postcrisis period, despite increased flexibility in the exchange rates vis-a-vis the dollar. If these
economies are to stabilize their exchange rates vis-a-vis some international currency or a basket,
at least in normal times, the issue is what currencyor currencybasket should be targeted.
For many emerging market economies in East Asia, a return to a "formal" fixed exchange
rate regime is unlikely, except for Malaysia, at least in the medium run. These economies have
learned the hard lesson that a pegged exchange rate regime can be vulnerable to currency
speculation unless they close the capital account vis-a-vis the rest of the world or choose to
institutionalize a more permanent fixed rate commitment such as a currency board system or
dollarization (or yenization). They are not likely to close the capital account or set up a
permanent fixed rate institution; they are likely to maintain "formal" flexible exchange rate
arrangementsunder open capital accounts. On the other hand, these economies are reluctant to
29
float freely (Calvo and Reinhart's [2000] "fear of floating") and have a greater tendency to
intervene in the foreign exchange market. The implication is that the East Asian economies are
likely to manage exchange rates so as to ensure reasonable rate stability. Essentially, the
immediate adoption of the "two-corner solution" approach (Eichengreen[1994] and Obstfeld and
Rogoff [1995]) would be unrealistic.32
Under this scenario, given a well-balanced diversification of East Asia's economic
transactions, a reasonable choice of target for exchange rate stabilizationis a currency basket that
includes the US dollar, the yen and the euro in a more balanced way than in the pre-crisis
period.33 Actual currency weights in the new basket will depend on: the relative importance of
the United States, Japan and the European Union as trade partners and FDI sources for each East
Asian economy; future expectations of trend movements of the yen/US dollar exchange rate; and
the perceived success of the newly introduced euro.
In general, monetary authorities cannot pursue simultaneously both nominal exchange
rate and inflation targets, when the capital account is open. However, if inflation targeting is
defined as a policy of achieving a weighted average of inflation rates of the United States, Japan
and the European Union and if nominal exchange rate targeting is defined as a policy of
stabilizing the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis a basket of the US dollar, the Japanese yen and
the euro, then these two policies are in fact one and the same, at least in the long run when
In the longer run, however, one of the corner solutions, that is, introducing a common currency through
coordinated regional integration may be feasible and even desirable from optimum currency area criteria. For
example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen [1994] found that Northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, and Taiwan POC) and
Southeast Asia (Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and perhaps Thailand), in addition to Northern
Europe (not entire Western Europe), were respectively plausible candidates for monetary union. Bayoumi,
Eichengreen and Mauro [2000] concluded that in terms of preparedness for monetary union, Asia in 1995 was not
much different from continental Europe in 1987. But the lack of political commitment and institutional capacity
would make such a move difficult in the short run.
3 As the earlier finding in Section 11-3indicated,an economy that has diversified trade and FDI relationships with
30
purchasing power parity (PPP) tends to hold. Nominal exchange rate targeting has one added
advantage over inflation targeting cum free floating: By removing the problems associated with a
floating rate regime (short-run volatility and medium-run misalignment of exchange rates), a
policy of nominal exchange rate targeting (with some bands) can better ensure exchange rate
stability in a way consistent with inflation targeting (with some bands). This is particularly the
case for East Asia where the economies are small and relatively open so that domestic price
inflation reflects international price movements. In essence, a "soft" peg to a basket of the tripolar currencies can stabilize intra-regional exchange rates, while maintaining a targeted range of
inflation rates.
It is not easy, however, for any East Asian economy to move unilaterally away from the
current exchange rate arrangement in which the US dollar has a dominant weight to a new
arrangement in which the relative weight of the dollar is smaller and those of the yen and euro
larger.34 Given other countries' arrangements, each economy may not have sufficient incentive to
unilaterally alter its own exchange rate policy; a large share of trade with US dollar areas can
increase the country's US-dollar weight. When neighboring countries stabilize their exchange
rates primarily against the US dollar, there may be no good reason for any one country to
unilaterally alter its exchange rate policy. This demonstrates the potential importance of
coordinated action on the part of the East Asian economies.
The rising degree of intra-regional trade and investment interdependence in East Asia
means that, economies in the region are expected to benefit from avoiding large fluctuations in
intra-regional exchange rates. This is particularly the case for the ASEAN members, which are
the major currency areas has strong potential for choosing a well-balanced currency basket.
31
expected to complete the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) by the year 2003 through
loweringtariffs on manufactured products below 5 percent. Essentially,large swings in exchange
rates among the ASEAN countries would be counterproductive because they would alter
international price competitiveness suddenly and make the prospective free trade agreement
unsustainable. One way to maintain stable currencies with one another is for the ASEAN
countries to adopt similar currency baskets consisting of the US dollar, the yen and the euro and
to loosely stabilize their exchange rates to such baskets. This does not require formal agreements
on common baskets or frequent, concertedjoint actions in the foreign exchange markets. Instead,
35
the countries have only to choose similar baskets.
To summarize, emerging East Asia is sufficiently integrated with Japan and Europe, as
well as with the United States, in the area of trade and FDI. The region would be better off by
adopting officially flexible arrangements,while in norrmaltimes actually stabilizing the rates visa-vis a basket consisting of the tripolar currencies. The desired weight to be assigned to the US
dollar would be lower and those to the yen and the euro higher than the pre-crisis levels.
3. Impact of the Euro on East Asia's Exchange Rate Arrangements
Although the above discussion suggests that the weights of the euro in East Asia's future
exchange rate policy could be higher, the newly introduced single currency is unlikely to rise to
the status of a dominant key currency. The geographical distance between Europe and East Asia,
and the continued structural rigidity of the EU economy are other important reasons why the euro
34Honohan and Lane [1999] emphasized the existence of strategic interdependence in the choice of exchange rate
regimes for neighboring countries that compete for exports in third markets and for FDI inflows.
3
As the degree of intra-regional integration becomes deeper, however, more concerted actions in the area of
exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies may be called for. And the choice of a common currency basket, or even
adoption of a common currency, may become desirable. See Williamson [I 999a, b].
32
may not serve as a dominant key currency in emerging East Asia.36
The introduction of the euro will bring several benefits and costs to East Asia. In terms of
benefits, the emergence of the euro will give private traders and investors a wider menu of
dominant international currencies and financial instruments from which to choose. This does
great service to everyone in the world, including East Asia. East Asian traders and investors will
be able to hedge exchange risks using a larger, more efficient, and more liquid money market in a
unified Europe. Investors will be able to diversify their portfolios across an increasing variety of
international financial instruments, particularly those offered in the broader, deeper, and more
liquid European capital market.37
In terms of costs, the emergence of the euro is expected to increase currency substitution,
thus creating greater fluctuations in the exchange rates among the euro, the US dollar, and the
Japanese yen. Given that East Asia trades with the US, Japan and the EU, exchange rate
fluctuations among the tripolar currencies could pose a large strain on many East Asian
economies. Furthermore, a unified, larger Europe would begin to exert greater financial and
macroeconomic influence on the rest of the world, including East Asia. The East Asian
authorities will have to take into account shocks emanating from Europe, in addition to those
from the US and Japan. East Asia's deepening financial interdependence with the rest of the
Once East Asia resumes its export expansion based on sustained economic growth, Europe is expected to face
renewed trade competition from East Asian exporters. East Asia's targeting of its exchange rates to the euro would
reinforce this trend to levels that might be politically unsustainable. Under exchange rate stabilization vis-a-vis the
euro, the East Asian economies probably would have to realign exchangerates frequently. This suggests that, while
its international role may rise in East Asia, the euro is not a realistic candidate for the region's major reference
currency.
3 Another global impact is that the emergence of the euro might place considerable limits on the policy autonomy
of the United States (Bergsten [1997]). The United States might be forced to pursue macroeconomic policies
consistent with sustainable current accounts and stable exchange rates. This would be a welcome consequence
because it would ensure stable purchasing power and increased attractiveness for the US dollar, the most dominant
international currency in the world.
33
3
world, including Europe, implies that they will face even greater risks of sudden capital flow
reversals, increased pressure on the exchange rates, and undesirable effects on its local financial
institutions, as illustrated by the recent currency crisis. This would require prudent
macroeconomic policy management on the part of the East Asian authorities, as well as more
frequent consultation with the EU (as well as the US and Japan) on the latter's macroeconomic
policy.
As the exchange rates of the tripolar currencies are expected to remain volatile, the East
Asian economies have the incentive to increase the euro's weight (and the yen's weight) in their
exchange rate management.
4. Possibilities for an Increased Role of the Yen
As in the case of the euro, the Japanese yen is unlikely to be the sole anchor currency, due
to Japan's limited size as an export market for East Asia, the continued perception of an "ever
higher yen," and its still shallow money and capital markets.38 Whether the weight of the yen in
East Asian exchange rate arrangements rises or not depends on how soon and strongly the
Japanese economy recovers from the long financial crisis of the 1990s, and how attractive an
international currency the yen becomes. There are reasons to believe that potential exists for a
greater international use of the yen.
First, Japan's economic interdependence with emerging East Asia has deepened over
time. This process is expected to continue as the East Asian economies resume their sustained
growth path, and as they become more similar to Japan, both in terms of economic and industrial
structure and in terms of output and trade composition. In addition, Japan's trade structure has
" See Hamada and Horiuchi [19871,Tavlas and Ozeki [1992], Garber [1996], and Kawai [1996] for explanations of
34
changed since the mid-1980s, mainly due to its overseas FDI activity. With diversified trading
partners and increased intra-industry trade, Japan has been expanding imports of manufactured
products, particularly from East Asia. If this trend continues, and if Japan offers larger markets
for foreign products, the international use of the yen as a trade invoicing currency is likely to
rise. In fact, in manufacturing products, 48 percent of Japan's exports to, and 29 percent of its
imports from, East Asia are invoiced in yen. Though still low compared with those of the United
States and Germany, these shares are much higher than those for Japan's overall trade that is
denominated in yen. A rapid expansion of Japanese markets for foreign products has potential for
the yen's greater attractiveness.
Second, the expectations of trend appreciation of the Japanese yen may be reversed in the
process of financial sector consolidation, economic recovery, and rapid aging of the population,
which would render use of the yen attractive in the exchange rate policies of East Asia. The trend
appreciation of the yen gave strong incentive for the emerging East Asian economies to stabilize
their exchange rates to the US dollar, because they could gain internationalprice competitiveness
against Japan by doing so. Japan's current account surplus is expected to be smaller due to its
eventual economic recovery (greater absorption) in the short run and its population aging (lower
savings rates) in the medium term, which would restrain the expectations of an "ever higher
yen."
Third, the on-going deregulation and liberalization of the Japanese money and capital
markets is expected to make some progress to transform Tokyo into a more user-friendly
international financial center. This process would be accelerated by the Tokyo financial "Big
the limited use of the Japanese yen as an international currency, even in emerging East Asia.
35
Bang" policy on the one hand and, on the other, by the Japanese government's response to the
introduction of the euro and the unification of money and capital markets in Europe. If it is
successful in reconstructing as a healthy financial system, the Tokyo market could grow into one
of the top three international financial centers in the world. This would promote the international
use of the yen. 3
Room exists for the yen to play a more prominent role as one of the international anchor
currencies in East Asia. At the same time, however, the role of the US dollar will continue to be
dominant because of the effects of inertia and history. To the extent that the yen's attractiveness
rises, it may come to share the anchor currency role with the US dollar, in the sense of receiving
greater weights assigned by the East Asian authorities in their currency basket policies.40
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has found that the role of the US dollar as the dominant anchor currency in
East Asia was reduced during the recent currency crisis period, but its prominence has recently
been restored, particularly since late-1998. Although it is too early to conclude anything
definitely at this point, the crisis experience suggests that the East Asian economies are likely to
maintain more flexible exchange rate arrangements, at least officially. At the same time, these
economies would presumably continue to prefer to maintain exchange rate stability without fixed
rate commitments. A case can be made that they are likely to choose a balanced currency basket
system in which the yen and the euro play a more important role than before.
"' Another point to be considered is the fact that the yen is being widely used to denominate long-term debt in East
Asia; since the 1980s, the East Asian economies have shifted the currency composition of their external debt away
from the US dollar and towards the yen.
4 Hence, the yen's role in East Asia will not be as distinct as the one that was played by the Deutsche mark in the
European Monetary System. Even in Western Europe, the French franc and the ECU before the introduction of the
36
Given the strong degree of intra-regional trade and investment interdependence, each
economy in East Asia has an incentive to avoid harmful large fluctuations in exchange rates
within the region. This is particularly the case for ASEAN countries: large swings in exchange
rates among the ASEAN members would be counterproductivebecause they could suddenly alter
internationalprice competitiveness and make the prospective free trade agreement unsustainable.
This implies that the ASEAN countries might find it useful to choose similar currency baskets
and stabilize their exchange rates against these baskets, ensuring intra-regional exchange rate
stability.
From a global perspective, the avoidance of large exchange rate fluctuations among the
major currencies will continue to be an importantpolicy objective not only for Japan, the United
States, and Europe, but also for emerging market economies such as those in East Asia, which
benefit from global exchange rate stability among the tripolar currencies. These economies are
particularly susceptible because (a) they have been pursuing financial deregulation, market
opening, and capital account liberalization, and (b) they are facing increased risks of sudden
capital flow reversals, as well as the consequent instability in their financial system and foreign
exchange market caused by these flows. A greater effort is required to develop a framework for
international monetary coordination, not only to maintain stable exchange rates among the
tripolar currencies, but also to minimize the risk of currency and financial crises in emerging
economies. In choosing exchange rate arrangements, the emerging market economies,
particularly those of East Asia, should focus on maintaining stable macroeconomic
environrnents,minimizing currency risks, and promoting trade, investment and growth.
euro sharedthe anchorcurrencyrole of the Deutschemark (seeKawaiandAkiyama[1998]).
37
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41
Table 1. Summary of Reported Exchange Rate Arrangements of IMF-member Developing Countries
1980-1998
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
65
65
63
82
71
70
65
90
89
81
75
Fixedexchangerate arrangement
21
20
20
21
23
22
25
24
24
39
31
Peggedto the USdollar
15
15
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
Peggedto the Frenchfranc
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
Peggedto the UKpound sterling
3
3
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
0
0
Peggedtothedeutsche mark
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
6
0
0
Peggedto the Russianruble
8
9
6
7
5
6
7
5
3
3
4
Peggedto othercurrency
4
3
2
3
6
5
4
4
15
11
6
Peggedto SDR
12
18
19
16
27
24
20
30
27
18
28
Peggedto othercurrencycomposite
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
4
4
4
a
Limitedexchangerateflexibility
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
a
5
Flexibilitylimitedvis-a-visa singlecurrency
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Cooperativearrangements
92
88
89
89
58
77
81
32
46
54
3+b+c
More flexibleexchangerate arrangement
0
2
0
3
2
3
4
5
5
3
4
Adjustedaccordingto a set of indicators
43
44
55
28
30
42
21
25
22
b
17
Othermanagedfloating
37
44
45
48
44
33
45
24
11
20
c
Independentlyfloating
Unclassified
Total
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
118
127
132
134
144
152
155
157
158
158
159
Notes: 1) Thereare severalIMF-memberand non-memberdevelopingeconomiesthat are not includedin this table, such as HongKong SAR, TaiwanProvince
of China,and Cambodia(1980and 1992).
2) The last dateof this sampleis September1998.
3) Thesum of a, b, and c in the table in 1980is 25.
Sources: IMF,IntemationalFinancialStatistics,variousissues.
42
Table 2. Summaryof ObservedExchangeRateArrangementsof Developing Countries, 1990-1996
(a) Pegged:volatility< 0.005
USD
Afghanistan,l S of0
Antigua& Barbuda#
Anuba#
Bahamas,
The
eahrain
#
Barbados#
Belize#
Djiboult8
Dommica
8
Grenada
#
Iraq#
Lbenria#
Micronesia,FedSts #
Netherlands
Antilles#
Oman#
Panama#
Qatar#
St Vincent&Grenadines
8
SaudiArabia#
St. Kittsand News#
St Lucia#
SynanArabRepublic#
UnitedArab Emirates
Yemen,Republicof#
HongKongSAR#
Indonesia#
Egypt#
Bolvia#
Trinidad& Tobago#
No. Obs.
VolatilityENcif
1cI
0.0000
0/84
00000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0 0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
00000
0/84
0 0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0 0000
0/84
0 0000
0184
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0184
0.0000
0(84
0/84
0 0000
0 0000
0/84
0.0000
2/77
0.0011
0/84
00027
0/84
0 0035
2/82
0 0036
0/83
1/83
0 0047
No.Obs.
VolatilityEnxllnci
00000
1/83
0 0000
1/83
00000
1/83
a 0000
1/83
0.0000
1/83
0.0000
1/83
0 0000
1/83
0 0000
1/83
0 0000
1/83
0.0°00
1/83
0.0000
1/83
0 0000
1/83
0 0000
1/83
0 0000
1(83
0 0000
0(84
0 0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0000
0/84
0.0002
2/82
0 0033
0(30
00037
0(54
OtherSingleCurrency
Benin(FF#)
BurkinaFaso(FF#)
Cameron(FF#)
CentralAfricanRep(FF#)
Chad(FF#)
Comors (FF#)
Congo(FF#)
Cote dnlvoire
(FF8)
Equatonal
Guinea(FF#)
Gabon(FF#)
Mali(FF#)
Niger(FF#)
Senegal(FF#)
Togo(FF#)
Kiribab(AD#)
Lesotho(SAR#)
Namibia
(SAR#)
Swaziland(SAR#)
Bhutan(IR#)
BnuneiDanussalam
(SID#)
Estonia
(DM#)
No. Obs.
0.0068
0.0088
0 0073
00078
0.0093
0.0107
0.0118
0 0119
0 0124
0 0125
0.0127
0.0127
0 0128
0.0130
0.0134
0.0140
0.0143
0(84
1/83
0131
1/18
2/82
0/84
5(79
0/84
0/83
1/83
0/84
0/84
0/84
2/82
0/84
0/84
18/68
No. Obs.
VolatilityE=toflnci
00009
0/84
0 0027
0184
0.0042
0/47
0.0043
0184
0.0048
0184
00050
0/84
Basketof Currencies
Mautinus(ECU,FF,USD)
Cypnus(ECU,USD,UKP)
Korea(USD#,JY)
CapeVerde(FF,PE)
El Salvador(USD#,UKP)
Tunisia(ECU#,USD)
Kuwait(USD.JY)
Seychelles(USD,JY, UKP)
Libya(USD FF,JY, UKP)
Botswana(SAR,USD)
TaiwanPOC1USD.FF,JY)
Myanmar
(SDR#)
Malta(ECU#,USD)
SlovakRepublicFF#.USD)
Iran,I R of (USD.DM,UKP)
Malaysia(SID,USD)
Morocco(FF,DM,USD)
Colombia(USD.SDR)
Argentina(USD,DM)
Guyana(USD DM)
Hungary(USD.FF)
SouthAfrica(USD,UKP)
Mauritania
(USD,UKP)
Gambia,The(FF,USD,UKP)
No.Obs.
VolatilityExcl/lncl
0184
0.0058
00058
0/84
0.0062
0/84
0 0088
1/83
0 00B8
2/82
0184
0.0070
0.0073
0/75
0.0075
0/84
0.0079
1/83
0.0085
2(82
0.0087
0/84
0.0089
0184
0.0086
0/84
0/47
0.0103
0 0108
2/82
0.0108
0/84
0.0108
0/84
0.0114
1/83
0.0124
B(78
0 0130
4/80
00133
1/83
0.0135
0/84
0 0139
1/83
0.0146
0/83
.
(b)Intermediate:
0.005<Volatility' 0.015
USD
Bangladesh
#
LaoPeople'sDem #
Moldova#
Azerbaijan
#
China,People'sRep#
CostaRica#
Sunname#
Paraguay#
Guinea#
Ethiopia#
Solomon
Islands
Israel
#
Pakistan
India#
Maldives#
Sri Lanka8
Nicaragua
BasketofCurrencies
ThaJand(USD#,JY. DM,UKP)
F1i(USD,AD,JY, UKP,NZD)
CzechRepublic
(DM,USD)
Jordan(USD,SDR)
Tonga(AD USC,NZD)
Singapore(SDR,USD)
Croatia(DM#)
Vanuatu(AD)
WestemSamoa(AD)
(DM#)
Macedonia
No. Obs.
VolatilityEOclincl
0 0064
0/24
00122
0/84
0 0148
0/84
0 0148
0/38
OtherSingleCunrency
Malawi(UKP)
Slovenia(DM#)
Taykistan(UKP#)
No.Obs.
Vola.lity Enollncl
00166
7(74
0 0202
1/60
00346
21/18
_Nepal (IR, USD)
0.0148
0/84
(c) Flexible:Volatilitv > 0.015
USC
Poland
Somalia
DomincanRepublic8
AIgena
MexicoC
Honduras
#
Uruguay#
Philippines
#
Vietnam#
Mongolia#
Ecuador#
Venezuela
#
Turkey
Lebanon
Rwanda
Peru#
Turkmenistan
#
SierraLeone#
Armena#
Guinea-Bissau
Tanzana#
Cambodia
#
Albania
Dilthuama
#
RussianFederati-i#
Nigeria#
Ukraine#
Kazakhstan
8
Uganda#
Haiti#
Bulgaria
#
Sudan#
Romania
Jamalca8
Zambia8
Brazil#
Zaire#
No.Obs.
VolatilityExcIleol
0.0152
3/81
0.01586
0/s
0.0158
3/81
0 0159
6(78
0.0163
4/80
4/80
0.0165
0.0158
0/84
0 0168
0/84
0 0169
2/69
00175
6(71
0,0180
1/83
678
0.0180
0.0183
4/80
0 0203 16/68
8(70
0 0203
0.0214 10/68
0.0239 1823
0.0242
7(77
0 0244 21/35
0.0249
6(78
0 0250
2/82
0.0250 13/46
0 0251
2/57
0.0260
3v45
00261
11/25
0 0267
3789
0.0274 16132
0.0281
7/30
0.0283
2/82
5(79
0 0284
0.0294 14/58
0.0285
9(71
0 0303 13(71
0 0318
3/81
0 0335 19565
0 0380 46/38
0.0453 53/21
__
Basketof Currencies
Latvia(USD,JY)
Chile(USD#,JY)
Burundi(SDR#)
PapueNewGuinea(USD,AD)
Zimbabwe(USD,UKP/
(SDR#)
Madagascar
Ghana(USD.FF)
Kenya(USD UKP)
Guatemala(USD#,JY)
Mozambique
(FF,USD)
Sao Tome&Prindipe(SDR#)
Angole(ECU#)
No.Obs.
VolatilityExcinel
5/53
0.0150
0.0151
0/84
1(78
0.0152
0 0168
1/83
3v81
0.0187
0.0191
3281
0 0192
0v84
0.0204
5/79
0.0220
2/82
0.0254
7(77
8(73
00276
0.0395 40/28
and
(pegged,intermediate,
Note:1) Countriesare classifedinto threecategoriesofexchangeratearrangements
flexible),depending
on the sizeof exchange
ratevo/obildy
as measuredby theestimatedstandarderor
is lossthan 0005, "internediate"when
ofregression.Countiesare classifiedas pegged"whenthe voleaility
thevolatiltyis between0.005and0 015,and"esible" whenthevsiahftyis greaterthan 0.015.Thesize
ofexchangeratevolatilityisshownnextto eachcountry'snameIn eachcategory,countriesam farther
classifiedinto threegroups,dependingonwhat cunrency
or basketof curenciesis assigneda significant
weightn theregression
equation.Countresin the'USD"grouparethosefor whichthe USdollarappears
as theonly signifmant
curencyin the regression
equationCountriesmthe "othersinglecuency" group
are thoseforwhichothersinglecurencyappearsasthe onlysignfi.antcurrencyin the regression
equation,
with thenameof thecurrencyshownin each parenthesisCountriesin the 'basketof currencies"gnoup
are thosefor whichmultiplecurrenciesappearas signficantin the regression
equation,withthe namesof
currenciesshownin eachparenthesisThe poundn,gn"" is attachedto a currencyif itsestimated
coefficient
exceeds0 80 on an adjustedbas/s whenthe sumof theestimatedcoe/ffi.entson multple
currenciesis geaterthan unity,adjustment
is madeby prupomonally
re-scaling
the estimatedcoefficients
equalto one
downwardso asto makethe sumofthe adjosledcoefficients
2) Dataobservabons
withvaluesof logfirst differences
greaterthan 0.1havebeenexcluded.Thecolumn,
excl/incl,showsthe numberof obsenvations
excludedandincludedin the regression
equation.
as USD= USdollar,FF
P Frenchfranc,SAR= SouthAfrtcan
3) Thecurencynamesareabbreviated
rand,SID= Singaporedollar,DM= Deutschemark,AD = Australandollar,JY= Japaneseyen,UKP=
UKpound,NZD= NewZealanddollar,SDR= Specialdrawng rights,ECU= European
cunrency
uat
4) Croabareterstothe 1995.96penod.Only Belanus
(thesize ofvola/iiy being0.0336)exhibitedno significant
cunrency
in thb regression
equation However,the numberof obseNations
for Belaruswasonlyeight
DataSource:KawaiandAkiyama(1998),Appendi.Table.
43
Table 3. Determinantsof G-5 CurrencyWeights in DevelopingCountries' ExchangeRateArrangements
Direct-Tradebased RegressionResults
Major CurrencyWeight
US dollar(USD) Weight
Constant
US's TradeShare
France'sTrade Share
Currency-Areabased RegressionResults
Coefficient
Std. Error R2-adj. MajorCurrencyWeight
Coefficient
0.451 US dollar(USD)Weight
1.001
0.080
Constant
0.029
-0.020
0.208
USDArea's TradeShare
1.247 ^^
-1.977
0.328
--JY Area's TradeShare
1.072 **
Germany'sTrade Share
-0.682
0.671
Regional:Africa
-0.271
0.079
Regional:EastAsia
-0.322
0.082
Regional:EastAsia
-0.344 **
Regional:Europe
-0.393 ^^
0.129
--Regional:MiddleEast
0.114
---Colonial:France
-0.267
Colonial:FormerUSSR
0.213
0.148
----Deutschemark (DM)Weight
0.153 Deutschemark (DM)Weight
Constant
-0.029
0.019
Constant
-0.034
Germany'sTrade Share
0.829
0.267
DM Area's TradeShare
0.403
Regional:Europe
0.068
0.040
Regional:Europe
0.078
Japaneseyen (JY) Weight
0.025Japaneseyen(JY) Weight
Constant
-0.001
0.009
Constant
-0.229
Japan's TradeShare
-0.047
0.070
JY Area's TradeShare
0.176
Germany'sTradeShare
0.161
0.079
DM Area's TradeShare
0.412 *
---UKP Area'sTrade Share
0.369 '
----FFArea's Trade Share
0.230
USDArea's TradeShare
0.212
--Regional:Africa
-0.016
Regional:EastAsia
0.025
0.016
Regional:EastAsia
0.021
-Regional:Europe
-0.035
Regional:Middle East
0.017
0.015
Colonial:FormerUSSR
0.025
0.017
Colonial:FormerUSSR
0.070
Frenchfranc (FF) Weight
0.536 Frenchfranc (FF)Weight
Constant
0.053
0.048
Constant
-0.004
France'sTrade Share
1.270
0.356
FFArea's TradeShare
1.092
Germany'sTradeShare
-0.811
0.483
---- --UKP Area'sTrade Share
-0.798 '
Japan'sTrade Share
-0.250
0.247
JY Area's TradeShare
-0.242
Regional:Africa
0.113
0.053
Regional:Europe
0.146
0.093
Colonial:France
0.207
0.097
Colonial:France
0.241
Colonial:UK
-0.063
0.044
Colonial:UK
0.052
Colonial:FormerUSSR
-0.161
0.107
--UK poundsterling(UKP)Weight
0.090 UK poundsterling(UKP)Weight
Constant
-0.025
0.017
Constant
0.857
UK's TradeShare
0.442
0.155
UKP Area'sTrade Share
-0.665
-FFArea's Trade Share
-1.044
USDArea's TradeShare
-0.943 ''
Japan's TradeShare
0.106
0.103
JY Area's Trade Share
-0.800
DM Area's TradeShare
-0.664
Regional:Africa
0.031
0.018
-----Regional:Europe
-0.074
_Colonial:France
0.052
Colonial:UK
0.023
Colonial:FormerUSSR
0.110
0.033
Colonial:FormerUSSR
0.076
Note: 1) Doubleasterisks ('*) and a singleasterisk (*) indicatethat the estimatedcoefficientsare
statisticallysignificantat the 11%and 5% levels, respectively.
2) The numberof observationsis 146.
44
Std. Error R2-adj.
0.515
0.084
0.146
0.364
0.091
--
0.083
0.076
--0.129
0.024
0.173
0.042
0.046
0.144
0.153
0.171
0.176
0.149
0.147
0.015
0.016
0.023
0.028
0.572
0.047
0.189
0.376
0.211
0.078
0.048
0.159
0.259
0.343
0.291
0.263
0.266
0.306
0.038
0.037
0.023
0.051
Table 4. Regression Results of Exchange Rate Movements:
Pre-crisis, Mid-crisis, and Post-crisis Periods
Hong Kong Dollar
Period
90/01-91/06
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
94/07-95112
96/01-97/06
0.004
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
0.000
0.014*
KoreanWon
Period
90/01-91/06
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
USD
JY
0.993 **
-0.001
-0.011
0.998 **
0.995 **
0.000
0.997 **
0.000
0.997 **
0.009
1.001 **
0.006
0.999**
0.001
Const
-0.014
-0.008
-0.004
0.002
USD
JY
1.004 **
-0.013
1.026
-0.016
1.014 *
-0.021
Const
0.172
0.210
0.045
94/07-95/12
-0.127
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
0.354
0.758
-0.203
0.983
**
**
0.960
1.149
0.922 *t
R2-adj
D.W.
Std-res
No. obs.
1.566 0.000425
389
0.9973
394
0.9956
2.579 0.000597
0.9975
2.147 0.000358
390
0.9994
2.018 0.000204
391
EURO
0.007
0.006
0.003
0.002
-0.007
**
0.000
0.000
**
0.065
0.039
0.061
**
**
-0.045
2.598
0.000277
391
0.9938
0.9998
2.773
2.402
0.000528
0.000108
393
261
R2-adj
EURO
-0.011
-0.006
-0.002
*
0.081
0.9977
*
0.020
0.084
0.001
D.W.
Std-res
No. obs.
0.9336
0.8098
0.9720
1.968
2.005
2.255
0.002149
0.004458
0.001208
389
394
390
0.9329
2.008
0.002205
391
0.8583
0.0921
0.7152
1.804
1.607
1.585
0.002378
0.024301
0.004190
391
393
261
SingaporeDollar
Period
Const
JY
USD
-0.212
0.739
**
0.065
91107-92/12
-0.140
0.758
**
0.077
0.185
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
-0.160
-0.189
-0.019
0.381
0.865
0.789
0.798
0.635
**
0.049
0.098
0.096
0.342
0.098
0.117
0.144
0.190
0.119
99/01-99/12
New TaiwanDollar
Period
0.035
**
**
0.874
Const
0.199
**
**
**
0.087
JY
USD
90/01-91/06
0.040
0.840
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
-0.154
0.193
0.023
0.024
0.382
-0.106
0.967 **
1.012 **
0.948 **
0.946 ^*
0.867
0.957 **
**
R2-adj
EURO
90/01-91/06
Std-res
No. obs.
2.309
0.002188
389
0.9482
2.309
0.001857
394
**
0.9199.
**
0.9383
**
*
0.9294
0.4851
2.131
2.052
2.167
2.181
0.001960
0.001915
0.001503
0.006911
390
391
391
393
**
0.8463
2.177
0.002927
261
-0.003
-0.019
0.028
-0.001
0.068
0.045
R2-adj
D.W.
Std-res
No. obs.
0.4605
2.849
0.008475
389
0.6336
2.913 0.006803
394
2.875 0.005199
390
0.6664
391
0.8956
2.022 0.002807
0.8264
2.734 0.002573
391
0.5698
1.702 0.005472
393
0.9495
1.765 0.001578
261
EURO
0.030
No. obs.
R2-adj
D.W.
Std-res
0.9094
2.084 0.002555
389
EURO
-0.017
0.033
0.055
0.060
0.036
0.090
0.023
D.W.
0.9167
**
0.240
*
**
Indonesian Rupiah
Period
90/01-91/06
USD
0.962
Const
0.227
JY
91/07-92/12
0.145
**
0.997
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
0.131
0.153
0.156
2.982
-0.313
*
0.995
0.994 **
1.009 **
0.512
0.769 **
MalaysianRinggit
Period
Const
90/01-91/06
0.072
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
*
0.029
**
**
USD
-0.006
0.016
0.9903
2.292
0.000900
394
0.010
-0.015
0.001
0.692 *
0.313 *
-0.002
0.011
0.002
-0.067
0.207
0.9739
0.9710
0.9372
0.0167
0.1501
2.044
2.004
2.165
1.961
1.773
0.001161
0.001438
0.001528
0.053151
0.018294
390
391
391
393
261
JY
EURO
R2-adj
D.W.
Std-res
No. obs.
0.892**
0.027
0.096**
0.9739
2.207
0.001279
389
-0.138
0.004
0.874 *
0.906 **
0.025
0.001
0.090
0.020
**
0.9487
0.8170
2.006
1.507
0.001944
0.003072
394
390
94107-95/12
-0.062
0.869
0.059
**
0.084
**
0.9532
1.970
0.001738
391
96/01-97/06
-0.049
0.885
0.034
*
0.086
**
0.9226
2.018
0.001611
391
97/07-98/12
1.032
0.883
0.300
**
0.1862
1.742
0.014911
393
99/01-99/12
0.000
1.001 **
0.9984
2.658
0.000280
261
**
**
0.000
-0.035
0.004
45
Table4. (Continued)
PhilippinesPeso
Period
90/01-91/06
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
Thai Baht
Period
90/01-91/06
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
Chinese Renminbi
Period
90/01-91/06
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
VietnameseDon
Period
Const
USD
0.571
-0.363
0.309
-0.045
0.020
0.998
0.131
Const
USD
0.014
-0.017
-0.037
0.017
-0.053
1.014
0.093
Const
1.431
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
0.751
-0.027
0.088
0.070
0.440
0.036 *
USD
*
0.419
EURO
0.031
0.019
0.012
0.069 **
0.178 **
0.311 **
0.119 **
0.561
0.351 **
0.607 **
0.699 **
1.014 **
0.998 **
0.023
0.043
0.006
0.049
0.154
0.099
0.139
R2-adj
**
EURO
-0.036
-0.041
0.082
-0.001
-0.010
0.001
0.004
0.007
-0.032
0.064
-0.030
-0.012
-0.002
0.011
JY
**
0.6891
0.6700
0.6154
0.7805
0.9936
0.1924
0.6997
0.043
JY
1.025 **
1.037
0.969 **
1.030 **
1.018 **
0.996 *
0.995 **
R2-adj
-0.048
0.101
-0.026
-0.059
-0.002
-0.022
JY
USD
0.317
0.211
1.037
-0.113
0.000
-0.008
0.000
EURO
0.043
-0.110
-0.006
0.062
-0.005
0.285
0.096 *
0.961 **
0.957
0.972 **
0.877 *t
0.823
0.608 *
0.775 **
Const
90/01-91/06
JY
1.054 t*
1.048 **
0.973 *
0.986
1.004
0.876
0.876 **
R2-adj
*t
EURO
-0.243
0.653
*
-0.013
-0.109
-0.048
-0.036
0.037
0.000
0.263
0.725
0.403
0.415
-0.024
-0.001
0.9543
0.9782
0.9778
0.9882
0.4746
0.1046
0.5348
0.7145
0.8889
0.1159
0.9829
0.9335
0.9919
0.9939
R2-adj
**
**
**
D.W.
2.011
1.991
2.013
2.221
2.202
1 716
1.998
D.W.
2.034
2.007
2.040
2.410
1.978
1.877
2.197
D.W.
2.007
2.042
2.007
2.082
2.832
2.471
2.966
D.W.
Std-res
0.005762
0.006458
0.005375
0.004306
0.000469
0.014420
0.004362
Std-res
0.001766
0.001334
0.001049
0.000848
0.006179
0.017221
0.005990
Std-res
0.005179
0.003212
0.019926
0.001116
0.001569
0.000597
0.000541
Std-res
No. obs.
389
394
390
391
391
393
261
No. obs.
389
394
390
391
391
393
261
No. obs.
389
394
390
391
391
393
261
No. obs.
0.1748
2.118
0.013246
389
0.1121
0.2816
0.6055
0.5700
0.6258
0.9994
2.083
1.959
2.163
2.190
2.271
2.403
0.016349
0.008682
0.005797
0.004833
0.005244
0.000166
394
390
391
391
393
261
Cambodia Riel
Period
90/01-91/06
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
Const
3.464
3.234
1.591
-1.048
0.402
USD
JY
0.375
0.280
0.158
0.885 **
1.142 '*
0.816
1.333
99/01-99/12
-0.137
1.127
LaosKip
Period
90/01-91/06
91/07-92/12
93/01-94/06
94/07-95/12
96/01-97/06
97/07-98/12
99/01-99/12
Const
0.441
0.214
0.100
0.673
-0.044
3.794
1.891
**
EURO
-0.433
0.448
0.290
0.145
-0.150
0.172
-0.179
0.523
-0.302
-0.358
0.120
-0.807
-0.117 **
-0.320
USD
JY
0.343 **
0.111
0.243 *
0.175
0.284 **
0.026
0.794 **
0.122
0.704 **
-0.023
0.757
-0.240
1.687
-0.388
R2-adj
D.W.
No. obs.
2.007
2.039
2.023
2.037
2.083
0.045834
0.042950
0.033773
0.019219
0.013866
389
394
390
391
391
**
0.1295
2.291
0.019151
393
**
0.6119
2.506
0.005043
261
EURO
0.195
0.124
0.309 **
-0.183
0.112
-0.168
-1.447 *
R2-adj
D.W.
Std-res
No. obs.
0.0912
2.144 0.013244
389
0.1187
2.167 0.009874
394
0.1366
2.063 0.008243
390
0.1754
2.068 0.013119
391
0.4029
2.121 0.005386
391
0.0119
2.139 0.032036
393
0.0175
1.954 0.049340
261
Note: Double asterisks (**) and a single asterisk (*) indicate that the estimated coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
46
Std-res
-0.0025
0.0060
0.0130
0.0969
0.1189
Table 5. Shares of the UnitedStates,the European Union, Japan, and East Asia in the Total InternationalTransactions
of the Individual East Asian Economies, 1996
(Percentage)
Imports
Exports
United
Singapore
HongKong SAR
Taiwan POC
Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
Philippines
Indonesia
China
Vietnam
EastAsia
Singapore
HongKong SAR
Taiwan POC
Korea
Malaysia
Thailand
Philippines
Indonesia
China
Vietnam
EastAsia
States
18.4
21.3
26.8
16.7
18.2
18.0
33.9
16.4
17.7
4.5
19.8
United
States
39.6
9.8
19.3
27.4
17.0
21.1
3.4
2.1
8.3
8.1
10.7
European
Union
13.0
14.9
13.6
10.8
13.7
16.0
15.9
16.6
13.1
24.3
13.7
Japan
8.2
6.6
12.9
12.3
13.4
16.8
17.9
28.5
20.4
26.4
13.5
Total
East
Asia
46.8
45.1
45.0
35.9
43.2
32.7
25.3
29.7
35.0
24.1
40.0
ForeignDirect Investment Inflows
East
European Japan
Asia
Union
n.a.
34.3
23.1
22.7
45.4
18.1
18.6
22.2
5.0
29.9
7.9
27.9
36.8
27.0
5.1
44.3
47.2
16.3
41.0
6.0
17.5
30.2
25.6
16.8
68.7
8.8
6.6
35.3
17.3
16.8
46.7
21.2
12.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
European
United
Union
States
14.5
16.4
11.1
7.9
15.3
18.2
14.1
22.1
14.5
15.6
14.5
12.6
9.4
19.7
22.2
10.2
14.3
11.7
13.0
5.0
14.0
14.3
Japan
18.2
13.6
25.7
20.9
24.7
27.8
21.8
23.2
21.0
9.2
20.3
East
Asia
37.9
60.4
23.0
15.9
32.6
24.3
28.3
29.4
34.0
57.1
35.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
OutstandingLoans from BIS-ReportingBanks (Year End)
Total
East
Japan
European
United
Asia
Union
States
100.0
n.a.
31.1
54.3
3.0
100.0
n.a.
42.2
41.6
4.2
100.0
n.a.
12.0
56.6
12.4
100.0
n.a.
24.3
33.8
9.4
100.0
n.a.
36.9
41.4
10.5
100.0
n.a.
53.5
27.3
7.2
100.0
n.a.
11.7
47.6
29.4
100.0
n.a.
39.7
37.8
9.5
100.0
n.a,
32.3
47.4
4.9
100.0
n.a.
16.3
62.7
12.0
100.0
n.a.
35.4
43.2
6.2
Source: InternationalMonetary Fund, Directionof Trade Yearbook 1997.
Japan External Trade Organization,Jetro White Papers on ForeignDirect Investment (1998).
Bank for InternationalSettlement,The Maturity, Sectoral and NationalityDistribution of InternationalBank Lending,
First Half 1997 (Basle, Junuary 1998).
47
Total
Figure 1. InflationRate and Volatilityof ExchangeRates (OLS residuals)
0.03
*
0.025 -
~x
A
3
0
x
0.02 -A
*
0.02O
0
6i
z
-
0.015
m
0B
0.01
x
[3
Middle East
0
0.005
A
0.01
0.015
Europe
LatinAmerica
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
00
X
0
A
A
A A
A
.C
A,
0.005-
v
X
a*
0E
* Africa
o East Asia
a South Asia
v
x
x
0.02
0.03
0.025
Inflation Rate (average)
48
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
Figure 2. The East Asian Economies'Exchange Rate Movements
(a) ASEAN Countries' Exchange Rate Indices, Offshore Rates (January 1997 = 100)
Thaibaht
110
.90
90
70=
_
_,_,_peso
~~~~Philippine
-
_ _
50
Malaysia ringgt-
-
30
-- '___________
___
___
10
10C)
(''
>.
->
O
°
C~
CN
~
,
O
C)
o
o~~~~~~c a
l
-
-
:1
,'
c
o
3
rupiah
tk,.
,^tIndonesia
'@"
,
D
o
ol
,
O
C
T,
M
,
la
I
CD
CD
o
CD
CZ>
z
C,
O.
(b) The Asian NIEs' Exchange Rate Indices (January 1997 = 100)
,00
HongKong
~~SingaporeNwawn-.,;
,\,
_
__
80
__
60
)tv
/
K~orean
Ct
0C-0)
f
40
--
C-
C-0)
C--O
C)
CD.
r-
03
C--
C
C
D
CO
cc
C)
a)
0
Source: Datastream.
49
0)
O>
0D
CD
CZ
CC0
OO
C'
Cz
Figure3. EstimatedCoefficientson the USDollar,JapaneseYen,and Euro
Hong Kong Dollar
3
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
2
-1
__EUROI
-2
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
.3
--.
-.
-~
-~
-a
-a
-~
-a
-.
-~
-aa.
a
a
a
.
.
,a.a.-
a
a
,.'..a'-,
a.
Korean Won
3
1-USO
-3
3
2
1
-1
New Taiwan Dollar
-
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
-USD
EUROj
_-.
____________
3
-1
EURO
-2
_
Indonesian Rupiah
_ _
_ _
__________
3
2
-3
Malaysian Ringgit
3
2.
-
-2
.3
-1
/~~~~~
,'
50
-S
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
I-
cr
90/01-
99/01-
90/05~~~~~~~~~
90/05-
00/0590/05-
91/05-
q1/OS-
91I/09
0100
92/01i
92/05-
-
93/01-
94/n-
I
94/09-
92/05-
(J.')
~~ ~
97/01-
I
~~~~94/05-
-9/1
-
os/os
-
0
a
~
-
~ ~9/09
~
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I
99/0593/0593/09940
~~~~~94/09~~95/0;
95'/01
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
S
~~
3
90/09-
W
92/0102/05q/5-9/5
92/01
92/05-
94/0594/09/l
95/05-
~
-9/1
~
'A
91001
t
91/09
92101192/05
92/09-
-
I92/09
93/09-
93/09
94/01-
99/0194/00-
95/01-
9/0-
I0505-~~~~~~95/05I
00~0i97/Il-
90/0?-
-
-
/07/
/090/01-
00/0197/01-
0/01-
9//05-
9700/O-
98/00-
900-
-
-9
0/01-
-
90/00-
90/05-4/009
90/1907/05
99/09-
-9/09-I-
0/00-
99/01-
98/01-
90/01-
98/01-
99/01-
90/05-
98/0S-
09/os
-
009/05
-
99/OS-
99/Os
99/O09-
09/09-
99/09-
99/09-
99/09
90/00-
99/09-
0
c
-94/05-
94/09-
000-1)706//5-0/05-
9b//0
90/00-
00
~~~93/0193/05~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~93/05-
,94/05-
-
96/01-
96/01-
f
~~~~~~~-1
92/0990/0193/05
9310590/09
94/10
-.
91/o5-
1/0591/09-
-
-90/01
~9/5
90/0590/099/9-9/9-'
91/09-
95/09
95/09
-
I
90/01-
00/01I90/0505
01/05
94/05-
94/00-
-
CD~~~~~~~~~~~~~0
900
-9/oq
92/05-
--
95/95-
0
092101-
~~~~~~~~
os/Ol-
91/01-/
~~
92/01-
93/05- 9.3/0593/0994/01
93/0994/01
-
ol
91/05-
~~~~~~~~~~~93/05-
93/05-
90/0I90/05~~~~~~~~~~~~~-7
90/0500'09-
1/09-
-92/0992/09
93/01-
92/09-
-
Ck.
-0-/
91/01-
90/09-9009
91I/01
-
:0
0
0
0:n-
-
-~~~96/9
C
Figure4. CorrelationCoefficientsof ExchangeRate Changes
(a) KoreanWon versusOther Currencies
Actual
_
0.8SI
0.6
8
K
0.4
__
0
NTD
_
_
_
_
_
_
~-IDR
_
_______
-0.2 -P_P___
-0.4 _
__
_
__
-MLRi
_
_
__
___
___
__
- +THBj>
-
-0.6
c7DCD
CD~
cm
Cccc
CDCccc-cc
CD
~m
cc
cc
cycm
cmccc cm
ccc)cc
c
CcD
CD
c-c
-
CDc
c
CDCcc-c
cccc cc c cc ccc c cc c cc
Cc~
c-
cm- cm
ccm
) 1 Cm
c
CDcc
mcc
CDCD
c
-
c~ cc~cD-c)cc~ cc cc
Predicted
0.8
S ID
0.6
-
0 .4
0.2
-0.2
-0.4
_
_
--
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
-THB
ID
__
0
u-NTD
-- D
-
--
-
-
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
o
_
_
__
_
_
_
Y
_
_
~
_
-w
P
-L-----7!7THB
N
PHP-_
_
0
MLRrF
-0.6
-C
ccc
cm
cccm cc cc cm
Residual
)C
DC
cm) cm
cm~cm cmcm)
______
Z
ccmcm)
CDCD -rOCDCD
~cm) ccm)cm) ~Cmcmc)(c
O-~
CD C.-CI) COCCD
CD-CZDCDcc
cm cm~cm~ ~C'
cm~ cm
T cmc
~ cmcm~cm c
__________
0.8
0.6
04
A
SL
sii
£4w
-NTD
-h~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
02
-0.2
-0.4PH
-0.6
4__
MLLR
_
_
--
,-THBK
--
-
-0.8
Cc~
Cc
ccCD~
CD.
C- CDc-. CD-.
fCD
-
CDr'- CD---
c CD
cr.)
(
c r---cc (C~ C-DF- r-D CDccc) c
-m cm cm cm cm cm cm cm cm cm cm cm.cm cm cm cm cm cm cm m_cmncn cn cn cmcm m c
52
c cm
)
cc
0c
cmcmc
Cm
cm cm cm cm cm cm1l
Figure 4. Correlation Coefficients of Exchange Rate Changes
(b) Singapore Dollar versus Other Currencies
Actual
-nNTD
8_
06
0.4
~~
~
~
~
~
~
hIDR
___
0.2
MLR
_
0
~~
~
~
~
-0.2--_
_
~
_
_
_
_
__
_
_
_
___--PHP
_
_
_
_
-.- oTHB
-__-
-0.4
__
F
(
'd
-
CD
CD
"--
-C (C
CD
CD-CD-C-~ CNC D
j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~CL,
DC
0h 0Th
0Th 0T 0Th0T
~
C-)
0Th
0h0-)
CD
C
-C
D
C3
C0D((0-
C-) CD-
-
D
--
CCD
D
CD
CZ,:,00C00000000000.000000000
=
CD CDDnL
-
CT)
0Th
r-
-
r
c:tc
r- C
-C:: CD
CO C)C,0CD CDh
0T 0'T
00 CD00
-
0Th 0ThO'
0ThC)DCD)0ThC7h0T, 0C7m C7CC7CDC7
0Th0Th0-)0CThC-c
7CY'
CD-)0
0-h 0Th0T
Predicted
0.8
KW
-
0.6
---
0.4
NTDK
d
--
H_
-
_
--
_IDR
02 -
-
MLRK
tt*L
-
0
-
-0.2
-
o
__
PHP-
|+THB
__
-0.4
CD CD -D
CD CDCD '-C
CD C.D .-
N
-0C0
C) CD CD'- CD0h
0h0Th0Th
0c c 0Th0Th0h)
Residual
___
CD -
CD CD CD '-
r[-C
OTh00Th0Th0)
C-D CZ)C-
-C'C 'C J
O-Co-)0Th0)
CC)CDCD-
QCCD
00
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C
CD CD -CD
CD CD '-C
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-
o 0-c
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C>-rCC-) 0Th c0l C-) C~C- CT)0-0Th 0Th)0Th0Th CTh0T
_-
0.8
0.69
_
TR
-CD-e>.
D
-0.6
0.4
D
-D CDC D
D CCD
oC
T0hTT
-'-'
z-'C-CD
N(N(
CD
CD -s cD
CD C
0
Th
NC DCCD CD -)
0~cO-c00
C-,'
"CD 'CD CD -
DC
CD(0((0(
CD CDz
CD-CDC
0T 0l 0Th -cn0-c 0)
C-c~
07)0Ch
0T 050Th
L-CDC-CTh
C-0T
r - C C.D
DCCD CD
CD(E-CD
-CD 0zth0Th
CD--0C\\--CDh0
C
(Th
T
C7hCTh
0T 0Th CT)
0 0h0
-)
NTD-
Figure 4. Correlation Coefficients of Exchange Rate Changes
(c) New Taiwan Dollar versus Other Currencies
Actual
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0.8
0.6
K
SID
SU
0._
10.
__4
_-&IDR
__________
____
0
-0.2
_
_____
_-*MLR
-
-0.4
-
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
PHP
-- ----
--
--
TH B
-0.6
f
~~~~~~CDUCDC ) CD
CC CCS
(n
Predicted
)CJ
CDZ
CCD CS)
,
C
C--
CM-
CD CD5 C
__________
CB.C)
CJrc cC7
. (1:: CCD
5cCJ)J
__I
11
0.8
0.6
___-0.4 -____
0.2
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
____
-^
_
____._R
____
C0DCD
KW1
-__
SID
_IDR
-ML-R
&A
_P
-__
__________
CmCD
cm- mCD
CD CD -
CnO-)u
c
mmn crmmc-s
mm m
-
cmzcmccmcrrsc
cm m
m)c,
LDcm
-
I_
____.-.____
mm m=
mm m.-
.-
n~
-m
m (- C!D
mcmc.-cs
-
1CD
CDcm
THB
mmD
Z) m
c
cm cmcnccmcn
cmmnmc mm
Residual
0.8
_
--
0.4
0.2
0
-- -SID
IDR
0-
-0.2
-
___._T
-0.6
_
_
_
_
_
_
__
_
_
TH__
-0.8
)CThDCD~C=mm,)-
(7
T
ncm
mmmcmmm
CmmCm.
C)C)c
19CO
mmmcmmmcm
D--
~
T,(s(OC70~0
C:1iCC
CZ)
Cm C
-
mcm.mcmmm
CDm --- mmm.--CD
n
-
:1
(-:,---QC0c10-mmC
-LfDCD)=(D(--.(M-M
CCl.f1b)G)/
06.O
CC7T
n
)
mcm
mmm
mmcm c. c mm.cmcmmmcm
mmcm
54
I-
Figure 4. Correlation Coefficients of Exchange Rate Changes
(d) Indonesian Rupiah versus Other Currencies
Actual
_
0.8
0.6
-uA _SID
0.2
-*NTD
_
__-0.2
-0.4 -
-0.6
-0.8
_
.
_
.
___
_
e
i)D
PHP
-
TH~B
.
czc-0000-000-00000--0000-000-0000c00c
CD00--- CDC
'CD' CD
-
o----00000'Ce CD
CZ CD
C) CD
-
CD00000>-- C
CD-
D0CD000000000D0000
Predicted
___
__
__
__
__
SI
___
-
0.6
1|-KW SID
0.4 __
0.2
_
0
NTD
MLR
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
PHP
~
-
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_-
_B__
X
-0.8
-00-000000
0
CD CD
Residual
C
)-
0-0000000--000-000-0000000-000000'.
CD- (N
-
C
-
LOCD
CD
___
-
>->-
00
C-
___
0
0 C0
___
0
-0.2
P IHP
-0.6
-0.8
-.- THB
i0000
-'C10
-0000C0
CD C
-1000- (-10--00 CD00
0+rC
- CDCD CD
CD--000CD0-0000-000--ICC'-C
0t - CDC)
r 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
C
0CD-
C-)
-D
=D
000000000000
55
D
D-o
Figure 4. Correlation Coefficients of Exchange Rate Changes
(e) Malaysian Ringgit versus Other Currencies
Actual
0.8
0.6
KW
m
I
0.4
NTD-_
0.2
0
-0.2
-0.4
_
__
-_I-D_R
_
__-
_
__
PHP
-+THB
' -000000-0000.000~00000-00OOCOOOOOO
- OC
E0
---0. ON CD
(040
00Th 0Th0Th
T Cn0h0T
0Th 000T
CTh
Predicted
.
- CD0
~-,:4-C)- LO
0Th 0Th 0Th 0Th 0Th 0Th O00T
_
_
0000000-->CD&
'rj-
,
000T
0--j-
c0T 0Th
0Th 0Th 0Th
CCD
000T
CD
T
0Th)000Th 000Th) 00.T 0Th 0Th0Th 0Th 0Th 0ThC
_
_
1
0.8
-
0.6
-
-___
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2
+
--
-
K
-_
--
_
--
i
___
KW-
_
_ . -
N
____
SID
D
-
D
IR_
__
.__PHPE
____.__.---+_THB
_-.
-0.4
00-oo0~-
-~-~--.:-
-
f- f--CDCo-
ro
C
:COCOCO.-.--.--.-CD CD Z:0Df
0T
--
Th 000C0,0,00000000000
r--o C
0-C>.-r---"C
o
OO
ooo
ooo
-Th000000000n00n000000000000
oCoCX)00000
r
000
hr_ rTh
0Th 00 00Cn0000000
Residual
0.8
0.6__-
_
KW
.
0.4
0.2
iNTD
-
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
P HP~
-.w-THB
-h
ooo
T000000Th000)0
00Z0
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cy r f
h0)0000DCD00000000-0000000C-
Cn C
CCT
5n r7OCyO
f -0,
56
cn
rz C-)
nC
(0T
CTr:r
C
T
TChD,
n
CD
r) C
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Df)
666
I
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oo
ccoo
0
-
901'07
g0/,10 91/010
91/,04
911/07
91/10
92/01
9204
9207
92/,10
93/01
93/,04
93/,07
93/10
94/01
94/04
94/,07
94/,0
95/,Ol
~J95/04
97Y1 0
98/,O I
98/,10
99/01~
99/07
99/0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~9
co___z
,aCD'O
Po
I
IP,
J4
9004
90j/,O
90/109/0
95/10
96/01
96/0
I96/07
~~~~~~~~~~~~96/10
97/01i
7/l
97/O
97/0
97/07970
____
-
95/07
96/10
99/10
C
~~~~~~~91/04
91/Z07
~~~~~~~~~~~~91/10
92/01l
92/,04
92/0/
92/10
93/01
93/04
93/07
93/10
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~94/01
94Z04
94/07
4i0
~~~~~~95010
95/04
95/,07
,04
98/07
I)C
~oo6
~~~~~~~90/04
~~~~~~~90/,07
oi
90/,04
95/,10
96Z01
9604
96/07
0
9 I0
98/01
~~~~~~~98/04
~~~~~~~98/0
98/,107
99/04
gz
099/04
z
91/04
91/070
91/10
92Z/01
92/,04
92/0
92/,10-0
93/01l
93/,04
93/,07
93/,10
94/01l
94/,04
94/07
94/,10
95/,01
95/04
95/07o
95/,10
96/01
96/04
96/07
96/10
97/01
z
97107
~~~~~~~~~~~~~97
/10C
~~~~~~~~~98/go
9804
9/0
98/10
99/01
99/07
99/10
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.ZC
A
<
( C
.
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(
O
x
(0
(.0(0(0(0(0(0(0(0(0
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(.0.0
ElH
CD
c0(0(0(0c
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CZ)CflOo-.--
-. 0(0
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((0Q0
Q
<Dt:b
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D CD (D) (ZD
U1CD:J -P.
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8
9'0-
Z_O-
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l
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C
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>-
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o.
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c-o
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c
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.
L l UlW. . ~~~~Ah7WLZ'O-
GI
wds
o
seoUeJjnfl
J9e4;0snSJOA
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seU!dd!1i4d
se6uu40 OeeNGBuB4Lx3 1o 8uOe3eGOO uO!Ree1JJO31i ejnS
-0C0
-
~~~~~~~~~~~9'0
Figure4. Correlation
Coefficients
of Exchange
RateChanges
(h) LaosKipversusOtherCurrencies
Actual
1
0.8
0.6
s,-6lS dL
IL___1K
0
hS
i
-in--IbSID
0.4
0.2
NTD
-0.2
--
_____MLR
-0.4 _
PHP
-0.6
--------
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AppendixTable.(Continued)
(c) Singapore Dollar
(d) New Taiwan Dollar
Perid
USD
790
0 799
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90,01-90'03-0234
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66
65
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1 013
90, 110-90172
90,1-91,1
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91/0291/04
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91/04-511000
51/05-91/0
91 00-01/08
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88
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AppendixTable.(Continued)
(g) Philippines Peso
Co,,st
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000-00/03
900/02-00/04
50/0-90/05
900,0-90/0
00/05-00/07
90/6-9/9
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1190
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00/12-91/02
0 112
91/01-81/03
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01/02-91/04
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01/03-011/00
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91/04-1/00o
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91/05-0/107
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91/07-01/00
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01/04-01/10
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92/059-2/07
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02/00-210
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920D9200-043
22/09-92/10
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2/0092111
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92/10-82112
3556B
92/11-03/01
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02/12-93/02
02/1-303
00885
03/02-:93/04
00/12 8
0303-9M3/00
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1 100
0 871
93/00-93/07
93/0093/08
0 599
0780
93/07-93/00
83/06-93/13D
00B14
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03/10-93/12
93/11.94101
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93/12-04/02
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94/0194/03
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94/00-54/10
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04/10-04/12
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94/11-9001
94/2-05/02
1 226
1 220
95/01-95103
91102-950/4
1 109
05/03-9505/0
0231
95/04-95/00
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05/05-55/07
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16040
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99/02-90/04
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USD
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0
0
0
3
0
AppendixTable.(Continued)
(k) Cambodia Riel
(I) LaosKip
Old-las
.
No. abs.
N*
bsaCO
EURO
62-ad: 0.06.
PeSoS
Cans: /300
Si
-0 918
-006
1
461
04
90/01-90/03
6 400
1473
-0 467
5
-0 362
-1 023
-0.0370 2 024 0 049017
97/02-90041
6 94
1 439
0.4319
2 297 0 005925
66
-0 032
0177
0 093
0 702
/03-9/5
45
0 145
0 354
0 5429
1048 0.054787
00/'4-000
0 499
0 397 0 458
0 4248
2 101 00D06240
86
90/05-90/07
0903
0 310
5 107
90
-3 217
4 012
00387
18478 0 091000
90/06-93090
10 569
-1 807
89
-0/704
-2 172
1 659
00628 1 912 6 094400
90/07-90/09
13054
6 0044
15913 0.093830
90
116010
-1 206
-1887
2 399
s0/0,-90/10
2 204 006O8606
85
056
-0 116
0 067
0 764
0 2620
0/-90/11
0 2547
2 342 0 008388
90
0334
0 084
6 239
04860
9/-992
2 284 0 006538
90
-90403
0 300
0 239
-0294
0 1591
30/11-91/01l
2 336 0 006948
84
0 449
0 189
-0338 4
0 2184
90/12-91/02
-0322
84
0 055
-03276
0 2288
2 30
0 009888
31/01-91/03 -0~~~76
D493
0
63
-0 247
-19
048
221
0762
91/02-91/04 -2~~~067- 0 451
2 343 0 008803
90
-1 303
0 236
-0 148
-0085
-0.0/06
91/03-9/109
2 018 0 004926
85
3 406
0 528
0005
-0 145
-0 0095
91/04-91/06
66
-0 142
10965
0.799
00174
1037 00482
91/05-91/07
0 347
1541 0 0488306
85
0110
/ 729
0 062
6 0237
9I/05-1/00
66/9l
68
-0 629
2.4002
-0216B
00457
1 907 00098608
31/017-91/09
4 761
90
0 116
0 300
0.082
-0 218
0 00-42 1065 0 008084
D/109-9/I/
-0 0073
2 090 0 028261
89
6 010
00561
6123
-0638
91/00-91411
-0020
2 026 0 043118
66
0 600
6541
09539
-0671
91/10-91/12
80
0 179
0.482
-6268
-00378
29042 0 043544
01/11-92/0/
-0314
90
-0071
-0 0420
2/01
0 033871
/9/t2-92/02
-/ 224
-00691
0 515
80
-0 007
-6 055
0200
-094103 2068 0 012905
/2/01-92/03
-2 639
0 157
-00446
1 966 0 012359
64
92/02-92/04
-1 790
06030
0 024
0 0908
2900 0 010943
45
-0720
0 249
-0 037
9644
92/03-00/03
/ 90 0 0005871
69
3 900
0 705
-1 223
1 6555
0 0490
32/04-02/06
1 260
0 0290
2 058 0 026065
90
/2/05-90/07
4 602
0 60
-1 221
0 0006
1 068 0020694
88
4934
04827
-1 48948
1290
92/00-920/0
2011l 0 077183
46
_-253
0 870
-0 417
-0 0424
32/0-90/09
9 760
65
0544
-0845
-0 0233
2 073 00850
92/96-90/10
14276
0 533
96
0 673
0662
-0823
-0 0292
2 085 0 0858658
02/09-92//i
14088
6
90
-0 077
-0 7690
00650 0116 06037428
92/10-93//2
6956e
11i13
65
0708 0 306 8
01980
18B22 000817
929/1-93/01
-0304
-025/
0 1972
2 208 0 01088
64
0 283
0 106
0 281
0 524
/7/12-93/02
84
28911
1 998
00040
2 070 0 081114
93/01-03/03
14076
-0945
0 0101
201I0 0081213
65
/11303
-09051
2 396
2 36
93/02-93/04
80
-1 036
2562
2 310
090079 2 014 008B0338
93/03-93/05
/09141
060332 2 129 0 006855
85
A 606
0 210
-0014
0 421
93/04-03/06
00D657 1990 00690896
65
9059/7
-0775
0 219
0 0/4
00029
90
08620
0 1059
1479 0D069004
93/'06-93/1
-0529
-0231
-0 115
09
0 428
0 0183
6
1 490 0008385
96
9307930
16
015
65
-0104g
08628
0176
1477 6006D805
93/0-93/101
03836
-,0029
80
0 031
0 230
00989
I 000 0 006900
93/09-03/11
/
_-063
0 272
1934 0 004649
68
0388
0046
0191
0 1798
93110-939/0
-0 005
84
048
65
-05
51828
2138 6005296
939/1-94/0/
0 162
-249
000272 1996 0 09014'8
64
93112-94/02
06474
9563
011
0 284
1003 0090291
64
06457
0631
017868
-0 255 4
94/01-94/03
0 2856
1841 00698896
64
0 173
0 660
0114
-0133
94/02-94/04
2 033 0904480
90
0116
0 610
-0053
00186
0 3815
34/03-94405
85
0 749
0 058
-90/00
0 4831
2 180 0 004548
94/04-94/06
0 265
0 4301
2 296 0 005564
65
6 157
0 577
0074
-0046
94/09-94/07
0 4174
2 395 0000663
68
0 469
0697
09015
-0 121
94/06-94/00
68
-77a018
1 2
083
94/7-94/00
- 35/
1 390
-0668
96
1 405
-0727
-0 480
-081l71 2018 0039618
94/00-949/0
-4 347
85
-0132
-00194
2028 0038319
94/69-94/11
-4917
1 580
-13264
2 303 0 095968
85
-0/126
0 458
0 196
-0197
0/1370
94/10-94/12
0 3012
2 373 0.065263
08
0023
0 54
0 344 8
0205
941/195/0/
0.200
2452 60 04956
PA
0305
0617
0 170
:-338
5912-0/0
85
1 123
0122
-06/0
065842 2 290 0 007280
90,019/0
0 579
93
-/874
0806 4
0 662 8
-192
618632 2 246 0 023387
3502-9504
96
1 099
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-0026
0185
2 202 00D26485
95/03-505/0
-0 903
2 245 90086267
90
00899
0 653
-0563
0 0794
99/04-95/06
-/9/6
96
1360
-08968
-0 778
0 2882
1.998 0 013157
95/09-95/07
106
80
0575
-006
0143
651960 2 230 009D4512
05/90-95/08
-414
65
09056
0 216
08094
29014 0 003390
95/7-05/69
-0108
0 670 .
68
0.7092
19836 090039604
0 70
6025
0133
99/00-95/10
-0150
-0 065
0 76890 1739 0053180
85
95/60-95/9/
0 807
-0024
1909 0 0943
85
01
63623
06916
95//992
-0077
0 2981
1 814 0.09567,2
08
-05/
00612
0 237 8
-0 112
95/111-9601//
45
08
631
-23
0 3247
1868 0D065092
93/1I2-96/00
-0396
85
0801
-0050
-0 182
500359 1949 0 004445
0/091-09/3
-0135
6 3137
2029 0 064221
84
-0037
0651 ,
-0 032
9954
5602-90/04
6240
0 2004
1 722 0 094819
68
90/3-96/5
-9377
0 390 8
0967
0 357 4
52820
2 224 09004902
65
46/04-06/36
-02890
0109
6161i
90
0 431
0 069
0 354
54296
1 867 6 004310
09/0390/0
029
0 004
0665
2 344 0002025
66
96/00-96/0
0136
06829-00890
217
0.000847
66
6
00
-0 045
0 7406
90/07-96/05
02
0 6028
2 42 0 0063218
80
-079
09669
0017
-0 067
9 0/3696/10
85
0105e
0 4023
2303 09004829
90/09-96/1/1
-0266
0 716 --0 046
66
0 4086
2 407 0 006310
6 438
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796
96/0-0/2
-0024
0870
0 3488
1983 0 007404
46
90/197I0
-091'2
0 35
-0239
65
_-02619
0 701
0 3562
10020 0 007238
95/12-97/02
-1079
030578
0 3896
1 807 080603
64
-0 320
0 596
-0 007
0 342
37,01-97,03
63
0 012
0114
098471 2 220 0000676
07/02-97/04
-0 165
0 703
65
0 257
-2051
6 1257
2 013 0021707
07/03-97/03
3506
1 977
17
2 078 0 031061
45
300/
2 76090 053
20
47/04-97/06
01149
2 060 0031947
66
4900
2 710
-06
-2.023
97/05-97,07
06
1 690 00292
60
201
1 827
-010
-79
97/0330
-201
0 0817
10653 0 018602
84
97/9-0/9
100
093
036
21064 0 006906
60
1213
1487 8
081
-2176
01050
97/05-97110
01192
20236 0 033982
65
0 729
1065 8
09686
-2296 97/09-909/1
90
-2921
01575
2 213 0 032325
97/10-1/12
0410
2 007
0 797
9 190
600 282 2/20 0 010293
85
97/"1/95/2
0 765
0 954
0 102
0.1533 28050 00149047
85
0 871
1302
-6 027
-0 568
97/12-080
64
I 236
-0 052
-0 565
0 1450
24668 68014721
56/01-98/03
0 627
D02015 2 683 0~012089
84
-0182
1500
-0 115
-12967 8
90/012-9/0
0 4059
1 611 0 096521
60
/ 695
0a05s0 075
-0 041
95/03-90/05
65
06906
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0 2242
2093 09005896
5/4-5/0
1 500
09861
-07
0616
21439 0615794
88
0954
111
0 177
99/05-90/0
01174
2.0
0021267
96
-16406
1454
0 116
0 078
36/00-36,0
46
5296
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0250
0 1246
20694 0 021509
90/07-69
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320
05
1070
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01513
1303 0 0170609
98/0-6/7
-0 263
05
08905
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0 3991
2768 066750
96/09-00/11I
0120
96
0 017
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0 4573
2 588 000714236
39/I0-36/1
0125
1016 04e73
2 249 00925
46
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84
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0 408 4
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2 470 090594
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2 396 09004803
04
3 260
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0 7506
93,01-39,03
85
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068717
2 715 0 003567
99/02-99/04
0 302
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0 7760
2 450 0 D082714
95/306/05
0 205
1180
65
002
2 821 0 002952
0~~~~~~~~~~
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99/04-93/00-0 104
056492 2 628 09030
85
97
00
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100
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06870
2 441 0 00419
86
399 0-9/6
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04
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0 659491M2 493 0 094896o
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90/0-90903
902-/4
90/00-90/05
90/D4-90/06
90/05-90/07
90606-90608
90107-90109
90/06-90:10
90/09-95/11
90110-90/12
90/11-91/01
90/12-91/02
91101-91/00
91/02-91/04
91/03-91/05
91904-91/06
91/09-91/07
91/168-91/08
91/07-51/09
91/08-91/10
91/0-91/11
91/10-91/12
61/17-92/0/
91/12-92/02
92/01-942/03
92/02-92/04
52/03-02/05
92/04-92/0
92/00-00/07
92/00-92/00
92/07-9/9
92/09910
92/09-17
2/15-92/32
02/l1/-93/07
92/12-93/02
93/01-93/03
93/102-93/0
9303-93/06
90493/96
93/05-53/07
93/06-62/08
03107-3/09
03/90-93910
53/99-62/11
9/010-2/1
93/11-94/1i
93/1-94/02
04101-9453
64/02-04/04
54/03-54/05
94/694906
94/05-94/07
94/06-04/08
94/07-54/09
940-/10
94/09-411
94/10-94/12
04/11-9510/
9/2-50
9i0/0-90/3
95/02-95/04
95/03-95t09
95/04-96/06
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95/06-05/08
95/07-905/0
99/08-95/1
95/09-95/11
95/16-90/12
95/11-90/01
60/12-980
96/01-96/03
96/02-960A0
90/03-960/0
98/94-90/06
~~~~~~~649
~~897
~~~~~~114
Sole D-ub,e -seI.ks
fl 46g98/ asatsnkQ
4408
pouod (8//adictae thatis
/3.66.
OtS-ras
No. ass~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
JO
jyEUR
EURO)
R
,02-841
Coast
/300
SD
090470 2 074 0 027622
54
2 573
0 907
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6
0 099
064
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39
0028
010
0 060
0 4475
2 251 0006299
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0.005141
65
0 313
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0 601
0 222
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66
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2 464 0 008699
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0 233
0 019
0 313
02593
28678 6009607
96
0 718
9 004
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65
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0.2898
2 289 0006476
0 281
86
0 609
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2 483 0 067531
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007/I
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2 033 0 004475
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2 161 009'4541
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2 267 0 005558
65
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0 074
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0 4205
0 4174
2 399 0 00666a
60
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0 019
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66
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5 1868
2 383
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0 202
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16124 2 335 00030
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2 335 000D5758
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0 340
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2.284 0.007310
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2 212 9 007945
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2 280 06006701
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2 380 0 006577
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0723
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2 286
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2 046 0 029011
23060
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0 425
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0 7879
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65
6460
0 807 -00524
186
0959
5
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5 3922
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0 151
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40
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