The German Question and the International
Order (1943-8): An English School Approach
Nicolas Lewkowicz-School of History
University of Nottingham
[email protected]
WISC ( Istanbul, Turkey ), 24-27 August, 2005
Paper for the Panel ‘ES Theory Debates’
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Introduction
The German Question was at the heart of the wartime Allies concerns in regard to the
configuration of the post-war international order. The fate of Germany was crucial for a
number of reasons. Hitlerite Germany had disrupted the international order in Europe and
beyond with the revisionist challenge to the status quo carried out in the 1930s. This
aggressive challenge, which in its heyday entailed the virtual domination of Europe from the
Pyrenees to the outskirts of Moscow, caused an unprecedented level of devastation and the
demise of Europe’s political and economic structures, which necessitated America’s financial
and military succour and the intervention of the Soviet Union on an equal footing after the
launch of Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. The vacuum of power, prompted by an
occupied and paralysed Europe, enabled America and the Soviet Union to occupy the center
stage of a new international order, in which Europe would have a subordinate role but
would still be the most important battleground, with the fate of Germany at its very heart.
The treatment of the German Question determined to a great extent the shape of the postwar international order. Although the outcome of the German Question was influenced by
the general context of inter-Allied relations, the treatment of the power that challenged and
disrupted the international order in the 1930s was the main determinant of the realignment
of international order after the war. Therefore it is possible to argue that the post-war
international system was forged through the combination of two elements. Firstly, the
practical association formed for the purposes of the prosecution of the war against Germany
left the Big Three (and later on France) with the responsibility of creating a post-war
international system diametrically opposed to the ideology of the Axis and one in which the
diversity of ideologies, namely Communism and Liberal Democracy, would be able to coexist. Secondly, the shaping of the international political system had the treatment of the
German Question as its central element.
This paper deals with the evolution of the German Question from the declaration of
unconditional surrender at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 until the events
leading to the Berlin Blockade, which finalised the division of Germany and Europe at large.
Most importantly, it charts the significance of the treatment of the German Question in the
making of the post-war international order, using the trilateral approach espoused by Martin
Wight. I argue that the wartime coalition constituted itself using a non-ideological,
Rationalist criteria, because of the need to win the war. Its character was also informed by
Realist concerns deriving from the pursuit of the national interest and by the Liberal values
inherent in the Alliance, which juxtaposed the Axis credo.
The English School and the Origins of The Cold War
Martin Wight suggested that the most distinguished theories of international politics could
be divided into three basic categories: Realism, an international system-maintaining tradition
which emphasises the concept of ‘international anarchy’; Revolutionism, an international
system-transforming paradigm which concentrates on the aspect of the ‘moral unity’ of the
international society, and Rationalism, an international system-reforming perspective which is
based on the aspect of ‘international dialogue and intercourse’. i Wight argued that the three
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traditions influence and cross-fertilise each other, constantly evolving but without losing
their inner identity. ii According to Wight, the historical development of rationalism spans
from ancient Greece to modern Liberalism, and is based on the view that reason is the most
fundamental source of knowledge. Drawing from the analogy between rights of individuals
and states rationalism upholds the notion of the system of states as a ‘moral constitution’
whose upkeep was taken over by the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages and later on
by secular political philosophy. Wight also argued that rationalism is ‘the broad middle road
of European thinking’ which includes philosophers like Aquinas, Vitoria, Suárez, Grotius,
Locke, Kant, Mill and Cobden and leaders like Gladstone, Churchill and Wilson. iii
The English School, which has its roots in the Grotian view of an international order based
on the rule of law among nations, describes the international political system as a society of
states or an international society. An international society comes into existence when a group of
states perceive themselves to be bound by rules in their relations with one another and share
common institutions. iv The goals of international society are the preservation of the system
and the society of states, the maintenance of external sovereignty (subordinate to the
preservation of the society of states, through balance of power) and the goal of peace, to be
breached only on special occasions v.
The normative theory of Terry Nardin can be placed in the same theoretical category of the
English School, since it addresses questions relating to standards of behaviour, obligations,
rights and duties as they pertain to states and the international system. It ranges over all
aspects of the subject area including international law, international political economy and
diplomacy. vi In addition Michael Oakeshott recognised two distinct modes of human
association, universitas and societas. A universitas is an association of people united in the
pursuit of a common objective. Its practices are ‘prudential’ in nature, designed to realise an
end. Conversely, societas is a ‘moral’ relationship between free agents who severally acknowledge
only the authority of certain conditions that are necessary to association and action but that otherwise
leave those involved to pursue their own goals. vii Nardin replicates Oakeshott’s model on a
global scale: international society is best seen as a practical association comprising of each states
devotion to their own conception of good. Practical association is a ‘set of considerations to
be taken into account in deciding and evaluating decisions and actions’. viii For Nardin, ‘the
common good resides not in the ends that some, or at times even most of its members may
wish collectively to pursue but in the values of justice, peace, security and co-existence which
can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices ‘ ix
According to Nardin, we should not understand the society of states as a purposive association
but rather as a procedural societas that protects the common interests of states in stable coexistence. Nardin argues that the societas is undermined if states or any other actors attempt
to transform it into a purposive association. Justice is about impartial rules, which impose
obligations on all states with equal force, regardless of the distribution of power and wealth
amongst them.
The practical association model is closely related to the emphasis that the English School
places on common rules and interests for the attainment of order and the taming of the
worst effects of power politics. The procedural societas described by Nardin approximates
the normative and descriptive value of the international society model of the English School
reinforcing the concept of procedural justice which was to be quintessential in order to
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achieve a solid working arrangement for the great powers in regards to the German
Question and the creation of a post-war international order.
Within the Realist tradition, two mainstream theories of the origins of the Cold War
must be considered due to their focus on the centrality of power in the relations between the
Western powers and the Soviet Union after the end of World War Two.
The Traditionalist school, which includes the work of George Kennan and Arthur
Schlesinger Jr., pins the blame for the start of the Cold War on the Soviet Union, based
on the argument that the Soviet Union took over Eastern Europe and the United States
did virtually nothing until 1947 when they responded in the form of the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Traditionalists see the protection of democracy and
capitalism, and security concerns as the prime motives of US foreign policy at that time.
The Revisionist school includes the work of Alperovitz, Kolko, LaFeber and Fleming
maintains that in the aftermath of World War Two the United States conducted an
aggressive foreign policy from a position of tremendous economic and military supremacy
and the Soviet Union was consequently forced to protect itself against US led Western
capitalist expansion. Revisionists see the need to invest abroad, to export surplus production
and to import certain goods that the United States lacked as the primary motive of post-war
US foreign policy.
It is also possible to link an English School approach to the German Question and the
international order during this period to a post-revisionist interpretation of the Cold War,
particularly a corporatist one. Post-revisionists like Gaddis and Yergin see the Cold
War much more in interactive terms than the other two schools. Post-revisionism sees
the history of the Cold War as a study of the interaction between the United States and
the Soviet Union and the Western and Soviet bloc. Post-revisionism argues that there
were several political and economic considerations that accounted for the start of the
Cold War. One post-revisionist strand, the Corporatist School of Michael Hogan is
primarily concerned with the organisation of the Western side as an economic and
political entity.
While IR theory and the different strands of opinion on the origins of the Cold War attempt
to explain the making of the post-war international order, I chart the evolution of the
German Question using an English School trilateral approach and determine to what extent
that evolution contributed to configure the post-war international order.
The practical association framework and the German Question during wartime (1943-5)
During the period stemming from the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 until the
Potsdam Conference of April 1945 a practical association framework evolved along
Rationalist lines. This practical association framework was not only pivotal for the defeat of
the Axis but its evolution also helped to lay the foundations of the post-war international
system. The practical association framework disciplined the political behaviour of the Allies
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due to the marriage between the legal arrangements imposed by diplomatic, military and
financial cooperation and a commonly agreed ethical dimension prevailed over concerns
imposed by ideology or national interest. The moral and legal understanding imposed by the
practical association framework created a sense of prudence on the Allies which were then
able to maintain a connection between different political spheres on a domestic level
allowing considerable space for inner dynamics x.
The practical association between the Big Three resembled the model of a society of states
and constituted the embryo of the international system which would emerge at the end of
the war. The onset of World War Two prompted the making of a new international order,
which took a visible shape with the entry of the Soviet Union and the United States into the
war. When the conflagration became global in spectrum and therefore affected the
international political system as a whole, it became an ‘epochal war’ xi hence propelling the
Allies to create a new international order based on a new international legal framework which
would not only juxtapose the Axis credo but fill the legal vacuum of the interwar period
which had resulted in the upheaval of the international system in the first place.
As Bobbit explains, the history of the society of states and international order evolved
according to constitutional periods brought about by ‘epochal wars’. The constitution of a
society of states has as its main functions the allocation of jurisdiction, duties and rights of
the institution it recognises. It also legitimises acts appropriately taken under its authority xii.
In this context, the foundations of the post-war international order laid down during the
1941-3 period provided the system with a legitimacy based on ethical considerations and
accommodation of liberal democratic values of the Western Allies and Soviet Communism
to the practical association framework.
This period signalled the start of something unprecedented in the history of the society of
states. The main Allies determined the future shape of the post-war society of states in a
radically different way than that envisaged and pursued by their former enemy. That was not
the case in the system established at the Congress of Vienna, when the members of the
various anti-Napoleonic coalitions could not escape from the political consequences of the
constitutional upheaval brought about by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic
reforms. This differed to the practical association framework established by the Allies,
which rejected the racially motivated and self-aggrandising credo of the Axis. It also differed
from the system laid down by the Treaty of Versailles, which refused to accommodate
ideological differences among its members by denying admittance to the Soviet Russia and
denied a clause of racial equality to Japan.
This new international order in the making was shaped by the English School elements of diplomacy and
international law. The international law laid down during this period restricted the conduct of
the Big Three as it created an ethical relationship which sustained the edifice of practical
association arising in response to the question of how this association would be workable
among the members of an Alliance who lacked shared beliefs and values xiii. The Atlantic
Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations along with the intense summitry
diplomacy enhanced the practical association framework and gave it a sense of purpose that
went beyond the need to defeat the common enemy.
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The Rationalist structure of the practical association prevented the emergence of ideological
disputes between the Western powers and the Soviet Union from marring the functionality
of the framework put in place. Their discourse was not as hermetically sealed off from one
another as it was between the Allies and the Axis. The Big Three employed a normative
view in their dealings with one another in order to prevent their ideological diversity causing
an irresolvable confrontation that would undermine the chances of defeating a common
enemy xiv. Both adopted a state-centric domain of discourse, which enabled them to see beyond
their own inner ideological dynamics and in spite of Realist concerns, to discuss the shape of
a future society of states according to a rationalist approach. The law laid down during this
period remained highly optimistic about the prospect of maintaining the collaboration with
the Soviet Union after the war and the fight against the Axis was therefore waged with that prospect in
mind. The pattern of lawmaking-as-you-fight laid down between 1941-3 continued during
1943-5 and was system defining. The Alliance defined the nature of the shape of the postwar international system. If a normative solution to by-pass ideological consistencies was
useful to defeat a common enemy, it had the potential of proving equally useful to create the
foundations for a post-war international order based on the same principles of co-existence.
This modus operandi was followed up throughout this period of practical association. Law was
understood as a framework of restraint and co-existence, which presupposed toleration and
diversity xv. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1943 the Big Three agreed
to ensure that:
‘for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law
and order and the inauguration of a system of general security they will consult with one another and
as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations, with a view to joint action on behalf
of the community of nations’.
At Teheran in 1943, the Big Three signed the Declaration of the Three Powers which
included the
‘determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow’
The Dumbarton Oaks declaration of October 1944 stated that the purposes of a general
international organisation would be:
To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international
disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace
The foundations of the post war international system were laid down by an effective wartime co-operation
between the Big Three, based on a rationalist, non-ideological and normative framework which enabled
military and financial co-operation as well as intense diplomatic interaction. The wartime co-operation
restored the main element of the system of states, the balance of power and reshaped it into
one, which would accommodate ideological diversity in the post-war international order and
would create a workable balance of power. As Bull suggests, the balance of power is an
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artifact to a desirable end xvi, but its normative basis is crucial for its proper functioning xvii.
In the past, France-Russia (1892), France-Britain (1904) and Britain-Russia (1907) had all
forgone ideological and other considerations to balance against Germany. So did the Big
Three during 1941-5.
The practical association, which was efficient for the conduct of the war against the
common enemy, also provided the background for the joint treatment of the German
Question, which was firmly in the Allied agenda since the Casablanca Conference, when the
prospect of winning the war became more and more palpable. Mitrany argues that functional
action (in this case in regards to the German Question) influences international society by
rationally developing what is already in the system xviii. The Allies pursued the treatment of
the issues related to the German Question by the gradual and rational process, which
developed from their own planning and the diplomatic Allied interaction. The Allies realised
the necessity to deal with Germany methodically and in consensus with the practical
association framework because of the war effort. There was a consistent Allied effort to give
this treatment legality and an insistence in the diplomatic route to deal with the practicalities
of occupation of Germany as well as its role in the international political system that would
ensue the war on the part of the Allies. In spite of the difficulties created by the different
ideological systems of the practical association framework the willingness on the part of the
Allies to laid down a legal framework for the treatment of the German Question would
inform their association, even when as we will see later on, this practical association
framework experienced an irretrievable transformation. The initial treatment of the German
Question by the Allies revolved around the examination of the possible dismemberment and
subsequent emasculation of Germany; the zonal division of Germany for the purposes of occupation and the
issue of economic reparations and was carried out at government level and through the diplomatic
intercourse in which the Allies engaged upon during this period.
The international system in the making was also influenced by Realist elements. The practical
association framework responded to necessity. The Big Three engaged in this practical
association with specific needs in mind, namely, survival and the pursuit of the national
interest. Britain needed to prevent the collapse of its war effort and in a post-war scenario,
for Germany to be self-sufficient and stop being a threat to world peace, as well as the
preservation of its influence and power and financial aid to reconvert its economy to
peacetime needs. The Soviet Union needed financial aid for its war effort, territorial
advancement into Central and Eastern Europe as a security zone and the opening of a
Second Front. America needed Britain and the Soviet Union to keep carrying the brunt of
the war in Europe and a future suppression of Germany (and an autarkic Europe) as a world
power. In the broader context of practical association, there were issues where the interests
of each of the Big Three diverged. Britain and America clashed over the demise of the
imperial structure after the war and the demotion of power and influence of Britain in the
post-war international system. The Western Allies clashed with the Soviet Union over
territorial issues in Central and Eastern Europe and the Second Front.
The divergence of interests as well as the different needs of each of the Big Three clouded
the general spectrum of co-operation and spilled over the diplomacy of the German
Question directly or indirectly. The Big Three experienced disagreements over the issues of
reparations, the occupation of Germany as well as its possible dismemberment.
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The issue of the extraction of reparations from Germany was dear to the national interest of the each one of
the Allies. The United States wanted the reparations issue to be addressed within the context
of the setting of a fairly prosperous Germany organised along capitalist lines and the setting
of a Liberal economic order in Europe. The Soviet Union wanted to rehabilitate its
economy and had a vested interest in extracting reparations from Germany as well as in its
occupation.
The question of the possible dismemberment of Germany brought Realist concerns for each one of the Allies.
At Tehran, the idea of a Danubian Confederation (raised by Eden in the Moscow
Conference) containing parts of a dismembered Germany was opposed by the Soviets. At
Moscow, Molotov indicated that talk of federations reminded him of the efforts to build a
‘cordon sanitaire’ against the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution. Stalin was not so
explicit in his opposition but apparently opposed any Balkan Union as a potential threat to
the Soviet Union.xix Stalin objected to Churchill’s Danubian Confederation, arguing that the
Germans would simply put ‘flesh on something that was only a skeleton and thus create a
new state’. xx
The issue of the occupation of Germany also revolved around Realist concerns, particularly in regards to a
possible confrontation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The zonal division of
Germany was negotiated from 1943 until its finalisation in Potsdam in 1945. Sharp argues
that these negotiations cannot be understood divorced from their military context. The
negotiations were affected by the existing and future strategies of the Western and Soviet
military forces, and the reciprocal images of their political authorities, regarding what the
other’s existing gains and presumed future objectives betokened for the post-war
international system xxi.
The Liberal aspects of the shaping of the post-war international system can be outlined in two categories. In
a general context, it is possible to argue that it was the inter-Allied philosophy of cooperation which united Communism and Western Democracy in the same associative
framework for a common struggle against Nazism and Fascism, and the social liberalism
which took root in America and Britain in the 1930s and 1940s (hence bringing them closer
to the Communist ideals of the Soviet Union), the elements which provided the framework
for the setting of international and European organisation as well as the Liberal economic
order desired by the United States.
This general framework of association was conducive to the treatment of the German Question within a
scheme of co-operation that revolved around two Liberal goals: The need to prevent a future German
aggression and therefore a disruption of the post-war international system in the making
(based on international co-operation and the co-existence of Communism and Western
Democracy) and the possible economic rehabilitation of Germany in the context of the
international economic criteria set by the United States, the dire financial situation of Britain
and the Soviet desire to extract reparations from Germany.
The prevention of future aggression by Germany and the end of Prussianism and its possible
threat to the international political system in the making was at the heart of the practical
association framework. The lessons of Versailles gave the Big Three and the European
Advisory Commission two mutually contradictory objectives: (1) to punish German and the
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Hitlerite elite for the war and (2) to avoid a desperate situation that would turn Germany
into political extremism xxii.
The internationalisation of the German Question was unprecedented due to the Liberal
outlook of some of its aspects. This was radically different from the situation in 1918, when
Germany established a more Liberal political regime than that of the Wilhelmine Reich due
to losses in the battlefield and the toppling of the old regime from inside. At Versailles, the
Allies were interested in punishment, reparations and prevention but the Allies could not
agree among themselves or with their own colleagues on what to do. xxiii The situation was,
in spite of Realist concerns, radically different in 1943-5 since the practical association
framework nurtured the spirit of co-existence.
The occupation of Germany and the evolution of the practical association framework (1945-6)
The Rationalist elements of the general context of inter-Allied relations continued to
influence the outcome of the German Question and the configuration of a bipolar post-war
international order during this period. The practical association framework evolved through
the inter-Allied diplomatic engagement of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFMs), set up
by the Potsdam Conference in 1945, and the legalistic legacy of the wartime alliance, which
survived in the form of the United Nations Organisation (UN). This diplomatic engagement
and the Great Power input enhanced the practical association over the German Question, as
it enlarged the scope of cooperation and diplomatic and legal engagement.
The occupation of Germany marked a new phase in the history of practical association over
the German Question. The end of the war and the unconditional surrender of Germany
meant that the political, administrative and legal future of Germany would be the battlefield
over which the shape of the post-war international would take place. The Allies had
different aims and interests in regards to Germany but in order to attain them they needed,
for various reasons, to maintain the ethical and functional cohabitation of the wartime years.
The political, administrative and legal future of Germany was decided by the combination of
interactive forces. The inter-Allied and zonal occupational machinery put in place was
extremely sophisticated and dealt with every aspect of the social, economic and political
organisation of post-war Germany. The situation ‘on the ground’ was always more
peremptory than any diplomatic engagement or government level policy-making. After the
end of the war, the Allies needed to come together and lay down the basis for the inter-Allied
occupation of Germany. Moreover, the spirit of cooperation was still high and most
importantly, the façade of four-power cooperation would enable the four powers to organise
their occupation zones with a modicum of acceptability by the other Allied powers.
The occupation of Germany is the key to understand bloc formation during this period as
dividing Germany was concomitant with the process of dividing Europe. The bipolar
balance of power system stemmed from the modus operandi employed by the Allies in the
occupation of Germany. Disagreements over the organisation of Germany did not result in a
disruptive war. The occupational structure tied the Allies together in a common course. It
enabled them to continue the diplomatic engagement and to maintain the practical
association framework, which extended to all other aspects of post-war organisation.
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It is possible to argue that the Allies greatest triumph in regards to the treatment of the
German Question was the prevention of a complete breakdown of inter-Allied relations over
the treatment of the German Question. Although their common concerns extended beyond
Germany, the vanquished nation was the most important ‘battleground’ of the nascent
international order. The occupation structure, the policies on which the Allies agreed on and
implemented, the channels of negotiation and even the façade of cooperation contributed to
an abrupt and potentially dangerous end of cooperation over Germany.
The Potsdam arrangements and the occupation apparatus as well as the wartime legacy of
law making and cooperation and quite possibly post-war fatigue, ensured that the breakdown
came about gradually and incrementally and tamed by the constraints imposed by diplomacy
and the inter-Allied occupation structure. The breakdown which unfolded during this
period created the conditions for a nascent international order based on balance of power
between the Soviet Union, with its increasingly Sovietised zone in Germany primarily, and the
increasing influence of Communist Parties in central and Eastern Europe and the AngloAmerican front which because of the mutual need to rehabilitate their economy, the
pressures (political and economic) of running the occupation and the need to secure a
foothold in Europe, realised that their common interests were best served through Bizonia
and a common stance against the Soviet Union. The nascent international order was going
to have Europe and particularly Germany as the main ‘battleground’.
The general context of inter-Allied relations also had a Realist element, which informed the treatment of the
German Question and marred the general framework of diplomacy and cooperation. There was the
wartime legacy of suspicion, which itself went back to 1917-20 and the political situation in
Central and Eastern Europe, with the increasing sway of Soviet power and the convulsed
political and economic situation in Western Europe and beyond.
The diplomatic forum of the CFM was the medium by which the divergences over the
organisation of world politics became apparent. During the London and Paris CFMs in
1945-6 the Allies found it difficult to agree on the issue of the peace treaty with Germany’s
former Allies on the future of the Eastern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, on the
trusteeship of the former Italian possession of Tripolitania (Libya), for Yugoslavia to receive
the port of Trieste, for Soviet warships to gain easier access to the Mediterranean and for the
Soviet Union to occupy Japan and negotiate a peace treaty. Equally, the Soviets intended to
hold on firmly to Eastern Europe, rejecting Western demands for a democratic political
process in that region. xxiv
In regards to the treatment of the German Question, in 1945 Germany was divided into four
zones of occupation controlled by Allied Military Governments, as agreed in Potsdam. The
four military governors were able to administer their zones with a relative degree of
autonomy as long as they were in agreement with their governments. Moreover, on the
basis of Postdam, the matters concerned with Germany as a whole would be entrusted to the
Allied Control Council, whose decisions were binding only if unanimous. When there was
no agreement, the military governors would act according to their own ideas. It would be
the zonal organisation of Germany, which by January 1947 geared towards a bipolar
arrangement with the creation of Bizonia and the organisation of the Soviet zone along
Communist lines, which would pave the way to the evolution and transformation of the
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practical association framework and the shape of the post-war international order.
During this period, America, frustrated with the slow progress made at inter-Allied level on
the restoration of the German economy and the Soviet demands for reparations which went
against that very piece of policy, proceeded with the organisation of the occupation on a
zonal basis. The policy of economic and political rehabilitation was aided by the joining of
the British Zone into a common economic area in January 1947.
Britain, for which the costs of occupation overruled all other considerations because of their
dire financial situation, was at the heart of the creation of Western policy, hence facilitating
the evolution to a bipolar treatment of the German Question; an evolution that was
replicated in Europe at large.
France was from the very outset of the occupation opposed to a German central
administration arguing security concerns and interested in severing the Ruhr from any future
German entity in order to aid the process of economic rehabilitation at home. The insistent
refusal of the French to acquiesce to a German central administration was a further incentive
for the Anglo-American policy of a single economic zone for the French stubborness
provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to extract reparations from all the
occupation zones and to organise their zone of occupation according to Communist lines.
The Soviet Union was primarily concerned with having a foothold in Germany and
proceeded cautiously on any attempts to achieve unified central institutions. The general
context of inter-Allied relations, which by 1946 had turned sour and their insistence on the
reparations while at the same time impeding the process of economic rehabilitation in
Germany as political and economic considerations also turned Soviet policy more inwardlooking and less regarding of the inter-Allied framework of co-operation. A balance of
power was being created in Germany and replicated throughout Europe.
The gradual evolution of the practical association over Germany, prompted by the
organisation of the Soviet and the Western zones according to the diktat of Moscow and the
growing interaction of London and Washington, unfolded within the context of inter-Allied
relations. On one hand, the Soviet Union was sovietising its zone in Germany as well as
Central and Eastern Europe, while the Western Allies reacted simultaneously by creating
Bizonia and by pushing for the economic Liberal order envisaged by Washington during
wartime. Western Europe and specifically France and Italy also provided the scene for
confrontation, with efforts to keep those two nations under the Western camp. But it was
the gradual evolution of practical association over Germany, as seen in the diplomatic
failures of the summer of 1946 and the increasing organisation of the German zones
according to the national interest of the Allies which would serve as a catalyst for the
creation of the post-war international order. While the Sovietisation of Central and Eastern
Europe was by no means complete during this period and would suffer a serious blow in the
Balkans with Tito’s disaffilitation from the camp led by Moscow, it was indeed complete in
the zone occupied by the Soviet Union in Germany. The fact that the Soviet Union
exercised direct zonal control in Germany, unlike central and Eastern Europe where they
had to reckon with the tripartite agreement of the Allied Control Commissions, meant that
the Sovietisation of 1/3 of Germany was completed before any ‘sphere of influence’ that the
Soviet Union was carving in the zone came into full existence.
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Likewise, Bizonia, if not created, at least served as the most important milestone for the
creation of a ‘Western Policy’ for Germany and the configuration of a ‘Western bloc’. The
overwhelming influence of the other, made possible the looming of a bipolar world, as the
rehabilitation of an independent Germany (and hence a tripolar international order) could
not be completed after years of carnage. While this created a rational response to the
problem of Germany, it also heated up the nascent international order, based also on
confrontation and mutual distrust. While it is possible to say in hindsight that Sovietisation
and Bizonia plus the occupation structure might have avoided an all out war over Germany,
also contributed significantly to the division of the continent and to the tense relations
between the West and the Soviet Union. Coupled with the atomic race, the volatile situation
in Asia and the general aura of suspicion, it would give rise to an international order that
while in operation under rationalistic and partly Liberal conditions, was also under constant
threat of disruption.
The general context of inter-Allied relation also had Liberal elements. During this period
there was an institutionalisation of the international political system and an advancement of
international organisation, unprecedented in modern times. The wartime legacy of
cooperation also informed the general framework of diplomacy.
The liberal economic international world order conceived at the Bretton Woods created the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, whose function was to loan money to
embattled countries and to prevent a potential future war that would disrupt the free trade
system. The rationale behind the Bretton Woods agreements was to contain and transpose
the threat of war into the realm of international commerce. This liberal order would involve
lowering tariffs, free convertibility of currencies and free trade that relied on fixed monetary
exchange rates.
In regards to the German Question, within the context of the occupation structures, interAllied and zonal, there was a pervasive view which informed all other aspects of the
occupation and most importantly, of the treatment of the German Question and the postwar international order. The legal provisions laid down at wartime stated the unanimous and
unambiguous will of the Allies to reform what they perceived was the militaristic, warlike
disposition of Germany, with its potential to disrupt the international political system, as was
the case twice in the twentieth century. It was in the Allies interest to de-prussianise the
character of German society and its system of government. As we have witnessed, the
Western Allies did by way of setting up political and economic foundations akin to the
liberal democratic and free-market systems in Washington, London and Paris. The Soviets
did it by imposing socialistic measures that were directed against the big landowners and
captains of industry and banking that supported Hitler’s rise to power and its war of
aggression on the international order.
The fact that the Allies had to operate under Rationalist conditions contributed to them
having to cooperate. Efforts to denazify and demilitarise Germany agreed by the Allies at
inter-Allied level and implemented at zonal level, were influential in securing the
emasculation of Germany as a threat and its operation as an independent entity capable of
seeking the revision of the international order. The cooperation of the Allies in regards to
the re-education of the German mindset away from Prussianism created a historical
discontinuity that still persists. Incapable of seeking the revision of the international order,
12
Germany was by the end of 1946 on its way to greater interdependence with Western
Europe on 2/3 of its territory and with Moscow on the other third. A politically
emasculated Germany meant the possibility of true cooperation within the framework of
European integration, which meant a US presence in accordance with the vision of a Liberal
economic order and European fears of a revived Germany, and a Soviet presence deep in
Central and Eastern Europe.
The transformation of the practical association framework: From co-operation to co-habitation in Germany
and beyond (1947-8).
From the formation of Bizonia onwards, the treatment of the German Question took a
decisive bipolar slant. It was now clear that the fate of Germany would be for all practical
purposes decided on the basis of a balance of power between the Anglo-American camp and
the Soviet Union, both now decisively embarked on the process of organising their zones of
occupation according to their national interest. This would have decisive consequences for
the formation of the post-war international order. A balance of power in Germany, which
was also looming at large, was replacing the original practical association framework put in
place. This ensured a Rationalist stance, which would prevent a disruption of the
international order in the making and guarantee a continued presence of both the Western
and Soviet powers in the fate of Germany. The events leading to the Berlin Blockade
prompted the organisation of Germany according to Western and Soviet lines.
The Moscow and London CFMs signaled the transformation of the practical association
over the German Question into one of co-habitation instead of co-operation by way of
Four-Power agreement. The dire economic situation in Germany prompted an even more
decisive turn by the United States. In June 1947, just as the Allies were debating the German
Question at the Moscow CFM, US Secretary of State George Marshall announced the
European Recovery Program, aimed at the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Europe
and it integration into a multilateral economic order, which would serve American interests.
The Marshall Plan coupled with the Truman Doctrine (laid down in March 1947) aimed at
containing Communism in Europe and beyond and the commitment of America to stay in
Europe prompted a reaction on the part of the Soviet Union. Moscow reacted by facilitating
the formation of the German Economic Council (DWK) and the German People’s
Congress and constituting Cominform in September 1947 while announcing the ‘two camps’
theory.
The events that were to lead to the formation of two separate German entities unfolded at
great speed during 1948. By June of that year, the Western powers, including Britain,
America, France and the Benelux countries had summoned a conference in London in order
to integrate the Western German economy into a Western bloc, merged the French Zone
into Bizonia and announced a currency reform. The Soviets retorted by withdrawing from
the Allied Control Council and summoned an Eastern bloc summit at Warsaw, denouncing
the Western camp intention to partition Germany, facilitating the creation of the German
People’s Council and announcing a currency reform of their own. However, although these
events led to the Soviet refusal to allow Western access to the Soviet Zone in Berlin, the
transformation to a new international order was epitomised not by an all-out war but by the
creation of two German republics in 1949.
13
While the German Question continued to operate, at least on the surface, at inter-Allied
level until the summer of 1948, it suffered a decisive transformation. The breakdown of the
diplomatic intercourse and at the Moscow and London CFM came about as the result of the
occupational policies put in place since August 1945 (especially at zonal level) which made
sure that the political battle lines were drawn long before the Allies had the chance to debate
the political make-up of Germany at summit level. By the time the Allies met at Moscow,
Germany was already divided. America was now convinced that action was needed in order
to secure a prosperous and stable Germany, which could be reintegrated into a more
integrated Western European bloc sponsored by the United States.
The fate of Germany was inexorably linked to the fate of Europe. By the end of the
London CFM in November 1947, the breakdown of inter-Allied diplomacy was complete.
The wartime Allies now proceeded on the basis of the national interest although with the
implicit acknowledgement of each other’s spheres. Confrontation was therefore informed
by a ‘two camps’ mentality, which would be crucial for the finalisation of a bipolar Germany
and a bipolar Europe.
Bipolarity would have decisive implications for the post-war international order. The
international political system was making a transition to a system marshaled by two great
political and economic blocs. America’s presence and backing of an integrated Europe and a
reconstituted Germany meant the subordination of the former great European powers, now
deprived of political and economic autonomy. Moreover, the joining of Central and Eastern
Europe into a Moscow led bloc ensured that there would be no aggressive launches of war.
Most importantly, the occupation had transformed Germany politically, socially and
economically. The integration of Western and Eastern Europe into separate blocs created a
legacy, which survives to this day. The links between the European economies and political
systems created a fundamental new proposition. It made confrontation impossible. The
conditioning of Germany into a peaceful, prosperous and liberal state, deprived of the
power, and most importantly, the willingness to engage in war efforts ensured the peace of
Europe. The Allies conditioned Germany and transformed the political and economic
mindset. The end of autarchy and the end of aggressive militarist revisionism, aided by
financial, political and backing from the Soviet Union and America reconstituted Europe
and the international political system to an extent that still survives.
The German Question and the new international order (1943-8)
Both the Western powers and the Soviet Union, by exploiting their preponderance as great
powers, gave central direction xxv to the German issue by organising Western unity and
consolidating a Soviet bloc. With Berlin, Germany and Europe divided in two, a new
international order based on balance of power was finally created. According to Bull, the
function of the balance of power is to prevent the system from being transformed by
conquest into a universal empire. xxvi This notion is also akin to Realism, for which the
preservation of the state is quintessential to the understanding of world politics as a statesystem order. xxvii And while Rationalism accepts a variety of contexts in which a balance of
power situation can exist, it generally thinks of equilibrium in international politics as an even
distribution of power, that is, a state of affairs in which no Power is so preponderant that it can
endanger others. xxviii
14
That was the kind of balancing achieved in the international system created by the division of Germany.
The United States exercised its preponderance in order to organise the unity of the West but
its use of power did not extend to working towards eliminating the Soviet bloc. For the
United States and the West, balance of power meant the containment of the Soviet threat
both in Germany and Europe and the advancement of their political and economic interests,
not a crusade to rid the world of Communism. Likewise, the Soviet ‘two Camps’ theory
meant that the Soviet Union were interested in having a sphere of influence and lead the
international Communist movement, but not in initiating an ideological crusade in order to
destroy the West. The balance of power between the West and the Soviet Union resulted in
a calculated use of power.
The division of Germany was crucial for the creation of a post-war international order.
Partition was the corollary of a diplomacy that gradually discarded the practical association
model of the war years and confronted two different socio-political systems confronted each
other. Partition was not a fortuitous event. It was an outcome managed by the orderly
diplomacy of the great powers xxix, which would gradually pave the way for a continent and
an international system divided along lines dictated by the national interest of the respective
superpowers. Once the fate of Germany took a definite shape, the formation of co-existent
spheres of influence took a definite shape. Because Germany was the ideological battlefield
for the nascent political struggle over the shape of the post-war international order, the
Western bloc was forced to lay the foundations for the economic recovery of Western
Germany and Western Europe. First with the ERP and then with the formation of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first treaty of what has become the
European Union, established by the Treaty of Paris (1952), in which member states pooled
their coal and steel resources by providing a unified market for their energy products, lifting
restrictions on imports and exports, and creating a unified labour market.
While the Western powers endeavoured to secure the western part of Germany for their side
and rebuild Europe on the basis of the Western political and economic system, the Soviet
Union was forced to secure Eastern Germany and abandon the original intention to keep
Germany unified. That would in turn produce the consolidation of a East German state and
the creation of a Soviet-led bloc in Europe. Its pillars were COMINFORM, the Warsaw
Pact (1955), an organisation of military assistance founded in response to the formation of
NATO and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), agreed upon by
the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania in 1949, whose
purpose was to enable member states to exchange economic experiences, extend technical
aid to one another and to render mutual assistance with respect to raw materials, foodstuffs
and equipment.
The balance of power, which would prevail during the next four decades pre-empted an all-out
confrontation along realist lines. Even when the treatment of the German Question became
more confrontational, as in the Berlin Blockade, the United States and the emerging Western
bloc preferred a costly and politically embarrassing airlift to the possibility of waging war in
order to have a unified Germany under Western wings. Germany’s division was accepted as
a distinct possibility since Bizonia and by the time of the blockade it became a de facto reality,
which would shape the international political system for decades to come. Both blocs
15
accepted a bipolar world as fait accompli and abided by the convention that as long as there was a
Cold War, there would be a divided Germany.
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iii Dunne T., Inventing International Society: a history of the English school, p. 59-60
iv Bull H., The Anarchical Society, p.13
v Bull H., The Anarchical Society, p.17
vi Evans G., and Newnham J. (ed.), Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, p.382
vii See Oakeshott M., On Human Cconduct.
viii Nardin T., Law, Morality and the Relations of States, p. 6
ix Nardin T., Law, Morality and the Relations of States, p. 19
x Coll A., ‘ Normative Prudence as a Tradition of Statecraft ‘ in Rosenthal, Joel H, Ethics & international affairs: a reader, ,
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xi Bobbit defines an ‘epochal war’ as ‘a war that challenges and ultimately changes the basic constitutional
structure of the State, by linking strategic to constitutional innovations’ See Bobbitt, P., The shield of Achilles: war,
peace and the course of history, p. 907. See also Bobbit, P., The Shield of Achilles, p. 21-3
xii Bobbitt, P., The Shield of Achilles, p. 484
xiii Nardin T., Law, Morality and the Relations of States., p. 305
xiv Frost. M., Towards a normative theory of international relations, , p. 89
xv Nardin T., Law, Morality and the Relations of States., p. 322-4
xvi Bull, H., The Anarchical Society, p. 100
xvii Brown, C., Understanding International Relations, p. 112
xviii Mitrany, David, The Functional Theory of Politics, p. 119-21
xix Neumann, W., Making The Peace 1941-5-The Diplomacy of the Wartime Conferences, p. 67-8
xx Mayle, Paul D., Eureka summit: agreement in principle and the Big Three at Tehran, 1943, p. 147
xxi Sharp, T., The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany, p. 1
xxii Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany, p. 10
xxiii Macmillan, M., Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War, p. 172
xxiv Smyser, W R, From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War Struggle over Germany, p. 28
xxv Bull, The Anarchical Society., p. 205-7
xxvi Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 106
i
ii
17
Schmitt C., The Concept of the Political, p. 55
Wight, M. and Butterfield, H. (ed.), Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics, p.151
xxix Dunne T., Inventing international society: a history of the English school.,p. 147
xxvii
xxviii
18