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BEBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1309
Major Determinants of Tax Structures
in Market Economy Countries
John
F.
Due
Carrie Meyer
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College of
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Commerce and Business Administration
Economic and Business Research
of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
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BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 1309
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
November 1986
Major Determinants of Tax Structures in Market Economy Countries
John
F. Due, Professor Emeritus
Department of Economics
Carrie Meyer, Graduate Assistant
Department of Economics
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in
2012 with funding from
University of
Illinois
Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/majordeterminant1309duej
ABSTRACT
Major Determinants of Tax Structures in Market Economy Countries
The purpose of the paper is to reexamine the major influences on
the tax structures of market economies, with particular emphasis on
the significance of the level of GNP on the relative reliance on major
forms of taxes.
Previous work, primarily developed under International
Monetary Fund auspices, is reviewed.
The econometric study summarized
in this paper includes 120 countries, both developing and industrialized,
with data for the most recent year available.
The results confirm the
principal findings of the earlier studies but provide more detail by
area.
The most firmly established result is that the relative reliance
on customs duties,
total indirect taxes, and export duties falls as
per capita GNP rises.
Sales and excise taxes, as such, show no
correlation with GNP.
In Africa,
consisting almost entirely of low
income countries, no inverse correlation of import duties or total
indirect taxes with GNP is found.
If openness
is
included as a variable
and oil exporting countries are segregated, the results are improved
but not basically changed.
Countries with a high degree of openness
rely more heavily on import duties, the oil exporting countries more
heavily on income taxes than other countries with similar GNPs per
capita.
MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF TAX STRUCTURES OF MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES*
John F. Due
Professor of Economics, Emeritus
Carrie Meyer
Graduate Assistant in Economics
A question of long standing interest in the field of public
finance is that of influences affecting the relative reliance on par-
ticular forms of taxes by various countries.
Of particular interest
is the relationship between relative reliance on various forms of
taxes and per capita GNP.
analysis in the field.
There are a number of obstacles to precise
Various countries label particular taxes by
different names, and while the International Monetary Fund, the chief
compiler of statistics in the field, attempts to adjust for this, it
is not easy to do so in an entirely satisfactory fashion.
In addi-
tion, the figures of GNP per capita are by no means accurate, espe-
cially for developing countries in which subsistence production is
important and data collection limited; even population figures are not
necessarily reliable.
Conversion of the figures of each country
to a
common denominator, such as the U.S. dollar, involves the use of arti-
ficially set exchange rates and ones which reflect very few exchange
transactions between the countries.
Finally, data for regional and
local governments broken down by type of tax are not available for a
number of countries.
This analysis is therefore confined to data for
central governments and the states of the federal systems.
The authors are indebted to the College of Commerce and Business
Administration, University of Illinois, for financial assistance for
the study.
-2-
Previous Studies
Several of the studies previously made can be summarized briefly.
Some of the earliest work was that of Harley Hinrichs, stressing
a
time series approach, and concluding that beyond the earliest years
of development, relative to per capita income, direct taxes tend to
rise as development continues and indirect taxes fall.
More
sophisticated econometric analysis undertaken by Richard Musgrave
published in his Fiscal Systems
2
showed no significant correlation
between per capita GNP and relative reliance on indirect taxes for the
countries with per capita GNP under $850, but a significant correlation (inverse) for the entire set of countries.
The work for the
earlier edition of this book (1970) likewise showed no correlation for
relative reliance on indirect taxes for countries under $500 per capita
GNP and no significant correlation for those under $850.
most thorough earlier studies was that by Raja J. Chelliah.
One of the
He
concluded from cross section analysis that the share of direct taxes
does not rise with per capita GNP in the lowest income countries, but
rises once a certain level is reached;
a
positive correlation is found
when the poor or less poor countries are grouped together and when the
developed and less developed countries are considered together.
The
A General Theory of Tax Structure Change During Economic Development
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Law School, International Tax Program, 1966).
2
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1969.)
3
John F. Due, Indirect Taxation in Developing Economics (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), chap. 9.
4
"Trends in Taxation in Developing Countries," IMF Staff Papers
Vol. 18 (July 1971), pp. 254-327.
,
.
-3-
reverse pattern is found with indirect taxes, with no correlation with
GNP in the lower income group, but inverse correlation if the lower and
higher income are considered together.
Most of the more recent work has been undertaken by the staff of
the International Monetary Fund and has appeared in departmental
memoranda of the Fund rather than in published material.
A study by
Alan Tait and Barry Eichengreen stressed the per capita levels of
indirect taxes and found these to rise as per captia GNP rises.
A
study by Vito Tanzi of tax levels and structures in Africa emphasized
the dominance of indirect taxes,
the wide variation among various
countries, and the lack of any trend in the relative reliance on
o
various forms of taxes in the period under consideration.
By far the most significant study is that of Tanzi issued in
1983.
3
1
The major conclusions are:
Personal income taxes rise as a percentage of tax revenue as
GNP per capita rises, but with a low correlation (R = 0.25).
2.
Corporation income taxes show a higher correlation (R = 0.45)
between the relative reliance on these taxes and per capita GNP within
the group of the developing countries, but the relationship reverses in
the industrialized countries.
Two Alternative Approaches to the International Comparison of
Taxation IMF DM/78/73, July 31, 1978.
,
2
Taxation in SubSaharan Africa
DM/81/21, March 13, 1981.
3
— Statistical
Analysis
,
IMF
Quantitative Characteristics of the Tax Systems of Developing
Countries, IMF DM/ 83/ 79, November 28, 1983.
-4-
3.
There is no correlation between relative reliance on domestic
indirect taxes and per capita GNP within the range of the developing
countries.
The structure of these taxes varies widely among the
countries.
4.
Import duty revenue declines as per capita GNP rises, but
varies directly with the "openness" of the economy, that is, foreign
trade as a percentage of GNP.
Export taxes also fall as a percentage
of GNP as income rises, but are very uneven among developing countries.
The Objectives and Structure of this Paper
This paper provides a detailed empirical analysis of the tax
structures of 120 market economies and the influence of per capita GNP,
openness, and the role of agriculture in the economy on the structure.
The nonmarket economies are excluded.
The bulk of the paper is
organized according to type of tax and emphasizes the significance of
per capita GNP to the structure.
A presentation is made of tabular,
graphical and regression analysis results of each type of tax for all
countries as
a
whole and for each region studied (i.e., Africa, Asia,
The major conclusions are restated in an
Europe, and the Americas).
overview of each region and the robustness of the regression results
by region is noted.
Finally, other possible explanatory variables are
discussed.
The following notation and definitions are used throughout:
P123
—
income taxes as
%
of
total tax revenue
income related taxes include tax on income, profits and capital gains, and social security contributions and payroll and
manpower taxes.
-5-
P4
—
P62
—
property tax as
% of
total tax revenue
import duties plus misc. international taxes as
revenue
%
of
total tax
Import duties include customs duties and other import charges.
Misc. international includes stamp duties, transit duties,
custom fines and penalties, and exchange taxes.
P51
P52m
—
—
sales tax as % of total tax revenue
excises plus misc. domestic as
% of
total tax revenue
Misc. domestic includes taxes on services, permits to use
goods and monopoly profit of government enterprises.
— per capita GNP
Ptitx — indirect tax as
Yc
% of
total tax revenue
Indirect tax includes import duties plus misc. international,
sales, and excises plus misc. domestic as described above.
It
does not include property tax, export duties or those taxes
classified as misc. taxes (defined below).
P7
—
misc. tax as % of total tax revenue
Misc. tax includes mostly stamp taxes and poll taxes.
excise tax as
PI5m
—
—
—
PI5
=
PI51 + PI52 + PI5m
PI51
PI52
PI61
PI6m
—
—
sales tax as % of indirect tax
% of
indirect tax
Misc. domestic tax as % of indirect tax
import duties as
%
of
indirect tax
misc. international tax as % of indirect tax
PI52m = PI52 + PI5m
PI61m = PI61 +PI6m
-6-
The major source for the tax data is the Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook Vol. IX, IMF, 1985.
1
Since the data available in the IMF Government: Finance Statistics
Yearbook is not broken down into appropriate subdivisions at the statelocal level, estimates for percentages of state tax derived from the
various types of taxes were made for the following federal countries:
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Switzerland, and
the United States.
Information on state taxes from the IMF data was
combined with that from sources specific to each country, which are
listed in references.
The percentages found in this way were applied
to the figures for total state tax from the IMF data, so that the total
for each type of tax could be summed for central and state level and
percentages then obtained as a percent of total central and state
taxes.
Figures for all other countries reflect only central government
taxation.
It
should be recognized that many of the countries included do
receive tax revenues at the local and regional level and in some cases
this is rather substantial, but data are not adequate to allow general
Latest year data were utilized.
Of the 120 countries included 1983
data were used for 50 countries, and 1984 and 1982 data for 26 and 17
countries respectively.
1981, 1980 and 1979 data were used for 10, 6,
and 4 countries respectively, 1978 data for Gambia, Nigeria, and Somalia, 1977 data for Grenada and Seychelles, 1976 for Chad and 1975 data
for Gabon.
-7-
inclusion of these revenues.
Fifty-five countries listed local or
regional taxes in the IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook .
Income Related Taxes
Income related taxes as defined above are a major source of revenue
for the developed world but much less so in developing countries.
Simple two variable regressions with per capita GNP (U.S.$)
2
as
the
independent variable and income tax as percent of total tax as the
dependent variable show significant positive correlation for all
—
Eight of those Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and the Netherlands Antilles have local tax revenue
In the
exceeding twenty percent of central government tax revenue.
Scandinavian countries this is almost entirely income tax.
In Iceland
it includes income tax, property tax and taxes on commodities and
service taxes among others.
In Bolivia it includes mainly commodity
and service taxes and in Ecuador the bulk of the state and local taxes
are listed under the miscellaneous tax category.
But many of the
tabulations are not broken down by type of tax.
2
World Bank Atlas
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development/the World Bank, 1985, pp. 6-9.
,
-8-
countries as a group and for each region except Europe, where correlation is positive but insignificant.
The results of the analysis are
as follows:
0.2603
1.6947
All countries:
2
P123 = e
Yc
-
(8.549)
P123 = e
(2.646)
(.0117)
0.3748
.7244
Asia:
R
Yc
(5.366)
3.8523
P123 = e
Europe:
= .56
0.0231
R
Yc
2
= .00
(.8211)
0.2740
1.5467
Americas:
2
(.0001)
(0.229)
P123 = e
= .15
R
Yc
PI 23 = e
.38,
(.0001)
0.2430
1.9043
Africa:
=
R
J
R
Yc
(3.242)
= .25
(.0028)
A summary table showing world and regional averages by increasing
income level (Table
demonstrating
a
1,
page 9) supports the regression analysis,
steady increase in percent of total tax revenue from
income tax with increasing income level.
Europe shows uniformly
heavy dependence, increasing mildly from 54.5% to 60.5% as income
levels increase.
Plots of the data points (appendix Dl) show a more
Significant is used to mean a .05 level of significance or
better.
2
Of the 120 free market economies used in the analysis, 41 are
from Africa, 21 from Europe, 25 from Asia, and 33 from the Americas.
Individual countries are listed in appendix A.
For some purposes,
North and South America are kept separate, for others they are combined
3
4
.
.
t-statistic
Significance level, half of which is the chance of observing a
t-statistic that large in absolute value if the parameter were
actually equal to zero or of opposite sign.
.
.
-9-
Table
1
INCOME RELATED TAXES
Income Related Taxes as % of Total Tax
All
Africa
Asia
Countries
Estimated
per capita
#
#
#
of
of
of
GNP US$
Coun
Coun.
Coun.
& Cen.
N.
Europe
America
#
#
of
#
of
Coun.
Coun
South
America
of
Coun.
Below 351
24
24.9
18
28.7
5
12.5
—
—
1
19.1
—
351 - 800
20
32.8
10
30.0
5
35.2
—
—
3
27.3
2
48.9
801 - 3000
39
38.8
12
42.5
7
37.6
2
54.5
11
34.0
7
36.8
3001-8000
18
57.8
1
59.5
4
68.1
6
60.4
4
48.8
3
50.4
above 8000
19
60.5
—
—
4
53.3
13
60.5
2
74.5
—
Table
—
—
2
PROPERTY TAXES
Property Tax as
%
of Tot al Tax
All
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
1
N.
Countries
Africa
of
Coun.
of
Coun.
Cen.
America
Europe
Asia
#
//
&
South
America
#
//
#
//
of
of
of
of
Coun
Coun.
Coun.
Coun.
—
Below 351
24
2.0
18
1.9
5
2.5
—
—
1
1.4
—
351 - 800
20
1.2
10
0.8
5
0.8
—
—
3
2.3
2
2.8
801 - 3000
39
2.6
12
1.3
7
2.1
2
1.8
11
3.1
7
4.6
3001-8000
18
2.8
1
0.01
4
4.7
6
2.5
4
2.9
3
1.7
above 8000
19
2.8
—
4
3.3
13
2.8
2
1.0
—
—
—
:
-10-
detailed picture for all countries.
Plots by regions are not included
in the appendix, but data for the individual countries is recorded in
appendix A.
In Africa income
tax as percent of
tax revenue ranges
between 6.4 and 71.4% with Somalia as the lowest figure and Congo as
the highest.
All but four observations lie between 10 and 60%.
In
Asia, Indonesia stands out with a very high income related tax
figure
— 82.3%
at per capita GNP of only $580.
Bahrain and Kuwait also
stand out, perhaps because their high per capita income is not
representative of their level of development.
The majority of the
observations (all but 4) fall between 10 and 70%.
Reliance on income
related taxes in Europe varies between 40 and 75% with the exception
of Iceland at 20.6%.
A smooth linear relationship is found in the
western hemisphere ranging from 20% to a high 86.5% in Trinidad and
Tobago.
Property Tax
Property taxes play a very minor role as a source of national/state
tax revenue at all income levels with only Dominica and Singapore
exceeding 10% and the bulk of the countries, all but 7, below 6%.
A
study which includes taxes at the local level would give a more repre-
sentative picture of property taxes in general but data are not
available.
Regression analysis gives ambiguous results in all regions of the
world taken separately and a positive relationship in the world as a
whole
-11-
-3.5968
P4 = e
All countries:
0.4508
Yc
R^ = .07
(2.866)
(.0049)
(See appendix B2 for other results)
Summary Table 2, page 9, and plots of the world picture (appendix
D2) might lead one to posit a U-shaped relationship with highest
levels of property tax at low levels of development and again at much
higher levels.
The importance of land tax at low levels of develop-
ment, pointed out by Musgrave
could be reflected here as well as more
available tax handles at higher levels of development.
Export Duties
Export duties are shown to be an important source of tax revenue
only at the lowest income levels, especially in Africa and Central
America and the Caribbean (Table 3, page 12), with almost no reliance
on them in Europe and the countries above $3000/pc in Asia and North
and Central America.
Africa shows a drop from an average of almost
12% for those countries below $351/pc to appoximately 2.5%, which is
maintained throughout the range of $351-8000/pc .
The "all countries"
summary shows a very strong negative relationship between level of
GNP/pc and percent of total tax from export duties.
The plots of the data points for all countries (appendix D3) show
the same strong negative relationship.
A more detailed account of
those countries which do rely heavily on export duties for tax revenue
can be found in appendix A.
Five countries in Africa exceed 20%
reliance on export duties, including Uganda at 46.6% and Guinea at
1
,
Musgrave, R.
,
Fiscal Systems, op. cit.,
p.
125.
.
.
.
.
-12Table
3
EXPORT DUTIES
Export Dutie s % of Total Tax
All
Africa
Countries
Estimated
per capita
#
#
of
of
GNP US$
Coun.
Coun.
& Cen.
N.
Asia
Europe
#
America
#
#
of
Coun.
of
Coun.
South
America
of
of
Coun.
Coun.
Below 351
24
9.9
18
11.7
5
3.6
—
—
1
7.2
—
351 - 800
20
4.1
10
2.6
5
4.0
—
—
3
12.0
2
0.4
801 - 3000
39
3.7
12
2.7
7
2.4
2
0.01
11
6.3
7
3.4
3001-8000
18
1.1
1
2.5
4
0.03
6
0.001
4
0.6
3
4.7
above 8000
19
—
4
0.03
13
0.01
2
0.1
—
.03
Table
—
—
4
TOTAL INDIRECT TAX
Indirect Tax as
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
of Total Tax
All
%
Countries
N.
Africa
&
Cen.
America
Europe
Asia
South
America
#
#
#
#
#
of
of
of
of
of
of
Coun
Coun
Coun
Coun.
Coun
Coun.
Below 351
24
61.0
18
55.3
5
80.5
—
—
1
66.3
—
351 - 800
20
59.6
10
64.8
5
56.0
—
—
3
56.6
2
46.7
801 - 3000
39
51.3
12
51.8
7
54.7
2
38.6
11
51.4
7
50.7
3001-8000
18
36.5
1
35.4
4
26.0
6
35.7
4
44.9
3
41.4
above 8000
19
36.4
—
—
4
42.2
13
36.4
2
24.3
—
—
-13-
37.9%.
Six countries in Central and South America fall in the range of
10-22% with Jamaica topping the range at 21.6%.
In Asia only three
countries exceed a reliance on export duties of 3%
at 15.6%, Sri Lanka at 13% and Malaysia at 11.8%.
— the
Solomon Islands
In Europe, Norway
and the U.K. top the list hut with only .05% of their tax revenue
coming from export duties, and from the world picture, it
can be seen that all countries with GNP/pc in excess of $5000 maintain
their export duties revenues at less than 1% of total tax revenue.
The regression analysis supports these conclusions, showing a
significant negative relationship in the world as a whole and in all
regions with the exception of Europe, whose reliance on export duties
in uniformly negligible.
The results of the analysis are as follows:
-1.6656
10.3986
P62 = e
R
Yc
(-8.370)
(.0001)
R
Yc
(-2.036)
7.2550
P62 = e
R
(-2.920)
-8.5819
Americas:
= .27
0.2832
Yc
15.0707
2
(.0077)
R
2
= .02
(.5959)
(0.539)
P62 = e
= .10
(.0486)
-1.3499
Yc
P62 = e
= .37
-1.0716
6.6618
P62 = e
2
-2.0640
Yc
(-3.824)
R
2
=
Indirect Taxes
Indirect taxes are major sources of revenue for developing
countries.
.32
(.0006)
Of those countries with GNP/pc under $5000 only four
:
:
:
:
-14-
received less than 30% of their tax revenue from indirect taxes:
Guinea at $3000 - 21.7%, Indonesia at $580 - 15.6%, Congo at $1370 26.7% and Venezuela at $4140 - 26.1% (see appendix A).
Regression analysis shows a significant negative relationship
between reliance on indirect taxes and GNP/pc in the world as a whole
and all regions except, once again, Europe, where indirect taxes range
consistently between 25 and 50%.
The analysis yields
the following
equations
-0.1690
5.0631
All countries:
Ptitx = e
Yc
Ptitx = e
R
Yc
(-1.567)
Ptitx
Asia
R
Yc
R
Yc
(-0.625)
Ptitx =
=
.02
(.5396)
R^ = .34
Yc
e
.33
-0.2522
5.7051
Americas
=
(.0029)
-0.0704
4.1707
Ptitx = e
.06
(.1252)
(-3.336)
Europe
=
-0.2124
5.4053
= e
.32
(.0001)
-0.0842
4.514
Africa:
=
R
(-7.369)
(-3.824)
(-3.973)
(.0004)
From the table summary (Table 4, page 12) and individual countries
figures (appendix A), we can see in Africa a generally higher reliance
on indirect taxes
— between
45 and 85%
— with
Lesotho at the top
receiving 84.2% of tax revenue from indirect taxes.
In Asia we note an
even heavier concentration in the range of approximately 70% and above,
with Burma at 94.8% and its neighbors, Nepal, India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh, all at approximately 80%, for the highest indirect tax
-15-
percentages in the world.
As was noted earlier with the discussion of
income related taxes, Bahrain and Kuwait stand out with high indirect
taxes at high GNP/pc but their GNP/pc is perhaps not representative of
their level of development.
country
— the
In the Western Hemisphere,
only one
Bahamas, at a relatively high GNP/pc of $3830
70% reliance on indirect taxes.
— exceeds
a
The remainder show a smooth decline
from highs of close to 70% in the low income range to lows of 12.7 in
Trinidad and Tobago and 19.3 in the U.S.
Indirect Taxes
— Various
Forms
For the various types of indirect taxes as expressed as percent of
total tax revenue and as percent of total indirect tax, the rela-
tionships with increasing GNP/pc are less clear and have more
variation among regions of the world.
Import Duties
Import duties
are the most important type of indirect
tax in
developing countries and decline in importance as GNP/pc increases.
As a percent of total tax revenue,
11
countries with GNP/pc under
$2500 receive in excess of 45% from import duties, while of those 20
countries with GNP/pc in excess of $7000, onlv Bahrain, Iceland,
Kuwait, and Switzerland have import duties which account for more than
approximately 5% of their total tax receipts with rates of 47.6%,
20.3%, 33.3%, and 6.4% respectively (see appendix D5).
Both plots
and summary Table 5.1 (page 17) show a strong negative relationship
Import duties here include misc. international.
-16-
between percent reliance on import duties and level of GNP/pc in
Europe and Asia with the aforementioned exceptions.
In Africa the
relationship is more ambiguous since only Gabon exceeds the $3000
GNP/pc range where import duties undergo a considerable drop in importance.
In the Western Hemisphere,
there is generally lower reliance
on import duties with most of the countries (even those with GNP/pc of
under $3000) receiving less than 20% of their tax revenue from import
duties.
Regression analysis shows
a
significant negative relationship
between GNP/pc and percent tax revenue from import duties in the world
as a whole and all regions on the world except Africa, as would be
expected given the prior discussion.
The results of the analysis are
as follows:
-0.8460
8.5059
All countries:
P61m = e
R
Yc
(-7.692)
Africa:
(.0001)
Yc
5.2215
P61m = e
(.7117)
-0.3169
Yc
R
(-2.747)
19.7178
Europe:
P61m = e
= .25
-2.2537
Yc
6.1910
P61m = e
2
(.0115)
R
(-2.345)
Americas:
= .004
R
(-0.372)
Asia:
= .33
-0.0408
3.5390
P61m = e
2
- .22
(.0301)
-0.4758
Yc
(-2.678)
R
=
.19
(.0117)
Import duties also show a general decline as a share of indirect
tax revenue with increasing GNP/pc although here the differences are
.
.
.
.
.
-17IMPORT DUTIES
Table 5.1
Import Duties as % of Total Tax
All
Africa
Countries
Estimated
per capita
#
#
of
of
GNP US$
Coun
Coun.
N.
Asia
Europe
#
of
Coun.
&
Cen.
America
South
America
#
#
#
of
of
of
Coun.
Coun.
Coun
Below 351
24
27.8
18
27.3
5
29.6
—
—
1
26.7
—
351 - 800
20
33.6
10
38.7
5
33.3
—
—
3
29.7
2
14.8
801 - 3000
39
23.2
12
31.2
7
29.0
2
7.3
11
20.1
7
13.1
3001-8000
18
17.3
1
23.7
4
6.7
6
12.1
4
31.6
3
20.8
above 8000
19
6.5
—
—
4
21.8
13
2.4
2
2.0
—
—
—
Table 5.2
Import Duties as % of Indirect Tax
All
Estimated
Countries
Africa
per capita
#
#
of
of
GNP US$
Coun
Coun
N.
#
//
of
Coun.
of
Coun
&
Cen.
America
Europe
Asia
South
America
#
//
of
of
Coun
Coun.
Below 351
24
46.8
18
50.0
5
36.9
—
—
1
40.3
—
351 - 800
20
54.3
10
58.3
5
63.3
—
—
3
51.8
2
31.6
801 - 3000
39
44.6
12
58.7
7
54.4
2
19.3
11
38.6
7
26.9
3001-8000
18
46.0
1
66.9
4
34.1
6
31.6
4
65.1
3
57.9
above 8000
19
13.0
—
—
4
41.0
13
5.2
2
7.7
—
—
—
-18-
Africa shows very little correlation, as
perhaps more regionalized.
shown by either plots or summary table 5.2, with most countries
distributed fairly evenly over a range from 13.4% in Tanzania to a high
of 98.3% in Swaziland with a mean of 55.0%.
The regression results for
Africa are ambiguous.
In Asia the relationship is also ambiguous.
are not significant.
Regression results
Plots and summary table show a fairly even
distribution among the countries with GNP/pc under $3000 around a mean
of 51.9 and a split between the higher GNP/pc countries:
Kuwait, Oman
and Bahrain relying on import duties for 62.0%, 77.8%, and 79.8%
respectively, while Singapore, Israel, New Zealand, Japan, and
Australia range between
9
and 26%.
Europe registers a clear negative relationship between share of
import duties in indirect taxes and GNP/pc.
Iceland and Switzerland
are the only countries of the 13 in the over $8000 GNP/pc range with a
share greater than 5%, both with shares of 27.2%.
The remaining eight
countries in the $801-8000 income levels average 28.5% as a share of
indirect taxes.
In the Western Hemisphere
the only two countries in the over $8000
income range, U.S. and Canada, register import duties as a share of
indirect taxes much in excess of the share found in most of Europe at
9.5% and 6.0% respectively,
tax revenue.
though low as a percentage of the total
The remaining countries in the first four income levels
are fairly evenly distributed about a mean of 40.0%.
Of the nine
countries with import duties over 60% of indirect taxes, only Venezuela
has Spanish colonial roots; it has no sales tax.
:
-19-
Regression analysis shows a significant relationship for Europe
and all countries taken together as follows:
-0.6770
8.0479
All countries:
PI61m
= e
Yc
R
(-6.426)
Yc
e
.26
-2.1832
20.1523
PI61m =
Europe
=
(.0001)
R
(-2.394)
= .23
(.0272)
The results for the other regions are ambiguous; they are shown in
appendix B5.
Sales Tax
Sales taxes account for 13.2% of total tax revenue on average for
the 120 countries in the sample, ranging roughly,
ween
and 30%.
in all regions,
bet-
Although there is some variation in this average
figure among regions (Table 6.0, below) there is no positive or
negative relationship between reliance on sales tax and GNP/pc that one
could discern on the summary table of all countries (Table 6.1, page
21), in the plot of all countries (appendix D 6.1) or that registers as
significant in the regression analysis (appendix B6).
As for the regions individually,
in Africa no relationship is
found between reliance on sales tax and GNP/pc but in Asia
Table 6.0
All
Countries
Africa
Asia
Europe
N&C Am
S
Am
Average %
of total
tax
Average %
of indirect
tax
Users
13.2
17.4
12.6
16.8
14.1
20.3
16.1
17.8
11.1
14.6
17.2
20.7
All
27.7
23.2
19.3
Users
36.5
30.2
34.6
45.3
50.1
25.9
34.0
32.9
39.5
All
-20-
a
significant negative relationship is found and in Europe a close to
significant but positive relationship is found.
The results of the
regression analysis are as follows:
-0.1714
1.5523
P51 = e
All countries:
Yc
R
= .003
(.5441)
R
2
(-0.608)
-0.3264
2.2255
P51 = e
Africa:
Yc
(-0.411)
P51 = e
(.6834)
-1.5144
9.5470
Asia:
R 2 = .20
(.0242)
Yc
(-2.413)
-14.3579
Europe:
= e
P51
1.8114
Yc
R
(1.956)
P51 = e
=
.17
(.0653)
-1.1606
9.4578
Americas:
= .004
R
Yc
(-1.481)
= .07
(.1487)
The table summaries (6.2-6.6, pages 21-23) and regional plots support
the regression results.
With sufficient theoretical backing, the results might lead one to
posit a U-shaped relationship.
This is especially apparent in the plot
of all countries (appendix D 6.1), but could be due strictly to
regional variation.
As a percentage of indirect
taxes we find no relationship with
GNP/pc when all countries are taken together.
viewed individually:
When the regions are
Africa shows no correlation, Asia shows signifi-
cant negative correlation, while America shows a negative correlation
but not significantly so.
relationship.
In Europe,
however, we find a positive
The results of the analysis are as follows:
-21SALES TAX
Table 6.1
Total Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
All
Users
incl. using tax
%
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
All
Countries
No.
Countries
Indirect Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
All
Users
%
below 351
24
21
18.3
20.9
28.9
33.0
351-800
20
14
10.4
14.9
18.5
26.4
801-3000
39
30
12.7
16.5
25.6
33.3
3001-8000
18
10
8.8
15.8
24.2
43.6
above 8000
19
16
15.0
17.8
43.4
51.4
Table 6.2
Total Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
incl. using tax
Users
All
%
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No.
Countries
Indirect Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
Users
All
%
below 351
18
15
15.3
18.4
27.2
32.6
351-800
10
6
10.2
17.0
15.5
25.8
801-3000
12
9
10.9
14.5
22.7
30.3
1
1
11.3
11.3
31.8
31.8
—
—
—
—
—
—
Africa
3001-8000
above 8000
.
-22SALES TAX
Table 6.3
Total Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
using tax All
Users
%
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No. Countries
incl
Indirect Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
All
Users
%
below 351
5
5
30.5
30.5
37.1
37.1
351-800
5
3
7.1
11.8
15.6
26.0
801-3000
7
3
6.9
16.1
11.0
25.7
3001-8000
4
2
10.1
20.2
30.2
60.4
above 8000
4
1
1.9
7.6
5.6
22.4
Asia
Table 6.4
Total Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
using tax All
Users
%
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
No.
incl
Countries
Indirect Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
All
Users
%
below 351
—
—
—
—
—
—
351-800
—
—
—
—
—
—
801-3000
2
2
10.4
10.4
26.6
26.6
3001-8000
6
4
10.3
15.5
30.2
45.3
13
13
19.7
19.7
55.2
55.2
Europe
above 8000
-23SALES TAX
Table 6.5
Total Tax
Revenue from
No. Countries
Sales Tax
incl. using tax All
Users
%
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
Indirect Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
All
Users
%
below 351
1
1
12.3
12.3
18.5
18.5
351-800
3
3
12.6
12.6
22.6
22.6
11
9
13.1
16.0
28.7
35.1
3001-8000
4
2
4.6
9.2
14.1
28.2
above 8000
2
2
10.6
10.6
42.7
42.7
N & C
America
801-3000
Table 6.6
Total Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
All
incl. using tax
Users
%
Estmated
per capita
GNP US $
Countries
Indirect Tax
Revenue from
Sales Tax
All
Users
%
—
—
351-800
2
2
16.0
16.0
34.4
34.4
801-3000
7
7
21.3
21.3
40.2
40.2
3001-8000
3
1
8.6
25.8
15.0
45.0
—
—
—
—
—
below 351
South
America
No.
above 8000
—
-24-
-0.0024
1.0944
All countries:
PI51 = e
Yc
R
(-0.009)
PI51 = e
Yc
R
(-0.302)
8.7469
Asia:
PI51 = e
-13.9234
R
PI51 = e
2
=
.
16
1.8818
R
(2.022)
Americas:
= .002
(.0481)
Yc
re
8.3579
2
-1.3019
Yc
re
PI51 = e
.000
(.9931)
(.7642)
(-2.088)
Europe:
=
-0.2422
2.3193
Africa:
2
2
= .18
(.0575)
-0.9084
R
Yc
(-1.134)
= .04
(.2656)
The above relationships are supported by table summaries (6.1-6.6,
pages 21-23) and plots of observations (appendix D 6.2).
Excises
Little can be said about the pattern of excises
as
a
percentage
of tax revenue except that all regions of the world average close to
15% with Asia at the top averaging 16.9% and Africa at the bottom
averaging 12.3%.
No significant relation exists
in any regions
studied or in all regions taken together between excises as percent of
total tax revenue and GNP/pc although suggestions of a negative re-
lationship are discernable in Europe, Africa and America in table
summaries (7.1, page 25), and regression results (appendix B 7.1).
The
plot of all countries taken as a whole (appendix D 7.1) might suggest a
U-shaped relationship, but again this could be purely regional.
Excises here include misc. domestic.
.
.
-25-
EXCISES
Table 7.1
Excises as
Total Tax
All
Africa
Countries
% of
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
#
N.
Asia
#
#
of
Coun.
of
Coun.
of
Coun.
&
Cen.
Europe
America
#
#
#
of
Coun.
of
Coun.
South
America
of
Coun.
Below 351
24
14.9
18
12.7
5
20.4
—
—
1
27.3
—
351 - 800
20
15.6
10
15.9
5
15.6
—
—
3
14.3
2
15.9
801 - 3000
39
15.5
12
9.7
7
18.8
2
20.9
11
18.1
7
16.2
3001-8000
18
10.4
1
0.5
4
9.2
6
13.3
4
8.7
3
12.0
above 8000
19
14.7
—
—
4
18.5
13
14.3
2
9.5
—
—
-!
Table 7.2
Excises as
Estimated
per capita
GNP US$
%
of
Indirect Tax
All
Countries
#
N.
#
of
Coun.
of
Coun.
&
Cen.
America
Europe
Asia
Africa
South
America
#
#
#
#
of
of
of
of
Coun
Coun.
Coun.
Coun
Below 351
24
24.3
18
22.9
5
25.9
—
—
1
41.2
—
351 - 800
20
27.2
10
26.2
5
27.1
—
—
3
25.6
2
34.0
801 - 3000
39
29.9
12
18.8
7
34.6
2
54.1
11
31.7
7
32.9
3001-8000
18
29.9
1
1.4
4
35.7
6
38.2
4
20.8
3
27.0
above 8000
19
42.3
4
53.3
13
39.7
2
37.6
—
J
—
-26-
As a percentage of indirect taxes, excises do have for all
countries studied taken together a significant positive relationship
with level of GNP/pc.
This is clearly shown in the table summary
(7.2, page 25) as well as in the all countries plot (appendix D 7.2).
Regression analysis yields the following equation:
1.8A56
All countries:
PI52m =
e
0.1824
R
Yc
(3.372)
= .09
(.0010)
Within the various regions regression analysis yields no significant
results, but in Asia and Europe positive and negative coefficients are
picked up respectively (see appendix B 7.2).
25) gives
the
Summary table 7.2 (page
same indications.
Overview and Regional Overviews
The results reported using all 120 countries are in general very
clear.
Income related tax as percent of tax revenue exhibits a positive
relation with GNP/pc; export duties, total indirect taxes, and import
duties as percent of tax revenue exhibit a negative relation, all at
.0001 significance level (no greater accuracy can be reported).
a
Import
duties as percent indirect tax is negatively related to GNP/pc at .0001
significance.
cant relation.
Sales tax as a percent indirect tax yields no signifi-
Excises as percent indirect tax exhibit a significant
positive relation of significance at .001.
Property tax as percent
total tax records a positive relation with GNP/pc and is significant
at a .0049 level of significance.
Finally the relations of sales and
excises as a percent of total tax to GNP/pc are unquestionably ambiguous when all 120 countries are taken together.
-27-
With the breakdown into various regions, significance is lost due
to the smaller sample sizes and as in the case of Africa, more uniform
GNP/pc levels across the region.
For Africa the most highly significant relationship is the positive
relationship of income related taxes as percent of total tax to GNP/pc.
Export duties show a significant negative relationship to GNP/pc.
No
other variables tested showed "significant" correlation.
An attempt was made to separate African countries by colonial heritage in the plots, but this did not prove fruitful.
Some confusion is
created because those countries with colonial roots in France and
Belgium have in general a lower GNP/pc than those of English roots.
The following observations were made:
Income
- British dominate 30-50% range and the 8-20% range;
French dominate 20-30% range
Property - French have highest property tax in general except for
Egypt and Mauritius which are British but also high
Export - No discernible patterns
Indirect tax - No discernible patterns
Import (P61m) -
Sales - Of the
roots,
of 10 countries with import duties accounting for
over 40% of total tax have British roots; however,
so have all 3 countries with under 10% of tax from
indirect taxes
7
9
2
countries using no sales tax, none were of French
were Belgian, 1 Italian, and 6 British
Excises (P52m) - Of the 17 former French colonies only Tunisia uses
Of the 10
excises for over 17% of its tax revenue.
countries using excises for between 17-37% of tax
revenue, 4 are British, 2 Belgian, 1 Italian, and
2 independent.
For Asia income related taxes as percent total tax again exhibit
the most significant relationship (positive) to GNP/pc.
Export duties,
-28-
indirect taxes, and import duties as percent total tax showed significant negative correlation; and sales tax as percent total tax and as
percent indirect tax showed significant negative correlation as well.
The other variables tested were not significantly related to GNP/pc.
In Europe due perhaps to the general high GNP/pc and level of deve-
lopment we see no significant correlation to GNP/pc in exactly those
variables where correlation is most significant in the other regions of
the world, i.e.,
income related taxes, export, and indirect tax as perImport duties as percent total tax and as percent
cent of total tax.
indirect tax are significantly negatively related to GNP/pc in any form
of the equation.
Likewise sales tax as percent total tax and as per-
cent indirect tax are very close to showing significant positive relation to level of GNP/pc.
indirect tax show
As with Asia,
a
Excises as percent total and as percent
negative but not significant relation to GNP/pc.
the Americas
income related taxes as percent total
tax show the most significant (positive) relationship to GNP/pc.
Indirect tax and export duties as percent of total tax can also exhibit
very significant and negative relationships to GNP/pc.
Import duties
as percent total tax exhibits a negative and significant relation to
GNP/pc as well.
Other variables tested show no significant relation to
GNP/pc.
Other Explanatory Variables
In addition to level of development, another major influence on the
tax structure of a country is its degree of openness.
Tanzi
emphasizes openness, measured by share of imports in GDP.
,
1983,
Including
openness as well as a dummy variable for middle and upper income oil
-29-
exporters
as explanatory variables in our equations
to
explain the
various taxes as percentages of total tax and as percentages of
indirect taxes, we find that openness is indeed significant at the .01
level or better in explaining the percentage reliance on each of the
three categories of indirect taxes (see Table 8.1,
positively related
to
p.
30).
Openness is
import duties as a share of total tax and as a
share of indirect taxes and negatively related to sales taxes and
excises, both as shares of total tax and as shares of indirect taxes.
The reliance on income related taxes and import duties as a share of
total taxes as well as import duties as a share of indirect taxes was
found to be significantly higher among the oil exporters.
Excise and
sales taxes as shares of total tax, however, were found to be lower
among the oil exporters so that in net, their reliance on indirect
taxes is less.
Additionally, reliance on property tax as a percentage
of total tax and sales tax as a percentage of total indirect taxes was
found to be relatively less among oil exporters.
For purposes of comparison, the dependent tax variables regressed
only on GNP/pc with the same reduced set of 111 countries, have been
included here in Table 8.2, p. 31.
It
can be seen that the explanatory
power of the equations improves substantially for the various indirect
taxes.
A possible proxy for development in place of GNP/pc is
agriculture in GDP.
the share of
When income related taxes as a share of total tax
are regressed on GNP/pc and again on agriculture as a share of GDP, we
These oil exporters include:
Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria, Cameroon,
Peru, Congo, Tunisia, Ecuador, Syrian Arab Rep., Malaysia, Mexico,
Venezuela, Gabon, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, Bahrain, Kuwait.
-30Table 8.1
Significance
World
111 Countries
1.A038 +
.2585 oil
P123 = e
.07937
.2577
Op
(8.493) (1.187)
Yc
(2.231)
-4.1544 - 1.4110 oil
P4 = e
(-2.388)
.4573
.46
(.0001)
.2242
Yc
Op
(2.955) (0.657)
.11
(.0049)
11.7125 + 0.3893 oil -1.6596 -0.4153
P62 = e
Yc
(0.490)
Op
4.8983 - 0.2196 oil -0.1702
Ptitx = e
Op
(-7.194) (1.077)
6.7647 + 1.1601 oil -0.9636
P61m = e
Yc
(2.795)
Op
P51
PI51
to
(.0051)
.11
(.0059)
-0.4281
Op
.13
(0.916) (-3.298)
(.0016)
-0.4842
0.2242
Yc
(-1.498)
*0p refers
Op
0.0540
3.3152 - 0.3027
= e
.11
(1.121X-2.967)
Yc
e
(-2.323)
PI52m
Op
0.3078 -1.7953
3.6083 - 0.5224
P52m =
(.0001)
(0.502) (2.880)
Yc
(-2.021)
.39
0.1377 -1.7392
5.5921 - 2.1187 oil
= e
(.0001)
0.6134
Op
Yc
(-2.235)
.44
(-7.678) (2.694)
5.8852 - 2.3384 oil
= e
(.0001)
(-8.863) (2.795)
Yc
(3.498)
.38
0.6695
6.4716 + 1.3797 oil -0.7934
= e
(.0001)
0.0561
Yc
(-2.432)
PI61m
.39
(-7.979X-0.906)
Op
.23
(4.235) (-4.151)
share of imports in GDP, oil is a dummy variable for oil
exports.
2
The sample used here contains 111 of 120 countries used in the rest of
the paper.
The Bahamas, Burkina Faso, Dominica, Netherlands Antilles,
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Zimbabwe have
been omitted due to data availability.
(.0001)
-31-
Table 8.2
R
World
111 Countries
Yc
.43
(9.029)
-3.3053
P4 = e
(.0001)
.4180
Yc
.06
(2.713)
10.4263
P62 = e
(.0077)
-1.6732
Yc
.39
(-8.267)
5.0936
Ptitx =
(.0001)
-0.1748
Yc
e
.33
(-7.394)
8.6074
P61m = e
(.0001)
-0.8728
Yc
.35
(-7.728)
8.1190
PI61m =
(.0001)
-0.6972
Yc
e
.27
(-6.399)
1.0114
P51 = e
(.0001)
-0.0738
Yc
.001
(-0.262)
Yc
e
(.7938)
0.1010
.5230
PI51 =
.001
(.7206)
(0.359)
2.4018
P52m =
0.0040
.000
Yc
e
(.9482)
(0.065)
0.1788
1.9133
PI52m =
e
Significance
.2733
1.6066
P123 = e
2
Yc
(3.206)
.09
(.0018)
-32-
Table
9
R
World
108 Countries
1.5539
P123 = e
A. 5708
P123 = e
0.2831
Yc
(9.225)
2
.45
(.0001)
-0.3517
Ag
.36
(-7.749)
1.6830
P123 = e
.2719
(.0001)
-0.0174
Ag
Yc
.45
(3.985) (-0.185)
LDCs
27 Countries
(.0001)
0.2950
1.4358
P123 = e
Yc
.04
(1.016)
7.1773
P123 = e
to
(.3194)
-1.0922
Ag
(-2.652)
*Ag refers
Significance
share of agriculture in GDP
.22
(.0137)
-33-
find that GNP/pc has more explanatory power.
.36 for agriculture
— see
Table 9,
p.
32).
o
1
(r
= .45 as
compared to
When both variables are
included, agriculture is no longer shown to be significant.
If we use
as our sample, however, only those 27 countries with GNP/pc less that
$450 (classified by the World Bank as "low income economies"), it is
found that share of agriculture in GDP has much more explanatory power
than GNP/pc.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented more detailed and current analyses of the
various influences on the tax structures of the market economies,
overall and by region, than the previous studies.
The results are not
revolutionary, but substantiate the previous conclusions and provide
greater detail.
The group covered includes the industrialized countries
as well as less developed countries, and thus the results are not
entirely comparable with some earlier studies.
The most significant
firmly established results indicate a negative relationship of import
duties, total indirect taxes, and export duties with per capita GNP.
Sales taxes and excise taxes show no significant relationship with GNP
per capita.
But on a regional basis,
for Africa, made up of relatively
low income countries, there is no inverse correlation of import duties
or total indirect taxes to GNP per capita, though there is a positive
one for income related taxes and a negative one for export duties.
Dominica,
Due to data availability we omit Bahamas, Burkina Faso
Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Netherlands Antilles, Seychelles, Solomon
Islands, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Switzerland from the original
sample of 120 countries.
,
-34-
The inclusion of openness as a variable and the singling out of the
oil exporting countries improve the results but do not alter the
overall pattern in the relation of the various taxes to per capita GNP.
As would be expected, those countries with a greater degree of openness
rely more heavily on import duties.
Oil exporters, as a whole, rely
more heavily on income related taxes and import duties.
If share of
agriculture in GNP is introduced as a variable, this is found to have
no significance for the results for the overall group, but has greater
explanatory power than per capita GNP for the 27 lowest countries.
-35-
Appendix A
REVENUE FROH VARIOUS TAXES AS A PERCENTABE OF:
TOTAL TAX REVENUE
AFRICA
P roperty
INDIRECT TAX REVENUE
indirect Export
laport
Sales Excises
P4
P6in
P51
0.96
36.49
18.23
5.96
60.65
3.61
17.43
9.66
19.89
46.18
25.95
4,05
20.73
22.30
15.71
16.59
24.96
6.99
210
37.J1
32.84
0.12
1.19
41.62
7.66
Malawi
210
39.07
0.11
24.36
Burundi
240
30.27
10.00
Uganda
240
7.06
Rwanda
260
Tanzania
270
Somalia
PI61i
PI51
PI52i
60.16
30.81
9.83
37.74
20.92
41.34
9.11
35.29
37.96
26.74
2.33
34.18
51.42
14.40
1.83
4.06
68.35
12.56
19.85
60.28
0.00
8.54
40.41
47.53
12.08
32.20
57.39
1.71
0.63
43.91
8.30
56.11
19.99
5.39
46. 31
46.60
3.03
45.17
43.17
11.64
27.08
0.00
22.46
49.55
22.28
1.57
54.65
0.00
45.33
8.44
53.82
0.98
63.25
2.67
0.27
13.34
85.09
1.55
3.88
59.57
8.00
19.68
79.24
1.50
8.95
75.18
0.00
24.84
32.60
3.51
17.31
34.74
6.71
58.74
4.75
0.39
29.47
59.14
11.42
40.14
0.07
19.61
1.27
8.79
21.67
37.86
0.25
93.49
5.86
3.65
60
21.89
Ethiopia
140
24.67
Hah
170
Zaire
188
Burkina Faso
P52a
PTI7X
P62
P7
8.99
7.52
24.80
8.74
58.74
2.15
48.54
11.75
11.60
68.89
28.65
7.28
25.28
8.80
0.00
20.92
25.45
1.24
33.23
0.58
293
6.43
Niger
300
Guinea
300
Chad
African Rep
Import
Excises
P123
BNPC
Misc
Sales
!ncoi8e
310
28.97
0.48
28.75
11.19
16.27
56.21
10.46
3.89
51.15
19.91
23.95
Madagascar
320
30.34
2.35
19.06
26.35
16.87
62.27
4.31
1.04
33.61
42.32
27.39
Benin
330
24.60
0.22
59.73
3.28
9.18
72.19
1.69
1.38
82.74
4.54
12.72
Ghana
340
22.65
0.00
18.23
2.46
28.88
49.57
27.74
0.05
36.78
4.96
JO. i6
Togo
350
53.44
1.26
30.58
18.54
3.10
44.22
0.85
8.23
69.15
23.34
7.81
Gasbia
360
18.52
0.00
67.84
0.00
3.80
70.84
10.24
8.39
94.64
0.00
5.36
Sierra Leone
390
29.75
0.00
37.09
0.00
24.79
61.88
5.22
3.15
59.94
8.33
48.36
Kenya
398
32.80
0.08
23.45
27.79
14.37
65.60
0.97
8.55
35.75
42.36
21.91
Sudan
430
19.64
0.27
56.97
0.00
17.59
74.56
4.95
8.59
76.41
0.00
23.59
Mauritania
480
40.09
1.01
34.11
14.99
8.85
57.95
0.63
3.32
58.86
25.87
15.27
Liberia
498
38.92
1.16
30.61
2.51
24.57
57.69
0.09
2.14
53.86
4.35
42.59
Senegal
490
26.64
2.93
26.58
31.94
10.45
68.90
0.63
3.70
38.46
46.36
15.17
Lesotho
518
11.19
0.04
72.96
9.74
1.50
84.20
3.45
1.13
86.65
11.57
1.78
Zambia
640
37.99
0.35
9.47
15.28
36.49
61.23
0.30
0.72
15.47
24.96
59.59
C
Egypt
670
44.62
2.11
28.66
0.00
16.65
45.31
0.00
7.96
6 o.
ij
3.38
36.75
Zimbabwe
850
46.76
0.34
16.67
25.09
10.42
52.18
0.30
0.72
31.95
48.36
19.97
Nigeria
850
68.79
0.00
25.70
0.80
5.49
31.18
0.03
0.00
82.42
0.33
17.61
Morocco
868
26.54
2.59
20.57
29.20
14.09
63.86
1.88
5.92
32.21
45.73
22.36
Caaeroon
8B8
57.75
1.10
15.70
11.10
8.87
34.87
2.54
1.75
45.82
31.33
Botswana
898
44.99
0.17
51.35
2.54
0.77
54.66
0.19
0.88
93.94
4.65
1.41
Ivory Coast
918
24.23
2.33
24.56
21.17
16.18
61.91
11.24
8.38
39.67
34.19
26.13
Swaziland
930
25.53
0.31
72.43
0.00
1.23
73.65
0.05
8.45
98.34
0.30
1.67
24.72
Mauritius
1230
15.18
3.34
41.90
7.36
16.18
65.44
15.77
8.28
64.03
11.25
Congo
1370
71.43
0.09
16.69
9.12
0.87
26.68
0.27
1.53
62.56
34.18
3.26
Tunisia
1380
31.86
2.75
35.30
6.48
21.28
63.06
0.93
1.48
55.98
18.28
33.75
Seychelles
2378
34.39
1.16
47.74
0.00
9.88
57.62
0.42
6.41
82.85
0.38
17.15
South Africa
2650
60.18
1.86
5.28
18.85
12.35
36.48
0.19
1.29
14.47
51.67
33.85
Gabon
4848
59.54
0.01
23.67
11.27
0.48
35.42
2.51
2.52
66.83
31.82
1.36
Bangladesh
148
14.84
2.99
39.21
18.20
19.22
76.62
2.79
2.75
51.17
23.75
25.88
Nepal
178
8.56
8.19
35.29
26.93
18.86
81.07
1.90
8.28
43.53
J
ui
23.26
Buna
198
5.19
3.00
30.99
57.19
6.63
94.81
0.00
0.88
32.69
60.32
6.99
ASIA
India
Sri
Lanka
Pakistan
-• •
268
17.72
1.12
19.45
20.48
48.99
80.92
0.25
0.00
24.04
25.31
50.65
328
16.85
8.33
23.06
29.68
16.30
69.04
13.02
1.56
33.40
42.99
23.61
388
18.83
0.36
39.70
7.49
32.74
79.93
0.B6
0.02
49.67
9.37
40.96
-36-
Appendix A (cont.)
P123
BNPC
P4
P61bi
P51
P52i
PTITX
P62
P7
Pliisi
PI51
PI52s
Yesien Arab Rep
503
14.79
1.24
56.39
3.00
9.35
65.74
8.00
18.23
35.78
0.83
14.22
Indonesia
5B3
82.31
1.35
4.32
5.99
5.58
15.59
0.75
0.31
25.79
38.42
35.79
Soioion Is
680
36.78
0.00
43.62
0.00
3.25
46.87
15.62
0.73
93.07
0.00
6.93
Thailand
790
23.09
1.55
23.04
21.86
27.13
72.00
2.56
0.81
32.00
38.36
37.64
Philippines
820
22.36
0.86
30.38
15.33
28.35
74.06
8.67
2.04
41.02
28.70
38.28
830
55.89
0.00
25.27
0.00
15.63
48.89
1.39
1.83
61.80
8.38
38.22
Syrian Arab Rep
1680
37.59
3.41
34.99
0.00
15.74
50.73
2.06
6.22
68.97
8.08
31.83
Jordan
1690
16.88
8.58
51.15
0.00
15.47
66.62
0.00
7.93
76.78
8.30
23.22
Malaysia
1870
46.17
0.63
16.05
8.05
15.14
39.24
11.84
2.12
40.98
28.51
33.58
Korea
1910
28.16
0.91
17.89
25.18
28.23
78.29
0.00
0.64
25.45
35.82
48.16
Fiji
1960
56.22
0.31
27.03
0.00
13.74
48.77
1.22
1.49
66.38
0.88
33.78
Israel
5320
60.27
1.98
6.18
27.88
3.17
37.23
0.00
0.52
16.68
74.89
8.51
Papua N Guinea
Singapore
5980
52.54
15.48
7.23
0.00
20.50
27.73
0.00
4.26
26.87
8.88
73.93
Oian
6370
88.48
0.00
9.03
0.00
2.57
11.68
0.30
0.38
77.84
8.88
22.16
New Zealand
7910
71.18
1.30
4.38
12.53
10.34
27.26
•0.12
0.14
16.87
45.96
37.93
9860
37.99
2.42
47.58
0.00
12.32
59.59
0.00
0.08
79.85
3.80
28.17
Japan
10050
71.05
3.70
1.96
0.00
19.37
21.33
0.00
3.92
9.19
8.00
93.31
Australia
11140
60.43
4.72
4.39
7.70
22.06
34.14
0.13
8.58
12.86
22.55
64.62
Kuwait
19610
43.78
2.49
33.33
0.00
20.40
53.73
0.00
0.00
0.00
37.97
Turkey
1368
56.44
1.78
18.39
6.11
28.66
37.16
88
4.62
27.96
16.44
55.68
Portugal
2468
52.54
1.78
4.38
14.78
21.88
48.87
8 81
5.59
10.73
36.69
52.61
Malta
3798
64.54
2.75
23.87
8.00
8.58
32.37
8 88
8.34
73.74
8.30
26.26
Cyprus
3980
46.83
3.21
24.72
0.00
23.91
48.63
8 88
1.33
50.83
8.88
49.17
Greece
4288
58.92
2.62
3.64
21.45
16.26
41.35
88
5.11
8.80
51.87
39.32
Bahrain
EUROPE
Ireland
5858
52.72
1.88
15.58
20.13
9.85
45.49
8 88
8.80
34.07
44.25
21.65
Spain
5388
74.99
3.89
4.63
5.29
11.68
21.59
8 38
8.33
21.45
24.58
54.18
Italy
6798
72.28
1.73
0.21
14.75
9.47
24.44
8
88
1.56
0.86
68.35
38.75
United Kingdoa
9628
65.63
1.B4
8.38
15.81
16.64
32.45
8 85
8.34
3.30
48.72
51.28
Austria
9798
67.14
1.76
1.47
18.76
9.68
29.92
8 84
1.14
4.91
62.78
Belgiuis
10488
72.58
1.93
8.81
17.90
7.52
25.42
8 88
8.87
0.84
78.42
29.58
Netherlands
18798
73.58
1.99
8.00
14.98
9.17
24.86
8 80
8.45
8.88
61.93
38.11
Finland
18868
41.86
3.16
1.41
27.28
26.87
54.69
8 88
8.29
2.58
49.73
47.67
France
11548
66.77
1.98
0.03
22.92
B.28
31.15
8 88
8.17
8.18
73.58
26.32
Iceland
12118
28.67
4.58
20.27
33.77
28.54
74.58
3 04
8.21
27.18
45.28
27.54
Gernany
12380
72.96
1.62
0.02
18.15
15.26
25.42
8
00
8.00
8.38
39.93
68.83
Dennark
12358
47.18
3.89
0.98
29.82
19.81
49.73
8 00
8.03
1.81
58.36
39.84
Sweden
13848
65.81
1.59
8.63
18.46
14.22
33.31
8
00
8.18
1.89
55.42
42.69
Luxeabourg
14818
63.38
6.88
8.18
13.15
12.24
25.48
8 00
0.14
8.39
51.61
48.84
Norway
14278
54.83
8.96
8.56
22.44
28.96
43.96
8
05
0.21
1.27
51.85
47.68
08
0.00
27.14
48.25
24.62
Switzerland
16968
69.97
6.63
6.35
11.29
5.76
23.48
NORTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA
Haiti
388
19.89
1.41
26.76
12.26
27.32
66.34
7.15
6.81
48.34
18.48
41.18
Honduras
668
25.65
8.96
28.68
7.75
19.65
56.89
16.29
1.02
51.13
13.82
35.83
788
28.02
5.91
9.19
27.17
19.81
55.36
18.15
8.56
16.68
49.08
34.34
St Vincent
778
36.32
8.88
51.14
2.93
4.23
58.31
1.47
3.91
87.78
5.82
7.25
Nicaragua
868
25.37
5.51
18.93
18.42
38.08
67.36
8.35
1.72
28.10
15.47
56.41
Grenada
948
28.56
2.13
31.25
7.71
12.21
51.17
15.39
10.75
61.07
15.87
23.36
Doainica
948
25.29
17.64
18.97
28.69
5.97
45.62
1.14
18.31
41.58
45.35
13.39
25.78
9.88
49.66
28.24
El
Salvador
St Lucia
1848
38.11
8.77
37.85
14.83
5.64
57.53
2.16
1.43
64.40
Guateiala
1138
27.58
1.01
11.82
24.76
14.88
49.86
6.52
15.83
22.10
-37-
Appendix A (cont.)
P52m
pun
P62
17.18
14.89
42.88
8.30
11.38
54.08
5.74
23.59
4.09
1.12
33.67
0.00
2.25
12.86
P61s
P51
0.54
10.81
1.06
42.70
38.74
2.03
1349
28.96
2120
61.07
BNPC
PI 23
P4
Costa Rica
1153
43.57
Belize
1160
32.72
Jaaaica
1243
Doainican Rep
Panata
P7
PI61B
PI51
PI 52a
12.34
0.67
25.21
48,87
34.72
2. 73
9.35
78.96
0.83
21.84
33.42
21.63
4.19
17.18
73.59
12.24
36.92
67.59
0.78
1.56
45.38
3.38
54.62
9.38
11.28
32.42
1.71
2.55
37.20
28.81
34.79
44.56
63.13
4.29
0.84
Hex i co
2740
32.49
0.05
2.31
16.26
3.66
25.76
70.58
Bahamas
3830
9.89
3.31
67.37
0.00
12.38
79.75
2.87
4.97
84.48
8.38
15.52
Barbados
3830
48.77
4.89
16.80
16.52
6.71
48.34
8.16
6.16
41.96
41.26
16.76
Neth Antilles
5430
49.84
3.15
34.29,
0.00
12.72
47.01
8.00
0.80
72.94
8.30
27.86
Trinidad/Tobago
6920
86.51
0.26
7.77
1.94
3.02
12.72
0.00
0.51
61.88
15.25
23.74
Canada
11330
70.02
0.36
2.78
13.69
12.66
29.33
0.28
8.01
9.48
46.68
43.85
United States
13160
79.02
1.66
1.16
7.46
6.34
19.31
0.00
0.00
6.31
38.63
31.28
590
58.49
1.B1
11.65
25.22
9.74
46.63
0.34
0.75
25.08
54.12
20.90
SOUTH AHERICA
Suyana
610
47.33
3.78
17.89
6.83
22.88
46.81
0.41
1.66
38.22
14.59
47.17
Peru
1260
20.63
6.19
19.23
30.30
16.39
65.92
6.38
0.89
29.17
45.96
24.86
Coloabia
1420
45.95
0.38
15.70
20.64
9.64
45.99
5.23
2.45
34.14
44.38
20.96
Paraguay
1570
34.92
10.09
16.B2
5.01
28.42
42.23
0.49
12.26
DO'
11.86
Ecuador
1610
56.39
1.97
19.70
12.35
7.94
39.98
1.54
0.42
49.27
30.39
Argentina
2070
26.65
8.04
6.22
19.75
21.92
47.89
7.69
9.74
12.99
41.24
45.77
Brazil
2170
47.92
0.53
1.77
21.97
24.67
48.41
2.65
0.49
3.66
45.38
50.96
Chile
2190
25.33
5.22
12.54
39.19
12.56
64.28
0.00
5.17
19.51
60.97
19.54
Bolivia
07.
48.31
'
19.86
Surinaa
3310
44.62
0.78
30.01
0.00
10.90
40.98
11.87
1.83
73.37
8.03
26.65
Uruguay
3400
33.72
3.54
11.42
25.82
28.08
57.31
2.11
3.32
19.93
45.85
35.04
Venezuela
4140
72. B8
0.83
21.04
0.00
5.06
26.18
0.00
0.19
80.61
8.33
19.39
-38-
Appendix B
Table B.l
R
P123
PI 23 = e
Yc
.38
(8.549)
Africa
(.0001)
0.2430
1.9043
P123 = e
Yc
.15
(2.646)
0.7244
Asia
P123 - e
(.0117)
0.3748
Yc
.56
(.0001)
(5.366)
0.0231
3.8523
Europe
P123 = e
.003
Yc
(0.229)
Americas P123
(.8211)
0.2740
1.5467
= e
Significance
0.2603
1.6947
World
2
.25
Yc
(.0028)
(3.242)
Table B.2
R
P4
-3.5968
World
P4 = e
2
0.4508
.07
Yc
(.0049)
(2.866)
-0.3450
0.8664
Africa
P4 = e
Yc
.01
(.5104)
(-0.664)
-3.8699
Asia
P4 = e
0.4444
.05
Yc
(.2877)
(1.088)
-0.2347
Europe
P4 = e
0.1224
.03
Yc
(.4517)
(0.768)
-0.0811
0.9074
Americas
P4 = e
Significance
Yc
(-0.221)
.002
(.8262)
-39-
Appendix B (continued)
Table B.3
R
P62
P62 = e
Yc
.37
(-8.370)
P62 = e
(.0001)
-1.0716
6.6618
Africa
Yc
.10
(-2.036)
P62 = e
(.0486)
-1.3499
7.2550
Asia
Yc
.27
(-2.920)
-8.5819
Europe
P62 = e
(.0077)
0.2832
.02
Yc
(.5959)
(0.539)
-2.0640
15.0707
Americas
P62 = e
Significance
-1.6656
10.3996
World
2
Yc
.32
(-3.824)
(.0006)
Table B.4
Ptitx
R
Ptitx = e
.32
Yc
(-7.369)
Ptitx = e
(.0001)
-0.0842
4.5114
Africa
Yc
.06
(.1252)
(-1.567)
-0.2124
5.4053
Asia
Ptitx = e
.33
Yc
(.0029)
(-3.336)
-0.0704
4.1707
Europe
Ptitx =
.02
Yc
e
(.5396)
(-0.625)
-0.2522
5.7051
Americas Ptitx = e
Significance
-0.1690
5.0632
World
2
Yc
(-3.973)
.34
(.0004)
-40-
Appendix B (continued)
Table B.5.1
2
P61m
World
P61m =
Yc
e
.33
(-7.692)
P61m = e
(.0001)
-0.0408
3.5390
Africa
.004
Yc
(-0.372)
P61m = e
(.7117)
-0.3169
5.2215
Asia
Yc
.25
(-2.747)
P61ra
= e
(.0115)
-2.2537
19.7178
Europe
.22
Yc
(-2.345)
P61m =
.19
Yc
e
(.0301)
-0.4758
6.1910
Americas
Significance
-0.8460
8.5059
(-2.678)
(.0117)
Table B.5.2
PI61m
R
PI61m =
.26
Yc
e
(-6.426)
3.6328
Africa
PI61m
= e
(.0001)
0.0434
.005
Yc
(.6503)
(0.457)
-0.1045
4.4214
Asia
PI61m =
.06
Yc
e
(.2430)
(-1.198)
-2.1832
20.1523
Europe
PI61m = e
Yc
.23
(.0272)
(-2.394)
5.0911
Americas PI61m = e
Significance
-0.6770
8.0479
World
2
-0.2236
Yc
(-1.307)
.05
(.2007)
-41-
Appendix B (continued)
Table B.6.1
R
P51
P51 = e
Yc
.003
(-0.608)
Africa
(.5441)
-0.3264
2.2255
P51 = e
.004
Yc
(-0.411)
P51 = e
(.6834)
-1.5144
9.5470
Asia
Yc
.20
(-2.413)
-14.3579
Europe
P51
= e
(.0242)
1.8114
Yc
.17
(.0653)
(1.956)
-1.1606
9.4578
Americas
P51 = e
Significance
-0.1714
1.5523
World
2
Yc
.07
(-1.481)
(.1487)
Table B.6.2
R
PI51
PI51 = e
.000
Yc
(-0.009)
Africa
PI51
(.9931)
-0.2422
2.3193
= e
.002
Yc
(-0.302)
PI51 = e
(.7642)
-1.3019
8.7469
Asia
Yc
.16
(.0481)
(-2.088)
-13.9234
Europe
PI51
= e
1.8818
.18
Yc
(.0575)
(2.022)
-0.9084
8.3579
Americas PI51
= e
Significance
-0.0024
1.0944
World
2
Yc
(-1.134)
.04
(.2656)
-42-
Appendix B (continued)
Table B.7.1
P52m = e
Yc
.000
(0.228)
P52m = e
(.8201)
-0.3270
4.0937
Africa
Yc
.06
(-1.528)
P52m = e
(.1346)
-0.0671
3.1062
Asia
Yc
.02
(-0.650)
P52m = e
(.5218)
-0.1694
4.1139
Europe
Yc
.06
(-1.170)
P52m = e
(.2565)
-0.2144
4.1173
Americas
Significance
0.0134
2.3035
World
2
R
P52m
Yc
.08
(-1.609)
(.1177)
Table B.7.2
PI52m
R
1.8456
World
PI52m =
.09
(3.372)
PI52m = e
(.0010)
-0.2428
4.1875
Africa
Yc
.04
(-1.194)
PI52m =
Yc
e
(.2397)
0.1454
2.3061
Asia
.11
(.1104)
(1.661)
-0.0990
4.5484
Europe
PI52m =
Yc
e
.05
(-0.963)
e
(.3474)
0.0379
3.0174
Americas PI52m =
Significance
0.1824
Yc
e
2
.004
Yc
(0.346)
(.7318)
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