Barbara Kratiuk – Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status
Abstract
This paper will investigate the possibility of Vietnam becoming one of Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders. It will attempt to define what constitutes a dominant power,
what are the most common characteristics. It will draw on the theories of hegemonies and
regionalism. This paper will try to examine the way Vietnam exercises its power and influence,
how it tries to gain it through hard, soft and smart power. To do that, Vietnam’s unique position
as a communist republic with successful economic transformation will be briefly analysed, as
well as its’ relations with other countries in the region. Other ASEAN member-countries will
also be briefly analyzed to show how the power shift towards Vietnam is not taking place in a
vacuum and how it changes the position of previous dominant powers, such as Thailand.
Vietnam’s role and engagement in ASEAN itself would also have to be examined to show
leadership capabilities and see how far Vietnamese influence stretches, how active Vietnam truly
is in the regional arena.
Introduction
Vietnam has for years been the leader of Indochina and in the recent years has also shown
ambitions to become one of the leaders of Southeast Asia as a whole. Hanoi believes Vietnam
should be considered one of the dominant powers within the region and within ASEAN. This
should stem from both current strength and future potential that this country exhibits. It is the 14th
most populous country in the world, with a very young population and dynamically growing
economy. Hanoi believes that Vietnamese foreign policy should reflect that as well as the place it
has envisioned for itself in the world. Vietnam in the 21st century has been shaping itself into a
leader of Southeast Asia.
Within Southeast Asia, Vietnam is in a unique geopolitical and geostrategic position: it can
influence both the continental and the maritime sub-regions of Southeast Asia. The continental
sub-region has been dominated by Vietnam militarily since the unification in 1975. At the time
Lee Kwan Yew said “there is no combination of forces in Southeast Asia that can stop
Vietnamese on mainland Asia.” While the military power of ASEAN countries is more balanced
nowadays, the sentiment remains: Vietnam is still perceived as a military power within the region,
even as it attempts to become a key political player as well. It is a crucial part of doi moi reforms,
Barbara Kratiuk – Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status that have started back in 1988 as foreign policy plays a key role in the renewal of Vietnam. Joern
Dosch opinionated that the success of the reforms is contingent on Vietnam establishing itself as
a middle power in Southeast Asia. i While access to the internal debates on foreign policy in
Vietnam has been sorely limited, it is clear that both the reformists and the conservatives stride to
establish Vietnam as a middle power, even if they differ in their preferred tools.
Methodology
This paper will utilize Organski's theory of world order to prove, that Vietnam should be
considered a middle power. It will be supported by similar ideas presented by Edward Jordaan,
who coined a definition of middle power and William Tow. This paper will also present data
concerning Vietnam's economic, military and social development to compare to the requirements
of Organski's theory and supplements added by both Tow and Jordaans. Finally ASEAN will be
used as an example of coalition building and promoting cohesion and unity within the region
through use of hierarchical structures and elements of theories of regional integration as
represented by Karl Deutsch, Timo Kivimaki or John Ikenberry.
In his works Organski built a pyramid structure which was supposed to order hierarchically each
level of power domination.ii At the very top was the dominant power or the hegemon, followed
by great powers and middle powers. The middle powers were countries, which attempted to
emulate the dominant power, but only within certain borders. All the other countries were small
powers. The dominant power was to, according to Organski, control resources like populations,
territory, have military and economic power as well as technological capacity and political
stability. All of those tools would be needed to gain dominance over the globe, or in case of a
middle power, over a region. Hanoi is trying to establish Vietnam, a country with a great economic
and military potential, as one of the dominant powers in the region, which would make it a middle
power within the definitions set forth by Organski.
The very first definition of a middle power was introduced by the archbishop of Milan, Giovanni
Botero back in late 16th century. In his writings he described the ‘middle power’ as follows: a
medium [state] is that which has force and authority sufficient to sustain itself without the need
of the help of another. He linked, as Holbraadiii noted, power directly with international security.
Vietnam is definitely seeking greater regional security, especially in context of China and the
conflict in South China Sea and by turning Botero’s definition around, it might be said, that
Vietnam seeking greater security has brought about the transition into a middle power.
Barbara Kratiuk – Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status According to Jordaan middle powers, such as Vietnam, could be described as “states that are
neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity, influence and demonstrate a
propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system.”iv That propensity has also
been noted by William Tow, who put a greater weight on the sufficient control of resources for
the state to effectively exercise power.
Ralf Emmers additionally noted that there are different types of power in international relations,
as well as different styles of exercising that power: it can be benevolent using leadership,
accommodation and shared ideology or coercive, imposing will using military power.v Vietnam,
although it has been investing considerably into armament falls into the benevolent middle power
category, primarily uses means other than coercion to archive its goals, particularly in Southeast
Asia.
Applying theory
In Vietnamese policy towards Southeast Asia, Pham Quang Minh identified four points that stand
as most important: independent, multilateral foreign policy, importance of broadening friendly
relations in Asia-Pacific, readiness to participate in bilateral and multilateral dialogue and support
for peaceful conflict resolution. vi Vietnam has been very consequent inflowing those points,
especially evident in the relations with ASEAN in the 21st century. However Hanoi had always
been quite strict in adhering to the principles of ASEAN, even just after joining in 1995. The
amount of conflicts and battle deaths dropped to 0 after Vietnam joined the organization as
opposed to the period between unification and joining, when there were 54 deaths and 1 conflict
a year. There is also no intra-regional war despite the territorial conflicts between members. It
should also be noted that Vietnam has taken a very active role in trying to find a solution for
those, especially for the South China Sea conflicts.
While Vietnam’s territorial conflicts with other members of ASEAN have been solved or
suspended, the fact remains that the country’s military expenditure is growing. While it should
be noted that the 2,8 billion USD spent in 2012 is nowhere near the expenditure of countries such
as Singapore or Indonesia, which spent 9,9 and 7 billion respectively, the amount spent in 2012
war around 2,4% of GDP that year. This figure alone shows the seriousness with which Hanoi
takes the need to modernize its armed forces. For the aforementioned Indonesia military budget
was only 0,8% of GDP, while Singapore spent 3,6% GDP. Vietnam is therefore clearly working
on strengthening the economic position in the region and in the world, not only to solve domestic
problems, but also to build the economic capacity for the engagement in the region necessary for
Barbara Kratiuk – Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status Vietnam to both feel secure in its own back yard and to be able to project itself properly as a
middle power.
Vietnam also places 23rd in the Global Firepower ranking with only Indonesia ranked higher as
19th out of the countries in the region.vii This is the legacy of the Vietnam War and the unification
in 1975. The opinion of Lee Kwan Yew was shared by many in the late seventies and the lost war
with Chinese in 1979 did not change the perception of Vietnam as a state, which draws its power
and influence from the military. Vietnam has since embarked on a path to modernization of the
armed forces, mostly due to the perceived threat by the Chinese in the South China Sea. They
have purchased submarines from Netherlands, vehicles from United States and are in the final
stages of buying the BrahMos missile system, one of the most advanced in the world, which has
been developed by India and Russia. The perceived lack of security and ambitions to become a
regional power force Vietnam to build up the capabilities, or as Riddell would say, material
resources.
Vietnam is also, as it has been already mentioned, a country with unique geostrategic position in
the sense that it dominates geographically and demographically over most of the region. Vietnam
remains the third most populous country in the region with almost 100 million citizens and is is
the third biggest country with over 330 thousand km2. Only Indonesia is both bigger in terms of
territory and population, while Philippines and Thailand have each greater population and territory
respectively. Vietnam also has the makings of a maritime power, a country that could stride the
divide between continental Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia, as it has the longest
coastline out of the non-archipelago ASEAN members. These factors, coupled with Vietnamese
military capacity, make Vietnam the very embodiment of Organski’s definition of a middle
power, although it should be considered that Indonesia has very similar traits. The theory does not
however limit the number of middle powers in a region: both Indonesia and Vietnam fulfill the
conditions of the definition.
Integral is also the economic capacity. Vietnam has been named as the new Asian tiger, following
reforms that remade Vietnamese economy in a very spectacular way: from a country that had to
import rice in 1990, Vietnam became one of the biggest exporters of foodstuffs such as rice or
fish in the world. Avoiding the Asian crisis in 1997 allowed the country to continue with economic
growth of 7% GDP per year for almost 20 years. Even in the past decade the GDP of Vietnam
grew by 50% between years 2006 and 2011. viii Such growth within the region can be only
paralleled with the growth of Indonesia. Again, this shows how Vietnam has all the potential to
grow into a middle power, able to utilize also economic tools in its foreign policy.
Barbara Kratiuk – Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status The method most often utilized by middle powers is coalition building with like-minded countries.
Vo Van Kiet-wa said that Vietnamese were “living in a region surrounded by tigers and a dragon;
the continued backwardness of the country is the biggest security threat to the nation.” Here
ASEAN is the key: it gave Vietnam a new identity after the end of communist bloc and became
the main mean for Vietnam to exercise its foreign policy. As the countries in the region have
several common goals, Vietnam believes ASEAN could be the means by which a common
strategy could be utilized. For the effective use of ASEAN as a coalition ,Vietnam however needed
to ascend to its coveted role as of a regional power.
Vietnam therefore embarked on a road towards a balanced, multidirectional policy making in
foreign affairs. ASEAN became of the most important parts of that policy, starting with sponsoring
both Laos and Cambodia as future members of the organization, mere two years after Vietnam
itself joined.
Karl Deutsch believed, that for regionalism to truly succeed a regional hegemon is needed.ix It
would therefore mean, that a Vietnam with a middle power status would be an asset for ASEAN
and it's initiatives, not a threat. Vietnam, once the organisations’ most immediate enemy, is also
paradoxically a very suitable candidate for its’ leader: the ASEAN Way remains a primary
concern for Hanoi. Similarly important is the independence from outside influences, which also
troubles most of the region. Regionalism is part of Vietnamese identity and it is embodied by
ASEAN in the region, with which Vietnam shares a lot of values and outlooks.
ASEAN is the perfect tool for further regional integration as well as the perfect platform for
Vietnam to become the leader and cement its position as the dominant power in the region. With
Vietnam and ASEAN Wright’s justification of power can be observed: there is a drive in Hanoi
to turn brute coercion into legitimate authority, as force by itself is unreliable.
Evelyn Goh mentioned that institutions such as ASEAN have a role of managing power disparity
in international system:x it allows for the more powerful to be constrained in a constructive way.
The middle power can still play a very active role, but it remains within the greater framework of
regionalism. Especially as ASEAN represents the model of regionalism that is more comfortable
for the Southeast Asian countries, it allows for soft balancing at the same time as it is an instrument
of common policies and a platform for negotiations.
Vietnam’s and ASEAN’s relationship is largely symbiotic, the main goals of both are virtually
the same: economic development and regional peace and stability. Developmentalism, which
creates a positive interdependence between countries and which in time became the main
Barbara Kratiuk – Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status philosophy of ASEAN xi is also important to Vietnam, as it evolves and pursues economic
development.
ASEAN, for all its merits, is its own worst enemy. The ASEAN Way is both a unique achievement
and a hindrance, which was illustrated at the Phnom Penh summit in 2012 when the members of
ASEAN failed to produce a joint communique at the end of the ministerial meeting for the first
time in history. The national interests divided the members of organization, which without a
stronger structure simply failed to deliver. Although generally peer pressure as a tool is very
effective in ASEAN, in this particular case, as in the case of South China Sea it failed. Vietnam,
trying to strengthen its position and keep a constructive approach towards South China Sea: Hanoi
worked over the issue closely with Malaysia to bring the issue over to the United Nations. xii
Vietnam also cooperates closely with Philippines over the same issue.
Conclusions
ASEAN is crucial for Vietnam as a middle power: it is the most important tool of persuasion, peer
pressure and cooperation available in the region. As a middle power Vietnam has and will
encounter distrust, especially as a communist country. ASEAN allows Vietnam to put those
concerns to rest as it loyally follows the ASEAN Way. On the other hand, Vietnam as a dominant
power in the region could help ASEAN overcome the inertia that has been present in the
organization four or five years.
To be a truly effective middle power Vietnam must take great care of the relations with its
neighbours, which is not an easy task. While Laos has for years followed Vietnamese footsteps in
foreign policy, Cambodia long thought to be under Hanoi’s influence resents it. In the meantime
Vietnam has been crucial in constructive engagement of Myanmar. As an authoritarian regime
Hanoi can find common ground with Naypyidaw than the ASEAN democracies. Vietnam has also
closely cooperated with both Philippines and Malaysia on the issue of South China Sea conflict,
which shows again Vietnamese willingness to engage its regional partners. The key relationship
for Vietnam is with Thailand, which back in the early 90ties opposed Vietnamese accession into
ASEAN. Since then the two countries have settled their border disputes and began a closer
cooperation on issues such as drugs or international crime.
Vietnam over the last decade has truly begun to integrate itself with the region: became very
supportive of the idea of ASEAN community and tries to overcome the hurdles of implementing
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Vietnam is already the leader of the ‘new’ ASEAN
membersxiii: it is in a position where it can advise Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia on matters of
economic development and reform from a state controlled into private controlled industry.
Barbara Kratiuk – Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status According to Ikenberry Vietnam is working towards greater strategic interdependence, as it would
benefit not only the country but also the whole region, both politically and economically.xiv That
interdependence would strengthen the region and allow Vietnam to more effectively influence
regional politics; hence further engagement with ASEAN and its individual members. While
Hanoi has been previously accused of having a ‘quick fix’ approach to problems with the
region, the overall approach to ASEAN and to the matter of South China Sea shows Vietnam as
committed to realizing its national and regional interests over a long period of timexv.
The middle power status is something that Vietnam strives to achieve. The current importance of
the country within the region, within ASEAN and the future potential all show, that in compliance
with Organski’s theory proves that Vietnam should be considered a middle power with all the
ramifications. It is a country that commands considerable resources in the region, in terms of
territory, population and economic capacity and has the necessary military force and the will to
be
actively
engaged
in
the
region. Barbara Kratiuk – Vietnam's Transition into Middle Power Status i
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v
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