DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION
POLICY DEPARTMENT
THE DAWN OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT
POLICY BRIEFING
Abstract
Egypt's political influence stems from its strategic geographic position, historical and
cultural importance and the strength of its diplomacy and military. Egypt's roles in the
League of Arab States, the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and the Nile Basin make the
country a critical Middle Eastern and North African partner for the EU and its Member
States. Egypt's parliamentary elections gave the Islamist parties a landslide victory — a
two-thirds majority in the new People's Assembly. Some concerns have been raised over
this majority and its commitment to safeguarding principles of democracy and pluralism
in the new constitution, protecting human rights and preserving Egypt’s international
relations. The current human rights situation in Egypt is worrisome, in particular
concerning the use of excessive force, the crackdown on civil society organisations and
violence against women. The Egyptian economy is also in a desperate state, with foreign
currency reserves down to an alarming level. If the current economic uncertainty
continues, the country risks social unrest for some time to come. Egypt is a major trading
partner for the EU. For many decades, the EU has been engaged in the political, social
and economic development of the country via various programmes. Since the revolution,
the EU’s approach has not radically changed, and its assistance has increased only
incrementally.
DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2012_032
PE 457.147
February/2012
EN
Policy Department DG External Policies
This Policy Briefing is an initiative of the Policy Department, DG EXPO.
AUTHOR:
Pekka HAKALA and Paolo NAPOLITANO
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union
Policy Department
WIB 06 M 071
rue Wiertz 60
B-1047 Brussels
Feedback to [email protected] is welcome
Editorial Assistant: Agnieszka PUNZET
LINGUISTIC VERSION
Original: EN
ABOUT THE EDITOR
Manuscript completed on 8 February 2012.
© European Parliament, [2012]
Printed in [Belgium]
The study is available on the Internet at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN.
To obtain copies, please send a request by e-mail to: [email protected]
DISCLAIMER
Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not
necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.
Reproduction and translation, except for commercial purposes, are authorised, provided the source is
acknowledged and provided the publisher is given prior notice and supplied with a copy of the
publication.
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Policy Briefing: The Dawn of Parliamentary Democracy in Egypt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTERNAL SITUATION
4
1.1
ELECTIONS RESULTS AND COMPOSITION OF THE NEW PARLIAMENT
4
1.2
MAIN POLITICAL CHALLENGES AHEAD
8
1.3
SOCIO ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
10
2. REGIONAL CONTEXT
11
2.1
MORE ACTIVE ARAB LEAGUE
11
2.2
STRAINED EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS
11
2.3
THE NILE BASIN INITIATIVE
12
3. RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION
12
4. SOURCES
14
3
Policy Department DG External Policies
1.
INTERNAL SITUATION
A year after Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak’s resigned from office, the Egyptian revolution remains in
many ways still unfinished. The country is experiencing a complex and difficult transitional phase where
several processes are taking place simultaneously: the military and the security apparatus have
maintained their power, the prerogatives of the new elected Parliament have yet to be defined, the
timeframe for the handover of power to civilian authorities is still unclear, and a new constitution is
needed before the presidential elections scheduled for the summer.
Elections results and composition of the new parliament
After a complicated electoral process that stretched over 55 days, the Egyptian High Judicial Elections
Committee announced the final results of the People's Assembly, the lower and more powerful house
of the Egyptian parliament, on 21 January. The election of the members of the Shura Council, the upper
house, is ongoing and will end on 4 March. The outcome of the Shura elections will be significant, as the
two houses will jointly nominate the members of the Constitutional Assembly, which in turn will draft
the new Egyptian constitution.
The Islamist parties (the Freedom and Justice Party and the al-Nour Party) have won a significant victory
in the People's Assembly elections, gaining more than 70 % of the seats. The secular and liberal parties,
on the other hand, scored badly — between 3 and 8 % each. However the historically significant alWafd party and the secular Egyptian bloc performed rather well in some constituencies. Around 30
million voters out of a potential 50 million cast their ballot.
Final election results
Major orientation
Freedom and Justice Party Democratic Alliance
Al-Nour Party - Alliance for Egypt
Seats
% of seats
Moderate Islamist
235
47 %
Radical Islamist (Salafist)
121
24 %
Al-Wafd Party
Secular liberal
38
8 %
Egyptian Bloc
Secular centre-left
34
7%
Al-Wasat Party
Moderate Islamist
10
2%
Reform and Development Party
Liberal
9
2%
Revolution Continues Coalition
Leftist
7
1%
15
3%
29
6%
NDP and Off-shoots of Mubarak's
party
Former Regime
Others/Independents
Total
498
4
100 %
Policy Briefing: The Dawn of Parliamentary Democracy in Egypt
Composition of the new Parliament
121
38
34
235
10
9
7
15
29
Freedom and Justice Party -Democratic Alliance
Al-Nour Party
Al Wafd Party
Egyptian Bloc
Al Wasat Party
Reform and Development Party
Revolution Continue Coalition
NDP and Off-shoots of Mubarak's party
Others/Independents
(c) European Parliament, DG Expo Policy Dep. 2012, PH/ap
No governmental institutions - including the EU - had been invited to observe the elections, although a
few local and international NGOs were allowed to oversee the electoral process. While the Egyptian
High Electoral Committee declared the elections to have been fair and transparent, the international
community pointed out some shortcomings, but also admitted that the election results reflected the
will of the Egyptian people. Some observers reported problems outside the polling stations, such as
illegal campaigning, confusion, and insufficient surveillance of the ballot boxes 1 . Further problems
arose when the High Electoral Committee hesitated to release official data. Elections had to be repeated
in several districts.
As depicted in the political landscape map below, the parties that were better organised at the grassroots level, - i.e., the Muslim Brothers and the Salafists - scored well across the entire country. As
expected, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) emerged as the dominant
political force in the vast majority of governorates. The party built on its well-established grassroots
networks, presenting itself as a movement cutting across all social classes, and reaped the rewards of
poor and middle class votes.
The strong performance of the Salafists' al-Nour party (24 %) shocked all the commentators and
observers. al-Nour came first in two sparsely populated western governorates (New Valley and Matruh),
three governorates in the Delta (Damietta, Kafr al-Shaikh, al-Buhayrah) and in Suez. The party also
obtained a good result in its traditional stronghold Alexandria, where it was defeated by the FJP by a
narrow margin. The groups within the al-Nour party form a well-connected network linked to Salafist
groups that carry out charitable activities throughout the country. All share an ultra-conservative
Islamist ideology based on rigorous application of Shari'a law. Their outstanding performance is due to
1
Some witnesses reported that many ballot boxes were found outside the polling stations with no surveillance.
5
Policy Department DG External Policies
several factors: their ability to campaign in all districts, a well-connected network of charities, a populist
political platform that has enticed the poorest voters, a political message that stressed their differences
from the Muslim Brotherhood, and dubious electoral practices reported in some remote areas of the
country (where al-Nour did well). 2
The secular coalition of the Egyptian Bloc did reasonably well in the main urban centres such as Cairo,
Asyout, Sohag and Minya. The al-Wafd party, which benefitted from well-connected social networks,
was confirmed as a viable political formation with passably good results in some governorates in the
Delta and in South Sinai.
(c) European Parliament, DG Expo Policy Dep. 2012, PH/ap
2
According to some witnesses, Al Nour party took advantage of the scarce surveillance at polling stations and campaigned
during the electoral process.
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Policy Briefing: The Dawn of Parliamentary Democracy in Egypt
Election results by governorate (party lists)
FJP
Al-Nour
Egyptian
Bloc
Al Wafd
34,50%
31,50%
11%
6%
34%
24%
9%
8%
Asyut
36,50%
23,50%
19%
4%
Beheira
35,50%
38%
3%
9%
41%
33,50%
5%
9,50%
Cairo
38,75%
21,75%
20,25%
8,50%
Dakahlia
33,60%
28%
2,60%
10,60%
Damietta
31%
39%
3%
5%
Faiyum
45%
34,50%
4%
2%
Gharbia
33,50%
29,50%
6%
15,50%
Giza
39,50%
28,50%
10,50%
6,50%
38%
28%
7%
7%
30,50%
30,50%
1%
13,50%
Matruh
14%
68%
2%
7%
Minya
41%
25%
13%
5,50%
36,50%
19%
3%
18%
New Valley
26%
40%
7%
4%
North Sinai
35%
27%
2%
6%
Port Said
33%
21%
10%
14%
Qalyubia
37%
26,50%
6%
9%
29,50%
20,50%
2%
7,50%
Red Sea
36%
0%
17%
10%
Sharqia
37%
24%
6%
12,50%
25,50%
24%
15,50%
7%
South Sinai
43%
0%
11%
17%
Suez
27%
46%
8%
5%
Luxor
37%
16%
13%
11%
Alexandria
Aswan
Beni Suef
Ismailia
Kafr el-Sheikh
Monufia
Qena
Sohag
FJP - the biggest party; Al- Nour - the biggest party;
Egyptian Bloc - stronghold; Al-Wafd: - stronghold
7
Policy Department DG External Policies
Main political challenges ahead
Muslim Brotherhood seeks coalition partner(s)
The FJP is only 20 seats short of an absolute majority in the lower house; it would need 255 seats of the
total 508, while it now holds 235 In the new parliament, the party occupies the most powerful
parliamentary committees, including the foreign affairs and budget committees3 . To form the
government, the FJP will have to create a coalition with other political groups. The first contender may
be the al-Wafd party, with which the FJP signed a political agreement outlining basic constitutional
principles in September 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) might also attempt to form a coalition
with the Salafists' al-Nour party, whose striking performance is a source of concern for many observers.
However, but the FJP leadership has consistently refused to enter into a formal alliance with al-Nour.
The MB's slogan 'participation not domination' — which refers to the organisation’s desire to play a
decisive role in the political process, without making key decisions on its own — will certainly be used in
its parliamentary activity. The party will probably apply a 'consensus model', at least in the short term;
rather that assume complete authority and responsibility, it would prefer to improve education and
effect a long-term change of culture towards it own its religious and social model. The MB must, in any
case, respond to the expectations of its lower- and middle-class electorate, in cities, suburbs and the
countryside. It will also have to refute the claim of its rival, al-Nour, to be the purest representation of
the Islamist agenda in Egypt.
Uncertain constitutional path
The future of Egypt is still uncertain, and much depends on the future relation between the FJP and the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the group of senior military officials that has effectively
ruled Egypt since Mubarak stepped down 4 . On 23 January the People's Assembly convened for the first
time and elected, during a chaotic first session, its speaker, Said al-Katatni, a prominent FJP leader. The
exact powers of the newly elected Assembly are not clear. In conjunction with the Shura Council, the
Assembly will appoint the 100 members of the Constitutional Assembly, which will draft the new
Constitution. The timetable is not yet defined. The SCAF wishes to hold presidential elections only after
the new constitution has been prepared (by the end of June 2012). The FJP, on the other hand, has
suggested drafting the new constitution in parallel with the presidential elections, in order to accelerate
the handover of military power in the spirit of the 25 January revolution. Realistically, a three-month
period for drafting and approving the new constitution appears too short given the delicate state of
Egypt today. A compromise between the SCAF and the FJP is expected on this topic.
Incomplete revolutionary process
During the recent and somewhat confused period in Egyptian history, protest and politics have
overlapped. The delayed transition from military to civilian rule has been the main source of confusion
and anger among those generations and social strata that took to the streets in January 2011. These
people now sense their revolution has been betrayed by the SCAF. The SCAF has responded by
announcing that the state of emergency will be lifted, except in those cases necessary to protect the
country against ‘thuggery’. That said, the 'Tahrir Square principles' cannot yet be said to have
triumphed. The democratically elected parliament will now have to take up the banner of reform.
3
In a forward-looking spirit, al-Nour has opted for the chairmanship of the education committee.
4
With reference to the Constitutional principles, the Muslim Brotherhood advocates a mixed or semi-presidential system,
supporting a civil and democratic Constitution with Islamic reference that allows popular sovereignty through the existing
institutions.
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Policy Briefing: The Dawn of Parliamentary Democracy in Egypt
According to many international human rights organisations (including Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International), there has been no improvement in human rights in Egypt during the last
year of unrest. Under Emergency Law, the military referred more than 12 000 civilians to military courts
and used excessive force to break up demonstrations in July, November and December 2011. The
majority of human rights activists argue that the country will deteriorate without a comprehensive
police reform. Many violations have been reported in the last year, including torture and excessive use
of force by military and police officers, killing unarmed protesters, violence against religious minorities.
Improvements are also badly needed in the field of labour rights protection.
There have been many calls for an expanded freedom of expression in Egypt since the beginning of
the uprising. Yet when bloggers and journalists have criticised the SCAF and the military, many have
faced prolonged and unjustified detentions.
Military rule has targeted NGOs, in particular those that receive foreign funding. The offices of many
organisations have been raided and they have been prevented from working on the ground. On 29
December 2011, the offices of 10 civil society organizations operating in Egypt were searched, their
officers investigated and banned from leaving the country. Many US-funded NGOs, such as the
International Republican Institute (IRI), Freedom House, the International Center for Journalists, the
National Democratic Institute (NDI), as well as the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation, have been
vilified by the SCAF. The accusations faced by the organisations range from illegal foreign funding to
carrying out 'political training programmes', or even supporting illegal election campaigns by financing
individual or groups in the recent elections. On 6 February 2012, the Egyptian public prosecutor
released the names of 44 persons indicted of illegal funding who will be tried in the upcoming weeks.
The US and Egypt have long disputed the question of NGOs for a long time, but relations have sharply
deteriorated as a result of crackdown on US-funded NGOs 5 .
The situation concerning women's rights appears even worse. Women have been the victims of
increasing physical assaults over the past year. Regarding their political rights the SCAF eliminated the
quota of 64 seats that had been assigned to women in the People's Assembly and has only required the
political parties to nominate at least one female candidate in their lists. This has resulted in a dramatic
fall in women among the elected Parliament — from 64 seats to only 8. Discrimination against women
in Egypt has long been a problem, and the victory of the Islamists parties in the elections raises serious
concerns about for their future situation.
The Islamist victory has also created worries for the fate of the Coptic minority in Egypt. Numbering
around 5-7 million people, Egypt's native Christian minority have been the victims of several attacks in
the past months. The EU institutions have repeatedly expressed their deep concern about their
situation.
Finally, the excellent electoral performance of the Salafists has eroded the Muslim Brothers'
constituencies in some areas of the country. In all but one governorates, the Salafists came at least
second 6 . The Salafists' have no experience of party politics or parliamentary activity, as they only
recently accepted participating in political institutions. Some time will need to elapse before their
parliamentary behaviour can be evaluated. They are likely to act both to preserve their own support
5
Whereas Egypt maintains that foreign NGOs operating in the country and receiving foreign funding should register with
the Ministry of Social Solidarity., US legislation in force since 2004 establishes that no US assistance should be subject to
prior approval by the partner country's government. Egypt currently receives 1.3 million USD in aid. In its appropriation bill
adopted last year, the Congress linked the disbursement of this assistance to an obligation of the Egyptian administration to
guarantee that Egypt is holding free elections and that it protects freedom of expression and association.
6
They were banned from running in the Red Sea Governorate due to a legal infringement in the registration of candidates
9
Policy Department DG External Policies
base, which is rooted in the lower strata of population, and to challenge the Muslim Brothers on the
issue of 'true Islamic policy-making'.
Socio economic challenges
Egypt is one of the most developed countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and
the main economic partner for the EU in the region. It is also the most populous Arab country and the
third-most populous on the African continent. Its demographic evolution has been impressive, and its
population is expected to double by 2040-50. In 2010 the EU’s exports to Egypt stood at EUR 15 billion,
and imports from Egypt at EUR 7 billion. The agricultural sector represents 10% of GDP and employs
32 % of the labour force. The industrial sector represents 29 % of GDP and employs 17 % of the labour
force. The main industrial sectors are steel, electricity, oil extraction and refining, chemicals, domestic
goods and automobiles. The service sector is the largest contributor to the Egyptian economy,
representing 61 % of GDP and employs around 50 % of the workforce. Prior to the uprising, the service
sector was rapidly developing. Today, as a result of a precipitous drop in tourism– -- faces a dramatic
crisis.
The unfinished revolution has virtually paralysed the Egyptian economy. According to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), GDP growth in 2011 was 1.2 %, down from 5.1 % in 2010. The IMF predicts a
growth of 1.8 % in 2012. If the prevailing political uncertainty can be laid to rest, we can expect much
better growth rates (7-8 %) in the upcoming years. Several sectors have been strongly affected by the
current crisis, with tourist visits down 24 %, with only 2.7 million visitors to the country in 2011,
compared to 3.6 million the year before. Total tourist income recorded a 40 % drop last year. The
manufacturing sector contracted by 3.3 %, and the construction sector by 2 %. During the crisis,
investor confidence fell dramatically, and private investment was down by 20 %. In June 2011, unhappy
with the terms the SCAF blocked the IMF loan, and the government continued its policy of borrowing
"locally", mainly in the Gulf States in order to compensate for the budget deficit and boost economic
growth. However, this policy also resulted in a rise in inflation to 9 % in November 2011, and the
Egyptian Central Bank raised its interest rate for the first time since 2008.
In January 2012, with the economic crisis ongoing, the government decided to negotiate another IFM
loan. The loan could lessen the government's reliance on domestic borrowings, in which case local
banks would finance internal economic growth rather than the deficit. The loan might also help
convince foreign investors to return to the Egyptian capital market. Given the importance of confidence
for the markets, Egypt’s economic improvement will depend on the outcome of the current political
transition. What the country now urgently needs is liquidity.
The Muslim Brotherhood has listed a series of economic priorities in its political programme, including
connecting households to the natural gas network; obtaining a fair price for land sold by the
government (land was previously given to businessmen and investors for free) ; reviewing oil and gas
export deals (particularly those with Israel); imposing a 10 % tax on the communication sector; revising
subsidies in order to favour those who are most in need; and introducing a tax on capital gains.
10
Policy Briefing: The Dawn of Parliamentary Democracy in Egypt
INTERNAL CHALLENGES

handover power to civilian authorities through the formation of a coalition government based on
a parliamentary majority

safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms

clarify the constitutional process, timeline and principles

organise a referendum on constitution and presidential elections

improve the economic situation, solve the liquidity crisis and implement needed social measures
(e.g., a minimum salary and job creation programmes),
2.
REGIONAL CONTEXT
More active Arab League
Appointed in summer of 2011, the Egyptian Secretary General of the League of Arab States, Nabil elAraby, , has worked to expand the organisation's international role despite its obsolete decision-making
processes and lack of institutional stature. As reported by many observers on the ground, the
atmosphere around the Arab League's premises in Cairo has changed, and the organisation has begun
to work again after years of disarray and inactivity. Al-Araby's activism was decisive during the Libyan
crisis, when the League asked the United Nations to impose a no-fly zone over the territory in order to
protect civilians. Later, the League suspended Syria's membership and imposed economic sanctions
before finally presenting its peace initiative to the United Nations. Much of this activism could be
interpreted as reflecting Egypt's desire to regain stature in the regional arena. For the time being, the
League's ability to act depends on the willingness of its member states, and first and foremost those
also seeking regional authority, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Strained Egyptian-Israeli relations
The recent victory of Islamist parties in the Egyptian elections has raised concern about the future of
Egyptian-Israeli relations and the solidity of the 1978 Camp David Treaty. In recent years, the situation in
the Sinai Peninsula has deteriorated as a result of the lack of development; the growth of an alternative
economy, led by the Bedouin community and based on long-established smuggling routes; and an
extensive radicalisation resulting from the conversion of many Sufi Bedouins to radical Sunni Islam.
Since Hamas took over of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the Sinai has become the refuge for the Islamist
movement, and the 'tunnel economy' is estimated to be worth USD 300 million annually. Tension on
the Israeli-Egyptian border is extremely high. During the electoral campaign, the Muslim Brotherhood
stated that they would recognize the Camp David treaty, but downgrade diplomatic relations. The FJP
has since reaffirmed this commitment, although the movement generally has no clear international
strategy. Any future Egyptian government resulting from the democratically elected parliament will
have to consider Egyptian public opinion on the matter.
11
Policy Department DG External Policies
The Nile Basin Initiative
The African dimension of the Egyptian foreign policy merits being closely followed. Instability in Egypt's
immediate southern neighbourhood has repercussions all the way to Cairo. In order to manage and
sustainably develop the vital shared water resources of the Nile Basin, Egypt has made efforts to
resolve its dispute with Ethiopia through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). A dispute over the renegotiation
of national rights to the waters of the Nile between Egypt and Ethiopia, where 85 % of the river’s water
originates, has been exacerbated by plans to construct a massive hydroelectric project in Ethiopia,
known as the Millennium Dam. Under Mubarak, Egypt has strongly opposed this project, causing the
two countries' relations to freeze. (Current conventions give the country veto power over all upstream
projects.) Last year, however, relations thawed somewhat, and in September 2011, the Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi visited Egypt. The countries have demonstrated their desire to renew relations
and have agreed to form a technical team in order to study the dam's effects on countries downstream.
3.
RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION
The EU is Egypt's first commercial partner. For the EU, Egypt is a key player in the framework of the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean. Since the Egyptian
uprising, the EU has carefully observed the transitional process and has begun to reorient its
contribution and activity in the country. High Representative and Vice President (HR/VP) Catherine
Ashton recently acknowledged the first session of People's Assembly as a first step towards democracy
and stressed the importance of transferring power to civilian rule as quickly as possible. 7 As the
situation on the ground remains uncertain, the HR/VP expressed deep concerns about the ongoing
crackdown on civil society and urged the Egyptian authorities to allow civil society organizations to play
their role in building a sustainable democracy 8 . Alarmed by the events at the football stadium in Port
Said on 1 February — in which at least 79 people were killed — HR/VP Ashton called for an
independent probe to find out why and how knife-wielding fans overwhelmed stadium security
following a football match 9 .
The EU-Egypt Association Agreement, which entered into force in 2004, forms the legal basis governing
relations between Egypt and the EU. Cooperation between the EU and Egypt is based on the Action
Plan adopted in 2007 in order to promote political, economic and social development. The country
strategy paper fixes the framework for the Commission's priorities in terms of financial cooperation with
Egypt. According to this document, two Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (MIPs), for 2007-2010 and
2011-2013, address a set of priorities: human rights and political reform, economic reform and
sustainable social development.
Main focuses
Reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights and
justice
7
2007-2010
2011-2013
€ million
€ million
40
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127477.pdf
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127777.pdf
9
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127786.pdf
8
12
50
Policy Briefing: The Dawn of Parliamentary Democracy in Egypt
Competitiveness and productivity of the economy
220
199
Sustainability of social development and better
management of human and natural resources
298
200
558
449
Total
The total budget allocated for the period 2011-2013 is EUR 449 million, but the evolving situation has
led to slight reorientation and restructuring of the programmes via frontloading and regrouping
existing funds to support civil society organisations, democratic dialogue and women's empowerment.
The amount of additional funding for Egypt remains moderate, some EUR 5 million, as the EU has
hesitated to make new commitments until the current situation is somewhat settled and democratically
elected institutions take office.
Programme/Action
Contents
Amount
Agricultural SMEs (fall 2011)
Improve access to finance for
farmers, increase productivity,
improving
farmers
living
conditions
€22 million
Civil society package (2011)
Strengthen
civil
society
organizations,
support
for
democracy
€20 million
On December 2011 the Council gave the Commission the mandate to open bilateral negotiations with
Egypt, alongside Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Agreement (DCFTA). However, the Egyptian authorities have not wished to engage in formal
negotiations because they cannot engage in any international commitment until the transitional phase
has been completed. Relating to the Mobility Partnership, referred to in the reformed neighbourhood
policy, preparatory talks started in Cairo on June 2011, but again the Egyptian authorities have stated
they cannot commit to any agreement before the elected officeholders take responsibility for the
question.
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES

The League of Arab States: a future partner to tackle regional issues

Egypt's role in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The Nile

EU: reallocation of assistance to match the new realities, effective use of other instruments to
deepen relations with its key partner in the Arab World
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
13
Policy Department DG External Policies
4.
SOURCES
PRIMARY SOURCES - OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127477.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127777.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127786.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/countrycooperation/egypt/egypt_en.htm
REPORTS

Human Rights Watch (2012), http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-egypt

Economist Intelligence Unit (2012), Egypt, available at
http://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=188752803&mode=pdf

Oxford Analytica (2012), Egypt country profile, available at
http://www.oxan.com/analysis/c/default.aspx?q=Egypt

Institute for Security Studies (2011), Egyptian democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood, available
at http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/egyptian-democracy-and-the-muslimbrotherhood/

Brown N. (2012), When Victory Becomes an Option, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
available at http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/brotherhood_success.pdf
WEB ARTICLES

http://www.ikhwanweb.com/

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/middle_east/

http://www.jadaliyya.com/

http://www.arabist.net

http://english.ahram.org.eg/

http://www.nytimes.com/pages/world/middleeast/index.html

http://www.sandmonkey.org/

http://www.thedailybeast.com
STATISTICS

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113375.pdf
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