DOI 10.1515/cj-2015-0009 Contemporary Japan 2015; 27(2): 149–168
Open Access
Juha Saunavaara
Multilevel relations in Japanese political
parties at the beginning of the post-war
period: Hokkaido as a case study
Abstract: The recent political turmoil challenges one to study the function and
form of the post-war Japanese political parties. The obvious differences in the
spatial and temporal contexts do not change the fact that many of the organizational behavioral patterns that are topical in the analysis of the current situation can be found in the parties that were established during the erratic years
following Japan’s defeat. With a focus on intra-party relations and on the multilayered institutional environment in which the political parties operate, this
article focuses on Hokkaido, a region which analysts of Japanese political parties
have often ignored. While demonstrating (a) the interconnectedness of different
spheres in the political system, (b) the varying roles of central party organs in the
development of local party branches, and (c) the personal relations prevailing
over the official organizational channels, the analysis of the control and granting
of autonomy pays special attention to the first gubernatorial elections in Hokkaido. This is because the electoral competitions and the creation of electoral
products are recognized as moments when the relations between local branches
and central leadership are defined.
Keywords: multilevel relations, party organization, Hokkaido, elections
Juha Saunavaara, University of Oulu, e-mail: [email protected]
1 Introduction
Studies concentrating on intra-party organizational dynamics within Japanese
political parties are topical. This is due to the observable change in the realm
of politics – especially the rise of the so-called “third force” parties around the
2012 House of Representatives election – and because of the recent theoretical
discussion concerning the functioning of political parties. The Osaka Restoration
Association (Osaka Ishin no Kai) and its metamorphosis into the Japan Restoration
© 2015 Juha Saunavaara, licensee De Gruyter Open.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
150 Juha Saunavaara
Party (JRP, Nihon Ishin no Kai) at least temporarily served as an alternative model
of party organization, that is, a regional party successfully expanding into
national politics. Meanwhile, contemporary critics have proposed that the ways
in which political parties operate and the environment in which they operate
have not been understood properly.
The increased volatility within the current party system motivates one to
ask how much we know about the past of Japanese political parties vis-à-vis the
relations between party headquarters and local party branches. Even a cursory
literature review reveals a comprehensive array of studies which explain (a) the
factional nature of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP, Jiyū Minshutō), (b)
the role of personal support groups (kōenkai) which have substituted for strong
local party organizations, and (c) the “keiretsu relations” between Diet members
and local politicians (Uekami 2008; Krauss and Pekkanen 2011; Tsuruya 2012;
Winkler 2012). However, our knowledge concerning the political parties that
existed before a long-lasting status quo was achieved in 1955 through the mergers
of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, Nihon Shakaitō) and the LDP is slim.
Starting with these premises, this study has two interconnected objectives. It
strives for a new understanding of post-war intra-party organizational dynamics
and introduces the development of the pre-1955 parties through the case study of
the peripheral region of Hokkaido, a region which analysts of Japanese political
parties have often ignored. The models of delegation and franchise are utilized as
analytical tools for characterizing and categorizing different parties vis-à-vis the
level of autonomy and control. The former refers to a top-down model where the
national party leadership is principal and local units are nominally “delegated”
the discretion to act at the local level. The latter does not assume that ultimate
power lies in any branch of the party organization, but that different parts of the
organization join together on an equal footing for mutual benefit (Hijino 2014).
The focus on Hokkaido is based on the following rationale: The amount and
type of authority delegated to the regional branches can be expected to vary
with the need for regionally specific information, expertise, or credibility. This
need is likely to be highest in regions that are distinct from the rest of the state.
For example, the distinctive regions of Catalonia, the Basque Country, Corsica,
Scotland, and Northern Italy are also regarded as the most interesting case
studies for this phenomenon (Van Houten 2009: 141). The claim on Hokkaido’s
unconventionality as a location for party political competition is based on the
JSP’s exceptionally good results in the Diet and gubernatorial elections, which
were followed by the success of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, Nihon
Minshutō). In other words, Hokkaido went against the belief that anti-LDP voting
is particularly prominent in urban areas and that the governing party is stronger
in rural areas, which are more dependent on central governmental support
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 151
(Scheiner 2006: 116–117). Furthermore, while the combined percentage of votes
secured by the LDP and the JSP since the 1958 House of Representatives election
has been even greater in Hokkaido than the nationwide average (Hasuike 1997:
83–84), the political parties that were built around the farmers’ movement and the
strong cooperative tradition in Hokkaido successfully challenged the mainstream
parties during the first post-war decade.
2 Intra-party relationships and the multilayered
institutional environment
Theoretical literature alleges that the traditional models of political parties fail
to recognize the nature of the relationship between various organizational units
within the parties. It has also been argued that the language used to describe
and analyze the behavior of political parties often fails to recognize that (a)
political parties function in a multilayered institutional environment, and (b) the
environment affects the way in which they are organized and behave (Deschouwer
2003: 213–214; Carty 2004: 6–7; Deschouwer 2006: 292). In other words, the degree
of autonomy that units within the parties have may vary, and differences in the
relationship between the party’s central organization and its local franchises are
possible. In addition, different spheres in a multidimensional political system
are connected and things happening at one level or in one region can affect the
political life of the others (Deschouwer 2003: 222).
There are several possible benefits for a party in allowing some form of
autonomy in a local party branch. The regional branch may be more effective
in mobilizing voters and conveying the party’s message, and it may have more
credibility with the electorate in the region. Yet when a party gives freedoms to
its local branches in order to gain the benefits of specialization, it also opens
the door to an increase in uncontrolled actions that may hurt the party as a
whole. Therefore, the party leadership conducts a continuous balancing act
between control of the branches and the delegation of authority and autonomy
for the sake of benefits obtained. Electoral competitions and the creation of
electoral products (i.e., candidates and policy) in particular are moments when
the relations between local branches and central leadership are defined and
re-defined (Carty 2004: 11–13; Van Houten 2009: 141–143). This article analyses
these crucial moments through the first three popular elections for the Hokkaido
governorship. This approach borrows from the argument of Hijino (2014), which
states that in order to understand the organization of Japanese parties, one has to
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
152 Juha Saunavaara
pay attention to how the national party leadership chooses to control or delegate
tasks related to the election of directly elected governors and mayors.
The variety of methods and mechanisms of control is significant, ranging
from the selection and screening of agents to different types of contracts and
sanctions. This means that – secretly or openly – the central party leadership can
influence the selection of regional leaders and the candidate selection process.
Furthermore, the use of contracts, from formal party rules to informal conventions
as well as the idea of party discipline, is a way to control the local agent. Control
of party finances is another type of contract that is also closely connected to the
party leaders’ ability to punish (or reward) regional branches. Thus, the use of
sanctions is a nuanced process that is not limited to the ability to expel an actor
from the party (Van Houten 2009: 145–147).
3 Hokkaido branches and party headquarters
The following historical narrative describing the relationships between Hokkaido
branches and central party organs is divided into two parts. The first introduces
the evolution of political parties in Hokkaido prior to the 1955 mergers (leading
to the creation of the LDP and JSP) and pays attention to the role of party
leadership in the establishment and development of local chapters. The second
part concentrates on the gubernatorial elections as cases that allow for a more
detailed analysis of control and delegation of autonomy.
3.1 Hokkaido in the periphery and center of party
organizations
3.1.1 Establishment and early development of the local party branches
The months following Japan’s surrender saw the rapid emergence of various
political parties, which filled the vacuum caused by the dissolution of the already
disconnected and weak pre-war political parties in the summer of 1940 and the
demolition of Japan’s wartime political control organizations. The Progressive
Party (Nihon Shinpotō), the Liberal Party (Nihon Jiyūtō), the Socialist Party (Nihon
Shakaitō), and the Communist Party (Nihon Kyōsantō) were the most important
new parties established during the autumn of 1945. Despite their names, the
first two were conservative by nature and consisted of elements derived from the
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 153
pre-war Rikken Seiyūkai [Friends of the Constitutional Government] and Rikken
Minseitō [Constitutional Democratic Party] (Masumi 1985; Tominomori 2006).
There is no evidence that Hokkaido played a major role in the founding of the
Progressive Party, although many of the wartime Hokkaido Diet members joined its
ranks. The party that was by far the largest among the newly established groups
was formed by those Diet members who had been elected in the 1942 election with
the blessing of the wartime cabinet and at the recommendation of the Imperial Rule
Assistance Political Structure Association (Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kyōgikai) (Shillony
1981: 19–22). Therefore, the execution of the 4 January 1946 purge directives was
a devastating shock to the party, which had only three candidates in Hokkaido –
all of whom failed to win election – in the first post-war House of Representatives
election in April 1946. The leadership of its Hokkaido branch was passed to Arima
Eiji, who had been elected as an independent candidate (Okuda 1956: 97, 135; Gikai
Seiji Kenkyūkai 1998: 150). The modest success of the Progressive Party seems to
go hand-in-hand with Babb’s (2002) distinction of different types of conservatism
in the immediate post-war era in Japan, suggesting that the party polled well in
industrial and urbanized areas but yielded to the liberals – focused on defending
the status quo of rural landlords – in rural areas.
Table 1: House of Representatives election results, 1946–1958: Number of seats in Hokkaido
(versus national) / percentage of all seats in Hokkaido (versus national).
1946
Liberal Party
1947
1949
1952
1953
1955
1958
6 (141)/ 7 (131)/
26.1 (30.0) 31.8 (28.1)
Democratic
Liberal Party
11 (264)/
50.0 (56.7)
Liberal Party
1950
9 (240)/
40.9 (51.5)
5 (112)/
22.7 (24.0)
Yoshida Liberals
8 (199)/
36.4 (42.7)
Hatoyama
Liberals
1 (35)/
4.5 (7.5)
Hokkaido Politi- 3 (3)/
cal League
13.0 (0.6)
Progressive
Party
Democratic
Party 1947
0 (94)/
0 (20.2)
3 (124)/
13.6 (26.6)
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
154 Juha Saunavaara
Table 1 (continued)
1946
1947
Democratic
Party 1949
1949
1952
1953
1955
2 (69)/
9.1 (14.8)
Reform Party
4 (85)/
4 (76)/
18.2 (18.2) 18.2 (16.3)
Democratic
Party 1954
8 (185)/
36.4 (39.6)
LDP
Cooperative
Party
1958
11 (287)/
50.0 (61.5)
7 (14)/
30.4 (3.0)
People’s Cooperative P.
1 (31)/
4.5 (6.7)
Farmers’ Party
3 (4)/
13.6 (0.9)
New Farmers’
Party
0 (14)/
0 (3.9)
6 (6)/
27.3 (1.3)
Socialist Party 4 (93)/
8 (143)/ 0 (48)/
17.4 (20.0) 36.4 (30.7) 0 (10.3)
Left-wing Socialists
7 (54)/
6 (72)/
6 (89)/
31.8 (11.6) 27.3 (15.5) 27.3 (19.1)
Right-wing
Socialists
0 (57)/
0 (12.2)
1 (66)/
1 (67)/
4.5 (14.2) 4.5 (14.3)
2 (4)/
9.1 (0.9)
2 (5)/
9.1 (1.1)
Labor-Farmer
Party
1 (7)/
4.5 (1.5)
1 (4)/
4.5 (0.9)
Japan Socialist
Party
Communist
Party
11 (166)/
50.0 (35.5)
1 (5)/
4.3 (1.1)
0 (4)/
0 (0.9)
1 (35)/
4.5 (7.5)
0 (0)/
0 (0)
0 (1)/
0 (0.2)
0 (2)/
0 (0.4)
0 (1)/
0 (0.2)
Other parties / 2 (210)/ 0 (29)/
Independents 8.7 (45.1) 0 (6.2)
1 (23)/
4.5 (4.9)
0 (26)/
0 (5.6)
0 (12)/
0 (2.6)
1 (8)/
4.5 (1.7)
0 (13)/
0 (2.8)
Note: Number of Hokkaido representatives: 1946 (23), 1947 onward (22). Total number of representatives: 1946 (464), 1947–1953 (466), 1955 onward (467). Sources: http://go2senkyo.com/;
Ishikawa and Yamaguchi (2010).
The early development of the Liberal Party was connected to Hokkaido through
Hiratsuka Tsunejirō. Hiratsuka was a businessman and a behind-the-scenes
political influencer who had helped establish the Liberal Party. At the same
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 155
time, Kōno Ichirō, a young politician close to party president Hatoyama Ichirō
– and also the vice-president of Hiratsuka’s company – was elected as the first
secretary-general of the party. The Hokkaido branch of the Liberal Party was
established in December 1945 under Hiratsuka’s leadership. Meanwhile, the
party’s Kanagawa and Iwate branches, for example, were built around other
confidants of Hatoyama. After being elected in the April 1946 election, the firstterm Diet member Hiratsuka joined the first Yoshida Shigeru Cabinet and became
the first minister from Hokkaido with the backing of Kōno and Hatoyama, who
were both purged by the General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) after the election (Hiratsuka Kiju Kinen 1957: 40; Kōno
1965: 197–198, 213; Masuda 1998: 164; Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai 1998: 141; Masuda
2001: 105). While Hatoyama’s unsuccessful attempt to recruit an influential
local figure to run as a candidate in Muroran at the beginning of the occupation
indicates the party headquarters’ interest in Hokkaido (Sano 2009: 89–91), no
evidence has been found that the recommendation letters and money provided
by Tsuji Karoku – an important behind-the-scenes supporter of Hatoyama and
Kōno – affected the nomination of candidates in Hokkaido, as it did in Tottori, for
example (Nagayama 1991: 54–55).
The post-defeat political confusion manifested itself in the establishment
of numerous small parties and in the great number of independent candidates
who ran in the first post-war election. In Hokkaido, the Hokkaido Political
League (Hokkaidō Seiji Dōmei) was a local conservative group established at the
beginning of January 1946, a league which, alongside holding half of the Hokkaido
Assembly seats, got three of its candidates elected in the April 1946 election. The
central figure and sponsor of the party was Chizaki Usaburō, who together with
the other two successful candidates joined the ranks of the Progressive Party
soon after their election to the Diet. The defections at the national level also led
to the disintegration of the Political League at the regional level. A year later,
Chizaki acted as one of the architects behind the establishment of the Democratic
Party (Nihon Minshutō) as an amalgamation of the Progressive Party, the Ashida
Hitoshi group from the Liberal Party, and members of smaller parties. While
Chizaki served as the secretary general of the party before being purged in April
1947, Shiikuma Saburō, another old Seiji Dōmei Diet member, took the lead in the
party’s Hokkaido branch (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 49–50; Chizaki Usaburō
Kinen 1984: 215, 228; Asahi Shinbun Seitō Kishadan 1998: 165).
It can thus be concluded that immediately after their establishment, the ties
between the Hokkaido branches of the conservative parties and the central party
leadership were relatively weak and based on personal relations rather than on
formalized organizational channels. At the same time, the lack of local actors
was a typical feature of both major conservative parties. The composition of the
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
156 Juha Saunavaara
Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly remained unchanged after the 1940 election, and
only five of the incumbent 56 assembly members were affiliated with the Liberal
Party in the spring of 1946. The Progressives had only one seat in the Assembly.
The first Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly election in April 1947 demonstrated
only a slight increase in the popularity of candidates affiliated with these parties
(Okuda 1956: 49, 118, 205).
The weakness of the local party chapters was not limited to Hokkaido. On
the contrary, when the occupation authorities evaluated the Liberal and the
Progressive Parties in the summer and autumn of 1946, they acknowledged the
centralized party organization, local branches’ lack of freedoms and influence,
and the all-powerful position of party leaders (Saunavaara 2010: 233–240). It is,
however, important to emphasize that the lack of official party membership did
not automatically rule out the possible cooperation between a member of the
Hokkaido Assembly and some national political party or its representative in the
Diet. In other words, it is not only party affiliation but also unofficial personal
relations that connect local- and national-level politicians with each other
(Scheiner 2006: 127–130; Uekami 2008: 58–61, 69).
Although the pre-war Hokkaido electorate had voted for the mainstream
conservative parties (Shimizu et al. 1996: 92–96), the rapid start of the left-wing
parties in Hokkaido was due to the existence of proletarian movement activists
whose personal networks reached beyond the borders of the island. The first
preparatory meeting to organize the Socialist Party’s Hokkaido chapter was
opened in Sapporo on 8 October 1946, and the formation was finalized on 5
December 1946. A month earlier, the Hokkaido socialists had sent a delegation
to the party’s inauguration meeting (Okuda 1956: 99–100; Takahashi 1982:
41–47; Hasuike 1997: 85). The formation process in Hokkaido resembled the
simultaneous development in Hyōgo Prefecture, where many pre-war proletarian
parties and movements had been popular, although the connection between
Hyogo-based actors and the Socialist Party headquarters seems to have been
stronger than it had been in Hokkaido (Fukunaga 1982a, 1982b). In the case of the
Communist Party, the central party organization supported the local actors and
the party leaders were present when the post-war party organization in Hokkaido
was launched in December 1945. The early efforts of the Hokkaido communists
culminated in the April 1946 election, in which they secured a seat in the Diet.
While the party’s activities also gained visibility later, the electoral success of
the communists remained modest in general (Okuda 1956: 99–100, 107–109;
Takahashi 1982: 41).
The early post-war years turned out to be a period of organizational flux
for agricultural and cooperative organizations incorporating a strong tradition
of supervision by agricultural administration and of association with the
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 157
conservative parties. Nevertheless, their pre-war political power in Hokkaido
did not disappear, and political parties were soon established to represent the
cooperative movement and agricultural interests.1 Many of the leaders of the
new parties had their background in those pre-war organizations that had been
utilized to direct rural votes and which could even be considered substitutes for
local party organizations (Mulgan 2000: 39–43; Babb 2005: 177–179, 186–187).
The Japan Cooperative Party (Nihon Kyōdōtō) was a nationwide party,
but many of its founding fathers came from Hokkaido. It was established on
18 December 1945, with the aim of bringing together groups unified by the
cooperative principle and practices. The spokesmen of the party insisted that
the idea of founding a new party did not originate from members of the Diet,
but rather the organization came about because of an appeal from the local
prefectural level committees, one of which was naturally active in Hokkaido.2
Soon after its establishment, the party lost almost all of its leaders in the purge
and remained far behind the liberals, progressives, and socialists in the national
results of the April 1946 election (Saunavaara 2010: 163, 204). Nevertheless, the
Cooperative Party was the most popular party in Hokkaido.
The party’s standing in Hokkaido soon changed as it amalgamated with
smaller groups, and new influential characters with nationwide recognition were
persuaded to join the Cooperative Democratic Party (Kyōdō Minshutō), formed
in May 1946 (Fukunaga 1997: 81–82). When the new party began to diverge from
the cooperative theory and tried to broaden its support base to urban areas, it
ran into internal problems. Because of party infighting, Kita Katsutarō, a member
of the Lower House elected from Hokkaido and a founding father of the party’s
Hokkaido branch, was expelled from the party together with his brother. Soon
after, the Kita brothers formed the second Japan Cooperative Party (Nihon
Kyōdōtō) in cooperation with the third Hokkaido-based Diet member (Okuda
1956: 100–101; Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 49; Mulgan 2000: 177).
The process described above seems to reflect the juxtaposition within
the party between Hokkaido and the rest of Japan. However, if the history of
the Hokkaido Farmers’ League (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei), the important votegathering organization behind the various Hokkaido-based Farmers’ Parties, is to
be believed, the Farmers’ Party movement carried another type of juxtaposition
1 P. K. Roest, GHQ/SCAP, GS, Memorandum for the Chief, GS, 24 September 1946. National
Diet Library (NDL), Tokyo, CIE(C)01163.
2 Nippon Times, 22 December 1945. United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland
(NARA), RG 84, Entry 2828, Box 11, Folder 16; Memorandum of Conversation, 28 December
1945. NARA, RG 84, Entry 2828, Box 11, Folder 16.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
158 Juha Saunavaara
within it from the very beginning: The party, born as an outcome of political
struggle in Tokyo, managed to win the support of the Sorachi and Tokachi
Agricultural Associations, which had already advanced with their own party
plans in Asahikawa. The party reorganized itself as the Japan Farmers’ Party
(Nihon Nōmintō), and politicians with experience of national politics subjugated
a locally born political movement with a totally different, more socialist character
in line with their own preferences (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 44–49, 53). This
narrative has to be understood in the context of a time when the Farmers’ League
supported socialists, but it may explain the later close relations between the
Nōmin Dōmei and the Socialist Party.
3.1.2 Tumultuous transition toward the 1955 regime
As Table 1 shows, the conservative regional branches in Hokkaido adapted to
changes occurring at the national level after the immediate formation period.
The liberals’ Hokkaido branch suffered in the purge of Hiratsuka in the spring
of 1947, but enjoyed a great victory in the January 1949 House of Representatives
election under the banner of the Democratic Liberal Party (Minshu Jiyūtō), which
was born in the center as an amalgamation of liberals and a group disengaging
itself from the Democratic Party. The progressive votes were mainly channeled
into the Socialist Party. But while the Socialist Party won the greatest number of
seats among all political groups in the April 1947 Hokkaido Assembly election
(Hokkaidō Gikai 1977: 202) and the House of Representatives election, it crashed
in the 1949 election. The party lost a majority of its nationwide seats in the election
that followed the middle-of-the-road cabinets of Katayama and Ashida Hitoshi,
and could not hold on to any of its incumbent seats in Hokkaido. However, the
socialists – the left-wing of the disintegrated party in particular – recovered
rapidly at the beginning of the new decade.
While the Japan Farmers’ Party polled well in Hokkaido despite the purge of
many of its leaders, the Cooperative Democratic Party, which had amalgamated
with the People’s Party (Kokumintō), lost ground in the northernmost prefecture.
However, the local assembly groups of the new People’s Cooperative Party
(Kokumin Kyōdōtō) and the Farmers’ Party merged in April 1948 (Hokkaidō Gikai
1977: 202, 268), leading to the establishment of the New Farmers’ Party (Nōmin
Shintō) in December 1948 through a partial merger of the same parties. Although
the new party, which had been established with the aim of achieving nationwide
success, performed well in Hokkaido in the 1949 Lower House election, it failed
to win any seats in the rest of Japan. And even though two Diet members from
Fukuoka joined the party after the election, it did not solve the basic dilemma,
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 159
which became obvious in December 1949 when the Farmers’ Cooperative Party
(Nōmin Kyōdōtō) replaced the New Farmers’ Party (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957:
105–113; Hasuike 1997: 86; Mulgan 2000: 177–179).
The re-naming process was connected to the struggle for a larger support
base and revealed differences inside the party. Although the more conservative
Diet members’ faction was eager to remove characters referring to farmers from
the name of the party in order to attract nationwide interest from different social
classes, the Hokkaido Farmers’ League pressured them into accepting a name that
would not sever the links between the party and its rural supporters in Hokkaido.
The re-named party secured the greatest number of Hokkaido seats among all
political groups in the 1950 Upper House election, but was unable to win seats
elsewhere (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 139–140, 152; Mulgan 2000: 179–181).
During the political turmoil of the first half of the 1950s, the voting behavior
and structural realignment of the Hokkaido conservatives continued to reflect
national trends. When the Liberal Party split into the Yoshida and Hatoyama
factions, the Yoshida faction won all but one of the party’s seats despite the
early connection between Hokkaido liberals and politicians close to Hatoyama.
However, in 1955, conservative voters voted mainly for the Democratic Party
(Nihon Minshutō) (Ito 1992: 104–105; Tsutsui 1992: 119–121, 127, 130). Meanwhile,
the Hokkaido branch of the Socialist Party attempted to distance itself from the
serious internal friction at the national level and eventually was the last part of
the party to split. In the spring of 1950, the party was divided for 75 days, but
reunified following calls for unity from the local branches and supporting labor
organizations. However, after the party’s second rupture from October 1951 on,
which penetrated down to the local branches and labor union movement, leading
Hokkaido socialists were among the first to build bridges between the competing
left- and right-wing socialists at the national level (Okuda 1956: 269; Fukunaga
1982b; Takahashi 1983: 135–139).
The final collapse of the Farmers’ Cooperative Party in 1952 was preceded
by challenges in both the local and central political sphere. Whereas a link
between the disintegration of the party and changes in the political center – that
is, the establishment of the Reform Party (Kaishintō) – existed, it was mainly
connected with disorder among the ranks of the Nōmin Dōmei prior to the 1951
Hokkaido governor’s election. Thereafter, the former Diet members of the party
who had switched to the Reform Party performed poorly in the 1952 House of
Representatives election, and the remaining members of the Hokkaido Assembly
changed the name of their group under the auspices of the Nōmin Dōmei. The
majority of the former supporters of the various Farmers’ Parties found their way
into the ranks of the Socialist Party (Okuda 1956: 291–294, 303–305; Hokkaidō
Nōmin Dōmei 1957: 157–159).
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
160 Juha Saunavaara
The turbulence in the political party field was settled at the end of 1955 when
the establishment of the LDP succeeded the unification of the right- and left-wing
socialists. The local actors reacted rapidly to the change in the center and the JSP
Hokkaido branch was among the first local units to amalgamate. The formation
of the LDP Hokkaido chapter had already been preceded by the unification of
conservative groups in the Hokkaido Assembly in August 1955. The leadership
was in the hands of local political actors, but the branch was still dependent
on funding provided by the Diet members (Fujino and Asada 1982: 88–91). The
two catch-all parties split the Diet seats of Hokkaido into almost equal shares,
leaving very little or nothing for other parties in the following elections. The
exceptionally good election results of the Socialist Party were not, however, a
direct indication of the party’s organizational strength or political leadership. On
the contrary, as Nagai and Okaji (1962: 221) have shown, the number of registered
party members remained low in Hokkaido even after the party re-unified, and
many of the Socialist Party members identified primarily with the labor union
with which they were affiliated. The labor unions initiated policies that were later
accepted by the party branch, which was far from being able to operate with the
money it collected from its local members.
3.2 Intra-party relations and the creation of the electoral
product in gubernatorial elections
The months following the defeat saw a parade of short-term nominated office
holders, but the office of the Hokkaido Governor remained a conservative citadel
until a system of popularly elected governors was introduced (Hokkaidō Gikai
1977: 19–23). The two main conservative candidates for governorship in April 1947
were first-term members of the House of Representatives: Tomabechi Hidetoshi,
supported by the Liberal Party, and Arima Eiji, who was backed by the Democratic
Party. The Cooperative Democratic Party had already elected their official
candidate, but after the party merger the People’s Cooperative Party decided
to back Tomabechi. The Farmers’ Party supported an independent candidate.3
The Socialist Party headquarters accepted Professor Minami Ryōsaburō as the
party’s candidate for governor on 12 March 1947. However, this situation changed
when the leaders of the Hokkaido Government Workers’ Union proposed another
candidate, Tanaka Toshifumi, a young and unknown chairman of the Workers’
3 Co-operative Democratic Party, Official Candidates for Governors (as of 25 February 1947).
NDL, GS(A)00079. Also see Ogawa and Araki (1971: 171) and Takahashi (1982: 108–109).
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 161
Union and the Chief of the Forest and Public Works Section in the Hokkaido
Prefectural Government. Eventually, the leaders of the Socialist Party withdrew
their earlier decision and decided to support Tanaka, who joined the party (Arima
and Ono 1961: 165; Takahashi 1982: 101, 108).
Tanaka won the first round, but his situation in the decisive vote against
Arima was challenging as the conservatives could concentrate support on one
candidate. Despite this, Tanaka won re-election on April 16 with the strong
backing of labor unionists and with the rural votes of the Farmers’ Party. Besides
representing the relative strength of various political parties, the election result
also reflected peculiar political conditions and networks in Hokkaido. As has
been argued by Ogawa and Araki (1971: 171–172) and Takahashi (1982: 110–117),
much needed funds for the socialist candidate were received from the supporter of
Chizaki Usaburō. Interestingly, Arima also argues that Chizaki and Shiikuma, two
Diet members from his own party, at first refused the liberals proposal concerning
the conservatives’ unified support for Tomabechi but then did not lend him their
support during the election (Arima and Ono 1961: 164–167).
The outcome of the Hokkaido election was exceptional. The Socialist Party
won the race for the governorship in only four prefectures nationwide. It seems,
however, that Tanaka’s success was not based on the strength of the party itself
or its strong commitment to strive for electoral success in Hokkaido. Instead,
the party headquarters’ support for the establishment of the Hokkaido branch,
and its aid for the Hokkaido-based candidates in the Diet election, was at best
moderate (Takahashi 1982: 121, 1983: 77). The surprising result was a testament to
the ability to adapt to prevailing conditions. While the locally strong labor unions
and the Farmers’ Party secured Tanaka’s victory, the support of the People’s
Cooperative Party, which had reasonable representation in the Diet, did not help
the conservatives. The confusion inside the party’s Hokkaido branch peaked in
the second round of the election when it withdrew support from the conservatives
and decided not to recommend either candidate (Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei 1957:
52).
While in 1947 the conservative parties’ nomination of candidates, failed
attempts at cooperation, and campaigns, were planned and executed by the
Hokkaido branch offices and local politicians, the April 1951 election clearly
demonstrates a change in the approach of party headquarters. Besides having
learned a lesson concerning the importance of rural voters, the nomination
process and campaigning showed a new readiness by party headquarters to play
a role in and even to dominate their local chapters. The 1951 elections turned
out to be a case in point when the party headquarters parachuted a candidate
into the locality. What made this process unusual was the fact that the leaders
of the Liberal Party parachuted in a non-party affiliated candidate, while the
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
162 Juha Saunavaara
local branch wanted to vote for a party candidate. More recent examples point in
the opposite direction – that is, local actors’ occasional inclination to go against
the candidate imposed by the central leadership and vote for the candidate of
another party (Hijino 2014).
The political scene in Hokkaido changed drastically after the depurge of midOctober 1950, as many of the most notable political figures could now re-enter
the political world. Before the depurge issue became topical, the Liberal Party
was campaigning on behalf of Okada Kaneyoshi, the former governor and
assistant director of the Hokkaido Development Agency. Okada visited Hokkaido
twice during the second half of 1950 and continued the Liberals’ earlier attempt
to attract the Hokkaido farming population. Another former governor, Masuda
Kaneshichi, Minister of Construction and the Director of the Development Agency,
promoted Okada by first denying funding from Governor Tanaka’s dam project in
Hokkaido and then approving it as a fund assured through the efforts of Okada.4
The change in the big picture meant, however, that Okada was discarded. The
Liberal Party headquarters in Tokyo did not believe in Okada’s chances against
Tanaka, and Hirokawa Kōzen, the Liberal Party Secretary General and later
Minister of Agriculture, introduced the depurged Kuroasawa Torizō, a pioneer of
the Hokkaido dairy industry and one of the original founders of the Cooperative
Party, to other party leaders. After the decision to back Kurosawa was made, the
Hokkaido chapter was pressured to support Kurosawa, who was also backed
by the Farmers’ Cooperative Party and the People’s Democratic Party (Kokumin
Minshutō), as well as influential individuals like Chizaki.5
In short, Yoshida Shigeru and other party leaders supported a prestigious,
non-party affiliated person from Hokkaido, who spent weeks on a study tour
around Europe in the spring of 1951 and dispatched spokespersons to represent
himself at various speech events around Hokkaido. Meanwhile, the local branch
and the Diet members elected from Hokkaido spoke, unsuccessfully, on behalf of
a candidate whose life and career had only briefly touched Hokkaido, but who was
4 Hokkaido Civil Affairs Region (HCAR), ANNEX A, Political and Government Activities, Ellwood
F. Hanson, Report for February 1950. NDL, CAS(B)00427–CAS(B)00428; translation, Yukan
Hokkai Times, 7 July 1950. NDL, CAS(A)02077; HCAR, ANNEX A, Political and Government
Activities, Orren L. Hays, Report for July 1950. NDL, CAS(B)00426; HCAR, ANNEX A, Political
and Government Activities, Orren L. Hays, Report for September 1950. NDL, CAS(B)00425;
translation, Hokkai Times, 24 January 1951. NDL, CAS(D)01234; translation, Asahi Shinbun, 2
March 1951. NDL, CAS(D)01234.
5 Translation, Hokkai Times, 24 January 1951. NDL, CAS(D)01234; translation, Asahi Shinbun,
2 March 1951. NDL, CAS(D)01234; translation, Asahi Shinbun, 4 March 1951. NDL, CAS(D)01234.
Also see Okuda (1956: 179–180, 285–286).
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 163
clearly a party candidate committed to running for office. When Kurosawa was
abroad, the leaders of the parties that were backing him planned his campaign.
Furthermore, Masuda and Hirokawa came to Hokkaido to support Kurosawa at
the end of the campaign. Masuda openly argued that Tokyo’s political leaders
supported Kurosawa, who could secure the funding for and execution of the
comprehensive development of Hokkaido. Tanaka was described as a candidate
who was longing for the overthrowing of the Yoshida Cabinet and could do nothing
to advance or secure the comprehensive development of Hokkaido (Okuda 1956:
288; Takahashi 1982: 327–332, 336–339, 1983: 36). While this kind of interference
on the part of members of the Cabinet may look exceptional, it is worth noting
that the following decades saw similar kinds of warnings against the selection of
non-LDP governors in other prefectures (Scheiner 2006: 111).
During his first term, Tanaka had created good working relations with
the Hokkaido Assembly members of the Farmers’ Cooperative Party and the
Democratic Party. Kurosawa’s emergence as a candidate meant that Tanaka lost
the assumed backing of the Farmers’ Cooperative Party. However, the Hokkaido
Farmers’ League was split between the candidates. In particular, some of the
youth groups within the League decided to support Tanaka even in regions that
were considered Kurosawa strongholds.6 In addition, two Democratic Party
candidates who were running in the 1951 Hokkaido Assembly elections openly
supported Tanaka’s governorship (Okuda 1956: 266). While this may look like an
odd mismatch, this kind of behavior is not rare in Japanese politics. More recent
observations show that in order to secure policy access and influence after the
local chief executive election, local legislators may choose to support a strong
candidate representing another party rather than fight for the candidate of their
own party and fall into opposition (Hijino 2014). The socialists also managed
to bring the Hokkaido labor unions together in November 1950 when the All
Hokkaido Council of Labour Unions (Zendōrōkyō) was established to support
Tanaka’s campaign and to muster, successfully, the progressive elements of the
Nōmin Dōmei.7
After all this maneuvering, Tanaka Toshifumi won the gubernatorial election
and the Socialist Party secured the greatest number of seats among all parties
in the Hokkaido Assembly. Nevertheless, the interconnectedness of different
6 Translation, Hokkaido Shinbun, 27 January 1951. NDL, CAS(D)02602–02603. See also
Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei (1957: 157–159) and Takahashi (1982: 334–335).
7 Translation, Yomiuri Shinbun, 15 December 1950. NDL, CAS(D)01234; translation, Mainichi
Shinbun, 16 December 1950. NDL, CAS(D)01234; translation, Yomiuri Shinbun, 24 January 1951.
NDL, CAS(D)01234.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
164 Juha Saunavaara
spheres in multidimensional political systems soon became apparent. The
conservatives, who lost in the Hokkaido polls, bounced back with a victory in
Tokyo. Only weeks after the election, the Yoshida Cabinet decided to amend the
Hokkaido Development Law and establish the Hokkaido Development Bureau.
Through this process, various Hokkaido administrations were incorporated under
the direct jurisdiction of the central government (Fujino and Asada 1982: 88–91;
Saunavaara 2014: 149). The left-wing parties and the labor union front opposed
this change, which was actively promoted by the Liberal Party.8 It should be
noted, however, that this was yet another initiative that originated in the Liberal
Party headquarters and was afterwards introduced to the representatives of the
Hokkaido branch (Okuda 1956: 297–298).
Four years later in 1955, the Nōmin Dōmei successfully supported Tanaka’s
re-election against a conservative candidate who, despite the recommendations
of two major conservative parties, could not even secure the united support of the
more conservatively inclined farmers’ organizations. It is noteworthy that, also
in 1955, it was the Tokyo-based party leadership who mobilized the movement
behind the conservative candidate for the Hokkaido governorship at least
partially against the will of local party activists (Takahashi 1983: 222–225, 232).
4 Conclusions
This study strengthens the perception that local party organizations at the
beginning of the post-war period were weak. The socialists and especially the
successive farmers’ parties polled well in Hokkaido, but their success was not
based on strong local party organizations. On the contrary, their victories rested
on the support of interest groups, which eventually secured the post-1955 success
of the JSP. Theoretical literature suggests that it is often difficult to distinguish
between a regional branch that has autonomy because the national party allows
it, and a regional branch that has autonomy because the national party no longer
controls it (Van Houten 2009: 148). The case of Hokkaido supports this conclusion.
The autonomous position of Governor Tanaka (who resigned from the Socialist
Party in 1953 to protest against the party split [see Fujino and Asada 1982: 56–59])
and the position of the Hokkaido socialists (in relation to the party leadership
in Tokyo) could be seen as either a sign of trust in local actors or a conscious
8 Special Investigation Bureau, Attorney-General’s Office, 8 June 1951, from Director
Mitsusada Yoshikawa to Lt. Col. Jack P. Napier, GS, GHQ. NDL, GS(B)04219.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 165
and calculated decision to delegate responsibilities to the representatives of the
distinctive region as a trade-off to benefit from the local expertise. However, these
two examples were more likely a sign of weakness in a party that was suffering
from serious internal friction at the national level.
The lack of organizational strength and stability also restricted the ways in
which the local branches were controlled. The party headquarters were incapable
of employing many of the control mechanisms associated with modern political
parties. The central leadership occasionally intervened in the selection of agents,
but no cases have been found where a punitive or controlling act was carried out
in the name of party rules or other type of formal contract. The control of local
chapters through the distribution of party finances remained rather insignificant.
Payments from the Diet members were important, but the necessary funds
for campaigning were often gathered from external sources outside the party
organization. While the expulsion of the Kita brothers from the Cooperative
Democratic Party may appear to be an example of sanctions against individuals
or branches, it was a matter of fighting in the center, not an act aimed at the local
party chapter.
Hijino (2014), who evaluates the LDP and the DPJ through the models
of “delegation” and “franchise,” concluded that, in the case of the LDP, the
discretion given to local branches appears to be one of looser franchise, whereas
for the DPJ it appears to be one of failed delegation. If this vocabulary is used to
illustrate the situation in immediate post-war Hokkaido, the Socialist Party can
be described as a “loose franchise,” whereas the conservative parties followed
the delegation model at least in two out of the three gubernatorial elections
discussed above. When introducing the behavior of the LDP and the DPJ in recent
gubernatorial elections, Hijino points out that attempts at top-down imposition
of candidates often trigger resistance from local organizations whose incentives
may differ from those of the central party organs. Although the actors and the
surrounding conditions are different in several respects, in general the choices
of the party leadership in the immediate post-war years were remarkably similar
to those of the LDP and the DPJ. In the case of Hokkaido, the choices made by
the conservatives prior to 1955 failed miserably and were not repeated during the
subsequent decades of LDP domination.
Placed within the context of the wider post-war history, however, the
observations made about the case of Hokkaido let us infer different conclusions:
The LDP has been more active than the JSP in participating in the election of
prefectural governors through the nomination of candidates running with the
blessing of the party headquarters. Yet the LDP candidate selection for local
elections has been described as being conducted “bottom-up” from lower to
higher tiers of the party organization. Thus, the pattern of agreement between the
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
166 Juha Saunavaara
party center and local branches resulted in the relatively conflict-free selections
of gubernatorial candidates from the 1960s to the 1990s for the LDP (Tsuji 2010:
46; Hijino 2014: 82). Although no direct link between the conservatives’ failed
intervention in Hokkaido and the pattern of behavior within the LDP can be drawn,
the early post-war examples at least demonstrate the existence of an alternative
modus operandi that was avoided in the following decades. Furthermore, while
the history of the Hokkaido-based Farmers’ Parties offers only limited means for
further analysis of the rise and fall of the Japan Restoration Party (JRP, Nippon
Ishi no Kai), many resemblances can be observed (for an analysis concerning
the JRP, see Reed 2013). It can be concluded that the difficulties the JRP faced
in the consolidation of a regional support base with attempts to scrape together
nationwide support, and the problems in holding on to the political identity and
original policy proposals despite amalgamations with other political groups,
were not without precedent in the history of Japanese political parties.
Acknowledgements: The author wishes to thank Professor Philip Seaton,
Professor Yamazaki Mikine, and the anonymous peer reviewers for providing
useful feedback on an earlier version of this article.
References
Arima, Eiji & Junichi Ono. 1961. Waga 77 nen no ayumi [My seventy-seven years’ history].
Sapporo: Yamada Toyoharu.
Asahi Shinbun Seitō Kishadan. 1998. Seitō nenkan – Shōwa 24 nen [Political party yearbook:
1949]. Tokyo: Gendai Shiryō Shuppan.
Babb, James. 2002. Two currents of conservatism in modern Japan. Social Science Japan
Journal 5(2). 215–232.
Babb, James. 2005. Making farmers conservative: Japanese farmers, land reform and socialism.
Social Science Japan Journal 8(2). 175–195.
Carty, R. Kenneth. 2004. Parties as franchise systems. Party Politics 10(1). 5–24.
Chizaki Usaburō Kinen Shuppan Kankōkai. 1984. Chizaki Usaburō no ashiato [The footprint of
Chizaki Usaburō]. Tokyo: Yamate Shobō.
Deschouwer, Kris. 2003. Political parties in multi-layered systems. European Urban and
Regional Studies 10(3). 213–226.
Deschouwer, Kris. 2006. Political parties as multi-level organizations. In Richard S. Katz &
William J. Crotty (eds.), Handbook of party politics, 291–300. London: Sage.
Fujino, Kōichi & Hideki Asada. 1982. Sengo no Hokkaidō: dōseihen. Hokkai Taimususha hen
[Complilation of post-war Hokkaido politics. Edited by Hokkai Taimusu]. Sapporo: Hokkai
Taimususha.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
Multilevel relations in Japanese political parties 167
Fukunaga, Fumio. 1982a. Nihon Shakaitō setsuritsuji no chihō soshiki ni tsuite ikkōsatsu (1) –
Hyōgo-ken no baai [On the local organization of the Japan Socialist Party at the time of its
establishment (1): The case of Hyogo Prefecture]. Rokkōdai Ronshū 28(4). 112–130.
Fukunaga, Fumio. 1982b. Nihon Shakaitō setsuritsuji no chihō soshiki ni tsuite ikkōsatsu (2) –
Hyōgo-ken no baai [On the local organization of the Japan Socialist Party at the time of its
establishment (2): The case of Hyogo Prefecture]. Rokkōdai Ronshū 29(1). 31–45.
Fukunaga, Fumio. 1997. Senryō shita chūdō seiken no keisei to hōkai – GHQ minsei kyoku to
Nihon Shakaitō [The formation and collapse of the middle-of-the-road administration
under the occupation: The GHQ Government Section and the Socialist Party]. Tokyo:
Iwanami Shoten.
Gikai Seiji Kenkyūkai. 1998. Seitō nenkan – Shōwa 22 nen [Political party yearbook 1947].
Tokyo: Gendai Shiryō Shuppan.
Hasuike, Minoru. 1997. Hokkaidō-min no seiji ishiki to tōhyō kōdō – sengo 50 nen [Political
consciousness and voting behaviour in Hokkaido: Post-war 50 years]. Gendai Shakaigaku
Kenkyū 10 (Tokushū: Hokkaidō no sengo 50 nen). 83–98.
Hijino, Ken Victor Leonard. 2014. Intra-party conflicts over gubernatorial campaigns in Japan:
Delegation or franchise? Party Politics 20(1). 78–88.
Hiratsuka Kiju Kinen Kankōkai Hen. 1957. Kiju Hiratsuka Tsunejirō ryakufu [A simple genealogy
of Hiratsuka Tsunejirō on his seventy-seventh birthday]. Tokyo: Nichiro Gyogyō.
Hokkaidō Gikai. 1977. Hokkaidō gikaishi, dai 5 kan [The history of the Hokkaido Assembly, Part
5]. Sapporo: Hokkaidō Gikai.
Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei Jūshūnen Kinenbi Kankōkai. 1957. Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei jūnen shi
[The ten-year history of the Hokkaido Farmers’ League]. Sapporo: Hokkaidō Nōmin Dōmei.
Ishikawa, Masumi & Jirō Yamaguchi. 2010. Sengo seijishi (dai 3 han) [The post-war political
history (3rd edition)]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Ito, Takashi. 1992. Shigemitsu Mamoru and the 1955 system. In Tetsuya Kataoka (ed.), Creating
single-party democracy: Japan’s postwar political system, 100–118. Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, Stanford University.
Kōno, Ichirō. 1965. Kōno Ichirō jiden [The autobiography of Kōno Ichirō]. Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten.
Krauss, Ellis S. & Robert Pekkanen. 2011. The rise and fall of Japan’s LDP: Political party organizations as historical institutions. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
Masuda, Hiroshi. 1998. Kōshoku tsuihō ron [The public office purge]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Masuda, Hiroshi. 2001. Pāji no shōgeki: Iwate ken o chūshin toshite [The impact of the purge:
focusing on Iwate Prefecture]. In Amakawa Akira & Masuda Hiroshi (eds.), Chiiki kara
minaosu senryō kaikaku: sengo chihō seiji no renzoku to hirenzoku [Reviewing occupation
reform from the regions: Continuities and discontinuities in postwar local politics],
99–135. Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha.
Masumi, Junnosuke. 1985. Postwar politics in Japan, 1945–1955. Berkeley, CA: Institute of East
Asian Studies, University of California.
Mulgan, Aurelia George. 2000. The politics of agriculture in Japan. London & New York: Nissan
Institute/Routledge.
Nagai, Yōnosuke & Ichirō Okaji. 1962. Hokkaidō [Hokkaido]. Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha.
Nagayama, Masao. 1991. Tottori ken ni okeru sengo seitō no kessei [The formation of post-war
parties in Tottori Prefecture]. Tottori Daigaku Kyōyōbu Kiyō, Dai 25 kan, 47–68. Tottori:
Tottori Daigaku Kyōyōbu.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM
168 Juha Saunavaara
Ogawa, Kōichi & Toshio Araki. 1971. Sapporo kōgai chiku (Teine) no seiji ishiki chōsa (2): Sengo
Teine ni okeru seiji (1) [Investigation of political consciousness at an outskirt district of
Sapporo (Teine) (2): Politics in post-war Teine (1)]. Hokudai Hōgaku Ronshū 21(4). 170–194.
Okuda, Jirō. 1956. Dōsei fūunroku: sengo 10 nen [The record of Hokkaido political situation:
Postwar 10 years]. Sapporo: Sōjusha.
Reed, Steven R. 2013. Challenging the two-party system: Third force parties in the 2012
election. In Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed & Ethan Scheiner (eds.), Japan decides 2012:
The Japanese General Election, 72–83. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Sano, Shinichi. 2009. Hatoyama ichizoku: Sono kinmyaku to ketsumyaku [Financial connections
and lineage of the Hatoyama family]. Tokyo: Bunshun Shinsho.
Saunavaara, Juha. 2010. In search of suitable political leadership: Japanese conservatives in
occupation plans and policies 1942–1947. Oulu: University of Oulu.
Saunavaara, Juha. 2014. Postwar development of Hokkaido: The US occupation authorities’
local government reform in Japan. Journal of American-East Asian Relations 21. 134–155.
Scheiner, Ethan. 2006. Democracy without competition in Japan. Opposition failure in a
one-party dominated state. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shillony, Ben-Ami. 1981. Politics and culture in wartime Japan. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shimizu, Shōsuke, Akio Sogame, Minoru Hasuike & Samon Yamamoto. 1996. Chiiki kara no
seijigaku. Hokkaidō kara kangaeru (zōho shinpan) [Political science from the region:
Considerations from a Hokkaido perspective (new expanded edition)]. Tokyo: Kawade
Shobō Shinsha.
Takahashi, Akio. 1982. Shōgen: Hokkaidō sengo shi – Tanaka dōsei to sono jidai [Testimony:
The post-war history of Hokkaido – The period of Tanaka in Hokkaido politics]. Sapporo:
Hokkaido Shinbunsha.
Takahashi, Akio. 1983. Zoku shōgen: Hokkaidō sengo shi – Tanaka dōsei to sono jidai
[Continuing testimony: The post-war history of Hokkaido – The period of Tanaka in
Hokkaido politics]. Sapporo: Hokkaido Shinbunsha.
Tominomori, Eiji. 2006. Sengo hoshutō shi [The post-war history of conservative parties].
Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
Tsuji, Akira. 2010. Nihon no chiji senkyo ni miru seitō no chūō chihō kankei [The central-local
relationships of party organizations in Japan]. Senkyo Kenkyū 26(1). 38–52.
Tsuruya, Masahiko. 2012. Seiken kōtai go no Jimintō chihō kenren ni okeru senkyo katei:
Jimintō Shiga ken shibu rengōkai o jirei ni [The election process in the local prefectural
units of the Liberal Democratic Party after the shift in political administration: The Shiga
prefectural branch as an example]. Seisaku Kagaku 20(1). 55–69.
Tsutsui, Kiyotada. 1992. Toward the Liberal Democratic Party merger: Conservative policies
and politics. In Tetsuya Kataoka (ed.), Creating single-party democracy: Japan’s postwar
political system, 119–132. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.
Uekami, Takayoshi. 2008. Seikai saihen to chihō seiji: Iwate ken Kamaishi shi no jirei o chūshin
toshite [National party realignment and local politics: The case of Kamaishi City council
members]. Shakai Gagaku Kenkyū 59(3/4). 39–80.
Van Houten, Pieter. 2009. Multi-level relations in political parties. A delegation approach. Party
Politics 15(2). 137–156.
Winkler, Christian G. 2012. The evolution of the conservative mainstream in Japan. Japan Forum
24(1). 51–73.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/14/17 4:16 PM