THE NATURE OF PLEAS IN
MALTESE CIVIL PROCEDURE
- A Jurisprudential Analysis -
by
John Ludovic Gauci
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the
degree of LL.D
Faculty of Laws
University of Malta
ABSTRACT
The term plea is not defined anywhere in our law yet legal authors and jurists broadly
define it as any sort of defence that may be raised by the defendant in order to
counter the plaintiff’s demand. Generally, pleas serve as a means of safeguard for the
defendant’s rights when such rights are being attacked. When the defendant, by
means of his pleas, alleges different facts from those alleged by the plaintiff, the
former has to furnish proof of the existence and veracity of such different facts. A
distinction must be drawn between pleas which merely serve to impugn the plaintiff’s
demand, on the one hand, and counterclaims, on the other.
Pleas are further classifiable as either being dilatory or peremptory. A dilatory plea
serves to postpone the action and must be generally raised in limine litis. On the other
hand, peremptory pleas tend to destroy the action and cannot be reproposed. These
pleas can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even at the appellate stage.
The general rule is that the only admissible pleas are those raised by the parties.
However there are some pleas which due to their nature must be raised by the Court
ex officio. These pleas include those pleas which expressly according to the law can be
raised by the Court of its own motion and pleas of public policy. On this issue,
unfortunately, we have a number of discordant judgments, especially with respect to
what constitutes a plea of public policy or not.
The principle of jura novit Curia which literally means ‘the Court knows the law’, is
entrenched in the Codes of Procedure of some continental systems. Our Courts have
frequently maintained that it would not be equitable if the Court had to raise a legal
argument and decide upon it itself. However, some judgments have recently hinted
that the principle of substantive justice outweighs the private interests of the party
and the Court cannot approve of the application of incorrect norms.
In view of the conflicting judgments delivered by our Courts on some of the most
vital aspects relating to the nature of pleas and the procedure applicable thereto, it is
desirable that legislative intervention will help to clarify such important matters.
2
DEDICATION
To my family and to Marlene for their unfailing support and encouragement
throughout this work and my studies.
This thesis would not have been possible without their support.
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to express sincere gratitude and appreciation to Dr. Patrick
Galea LL.D for recommending this research topic and for his guidance, insight,
and support during this research and the preparation of this thesis.
Although I have consulted the above while working on this thesis, any error,
incorrectness or misinterpretation is purely of my own doing and therefore assume
complete responsibility for all the contents of this thesis.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE PAGE ..........................................................................................................1
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................ 2
DEDICATION ....................................................................................................... 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................ 4
TABLE OF CASES .................................................................................................. 8
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................15
A THE NOTION OF PLEAS ...................................................................................18
1 Definition of plea ............................................................................................18
2 Historical distinction between plea and defence...........................................19
3 Role and function of pleas..............................................................................21
4 The link between pleas and the underlying rights........................................ 22
5 The nature of pleas in relation to the burden of proof .................................. 24
6 Simple pleas and reconventional pleas ......................................................... 28
B DILATORY AND PEREMPTORY PLEAS ............................................................. 33
1 The importance of the distinction between dilatory and peremptory pleas . 33
2 Dilatory pleas and related procedural rules .................................................. 34
3 Peremptory pleas and related procedural rules............................................. 37
(a) Rules relating to the setting of additional pleas ...................................... 39
4 What pleas were deemed to be dilatory / peremptory by our Courts........... 40
(a) Prematurity of action ............................................................................... 40
(b) Plea of lack of capacity of the parties .......................................................41
(c) Plea of desertion of a cause...................................................................... 44
(d) Plea of jurisdiction and incompetence.................................................... 45
(e) Plea of prescription .................................................................................. 47
C PLEAS THAT MAY BE RAISED EX OFFICIO ....................................................... 49
1 The general principle..................................................................................... 49
2 Pleas that may be raised ex officio ................................................................ 50
(a) Plea of jurisdiction and competence ....................................................... 50
(b) Pleas relating to issues of public policy .................................................. 52
5
(c) Plea of lack of juridical interest ............................................................... 53
(d) Plea of res judicata................................................................................... 55
(e) Plea of lis alibi pendens (litis pendentia) ................................................ 58
(f) Plea of prescription................................................................................... 59
(g) Plea of nullity of judicial acts................................................................... 64
(h) Plea of desertion ...................................................................................... 65
(i) Plea of lack of capacity of parties ............................................................. 66
D THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF JURA NOVIT
CURIA
IN THE
MALTESE LEGAL SYSTEM ................................................................................... 68
1 Definition of the principle of jura novit Curia ............................................... 68
2 Applicability of the principle of jura novit Curia........................................... 69
3 The principle of jura novit Curia in the Maltese legal system ...................... 72
4 Jura novit Curia and the concept of surprise in the Maltese legal system.... 74
5 Can the court decide to ignore a plea/pleas raised by the defendant? ........ 76
6 The admissibility or otherwise of pleas raised for the first time in the written
submissions ...................................................................................................... 79
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................... 84
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................. 86
6
TABLE OF STATUTES
Malta
Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta – Code of Organization and Civil Procedure
Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta – Civil Code
Italy
Codice di Procedura Civile
Codice Civile
7
TABLE OF CASES
Abela Emanuel et v Fluti Muhammed et (First Hall Civil Court, 29th March 2006),
Agius George et v Schembri Charles V. et (Court of Appeal, 14th July 2005),
Agius Gualtiero et v Palmier Teresa et (31st March 1909),
Air Malta plc v South Rays Ltd (First Hall Civil Court, 30th June 2004),
Azzopardi Nutar Oscar v Cuschieri Gerald (First Hall Civil Court, 19th December 1950);
Bartolo Hilda et v Zammit Giuseppina et (First Hall Civil Court, 13th January 1953, Vol.
XXXVII.II.326),
Bellizzi Joseph et v Grioli Joseph noe (Court of Appeal, 5th June 2001),
Borg Anthony et v Willoughby Anthony Francis et (First Hall Civil Court, 28th March 2003),
Borg Edward v Bartlett Edward (Court of Appeal, 11th May 1992),
Borg Emanuel v Xuereb John (Court of Appeal, 25th January 1989),
Borg Emmanuel pro et noe v Grixti Neg Joseph et (Court of Appeal, 15th March 1948),
Borg Emmanuele pro. et noe v Grixti Neg. Joseph et (Court of Appeal, 12th July 1949),
Borg Francis X. noe v Court John et (Court of Appeal, 18th June 1979),
Borg Joseph et v Bartolo Joseph A. (Court of Appeal, 25th June 1980),
Borg Joseph v Breckon Josephine et (Court of Appeal, 1st March 2006),
Brincat Saviour et v Salina Estates Limited (Court of Appeal, 25th February 2004),
Busuttil Emmanuele v Mercieca Francesco (Court of Appeal, 15th April 1950, Vol.
XXXIV.I.410),
Cacciattolo Regina v Cacciattolo Francis (Court of Appeal, 30th June 1976),
Paolo Cachia v Carmelo Cachia (Court of Appeal, 15th January 1965, Vol. XLIX.II.129),
Cali Ruggiero v Galea Perit u Arkitett u Inġinier Ċivili George (Court of Appeal, 11th May
1956),
Calleja Raymond v Pace L-Avukat Dottor Raymond et noe (Court of Appeal, 31st January
1996),
Camilleri Benny v Schembri Ian et (Court of Appeal, 16th December 2002),
8
Camilleri Emanuela v Spiteri Doreen (Court of Appeal, 16th May 1995),
Emmanuele Camilleri noe v Anthony Calascione noe (Commercial Court, 29th October
1954),
Camilleri Joseph v Calleja Emanuel (Court of Appeal, 20th January 2003),
Camilleri Joseph et v Psaila Rosaria et (Court of Appeal, 1st March 2006),
Camilleri Vincent et v Aquilina Gaetana (Court of Appeal, 16th March 2004),
Capua Palace Limited v Arcidiacono Boris (First Hall Civil Court, 30th January 2003),
Caruana Paul et v Connell Norman (Court of Appeal, 25th February 2004),
Casha Giovanna Antida pro et noe v Casha Anthony (First Hall Civil Court, 27th February
2003),
Cassar Assunta v Zammit Avukat Dott. Carmelo noe (Court of Appeal, 4th November
1955),
Cassar Desain Markiż Anthony et v Pace Giovanni (Court of Appeal, 15th October 1965,
Vol. XLIX.I.421),
Cefai Emanuela et v Angelo Xuereb (Construction) Limited (First Hall Civil Court, 28th
January 2004),
Chircop Kevin v Chircop Joseph (First Hall Civil Court, 28th January 2004),
Cilia Vincent v L-Onor. Prim’ Ministru et (Constitutional Court, 28th January 2005),
Cini Joseph noe (Appellant) v Agius Emanuel u Rosaria (Appellati) (Court of Appeal, 15th
September 2005),
Commercial Services Bureau (CSB) Limited v Grima Communications Ltd (Court of Appeal,
23rd June 2004),
Cortis Charles v Aquilina Francis X et (First Hall Civil Court, 29th September 2003),
Cristina Anthony noe v Mizzi Eleonora (Court of Appeal, 27th March 2003),
Curmi David noe v Abela Godwin et noe (First Hall Civil Court, 31st January 2003),
Curmi Noel u Georgina konjuġi v Ellis Dottor Joseph et (Court of Appeal, 27th February
2004),
Cutajar Rosario v Caruana Giovanna (First Hall Civil Court, 22nd February 1947,
XXX.3.39),
9
Cutajar Vincent (Appellanti) v Cefai Teddy pro et (Appellati) (Court of Appeal, 15th
September 2005),
Dalmas Iris v Ronnie u German Carmen konjugi (Court of Appeal, 16th March 2005),
Debono Charles pro et noe v Caruana John noe (Court of Appeal, 5th April 1971),
Debono Ignazio v Debono Michael et (First Hall Civil Court, 2nd February 1990),
Debono Negte. Luigi Spiteri v Darmanin Negte. Charles noe (Court of Appeal, 25th April
1930, Vol. XXVII.I.895),
Debono Maria et v Mercieca Av Dr. Paolo et (Court of Appeal, 30th January 2004),
Degiorgio Carmelo noe v Farrugia George (Court of Appeal, 8th May 1981),
Dingli Av Dr. Kevin F. et noe v Surgiquip Ltd (Court of Appeal, 16th December 2003),
F. Mercieca & Sons Mobili Ltd v Borg George et, (First Hall Civil Court, 28th February
2001),
Falzon Antida v APS Limited (First Hall Civil Court, 28th May 2005),
Farrugia Carmelo v Farrugia Rokku (First Hall Civil Court, 24th November 1966),
Farrugia Carmela Armla ta' Farrugia Joseph v Mercieca Av Dr. Grazio LL.D. noe (Court of
Commerce, 22nd June 1988),
Fenech Joseph et Zarb Rev Sac. Prof. Serafino , O.P., ne. et, (Court of Appeal (Civil,
Superior), 10th October 1952),
Fenech Raymond et v Bajada Antoine et (First Hall Civil Court, 4th June 2004),
Fiorentino Alison v Dragonara Casino Limited (Court of Appeal, 19th October 2005),
Fogg Insurance Agencies Limited et v Azzopardi Raymond et (Court of Appeal, 25th February
2004),
Formosa & Camilleri Limited noe v W. J. Parnis England et (Court of Appeal, 8th June
2004),
Formosa Francis Xavier et v Carmelo u Doris aħwa Mifsud (Court of Appeal, 26th February
1999),
Formosa Dr. Vladimir v Direttur tas-Sigurtà Soċjali (Court of Appeal, 4th May 1992),
Galea Adam et v Calleja Tarcisio pro et (Court of Appeal, 25th May 2001),
Galea Joseph et v Borg Edwin (Court of Appeal, 26th February 1999),
10
Gasan Insurance Agency Limited noe v Soler Simon et (Court of Appeal, 22nd November
2002),
Gasan Insurance Agency Ltd noe v Valletta Freight Services Ltd pro et noe (Court of Appeal,
17th March 2003),
Gatt Diana et v Said Vincent (Court of Appeal, 23rd February 2001),
Gatt Ignazio v Debono Michael (First Hall Civil Court, 2nd February 1990),
Gatt Ignazio v Debono Michael et (Court of Appeal, 12th December 1983),
Gatt Joseph v Galea Joseph (Court of Appeal, 12th July 1965),
Gauci Eucharistico v Borg Jesmond et (Court of Appeal, 14th July 2004),
Giordmaina John v Pace Joseph (Court of Appeal, 19th June 2001),
Grech Carmelo v Guillaumier Salvatore noe (Court of Appeal, 7th January 1939, Vol.
XXX.I.953),
Grech Eduardo, quale Presidente della Filarmonica “Sta. Maria” di Musta v Darmanin
Negoziante Francesco (Commercial Court, 15th January 1907, Vol. XX.III.517),
Grech Edwin v Saglimbene Antida et (Commercial Court, 9th April 1992),
Grech George v Grech Mario et (First Hall Civil Court, 4th October 2002),
Grima Joseph v Aquilina Victor pro et noe (First Hall Civil Court, 17th February 2000),
Grima Mario v Gollcher Frederick Karl (First Hall Civil Court, 15th November 1946, Vol.
XXXII.II.478),
Grima Rosina nomine v Vella Joseph proprju nomine et (Court of Appeal, 14th April 1997),
Herrera Dr Josè noe v Cassar Anthony et noe (Court of Appeal, 5th October 1992),
Hillman David v G.R.A.P. Limited (Court of Appeal, 9th December 2003),
Holland Jeremy v Chetcuti Joseph (Court of Appeal, 25th February 2000),
Improved Design Limited v Grima Antoine (First Hall Civil Court, 4th March 2004),
Korporazzjoni Ghas-Servizzi Ta' L-Ilma v Quattromani Joseph, (Court of Appeal, 19th May
2004),
L&D Attard Company Limited v Mifsud Joseph et (Court of Appeal, 25th January 2006),
La Rosa de Cristofaro Salvatore noe v Rouselle Henri noe, (First Hall Civil Court, 24th
February 1939),
11
Licari Estates Limited et pro et noe v Vella Carmel (Court of Appeal, 10th October 2005),
Mallia Giuseppe v Giordimaina Carmelo (First Hall Civil Court, 11th November 1957),
Maltacom P.L.C. v Kurt Galea Pace (Court of Appeal, 19th May 2004),
Maltacom v Schembri Angelo (Court of Appeal, 16th December 2002),
Mamo Gaetana v Mercieca Therese sive Tessie et (First Hall Civil Court, 26th October 2005),
Marsaxlokk Sailing Club Company Limited v. J And H Company Limited (First Hall Civil
Court, 30th June 2004),
Martinelli Luciano noe v Pisani Saviour (Court of Appeal, 22nd June 2005),
Meilaq Sammy noe v Attinel Oral noe (Court of Appeal, 5th October 2001),
Micallef Giuseppe ed. v Micallef Grazio (First Hall Civil Court, 21st March 1923, Vol.
XXV.II.284),
Micallef Mark v Kontrollur tad-Dwana (Court of Appeal, 2nd December 2005),
Micallef Raphael v Agius Anthony (Court of Appeal, 12th May 1997),
Middlesea Insurance plc noe et v Vella Karl (Court of Appeal, 10th October 2005),
Mifsud Carmelo v Schembri Giuseppi (First Hall Civil Court, 28th April 2004),
Mifsud Carmelo v Vella Giuseppe (Court of Appeal, 30th July 1955, Vol. XXXIX.I.488),
Mirabelli Edwin noe v Parnis England John noe et (Commercial Appeal, 23rd January 1989),
Mizzi Vivian Charmaine v Mizzi Carmel (Court of Appeal, 30th June 2004),
Naudi v Geoghegan (Court of Appeal, 30th November 1903),
Pace Associates Ltd v Drawing Techniques Ltd (Court of Appeal, 7th December 2005),
Pace Karl et v Sullivan Peter J. pro et noe (Court of Appeal, 15th February 2006),
Pace Cole Albert v Chairman Tal-Maltacom P.L.C. (First Hall Civil Court Constitutional
Jurisdiction, 26th February 2004),
Pellegrini Toni v Abela Maurice et noe (Constitutional Court, 9th March 1966),
Portelli Catherine v Cachia Joseph (Commercial Court, 10th December 1992),
Portelli Rita v Ministru tal-Ġustizzja u Affarijiet Parlamentari u Portanier Harry
(Constitutional Court, 22nd July 1985),
Portelli Saviour sive Aldo v Delia Isabel A&CE et (Court of Appeal, 11th January 2006),
Refalo Profs Ian noe v Borg Grech Victor (First Hall Civil Court, 16th February 2006),
12
Reznikov Anatoli and his wife Reznikova Natalia v Kotivov Nikolai A for and behalf of the
foreign company Pan European Trading International Company Limited (Commercial Court,
24th March 1994),
Ricci Gustav v Latzen Harry (First Hall Civil Court, 18th February 1965),
Salvu Mintoff & Sons Limited v Road Construction Limited et (Court of Appeal, 2nd
December 2005),
Sammut Dr. Austin noe v Mifsud Silvio noe (Court of Appeal, 22nd June 1994),
Sammut Tommaso v Farrugia Carmelo et (First Hall Civil Court, 19th October 1954),
Santucci Josephine Mart Charles v Santucci Charles Sive Carmelo (Court of Appeal, 7th
August 1986),
Scerri Joseph v Fenech Anna et (First Hall Civil Court, 3rd August 2003),
Sciberras George et v Spiteri Josephine et (Court of Appeal, 8th June 2004),
Sciberras Josianne v Vella Giovanni et (Court of Appeal, 21st February 1996),
Sea Services Ltd v Aquilina Paul et (First Hall Civil Court, 12th December 2001),
Services Limited v Zammit Joseph (Court of Appeal, 29th January 1999),
Seychell Carmelo v Depasquale Giovanni (Court of Appeal, 11th January 1957),
Soċjetà Filarmonika La Stella v Kummissarju tal-Pulizija (Court of Appeal, 19th July 1997),
Spiteri Carmelo v Ellul Luqa (Commercial Court, 28th May 1965),
Spiteri Frans v Abela Godwin et noe (First Hall Civil Court, 31st January 2003),
Spiteri John et v Spiteri Stephanie pro et noe (Court of Appeal, 20th October 2003),
St. George's Bay Hotel Limited v Bay Street Holdings Limited et (First Hall Civil Court, 25th
September 2003),
Staines Dr. Robert et noe v Ellul Sullivan Carmelo et noe (Court of Appeal, 30th May 1995),
Stencil Pave (Malta) Limited v Kunsill Lokali Naxxar (First Hall Civil Court, 30th October
2003),
Sunspot Tours Limited v. C.H. Caterers Limited (Court of Appeal, 16th December 2001),
Surprise Yachts Limited v Joseph Rosso pro et noe (First Hall Civil Court, 21st April 2004),
Tabone Paul u Salvina konjuġi v Mizzi Joseph (First Hall Civil Court, 27th February 2002),
The Cargo Handling Co. Ltd. v Messrs. John Abela Limited (Court of Appeal, 7th July 2003),
13
Tomlin Company Limited v Jon David Limited (Court of Appeal, 20th October 2003),
Valentino Joseph v Vassallo Gio. Andrea et (Court of Appeal, 8th April 1957, Vol.
XLI.I.637),
Vella Alexis et noe v Jones David et noe (First Hall Civil Court, Civil Court, 31st January
2003),
Vella Emanuel Lawrence Fil-Kwalita Tieghu Ta’ Amministratur Ta' L-Eredità Ta’ Natalizia
Magri v Bernardina Armla Ta’ Joseph D’ Amato (Court of Appeal (Civil, Inferior), 28th
October 1994),
Vella Georgina Xebba v Caruana Emanuel U B'digriet Tas-16 Ta` Ottubru 1981, Gie
Kkjamat Fil-Kawza Vella Joseph (Court of Appeal, 25th March 1986),
Vella Joseph v Falzon Emanuel (Court of Appeal, 25th February 1997),
Vella Joseph noe v Migneco Anthony (First Hall Civil Court, 9th June 2005),
Yorkie Clothing Industry Ltd v Calleja Cremona Dr Lilian (First Hall Civil Court, 30th May
2002),
Zammit Joan v S. Borg & Sons Ltd (Court of Appeal, 19th October 2005),
Zammit Joseph v Hili Joseph (Court of Appeal, 27th June 1953),
Zammit Negoziante Michele per la Ditta Zammit e Cachia e Negoziante Joseph Cauchi per la
Ditta Bianchi e Cauchi v Civitelli Negoziante Gennaro (Court of Appeal, 26th November
1920),
Zammit P.L. Joseph noe v Pulis Lydia et (First Hall Civil Court, 28th February 2003),
Zammit Pawlina pro et noe v Zammit Gerald (First Hall Civil Court, 28th June 1954),
Zammit Tabona M.C. et v Borg Emanuele (Court of Appeal, 7th February 1966),
Zerafa Manuel v Muscat Scerri Nazzareno (First Hall Civil Court, 27th May 1970).
14
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to determine and establish the nature of pleas under Maltese
law. Such an exercise is of fundamental importance in order to be able to categorise
pleas of different nature and apply the various procedural rules laid down by the Code
of Organisation of Civil Procedure (COCP).
Unfortunately, this area, which is definitely one of quotidian application, was never
tackled comprehensively in local works. Thus the need of a critical evaluation of
jurisprudence on the matter was deeply felt. Moreover, the necessity to explore this
topic has increased in view of recent jurisdictional activity, which shows a de facto
increase in the discretion exercised by the members of the Maltese judiciary.
This thesis is to a large extent limited to local jurisprudence as its main source. The
works of continental jurists, especially Italian and French, are only used to
complement Maltese case law in areas that have never been treated by our Courts or
at least not in a conclusive manner.
It must be noted that in view of the recent amendments to the COCP by Act XXII of
2005, the writ of summons and the note of pleas have been replaced by the sworn
application and the sworn reply/answer respectively. Therefore, any reference to the
writ of summons or to the note of pleas should be construed mutatis mutandis as
referring to the sworn application and to the sworn reply/answer respectively.
In Chapter A, the author seeks to define pleas generally given that under the COCP
we do not have an express definition. Therefore, recourse is made to various Italian
authors, which have attempted a definition of plea. It was interesting to note that
while our jurisprudence is full of references to particular pleas and their particular
nature, our Courts have rarely went into the issue of what constitutes a plea. In this
chapter, reference is also made to the historical distinction between pleas and
defences and it discusses whether this distinction is still relevant. More importantly,
this chapter also discusses the role and function of pleas and what effects are brought
about if the pleas raised are upheld by the Court.
15
This chapter also seeks to identify the nature of the nexus between the plea as a
procedural mechanism and the underlying substantive right. It also discusses whether
the plea is a right in itself and whether one can renounce to the right to defend
oneself.
Subsequently, this chapter examines the nature of the plea in the light of the burden
of proof and particularly the interpretation and implementation of the Latin maxim
reus in excipiendo fit actor. Another important classification with respect to the nature of
the plea is to determine whether a plea is a simple one or a reconventional one. This
aspect has been dealt with extensively both by jurists and our jurisprudence.
Chapter B deals with a very important classification, which warrants a separate
treatment because of its procedural significance. Authors and jurisprudence in
essence agree on the definition of dilatory and peremptory pleas. On the other hand,
there are many inconsistencies in our jurisprudence regarding the classification of the
particular pleas. Particular pleas, especially those which have proved to be of a
problematic classification, are examined and their jurisprudential interpretation
studied. This chapter also discusses the procedural implications once a plea is
classified as being either dilatory or peremptory.
Chapter C then deals with whether pleas may be raised ex officio and what are those
pleas that may be so raised. This Chapter commences by explaining the general
principle as laid down in our jurisprudence and then starts to tackle the pleas that our
Courts have said that may be raised ex officio and those that may not be raised out of
its own motion.
Chapter D treats the subject of whether the principle of jura novit Curia exists or
otherwise in the Maltese legal system. In other words, this Chapter examines the
latitude of the Judge’s discretion in choosing what law is applicable to the facts
brought before him to decide upon. This Chapter begins by evaluating this principle
as existing in the Italian legal system, especially since this principle is very much
developed and recognised there. Contrastingly, this principle is not part of Maltese
law, although some case law seems to indicate that some judges have tacitly adopted
this principle as being part of our law. In the light of this, this chapter discusses
whether the extent of jurisdictional activity evident in some judgments is tantamount
to a recognition of this principle under our law.
16
This exercise is done by examining the parameters within which the judge may
operate, namely if he can raise pleas ex officio, whether he can ignore pleas raised in a
note of pleas, and whether he can ignore pleas raised for the first time in written
submissions.
The conclusion then identifies those areas which deserve legislative intervention in
order to achieve legal certainty in procedural law.
17
A
THE NOTION OF PLEAS
1
Definition of plea
It must be premised at the outset that our Code of Organization and Civil Procedure
(COCP) does not define the term ‘plea’. For a concrete definition, we have to refer to
jurisprudence and the works of jurists. It is established that, legally, the word ‘plea’
refers to all the defences, that the defendant brings forward in the suit, both of law
and of fact, directed at excluding in its totality or in part, permanently or temporarily,
the action brought against him.1 The term ‘plea’, in its widest sense, is defined by
Redenti as any motivation or reason, which can be brought to the attention of the
judge or taken into consideration by him, directed towards the refusal of the
plaintiff's request2. Bioche affirms that pleas are means which have the tendency to
interrupt the procedure and therefore help the judge to deliver a definitive judgment.3
Chiovenda opines that the submission of a plea is based on a counter right enjoyed by
the defendant to reject the demand or ask for the annulment of the action instituted
in consequence of the existence of a right enjoyed by the plaintiff. Such defence rests
on the existence of a fact, which may have the effect of eliminating the action.
Mortara affirms that the concept of civil action, in its widest sense, also includes the
right of the plaintiff to defend himself. He states that this right, when considered in
contrast to the right of action in a narrow sense, assumes the form of a plea
(eccezione).4
Chiovenda, in the introduction to his monograph about pleas5, explains that the word
plea includes ‘le più diverse forme di difesa del convenuto’, and that the juridical terminology
does not allow us to express with just one word, but to indicate with a phrase —
eccezione in senso proprio e sostanziale — that form of defence which consists in the
1
F Roberti Trattato delle Azioni e delle Eccezioni Secondo i Principii delle Leggi Civili per lo Regno delle Due Sicilie
(Napoli Tip. F. Fernandes 1832) vol 2, 8–9.
2 E Redenti and M Vellani Diritto Processuale Civile (5th edn Giuffrè Editore Milan 2000) 61.
3 Binoche and Goujet Dizionario Generale Ragionato della Procedura Civile e Commerciale (Stamperia di Pietro
Pensante Palermo 1853) vol 1, 573.
4 L Mortara Commentario del Codice e delle leggi di procedura civile (Vallardi Milan 1923) 26.
5 G Chiovenda ‘Sulla «eccezione»’ Saggi di Diritto Processuale Civile (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Milan 1993)
vol 1, 149–156.
18
defendant’s right, namely the counter right to impugn and annul the plaintiff's right of
action.
Mandrioli also affirms that in procedural language, the term ‘plea’ can be used either
in a narrow or wider sense. The wider sense, according to the same author, includes
all means used to contrast the judicial demand, and therefore comprises not only
allegations or negations of facts but also claims of defects of requisites and even
simple defensive argumentations. Under this wide notion of ‘plea’ we find claims of
defects of procedural requisites known as eccezioni processuali o di rito.6
2
Historical distinction between plea and defence
Historically, a number of civil procedure authors sought to make a distinction
between the plea, properly so speaking, and the defence. Under the rigorous
principles of Roman law, the plea presupposed the existence of an unjust action
which was hit at with the principles of natural equity. Carrè maintained that the term
‘plea’ only includes those means with which the defendant, without entering into the
merits of the demand, maintains that the plaintiff cannot be admitted to make such a
demand7. He states that such pleas must be distinguished from the so-called difese nel
merito, which are the reasons with which it is sought to show that the demand is
neither based on law nor on fact 8.
According to Bioche, under Roman law, the plea was a subsidiary issue established by
the prætor which allowed the judge to acquit the defendant, if the fact alleged by the
latter was justified.9 Chiovenda maintains that under Roman law, the plea was related
to a ius civile corrective function exercised by the magistrate in the impleading
process.10 Originally, therefore, the plea was not a right afforded to the defendant to
impugn the action. Such a right only emerged much later when, the distinction
between ius civile and ius honoriarium disappeared, and more importance was given to
the dichotomy between circumstances which have an ipso iure (by the law itself) or ope
6
C Mandrioli Corso di Diritto Processuale Civile (10th edn G. Giappichelli Editore Turin 1995) 121.
CLT Carre Commentario sulle leggi della procedura civile (3rd edn Domenico Capasso Naples 1853-56) 135.
8 Ibid 136.
9 Bioche and Goujet Dizionario Generale Ragionato della Procedura Civile e Commerciale (Stamperia di Pietro
Pensante Palermo 1853) vol 1, 573.
10 G Chiovenda Saggi di Diritto Processuale Civile (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Milano 1993) vol 1, 149.
7
19
exceptionis (by force of exception) effect based on the numerous facts important for
the constitution or the extinction of a right. Gaius used to maintain that the scope of
the plea is more generic than that of the defence. Justinian, elaborating on Gaius held
that the defence is the denial of the plaintiff's right of action. Legal doctrine sought
first of all to keep pleas or peremptory pleas (exceptiones o exceptiones peremptoriæ such as
dolus, violence and error), distinct from other defences (defensiones such as payment).
Chiovenda explains that with time, however, it became customary to define exceptiones
all the defences. 11 Bioche submits that under Roman law and later antique
codifications, the term ‘plea’ acquired different meanings. The author mentions Jouse
who in his Commentaire sur l’ordonnance de 1667 described pleas all those means by
virtue of which the defendant could oppose the plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, he
divided pleas into declinatory, dilatory and peremptory pleas, while subdividing the
latter into proper peremptory pleas and substantive defences. On the other hand,
Pothier in his Procèdure civile defined as ‘defence’ what Jouse defined as ‘plea’ and
divided defences in proper defences and pleas. According to Pothier, ‘pleas’ do not
include the means which, without attacking the merits of the demand, tend to show
that the plaintiff should not be admitted to make such demand.
The distinction between plea (exception) and defence can be illustrated by means of a
simple example:
If A suing B for the price of certain goods ordered by and
delivered to him, be met with the statement that the goods were
never either ordered or delivered, this was a defence; but if B,
admitting the receipt of the goods pleads that he has already paid
the price thereof to A, this is an exception.12
This distinction however bears no practical relevance nowadays. In the words of
Mortara, in modern civil procedure, the means which serve the defendant to repel the
plaintiff’s action all fall without any distinction under the name of pleas (eccezione). The
same author states that this is different from what was the situation under Roman law
or the schools of antiquity, but the present simplicity is useful both with respect to
clarity and to the attainment of justice since it does away with the hindrance
occasioned by procedural subtleties.13
11
G Chiovenda Saggi di Diritto Processuale Civile (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Milano 1993) vol 1, 150.
J Trayner Trayner's Latin Maxims (Sweet & Maxwell London 1998) 425.
13 L Mortara Commentario del Codice e delle leggi di procedura civile (Vallardi Milan 1923) 27.
12
20
3
Role and function of pleas
Chiovenda defines the role of pleas as being that of affording to the defendant the
right of impugning the plaintiff’s right of action. He maintains that since a plea is a
counter right, the defendant cannot ask for something more than the refusal of the
plaintiff’s demand. In fact, even when the plea is based on the right of the defendant
(e.g. the right of retention) the plea does not aim at giving effect to this right, but
exclusively to annul the plaintiff's action.14
The author maintains that by means of an improper plea (eccezione in senso improprio)
one obtains the rejection of the demand because the right of action never existed or
came to exist only subsequent to the plea. On the other hand, by means of a proper
plea (eccezione in senso proprio) one obtains the rejection of the demand through the
annulment of the action itself. Mandrioli explains that if a plea aims at impugning the
constituent facts of the plaintiff’s demand, then it is an eccezione in senso improprio.
Contrarily, an eccezione di merito in senso proprio consists in the plaintiff’s request that the
Court decides negatively upon the plaintiff’s demand on the basis of the existence of
facts which impede, modify or extinguish the action claimed by the plaintiff.
Mandrioli illustrates this by an example. He says that when a contract of lease is
concluded between two parties, the fact of its conclusion is the fact which constitutes
the right (constitutive fact) of the lessee, Tizio, to demand from the lessor, Cajo, the
delivery of the subject of the lease. However, if the contract of lease was rescinded
consensually prior to the delivery, the right of Tizio to demand delivery is now
extinguished. Therefore, the fact of the rescission would be an extinguishing fact visà-vis that right. On the other hand, if the validity of the contract was related to a
suspensive condition, the fact of the existence of such condition and that it did not
verify itself impedes the occurrence of the plaintiff’s right. This would be considered
as an impeding fact. In the same manner, with respect to a right of credit regarding a
sum of money arising out of a contract of loan; the actual payment or the expiry of
the prescriptive period would be extinguishing facts; the fact that the sum is not yet
14
G Chiovenda Saggi di Diritto Processuale Civile (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Milan 1993) vol 1, 151.
21
due would be an impeding fact; while a partial payment would be tantamount to a
modifying fact (it modifies the plaintiff’s right).15
According to Chiovenda, unlike other rights of impugnment, the efficacy of
annulment of the plea is limited to the action. While rights of impugnment extend
more or less according to the intent proposed by the plaintiff and normally attempt to
counter the entire juridical relationship, the plea operates in strict boundaries. A plea
can only have the effect to annul the action – the action proposed and against which
the plea is directed. It does not affect that juridical relationship and those actions
which can be derived therefrom in the future. The operation of a plea can indirectly
affect the entire juridical relationship only when an extremely simple juridical
relationship consists of just one right. If it happens that the plea transcends the scope
of the action, that plea ceases to be considered as such and transforms itself into a
reconventional means of impugnment.16
Our Courts only seem to consider as pleas those arguments raised as a means of
defence by the defendant. For example, in David Curmi noe v Godwin Abela et noe (First
Hall Civil Court, 31st January 2003) one of the ‘pleas’ raised by defendant was to
demand the exhibition of the insurance policy relative to the imported goods which
were the subject of the controversy. The Court held that this type of plea, ‘effettivament
m’għandha xejn minn natura ta’ eċċezzjoni’ since it does not constitute a means of defence.
4
The link between pleas and the underlying rights
In the majority of cases, pleas are a procedural mechanism aimed at the protection of
a substantive underlying right. Nevertheless, pleas are only raised when this right is
attacked or prejudiced by a conflicting claim. Such conflict can sometimes arise from
rights of the same nature, such as for example, when two people claim that they have
a good title of the same tenement, or from an opposing interest. Redenti17 maintains
that between a plea and the underlying right (attacked or prejudiced by the claim of
another person) there is a ‘relazione genetica ed una interdipendenza delle loro sorti’. Quite
15
C Mandrioli Corso di Diritto Processuale Civile (10th edn G. Giappichelli Editore Turin 1995) 121
See no 21 below.
17 E Redenti and M Vellani, Diritto Processuale Civile (5th Giuffrè Editore Milano 2000) p. 66.
16
22
interestingly, Chiovenda goes a step further and investigates whether the plea is a
right in itself:
Or si dirà che qualunque difesa, anche la semplice negazione dell’azione,
costituisce un diritto del conveuto. Certamente nel senso che il convenuto ha
diritto di difendersi con tutti i mezzi che sono a sua disposizione. Ma
l’eccezione è un diritto nel senso che il convenuto ha diritto di impugnare
l’azione: e ciò non accade che in casi determinati.18
Therefore, according to Chiovenda, the plea is only a defendant’s right in limited cases.
He illustrates this by means of a number of examples. If the debt is paid or is remitted;
if novation, intermixture of goods, loss of the thing due take place; if a resolutive
condition occurs; in all these cases the action is indeed no longer existent. If the
contract was simulated, the action never existed. In these cases the judge rejects the
demand not because the defendant raised the plea but because the action does not
exist and the judge cannot uphold unfounded demands. If, on the other hand, we are
talking about pleas such as prescription, compensation, retention, incapacity, vices of
consent, and lesion, the judge, in the absence of a plea to that effect, must uphold the
demand, because the action, unless the defendant decides to make use of his right to
impugn it, exists and the action is well-founded. Indeed it may happen that even in the
first cases, if the defence of the defendant is lacking, the judge would not know
anything about the payment, of the novation, of the loss of the due thing and so on,
and so he upholds the demand. Yet, this will depend only on the ignorance of the
judge, and not because of the lack of exercise of the defendant’s right of impugnment.
A judgment which condemns the defendant to pay a debt which has been already paid
is an unjust one, even though the judge has ignored that the payment has occurred.
Contrastingly, the sentence which condemns the defendant to pay a debt, the
prescription of which could have been pleaded but was not so pleaded, is not an unjust
one even though the judge knew that the prescriptive period had elapsed.
Chiovenda argues that one can renounce the right to oppose the plea of prescription
which is a proper plea. This is because proper pleas are rights of impugnment and
these can be renounced to. However, the author affirms that one cannot renounce to
the pleas such as the plea of payment or the plea of the loss of the thing due since,
although one can choose not to defend himself from an unfounded demand, one
cannot validly oblige himself a priori not to defend himself. If the plaintiff opposes the
plea of payment or similar pleas because he alleges that there was a contract of
18
G Chiovenda Saggi di Diritto Processuale Civile (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Milano 1993) vol 1, 153.
23
renunciation to these defences, the judge should free the defendant without
considering such a contract. The rationale behind this is that the judicial process
cannot serve to invent new juridical relationships. On the contrary, it serves to
ascertain the existence or non-existence of such relationships.19
5
The nature of pleas in relation to the burden of proof
The determination of the nature of particular pleas raised by the defendant impinges
on the shift or otherwise of the burden of proof. On this topic, Satta maintains that
the distinction between pleas and defences is important since it is only in the case of
the former that the maxim reus in excipiendo fit actor applies.20 To put it simpler, this
maxim means that if by means of his plea, the defendant is alleging different facts
from those alleged by the plaintiff, the defendant must prove those facts. This
principle has been recognized by our jurisprudence for a long time. Carnelutti
explains that with regards to the facts pleaded by him, the defendant becomes a
‘plaintiff’ for purposes of proof. However, the facts alleged by the defendant serve to
attack the plaintiff’s pretended right and not for the defendant to pretend a different
right.21
For instance, in the case Gustav Ricci v Harry Latzen (First Hall Civil Court, 18th
February 1965), the plaintiff sued the defendant for the price of sale of carpets.
Defendant pleaded that this sum was not yet due since litigants had agreed upon a
later date for payment. However, he did not manage to substantiate his claim with
proof and thus this plea was not upheld, as the Court rightly commented ‘min jallega
fatt għandu l-piż tal-prova fuq spallejh’.
This case was quoted with approval in the recent case St. George's Bay Hotel Limited v
Bay Street Holdings Limited et (First Hall Civil Court, 25th September 2003) where the
Court added: ‘M’hemmx għalfejn jingħad li f'dan il-każ il-piż tal-prova jaqa' fuq l-imħarrkin
fuq il-massima li reus in excipiendo fit actor, u huma meħtiega l-istess provi fi grad tali li s-soltu
jaqa’ fuq attur dwar il-pretensjonijiet tiegħu’.
19
G Chiovenda Saggi di Diritto Processuale Civile (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Milano 1993) vol 1, 151-152.
S Satta Diritto Processuale Civile (CEDAM Padova 1967) 149.
21 F Carnelutti Lezioni di Diritto Processuale Civile (Editrice Universitaria Padova 1921-22) vol 2, 365.
20
24
This principle was emphasised in detail in the more recent case Joseph Camilleri et v
Rosaria Psaila et (Court of Appeal, 1st March 2006) where the Court held: ‘Hu prinċipju
dottrinali, sostenut mill-ġurisprudenza, illi in kwantu “reus excipiendo fit actor”, il-fatt allegat millappellanti, u minnhom imqiegħed a bażi ta’ l-eccezzjoni sollevata biex tikkuntrasta l-pretiża ta’ lavversarju, kien jaggrava fuqhom li jippruvawh’. In order to better explain the burden of
proof in civil cases, the Court quoted a Italian Court of Cassation case (20th April
1996, No. 3775) 22 which states that in order to distribute the onus of proof, if
defendant just submits a defence based on facts different than those on which
plaintiff is basing his claim (instead of generically contesting the plaintiff) he would be
proposing a plea of substantive nature and he must prove such plea according to
article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code. If he does not manage to adequately prove his
plea, therefore, his plea will be dismissed. If on the other hand, the defendant limits
himself to state that the juridical relationship which is the basis of the plaintiff’s
demand is inexistent, and therefore one of the conditions of the demand is lacking,
then it is up to the plaintiff to prove the existence of such relationship because it is a
constitutive element of his demand. According to the Italian Court of Cassation,
‘allorche le circostanze costitutive dell’ azione esperita siano desumibili ‘ex actis’, incombe al
convenuto di dimostrarne l’ inefficacia’.
Hence, when the defendant bases his defence on pleas which portray facts differently
from the way they are presented by the plaintiff, the defendant must prove the
veracity of such facts. Therefore, while the plaintiff must demonstrate the juridical
facts which constitute his rights, the defendant alleging the inexistence of those facts
must prove his thesis as well.
The allocation of the burden of proof between the plaintiff and defendant was also
the subject of the judgment in Gaetana Mamo v Therese sive Tessie Mercieca et (First Hall
Civil Court, 26th October 2005) where the Court held that every party must prove the
existence of the fact alleged by him:
L-oneru hu distribwit b' mod li l-attriċi trid tipprova l-fatti kostituttivi taddritt azzjonat minnha (“actori incumbit probatio”) mentri l-konvenuti huma
tenuti jipprovaw il-fatt minnhom allegat kostitwenti l-kontroprova offerta biex
tikkuntrasta il-pretiża ta' l-attriċi (“reus in excipiendo fit actor”).
The Court went on to say the burden of proof incumbent on the defendant is only
relevant when the plaintiff would have brought forward evidence to substantiate his
22
reported in R Triola Codice Civile Annotato con la Giurisprudenza (Giuffrè Editore Milan 2002) 2179.
25
demand and this is because ‘in-nuqqas jew insuffiċjenza tal-prova taċ-ċirkostanzi dedotti millkonvenuti biex tikkonfuta l-pretensjoni ta' l-attriċi ma jiddispensax lil din mill-oneru li tiddemostra
adegwatament il-leġittimità u l-fondatezza tal-meritu tat-talba tagħha’. Consequently, even if the
defendant fails to prove his position, the plaintiff must still prove the demand in order
for it to be upheld by the Court.
For instance, in the case of X suing Y for payment of a particular sum of money, if Y
is pleading payment, he must prove that payment was actually effected. If X proves
that the sum demanded is due and Y proves that the sum was actually paid, and a
situation of doubt is created, this doubt will always favour the defendant. Even if the
defendant does not manage to prove payment, the plaintiff still has to prove that the
pretended sum is due. This was explained in very clear terms in Manuel Zerafa v
Nazzareno Muscat Scerri (First Hall Civil Court, 27th May 1970) by Mr. Justice Caruana
Curran as follows:
U fil-każ ta' konflitt serju bejn il-kontendenti fuq il-provi inkombenti
rispettivament lilhom, ċioe l-attur, l-esiġibilita` u l-konvenut is-soluzzjoni taddebitu, in-nuqqas tat-tieni ma tikkolmax il-lakuna probatizja ta' l-ewwel u
jibqa' dejjem jimpera l-prinċipju ‘actore non probante, reus absolvitur’. L-attur
li jallega d-debitu ma jistax jiskarta l-oneru tiegħu fuq il-prinċipju l-ieħor ‘reus
in exipiendo fit actor’ għax, jerġa' jingħad, l-oneru ċentrali ta' l-akkuża jibqa'
fuqu.
Altrimenti f' kull każ ta' kunflitt ikun faċli għall-attur jirbaħ avolja l-Qorti
tibqa' sospiża fi stat ta' dubju jekk hemmx debitu.
This principle was recently reaffirmed in Maltacom P.L.C. v Kurt Galea Pace (Court of
Appeal, 19th May 2004) where the Court held that in case of doubt of whether
payment was effected or not, then such doubt must favour the defendant. This
contrasts starkly with the decision delivered by the same judge less than five months
before, Emanuela Cefai et v Angelo Xuereb (Construction) Limited (First Hall Civil Court,
28th January 2004) wherein he had stated:
Fejn konvenut jikkontrapponi difiża bażata fuq ħlas bi kwalsiasi mod loneru tal-prova tal-pagament jew kompensazzjoni hu fuq id-debitur konvenut
li jallegah. Hu wkoll ġeneralment aċċettat illi f’ każ ta’ dubju dan kellu jkun
riżolt favur l-attur kreditur li ma kellux dan l-istess oneru.
In the case of prescription it seems that the defendant who raises the plea of
prescription must not only specify clearly which prescriptive period he is pleading but
he must also prove the lapse of the prescriptive period. Although cases such as Hilda
26
Bartolo et v Giuseppina Zammit et (First Hall Civil Court, 13th January 1953, Vol.
XXXVII.II.326) used to hold that once prescription is pleaded, it is up to the plaintiff
to attack such plea, recent cases such as Josianne Sciberras v Giovanni Vella et (Court of
Appeal, 21st February 1996) and Jeremy Holland v Joseph Chetcuti (Court of Appeal, 25th
February 2000) held that it is up to the defendant to prove the prescriptive period has
really lapsed. These two different trends were discussed in Luciano Martinelli noe v
Saviour Pisani (Court of Appeal, 22nd June 2005) where the Court held that ‘Fil-fehma ta’
din il-Qorti jidher li dan l-aħħar insenjament jagħmel aktar sens ġuridiku’.
Generally speaking, as confirmed in L&D Attard Company Limited v Joseph Mifsud et
(Court of Appeal, 25th January 2006), it is only when the fact alleged by plaintiff has
been proved to such a degree that the plaintiff's demand seems prima facie satisfied
that the burden of proof becomes incumbent upon the defendant: ‘spiss jiġri li waqt li lkawza tkun mixja, il-piż tal-prova jgħaddi fuq il-konvenut, għax jista’ jkun ġie stabbilit fatt li juri
prima facie li t-teżi ta’ l-attur hija sostenuta’23.
If the Court believes that the plaintiff has not adequately proved his demand,
however, the Court cannot immediately adopt the principle of in dubio pro reo but must
try to determine which version is more likely and truthful. The Court should not,
when facing doubt, automatically decide in favour of the defendant. This has been
established in the classic case Carmelo Farrugia v Rokku Farrugia (Civil Court, 24th
November 1966), Mr. J. Caruana Curran held that when the Court is faced with two
conflicting versions, such a situation should not leave the Court in a quandary and
opt for the application of the in dubio pro reo principle. The Court continued that
conflicting evidence is occasioned by the errors of perception and passion which are
inherent in the human nature and the Court must be ready to tackle such situations:
Meta l-każ ikun hekk, il-Qorti m’għandhiex taqa’ ċomb fuq l-iskappatoja
tad-dubju, imma għandha teżamina bl-akbar reqqa jekk xi waħda miż-żewġ
verżjonijiet, fid-dawl tas-soliti kriterji tal-kredibilità u speċjalment dawk talkonsistenza u verosimiljanza, għandhiex teskludi lill-oħra, anke fuq il-bilanċ
tal-probabilità u tal-preponderanza tal-provi, għax dawn, f’kawża ċivili, huma
ġeneralment suffiċjenti għall-konvinċiment tal-ġudikant.
The Court went on to state that in cases where there are two diametrically opposed
theses, it is obvious that one of the parties is not saying the truth.
23
also confirmed inter alia in Joseph Zammit v. Joseph Hili (Court of Appeal, 27th June 1953, Licari Estates
Limited et pro et noe v. Carmel Vella (Court of Appeal, 10th October 2005).
27
When the Court has the task of evaluating the credibility and weighing the evidence,
the test is not whether the judge believes the version of facts brought before him but
whether such a version is in fact possible and true to life. This was explained in Joseph
Borg et v Joseph A. Bartolo (Court of Appeal, 25th June 1980).24
6
Simple pleas and reconventional pleas
According to Mortara25, pleas may be subdivided into two further categories, namely
eccezioni semplici (simple pleas) and eccezioni riconvenzionali (reconventional pleas). He
states that simple pleas are those that oppose the demand of the plaintiff by alleging a
procedural or substantive defect of the pretended right. Mortara gives some examples
of these simple pleas: the plea of lack of competence of the magistrate (procedural
defect), the plea of extinction of the obligation, by payment, renunciation,
prescription etc (substantive defect). The author affirms that this classification is
based on the fact that these pleas only serve to oppose the demand on its own
grounds. Each demand made to the Court must contain a number of procedural and
substantial elements which make it admissible to be examined by the magistrate and
show it to be well-founded. The negation of any of such elements is a defence based
on simple pleas.
In some cases it is not possible to contest the demand in this manner but it is possible
to show that it is unfounded by directing the judge’s examination to another set of
elements (facts or juridical relationships) which if proven to be correct, would
necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s pretended right is non-existent. In some other
cases, the demonstration of the non-existence of substantial elements claimed by the
plaintiff, must be given through a wider research, which research cannot be
completed unless the adjudicator goes beyond the limits of the plaintiff’s demand. An
example of the first situation would be that of pleading set-off in order to establish
the extinguishment of the credit claimed by the plaintiff. An example of the second
situation would be to plead a total obligation in order to show the untenableness of
24
These two cases were recently quoted with approval in Vincent Cutajar (Appellanti) v Teddy Cefai pro et
(Appellati) (Court of Appeal, 15th September 2005).
25 L Mortara Commentario del Codice e delle leggi di procedura civile (Vallardi Milan 1923) 27.
28
the partial or accessory obligation of which the plaintiff demands the fulfillment. The
pleas brought forward in these two examples are, properly speaking, counterclaim
pleas.
Under our law, reconventions are dealt with in Book Second, Part I, Title VIII,
Subtitle 1 – Of Reconventions. Our law provides two instances where the defendant
can set up a counter-claim (reconvention) against the plaintiff. 26 The first instance
occurs where the claim of the defendant arises from the same fact or from the same
contract or title giving rise to the claim of the plaintiff. This is akin to the second
example given by Mortara described above. This first instance where counter-claims
may be set-up was thoroughly explained in the recent case Air Malta plc v South Rays
Ltd (First Hall Civil Court, 30th June 2004). The Court said that regarding the words
‘same contract’ or ‘fact’ found in article 396 of chapter 12 it is established that the
word ‘fact’ refers to the totality of operations or transactions that gave rise to the
juridical nexus. The Court made it clear that ‘fact’ can never be held to mean
something which arose after and consequently to the fact that judicial proceedings
were initiated to determine whether one of the parties had breached the contract (i.e.
the real ‘fact’).
The second instance under our law where counter claims are allowed to be set up is
when the object of the claim of the defendant is to set-off the debt claimed by the
plaintiff, to bar in any other manner the action of the plaintiff, or to preclude its
effects. This second instance was dealt with in the case Joseph Scerri v Anna Fenech et.
(First Hall Civil Court, 3rd August 2003) where the Court held: ‘It-tieni bażi għarrikonvenzjoni kontenuta fl-Artikolu 396(b) tal-Kap. 12 ossia meta ssir rikonvenzjoni “għaliex limħarrek ikollu l-ħsieb li bil-kontro-talba tiegħu jpaċi jew iġib fix-xejn l-azzjoni tal-attur jew
iżomm l-effetti tagħha” ma tistax tiġi sewwa mfissra jekk mhux fid-dawl tal-kliem ewlieni ta' dak
l-artikolu, u preċiżament mal-ħtieġa li bejn talba u kontro-talba jrid ikun hemm konnessjoni u li
tali konnessjoni trid tinstab bejn l-istess partijiet.’ Thus, for a counter claim to be set up,
there must necessarily be a nexus between the claim and the counterclaim and such a
nexus must subsist between the plaintiff and the defendant. This was also confirmed
in the case Alexis Vella et noe v David Jones et noe (First Hall Civil Court, 31st January
2003) ‘Min jiġi ċitat in ġudizzju f’ċerta kwalità (e.g. f’ ismu proprio) ma jistax jagħmel kontrotalba fi kwalità diversa (e.g. bħala rappreżentant ta’ ħaddieħor)’ and in Gasan Insurance Agency
Limited Noe v Simon Soler et (Court of Appeal, 22nd November 2002) wherein it was
26
Art. 396 of the COCP.
29
held that ‘Talba rikonvenzjonali hi akkordata biss kontra l-attur u mhux ukoll kontra konvenut
ieħor fil-proċeduri’. 27 In Georgina Vella Xebba v Emanuel Caruana U B'digriet Tas-16 Ta`
Ottubru 1981, Gie Kkjamat Fil-Kawza Joseph Vella (Court of Appeal, 25th March 1986)
the Court held that a counterclaim cannot be set against a joinder (kjamant in kawża)
and raised this plea ex officio:
Minn eżami tad-disposizzjonijiet relattivi għar-rikonvenzjoni (article 396 et
seq.) jidher ċar illi l-kontro-talba tal-konvenut tista’ ssir biss kontra l-attur u
kwindi l-kontro-talba f’din il-kawża tal-konvenut inkwantu magħmula
kontra Joseph Vella (li lanqas biss kien fil-kawża meta saret il-kontrotalba u
li ġie kkjamat fil-kawża wara) hija nulla – nullità dina li l-Qorti tista’ u
anzi għandha tissolleva ex ufficio billi tirrigwarda materja ta’ proċedura u
ordni pubbliku.
After examining the instances when a counterclaim is warranted, we must now see
what is the relationship between a plea properly so speaking (eccezione semplice) and a
counterclaim (eccezione riconvenzionale). The similarity between the two lies in the fact
that both are means of defence afforded to the plaintiff. This was eloquently
explained in a classic Maltese decision about counterclaims in the names Negte. Luigi
Spiteri Debono v Negte. Charles Darmanin noe (Court of Appeal, 25th April 1930, Vol.
XXVII.I.895) wherein it was held ‘la riconvenzione, essendo in diritto un mezzo di difesa,
venne dal legislatore giustamente estesa a tutti i casi suddetti in cui il convenuto, agendo contro il suo
attore, potrebbe difendersi’. 28 Therefore, the right to submit counterclaims seems to be
extended to all those cases in which the defendant is empowered to set up pleas to
defend himself. Another similarity between pleas and counterclaims is that they must
be presented together in the same sworn reply29. This was stipulated in the case Joseph
Brownrigg noe v Frederick Heese et noe (Commercial Court, 3rd April 1989): ‘Il-kontrotalba
trid issir man-Nota ta’ Eċċezzjonijiet fi żmien għoxrin jum min-notifika taċ-Ċitazzjoni’.
Although bearing many similarities, Mattirolo exhorts us to accurately distinguish a
counter claim from a plea: ‘Questa nuova domanda, che il convenuto, quasi reagendo, propone
contro l’attore, si chiama “riconvenzione” … la quale perciò vuole essere accuratamente distinta
27
Here one must briefly note the current debate surrounding the issue of whether or not the defendant
in an action in rem set up in personam counterclaims against the plaintiff’s in rem claim and whether the
defendant has the legal capacity to do so. See inter alia Meilaq Sammy Noe v Attinel Oral Noe (Court of
Appeal, 5th October 2001).
28 Quoted with approval in the majority of subsequent cases about the matter, most notably in Gasan
Insurance Agency Limited Noe v. Simon Soler et (Court of Appeal, 22nd November 2002).
29 Art. 398 of the COCP.
30
dall’eccezione’30. The Italian author maintains that while the plea is just a reply to the
principal claim, the counterclaim constitutes a new demand and therefore gives rise to
a second suit, which is logically and legally connected to the first one. Mattirolo
explains the distinction by means of two examples:
1) The lessee sued by the lessor for the payment of rent – or the buyer sued by
the seller for the payment of the price - bring forward the non impleti contractus
plea by means of which they claim that they are not liable to pay because they
have not acquired the enjoyment and full and peaceful possession of the
leased or bought object. In such cases, the suit, from what results from the
demand and plea, is one. However if the said defendants, in the same case,
demand the transfer and the possession of the leased or bought thing, or
damages for the contractual breach, then in the latter case by means of the
reconventional demand by the defendant, a new suit arises (and thus we have
two actions/suits proceedings together – mutuae petitionis).
2) If X, sued by Y for the payment of a sum of £ 3000 according to title A,
limits himself to demanding to be declared non-suited, by opposing an equal
credit, which he has against the plaintiff by means of title B – the suit is one.
The set-off claimed by the defendant has the form and attributes of a plea.
Therefore if the credit claimed by the defendant is more than £ 3000, and X,
after asking to be declared non-suited because of set-off, also demands that Y
be condemned to pay him the balance, this new demand would be a counterclaim and would give rise to another suit.
The distinction between a plea and a counter claim was elucidated in the
aforementioned Air-Malta case:
Il-Qorti tħossha fid-dmir li tagħmilha ċara li l-fatt li għan ta’ parti mħarrka
jkun li ġġib fix-xejn azzjoni mressqa kontriha ma jirrendix ġustifikat
invarjabbilment it-tressiq ta’ att ġudizzjarju fl-għamla ta’ rikonvenzjoni. Listess għan jintlaħaq b' Nota tal-Eċċezzjonijiet. Ma kien qatt il-ħsieb talleġislatur li jirrendi l-azzjoni rikonvenzjonali bħala strument ordinarju li bih
kull kawża tfaqqas fi tnejn. Kemm hu hekk, ir-rikonvenzjoni hija rimedju
straordinarju proċedurali li għandu ħsieb u għan speċifiku, u kemm hu hekk
hija waħda minn dawk il-proċeduri li l-Kodiċi isejjaħ ‘speċjali’ .
30
L Mattirolo Trattato di diritto giudiziario civile italiano (5th edn Fratelli Bocca Torino 1902–1906) vol 1,
43.
31
Therefore the Court is saying that when the defendant’s aim is merely to extinguish
the plaintiff’s claim, he is not always justified to make use of counter-claims, since in
such a case, the proper tool would be the note of pleas. According to the Court, a
reconvention is an extraordinary procedural measure and must only be used in
accordance with the special conditions laid down in the law31. In fact, according to
Dingli Av Dr. Kevin F. et noe v Surgiquip Ltd (Court of Appeal, 16th December 2003), a
counterclaim has all the elements of a separate writ of summons (wara kollox għandha laspetti kollha ta’ ċitazzjoni indipendenti).
31
However, see also F. Mercieca & Sons Mobili Ltd v George Borg et, (First Hall Civil Court, 28th February
2001) where the Court held that “Id-dritt tal-konvenut li jagħmel kontrotalba mhux limitat għal xi tip ta’ azzjoni.
Isegwi li la l-leġislatur ma impona l-ebda limiti, dawn ma jistgħux jiġu mposti mill-Qorti. Infatti l-kliem tal-liġi flimsemmi artikolu huwa ċar li ċertament ma hemm lok għall-ebda interpretazzjoni.” This interpretation was
somehow qualified in the later case Mifsud Carmelo v Schembri Giuseppi (First Hall Civil Court, 28th April
2004) where the Court held: “L-Artikolu 396 tal-Kap.12 jiddisponi li "Fil-kawżi [fit-test Ingliż ‘in any action’']
il-konvenut jista’ jagħmel kontro talba kontra l-attur, basta din il-kontro talba tkun konnessa mat-talba tal-attur”.
32
B
1
DILATORY AND PEREMPTORY PLEAS
The importance of the distinction between Dilatory and Peremptory
Pleas
The distinction between dilatory and peremptory pleas is of fundamental importance
since our COCP lays down different rules applicable to each of the two categories of
pleas. However, the COCP does not give us a definition of dilatory and peremptory
pleas. Therefore we have to resort to our jurisprudence in conjunction with Italian
authors in order to determine which pleas are classifiable as dilatory or peremptory
respectively.
Mattirolo32 defines peremptory pleas as those pleas which have as their object the
extinction of the plaintiff’s right (such as, for example, the plea of payment), or to
annul (perimere) the lawsuit (for example, the plea of incompetence). On the other
hand, the author defines dilatory pleas as those pleas which have the aim to suspend
the exercise of the right of the plaintiff (for example, the plea arising out of a contract
which concedes a term of, which has not yet expired, to the debtor), or to suspend
the course of the lawsuit (for example, the plea with which the defendant asks for a
delay to demand the joinder of his guarantor).
The Italian author mentions the possibility of having peremptory pleas on the
proceedings (eccezioni perentorie del giudizio). He argues that such pleas are merely
dilatory on the merits and gives the example of the plea of incompetence. The author
states that such pleas are peremptory on the proceedings because if upheld they
would destroy the lawsuit completely but they are only dilatory vis-à-vis the merits
since the plaintiff can institute fresh proceedings in front of the competent judge.
32
L Mattirolo Procedura Civile , p. 40.
33
2
Dilatory pleas and related procedural rules
Carrè defines the nature of dilatory pleas by delving into the etymological origin of
the word. He states that that the word dilatory is derived from the Latin terms diferre
and dilatum because dilatory pleas tend to defer the procedure and the judgment. In
fact, Mortara stipulates that the test to be used to identify whether a plea is dilatory or
peremptory is to look at the result that it produces or tries to produce. Accordingly if
a plea postpones or defers the discussion and the settlement of the judicial
controversy it is a dilatory one.
Our Courts have described dilatory pleas as being pleas the effect of which is to
postpone the action and not to totally exclude it33. According to Raymond Fenech et v
Antoine Bajada et (First Hall Civil Court, 4th June 2004) ‘din l-eċċezzjoni m’għandhiex effett
ieħor ħlief li tikkostrinġi lill-attur jerġa’ jipproponi l-azzjoni tiegħu’.
According to our jurisprudence, dilatory pleas also include those pleas which may be
regarded as peremptory pleas on the proceedings (such as Mattirolo’s eccezioni perentorie
del giudizio). Therefore, the rules that the COCP lays down with respect to dilatory
pleas are also applicable to the peremptory pleas on the proceedings. Salvu Mintoff &
Sons Limited v Road Construction Limited et (Court of Appeal, 2nd December 2005)
defined a peremptory plea of the proceedings as follows:
Għaldaqstant il-punt imqanqal mill-konvenuti jolqot il-kawża odjerna filqofol tagħha – din hija eċċezzjoni perentorja tal-ġudizzju li darba tiġi
milqugħa twaqqaf l-azzjoni kollha bla ħtieġa li jiġi investit il-mertu.
Emmanuel Borg pro et noe v Neg Joseph Grixti et (Court of Appeal, 15th March 1948)
explained that the law when making the distinction that the dilatory pleas must be
raised in limine litis was referring to pleas that are dilatory of the merits. A different
interpretation would run counter to the rationale and utility of that provision, since
the law desires that before a party produces its pleas on the merits, such party must
specify whether there are any procedural grievances. The Court also said that the term
‘peremptory plea’ is not inclusive of peremptory pleas on the proceedings as the latter
are akin to dilatory ones. Similarly, in Charles Debono pro et noe v John Caruana noe (Court
of Appeal, 5th April 1971) it was held that for purpose of the procedural rules in
33
See inter alia Dr Austin Sammut noe v. Silvio Mifsud noe (Court of Appeal, 22nd June 1994).
34
which pleas are to be set up, peremptory pleas of the proceedings have to be
considered as dilatory pleas: ‘din id-dispożizzjoni tal-liġi tirreferixxi għall-eċċezzjonijiet
perentorji merament tal-ġudizzju; dawn ta’ l-aħħar għall-finijiet ta’ l-istadju li fih għandhom jiġu
eċċepiti, għandhom jitqiesu bħala eċċezzjonijiet dilatorji’. This principle was then reaffirmed in
Carmela armla ta’ Joseph Farrugia v Avukat Dr Grazio Mercieca LL.D. noe (Commercial
Court, 22nd June 1988) where it was held that:
Eċċezzjonijiet dilatorji jistgħu jingħataw biss in limine litis, waqt li
eċċezzjonijiet perentorji jistgħu jingħataw f'kull waqt tal-kawża, anke waqt lappell. Iżda eċċezzjonijiet li huma perentorji biss tal-ġudizzju u mhux talmertu jitqiesu bħala eċċezzjonijiet dilatorji, u għalhekk jistgħu jingħataw biss
in limine litis.
As a general rule, in actions instituted by (sworn) application, all pleas whether
dilatory or touching the merits must be included in the sworn answer and no other
pleas can be set up at a later stage. Article 728(1) of the COCP states:
Subject to the provisions of article 731 in actions instituted by writ
of summons 34 or by application, all pleas whether dilatory or
touching the merits shall be raised in the sworn answer, as the case
may be. Those pleas touching the merits shall be raised without
prejudice to the dilatory pleas.
This rule, when applicable is interpreted rather strictly. In fact, when commenting
about this article, the Court in Pace Associates Ltd v Drawing Techniques Ltd (Court of
Appeal, 7th December 2005), held ‘Kif saput, il-proċedura hi liġi ta’ ordni pubbliku u, allura,
jekk il-provvediment tal-liġi jippreskrivi ċertu konvenzjoniżmu, kemm ta’ forma jew ta’ kontenut,
mhux ammessa interpretazzjoni oħra ħlief dik letterali, u hi din li għandha tiġi osservata u segwita’.
However there are a number of exceptions to this general rule. The first exception
arises when the party who intends to raise dilatory pleas at a later stage (pendente lite)
requests this possibility from the Court by means of an application and the Court has
the discretion of allowing the setting up of these additional pleas if it is satisfied that
there were valid reasons for not raising them in limine litis.
Article 728(2) states:
34
This should probably read ‘sworn application’.
35
No other pleas can be set up at a later stage; provided that the
court may on an application by the defendant or respondent allow
the setting up of additional pleas, if it is satisfied that there were
valid reasons for not including them in the note of pleas or in the
answer.
Secondly, the general rule is not applicable to pleas which may be set-up at any stage
of the proceedings. In fact Article 731 states:
The provisions of article 728 shall not apply to such pleas as by an
express provision of this Code may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, or to pleas the reason for which arises during the
trial.
Article 732 of the COCP in actual fact expressly lays down that peremptory pleas may
be raised even before the appellate court although they may not have been raised
before the court of first instance. Thirdly, if the reason for a particular plea arises
during the trial, then the general rule, i.e. that all pleas have to be necessarily included
in the sworn answer, does not apply.
Therefore, unlike peremptory pleas, almost all dilatory pleas have to be set up in the
note of pleas or in the answer and cannot be set up at a later stage. The rationale
behind this rule was expounded in the Borg v Grixti case. The law wants that before
the defendant raises his pleas on the merit, he states whether he has any objections
vis-à-vis the procedure. It would be against the spirit of the law if procedural pleas
were to be raised at the appellate stage. In fact, when a plea does not attack the merit
but just the procedure, it is considered to be a dilatory plea and as such must be raised
in limine litis. Some cases even examined why it is so desirable that dilatory pleas are
not raised at an advanced stage of the proceedings. One such case was Paolo Cachia v
Carmelo Cachia (Court of Appeal, 15th January 1965, Vol. XLIX.I.129) which stated ‘la
l-buona fede bejn il-partijiet, indotta mill-aċċettazzjoni tat-terren tad-diskussjoni, ta’ l-ekonomija
taż-żmien u l-ispejjes għal-partijiet u lanqas l-użu sewwa tal-ministeru tal-Qorti ma jippermettu li
jsir hekk’. Moreover, if these pleas are not set up in the manner prescribed by law,
they can neither be raised in the written submissions (nota ta’ l-osservazzjonijiet) nor in
the oral debate.35
35
See Fogg Insurance Agencies Limited et v. Raymond Azzopardi et (Court of Appeal, 25th February 2004),
and Emmanuele Busuttil v Francesco Mercieca (Court of Appeal, 15th April 1950, Vol. XXXIV.1.410)
36
3 Peremptory pleas and related procedural rules
Carrè explains that the word ‘peremptory’ derives from the Latin perimere, peremptum
which mean to destroy, to extinguish and to annul both the demand brought forward
by the writ of summons (sworn application) and even the action itself. The author
states that the peremptory pleas on the merit aim at definitively deciding the action,
without examining whether the demand is properly founded, since the action is
extinguished or has been destroyed because of numerous reasons, including res
judicata, payment, prescription etc.36 Indeed, when faced with the issue to distinguish
between a dilatory and a peremptory plea our Courts held that a peremptory plea is
one which destroys the action definitely37.
Therefore when a defendant raises a peremptory plea successfully he does not only
manage to stop the current procedures but he actually bars the plaintiff from
proposing the same action again.
As was already said, the general rule is that all pleas must be contained in the sworn
answer. Yet one of the exceptions to this is that peremptory pleas may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings (pendente lite), even at the appellate stage38. According to
Laurent:
È di principio che le eccezioni perentorie possono essere opposte in tutto il
corso del procedimento: s’intende però l’eccezioni che distruggono l’azione e
la rendono assolutamente inefficace.39
This principle was upheld even in early cases, including Dr. Naudi v Geoghegan (Court
of Appeal, 30th November 1903) and Eduardo Grech, quale Presidente della Filarmonica
“Sta. Maria” di Musta v Negoziante Francesco Darmanin (Commercial Court, 15th January
1907), which cases maintained that a peremptory plea is ‘opponibile in qualunque stadio
del giudizio anche in seconda istanza’.
In Sunspot Tours Limited v. C.H. Caterers Limited (Court of Appeal, 16th December
2001), the Court went into great detail in order to explain which pleas can be raised
36
CLT Carrè Commentario sulle leggi della procedura civile (3rd edn Domenico Capasso Naples 1853-56)137.
Dr Austin Sammut noe v. Silvio Mifsud noe (Court of Appeal, 22nd June 1994), where the Court held
“Eċċezzjoni perentorja toqtol l-azzjoni definitivament”.
38 Art. 731(1) of the COCP.
39 Laurent Diritto Civile Vol. XXXII, para. 175, p. 146.
37
37
pendente lite. The Court admitted that the provisions of the COCP found under the
title Of Pleas are leading to some conflicting views with respect to the necessity of the
setting up of additional pleas. The Court reiterated the general rule i.e. that all pleas
both dilatory and peremptory must be raised in the sworn reply or in the answer, as
the case may be. Then the Court mentioned the two exceptions to this rule. Firstly,
additional pleas may be raised if the person submitting such pleas can show to the
satisfaction of the Court that there are valid reasons why such pleas were not raised in
the sworn answer. Secondly, a party to the proceedings may raise those pleas which in
accordance with an express provision of the COCP may be raised in any stage of the
proceedings or pleas that may arise during the pendency of the case. These include
peremptory pleas, which have as their effect the extinguishment of the procedures.
Article 731 of the COCP, which deals with those pleas which by an express
disposition of the law may be raised pendente lite, states that in such cases the
provisions of article 728 do not apply. This means that when, during the pendency of
the suit, there arises the need of setting up a peremptory plea or any another plea
which by means of an express provision of the COCP can be raised pendente lite, it is
not necessary to make an application to the Court as contemplated in article 728(2)
and consequently the Court does not enjoy any discretion to examine whether there
exists a valid reason why such plea was not raised in the sworn answer. This is
because peremptory pleas have as their effect the termination of the proceedings and
pleas that arise during the pendency of the suit could never be set up at the stage
when the sworn reply was presented. In such a case, the Court must only go into the
question of establishing whether such pleas are really of a peremptory nature or
whether their necessity arose during the course of the procedure. The Court may, in
the case of peremptory pleas raised pendente lite, take such fact into consideration when
ordering costs if it results that such pleas could have been raised in the sworn answer.
In Edwin Mirabelli noe. v John Parnis England noe. et (Commercial Appeal, 23rd January
1989) the Court held that a peremptory plea can be raised even at an appellate stage.
However, this may be reflected in the way the costs are distributed: ‘din is-sottomissjoni
tista’ ssir f’ dan l-istadju tal-proċeduri, għalkemm, jekk tiġi aċċettata, il-fatt li ġiet mogħtija flistadju ta’ l-appell jista’ jkun ċirkostanza li tagħti lok għal temperament fil-kap ta’ l-ispejjeż’. This
was recently confirmed inter alia in Karl Pace et v Peter J. Sullivan pro et noe (Court of
Appeal, 15th February 2006).
38
(a)
Rules relating to the setting up of additional pleas
Article 158 (11) of the COCP states that:
The sworn reply, after the conclusion of the evidence of the
plaintiff and before the defendant produces his evidence, may be
amended by means of a separate statement either withdrawing any
of the pleas set up or adding new pleas, saving those pleas which
may be set up at any stage of the proceedings.
Therefore, the defendant may, after the conclusion of evidence of the plaintiff,
withdraw or add new pleas by means of a separate statement (nota). However, this
article does not apply to those pleas, which may be set up at any stage of the
proceedings (e.g. peremptory pleas).
However, the defendant by raising new pleas cannot change completely his line of
defence. This principle is best elucidated by the Latin maxim selecta una via non datur
recursus ad alteram. It was explained in the case Diana Gatt et v Vincent Said (Court of
Appeal, 23rd February 2001), where the Court stated:
Una volta l-parti f’kawża tkun għażlet triq ta’ difiża tal-jeddijiet tagħha,
kemm bħala attur kif ukoll bħala konvenut, u proċediet fuqhom bil-preżentata
ta’ azzjoni jew eċċezzjoni, ma kienx konsentit lil dik il-parti illi f’dawk listess proċeduri tibdel il-linja difenzjonali tagħha. Ma kienx hekk permess li
tagħmel f’kull każ imma żgur li ma seta’ jiġi aċċettat qatt li jekk isir meta lbidla fil-linja difenzjonali proposta bl-eċċezzjoni ulterjuri tkun tali li tbiddel
kompletament il-bażi tad-dritt li biha l-konvenut jkun qed jiddefendi ruħu u
anzi tkun in kontradizzjoni netta magħha.
Thus, the new plea should not be in conflict with the line of defence previously
adopted by the plaintiff in such a manner as to change completely the legal basis
used by the defendant to defend himself.
Problems have arisen regarding whether all the procedural requirements prescribed by
article 158 for the setting up of original pleas in the sworn reply, such as the
confirmation on oath before the registrar or legal procurator of the sworn reply, are
also applicable in the case of additional pleas. In other words, do additional pleas
have to be sworn before the registrar or legal procurator?
39
In Paul u Salvina konjuġi Tabone v Joseph Mizzi (First Hall Civil Court, 27th February
2002), the Court examined what formalities, if any, are required for the setting up of
additional pleas: The Court40 held that all the requisites of form and time-limits laid
down in article 158 for the presentation of the note of pleas (now sworn reply) refer
exclusively to the original note of pleas. For additional pleas, only subarticle 11 is
applicable, which subarticle establishes that the withdrawal or addition of pleas must
take place by means of a statement (nota) and the period in which such statement may
be presented. Therefore, the Court argued, that the only formalities which must be
observed when setting up additional pleas, are those required by article 158(11).
4
What pleas were deemed to be dilatory / peremptory by our Courts
As already indicated above, our Courts have constantly subscribed to Mortara’s test in
order to establish which pleas are dilatory or peremptory. Therefore, if a plea
postpones the discussion and the settlement of the judicial controversy it is a dilatory
one. Otherwise, if the plea has the effect of destroying the action, then that plea is a
peremptory one.
(a)
Prematurity of action
The nature of this plea was discussed in St. George’s Bay Hotel Limited v Bay Street
Holdings Limited et (First Hall Civil Court, 26th June 2003), where the plaintiff sought to
stop defendants from using its trademark. The first plea raised by plaintiffs was that
of the prematurity of the plaintiff’s action since the plaintiff’s claim was not made
known to them prior to the institution of this case. The Court said that the plea of
prematurity, if upheld, ‘jeħles lill-parti mħarrka milli tibqa’ iżjed fil-kawża, bil-jedd tal-parti
attriċi li terġa’ tibda proċedura meta jgħaddi t-terminu li kien ingħata’. Thus, the effect of this
plea makes it obvious that we are dealing with a dilatory plea.
40
referring to Josephine Mart Charles Santucci v. Charles Sive Carmelo Santucci (Court of Appeal, 7th August
1986)
40
In the recent case Iris Dalmas v Ronnie u Carmen konjugi German (Court of Appeal, 16th
March 2005), the Court maintained that the appellants could not raise the plea of
prematurity of action for the first time at the appellate stage, because it is a well
known principle that this plea ‘hija ta’ natura dilatorja u ghalħekk għandha titqajjem fil-bidu
tal-kawża’ and therefore it must be raised in limine litis. Similarly, in Carmelo Spiteri v
Luqa Ellul (Commercial Court, 28th May 1965), plaintiff raised an additional plea
(eċċezzjoni ulterjuri) of prematurity of action. The Court held that ‘din l-eċċezzjoni, fil-fatt
m’hix sollevabbli fl-istadju li ngħatat billi hija ta’ natura dilatorja u kwindi għandha titqajjem filbidu’.
In Profs Ian Refalo noe v Victor Borg Grech (First Hall Civil Court, 16th February 2006),
the Court examined the nature of the plea of prematurity of action and held that:
Illi tali eċċezzjoni, li hija waħda ta’ natura dilatorja u għalhekk għandha
titqajjem u tiġi mistħarrġa fil-bidu tal-kawża… Minbarra dan, … l-effett ta’
eżitu favorevoli għal eċċezzjoni ta’ intempestività huwa dak li jeħles lill-parti
mħarka milli tibqa’ iżjed fil-kawża, bil-jedd tal-parti attriċi li terġa tibda
proċedura meta jgħaddi t-terminu li kien ingħata.
The classification of the plea of prematurity of action does not seem to pose any
special difficulties and in fact, it has traditionally and constantly been classified as
dilatory.
(b)
Plea of lack of capacity of the parties
This plea is defined in article 780 of the COCP which states that:
The plea as to the capacity of the plaintiff or the defendant may be
raised, if the one or the other is under any legal disability to sue or
be sued or if he sues or is sued in the name and on behalf of
others without being lawfully authorized for the purpose.
This plea is one of those listed in article 730 of the COCP, which means that this plea
must be determined by a separate head either before or together with the decision on
the merits. Thus it would seem that this plea is a dilatory one. However, as explained
in Dr. Robert Staines et noe v Carmelo Ellul Sullivan et noe (Court of Appeal, 30th May
1995) ‘Importanti li jiġi hawn rilevat li l-Kodiċi ma jgħidx ukoll li dawn it-tipi ta' eċċezzjonijiet
41
huma dilatorji.’ In fact, the article also mentions the pleas of compromise and of
prescription which are certainly both peremptory and not dilatory. The Court held
that, since the plea of lack of capacity of the parties destroys the action against the
defendant and impinges on the merit, it is evident that this is a peremptory plea. On
this point, the Court quoted Foramiti: ‘Eccezioni perentorie sono quelle che distruggono
l’azione; tali sono: il pagamento gia’ fatto di un debito che viene domandato; una trasazione, una
rinuncia, la prescrizione ecc.,. in virtù delle quali il convenuto deve essere esonerato dalla domanda.
Simili eccezioni anche secondo il diritto romano possono essere opposte in ogni stato di causa’.
Our Courts have consistently considered the plea of lack of capacity of the parties as
a peremptory one. The classic decision is Grech noe v Darmanin (Commercial Court,
15th January 1907, Vol. XX.III.517) where it was held that: ‘Che, come è stato ritenuto
dalla Corte di Appello nella causa Dr. Naudi vs. Geoghegan (30 Novembre, 1903) l’eccezione di
illegittimità di persona non è eccezione dilatoria, ma perentoria, opponibile in qualunque studio del
giudizio anche in seconda istanza’. This decision has been often quoted by subsequent
judgments and our jurisprudence has been constant on this point. One such example
is Joseph Valentino v Gio. Andrea Vassallo et (Court of Appeal, 8th April 1957, XLI.1.637)
where the Court stated: ‘il-konvenut jista' jagħti l-eċċezzjoni tal-illeġittimà tal-persuna tal-attur
u din l-eċċezzjoni tista’ tiġi sollevata fl-appell, avvolja ma tkunx ġiet sollevata fl-ewwel istanza; għax
din hija eċċezzjoni perentorja, u mhux dilatorja. … Imma jekk din l-eċċezzjoni tiġi sollevata flappell u ma tkunx giet sollevata fl-ewwel istanza hemm lok għal temperament fil-kap tal-ispejjeż.’
This is confirmed also in the case Rita Portelli v Ministru tal-Ġustizzja u Affarijiet
Parlamentari u Harry Portanier (Constitutional Court, 22nd July 1985), where the Court
held that ‘Kif ġie diversi drabi ritenut minn dawn il-Qrati, l-eċċezzjoni tal-illeġittimità tal-persuna
mhix eċċezzjoni dilatorja iżda hija waħda perentorja u għalhekk opponibbli fi kwalunkwe stadju
tal-ġudizzju, anke fis-sekond'istanza meta jista' jkun hemm temperament fil-kap tal-ispejjeż’.
In Soċjetà Filarmonika La Stella v. Kummissarju tal-Pulizija (Court of Appeal, 19th July
1997), the Court classified the plea of lack of capacity as peremptory of the
proceedings. Technically speaking, a peremptory plea on the proceedings is
considered by our jurisprudence as having the effects of a dilatory one. Therefore, the
classification in this case is an erroneous one since the Court affirmed that this plea
amounts to ‘eċċezzjoni perentorja tal-ġudizzju li skond il-liġi tiġi sollevata anke fl-istadju ta’ lappell’. We have already seen (in footnote 33 above) that peremptory pleas on the
proceedings are considered to be dilatory pleas and therefore cannot be raised at any
42
stage of the proceedings. Therefore, the Court’s affirmation in La Stella v. Kummissarju
tal-Pulizija is a contradictory one as a peremptory plea of the proceedings cannot be
raised at an appellate stage. Probably, therefore, the Court should have classified this
plea as a peremptory one and not a peremptory plea of the proceedings.
Unfortunately, this erroneous classification is also evident in a recent Court of Appeal
decision in the names Dennis Burke et v Anthony Grech Sant et (Court of Appeal, 3rd
March 2006) where the Court equated the fact that since this plea must be determined
by a separate head either before or together with the decision on the merits, therefore
it is peremptory of the proceedings: ‘l-ewwel eċċezzjoni tammonta għal kwestjoni ta’
leġittimita’ tal-parti fil-kawża, li hija waħda ta’ natura perentorja tal-ġudizzju u jeħtieg, fil-kliem
espress tal-liġi, li tiġi deċiża, b’kap għaliha, qabel jew flimkien mas-sentenza fil-mertu’. As already
explained, if this plea were to be classified as being peremptory of the proceedings, it
cannot be raised at any stage of the proceedings but only in limine litis. Moreover, the
vast majority of judgments dealing with this plea have affirmed that this plea can be
raised at any stage of the proceedings.
This point was expressly treated in Rosario Cutajar v Giovanna Caruana (First Hall Civil
Court, 22nd February 1947, XXX.3.39), where the Court did not agree with the
plaintiff who said that the plea of lack of capacity of the parties is peremptory of the
proceedings and has to be raised in limine litis:
Illi l-attur qal ukoll illi dina l-eċċezzjoni hija perentorja tal-ġudizzju u kien
imissha ngħata “in limine litis”. Imma apparti li dina l-asserzjoni tiegħu
mhijiex eżatta, jingħad li huwa dmir il-ġustizzja li tikkunsidra f’azzjoni
ġudizzjarja l-kwalità ta’ min jintentaha għall-interess ta’ dik il-parti li trid
tiddefendi ruħha kontra tagħha. Il-parti konvenuta ma tistax tkun kostretta
tispjega ruħha u tipproċedi ma’ persuna li hija taf li ma għandux dritt u li
kontra tiegħu ma tistax tottjeni kundanni li jistgħu jkunu opposti lill-veru
propjetarju, u għalhekk fi kwalunkwe stadju tal-ġudizzju, tant il-Qorti “ex
officio” kemm il-partijiet konvenuti, għandhom id-dritt jivverfikaw il-kwalità
tal-persuna li tkun qiegħda tattakka d-dritt tagħhom.
In fact, all judgments (whether they classified this plea as being peremptory of the
merits or of the proceedings) have all affirmed that the plea of lack of capacity of the
parties can be raised even at the appellate stage.
However, a notable exception comes from an appeal from the Rent Regulation Board
in the names Emanuela Camilleri v Doreen Spiteri (Court of Appeal, 16th May 1995)
43
where the Court held that ‘Eċċezzjoni ta’ l-illeġittimità tal-persuna ċitata in kawża, li hi ta’
natura preliminari, u li ma tqajmitx quddiem il-Bord li Jirregola l-Kera ma tistax titqajjem
quddiem il-Qorti ta’ l-Appell. Għalhekk l-appellanti ma tistax fi stadju ta’ appell, tippretendi li
hija mhix u ma kinitx aktar il-leġittimu kontradittur’. Thus, the argument in this case is
diametrically opposed to the jurisprudence discussed regarding this plea. While in
previous judgments, the Court held that this plea is a peremptory one and as such can
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, the Court in Camilleri v. Spiteri held that this
plea is a preliminary one and can only be raised in limine litis.
On the nature of the plea of lack of capacity, therefore, there have been a number of
inaccuracies in judgments delivered by our Courts. The author believes that the
proper classification of this plea would be as being peremptory of the merits and as
such can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In fact, as rightly highlighted by
Satta, the incapacity to be suited impinges directly on the merits:
Il merito quindi (il diritto sostanziale) viene ad essere una componente
essenziale della parte, e questo è il valore della preziosa intuizione della
Cassazione che ha sempre ritenuto che la legittimazione ad agire può essere
rilevata ex officio in qualunque stato e grado della causa : ciò che, se non fosse
vero quel che diciamo, sarebbe assurdo.41
Consequently, being a peremptory plea of the merits, it can be raised at any stage of
the proceedings.
(c)
Plea of desertion of a cause
This plea, according to the COCP, is the only plea which if not raised before the
other peremptory pleas would be deemed to have been waived. In fact article 732(2)
states that ‘Nevertheless, the plea of desertion of a cause shall be deemed to have
been waived, if not raised before any other peremptory plea’.
This was explained in the recent case George Sciberras et v Josephine Spiteri et (Court of
Appeal, 8th June 2004) where the Court held that rule found the above-mentioned
article 732(2) is supported by the terms of article 963(4) of the COCP:
41
S Satta Diritto Processuale Civile (CEDAM, Padova 1967) 76
44
L-eċċezzjoni tad-deżerzjoni minħabba nuqqas ta’ notifika tar-rikors ta’ appell
tista’ tiġi rinunzjata impliċitament - u għalhekk multo magis espliċitament minn min għandu l-aktar interess li jissollevaha, u ċioè l-parti li ma tkunx ġiet
notifikata bir-rikors entro t-terminu msemmi.
Here one can note that when the classification of a plea as a peremptory one
emanates directly from the COCP, the risk of having conflicting judgments regarding
the nature of the plea is greatly reduced.
(d)
Plea of jurisdiction and incompetence
The plea of lack of jurisdiction and incompetence is traditionally considered to be
dilatory, since if such a plea is successful, the plaintiff has the possibility to file
another lawsuit before the proper court. Until recently, it used to be maintained that
if the defendant fails to raise the plea of jurisdiction in limine litis, he is tacitly
renouncing to such plea. In fact, in Emanuel Lawrence Vella Fil-Kwalita Tieghu Ta’
Amministratur Ta' L-Eredità Ta’ Natalizia Magri v Bernardina Armla Ta’ Joseph D’ Amato
(Court of Appeal (Civil, Inferior), 28th October 1994), the Court quoted Sir Antonio
Micallef, ‘L’eccezione però d’incompetenza relativa nelle cause ordinarie dev’essere proposta prima
della contestazione della lite per non farse presumere prorogata la giurisdizione del giudice’ 42 .
However, later cases challenged this principle and maintained that since such a plea
must be raised ex officio by the Court if it deems so necessary, it does not follow that if
the defendant does not raise this plea in limine litis he is renouncing to it. In fact in
Rosina Grima nomine v Joseph Vella proprju nomine et (Court of Appeal, 14th April 1997)
the appellants appealed from a decision of the first Court which had said that since
the plea of incompetence was not raised in limine litis it was deemed renounced. The
Court of Appeal held that this plea should have been raised ex officio by the First
Court. Moreover, according to the appellate court, the First Court was also legally
incorrect when it stated that once this plea was not raised in limine litis then it is
inadmissible. The Court quoted Edward Borg v Edward Bartlett (Court of Appeal, 11th
May 1992) where the Court of Appeal had held that ‘din il-Qorti hija obbligata li tħares u
tissalvagwardja f'kull deċiżjoni li tagħti l-Ordni Pubbliku bħal ma hija din il-kwistjoni ta'
inkompetenza’.
42
Micallef, A., Trattato della Procudera Civile, Primo Tomo, p. 199.
45
This judgment was recently also quoted with approval in Sea Services Ltd v Paul
Aquilina et (First Hall Civil Court, 12th December 2001), where the Court held:
Minkejja li l-eċċezzjonijiet dilatorji għandhom jingħataw fil-bidu tad-difiża, leċċezzjoni ta' l-inkomptenza tal-Qorti għandha tiġi neċessarjament sollevata
mill-Qorti ex ufficio meta jkun hemm l-estremi tagħha, peress illi din hija
kwistjoni li tolqot l-organizzazzjoni tal-Qrati u għalhekk għall-isfera ta' ordni
pubbliku u li l-Qorti hija obbligata li tħares u tissalvagwarda f'kull deċiżjoni li
tagħti, trid bilfors tiġi sollevata u deċiza minnha.
Moreover, a distinction must be drawn between the relative lack of jurisdiction of a
Maltese Court and the absolute lack of jurisdiction of Maltese Courts. In the first case,
the Court/Tribunal in front of which the case is brought is not competent since
another Maltese forum is competent. In the latter case, the Maltese Court/Tribunal is
not competent because a foreign Court/Tribunal is the competent forum.
It is the latter kind of incompetence which led to some problems when a plea to that
effect arose in front of our Courts, since this plea is not easily classifiable as either
dilatory or peremptory. Our Courts have traditionally treated this plea as a dilatory
one and used to maintain that when there is a contract (which in many cases
happened to be a bill of lading) between the parties that stipulates that the proper
forum is a foreign Court, ‘quando l’eccezione d’incompetenza nascente dal patto suddetto non è
stata opposta in ‘limine litis’ s’intende rinunziata’43 . However, recently it was argued that
when such plea is successful, the result would be of having the action extinguished in
front of any Court in Malta. Consequently, it was argued that such a plea is a
peremptory one, since if raised with success, the plaintiff would not be able to file
fresh proceedings on that matter before a Maltese Court. This issue was discussed in
the case Dr Austin Sammut noe v Silvio Mifsud noe (Court of Appeal, 22nd June 1994).
The Commercial Court had decided that:
L-eċċezzjoni in kwistjoni hija kontra l-ġurisdizzjoni ċjoè ta’ inkompetenza
assoluta in kuntrast ma’, u għall-inkompetenza relattiva bejn id-diversi
Qrati tagħna. Mhix però assoluta fis-sens ġurisdizzjonali, in kwantu l-Qrati
tagħna f’każijiet bħal dawn – kieku ma kienx għal ftehim bejn il-partijiet, kien
ikollhom ġurisdizzjoni konkomitanti ma’ Qrati esteri
Plaintiffs appealed from this decision and their first grievance regarded the plea of
incompetence due to lack of jurisdiction and whether it should be raised in limine litis.
43 Negoziante Michele Zammit per la Ditta Zammit e Cachia e Negoziante Joseph Cauchi per la Ditta Bianchi e
Cauchi v. Negoziante Gennaro Civitelli (Court of Appeal, 26th November 1920, Vol XXIV.1067)
46
According to appellants, the plea of incompetence is a dilatory one, because its effects
are merely temporary in the sense that the action is postponed and not definitively
extinguished. Appellants quoted article 731 of Chapter 12 which mentions some pleas
that can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if the reason for such pleas arises
during the trial. Appellants argued that in this case, the reason for such a plea of
incompetence is found in the bill of lading which existed much before the filing of
the writ of summons. The Court of Appeal once more stressed the fact that if a plea
of incompetence is not raised in limine litis, it does not follow that the defendant has
automatically submitted himself to the jurisdiction of that Court. The Court of
Appeal explained that this is due to the fact that, first, such an argument would be
illogical and, secondly, the Court can raise that plea ex officio. The Court of Appeal
upheld the judgment of the first Court and stated that the plea in question was a
peremptory plea of the merits and so the Court could take such a plea into
consideration.
Therefore it seems that the current position vis-à-vis the plea of incompetence is that
a plea of incompetence rationae materiae or rationae valoris is a dilatory one, but since it
can be raised by the Court ex officio, its absence in the sworn reply does not mean that
the defendant is submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the Court. On the other
hand, if there is a contract between the parties which has a jurisdiction clause
establishing a foreign forum as the appropriate court, then if a plea of incompetence
is raised before a Maltese Court, then such a plea would be a peremptory one.
Consequently, such plea can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, apart from the
fact that such a plea can be raised by the Court ex officio.
(e) Plea of prescription
Our jurisprudence is generally consistent in maintaining that the plea of prescription
is a peremptory one and can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In Dr. Robert
Staines et noe v Carmelo Ellul Sullivan et noe (Court of Appeal, 30th May 1995), the Court
held that the plea of prescription is characteristically peremptory and not dilatory.
Then, the fact that the plea of prescription can be raised at any stage of the
proceedings is expressly stated in article 2112 of the Civil Code. In Lawrence Muscat v
47
Gozo Channel Company Limited (Court of Appeal, 7th May 2002) the Court disagreed
with the judgment of the Court of Magistrates and held that ‘illi dwar l-eċċezzjoni talpreskrizzjoni, għandu invece jingħad li bħala eċċezzjoni perentorja, din tista’ tingħata f’kull stadju
anki fil-Qorti ta’ l-Appell għalkemm ma tkunx ġiet meħtieġa fil-Qorti ta’ l-ewwel grad’.
In Gayle Scerri v Eric Borg et (Court of Appeal, 20th October 2003), it was held that:
Eċċezzjoni perentorja fuq il-meritu japplika għaliha d-dispost tal-Artikolu
732 (1) tal-Kap 12 li jipprovdu li “eċċezzjonijiet perentorji jistgħu jingħataw
ukoll fil-qorti fil-grad ta' appell għalkemm ma jkunux ġew mogħtija fil-qorti
ta’ l-ewwel grad”. B’mod aktar preċiż “l-eċċezzjoni tal-preskrizzjoni tista’
tingħata f’kull waqt tal-kawża, mqar fl-appell”. Infatti qatt ma ġie ddubitat
jekk l-eċċezzjoni tal-preskrizzjoni anki bl-emendi għall-Kodiċi ta’ Proċedura
tistax tiġi sollevata fi stadju ta’ l-appell salv dejjem il-kwestjonijiet rigwardanti
l-kap ta’ l-ispejjeż.
One may therefore conclude that the plea of prescription is a peremptory one and has
almost invariably been considered as such.
48
C
PLEAS THAT MAY BE RAISED EX OFFICIO
1
The general principle
After considering what pleas may be set up by the parties, it has to be assessed
whether the Court can raise any pleas of its own motion. It must be made clear at the
outset that as a rule, our jurisprudence has established that the Court cannot raise
pleas itself. This rule was eminently laid down in the case Joseph Gatt v Joseph Galea
(Court of Appeal, 12th July 1965), where the Court held:
L-Imħallef Ċivili għandu fl-għoti tas-sentenzi f’kawża joqgħod rigorosament
fil-limiti tal-kontestazzjoni b’mod illi, waqt li hu obbligat jokkupa ruħu millkwistjonijiet kollha dedotti fil-ġudizzju mill-partjiet, min-naħa l-oħra ma
jistax, jitratta u jissolvi kwistjonijiet li l-partijiet ma ssollevawx.
The only exceptions to this general rule are those instances where the power to raise
pleas ex officio emanates from the provisions of the COCP and where the matter
concerns an issue of public policy. This was well explained in the case Ignazio Debono v
Michael Debono et (First Hall Civil Court, 2nd February 1990) which stated that
according to the principles of justice no Court has the right to raise pleas ex officio
except those pleas which must be so raised by the Court, and such pleas are always
connected with public policy issues, such as jurisdiction and competence issues.
Otherwise, the Court would not remain equidistant between the parties and would be
infringing the natural rights principles namely the audi alteram partem principle and the
nemo judex in causa propria since the Court would be raising a plea and deciding it itself.
Therefore, only those pleas, which the law itself expressly states that may be raised by
the court ex officio, and those touching an issue of public policy may be raised by the
court of its own motion.
49
2
Pleas that may be raised ex officio
In this section, an examination of how the Court pronounced itself upon different
pleas will be carried out. This examination will be limited to those pleas which still
present some degree of uncertainty regarding whether they can be set up ex officio.
(a)
Plea of jurisdiction and competence
According to article 730 of the COCP, pleas to the jurisdiction and competence of
the court are among those pleas which have to be determined by the Court under a
separate head, either before, or together with the decision on the merits. Article 774
of the COCP states that the Court shall ex officio raise the plea of lack of jurisdiction
when 1) the action is not one within the jurisdiction of the courts of civil jurisdiction
of Malta and the defendant has either made default in filing the statement of defence
or is an absent defendant represented in the proceedings by curators; or 2) the court
is incompetent ratione materiae or ratione valorem; or 3) where in actions touching the
recovery of deposits, the monies or other things are deposited under the authority of
another court. However, this article has a very important proviso which states that in
the second case, i.e. when the Court is incompetent ratione materiae or ratione valorem,
pleas to the jurisdiction may not be pleaded nor raised ex officio in an appellate Court.
The principles emanating from this article were confirmed and interpreted in
numerous cases. For example, in the afore-mentioned Gatt v Debono case, it was held
that pleas of lack of jurisdiction or competence may be raised ex officio. This was also
confirmed in Raymond Calleja v L-Avukat Dottor Raymond Pace et noe (Court of Appeal,
31st January 1996). In the case John Spiteri et v Stephanie Spiteri pro et noe, (Court of
Appeal, 20th October 2003) the Court held that our jurisprudence has confirmed with
certainty, time and time again, that the plea of incompetence may be raised ex officio.44
The Court, quoting Carmelo Degiorgio noe v George Farrugia (Court of Appeal, 8th May
1981) said that the plea of incompetence cannot even set aside by an agreement to the
contrary between the parties.
44 The Court made reference to Emmanuele Vella v. Raffaella Barbara (Court of Appeal, 31st May 1957),
Patrick Grixti Soler v. Vincent Sultana (Court of Appeal, 27th March 1981).
50
Other judgments45 have confirmed the principle arising from the proviso to Article
774 of the COCP i.e. that the plea of incompetence ratione materiae or ratione valoris
may not be raised ex officio in the appellate stage, irrelevant of the fact whether the
First Court was obliged to raise that plea ex officio. To this effect, the Court quoted
Carmelo Mifsud v Giuseppe Vella (Court of Appeal, 30th July 1955, XXXIX.1.488) which
stated
apparti jekk l-Ewwel Qorti kelliex jew le tiddikjara ruħha "ex officio"
inkompetenti li tieħu konjizzjoni tal-kawża minħabba n-natura tad-domanda
tal-attur, hu fatt li dik id-dikjarazzjoni l-istess Qorti ma għamlitiex, u din iddikjarazzjoni ma tistax issir minn din il-Qorti għaliex hi liġi espressa illi leċċezzjoni ta' inkompetenza minħabba x-xorta jew il-valur tal-ħaġa li tkun filkwestjoni ma tistax tiġi dikjarata "ex officio" f'Qorti fi grad ta' appell.
In fact, on similar lines, we have the judgment in Commercial Services Bureau (CSB)
Limited v Grima Communications Ltd (Court of Appeal, 23rd June 2004), which held that
‘Kien jinkombi fuq is-socjeta` appellanti li tissolleva tali eccezzjoni u anke kieku, gratia argomenti,
din kienet wahda ta' ordni pubbliku l-fatt li ma gietx sollevata lanqas 'ex officio' mit-tribunal, ma
jfissirx li din issa tista' titqajjem in sede appell.’46
However, if the appellate Court believes that it is not competent to deal with the case
because there is no right of appeal, or a limited right of appeal, it can raise the plea ex
officio.
For example, in the case Saviour sive Aldo Portelli v Isabel Delia A&CE et (Court of
Appeal, 11th January 2006), the Court was faced with an appeal from a judgment
delivered by the Small Claims Tribunal. Since the right of appeal from such a
judgment is limited47, the Court held that it should, in the interest of public policy,
raise the plea of inapellability ex officio:
Qua Qorti ta’ reviżjoni din il-Qorti ma tistax tesorbita ruħha mill-arġinar
strett u limitat tal-liġi speċjali (Kapitolu 380) fejn għandhom x’jaqsmu ċċirkostanzi li fihom hu konsentit id-dritt ta’ l-appell, tant li anke jekk ma
tkunx sollevata b’ eċċezzjoni l-Qorti xorta waħda hi fid-dmir li tagħmlu hi
stess ex officio in bażi għall-prinċipju ta’ ordni pubbliku li ma jippermettix
lill-Qorti li tassumi ġurisdizzjoni li l-liġi ma tikkonsentilhiex.
45
such as Paul Caruana et v Norman Connell (Court of Appeal, 25th February 2004) and Brincat Saviour Et
v Salina Estates Limited (Court of Appeal, 25th February 2004).
46 Court also made reference to Anthony Fenech et v. Anthony Gauci et. (Court of Appeal, 9th March 1999).
47 Chapter 380 of the Laws of Malta.
51
Similarly in, Joan Zammit v S. Borg & Sons Ltd (Court of Appeal, 19th October 2005) an
appeal from a decision delivered by the Industrial Tribunal, the Court held that one
can only appeal from such a decision on a point of law and thus raised the plea of
inappellability ex officio: ‘anke fl-assenza ta’ preġudizzjali sollevata mill-kontroparti, din il-Qorti
għandha mhux biss id-dritt iżda [anke d-dmir] li tiddikjara ex officio l-inappellabilità tad-deċiżjoni
meta jkun il-każ’.
On the same lines, on the same day, we had the judgment in the names Alison
Fiorentino v Dragonara Casino Limited (Court of Appeal, 19th October 2005) where the
Court of Appeal held that it can ex officio raise the plea of inappellability since it is a
public policy plea.
(b)
Pleas relating to issues of public policy
As already hinted above, our jurisprudence has for a long time upheld that the Court
can raise a plea of public policy ex officio. In the above-mentioned Gatt v Galea (1965)
case, the Court of Appeal held that the Judge is obliged to raise issues of public policy
ex officio. However, over the years the application of this principle has proven to be
somewhat problematic, especially since not all judges agree on what issues are of
public policy or otherwise. This problem has arisen especially with respect to whether
a procedural plea is one of public policy. It has been established that procedure is a
law of public policy nature. A case in point is Markiż Anthony Cassar Desain et v
Giovanni Pace (Court of Appeal, 15th October 1965, Vol. XLIX.I.421) wherein the
Court held ‘Il-proċedura hi liġi ta’ ordni pubbliku. … U l-eċċezzjoni relativa, jekk ma tiġix
sollevata, jew tiġi rinunzjata, mill-parti l-oħra, għanda tiġi sollevata mill-Qorti “ex officio”’. Thus,
according to Cassar Desain v Pace, the Court is obliged to raise procedural pleas ex
officio since procedure is public policy law. However it has also been equally
established48 that ‘hu abbuż tal-kliem li jingħad illi, għaliex il-liġi ta’ proċedura hi liġi ta’ ordni
pubbliku ergo kull eċċezzjoni ta’ proċedura, anki stess meta jkun hemm lok ghaliha, għandha tiġi
rilevata mill-Qorti ex officio’. On the other hand, there were cases where the Court
48
In cases such as Romeo Sammut v. Flight Lieutenant Kenneth Shaw-Brown (Court of Appeal, 3rd April
1964), Joseph Gatt v. Joseph Galea (Court of Appeal, 12th July 1965), Veronique u Charmaine aħwa Amato
Gauci v. Marco u Anna konjuġi Zammit (Court of Appeal, 19th May 2004).
52
automatically equated a procedural defect with a public policy issue without going
into the merits. For example, in the aforementioned Vella v Caruana case (1986), the
defendant sought to raise a counter claim against another defendant (a joinder) and
the Court automatically raised the plea of procedural defect ex officio claiming that it
was a public policy issue.
(c)
Plea of lack of juridical interest
Related to the question of public policy pleas is the thorny issue of whether the plea
of lack of juridical interest can be raised ex officio. This issue is wholly linked to
whether the plea of lack of juridical interest is one of public policy or otherwise.
Traditionally, our Courts have held that the plea of lack of juridical interest cannot be
raised ex officio. For example in Ignazio Gatt v Michael Debono (First Hall Civil Court, 2nd
February 1990), the Court was faced with a judgment delivered by the same Court yet
differently presided whereby that Court49 ex officio had raised the issue of the plaintiff’s
juridical interest. The Court, in that case, had held that the plaintiff’s claim was
unsustainable because it lacked the juridical interest that was indispensable. As a result,
the Court of Appeal revoked the sentence of the First Hall and sent back the record
for the case to be heard in respect of the existence or otherwise of the juridical
interest.
The Court, in this case, held that it had to take a different approach to the issue that
the Court has a right to raise, on its own motion, any kind of plea that the parties may
not have themselves raised. On this point the Court held that ‘Skond il-principji talġustizzja, l-ebda Qorti m’għandha d-dritt li tissolleva eċċezzjonijiet ex officio ħlief dawk li l-ligi stess
timponi fuqha bħala dover, li huwa dejjem konness ma’ xi kwistjonijiet ta’ l-ordni pubbliku, bħal
ma hija l-problema ta’ gurisdizzjoni jew kompetenza’. The Court held that when the Court ex
officio raises a plea that is not ordained by the law, the Court would no longer remain
equidistant from the parties but would become a party to the suit itself and would be
contesting alongside one of the parties. The Court held that, as a malpractice, in order
to avoid this fact being contested by the other party, the Courts would raise the plea
49
Decision of the Court of Appeal on the 12th December 1983, in the names Ignazio Gatt vs Michael
Debono et (not published).
53
ex officio in the sentence itself and the party against whom this plea would be thus
raised against would not only be surprised (element ta’ sorpriża) but would also be
deprived from the possibility of rebutting that plea. In this respect, the Court held:
Il-Qorti tkun qed tikser bl-aktar mod pależi il-prinċipju ta’ audi alteram
partem. U mhux biss, ma tkunx tista’ tisma l-parti l-oħra għaliex tkun qed
tiskser wkoll principju iehor tal-ġustizzja li huwa nemo judex in causa
propria għaliex naturalment il-Qorti tkun qed tissolleva eċċezzjoni hija u
tiddeċidiha hija… Dan l-ezerċizzju ħazin infatti billi jikser dawn iż-żewg
prinċipji …iġib dejjem konsegwenzi deġenerattivi tal-ġustizzja proċedurali.
However, in the recent case, Kevin Chircop v Joseph Chircop (First Hall Civil Court, 28th
January 2004), the plea of lack of juridical interest was raised ex officio. This seems to
be a radical departure from the afore-cited case. The Court, in this case, justified the
raising of the plea ex officio by stating that the lack of interest is a public policy issue ‘IlQorti dehrilha bir-raġun li kellha tissolleva ‘marte proprio’ il-karenza ta’ l-interess fl-attur billi
tħoss li din hi kwestjoni ta’ ordni pubbliku li l-ġudikant hu obbligat li jirrileva ‘ex officio’ .
The Court held that by raising this plea ex officio it was respecting the principle that
justice must be administered well and according to law. Moreover, the Court held that
this principle is superior to the private interest of the parties. It maintained that the
principle of direct, lawful and actual juridical interest in he who files a case ‘jrid jigi
allura skrupolożament imħares bis-solennità proċedurali kollha, anke jekk mhux sollevat mill-parti
kuntrarja fil-ġudizzju.’
However, less than a month later, Fogg Insurance Agencies Limited noe et v Raymond
Azzopardi (Court of Appeal, 25th February 2004) held that the plea of lack of juridical
interest must be raised formally by the defendant since this plea is of a preliminary
nature and cannot be raised at a later stage in the proceedings. Moreover, the Court
held that this plea cannot be raised by the Judge who has to respect the limits of the
suit:
Il-kwestjoni tan-nuqqas ta’ interess ġuridiku kellha titqajjem “ope
exceptionis” in kwantu din fis-sustanza vera tagħha hi ta’ indoli proċedurali u
preliminari li ma setgħetx aktar titqajjem fi stadju inoltrat tal-proceduri. Kif
drabi oħra rilevat “la l-buona fede bejn il-partijiet, indotta mill-aċċettazzjoni
tat-terren tad-diskussjoni, ta’ l-ekonomija taż-żmien u l-ispejjes għal-partijiet
u lanqas l-użu sewwa tal-ministeru tal-Qorti ma jippermettu li jsir hekk”
(Kollez. Vol XLIX pI p138). Anzi ġie senjalat il-principju illi l-Imhallef
ċivili, u dan għandu igħodd ukoll għal Ġudikatur, għandu fl-għoti tas54
sentenza f’kawża joqgħod rigorożament fil-limiti tal-kontestazzjoni (Vol
XLIX pI p406).
Therefore while Chircop v Chircop held that the plea of lack of juridical interest should
be raised ex officio by the Court out of a public policy concern which is superior to the
private interest of the litigants, in Fogg v Azzopardi maintained that the plea of lack of
juridical interest should neither be raised at a later stage by the defendant nor ex officio,
this time out of a concern for the private interests of the litigants.
The stance of Chircop v Chircop was adopted in the case Improved Design Limited v
Antoine Grima (First Hall Civil Court, 4th March 2004) wherein the Court stated that in
the present case, the defendant did not raise the plea of the lack of jurisdiction of the
plaintiff company. The Judge held that when this plea is not raised by the defendant,
one must check whether the Court should raise this plea of its own motion: ‘Finnuqqas ta’ kontestazzjoni, wieħed irid jara jekk il-Qorti għandiex tqis minn rajha (ex ufficio) lkweżit tal-interess fil-kumpannija attriċi bħala element ewlieni kostitutiv ta’ kull azzjoni li tiswa’.
The Court held that it is ‘established’ that the Court has the power and the right to
examine the juridical interest of a party, even when there is no such plea. It is
interesting to note that the Court, in this case, chose to base this affirmation on the
decision of the Court of Appeal given on the 12th December 1983, in the names
Ignazio Gatt vs Michael Debono et (not published), which decision was however declared
to be an erroneous one by the First Hall Civil Court, diversely presided in the above
mentioned decision of the 2nd February 1990.
(d)
Plea of res judicata
Our Courts have maintained in numerous occasions that in order for the plea of res
judicata to subsist, there must exist three elements i.e. eadem personae, eadem res, and
eadem causa petendi. A case in point is Charles Cortis v Francis X Aquilina et (First Hall
Civil Court, 29th September 2003) where the Court held: ‘Hemm qbil ġenerali kemm fiddottrina u kif ukoll fis-sentenzi tal-Qrati dwar x’inhuwa meħtieġ biex l-eċċezzjoni tal-ġudikat tista’
tintlaqa’. Tlieta huma l-elementi li jmisshom jiġu murija minn min iqanqal l-eċċezzjoni biex din
isseħħ. Dawn l-elementi huma l-istess oġġett (eadem res), l-istess partijiet (eadem personae) u l-istess
mertu (eadem causa petendi)’.
55
The question of whether the plea of res judicata can be raised ex officio or otherwise is
also a problematic one. Vincent Cilia v L-Onor. Prim’ Ministru et. (28th January 2005)
dealt extensively with this plea and summed up local jurisprudence and doctrine on
the matter. The Court in this case affirms that bar some exceptions50, the prevalent
doctrine and jurisprudence maintain that the res judicata plea is not one of those which
can be raised ex officio. However, the Court said that if the parties bring this issue to
the attention of the Court, albeit indirectly and not in the form of formal plea, and
the Court notices that there is another preceding sentence between the parties on the
same issue and consideration, the judge is obliged to examine the issue.51 The Court
quoted Laurent: ‘Dal principio che l’eccezione della cosa giudicata non è di ordine pubblico, nel
senso che le parti interessate vi possono rinunziare, segue che il giudice non può supplire di uffizio
l’eccezione della cosa giudicata’52 While it is desirable that the renunciation of the res judicata
plea is made in a clear manner (Salvatore La Rosa de Cristofaro noe v Henri Rouselle noe,
First Hall Civil Court, 24th February 1939), the renunciation may be tacit as well, as
long as it is the clear expression of the will of the party who can raise that plea. In fact
Laurent affirms that:
Non bisogna credere che la rinuncia tacita sia una rinuncia presunta. La
rinuncia non si presume giammai, perché non si può presumere che una persona
abbandoni un diritto che le appartiene. Perché vi sia la rinunzia tacita bisogna
che la volontà sia così certa come se vi fosse rinunzia espressa: ma vi è questa
differenza: la rinunzia tacita risulta da un fatto il quale non può ricevere altra
interpretazione che quella della volontà di rinunziare allo effetto della cosa
giudicata.53
In Carmelo Seychell v Giovanni Depasquale (Court of Appeal, 11th January 1957), it was
held that the Court is not bound to raise the plea of res judicata ex officio, if there was
no such reference in the plea of the defendant:
50 E.g. see Giuseppe Micallef ed. v Grazio Micallef (First Hall Civil Court, 21st March 1923, Vol. XXV.2.284).
In this case the Court held: ‘Risultando tutti gli elementi necessary alla validità dell’eccezione del non bis in idem”
da una sentenza citata in causa da uno dei contendenti, la Corte è in obbligo di sollevare “ex officio” quell’eccezione,
benchè non sollevata esplicitamente da alcuno dei contendenti’. This judgment was confirmed on Appeal on the
23rd November 1923.
51 The Court mentioned a number of judgments that argue on these lines, namely Nutar Oscar
Azzopardi v. Gerald Cuschieri (First Hall Civil Court, 19th December 1950); Zammit pro et noe v. Gerald
Zammit (First Hall Civil Court, 28th June 1954); Assunta Cassar v. Avukat Dott. Carmelo Zammit noe (Court
of Appeal, 4th November 1955); Giuseppe Mallia v. Carmelo Giordimaina (First Hall Civil Court, 11th
November 1957); Toni Pellegrini v. Maurice Abela et noe (Constitutional Court, 9th March 1966).
52 F Laurent Principii di Diritto Civile (Vallardi Naples 1881) vol XX, 120.
53 F Laurent Principii di Diritto Civile (Vallardi Naples 1881) vol XX, 119.
56
Ma hemmx lok għal deċizjoni tal-eċċezzjoni tar-“res judicata” jekk dik leċċezzjoni qatt ma ġiet sollevata u għalhekk mhix nulla deċiżjoni tal-Board talKera fuq l-allegat motiv li l-Board ma ddeċidiex b’ kap separat, kif trid il-liġi,
dik l-eċċezzjoni, jekk ma jidherx li l-istess qatt ġiet imressqa quddiem il-Board,
jew ma jkunx hemm għaliex wieħed seta’ jaħseb li min jimponi n-nullità tassentenza tal-Board ried jissolleva dik l-eċċezzjoni.
Although the Cilia v PM case stated with certainty that the res judicata plea is not one
which can be raised ex officio, numerous cases54 in our jurisprudence have held that the
plea of res judicata is one based on public policy. If this were true, one would find it
hard to reconcile it with the fact that the plea of res judicata cannot be raised ex officio.
In fact, the outright certainty and optimism expressed by the Court in Cilia v PM in
the sense that ‘id-dottrina u l-ġurisprudenza prevalenti huma fis-sens li l-eċċezzjoni tar-res judicata
mhix waħda minn dawk li huma sollevabbli ex officio’ are immediately dispelled when one
reads the Court’s pronouncement in the case Albert Pace Cole v Chairman Tal-Maltacom
P.L.C. (First Hall Civil Court Constitutional Jurisdiction, 26th February 2004). Mr. J.
Tonio Mallia, in contrast with the Cilia v PM judgment admitted that ‘[m]hux ċar, filġurisprudenza, jekk il-Qorti tistax tissoleva hi stess ex officio l-ġudikat’. Thus while the Cilia
judgment crystallized the jurisprudential position as stating that this plea cannot be
raised ex officio, the Pace Cole judgment states that the jurisprudence is uncertain about
this matter. Mr. J. Mallia, in the latter case, held that it is incongruous to argue that
the plea of res judicata is one of public policy and at the same argue that this plea can
be renounced by the parties (as had happened in that case): ‘Din il-Qorti, kif issa
presjeduta, għandha d-dubji tagħha dwar kemm din il-proċedura hija valida, għax jekk il-ġudikat
għandha bħala sisien taghħha l-ordni pubbliku u ċ-ċertezza tad-dritt, diffiċli jiġi ammess li dak
kollu jista’ jiġi skartat bi qbil bejn il-partijiet f’kawża’.
Thus although, as stated in the Pace Cole judgment, it is generally agreed that the plea
of res judicata can be raised by the Court when although it is not raised formally by the
defendant, reference is made to a preceding decision 55 ; it is not sufficiently clear
whether it can be raised by the Court ex officio in all cases.
54
See inter alia Dr Josè Herrera noe v Anthony Cassar et noe (Commercial Court, 5th October 1992), Catherine
Portelli v Joseph Cachia (Commercial Court, 10th December 1992), Joseph Vella v. Emanuel Falzon (Court
of Appeal, 25th February 1997), and Anthony Borg et v Anthony Francis Willoughby et (First Hall Civil Court,
28th March 2003).
55 ‘Jidher, li l-Qorti tista’ tissolevha hi stess meta, għalkemm l-eċċezzjoni ma tkunx ġiet formalment mogħtija, tkun saret
riferenza għad-deċizjoni preċedenti (ara “Mallia vs Giordmaina” deċiża minn din il-Qorti fil-11 ta’ Novembru, 1957
(Vol. XLI.II.1163), “Cassar vs Zammit”, deċiża mill-Onorabbli Qorti ta’ l-Appell fl-4 ta’ Novembru, 1955
(Vol.XXXIX.1.282), u “Bonello vs Pule”, deċiża minn din il-Qroti fis-17 ta’ Frar, 1995)’
57
(e)
Plea of lis alibi pendens (litis pendentia)
The plea of lis alibi pendens may be raised in cases where there are two suits pending
before different courts in respect of the same claim. In terms of Article 794 (1) of the
COCP the plea of lis alibi pendens is a peremptory one and can be raised at any time
before judgment is delivered. If such a plea is accepted, it constitutes derogation from
jurisdiction. Article 792 of the COCP provides that: Where an action is brought before a
competent court after another action in respect of the same claim has already been brought before
another competent court, the second action may be transferred for trial to such other court.
In a recent judgment by the Court of Appeal, Adam Galea et v Tarcisio Calleja pro et
(Court of Appeal, 25th May 2001) appellants argued that the Court of first instance
should have ex officio raised the plea of lis alibi pendens. The Court of Appeal rejected
such an argument and held that the Court is not bound to raise the plea of lis alibi
pendens of its own motion:
L-implikazzjoni mbagħad illi din il-Qorti kellha minn rajha tiddeċiedi li
tissoprasjedi sakemm jinqatgħu proċeduri oħra li seta’ kellhom rifless fuq din
l-istanza hi għal kollox antiġuridika. Ġustament allura saret riferenza millappellati għall-ġurisprudenza li tgħallem illi “fis-sistema ġudizzjarju tagħna, lQorti m’għandhiex tissolleva eċċezzjonijiet, li ma hix awtorizzata
espressament mill-Kodiċi tal-Organizazzjoni u Proċedura Ċivili jew minn xi
konsiderazzjoni serja ta’ ordni pubbliku. Dana billi bħala norma l-ġudikant
għandu jiddeċiedi l-kawża billi joqgħod fuq il-binarju tal-kontestazzjoni li
jressqulu l-partijiet” (Edwin Grech vs Antida Saglimbene et, deciza millQorti tal-Kummerc fid-9 ta’ April 1992).
Once again, as in the case of the plea of res judicata, it may be argued that the plea of
lis alibi pendens is one of public policy since it is in the public interest not to have two
conflicting judgments on the same matter pronounced by two different courts. In fact
it results, from jurisprudence and doctrine, that once the Court is faced with a valid
plea of lis alibi pendens, it should ex officio declare that it lacks competence. This was
carefully explained in Anatoli Reznikov and his wife Natalia Reznikova v Nikolai A Kotivov
for and behalf of the foreign company Pan European Trading International Company Limited
(Commercial Court, 24th March 1994):
The effect of the plea of litis pendentia in the words of section 792
of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure is that the Court
before which the second action is brought may order the suit to be
58
remitted to the first Court. In fact, doctrine and caselaw in the
matter are to the effect that it is in fact mandatory for the Court to
declare its own incompetence ex officio if such plea is founded, in
spite of the use of the word ‘may’ in the said section quoted herein.
Thus, from the case-law on the matter it results that the Court cannot raise the plea
of lis alibi pendens out of its own motion, but should this plea be raised by defendant/s
and such plea is upheld, the Court is obliged to declare its own incompetence ex officio.
(f)
Plea of prescription
According to article 730 of the COCP, this is one of the pleas which if raised, the
Court must determine under a separate head. In fact, once raised the Court cannot
ignore this plea. The importance of this article was explained in Raphael Micallef v
Anthony Agius (Court of Appeal, 12th May 1997) wherein the Court held that article
730 is a ‘provvediment proċedurali tassattiv li jorbot lill-Qorti u li għandu jiġi osservat minnha taħt
piena ta' nullità tas-sentenza’. Moreover, the Court held that this ‘hi wkoll materja ta’ ordni
pubbliku fir-rigward tar-regolament proċedurali tat-trattazzjoni tal-kawża li tista’ tiġi sollevata
mill-Qorti ex officio’.
However, the Court cannot raise the plea of prescription ex officio. In fact, article 2111
of the Civil Code makes it clear that the Court cannot of its own motion give effect
to prescription, where the plea of prescription has not been raised by the party
concerned 56 . In Gasan Insurance Agency Ltd noe v Valletta Freight Services Ltd pro et noe
(Court of Appeal, 17th March 2003), the facts were as follows: the First Hall had
ignored the plea of prescription raised by defendant. The Court of Appeal held that
even though the defendant failed to specify the prescription applicable to the case,
the First Hall was not right to ignore the plea completely. The Court of Appeal held
that the First Hall should have commented on this fact, basing itself on the wellknown principle that the Court cannot ex officio determine the prescription applicable,
if this was not mentioned by the defendant:
56
This principle was also upheld in Vol XXXIII pI p481; Vol XL pI p170; Joseph Grech v. Emanuele
Camilleri et (Court of Appeal, 21st March 1977), and Gayle Scerri v. Eric Borg et (Court of Appeal, 20th
October 2003).
59
Eċċezzjoni bħal din, li kienet tidderimi l-azzjoni, ma setgħetx tiġi injorata millewwel Qorti, lanqas għal motiv li s-soċjetà appellanti naqset li tispeċifika d-dispost
tal-liġi applikabbli għall-każ. Anzi dan il-fatt kellu propjament jirċievi
kumment bażat fuq il-prinċipju magħruf, akkolt fil-ġurisprudenza, illi lpreskrizzjoni jew dekadenza eċċepita kellha tkun speċifikata ġjaladarba l-Qorti
ma tistax ‘ex officio’ tissupplixxi għan-nuqqas tal-parti (Vol XXXVII p II p.
630; Vol XLI p. I p. 178). Ma kenitx għalhekk ġuridikament korretta lewwel Qorti li tinjorah għal kollox.
Thus, the plea of prescription, not only cannot be raised ex officio, but the Judge
cannot determine ex officio the prescription applicable to the case. In fact, in the classic
case Ruggiero Cali v Perit u Arkitett u Inġinier Ċivili George Galea (Court of Appeal, 11th
May 1956) it was stated that the Court can only consider the prescriptive period
raised by the defendant and cannot of its own motion consider the existence of
another prescriptive period (even if this period really exists). Otherwise the Court
would be interfering and ‘tissuplixxi għall-parti eċċipjenti f'materja odjuża li fiha ma tistax
tieħu inizjattiva’.
The Court considered that the prescription pleaded by the defendant (i.e. that of two
years for actions of advocates, legal procurators, notaries, architects and civil
engineers, and other persons exercising any other profession or liberal art, for their
fees and disbursements) was not applicable in this particular case because such
prescription does not apply when there is a specific agreement between the parties
since the causa debendi in that case would be that specific agreement while the work of
the plaintiff is the causa causans of that agreement. The Court said that prescription
must be strictly limited to those cases to which it applies and cannot be extended to
other cases. If the defendant only raised the two-year prescription plea, then the
Court cannot apply another prescriptive period ex officio: ‘Għax xort'oħra l-Qorti tkun
qegħda tissupplixxi għall-parti eċċipjenti f'materja odjuża li fiha ma tistax tieħu inizjattiva; u flassenza ta' indikazzjoni ċara u speċifika ta' preskrizzjoni oħra, l-eċċezzjoni alternattiva talpreskrizzjoni mogħtija mill-eċċipjent mhix attendibbli’.
Our Courts have always held that the plea of prescription must be interpreted
restrictively. Therefore, even if there are doubts as to the applicability of the
prescriptive period which is being pleaded, such doubt would be suffered by the
pleader: ‘L-eċċezzjoni tal-preskrizzjoni trid tingħata tifsira restrittiva, u għalhekk jekk ikun
60
jezisti xi dubju dwar l-applikabilità taż-żmien preskrittiv minn dak li jirrizulta mill-atti, tali
dubju għandu jmur kontra l-eċċipjent.’57
As a corollary of the principle that the plea of prescription cannot be raised ex officio,
such a plea cannot be set up in the final written submissions but it must be raised
formally in the sworn reply: ‘Eċċezzjonijiet formali, bħal ma hija eċċezzjoni tal-preskrizzjoni,
ma għandhomx jingħataw f’noti ta’ osservazzjonijiet, imma bil-mod formali proċedurali.
Għaldaqstant l-eċċezzjoni tal-preskrizzjoni li ma tiġix mogħtija formalment qisha mhijiex quddiem
il-Qorti, u l-Qorti ma hiex tenuta tiddeċidiha; għax il-preskrizzjoni ma tistax tiġi sollevata millQorti ex ufficio’58. Consequently, if the plea of prescription is not raised formally, the
Court must not take cognizance of it.
Additionally, if the plea of prescription is raised by one out of several defendants, the
defendants who did not raise such plea, cannot benefit from the said prescription.
This was confirmed in a recent case in the names Joseph Borg v Josephine Breckon et
(Court of Appeal, 1st March 2006), where the Court dealt with the issue whether a
defendant could appeal from a judgment which declined the plea of prescription
raised by another defendant. The Court quoted a judgment, namely Francis X. Borg
noe. v John Court et (Court of Appeal, 18th June 1979), where a defendant sought to
appeal from a judgment which did not uphold the plea of prescription raised by the
intervenor, and with respect to this, the Court of Appeal held ‘il-konvenut huwa għal
kollox estraneju għal din il-preskrizzzjoni u mill-akkoljiment jew riġett tagħha ebda vantaġġ jew
nokument ma jista’ jidderiva. Hija tinċidi biss fuq ir-rapporti bejn l-imsejjaħ fil-kawża li ssollevaha
u l-attur li fil-konfront tiegħu ġiet opposta’. Basing itself on this 1979 decision, the Court of
Appeal in Borg v Breckon held that: ‘huwa dubitat kemm proċeduralment l-appellanti odjerna
setgħet tipprevalixxi ruħha biex tappella mis-sentenza b' aggravji fuq l-interpretazzjoni tagħha talpreskrizzjoni speċifika miġjuba 'l quddiem minn konvenut ieħor li ma appellax minn dik l-istess
sentenza’. Thus, it would seem that Borg v Breckon slightly departed from the absolutist
terms expressed by Borg v Court in that the Court held that it is doubtful whether a
defendant can appeal from a decision given with respect to a plea of prescription
which had been raised by another defendant. In fact, the Court in Borg v Breckon
afforded the appellant the ‘benefit of doubt’ and allowed her to appeal from the first
Court judgment with respect to the plea of prescription that had been raised by the
57
Stencil Pave (Malta) Limited v. Kunsill Lokali Naxxar (First Hall Civil Court, 30th October 2003)
Emmanuele Busuttil v. Francesco Mercieca (Court of Appeal, 15th April 1950),The Cargo Handling Co. Ltd v.
John Abela Ltd. (Court of Appeal, 7th July 2003).
58
61
other defendant. The Court's rationale behind affording the benefit of doubt to the
appellant was that even though it is doubtful whether such an appeal is valid, the plea
of prescription can still be raised at any stage of the proceedings (even at appellate
stage). Thus in this case, the Court circumvented the rule that the plea of prescription
can only bind the party who raise it, by saying that if a defendant appeals from a
decision given with respect to a prescription plea that had been raised by another
defendant, the Court of Appeal should consider that plea at the appellate stage and
treat it as if it were the appellants own. In the Court's own words:
Dan premess, il-Qorti f' dan il-każ ser takkorda lill-appellant il-benefiċċju
tad-dubju u tammetti l-aggravju fuq din il-kwestjoni. Dan għar-raguni illi
tikkonsidra li, bil-mod kif redatt l-appell, l-apellanti kienet qed ittendi li hi
stess tissolleva dik l-istess preskrizzjoni speċifika, kif hekk hu konsentit
lilha anke f’ dan l-istadju ta' l-appell bl-Artikolu 2112, Kodiċi Ċivili.
It must be pointed out, however, that if the defendant was contumacious before the
first court, he cannot raise prescription as one of his grievances at an appellate stage.
This was explained in Vivian Charmaine Mizzi v Carmel Mizzi (Court of Appeal, 30th
June 2004):
[G]ħalkemm huwa minnu li l-preskrizzjoni tista’ tiġi sollevata u eċċepita f’kull
stadju tal-proċeduri mingħajr riserva - anke fl-istadju ta' l-appell - jigi rilevat li
f'dawn il-proċeduri l-konvenut appellant kien ġie dikjarat kontumaċi u leċċezzjonijiet tiegħu sfilzati. Isegwi li mhux permess għall-konvenut li jressaq
ebda eċċezzjoni, inkluża dik tal-preskrizzjoni, għax jekk dan isir l-istess
konveut ikun qiegħed, b’dan il-mod, jissana l-posizzjoni tiegħu ta’ kontumaċi.
Another important issue to consider is that the plea of prescription is not one of
public policy. In fact, it is a generally accepted fact that acquired prescription can be
renounced59 and though the plea of prescription cannot be raised ex officio, the plea of
renunciation of prescription can in fact be raised ex officio. This was affirmed in
Eucharistico Gauci v Jesmond Borg et (Court of Appeal, 14th July 2004), wherein the Court
quoted a judgment delivered by the Italian Court of Cassation 60 to sustain his
arguments:
l’eccezione di rinuncia alla prescrizione non integra una eccezzione in senso
proprio, e pertanto può essere presa in esame dal giudice anche ‘ex officio’,
senza bisogno di un’apposita iniziativa della parte interessata, purchè i fatti
59
Art. 2108 of the Civil Code and see inter alia: Korporazzjoni Ghas-Servizzi Ta' L-Ilma v. Joseph
Quattromani, (Court of Appeal, 19th May 2004);
60 (C 96/963)
62
sui quali l’eccezzione si fonda, anche se non allegati dalla parti, siano stati
ritualmente acquisiti al processo.
It is interesting to note how the Court based itself solely on Italian jurisprudence,
which as we shall be seeing in the next chapter, varies significantly from the Maltese
concept regarding pleas which can be raised ex officio.
It is also essential to look at the distinction that the Courts have made between a plea
of prescription (preskrizzjoni) and a plea of forfeiture (dekadenza). This distinction was
explained in The Cargo Handling Co Ltd v John Abela (Court of Appeal, 7th July 2003):
Meta l-liġi tippreskrivi terminu li fih att ikun irid jigi kompjut, dak itterminu, minflok wieħed ta' preskrizzjoni ikun wieħed ta' dekadenza, fis-sens
li meta jkun għadda tali terminu dak l-att ma jibqax aktar ammissibbli. Ilkriterju distintiv huwa illi jekk disposizzjoni ma tgħidx espressament li
terminu huwa wieħed ta’ preskrizzjoni, jew li jkollu karatteristiċi talpreskrizzjoni, allura jkun il-każ ta’ dekadenza.
For example, this distinction has been made with respect to the period prescribed by
article 1407 of the Civil Code for the action of the seller for an increase of the price
and the action of the buyer for a diminution of the price or for repudiation of the
contract. This action is barred by the lapse of two years from the day of the contract.
According to our jurisprudence, such a period is not a prescriptive one but one of
forfeiture. This has been confirmed by Noel u Georgina konjuġi Curmi v Dottor Joseph
Ellis et (Court of Appeal, 27th February 2004) where the Court held:
Dejjem ġie ritenut mill-Qrati tagħna li hawn si tratta ta’ terminu ta’
dekadenza ta’ l-azzjoni u bħala tali la għandhom jidħlu konsiderazzjonijiet
dwar difetti latenti u lanqas ta’ perjodi ta’ sospensjoni jew interruzzjoni
bħalma hu possibli f’każ ta’ termini preskrittivi li nsibu elenkati fil-Kodici
Ċivili tagħna. Fi kliem ieħor ftit li xejn sewa li l-atturi qagħdu jittratienu u
jieħdu ż-żmien tagħhom sakemmfinalment ippromovew l-azzjoni tagħhom,
bit-tama li nel frattemp forsi jikonvinċu lill-venditur li huma kellhom raġun.
This decision was based on abundant case law, including the case Emanuel Borg v John
Xuereb (Court of Appeal, 25th January 1989). However, it is a moot point in our
jurisprudence whether a period of forfeiture can be interrupted/suspended or
otherwise. For example, whilst in Emmanuele Camilleri ne v Anthony Calascione ne
(Commercial Court, 29th October 1954) held that ‘[i]r-rikonoxximent tal-vizzju da parti
tal-venditur, biex jissospendi d-dekadenza ta’ l-azzjoni redibitorja, irid ikun car, fromali, esplicitu,
inkondizzjonat’ and thereby admitted that the period of forfeiture can be suspended;
63
cases such as Joseph Vella noe v Anthony Migneco (First Hall Civil Court, 9th June 2005)
held that ‘perjodu ta’ dekadenza mhux suġġett għar-regoli ta’ sospensjoni jew ta’ interruzzjoni; dak
it-terminu mhux prorogabbli, u l-inattività fil-perjodu ta’ xahar irrimedjabbilment jippreġudika ddrittijiet tal-kompratur’.
The Courts have argued that, unlike prescription, the plea of forfeiture can be raised
ex officio. For example, in Surprise Yachts Limited v Joseph Rosso pro et noe (First Hall Civil
Court, 21st April 2004), the defendant raised the plea of prescription but did not
indicate exactly what prescription he was pleading. Plaintiff argued that this plea
should not be considered since it was not correctly indicated. The Court held that the
‘Din il-Qorti ma tistax taċċetta l-argoment sottomess mis-soċjetà attriċi illi għax il-konvenut ma
ndikax l-artikolu tal-liġi, ergo hu, bħala speċi, ikkomprometta d-difiża tiegħu … għaliex it-terminu
fil-predett artikolu huwa perentorju tad-dritt u għalhekk strettament lanqas hi ammessa rinunzja
għall-eċċezzjoni bħal din.’ Therefore, the period of forfeiture may be raised ex officio.
This is stated expressly in Joseph Vella noe v Anthony Migneco (First Hall Civil Court, 9th
June 2005): ‘l-Qorti tirrileva li t-terminu ta’ xahar impost mil-liġi, ġie deċis li mhux terminu ta’
preskrizzjoni (li ma jkunx jista’ jiġi sollevat mill-Qorti ex officio), iżda hu terminu ta’ dekadenza li
hu t’ordni publiku u mhux interottibbli’. Therefore the Court here underlined the
difference between a period of prescription and a period of forfeiture and said that
while a prescriptive period cannot be raised ex officio, a period of forfeiture is one of
public policy ‘u l-Qorti, għalhekk, tista’ u anzi għandha tissoleva dan il-punt ex officio’.
Therefore, according to Vella v Migneco, the Court is obliged to raise the plea of the
lapse of the period of forfeiture ex officio.
(g)
Plea of nullity of judicial acts
On this point, our jurisprudence states that one must distinguish between the plea of
absolute nullity of judicial acts and the plea of relative nullity of judicial acts. It seems
that the Court would raise a plea of absolute nullity of judicial acts ex officio but it
cannot raise a plea of relative nullity of judicial acts of its own motion. In Capua Palace
Limited v Boris Arcidiacono (First Hall Civil Court, 30th January 2003) the Court held
‘…għandha ssir distinzjoni bejn nullità assoluta u dik relattiva. F’ tal-ewwel, il-Qorti għandha
dmir li tiġbed l-attenzjoni tal-partijiet u tieħu provvediment ukoll ex ufficio, imma mhux hekk il64
każ f'tat-tieni.’ The reason why the Court can raise the plea of nullity of judicial acts
was explained in Yorkie Clothing Industry Ltd v Dr Lilian Calleja Cremona (First Hall Civil
Court, 30th May 2002) wherein the Court held that where the nullity is imposed by the
law, there is nothing prohibiting the Court from raising the plea ex officio since
procedural law is one of public policy: ‘fejn in-nullità hija dettata mill-liġi ma hemm xejn
x’jimpedixxi lill-Qorti li tqajjem il-punt ta’ nullità ex officio, stante li r-regoli ta’ proċedura huma
ta’ ordni pubbliku’.
(h)
Plea of desertion
Although our jurisprudence maintains that this plea can be raised ex officio, the basis of
such an affirmation remains uncertain.
In Mark Micallef v Kontrollur tad-Dwana (Court of Appeal, 2nd December 2005), the
‘[t]ali eccezzjoni ta’ deserzjoni hi sollevabbli mhux biss per via ta’ eccezzjoni mill-kontro-parti …
izda hi sollevabbli anke ex officio’. Similarly, in George u Georgina mizzewgin Sciberras v
Josephine Spiteri et (Court of Appeal, 8th June 2004) the Court held that ‘Ma hemmx dubju
... li d-deżerzjoni ma hix sollevabbli biss per via ta' eċċezzjoni mill-kontroparti’.
Other cases in which this principle was affirmed include Francis Xavier Formosa et v
Carmelo u Doris ahwa Mifsud (Court of Appeal, 26th February 1999); Il-Prokuratur Legali
Joseph Galea et v Edwin Borg (Court of Appeal, 26th February 1999); David Hillman v
G.R.A.P. Limited (Court of Appeal, 9th December 2003) and Formosa & Camilleri
Limited noe v W. J. Parnis England et. (Court of Appeal, 8th June 2004).
Since the COCP does not expressly lay down that such a plea can be raised ex officio, it
seems that the judgments are saying that it can be so raised as a plea of public policy.
However, a number of other cases maintain that this plea is not of a public policy one
since it can be renounced to. In fact, in Giovanna Antida Casha pro et noe v Anthony
Casha (First Hall Civil Court, 27th February 2003), the Court maintained that ‘leċċezzjoni ta’ deżerzjoni ma hijiex ta’ ordni pubbliku għaliex tista’ tiġi rinunzjata kif rifless flartikolu 732 (2) tal-Kap 16 61 tant li jekk ma tingħatax bħala eċċezzjoni qabel kull eċċezzjoni
perentorja mela allura tittieħed bħala li l-konvenut rrinunzja għall-istess’. Hence, the Court’s
61
It is obvious that the Court here is referring to Kap 12 and not Kap 16.
65
reasoning62 is that since the plea of desertion of cause is deemed to have been waived,
if not raised before any other peremptory plea, then this plea is not one of public
policy. This argument is a very logical one and would lead to the conclusion that since
this plea is not one of public policy, then it cannot be raised ex officio.
(i) Plea of lack of capacity of parties
It would seem that this plea is one which can be raised ex officio. The classic decisions
are Dr Naudi v Geoghegan (Court of Appeal, 30th November 1903) and Edouardo Grech,
quale Presidente della Filarmonica “Sta. Maria” di Musta v Negoziante Francesco Darmanin
(Commercial Court, 15th January 1907, XX.3.517) where the Courts held that
‘l’eccezione di illegittimità di persona … può essere dalla Corte sollevata ex-officio’. In Mario
Grima v Frederick Karl Gollcher (First Hall Civil Court, 15th November 1946,
XXXII.2.478) the Court held that:
Illi l-eċċezzjoni ta’ l-illeġittimità tal-persuna hija ta’ natura perentorja u
opponibili fi kwalunkwe stadju tal-ġudizzju, anke fl-appell u tista’ tiġi
sollevata “ex officio” mill-Qorti; l-għaliex tipproduċi n-nullità ta’ l-attijiet di
fronti għall-persuna illeġittima u hija motiv ta’ revoka tas-sentenzi mogħtija
anki fit-tieni istanza u tar-ritrattazzjoni tal-kawżi.
Therefore, the Court is saying that since the plea of lack of capacity produces the
nullity of the acts with respect to the incapable person and is a reason for the
revocation of judgments given in the appellate stage by means of a retrial, this plea
can be raised ex officio.
Then the Court in Rosario Cutajar v Giovanna Caruana (First Hall Civil Court, 22nd
February 1947, XXX.3.39), held that ‘L-eċċezzjoni ta’ l-illeġittimità tal-persuna – l-għaliex
għal daqs tant jammonta n-nuqqas ta’ kwalità fl-attur – hija eċċezzjoni li tista’ tiġi sollevata “ex
officio” mill-Qorti (apparti l-fatt li tista’ tiġi sollevata mill-konvenut).’
62 See also Gualtiero Agius et v Teresa Palmier et (31st March 1909), and Joseph Grima v Victor Aquilina pro et
noe (First Hall Civil Court, 17th February 2000).
66
Similarly, in Rita Protelli v Ministru tal-Ġustizzja u Affarijiet Parlamentari u Harry Portanier
(Constitutional Court, 22nd July 1985) the Court held: ‘Kif ġie diversi drabi ritenut minn
dawn il-Qrati, l-eċċezzjoni tal-illeġittimità tal-persuna … tista’ tiġi sollevata mill-Qorti ex officio’.
67
D
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF JURA NOVIT CURIA IN THE
MALTESE LEGAL SYSTEM
1
Definition of the principle of jura novit Curia
The principle of jura novit Curia which literally means ‘the Judge/Court knows the law’
is a modern principle of procedural law found in some countries by virtue of which
the parties can limit themselves to allege and prove the constituent facts without
indicating the law to the judge, since he knows the law irrespective of such indication
by the parties. Chiovenda explains the principle of jura novit Curia by stating that the
judge enjoys unlimited power in determining and assessing the applicable norms.63
This principle was unknown in Roman law and the parties had to cite in front of the
judge those articles of law on which they were basing their claims.
Under Italian law, the principle of jura novit Curia is found in article 113 of the Codice
di Procedura Civile, which article reads: ‘Nel pronunciare sulla causa il giudice deve seguire le
norme del diritto, salvo che la legge gli attribuisca il potere di decidere secondo equità. Il conciliatore
decide secondo equità osservando i principi regolatori della materia.’ When commenting upon
this article, Carpi held that:
Il principio per cui il giudice deve comunque decidere la lite secondo le norme di
diritto implica anzitutto che egli abbia in via esclusive il potere-dovere di
conoscere e determinare le norme applicablili alla fattispecie (jura novit curia).
Al riguardo, le indicazioni di parte non solo non possono essere vincolanti, ma
non sono neppure necessarie (v. sub art. 112, III): avendo il giudice il dovere di
decidere secondo diritto, non è configurabile in capo alle parti alcun onere di
allegazione in senso proprio, anche se esse debbono indicare gli ‘elementi di
diritto constituenti le ragioni della domanda, con le relative conclusioni’.64
On similar lines, Mandrioli65 explains that the judge is free to apply those legal norms
which he deems best applicable to the concrete case. The author argues that article
113 refers generically to all legal norms (‘riferisce genericamente a tutte le norme del diritto’)
and not just those referred to in the parties’ submissions (application, demand, note
of pleas). With respect to the Latin maxim (jura novit Curia), Mandrioli comments that
63
G Chiovenda ‘Identificazione delle azioni. Sulla regola “ne eat iudex ultra petita partium”’ Saggi di
Diritto Processuale Civile (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Milan 1993) vol 1, 174.
64 F Carpi and others Commentario breve al Codice di Procedura Civile, (CEDAM Padova 1988) 113.
65 C Mandrioli Corso di Diritto Processuale Civile (10th edn G. Giappichelli Editore Turin 1995) 87.
68
the ‘knowledge’ of the Judge must be interpreted not in the literal sense of knowledge,
but in the sense of poter tenerne conto or poter applicare. Accordingly, the Latin maxim
must be interpreted as giving power to the Judge to choose the norm to apply,
independently of whether such norm was or was not invoked by the interested party.
2
Applicability of the principle of jura novit Curia
In Italian law, the principle of jura novit Curia, is in principle accepted by all
commentators and jurisprudence66. It is generally agreed that if a Judge decides to
apply a norm which is different from that indicated by the parties, he must first justify
the non-applicability of the norm indicated by the parties and must allow submissions
by the parties against such a decision of non-applicability.67 However, if the Judge
does not allow such submissions, the sentence would neither be null 68 nor anticonstitutional 69 . However a problem would arise with respect to the Judge’s
knowledge of norms that do not form part of the local (e.g. Italian) written laws, i.e.
customary rules and foreign norms. There might be cases where a rule of customary
law (esp. in the commercial law sphere) or a foreign jurisdiction norm would be
applicable. In this case, the problem would be with respect to the Judge’s ‘knowledge’
(properly so-speaking) of the applicable law. In the case of rules of customary law,
Italian jurisprudence maintains that the party alleging the existence of that law has to
demonstrate its existence 70 whereas the judge can apply it, even if he does not
demonstrate the existence of the same71, because he is deemed to know the law72 .
However with respect to the Judge’s knowledge of foreign laws, the tendency is to
require the Judge to bring forward evidence of the existence of such applicable
foreign norm, since the jura novit Curia principle is only applicable vis-à-vis national
laws.
66
There were however some dissident views (see e.g. Ruling by the Italian Court of Cassation, 22nd
June 1994, No. 6006).
67 E Grasso ‘La collaborazione nel processo civile’, (1965) Rivista di Diritto Processuale, 580.
68 At least according to S Chiarloni in Rivista Trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile (1987) 587.
69 See e.g. ruling by the Italian Court of Cassation, 23rd October 1989, No. 3290.
70 See e.g. ruling by the Italian Court of Cassation, 19th August 1958, No. 2926.
71 See e.g. ruling by the Italian Court of Cassation, 22nd October 1959, No. 3035.
72 See CE Balossini Consuetudini, usi, pratiche e regole del costume (Milano 1958) 533 et seq and N Bobbio
‘Consuetudine’ (1959), Enciclopedia del Diritto (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Spa, 1961)
69
In fact Satta73 explains that while, normally, he who alleges must prove, the rationale
behind jura novit Curia is that of uniformità del giudizio: ‘cioè è necessario, come suprema
garanzia di uguaglianza tra i cittadini, che il caso particolare sia deciso con applicazione di una
norma identica a tutti gli altri casi uguali’. However, Satta explains, that when a foreign
norm is invoked, the rationale of uniformity ceases to be relevant and therefore the
existence of the norm has to be proven by he who alleges it, even if he is the Judge.
While Satta’s view seems to be a mainstream one 74 , some Court of Cassation’s
pronouncements seem to be in the sense that the Judge does not need to prove the
existence of such foreign rule75.
Moreover, according to Italian jurisprudence76 the law which must be applied by the
Judge is that which is in force at the moment of the decision. In other words, the
Judge must consider ex officio any possible jus superveniens (new law which substitutes a
former law) during the trial.
Another maxim closely related to the jura novit Curia principle is ‘Da mihi factum dabo
tibi jus’ which is an old Roman law adage which literally means ‘give me the facts and I
will give you the law’. In fact, this has been explained as ‘rimane alla competenza del
giudice dare la qualificazione giuridica del fatto portato a sua conoscenza’77. However, as Satta
rightly points out ‘avviene in realtà ben raramente che il giudice trovi la norma giuridica pronta in
un testo di legge per il suo uso: se tale norma esistesse è chiaro che prima di lui la troverebbero le parti
e non litigherebbero’78. Therefore, normally it is up to the judge to ‘create’ the law, i.e.
apply the juridical norm to the concrete facts before him. On similar lines, Mandrioli79
explains that naturally the choice and application of the norm presuppose the
interpretation or the expression in actual terms of the judge in relation to the concrete
case, of what was the expression of the legislative will behind those words. According
to this author, such an operation entails a delicate adaptation to the present social,
ethical and economic conditions but it can never exceed the limit of the objective
content of the norm. This is one of the tenets of the principle of legality and certainty
of law and if the judge modifies the objective content of the law, he would be
73
S Satta Diritto Processuale Civile (CEDAM, Padova 1967) 152.
See e.g. ruling by the Italian Court of Cassation, 28th January 1978, No. 410
75 See e.g. rulings by the Italian Court of Cassation, 26th May 1980, No. 2278 and 9th July 1990, No.
7162.
76 Ruling by the Italian Court of Cassation 31st December 1968, No. 4101.
77 Decision by the Giudice di Pace of Civitanova, Marche, 5th December 2003, No. 70/2003.
78 Satta, S., op cit, p. 154
79 Mandrioli C., op cit, p. 88-89.
74
70
interfering with the legislative function – the highest expression of democratic
societies.
However, it is also true that both in the Italian, Maltese and the majority of legal
systems, except for those of Anglo-Saxon tradition, the judge is not bound to give a
uniform interpretation with that of previous pronouncements of higher tier Courts.
Nonetheless, questa assenza di vincoli formali, non impedisce d’altra parte, ai giudici di
interpretare le norme in modo più o meno conforme all’interpretazione compiuta in precedenti
pronounce per l’intrinseca persuasività degli argomenti.80 The situation in Malta seems to be
very similar to that in Italy because as established by Dr. Vladimir Formosa v Direttur
tas-Sigurtà Soċjali (Court of Appeal, 4th May 1992) while we do not have the AngloSaxon concept of Law of Principle or the analogous concept of stare decisis:
il-prinċipju illum hu li sentenza tal-Qrati Superjuri fuq punt ta' dritt
għandha per regola tiġi segwita, għalkemm ma hemm xejn obbligu preċiż
in propositu, però huwa wkoll stabbilit illi dan il-prinċipju huwa ċar
għax diversament ikollok anarkija81.
In Italy, the principle of jura novit Curia is so wide that after the Judge has interpreted
the law, he can ex officio (and so independently from the initiative of the parties) check
the constitutionality or otherwise of the norm and if there is a well-founded doubt
that the norm is unconstitutional, he has to suspend the proceedings and refer the
case to the Constitutional Court.
However, although the apparently vast interpretation of the jura novit Curia rule,
Italian authors and jurisprudence make it clear that the Judge must judge on all the
alleged facts or affirmed in the demand, and only on those (judex secundum alligata
judicare debet). Chiovenda explains:
Anche secondo questo più largo concetto, il giudice deve di regola astenersi dal
rilevare fatti non allegati dalle parti: « secundum allegata et probata partium
iudicare debet ». Ciò è più evidente, riguardo ai fatti che il giudice ritiene
influenti nella causa, ma che non risultano dagli atti (quod non est in actis non
est in mundo): ma altrettanto deve riteneresi per i fatti non affermati dalla
parte, che risultano dagli atti.82
80
Mandrioli C., op cit, p. 88.
Quoted with approval also in P.L. Joseph Zammit noe v. Lydia Pulis et (First Hall Civil Court, 28th
February 2003).
82 G Chiovenda ‘Identificazione delle azioni. Sulla regola “ne eat iudex ultra petita partium”’ Saggi di
Diritto Processuale Civile (Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore Milan 1993) vol 1, 175.
81
71
On the other hand, the Judge may apply to those facts, the laws that he deems to be
adequate, even if they are not included in the demand. Therefore, in practical terms
the Judge can refuse or accept the demand (or part of it) but he cannot exceed the
limits of the demand.
3
The principle of jura novit Curia in the Maltese legal system
Unlike under the Italian system, in our Code of Civil Procedure, we find no mention
of the application of the jura novit Curia principle. However, as we have seen when
dealing with chapter regarding ex officio pleas, the general rule is that the Judge must
limit himself to the pleas raised by the defendant. The afore-mentioned Gatt v Debono
case stated:
Skond il-prinċipji tal-Ġustizzja l-ebda Qorti m’għandha d-dritt li tissolleva
eċċezzjonijiet ‘ex officio’ ħlief dawk li l-liġi stess timponi fuqha bhala dover, li
huwa dejjem konness ma’ xi kwistjoni ta’ l-ordni pubbliku, bħal ma huwa lproblema ta’ ġurisdizzjoni jew kompetenza. Meta l-Qorti tissolleva
eċċezzjonijiet li mhumiex ordnat mil-liġi dan l-ezercizzju jfisser li l-Qorti ma
tibqax ekwidistanti bejn il-partijiet u tkun qed tikser bl-aktar mod pależi lprinċipju ta’ ‘audi alteram partem’, kif ukoll prinċipju ieħor tal-Ġustizzja li
huwa ‘nemo judex in causa propria’ għaliex naturalement il-Qorti tkun
tissolleva eċċezzjoni hija u tiddeċidiha hija stess.
We also saw, nonetheless, that this general rule bears numerous exceptions and while
the judge seems to be bound by law as to what pleas may be raised ex officio, a number
of judges has frequently opted to categorise a number of pleas under the wide class of
public policy pleas, in order to be able to raise them ex officio. Thus, it would seem that
by invoking ‘public policy’, judges in Malta enjoy quite a wide discretion in
determining which pleas can be raised ex officio.
The jura novit Curia principle seems to have been applied in the case Benny Camilleri v
Ian Schembri et (Court of Appeal, 16th December 2002) where a plea of prescription
was raised but the prescription alleged to have elapsed did not affect the instant case:
even though this point was not raised by the party against whom such plea of
prescription was raised, the court considered it necessary to raise the issue itself and it
said that:
72
Il-preskrizzjoni hawn kontemplata ma tikkolpix l-azzjoni preżenti, u anke
jekk dan il-punt ma tqajjimx formalment mill-appellant il-Qorti hi fid-dover li
tissollevah hi ghax ma tistax tħalli li tiġi applikata ligi żbaljata għal fatti
magħrufa fejn hekk jokkorrilha li hu l-każ. Dan anke in omaġġ għal
prinċipju tal-ġustizzja sostanzjali.
This last phrase, ‘prinċipju tal-ġustizzja sostanzjali’ seems very much akin to the maxim of
jura novit Curia, in that it shows the judge’s concern that the proper law is applied,
even if it is not indicated by the parties. Moreover, the Court mentions a ‘duty’ (dover)
incumbent on the Court to avoid the application of an incorrect law to the facts.
Therefore, it follows that the Court is bound to apply the proper law every time, even
though such law is not indicated by any of the parties. This is clearly an application of
the principle of the jura novit Curia. More significantly, although this principle is not
expressly invoked in the judgment itself, it is one of the keywords of the judgment.
Another case, which seems to show that the principle of jura novit Curia is accepted in
our legal system is Maria Debono et v Av. Dr. Paolo Mercieca et (Court of Appeal, 30th
January 2004). In appellate stage, appellant (plaintiff) alleged that the Court decided
that she was not a co-possessor for the purpose of the right of redemption although
there was no such a plea raised by the defendants.
The Court of Appeal admitted that the First Court had refused both plaintiff’s
demands without there being an express plea against them. It went on to say that the
First Court could have easily limited itself to what was formally pleaded by the
defendants and accept the plaintiff demands because of the lack of opposition to
them by the defendants. However, the Court of Appeal continued that the First
Court was not prohibited from verifying whether what was claimed by the plaintiff
was proven and legally correct. Such an exercise, argued the Court, ‘jinkwadra ruħu filparametri ta’ dak li jista’ jagħmel ġudikant qabel jasal għall-ġudizzju tiegħu u ma jammontax għal
ħolqien ta’ eċċezzjonijiet ġodda kif qegħdha tallega l-appellanti’. The Court seemed to equate
this exercise with the case of when the defendant is contumacious – in the event of
such an occurrence the plaintiff would still have to prove his case: ‘Għandu hawn
jingħad li anke f’kawżi fejn konvenut baqa’ kontumaċi hemm diversi preċedenti fejn il-Qorti xorta
waħda esiġiet li l-attur jagħmel il-provi tiegħu għall-konvinċement tagħha’. The Court also stated
that there was no element of surprise in the way the Court delivered its judgment: ‘ma
kien hemm l-ebda sorpriża u l-attriċi ċertament ma tistax tilmenta li dak kollu li riedet jew xtaqet
tissottometti tul nofs seklu ta’ trattazzjoni ġiet impeduta milli tagħmlu’.
73
Therefore, Debono v Mercieca is saying that the Court may check whether what is
demanded by the parties is legally correct (ma kien hemm xejn milli jipprekludiha li tkun
ukoll sodisfatta li dak li ppremttiet l-attriċi huwa legalment korrett), while Camilleri v Schembri
stated that the Court is bound to examine whether the proper law is going to be
applied (Il-Qorti ma tistax tħalli li tiġi applikata liġi żbaljata).
4
Jura novit Curia and the concept of surprise in the Maltese legal system
Although the wide exercise of discretion by our Courts can sometimes be seen as an
implementation of the jura novit Curia, our jurisprudence has consistently maintained
that the parties should not be surprised by the judge. In other words, the judge
cannot decide on points that were not part of the litis contestatio.
The classic case on this issue is Regina Cacciattolo v Francis Cacciattolo (Court of Appeal,
30th June 1976) which stated that the Civil judge, when giving judgment, must respect
the limits of the suit in a way that while he is obliged to treat all the issues raised by
the parties, he cannot decide upon issues which were not raised and submitted to the
Court’s decision by the parties, unless such issues are public policy ones. In the latter
case the Court must raise them ex officio.
This was confirmed recently in Joseph Cini noe (Appellant) v Emanuel u Rosaria Agius
(Appellati) (Court of Appeal, 15th September 2005):
[L]-Imħallef Ċivili għandu, fl-għoti tas-sentenza f’kawża, joqgħod
rigorożament fil-limiti tal-kontestazzjoni b’mod illi, waqt li hu obbligat li
jokkupa ruħu mill-kwestjonijiet kollha dedotti fil-ġudizzju mill-partijiet, minn
naħa l-oħra ma jistax jitratta u jirrisolvi kwestjonijiet li l-partijiet ma
ssollevawx u ma ssottomettewx għad-deċiżjoni tiegħu, ammenokke non si
tratta minn kwestjonijiet ta’ ordni pubbliku li l-Imħallef hu obbligat li
jirrileva ‘ex officio’.
In the recent case, George Agius et v Charles V. Schembri et (Court of Appeal, 14th July
2005), the main grievance of the appellants was that the first Court had ex officio
refused plaintiff’s interpretation of the law without there being an express plea by the
defendants in this sense: ‘L-appellati eċċepew ġeneralment li ma kienux l-legittimi kontraditturi.
74
Qatt ma ġiet preżentata eċċezzjoni li l-liġi kellha tiġi nterpretata mod ieħor kif tenniet il-Qorti fissentenza’. Appellants went on to argue that the First Hall in its judgment raised a legal
interpretation issue which was not part of the litis contestatio and this ran counter to the
fundamental principles of the civil action and rules of civil procedure. They
maintained that if a Court of Justice determines a case on an issue which surprises the
parties since it was never raised in the pendency of the suit, this breaches completely
the principle of onus probandi since both plaintiff and defendant would not know on
what basis they have to submit their demand and/or defence.
The Court said that it was true that the defendant did not attack the plaintiff’s
interpretation of the law, but this does not prohibit the Court from interpreting the
law itself. It held that the appellants are not correct to argue that the First Court
‘surprised’ them because, in their opinion, determined the case on an issue which was
never raised in the pendency of the case. The Court held that this particular case was
since the beginning, centered around the interpretation of law and regulations ‘u għax
l-interpretazzjoni finalment mogħtija mill-Qorti ma għoġbotx lil parti jew lil ohra, dik il-parti ma
tistax issa tilmenta li ġiet ‘sorpriża’ – se mai il-parti kellha tara l-possibilitajiet kollha għall-finijiet
ta’ dik l-interpretazzjoni, u ma tieħu xejn for granted’. The Court held that in this particular
case, the First Court respected the limits of the suit and treated all the issues raised
by the parties.
As we have seen, one of the tenets of the principle of the jura novit Curia is that the
Court not only has to find the applicable law, but must also interpret it to the facts of
the case. In fact, in Agius v Schembri the Court quoted the Novissimo Digesto
Italiano83:
La norma giuridica per essere applicata al caso concreto deve essere
interpretata. La interpretazione è un momento essenziale nella applicazione
della legge, ed un presupposto indispensabile, perché logicamente non si può
concepire applicazione di norma giuridica che non sia stata previamente
interpretata, se per interpretazione si intende, come deve intendersi, il processo
logico attraverso al quale si rivela e si pone in evidenza il contenuto della
disposizione legislativa.
Accordingly, even if the plaintiff’s interpretation of the law is not contested by the
defendant, the Court must still interpret it in order to be able to apply it to the facts
of the case.
83
Vol VIII, 896.
75
5
Can the court decide to ignore a plea/pleas raised by the defendant?
Until now we have discussed whether the Court can ex officio raise pleas which were
not raised by defendant. Now we have to examine whether the Court can decide to
ignore a plea/s raised by defendant when delivering its judgment.
In John Giordmaina v Joseph Pace (Court of Appeal, 19th June 2001) the appellants argued
that the First Hall did not adequately consider their plea of nullity of a bill of
exchange. Respondents argued that the sentence must be confirmed since it was just
and fair. However, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellants that the court of first
instance had in fact ignored this plea. The Court of Appeal held that this prejudiced
the appellants and thus annulled the judgment delivered by the First Hall.
This matter was tackled in the case Francis sive Frank Refalo v Mark Laferla et noe (Court
of Appeal, 4th December 1998). In this case, appellants argued that the Court of first
instance, in pronouncing itself, had ignored their pleas. The appellants were basing
themselves on article 218 of the COCP which states that ‘The court shall in the
judgment premise the reasons on which the decision of the court is based, and shall
include a reference to the proceedings, the claims of the plaintiff and the pleas of
defendant’. The Court of Appeal held that this article lays down the minimum
necessary for the validity of a judgment and therefore to bind the litigants definitively.
The Court explained that this minimum entails the identification of the case with
reference to the demands and to the pleas. Therefore, the Court continued that it
suffices that the judgment reproduces the writ of summons, the plaintiff's demands
and the pleas of the defendant. The Court must also give the reasons on which it is
basing its decision.
Furthermore, Refalo v Laferla stated that the Court
mhijiex strettament obbligata li tispeċifika r-raġunijiet għaliex kienet qed
tiċħad l-eċċezzjonijiet tal-konvenut. Hi biss meħtieġa li tqis dawn leċċezzjonijiet fl-isfond tar-raġunijiet li fuqhom tkun qed tibbaża d-deċiżjoni
tagħha. Deċiżjoni li trid tkun motivata fid-dawl ta' l-eċċezzjonijiet mogħtija
imma mhux meħtieġ għall-validità tas-sentenza li telabora oltre dwar dawn leċċezzjonijiet mogħtija.
76
Yet while the Court expressed itself in very generic terms, it seemed to be tying this
issue to the fact that, in this particular case, the defendant did not show any interest in
the case and so ‘fejn il-konvenut ikun naqas li juri nteress li jiddefendi l-kawża tiegħu stess, ilQorti tkun ġustifikata - kif għamlet f'dan il-każ - li taċċetta bħala ppruvata t-talbiet attriċi jekk
dawn jirriżultaw inkontestati minn min kellu jkollu nteress li jikkontestahom’.
Therefore it would seem, from this case, that the Judge in his decision is only obliged
to mention the defendant’s pleas and not to motivate his decision vis-à-vis those
pleas. Such an argument is very dangerous and tends to give the Judge more
arbitrariness than is afforded to him by our law and jurisprudence. In fact, in a
subsequent case Tomlin Company Limited v Jon David Limited (Court of Appeal, 20th
October 2003), the Court quoted the Refalo v Laferla sentence and seemed to indicate
that the logic adopted by that Court is somewhat questionable: ‘Indipendentement millfatt kemm wiehed jaqbel jew ma jaqbilx ma’ din l-osservazzjoni’.
In Gasan Insurance Agency Ltd noe. v Valletta Freight Services Ltd. pro et. noe (Court of
Appeal, 17th March 2003) the Court of Appeal upheld appellant's argument that the
Court of Magistrates had failed to consider their plea of prescription. Thus, the Court
of Appeal declared the judgment null.
At this point it is interesting to examine the provision of article 790 of the COCP
which states:
Where before an appellate court the plea of nullity of a judgment
appealed from is raised, such plea shall not be entertained if the
judgment is found to be substantially just, unless such plea is founded
on the want of jurisdiction or default of citation, or the incapacity of
the parties, or on the judgment of the court of first instance being
extra petita or ultra petita or on any defect which prejudices the right to
a fair hearing.
So when a court of first instance fails to consider a plea84 of the defendant, but the
judgment of such court is found to be ‘substantially just’, then such a judgment is not
necessarily null. The application of this article was explained in Joseph Camilleri v
Emanuel Calleja (Court of Appeal, 20th January 2003). In fact, in this case appellants
alleged that the court of first instance had failed to consider their plea of prescription
84 “unless such plea is founded on the want of jurisdiction or default of citation, or the incapacity of
the parties”
77
and thus argued that the sentence is null. The Court of Appeal, however, dismissed
this grievance by saying that it is not an absolute proposition of law (‘l-ewwel aggravju
ma huwiex xi proposizzjoni assoluta ta’ dritt’). The Court based itself on article 790 of the
COCP and on Carmelo Grech v Salvatore Guillaumier noe. (Court of Appeal, 7th January
1939, Vol. XXX.1.953). This judgment held that ‘in-nullità ta' senteza m'għandiex tiġi
attiża jekk is-sentenza tkun sostanzjalment ġusta’.
This concept was better analysed in Maltacom v Angelo Schembri (Court of Appeal, 16th
December 2002). The Court stated that a series of considerations must be made when
a judgment fails to deal with a plea that had been raised. Primarily, one must check
whether the particular plea is one of those listed in article 730 of COCP, in which
case such a plea should have been decided by a separate head, before or together with
the decision on the merit. However, even if this were the case and a procedural defect
results, such irregularity does not bring about the nullity of the judgment if the
judgment, ‘in its true substance’, is found to be just. The Court went on to say that
there is another argument why lack of consideration of a particular plea does not
bring about the nullity of the sentence: ‘Hemm imbagħad argument ieħor fis-sens li ġieli jista’
jingħad li meta l-ewwel Qorti tkun laqgħet it-talbiet attriċi hi kienet fl-istess waqt qed tirrespingi leċċezzjonijiet tal-konvenut’.
Moreover it has been determined by our Courts that even the Small Claims Tribunal,
although it is designed to decide cases summarily, cannot decide to ignore part of the
defence of the defendant. In the case Middlesea Insurance plc noe et. v Karl Vella (Court of
Appeal, 10th October 2005), it was held that it cannot be said that the judgment is
substantially just since the additional pleas raised not only were not substantially
considered but were completely ignored. The Court went on to say that:
Issa huwa veru li t-Tribunal għandu jmexxi l-kawżi sommarjament u blakbar ħeffa imma, imbagħad, hu mistenni wkoll li dan jagħmlu
kompatibilment ma’ l-amministrazzjoni tajba tal-ġustizzja, b’ mod li jokkupa
ruħu mid-difiża sħiħa tal-parti azzjonata. Jekk jonqos li jagħmel dan,
sostanzjalment, is-sentenza ma tistax ħlief titqies inġusta u dan jagħti lok
għall-annullament tagħha.
Our Courts have also examined whether if the Court fails to consider the written
submissions of one of the parties to the suit, that would lead to the nullity of the
sentence. This was dealt with in Joseph Bellizzi et v Joseph Grioli noe (Court of Appeal,
5th June 2001), wherein the Court held that if the Court fails to take cognizance of
78
the written submissions of one of the parties to the suit, that would not bring about
the nullity of the sentence ‘jekk dik il-Qorti tkun fehmet sew x’ kien il-punt determinanti talvertenza u għalhekk id-deċiżjoni tagħha kienet tkopri dak kollu li kull parti kontendenti kienet
qegħda tesponi u tasserixxi’.
6
The admissibility or otherwise of pleas raised for the first time in the
written submissions
We now have to consider the issue whether the Court is bound to consider ‘pleas’
which were not raised in the sworn reply but are raised for the first time in the written
submissions (nota tal-osservazzjonijiet / nota ta’ sottomissjonijiet).
This issue was discussed recently in the case Vincent Camilleri et v Gaetana Aquilina
(Court of Appeal, 16th March 2004). In this case the First Court had decided that the
Court can only consider those pleas that are formally raised and new pleas cannot be
raised in the final oral argumentation or in the written submissions. The Court of
Appeal upheld the First Hall’s reasoning and explained that a plea raised by defendant
must be incorporated in the note of pleas accompanied by a sworn declaration by the
person or persons raising it. Moreover, the law requires that a copy of this note of
pleas must be served on the plaintiff or his lawyer. This is because the note of pleas
outlines the defendant’s line of defence against the demands made in the writ of
summons. Therefore it is not correct and thus not permissible that in an advanced
stage of the case, when the proof stage is concluded and in the stage of presentation
of the written submissions, the counter-party is faced with a new line of defence
without the procedural rules being observed.
In Antida Falzon v APS Limited (First Hall Civil Court, 28th May 2005), the Court
declared that it was not going to consider a plea raised for the first time in the written
submissions as such:
Argument legali dedott f’ nota ta' sottomissjonijiet u mhux bħala eċċezzjoni
formali, ma jobbligax lill-Qorti li tqisha bħala tali. Diversament ikun
jammonta għal strapp proċedurali li jista’ jkun ta’ preġudizzju serju għallkontroparti, oltre li jkun ukoll jammonta għal intralċ mhux awtorizzat fuq ilproċeduri 'in corso'.
79
Therefore, the Court stated that it is not obliged to consider a legal argument raised in
the written submissions and not as a formal plea. Otherwise this can be tantamount
to a procedural breach which may be prejudicial to the other party apart from creating
a potential obstacle to the procedures.
The Court went on to say that generally the Maltese Courts do not view favourably
those pleas which materialise unexpectedly (li 'jfaqqsu' għall-għarrieda) throughout the
proceedings without any authorization. However, the Court was aware of the fact that
there was jurisprudence which had adopted a more liberal tendency in the sense that
accepted pleas which were raised in a dubious manner. One such case is Services
Limited v Joseph Zammit (Court of Appeal, 29th January 1999), where the Court held
that:
Kif hu risaput, il-ġurisprudenza tgħallem illi l-Qorti hi fid-dover li tieħu
konjizzjoni ta’ eċċezzjonijiet li jkunu ġew sollevati waqt it-trattazzjoni talkawża, anke f'noti ta' sottomissjonijiet, u anke jekk ma jkunux ġew
formalizzati fil-forma ta' eċċezzjoni.
The case Anthony Cristina noe v Eleonora Mizzi (Court of Appeal, 27th March 2003)
quoted with approval the case M.C. Zammit Tabona et v Emanuele Borg (Court of
Appeal, 7th February 1966), where the Court held that after the production of the
plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant after obtaining permission from the Court can
make changes to his note of pleas by means of a separate note. However, this does
not mean that the defendant can do this without any interference or control from the
Court and ‘Il-fatt li tista’ tingħata eċċezzjoni fi stadju ieħor tal-kawża wara l-ewwel nota ta’
eċċezzjonijiet ma jfissirx fih innifsu li jistgħu, bi dritt tal-konvenut, jinġiebu provi jew xhieda ġodda’.
On the other hand, the judgment in the names Frans Spiteri v Godwin Abela et noe (First
Hall Civil Court, 31st January 2003) held that:
Għalkemm hu veru li min ikun konvenut f'ġudizzju u jrid jikkontesta t-talba
għandu jippreżenta nota li jkun fiha miġjubin l-eċċezzjonijiet tiegħu, dan però
ma jfissirx illi l-istess konvenut, wara l-preżentata ta’ din in-nota, ma jkunx
jista’ jressaq u jissolleva eċċezzjonijiet oħra, anki fil-korp ta’ nota ta’ losservazzjonijiet, u huwa obbligu tal-ġudikant li meta jiġi biex jaqta’ l-kawża,
jeżamina u jivvaluta l-mezzi kollha ta’ difiża li l-partijiet ikunu ressqu
quddiemu.
80
Thus, this case is saying that the Judge must consider all means of defence presented
by the plaintiff including those raised in written submissions and must not limit
himself to the pleas raised formally in the note of pleas.
The function of the written submissions was discussed in Tommaso Sammut v Carmelo
Farrugia et. (First Hall Civil Court, 19th October 1954) where the Court held that ‘f’nota
ta’ osservazzjonijiet … ordinarjament ikun hemm sempliċi argumenti fuq kwistjonijiet ġà sollevati,
imma bil-mod formali proċedurali’. Therefore, according to the Court, the written
submissions should contain a further elaboration about the pleas which were already
raised in a formal manner, i.e. in the note of pleas (nota ta’ eċċezzjonijiet) or in a note of
further pleas (nota ta’ eċċezzjonijiet ulterjuri).
In this particular case, the defendants sought to raise the plea of prescription in their
note of observations. The Court started to argue that since the plea of prescription
should be raised formally, it should not be raised in written submissions. The Court
quoted Emmanuele Busuttil v Francesco Mercieca (Court of Appeal, 15th April 1950, Vol.
XXXIV.I.410) to the effect that if the plea of prescription is not raised formally, it
should not be considered by the Court since it cannot be raised ex officio. However,
the Court then argued that since the Court accepted the defendants’ written
submissions, such plea can be examined and decided upon, especially since after that
note, the plaintiff and defendant exchanged, by virtue of the Court’s authorization, a
number of notes regarding the prescription plea:
B’dana kollu, billi dina l-Qorti aċċettat dik in-nota ta' l-osservazzjonijiet ta'
l-imsemmijin konvenuti, li biha huma ssollevaw dik il-preskrizzjoni – nota li
huma kellhom il-fakoltà li jippreżentawha – jidher illi l-istess eċċezzjoni tista’
tiġi eżaminata u deċiża; iżjed u iżjed meta, wara dik in-nota l-attur u limsemmija konvenuti skambjaw, bl-awtorizzazzjoni tal-Qorti, diversi noti ta’
osservazzjonijiet in meritu għall-istess eċċezzjoni.
Thus, from this case it transpires that for a formal plea to be validly raised in the
written submissions, the following elements must concur. First of all, the Court must
have authorized the defendant to present those written submissions which contain
the new plea. Secondly, the Court must accept the presentation of the said note
containing the submissions. Thirdly, it would seem that if after the presentation of
the said submissions, the parties exchange a number of notes on the new plea, that
would enable the Court to examine and decide upon the plea. However, the last
element does not seem to be an ad validitatem one.
81
In fact, the Court is not obliged to accept written submissions. Thus, if a formal plea
(like the plea of prescription) is raised in the written submissions, instead of a note of
pleas, and the Court does not accept such note of observations, then the Court is not
obliged to consider such formal plea contained therein. Consequently, one cannot try
to impugn that sentence because the Court lacked to consider such formal plea. This
was discussed in the case Emmanuele Busuttil v Francesco Mercieca (Court of Appeal, 15th
April 1950, Vol. XXXIV.I.410), wherein it was held that the Court is not obliged to
accept written submissions and therefore, when the Court does not accept such
submissions, their content would not be considered by the Court. The Court went on
to say that formal pleas, such as the plea of prescription, must not be raised in written
submissions but in the formal procedural way. Therefore, the plea of prescription
which is not raised formally is considered as not being in front of the Court, and the
Court is not bound to decide on such a plea since prescription cannot be raised by
the Court ex officio. Consequently, when the plea of prescription was not raised in a
formal manner, the judgment who does not treat the prescription plea separately is
not null.
This case was recently quoted in the case The Cargo Handling Co. Ltd. v Messrs. John
Abela Limited (Court of Appeal, 7th July 2003), where the Court noted that the
defendants had not raised the plea of prescription per via di eccezione but by means of
the written submissions. However, notwithstanding this, the Court still decided to
tackle the issue of prescription:
Ciononostante din il-preċiżazzjoni l-Qorti, biex tkun affrontat ilkwestjoni, sejra tassumi li bin-nota ta’ sottomissjoni s-soċjetà
konvenuta ġabet il-quddiem il-preskrizzjoni li fuqha l-ewwel Qorti
ffondat il-parte disposittiva tad-deċiżjoni tagħha.
Thus, according to this judgment, a formal plea can even be set up by means of
written submissions. Moreover, here the Court did not go into whether the elements,
for the setting up of formal pleas by means of note of observations or submissions
required in Sammut v Farrugia existed or otherwise.
Notwithstanding the wide interpretation given by the Court in Cargo Handling Ltd. v
John Abela Ltd, we have a recent judgment in the names Emanuel Abela et v Muhammed
Fluti et (First Hall Civil Court, 29th March 2006) where the Court stated that it was
82
not going to consider the plea of prescription raised by the defendants in their written
submissions since this issue was never raised during the proceedings, especially since
this note was presented only after the defendants failed to appear for the final
discussion of the case and the plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to reply.
Moreover in George Grech v Mario Grech et (First Hall Civil Court, 4th October 2002)
the Court held that the plea of prescription cannot be raised by means of written
submissions but must be raised in a formal note of pleas which must be served on the
other party.
As we have seen, therefore, although generally our Courts do not view favourably
those pleas which are not raised in a formal manner, there have been quite a number
of discordant judgments and thus this issue is still a moot one.
83
CONCLUSION
After having reviewed a number of cases on the nature of pleas, it can be concluded
that many interpretation issues remain somewhat uncertain. This may be due to the
fact that some issues are not regulated expressly by our law. It is always debatable
whether it is desirable to reduce the judges’ discretion or whether a certain degree of
freedom should be afforded so that the judge can decide on a case-by-case basis.
The author submits that one of the most important tenets of the law of procedure is
that it should be certain and should produce foreseeable effects. Thus it is argued that
in moot areas, legislative intervention would be highly desirable. First of all, the
distinction between dilatory and peremptory pleas should be made clear by providing
a definition in the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure. To avoid confusion, it
should also be made clear that our concept of dilatory pleas also includes the figure of
peremptory pleas on the proceedings. Moreover, a classification of the major pleas
should also be included in our Code as this would clearly simplify the work of judges
and lawyers alike and would increase legal certainty. This would also lead to a better
application of the procedural rules found in the COCP applicable to peremptory and
dilatory pleas respectively.
With regard to the pleas that may be raised ex officio the situation is presently even
more ambiguous. It should be made clear legislatively what pleas are classifiable as
pleas of public policy. Otherwise, as we have seen from the jurisprudence on this
point, especially recent case-law, the judge would have too much freedom to declare
that he is raising a particular plea of his own motion because it is a public policy plea
and this may lead to legal uncertainty.
Another area which should be tackled legislatively is the issue of whether the
principle of jura novit Curia is accepted under our law. In the absence of such a
provision, the general trend in judgments seems to show that this principle is not
recognised in Malta. However, as we have seen, there were some sporadic cases
wherein it was hinted that this principle is accepted. The author is of the opinion that
the acceptance of this principle would conflict with the other established principle
under our law, namely that the judge should be bound by the parties’ submissions.
Thus it is being suggested that our Code should include an express provision stating
that, apart from those limited cases contemplated in our COCP, the judge should be
84
bound by the legal norms indicated by the parties. It must also be laid down exactly
what manners of raising of pleas would be considered acceptable by the Court and
whether certain pleas, like formal pleas, have to be raised only according to the strict
rule of Art. 728(1) of the COCP. In a particular manner, the COCP should indicate
what is the nature of pleas which are raised for the first time in written submissions
and whether they should be considered or not by the Court.
Although it is admitted that the proposed legislative intervention will not solve all
problems of interpretation and classification, it should in any case facilitate the
classification of pleas, which exercise is essential for the determination of the relative
procedural rules.
85
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