The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society
Author(s): Shu-Yun Ma
Source: The China Quarterly, No. 137 (Mar., 1994), pp. 180-193
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the School of Oriental and African Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/655693
Accessed: 07/09/2010 15:29
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Cambridge University Press and School of Oriental and African Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to The China Quarterly.
http://www.jstor.org
Research Note
The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society
Shu-Yun Ma
In recent years the concept of civil society has gained scholarly attention
world-wide. It has found numerous advocates in the West, such as John
Keane who suggested democratizing European socialism by defending
the distinction between civil society and the state'; Michael Walzer who
proposed synthesizing socialist, capitalist and nationalist ideals under the
rubric of civil society2; and Daniel Bell, who called for a revival of civil
society in the United States as a protection against the expanding state
bureaucracies.3 In 1992 alone, at least three books on the subject appeared.4In Eastern Europe, proponents of the civil society concept - like
Vaclav Havel, George Konrad and Adam Michnik - have been credited
with developing an extremely useful theoretical tool for overthrowing
Stalinist authoritarianism.5A volume consisting of case studies of seven
former or present socialist countries found that the notion of civil society
is generally applicable to the study of Communist systems, as long as the
influence of different cultures and traditions of individual countries are
fully acknowledged.6 The civil society paradigm, despite its basic
European orientation,' has also been recognized as applicable to the study
of developing countries.8
Western China scholars also seized upon the concept of civil society in
their recent research. Stimulated by the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in China, the translationof Habermas into English and the attention
paid to civil society in Europe, Western sinologists began to explore
1. John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988).
2. Michael Walzer, "The idea of civil society," Dissent (Spring 1991), pp. 293-304.
3. Daniel Bell, "Americanexceptionalism revisited: the role of civil society," The Public
Interest, No. 95 (1989), pp. 38-56.
4. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1992); Adam Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992);
Keith Tester, Civil Society (London: Routledge, 1992).
5. Zbigniew Rau (ed.), The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Vladimir Tismaneanu (ed.), In Search of Civil
Society: Independence Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc (New York: Routledge, 1990).
6. Robert Miller (ed.), The Developments of Civil Society in CommunistSystems (North
Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992).
7. John Keane (ed.), Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (London:
Verso, 1988).
8. Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State
Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Paul
Cammack, David Pool and William Tordoff, Third World Politics: A Comparative
Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). An argument against the
applicability of the concept of civil society to the Third World can be found in Partha
Chatterjee,"A response to Taylor's modes of civil society," Public Culture,Vol. 3, No. 1 (Fall
1990), pp. 119-132.
? The China Quarterly, 1994
The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society
whether civil society had developed in The People's Republic. Notable
scholars in this regard include Heath Chamberlain,9 Joseph Esherick
and Jeffrey Wasserstrom,'o Thomas Gold," David Kelly and He Baogang,12 Philip Huang,13Richard Masden,14 Barrett McCormick et al.,15
Clements Ostergaard,16 Margaret Pearson,17 Elizabeth Perry,"8Lucian
Pye,"9 Mary Rankin,20 William Rowe,21 Vivienne Shue,22 Dorothy
9. Heath B. Chamberlain,"On the search for civil society in China,"Modem China, Vol.
19, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 199-215.
10. Joseph W. Esherick and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, "Acting out democracy: political
theatre in modern China," in Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry (eds.), Popular
Protest and Political Culture in Modem China: Learning from 1989 (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1992), pp. 28-66.
11. Thomas Gold, "Party-state versus society in China," in Joyce K. Kallgren (ed.),
Building a Nation-State: China after Forty Years (Berkeley: University of California at
Berkeley, Centre for Chinese Studies, 1990), pp. 125-151; and his "The resurgence of civil
society in China," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 18-31.
12. David Kelly and He Baogang, "Emergentcivil society and the intellectuals in China,"
in Miller (ed.), The Developments of Civil Society in Communist Systems, pp. 24-39.
13. Philip Huang, " 'Public Sphere'/'civil society' in China?"Modem China, Vol. 19, No.
2 (April 1993), pp. 216-240.
14. Richard Madsen, "The public sphere, civil society, and moral community," Modern
China, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 183-198.
15. Barrett L. McCormick, Political Reform in Post-Mao-China: Democracy and
Bureaucracy in a Leninist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); "Theimpact
of democracy on China studies," Problems of Communism,Vol. 40, No. 1-2 (January-April
1991), pp. 126-132; and his (co-author with Su Shaozhi and Xiao Xiaoming) "The 1989
democracy movement: a review of the prospects for civil society in China," Pacific Affairs,
Vol. 65, No. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 182-202.
16. Clements Stubbs Ostergaard, "Citizens, groups and nascent civil society in China:
towards an understanding of the 1989 student demonstrations," China Information, Vol. 4,
No. 2 (Autumn 1989), pp. 28-41.
17. Margaret M. Pearson, "Managers in China's foreign sector: do they represent an
emergent civil society?" paper prepared for delivery at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, 29 August-1 September 1991.
18. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Stateand society in contemporaryChina," WorldPolitics, Vol. 41,
No. 4 (July 1989), pp. 579-591; "China's long march to democracy," (co-author with Ellen
V. Fuller), World Policy Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 663-685; and her "Labor
divided: sources of state formation in modem China," in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and
Vivienne Shue (eds.), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America (forthcoming).
19. Lucian Pye, "China:erratic state, frustratedsociety," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4
(Fall 1990), pp. 56-74; and "The state and the individual: an overview," The China Quarterly,
No. 127 (September 1991), pp. 443-466.
20. Mary Rankin, "Some observations on a Chinese public sphere," Modem China, Vol.
19, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 158-182.
21. William T. Rowe, "The public sphere in modem China," Modem China, Vol. 16, No.
3 (July 1990), pp. 309-329; and "The problem of civil society in Late Imperial China,"
Modem China, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 139-157.
22. Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politics
(Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press 1988); and "Powers of state: paradoxes of dominion Chia
1949-1979," in Kenneth Lieberthal, Joyce Kallgren, Roderick MacFarquharand Frederic
Wakeman, Jr. (eds.), Perspectives on Modem China: Four Anniversaries (Armonk: M. E.
Sharpe, 1991), pp. 205-225.
181
182
The China Quarterly
Solinger,23David Strand,24Lawrence Sullivan,25Frederic Wakeman, Jr.,26
Gordon White,27 and Mayfair Yang.28These scholars produced a literature that has affected thinking about contemporaryChina. In general, they
have tended to the view that Chinese civil society has been increasingly
vibrant since the introduction of reform in the later 1970s, though it is
still far from being fully developed.
Oddly, the heated discussion on civil society among Western scholars
has not been accompanied by any detailed consideration of the emergence
of the idea among Chinese theorists and intellectuals. Shortly after the
Beijing massacre, David Kelly noted that in China "very little has
been done to develop and theorize what intellectuals in Eastern
and Central Europe call 'civil society'."29 A year later, Kelly and
He Baogang found some signs of appearance of a "civil discourse" in
China. Nevertheless, they concluded that Chinese intellectuals'
consciousness about the emergent civil society and their faith in its
development were still weak.30 Barnett McCormick and two Chinese
scholars also noted that "Chinese intellectuals have not addressed the
problem of establishing an independent civil society in the same terms as
East Europeans."31 Similarly, historian William T. Rowe remarked that
civil society is not "even an item of contemporarydiscourse [in China]."32
While to a certain extent these comments are true, they also reflect the
limited knowledge in the West about the extensive Chinese discussion on
civil society. As far as I know, the first Chinese publication on the subject
appeared in 1986, two to three years before most Western scholars may
have assumed.
The purpose of this article is thus to present a preliminaryreview of the
Chinese discourse on civil society. It will show how Chinese theorists
have attempted to link this Western concept to the Chinese reality.
23. Dorothy J. Solinger, "Urban entrepreneurs and the state: the merger of state and
society," in ArthurLewis Rosenbaum (ed.), State and Society in China (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1992), pp. 121-141; and "China's transients and the state: a form of civil society?"
Politics and Society, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 91-122.
24. David Strand,"Protestin Beijing: civil society and public sphere in China," Problems
of Communism, Vol. 39, No. 3 (May-June 1990), pp. 1-19.
25. Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The emerence of civil society in China, Spring 1989," in Tony
Saich (ed.), The Chinese People's Movement: Perspectives on Spring 1989 (Armonk: M. E.
Sharpe, 1990), pp. 126-144.
26. FredericWakeman, Jr., "The civil society and public sphere in China,"Modern China,
Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 1993), pp. 108-138.
27. Gordon White, "Prospects for civil society in China: a case study of Xiaoshan City,"
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (January 1993), pp. 63-87; and his Riding the
Tiger: The Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China (London: MacMillan 1993), pp.
198-232.
28. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, "Between state and society: the construction of corporateness
in a Chinese socialist factory,"Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 22 (July 1989), pp.
31-60.
29. David Kelly, "Chinese intellectuals in the 1989 democracy movement," in George
Hicks (ed.), The Broken Mirror: China after Tiananmen (Harlow: Longman, 1990), pp.
24-51, at 45.
30. Kelly and He, "Emergent civil society."
31. McCormick et al., "The 1989 democracy movement," p. 196.
32. Rowe, "The problem of civil society," p. 143.
The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society
Origins of the Discourse
The Chinese discussion of civil society can be traced back to 1986,
when an article published in Tianjin Social Science "unearthed" the
concept of "townspeople's right" (shimin quanli) from Marx's classical
writings.33 In the liberal environment of the time, it was abstracted
without comment in the People's Daily,34 confirming that it caught
official attention. Shen Yue, author of the article, argued that in Marx's
original works there is a term "townspeople's right," which refers to the
right of equal exchange of commodities. In a market economy, this right
is supposed to be available to all townspeople. However, since the term
has been mis-translated into "bourgeois right" (zichanjieji quanli) in
Chinese, it has been equated with the improper privileges of the bourgeoisie. Consequently, it has been denied to Chinese townspeople.
According to Shen, "townspeople" is an economic concept that includes both bourgeoisie and proletariat.The basic characteristicof townspeople, apart from residing in urban areas, was their participation in
market economic activities. They were individual owners of commodities, and thus enjoyed greater autonomy than slaves and serfs, who had
limited personal freedom, as well as peasants, who were remote from the
market. However, private possession of commodities inevitably led to
conflicts among them. To settle disputes, a legal system was developed to
define individual rights and duties, transforming townspeople into a new
social category, "citizens" (gongmin).
In a later article, Shen further explained the origin of the concept of
"townspeople."35 According to him, the German term "burgerliche
Gesellschaft" used by Marx and Engels came from the word "burg,"
which literally means "castle" (chengbao). The development of a market
economy transformed"castles" into "towns." Hence, a "town" (chengshi)
must be a combination of "castle" (cheng) and "market" (shi). People
living in it, or townspeople, were inevitably involved in market activities,
though they were not necessarily entrepreneurs. Hence, just as equal
market exchanges must be distinguished from bourgeois exploitation,
townspeople should not be equated with bourgeoisie. However, this
demarcation was obliterated when the term "burgerliche Gesellschaft"
was mis-translated into Chinese as "bourgeois society" (zichanjieji shehui). The correct translation, in Shen's view, should be "townspeople's
society" (shimin shehui).
Shen's ideas are important in that they imply universality of civil
rights. As "townspeople" include bourgeoisie and proletariat, so do
"citizens." Since "townspeople's rights" are available to both classes,
civil rights are also class-neutral. This marks an importantdeparturefrom
33. Shen Yue, "Zichanjiejiquanli ying yi wei shimin quanli" ("Bourgeois right should be
translated as townspeople's right"), Tianjin shehui kexue (Tianjin Social Science), No. 4
(1986).
34. Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 24 November 1986.
35. Shen Yue, " 'Shimin shehui' bian xi" ("An examination of 'townspeople society' "),
Zhexue yanjiu (Philosophy Study), No. 1 (1990), pp. 44-51.
183
184
The China Quarterly
the previous rejection of the concept of civil rights on the basis of its
"bourgeois nature."
Shen's argument,however, was criticized by Xi Zhaoyong, a scholar at
Nanjing University.36According to Xi, although it is true that the German
term "burger"could mean both "townspeople" and "bourgeoisie,"in most
cases Marx and Engels used it to mean the latter. Shen's notion of
"townspeople's right" was mistaken because of out-of-context translation.
In Marx's and Engels' conception, Xi maintained, the system that replaced European feudalism was clearly a "bourgeois mode of production," not anything called "townspeople's mode of production."
Nevertheless, Shen Yue was not the only scholar who attempted to
assert that the "citizen" is a class-neutral concept. Another theorist,
Huang Dao, argued that a citizen is the principal component of the state.37
It is a legal entity that cannot be divided "for any reason nor under any
pretext." While civil rights are to be guaranteedby law and protected by
the state on the one hand, it is also necessary for each citizen to be aware
of his or her duties on the other. Under socialism, such "civic awareness"
is based on collectivism, in contrast to the individualistic "bourgeois
democratic consciousness." Notwithstanding this distinction, Huang did
not suggest that the central ideas of "civic awareness"- observance of
law and defence of social order - would vary with social systems.
Two other theorists, Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli, made a further
breakthrough by establishing individualism as the legitimate basis of
"civic awareness."38They argued that there can be no meaningful existence of collectivity unless individual rights are fully recognized. They
quoted University of Chicago political scientist Tsou Tang's idea that in
contrast to Western states which are built upon civil societies, the Chinese
one is based on a "mass society" (qunzhong shehui).39According to Liu
and Wang, the term "mass" in its traditional as well as contemporary
Chinese usage connotes subordination to rulers, whereas the Western
concept of "citizen" is associated with individual rights and equality. As
the Chinese general public have customarily identified themselves with
"mass," their "civic awareness" has been weak. China's modernization
thus calls for raising people's awareness of their civil rights, and a real
guarantee of democracy and freedom to the people. By replacing personal
rule with governance-by-law, and by establishing a democratic system,
the Chinese "mass" will be transformed into a "citizenry."
36. Xi Zhaoyong, " 'Shimin shehui bian xi' de bian xi" ("An examination of 'an
examination of townspeople society' "), Zhexue yanjiu, No. 5 (1990) , pp. 31-36.
37. Huang Dao, "Lue lun shehuizhuyi gongmin yishi de shidai tezhi" ("A brief discussion
on the characteristics of civic awareness during socialist era"), Lilun yuekan (Theoretical
Monthly), No. 1 (1988).
38. Liu Zhiguang and Wang Suli, "Cong qunzhong shehui zouxiang gongmin shehui"
("From mass society to civil society"), Zhengzhixue yanjiu (Political Research), No. 5,
(1988).
39. ApparentlyLiu and Wang were referringto Tsou Tang's "Marxism,the Leninist party,
the masses, and the citizens in the rebuilding of the Chinese state," in StuartR. Schram (ed.),
Foundation and Limits of State Power in China (London: School of Oriental and African
Studies, University of London 1987), pp. 257-289, at 265-68.
The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society
A somewhat different view was articulated by Ju Mingzhou.40While
Liu and Wang emphasized citizens' rights, Ju's concern was their duties.
But the three theorists were in fact talking about two different aspects of
the same issue: the making of a modern Chinese citizenry. According to
Ju, it is correct to say that individuals form the basic component of
society. "However, it must also be stressed that without society, there is
no citizen. Society creates citizens, and [the formation of] citizenry
represents perfection of individuals." In Ju's view, a large proportion of
the Chinese population are not yet citizens, in the sense that their "civic
awareness" is still limited. This is reflected in the widespread contempt
for law and decline in social ethics. To ensure economic development and
political stability, Ju argued, it is important to construct a "society-oriented culture," one which encourages the submission of individual interest to public good.
Thus, in its initial phase, the focus of the Chinese domestic discussion
of civil society was on the creation of a modem citizenry through
inspiration of "civic awareness" by the state among the people. This
corresponds to the second and third components of civil society defined
by Edward Shils - "effective ties" with the state, and presence of
"civility."41Given the apparent weak "civic awareness" among the Chinese population, the proposed construction of modem citizenry as the first
step towards formation of a civil society seems to make sense. While
advocating individual rights and freedom, the Chinese domestic discussants of civil society recognized the inevitable existence of the state. The
civil society in their mind is one that will maintain a harmonious relation
with the state, rather than a hostile rejection of it.
Such a moderate approachto civil society, however, promptedpolitical
conservatives to co-opt the idea into the official ideological framework.
In September 1986, the Party Central Committee issued the "Resolution
Concerning the Guiding Principles of the Socialist Spiritual Civilization
Construction," which stated that the Party should promote legal knowledge among the people, in order to "strengthen socialist civic awareness."42 Guided by this, a team of writers from the National People's
Congress, the Central Party School, the Beijing High Court, the State
Administration of Industry and Commerce, and some other academic
institutions co-published in 1988 a volume titled Gongmin shouce (Handbook for Citizens).43 According to the preface of this book, participantsof
the project "received support and encouragement" from the conservative
octogenarian leader Chen Yun, who even "checked and approved the
40. Ju Mingzhou, "Wenhua shi gongmin shehui xingwei de zhidu tixi" ("Culture is the
social behaviourial system for citizens"), Liaoning daxue xuebao (Liaoning University
Journal), No. 5 (1989), pp. 28-32.
41. Edward Shils, "The virtue of civil society," Governmentand Opposition, Vol. 26, No.
1 (Winter 1991), pp. 3-20, at 4.
42. Zhongguo baike nianjian 1987 (China Encyclopedic Yearbook1987), pp. 101-105, at
103,
43. Xie Bangyu (ed.), Gongmin shouce (Handbook for Citizens) (Beijing: Huayi Press,
1988).
185
186
The China Quarterly
table of contents of the whole book," and inscribed the title "in high
spirit."
Written in a guide-book style, this 560-page publication contains
chapters on democracy, rule-of-law, citizens' rights and duties, public
ethics, social discipline, public security, family and heritage laws, rules
concerning foreign affairs or foreign nationals, crime and penalty, and
right protection. The "socialist" as well as "Chinese characteristics" of
the official position over these issues can be found throughout the book,
as evident in some of the headings of the entries: "democratic centralism," "socialist spiritual civilization," "Lei Feng
spirit,"
"internationalism," "collectivism," "revolutionary heroism," and
"surveillance by the masses." On the other hand, Western institutions
such as universal suffrage, parliamentarism, the multi-party system,
judicial independence and equality of law were all said to be capitalist in
nature. Such a socialist or "sinified" version of "civil society" does not
seem to have been the intention of the scholars who initiated the
discussion in China. As mentioned, they wanted to make the idea a
neutral one, free of any socialist or capitalist labels.
Despite the above official campaign to create a socialist citizenry, the
domestic discussion of civil society seemed to subside for the two years
after mid-1990. After the publication of Xi Zhaoyong's article in May
1990," no major piece on civil society appeared in the Chinese press.
This quiescence lasted until May 1992, when a Sino-American joint
conference on contemporary Chinese history was held in Fudan University in Shanghai. There, Frederic Wakeman, Jr. presented a paper criticizing William Rowe's45 and Mary Rankin's46 application of the concept of
civil society to China. In Wakeman's view, there has not been any major
confrontation between civic power and the Chinese state. Another
scholar, Prasenjit Duara, agreed that there were indications of an emergent civil society in the late-Qing period. But this development was
suppressed in the Republican era because of popular demand for a strong
state. These views of Western scholars were summarized in the Fudan
Journal.47So far there has been no indication that this has rekindled the
domestic debate on civil society.
44. Xi Zhaoyong," 'Shiminshehuibianxi'."
45. William Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City 1796-1889
(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress, 1984).
46. Mary Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China (Stanford:
StanfordUniversityPress, 1986).
47. Wang Licheng,"JindaiZhongguoxiandaihuade tansuo"("Probingcontemporary
China's modernization process"), Fudan xuebao (shehui kexue ban) (Fudan Journal (Social
ScienceEdition)),No. 4 (1992) pp. 85-89, at 88. I am indebtedto an anonymousChina
Quarterlyrefereeforinformingmeaboutthisconference.Proceedingsof thesymposiumwill
appear in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Wang Xi (eds.), China's Quest for Modernization: A
See Wakeman,
HistoricalApproach(Berkeley:Instituteof EastAsianStudies,forthcoming).
"Thecivil society,"p. 134.
The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society
Shift of Focus by Intellectuals-in-Exile48
On the other hand, a new stage of discussion of China's civil society
has emerged among Chinese overseas since 1990. Major contributorsand
protagonists in this forum are mostly prominent Chinese intellectuals who
were forced into exile after the 1989 Beijing massacre. They have made
no reference to the earlier literature, suggesting that they might be quite
unaware of the foregoing domestic discussion. More importantly, as will
be shown below, their major emphasis has been on the autonomous
nature of civil society, representing a shift of focus from the second and
third components in Shils' definition of the concept to the first one independence from the state.49
To my knowledge, Chen Kuide was the first Chinese exiled dissident
who employed the concept of civil society in intellectual discourse. A
locally-trained Ph.D. in philosophy of science, Chen is a former editor of
a Shanghai magazine closed after 1989.50In an article published in March
1990, he called for an alliance between intellectuals and entrepreneursas
an important step towards formation of a civil society." Three months
later, in another article, he defined civil society as referring "primarilyto
the public sphere consisting of private enterprises, universities, newspapers and magazines, trade unions, churches, and other social organizations that are independent of the state." Chen believed that despite the
party-state's attempt to "strangle civil society in the cradle," the birth of
Chinese civil society, which began in the late 1970s, was only temporarily halted by the military suppression.52
A year after Chen made the above statements, he presented his deeper
thought on the issue in another article.53For him, the construction of
China's civil society is extremely important because it provides a third
alternative to the seemingly inevitable dilemma between Communist
authoritarianismon the one hand and anarchism on the other. He suggested three essential steps for this task. The first is to furtherdecentralize
48. Partof theinformation
usedin thissectionwasobtainedfrompersonalinterviewswith
a groupof Chineseintellectualsin exile in Princeton,New Jersey,October1991. I wish to
thanktheAssociatesof the Universityof TorontoTravelGrantFundfor providingfinancial
supportfor the researchtripto PrincetonUniversity,LorraineSpiess (co-ordinatorof the
PrincetonChinaInitiative)forarrangingtheinterviews,andMartinHe andSimonWongfor
theirassistancein the project.
49. A similarchangeof focus,accordingto Chamberlain,
canalsobe foundin theWestern
literatureon China'scivil society. This is his majorargumentin "Onthe searchfor civil
society."
50. For detailedbiographicinformationof Chen, see Shu-YunMa, "China'shigher
educationreform and the emergenceof dissidence:the case of Chen Kuide,"China
InformationVol. 7, No. 3 (Winter1992-93), pp. 39-45.
51. Hua Yifu, "Zai ping xin quanwei zhuyi" ("On New Authoritarianism
again"),
Zhongguozhichun(ChinaSpring),March1990,pp. 68-73, at 71. HuaYifu is ChenKuide's
pseudonym.
52. HuaYifu, "Congzhengzhiwenhuade jiaodukan 'liu si' yizhounian"("A reflection
at thefirstanniversary
of theJuneFourthIncidentfromtheperspectiveof politicalculture"),
Jiushi niandai (The Nineties), June 1990, pp. 54-55.
53. ChenKuide,"Lunzuqunshehuide wudaohe gongminshehuide chongjian"("Onthe
of civil society")Zhishifenzi
misleadingnotionof collectivesociety andthe reconstruction
(The Chinese Intellectuals), Summer 1991, pp. 23-30.
187
188
The China Quarterly
power to local authorities. This will institutionalize regional interest, and
thus form shelters for private economic activities and intellectual dissent.
Moreover, increased geographical mobility of human resources caused by
regional disparity will create horizontal networks, which will in turn
weaken the central government's vertical control mechanism. Chen's
second step is to "routinize"(make independent of political changes) and
"stabilize" operation of grassroots economic organizations. This means
not only a consolidation of the private economy, but also a de-politicization of state enterprises. When operation of economic undertakings are
"routinized,"they will become "micro-structures"that can be expected to
minimize social disruption when rapid political changes occur. The final
step is to create a "substitutivepolitical force." This will involve replacement of existing Communist leaders with intellectuals, whose activities in
the 1980s have made them vanguards of the construction of civil society.
Central to Chen's analysis is the detachment of the civil society from
the state. As already mentioned, this has also been the major concern of
East European scholars. In fact, to a large extent the Chinese exiled
intellectuals' discussion of civil society was inspired by the apparent
success of the idea in the former Soviet bloc countries. For example, Liu
Binyan, the former investigative reporter of the People's Daily, praised
East European intellectuals for daring "to confront the state and party
while maintaining remarkable self-restraint in the course of their long
struggle. They worked hard to develop a civil society." To learn from this
experience, Liu argued, "China needs a flowering of all kinds of independent organizations, especially free trade unions, and a strengthening of
civil society."54
However, some Chinese intellectuals-in-exile are sceptical about the
transplantof the East European concept to Chinese reality. One example
is Su Wei, an organizer of various intellectuals' petitions in the late
1980s. While noting that he has no intention of belittling the idea of civil
society, Su recommended that his fellow intellectuals search for "new
ideological resources" from China's own legacy." His view represents
the common concern that blind adoption of the East European notion of
civil society will reinforce the unhealthy trend of anti-traditionalism,
which has been influential among many Chinese intellectuals since the
mid-1980s.56
54. Liu Binyan,"Chinaandthe lessonsof EasternEurope,"Journalof Democracy,Vol.
2, No. 2 (Spring1991), pp. 3-11, at 8-9.
55. Su Wei, "Mantan Beijing de wenhuaquanzi"("On Beijing's culturalcircles"),
Zhongguozhichun,January1992, pp. 61-65, at 64-65.
56. Thestrongestvoice in thisregardis thatof PengWenyi,a Taiwaneseintellectualwho
migratedto theUnitedStatessome20 yearsago. Accordingto him,the successof thenewly
the abilityof Confucian-type
countriesin South-EastAsia has demonstrated
industrializing
Endowedwiththe sameculturalasset,China
collectivesocietiesto achievemodernization.
shouldalso utilizethis traditionaladvantagein its questfor development.Pengcondemned
of theWesternindividualistic
theChineseproponents
conceptof civil societyforblindimport
of foreign ideas, just like the Communists'introductionof Marxisminto Chinaseveral
decades ago. See his "Zuqunshehui yu gongminshehui"("Collectivesociety and civil
society"),Jiushiniandai,June1990, pp. 106-107; "Zaitan zuqunshehui"("Oncollective
society again"),Jiushiniandai,June 1991, pp. 69-71; and"Zhongguobi wanglun zhi er"
The Chinese Discourse on Civil Society
But for Su Xiaokang, the script-writer of the controversial television
series River Elegy, anti-traditionalism is not a real problem, since it is
simply a camouflage to attack Communism." More importantly, in his
view, the notion of civil society may provide a common ground to unite
iconoclasts (whose real purpose is to criticize Communism) with traditionalists. He noted that independent clan, religious, and trade associations did exist in traditional Chinese society until they were abolished by
the Communist regime. Since construction of civil society may result in
revival of some of the folk institutions, the endeavour is both anti-Communist and pro-traditional.
Su Xiaokang agreed that it is inappropriate to discuss civil society
purely in the East European sense, without relating it to the Chinese
context. However, according to him, "in terms of social structure,ideology, economic system, public psychology, and in particularthe model of
development of civil society, China has more similarities with East
European countries than with East Asian ones." He observed that since
the late 1970s, some independent social forces have begun to become
detached from the state. The disintegration of Communist control first
took place in the cultural sphere, and later in the economic sector,
resulting in an "embryonic civil society" that consists primarily of
independent intellectuals and private entrepreneurs.
An important feature of Su's thinking is his inclusion of the illegal
Triad Society as an importantcomponent of civil society. This is perhaps
related to his personal experience of escape from China through the help
of smugglers.58In his first discussion of civil society, as well as in my
interview with him, Su mentioned the role of the Triad Society, but did
not equate it with civil society.59 However, in a more recent article, he
explicitly emphasized the indispensable function of the Triad Society as
a counter-structureto the establishment." According to him, the present
Chinese civil society is characterized by three major features: the filling
of social "crevices" caused by state decay by traditional clan, religious
and underground forces; the decline of political participation to an
all-time low level; and the fundamental collapse of social ethics. In
footnote continued
("OntheviewthatChinawill definitelyperish,part2"),Jiushiniandai,May 1992,pp.88-89.
Peng'sargumentis notdiscussedin the maintextbecause,as a Taiwanese,he is beyondthe
scopeof thispaperwhichis on theviewsof themainlandChineseintellectuals.Fora critique
of Peng's opinion,see ChenKuide,"Onthe misleadingnotion,"pp. 23-25.
57. Su Xiaokang,"DangdaiZhongguode wenhuajinzhang"("Contemporary
China's
cultural tensions"), Minzhu Zhongguo (Democratic China), February 1991, pp. 32-37, at
35-37.
58. The assistancegiven by TriadSocietyin the escapeof Su andotherdissidentsfrom
China was featuredin the British BroadcastingCorporation'stelevision documentary
I amindebtedto PaulNg forprovidingme witha chanceto watchthis
OperationYellowbird.
film.
59. Su Xiaokang,"DangdaiZhongguo,"p. 36; personalinterviewconductedat Princeton
University,18 October1991.
60. Su Xiaokang,"Bandiao zi de shiminshehui"("Ahalf-madecivil society"),Minzhu
Zhongguo,August 1992, pp. 1-3, at 3.
189
190
The ChinaQuarterly
particular,he referredto an official reportthat thereare now more than
1,800 illegal secretsocietiesin China,the largestones with memberships
of over 10,000. They controlland, farmprices and sales of agricultural
productsin many villages;organizetax revolts;practiseusury;establish
undergroundmilitaryand law-enforcementcrews; and smuggle people,
guns and drugs. On the other hand, from 1990 to 1991 at least 1,000
formalapplicationsfor legal public assembliesand rallies were rejected
by the authorities,and 28 academicgatheringsby non-officialorganizationswerebanned.Comparingthe weakcivil activitiesto the increasingly
powerfulillegal societies, Su concludedthat "in Chinaonly the illegal
ways are viable."This is by far the most radicalversionof civil society
that has been articulatedby Chinesetheorists.61
Su has also noted that the expectationfor enlightenedleaders to
introducereformsfrom above has preventedChineseintellectualsfrom
paying sufficientattentionto the emergentcivil society. His view received an immediateresponsefromChenYizi, a formeradviserto Zhao
Ziyang. "Whenall people are denied a basic propertyright, and when
theirrightto surviveis completelycontrolledby the party-state,how can
a civil societybe formed?"Chenasked.62Whilethis questionseems to be
commonsensical,it recalls the Hegelian view that the right to private
ownershipof propertyis a central and indispensablefeature of civil
society.63
The case of Zhang Langlang,anotherdissident-in-exile,provides a
good illustrationof the relation between private economy and civil
society. After his release from nine-years' political imprisonmentin
1977, Zhangenteredthe advertisingbusiness,one of the fastestgrowing
industriesin China,andlaterestablishedhis own companies.He used the
artpublication,Fine Arts
money he madeto financea quasi-independent
in China,which has been describedby one foreign scholaras "thebest
sourcefor 'avant-garde'art"andthe "singlemost importantinstitutionin
fosteringthe new artmovement"in China.6The publicationsurvivedthe
61. The inclusion of Triad Society into the concept of civil society can find its root in
traditionalChinese thought. See Don Price, "LateCh'ing images of civil society and the public
sphere in the West," paper preparedfor Symposium on Civil Society in East Asia, Montreal,
23-25 October 1992; and Jack Gray, "China: Communism and Confucianism," in Archie
Brown and Jack Gray (eds.), Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States
(New York: Holmes & Meier; second ed. 1979), pp. 197-230, at 208. Reportedly, during the
1989 Pro-Democracy Movement secret societies showed support to the students by
voluntarily suspending their clandestine activities. See Tu Wei-ming, "Intellectual effervescence in China," Daedalus, Vol. 121, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 251-292, at 278. On the
government's side, China's Minister of Public Security, Tao Siju, admitted that the Chinese
government has maintained contacts with Triad Society in Hong Kong. According to Tao,
there are "patriots"and "good persons" in Triad Society. His statement has shocked the Hong
Kong public. See Song Chi, "Hong yu hei" ("Red and black"), Kaifang (Open Magazine),
April 1993, pp. 6-7.
62. Cheng Si, "Bajiu minyun wei women liuxialiao shenme" ("What did the 1989
pro-democracy movement leave to us?"), Jiushi niandai (June 1991), pp. 46-52, at 48.
63. Shils, "Virtue,"pp. 5-9; Charles Taylor, "Modes of civil society," Public Culture,Vol.
3, No. 1 (Fall 1990), pp. 95-118, at 108.
64. Ralph Croizier, " 'Going to the World': art and culture on the cosmopolitan tide," in
Anthony J. Kane (ed.), China Briefing, 1989 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 67-86,
at 71 and 75.
The ChineseDiscourseon Civil Society
Party'sideologicalsurveillanceby not touchingon any politicallysensitive issues. For Zhang, given the complete control of the Communist
Partyoverthe realmof politics,to createandexpanda de-politicizedgrey
area for private activities is equivalentto a weakeningof the Party's
power.Althoughhe did not use the termcivil societybeforehe left China
in 1989, he regardedhis previousde-politicizationeffort as the first step
towardsthe ideal.65Unconsciously,Zhang has followed the East Europeandissidents'strategyof repudiatingthe ubiquitousmendacitypropagatedby the regime throughcompleteavoidanceof politics.66
Zhang'sapoliticalapproachwas influentialamonga numberof readers
of Fine Arts in China, includingstudentsand faculty membersof the
CentralAcademy of Fine Arts. When they were asked by the 1989
demonstratorsto make a Goddessof Democracystatueto be erectedin
TiananmenSquare,they attemptedto de-politicizethe requestby handThe fact thatFine Artsin China
ling it as an ordinarycommercialorder.67
could not survivethe post-June1989 crackdownspoke for itself.
AnotherChineseuserof the conceptof civil society is KongJiesheng,
a well-knownwriterof "woundedliterature."In a personalinterviewhe
said that gatheringsof Chinese people in bars, karaokesand qigong
classes, as well as performanceby streetartists,are signs of the formation
of a "publicsphere"in Habermas'sense. He expectedthatfurtherformal
institutionalization
of this publicrealmof life will resultin an expansion
of civic power against the state.68 Elsewhere, referring to the
activities of a culturalsalon in the early 1960s, Kong
"underground"
claimedthata primitiveform of civil society in Chinaalreadyexisted at
that time.69
In short,amongexiled Chineseintellectualscivil society has become
fashionable.The commonemphasishas been on independencefrom the
state. This is understandable,
given that they were all repressedby the
Chineseparty-state.But in fact how realisticis this rejectionof the state?
An American-trained
Chinesescholar,now a professorof politicsat Yale
65. Interview with Zhang Langlang at Princeton University on 16 October 1991.
66. Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Unofficial peace activism in the Soviet Union and East-Central
Europe," in Tismaneanu, In Search of Civil Society, pp. 1-53, at 4.
67. Interview with Zhang. For a reporton the order for the Goddess of Democracy status,
see Han Minzhu (pseudonym; ed.), Criesfor Democracy (Princeton University Press, 1990),
p. 343.
68. Interview with Kong Jiesheng, conducted at Princeton University on 18 October 1991.
The historian Philip Huang, however, argued that the Habermas' notion of development of
civil society from public sphere is basically a European formula that may not be applicable
to China. According to him, the history of Ming-Qing China demonstrated a dissociation,
ratherthan association, between expansion of public realm of life and assertion of civic power
against the state. See Philip C. C. Huang, "The paradigmatic crisis in Chinese studies,"
Modem China, Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 1991), pp. 299-341, at 320-22.
69. Kong Jiesheng, "Zhanjian hou yu gushi yiren" ("A convict awaiting execution and
a story teller"), Zheng Ming (Contend) (August 1991), pp. 66-68. This article is a special
feature on Zhang Langlang, the artist-entrepreneurmentioned above. In the inverview by the
present author, Zhang admitted that most members of Zhang's group were scions of high
officialdom. Their ability to form such a "secret"organization, and their access to prohibited
publications and works of artwere partof the privileges of these "nobles," not a real indication
of an emergent civil society.
191
192
The ChinaQuarterly
Universitywith no apparentassociationwith the Chinesepoliticalexiles,
remindedthe dissidentintellectualsthatthe stateis still requiredto clean
up the social and economic evils of civil society.70Moreover, as a
Westernscholarrightlyremarked,no matterhow powerfulthe idea of
civil society is as a focus for resistanceto Communistregimes,it offers
no adequatepoliticalmodel for the long-termconstructionof a healthy
politicalcommunity.7'
Conclusion
Since 1986, there has been a theoreticaldiscourseof civil society in
China. Protagonistsof the discussion can be divided into two major
groups: domestic theorists and exiled intellectuals.The former have
focused on the makingof a moderncitizenry,consistingof law-abiding
and civil membersof society. Existence of this entity presupposesthe
activeinvolvementof the state.The relationbetweencivil societyandthe
state was thus seen as an intimateand harmoniousone. This contrasts
sharplywith the basic orientationof exiled intellectuals,whose primary
concernhas been creationof a privaterealm that is independentof the
state. Therehas been no mentionof law, orderand civility. Even illegal
societies are includedas a constituentof civil society. The term "civil"
becomes redundant.72
This is highly inappropriate.As one sociologist
noted, the word "civil"has a numberof very importantand interesting
social, historicaland interpretativeloadings.It "refersto a conditionof
education,refinementand sophisticationas opposed to a conditionof
barbarism.""73
Another China scholar remarkedthat among the whole
of
associationsthat have appearedin Chinain
range quasi-autonomous
recentyears,some arecertainlymore"civil"thanothers."Thosewith the
quality of 'civility' might eventually contributeto the creation of a
democraticpublic sphere, [whereasthose] withoutit may simply push
Chinacloser towardanarchicfragmentation."74
Borrowingthe idea of civil society fromEastEuropeandissidents,the
Chinese theorists-in-exileseem to be suddenly strengthenedby "the
powerof the powerless."'7However,unliketheirEast Europeancounter70. Wang Shaoguang, "Guangyu 'shimin shehui' de jidian sikao" ("Some thoughts on
'civil society' "), Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-First Century), December 1991, pp. 102-114. This
argumentis the opposite of thatof Adam Smith and many others, who thought thatcivil society
could clean up the feudal evils of the state. See Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the
Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979). I am indebted to an anoymous referee for pointing this out.
71. Paul Hirst, "The state, civil society and the collapse of Soviet Communism," Economy
and Society, Vol. 20, No. 2 (May 1991), pp. 217-242.
72. In Western literaturethere is also a tendency to conflate "civil society" with "society,"
and make the term "civil" redundant.See Chamberlain,"On the search for civil society," pp.
205-209; and White, "Prospects for civil society," p. 66.
73. Tester, Civil Society p. 9.
74. Madsen, "Public sphere," p. 190.
75. Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in Paul Wilson (ed.), Open Letters:
Selected Writings 1965-1990 by Vaclav Havel (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), pp.
125-214.
The ChineseDiscourseon Civil Society
partswho have been using the idea to buildparallelstructureswithinthe
system, the Chinese dissidents are advocatingthe concept in foreign
countries.Withouta domesticpresence,theirconstructionof civil society
can only remain at a theoreticallevel. The government'scensorship
system,thoughweakerthanbefore,is still effectivein preventingtranslation of externalvoices into internalinfluences.76
76. As one exile admitted, the Chinese public in fact could hear very limited voices from
overseas dissidents. See Li Peier, "Gao Xin: zhongguo de xiwang zai ziyou jingji" ("Gao
Xin: the hope of China lies at free economy"), Dangdai yuekan (ContemporaryMonthly), 15
May 1991, pp. 33-35, at 34.
193