THE KOREAN WAR AS A STATE FORMATION WAR
by
Hak Soon Paik
(The Sejong Institute, Korea)
INTRODUCTION
The year 2000 is the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War
(1950-1953). The literature on the Korean War is both rich and extensive.1 Of
the various debates on the Korean War, the one on its origins and character has
been the most heated. This study joins the on-going debate by putting forward a
new perspective on the origins and character of the Korean War.
This study will propose a theory of state formation war based on state
formation theories, and use the Korean War as a case to which the theory of state
formation war is applied. This study will argue, by locating the Korean War in
the context of state making in Korea, that it was a "state formation war" in its
character regardless of its outcome. It is hoped that the theory of state formation
war presented in this study will explain many wars in the past, if not all of them, as
well as the Korean War.
In explaining the Korean War as a state formation war, this study will draw
upon (1) Kim Il Sung’s power motive and motivational tendency to remove or
neutralize rival state makers in making a state; and his belief system, ideas, and
interests that affected his choice of using force as a means of removing the rival
state makers in the South; and (2) the concrete processes of North Korean state
formation in which Kim Il Sung obtained coercive, war-making, and extractive
capabilities and the favorable political opportunity structures for state making in
Korea. The whole analysis will be subsumed under a framework of the agentstructure relationship.
STATE FORMATION WAR: THEORY AND ITS BUILDING BLOCKS
State makers have a power motive and motivational tendency to seek the
monopoly of authority within a certain territory-to-be. To make a state—the goal
of their power motivation—they make efforts to secure coercive, war-making, and
extractive capabilities, and to transform and exploit domestic and external political
opportunity structures. If the state makers have secured the aforementioned three
capabilities and favorable political opportunity structures for effectuating their
power motive, they are prone to take action to remove or neutralize rival state
makers in the territory. Such a propensity can take many different forms of
action, but if the action assumes the form of making a war against the rival state
makers, the war is a state formation war. Thus, the state formation war is a war
in which rival state makers compete for the monopoly of authority within a certain
territory-to-be.2
In putting forward a theory of state formation war, I will make some
assumptions and statements. First, I assume that a fundamental power motive
underlies the state makers' instinctive and intentional behavior to remove or
neutralize their rival state makers. Motive refers to a "disposition to strive for a
particular kind of goal-state or aim."3 Thus, power motive is conceptualized as
an enduring and relatively stable disposition to strive for power.4 State makers'
power motives and motivational tendencies to remove or neutralize rival state
makers can be treated as an instinctive drive for exclusive power and monopolistic
authority over the territory they aspire to rule.
State makers' motives for state formation could be analogous to that of the
entrepreneurs in the market. Just as the entrepreneurs have a fundamental motive
and motivational tendency toward profit maximization and monopoly of profit in
the market, so do the state makers have a power motive and motivational tendency
toward the maximization and monopoly of authority and loyalty in the process of
state formation.5
Second, I also assume that all state makers have by instinct an equally
strong power motive and motivational tendency to remove and neutralize rival
state makers. As far as a power motive itself is concerned, there is not much
point in identifying and judging which state makers are motivated how much
stronger than which other state makers to get rid of rival state makers.
Therefore, what matters is the following: who sets up the state apparatus
and obtains the capabilities of defeating enemies, that is, coercive, war-making,
and extractive capabilities, more quickly and more firmly; how favorable the
political opportunity structures, both internal and external, for state making are;
how effectively the state makers exploit the favorable opportunity structures;6
what alternative means are available for state making other than going to war, and
how costly waging a war is compared with other less violent and more peaceful
means for state making.
I assume that both Kim Il Sung in the North and Syngman Rhee in the
South were, more or less, equally strongly motivated to defeat and remove the
other in order to form a state in the Korean peninsula after Korea was freed from
Japanese rule. But it was Kim Il Sung that obtained the capabilities to do so
2
much earlier and more successfully than Syngman Rhee, and Kim exploited more
effectively the opportunity windows opened for state making in Korea.
Until starting the Korean War, Kim had tried unsuccessfully less violent
other means to neutralize Rhee in the South such as civil uprisings, guerrilla
warfare, and military rebellions. By January 1950 Kim was heavily skewed
toward going to war against South Korea, and successfully mobilized the Soviet
and Chinese support for his enterprise to go to war in June 1950.7
Third, in explaining a state formation war, my approach combines the
following three elements: (1) state makers' power motives and motivation toward
neutralizing and removing rival state makers; and their belief system, ideas, and
interests that affect their choice of means of effectuating their power motive; (2)
state makers’ achievement of coercive, war-making, and extractive capabilities;
and (3) the objective power-resource and rule structures—that is, political
opportunity structures—that are given and available to the state makers.
It is the state makers themselves that are motivated to act and implement
motivation, their motivation being influenced by their desires, beliefs, and
understandings of actions.8 The state makers play a central role in my argument.
The state makers are a distinctive group of people whose interest is qualitatively
different from all other groups of people. Their single most important interest is
to establish a monopolistic state authority within a certain territorial boundary.
In order to eliminate rivals and gain exclusive authority, they endeavor to build up
coercive, war-making and extractive capabilities, and exploit and transform the
political opportunity structures, domestic and external, for state formation.
On the other hand, we cannot separate the state makers' belief-value system
from the rule structure of the world in which they stand. Admittedly, there are
individual differences in experience and understanding of the outside world. But
their belief-value system (or their normative structure) can be understood, by and
large, as the internalized norms and rules of the institution in which they are
functioning. Thus, their choice of power resources and means of influence
toward the target (or rival) state makers in state-making actions are both
constrained and allowed by the general rule of the game of state making.9 In
other words, the given power-resource and rule structures both constrain the
behaviors of the state makers and provide the state makers with the means of state
formation. Therefore, I combine attributes and factors at both agential and
structural levels for the ontological foundation of my argument about the Korean
War.10
3
Fourth, in the process of state formation, the means of influence on the
target state makers may range from concession and compromise for tactical
expediency, coalition making through united front strategies to the use of force
and going to war. It is noteworthy that going to war has been a basic means for
removing and neutralizing rival state makers in the process of state formation
throughout time and space. That is, the use of force in the form of going to war,
regardless of how desirable it was, has been one of the established means (rules)
of the game of state making throughout human history. Going to war has been
not only an option for state makers through learning of the past experiences of
human collectivity11 but also the most-frequently-employed means of state
making.12 In other words, the use of force as a means in state-making activity has
been recognized "through recurring patterns of behavior."13
Fifth, if a state maker's personal belief-value system is strongly influenced
by his experience of having used force, there will be no significant cognitive
dissonance between such force-prone belief-value system and the actual use of
force by going to war.14 In this sense, the choice of the means of influence on the
rival state makers will reflect the state maker's internalized normative structure.
STATE FORMATION: CRITICAL VARIABLES15
I shall provide a set of critical variables of state formation at both levels of
agent (that is, state makers) and structure (rules and resources and their
configuration for state makers) in order to provide a base upon which a theory of
state formation war is constructed and to explain the origins and character of the
Korean War as a state formation war. To succeed in making a state, the state
makers must acquire sufficient coercive, war-making, and extractive capabilities
and a favorable political opportunity structure for state formation.
Knowledgeable state makers will calculate their coercive, war-making, and
extractive capabilities and understand the political opportunity structure they stand
in, and they make strategic choices for new action16 based on their understanding of
the constraints and opportunities the structure provides. In making such strategic
choices as going to war to form a state and implementing them, the state makers’
belief system, ideas, and interests play an important role in perceiving and
calculating their capabilities, structural constraints, and the opportunities of their
choices.17 All of the above will combine and interplay in forming the state.
4
State Maker’s Belief System, Ideas, and Interests
Robert A. Dahl proposes three factors that influence the content of the
political beliefs an individual acquires during a period of receptivity, whether in
youth or later on. First is “the amount to which the actor is exposed to the belief,
which in turn (a) requires that the belief has been formulated and diffused to the
actor's environment; and (b) depends on the amount of influence that the bearers
of the belief exert on processes of socialization.” Second is “the relative prestige
of the belief, which depends on (a) the personal prestige of its advocates and
antagonists; and (b) the successes and failures of the people, organizations, and
institutions that symbolize the belief.” Third is “the extent to which the new
belief is consistent with the actor's perceptions of reality as these are shaped by (a)
the actor's present beliefs, and (b) the actor's experience.”18 Robert Jervis
suggests four variables that "influence the degree to which an event affects later
perceptual predispositions": (1) firsthand experience, (2) early experiences, (3)
events important to the person's state or organization, and (4) range of available
alternative analogies.19
State makers' beliefs (or their internalized normative structure) and
motivation for monopolistic authority and exclusive loyalty play a significant role
in converting and mobilizing the objective power-resource structure into a
concrete act of state making and in choosing a means of influence toward the rival
state makers. The state makers’ ideas based on their own belief system change
less easily than their interests. A change of their interests reflects their strategic
calculation, accommodating new developments and the opening of opportunity
windows for action.
Coercive, War-making, and Extractive Capabilities
Coercive and war-making capabilities are required for state makers to
eliminate and neutralize domestic rivals, fight off external enemies who oppose
the state makers and their state-making activities, and extract resources.
Extractive capability, in turn, is necessary to buttress the coercive and war-making
capabilities.
The attainment of coercive and war-making capabilities against other rival
state makers becomes the centerpiece of state making. It is a well-known fact
that “the formation of standing armies provided the largest single incentive to
5
extraction and the largest single means of state coercion over the long run of
European state-making."20 That is, founding armed forces and obtaining the
capability of extracting resources to support such coercive and war-making
activities, among other things, are particularly crucial in state making.21 We have
three recent historical cases which readily support this argument: the Russian Civil
War, and the Communist party's coming to power through victorious civil war in
China and in Vietnam.22
Political Opportunity Structure
The political opportunity structure, that is, the structure of the political
relationship between a group and the world around it,23 means “the configuration
of forces in a (potential or actual) group’s political environment that influences
that group’s assertion of its political claims.”24 A “favorable” political opportunity
structure is needed for the success of state formation just as it is needed for the
success of collective actions, social movements, protests, social insurgency, and
social revolution.25 The political opportunity structure constrains the state
makers’ activities and provides the state makers with the opportunities to form a
state. Even though the state makers have obtained coercive, war-making, and
extractive capabilities at the level of agent, they cannot succeed in forming a state
without having a “favorable” political opportunity at the level of structure.
The components of a political opportunity structure for state formation in
general could be classified into two categories, domestic and external. That is,
the structure of the relationship between the state makers and the world around
them can be understood in terms of the state makers' relationship with other
societal groups and rival state makers in the domestic realm and with other rival
states or rival state makers outside the territory.26
It is extremely difficult for the state makers of small polities to change or
improve the political opportunity structure in the external sphere, whereas it is not
impossible for them to transform the domestic political opportunity structure
through various policies of co-optation, mobilization, and extraction based on
their capabilities. Even though there is no difference between the earlier
European states and the new, latecomer states in terms of the necessity of
obtaining "primitive accumulation of state power" for state formation—that is,
attaining coercive, war-making, and extractive capabilities27—they have clear
differences in their political opportunity structures. Small, new states are, in
6
most cases, "dependent" on outside states, particularly at their initial stages of
state formation. Thus, for new states, external structural influence is more
decisive than domestic factors for the success or failure of state formation.28
THE CASE: THE KOREAN WAR
Competing Explanations of the Korean War
Most of the literature on the origins, causes, and characters of the Korean
War deals with: (1) who (which side or which country) initiated the war; (2) why it
did so; and (3) what was the character of the war, an international war or civil war
or a combination of both.29 It has been argued that the initiator or master planner
of the war was the Soviet Union and/or the United States. Thus, the Korean War
was an international war.30 Or domestic political considerations on the part of
Kim Il Sung and/or Syngman Rhee urged them to advocate the unification of the
divided Korea and to initiate the war. Thus, the Korean War was a civil war.31
Or the class struggle centering on the land tenancy problem, guerrilla warfare
within South Korea, and North Korea's support for socialist revolutionary forces in
South Korea led to the military conflict. Thus, the Korean War was a civil war.32
Or the combination of domestic and international factors led to the outbreak of the
Korean War or the Korean War was a globalization of a regional civil war, hence
an international civil war.33
The competing explanations about the origins and character of the Korean
War can be grouped into three categories. The first group of scholars focuses on
the external contextual influence on Korea in explaining the origins and character
of the war. They center on the confrontation of the expansionary policies of the
Soviet Union and the United States, and characterize the Korean War as a proxy
war. The second group of scholars focuses on domestic variables and their
interactions. They focus on the socioeconomic dynamics of the domestic politics
of both South and North Korea and characterize the Korean War as a civil,
revolutionary war between the progressive and conservative forces within Korea.
The point of emphasis in the literature on the Korea War has moved from the
former to the latter since the late 1970s. Finally, there is an eclectic position that
basically combines the elements of both arguments mentioned above as well as
Kim Il Sung's will and decision to unify the peninsula. Myung-Lim Park has
argued this position in full-scale research.34
7
Although Park points out that the Korean War was an effort to form a
single nation-state on the Korean peninsula, his focus was not on the Korean War
as a war of state making in Korea.35 My interpretation of the Korean War as a
state formation war goes much deeper than that, for instance, exposing the state
makers’ fundamental power motive and motivational tendency to seek exclusive
authority within a certain territory as the fundamental factors in explaining the
Korean War. Thus, my interpretation of the Korean War is not a negation of the
various interpretations of the Korean War that have been presented so far, but the
addition of a new one to them.
The Korean War as a State Formation War
Having delineated the theory of a state formation war and the critical
variables of state formation at both levels of agent and structure, I shall now
examine (1) Kim Il Sung’s belief system, ideas, and interests that affected his
choice of using force as a means of removing the rival state makers in the South,
and (2) North Korea’s state-making processes in which the North Korean state
makers obtained the various capabilities needed for state making and the
opportunity structure favorable for making a war. The interaction between all of
these led to the Korean War, a state formation war on the Korean peninsula. The
Korean War was a “failed” state formation war in that one group of state makers
failed to remove or conquer the other in Korea, but, regardless of its outcome, it
was fundamentally a state formation war—a war in which North and South Korean
rival state makers competed against each other for the monopoly of authority on
the Korean peninsula.
In explaining the Korean War as a state formation war, I will not make a
full-scale comparison of state formation processes between North and South Korea.
Rather I will focus on the processes of state formation in North Korea for the
following two reasons.
First, it is a historical fact that South Korea was far behind North Korea in
establishing a full-fledged state apparatus and acquiring coercive, war-making,
and extractive capabilities in the pre-Korean War years. The North Korean state
makers36 formed their own full-scale state apparatus as early as in February 1946,
while their South Korean counterparts succeeded in doing that as late as August
1948. The North Korean state makers extracted far more resources than their
South Korean counterparts through successful socioeconomic reforms, people’s
8
economic planning, and various forms of resources generation, mobilization, and
extraction by the time of the Korean War. They also secured coercive power in
the domestic realm through founding and strengthening the military and security
forces that were by far stronger than those of South Korea.37 They did all of this
while South Korea was struggling.38
Second, the Korean War was neither a preventive war in the sense that
North Korea attacked South Korea for fear of its power being overtaken by South
Korea nor a war that resulted from North Korea's preemptive strike for fear of
South Korea's imminent attack on North Korea. The Korean War was a longprepared conflict by the North Korean state makers bent on removing the rival
state makers in the South. Kim Il Sung must have been confident enough of his
overall capabilities to defeat South Korea. It would be absurd if North Korea
started the war "only to lose." We can reasonably assume that North Korea's
attack inspired by its own assured victory was based on North Korea's rigorous
calculation of its power vis-a-vis that of South Korea.39
Kim Il Sung's Belief System, Ideas, and Interests: Military Conquest
Kim Il Sung's choice of using force as a means of removing the rival state
makers in the South can be explained by employing Dahl’s and Jervis’s criteria of
determining the factors that influence the content of the political belief-value
systems of individuals. Even a brief review of Kim Il Sung’s personal history
and experience until his return to Korea in 1945 shows ample evidence that Kim
was prone to the use of force against the rival state makers: (1) Kim Il Sung was
raised in a strongly anti-Japanese family; (2) he left his native town for Manchuria
at the age of fourteen and joined the Communist Youth Union at the age of fifteen
when he was in middle school; (3) he was arrested and put in jail for eight months
at the age of sixteen; (4) later, he joined the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
organized an anti-Japanese guerrilla unit at the age of nineteen; (5) he led an antiJapanese guerrilla force in Manchuria and was the leader of the last partisan group
that fought until 1941, by which time all organized anti-Japanese guerrilla groups
in Manchuria had been wiped out or had to flee to the Soviet territory; and (6) he
returned to Korea with the Soviet army that defeated the Japanese Kanto Army.40
Kim Il Sung's most susceptible youth years were devoted to anti-Japanese
guerrilla warfare, and he was one of the most tenacious guerrilla fighters in
Korean history. It is more than likely that his guerrilla experience shaped his
9
belief-value system regarding the use of force, and he must have seen the use of
force as the most reliable and basic means of removing rivals and enemies. It can
be argued that the internalized value of the use of force based on his guerrilla
experience did not bring about any serious cognitive dissonance, and, more
positively, invoked the cognitive-coherence motive41 when he decided to remove
his rival state makers in the South by going to war.
We can reasonably assume that Kim Il Sung's choice of going to war in
order to remove the Syngman Rhee regime in the South had much to do with his
personal experience of using force in his anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in
Manchuria. That is, his decision to go to war against Syngman Rhee must have
been consistent with his perceptions of physical force shaped by his experiences in
the past.42
Kim Il Sung’s basic idea was to form a state in Korea by removing the
rival state makers in the Korean peninsula as a whole, which was an identical field
of contention among the Korean state makers for exclusive authority and
monopoly of state power. This was true for Syngman Rhee. Kim called for the
“completion of national territorial unification” and Rhee called for "unification by
advancing to the North." Both slogans signified the exactly same ideas and
interests, which were based on the state maker’s universal power motive toward
making a state by removing the rival state makers. In fact, almost all Koreans did
not regard the division of the peninsula as permanent until the Korean War.
It is noteworthy, however, that Kim Il Sung’s interests had been influenced
largely by the opportunity structures in the domestic and external spheres. His
immediate interest in the early years until the founding of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) was to neutralize and remove rival state makers within
the North and install a full-scale state apparatus there. Having removed all rivals
and after founding the DPRK, however, his interest now was to remove rival state
makers in the South and extend his rule over the entire peninsula. In other words,
Kim Il Sung’s interests can be differentiated and identified in light of the
developmental stages as he accommodated new developments and exploited the
opening of opportunity windows for action.
Given the belief system and motivation for state making of Kim Il Sung as
a state maker, the question is as follows: how quickly and effectively could he set
up a state apparatus and obtain coercive, extractive, and war-making capabilities
under the political opportunity structure; and how could he transform the existing
opportunity structure in favor of state formation.
10
North Korean Party-State Apparatus
The formation of a party-state apparatus43 was one of the urgent tasks for
the North Korean state makers. Forming the state apparatus not only was the
ultimate goal of state formation but also meant to be an instrument with which to
acquire coercive, war-making, and extractive capabilities, and to transform the
existing power-resource and rule structures into a favorable political opportunity
structure for state making.
With the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, the Japanese colonial
state apparatus collapsed and disappeared in Korea. Joseph Stalin directed the
Soviet army to establish a separate government in North Korea as early as
September 20, 1945.44 The North Korean state makers formed a central party
apparatus in North Korea in October 1945 and a state apparatus in November 1945
under the tutelage of the Soviet army.
The Moscow Agreement on the trusteeship for Korea toward the end of
1945 and the Korean nationalists' opposition to the trusteeship provided the
momentum for a decisive split between the Kim Il Sung group and the nationalist
group, which was crushed by the Soviet army. Finally, in February 1946, the
North Korean Interim People's Committee was installed as a central governing
body with Kim Il Sung elected as chairman. The Soviet Civil Administration
handed over its governing power to the North Korean Interim People's Committee
and remained an advisory group since then.45
After having built the popular support of the North Korean Interim
People's Committee and the North Korean Communist Party (later the North
Korean Workers' Party) through various “democratic reforms” that included land
reform, the nationalization of industry, labor laws, and others between March and
October 1946, the North Korean state makers won the popular elections of the
people's committees of various levels between November 1946 and March 1947.
Following victory in these elections, the North Korean People's Assembly (the
legislature), North Korean Supreme Court (the judiciary), and North Korean
People's Committee (the executive) were formed in late February 1947. The
Korean People’s Army was established in February 1948. The Constitution of
the DPRK was promulgated in July 1948. The election of the Supreme People's
Assembly of DPRK was held in August 1948, and the founding of the DPRK was
proclaimed on September 9, 1948.
11
If we compare North and South Korea, the North Korean state makers
installed the state apparatus far earlier and more solidly than their counterparts in
the South. The North Korean state makers had their own full-fledged state
apparatus as early as in February 1946, but the South Koreans were under U.S.
military rule until August 15, 1948, when the founding of the Republic of Korea
was proclaimed.
Another point is that the North Korean state was far more skillful in being
identified as the people's own regime, for instance, through popular elections and
revolutionary reforms,46 and in mobilizing and exploiting popular and
organizational support around itself. By the time the Korean War broke out, the
North Korean state surpassed its southern counterpart in both vertical depth and
horizontal breadth of institutionalization.47
The Security (Police) and the Military Forces
Two pillars of coercive power that state makers have to obtain are the
police and military power. Acquisition and control of the police and military
power are critical in competing with other domestic and external rivals for
political power and extracting resources for state formation.
It is noteworthy that it was the Korean Communists, not the Korean
nationalists, in North Korea who first realized that "the key to control of the whole
government depended on the control of the police." They immediately contacted
the advancing Soviet army, and with Soviet support they could obtain policing
power, a key factor for neutralizing or removing domestic rivals.48 Kim Il Sung
group’s taking charge of creating a nationwide police system49 and the
incorporation of the Soviet-Koreans into the police force guaranteed a firm control
of the police force by the Soviet-backed North Korean state makers.50
Significantly, there were more Soviet army advisors and more Soviet-Koreans in
the security department than any other organization in the North Korean central
governing organ.51 This testifies to the importance of controlling the police force
in the process of state formation.
Between September and October 1947, the strengthening of the security
forces targeted increasing efficiency and intensifying militarization and
centralization.52 As of October 1947, the security forces personnel assumed
military rank and uniforms "commensurate with their administrative position."53
With the proclamation of the DPRK in September 1948, the Ministry of
12
Internal Affairs (the police) had the powerful Border Constabulary and
Independent Brigade under its control, and the Independent Brigade had the same
organizational structure as that of the Korean People's Army units.54 At the
outbreak of the Korean War, the North Korean security forces were all equipped
with Soviet weaponry, and, as of June 1949, the strength of the police force was
reported to be 57,300.55
The Kim Il Sung group also took charge of creating the military
organization.56 The fact that both the police and military forces were completely
controlled by the Soviet-backed Kim Il Sung group clearly points to the
importance of obtaining coercive and war-making capability for the state makers.
North Korean military forces expanded rapidly and received Soviet arms
on a large scale.57 From October 1947 to April 1948, the average monthly
shipment of Soviet arms, ammunition, explosives, armament parts, clothing and
other commodities averaged 4,730 truckloads.58 As early as June 1948, Soviet
weapons and equipment including tanks, aircraft, flame-throwers, and rockets
were delivered to the North Korean Army.59 North Korea’s Korean People's
Army was formally activated on February 8, 1948. In 1949, the Soviet Union
provided military aid in 115 categories of items that included military planes, tanks,
various artillery pieces, rifles, ships, ammunition, communication devices, and
others.60 The Soviet military assistance continued in 1950. The Soviet Union
helped North Korea in founding three extra infantry divisions to strengthen the
North Korean military power and allowed Kim Il Sung to use Soviet loans
earmarked for 1951 to purchase Soviet military equipment in 1950.61
There were two additional things to examine regarding North Korea’s
military power. It is noteworthy that Korean Communists in China fought for the
Chinese Communists in the Chinese civil war and that the North Koreans provided
their territory as a rear logistic support area for the Chinese Communist forces
during the winter of 1946-47.62 Following the Chinese Communists’ military
victory over Guomindang forces in Manchuria, the Korean troops, who fought in
the Chinese civil war, streamed en masse into North Korea beginning October
1948. The transfer of the Korean troops to North Korea continued into 1950,
even after the Korean War started.63
The Korean troops, who returned from China, turned out to be invaluable
assets in enhancing the war-fighting capability for North Korea during the Korean
War. Despite a severe sacrifice of blood, the fighting in the Chinese civil war
provided an invaluable opportunity for the North Korean army to obtain battlefield
13
experience.64
The other important factor that enhanced North Korea’s war-fighting
capability tremendously was the extremely high selectivity and morale of the
North Korean army. Only "ideologically reliable" soldiers were "selected"
among the youth and were heavily indoctrinated.65 Only qualified youths were
allowed to join the army. Serving in the army was a privilege, and the soldiers
were indoctrinated to believe so.
The quality achieved through strict selective process was quite impressive,
compared to the recruiting processes and quality of the South Korean soldiers.
Those who formerly served in the Japanese Army fared well for their military
experiences in the South Korean army. Many jobless people and hobos joined
the army in South Korea. Furthermore, the United States refused to supply heavy
weaponry to South Korea because it was suspicious of Syngman Rhee's bombastic
call for "unification by advancing to the North."
There were popular uprisings, Communist guerrilla fighting, and military
rebellion in South Korea in the pre-Korean War years, and the South Korean state
makers could not wipe out the Communist guerrilla fighters in the mountains until
the outbreak of the Korean War. This meant that unlike their Northern
counterparts, the South Korean state makers even failed to remove domestic rivals
within their own territory.
Economic Growth and Extraction
The North Korean state makers adopted various means of generating,
expanding, mobilizing, and extracting resources, both human and material. They
carried out various reforms in the agricultural sector such as land reform and
agricultural produce tax, and extracted extra agricultural resources through
patriotic rice donation campaigns. The land reform in March 1946, together with
nationalization of industry, was the most critical revolutionary reform measure for
generating, expanding, and extracting resources in the agricultural sector. The
land reform helped enormously the new state gain its legitimacy among the people
who had suffered from an extremely harsh tenant system.
The uniform twenty-five percent agricultural produce tax served two
purposes simultaneously: to secure food needed for the urban population
(industrial and office workers), and to abolish numerous taxes to reduce the tax
burden on the peasants, thereby obtaining legitimacy among the people. The
14
patriotic rice donation campaigns were geared to squeeze whatever remaining
resources out of the agricultural sector.66
The nationalization of industry in August 1946 was another critical
revolutionary reform measure comparable to the land reform in the agricultural
sector. Given the fact that North Korea had the most of the large-scale heavy and
chemical industries left over by the Japanese at the time of liberation, the
nationalization of industry put enormous industrial resources and resourceproducing capital at the disposal of the North Korean state makers.
The North Korean state makers applied various Soviet-developed
managerial, accounting, and wage systems in order to generate, expand, and
extract resources to the maximum.67 Various competition campaigns to increase
production were waged to celebrate each and every national holiday and special
commemorative day, together with patriotic labor contribution campaigns.68
In addition, for the first time in Korean history, the North Korean state
makers worked out and implemented a people's economic plan in 1947. In order
to guarantee financial support for the 1947 economic plan, a comprehensive state
budget for 1947 and the comprehensive tax reform were introduced in early 1947,
which were followed by currency reform in December 1947. North Korean
economic production was restored to its pre-World War II level in 1949. The
North Korean state makers also secured resources through public borrowing (bond
sales) and public procurement from March 1950.69 Furthermore, the Soviet
Union provided economic aid to North Korea under the Soviet-North Korean
Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement signed between Pyongyang and
Moscow in March 1949.
Compared with their counterparts in the South, the North Korean state
makers obtained an incomparably overwhelming resource-extracting capability
through the reforms, campaigns, and policies explained above.70 In sharp
contrast, the South Korean state makers could not even feed their people, let alone
bring about economic growth or development. Most of the industries stopped
operation due to the lack of electricity and raw materials. The South Korean
economy was simply in a mess.
Changes in Political Opportunity Structure for Starting a War
State makers cannot achieve a successful state formation without a
favorable opportunity structure, domestic and external. By securing the party15
state apparatus and the various capabilities needed for state formation, the North
Korean leaders were actually building up a favorable political opportunity for state
making in the domestic realm.
But success in state making was also predicated on the externally provided
opportunity structure. Given the fact that North Korea was a small, dependent
state, the North Korean state makers were almost totally unable to change their
external political opportunity structure. However, they were blessed with fortune
to see the opportunity structure in the external realm change dramatically and
favorably in 1949-50. The window of opportunity opened up in June 1950 for
the North Korean state makers to launch a war against their rivals in the South due
to three specific factors: (a) the restructuring of society within North Korea, (b) the
withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Korea, and (c) the CCP’s military victory and
the backing of Stalin and Mao.
(a) Restructuring of Society within North Korea
Without any salient societal resistance due to the fleeing of almost all of
the landlords, businessmen, and pro-Japanese collaborators to South Korea, the
North Korean state makers set out to restructure the society.71 The only salient
anti-Communist force in North Korea was Christians, but they were crushed
politically by the time the North Korean Interim People's Committee was
inaugurated in February 1946. The Soviet occupation forces effectively backed
this undertaking by their North Korean comrades.
Through the various revolutionary reforms in 1946 such as land reform,
the nationalization of industry, progressive labor laws, the protection of private
enterprises, and other measures, the North Korean state makers co-opted the
peasants that comprised 80 percent of the population, industrial workers, and
national petty bourgeois. The coalition achieved through this co-optation was
institutionalized in political parties, social organizations, and people's committees.
The situation was diametrically the opposite in South Korea. The
peasants and workers were the principal participants in the revolts, antigovernment guerrilla activities, and demonstrations. The landlords and the
bourgeoisie were the foremost beneficiaries of the U.S. Military Government and
the Syngman Rhee regime once it was installed. This striking contrast between
North and South Korea points to the favorable domestic opportunity structure for
the North Korean state makers to launch an attack on their counterparts in the
16
South.
(b) Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Korea
On the Korean peninsula, the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in international politics
during and after World War II was concretely expressed in the form of separate
territorial occupation by both powers, their limited diplomatic efforts and failure
to establish a unified Korean state through negotiations, and the establishment of
separate governments and the ultimate division of Korea. Both the United States
and the Soviet Union transplanted their own form of government in their occupied
territories in Korea, respectively, and provided military and economic assistance to
the state makers they backed.
After World War II, state making in many new polities was influenced by
the idea of "social engineering," which was based on the theories of political
development. Major Western powers actively assisted the state makers in the
Third World by "lending experts, models, training programs, and funds."72 This
aspect of social engineering also held true for the relationship between the Soviet
Union and North Korea73 as well as for the relationship between the United States
and South Korea.
The outcome of the Soviet and U.S. occupation and military rule was not
the same. What resulted from the Soviet occupation and assistance in the North
was a strong state, a state that was remarkably capable and powerful in the
political, economic, and military realms. On the other hand, the U.S. occupation
and military rule in the South produced a weak, divided state. The South Korean
state suffered from the divided loyalty of the people expressed through various
collective actions such as demonstrations, strikes, uprisings, guerrilla fighting, and
military rebellions.
This imbalance of the two Korean states, however, did not translate into an
actual war until the external political opportunity structure over Korea changed
dramatically and favorably for the North Korean state makers, who were ready to
exploit it for the "completion of national territorial unification." The dramatic
change took place in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea by the
end of June 1949 and the U.S. announcement of the exclusion of South Korea
from the U.S. Asian defense perimeter, which was revealed in January 1950.74
The North Korean state makers did not lose time in capturing this long-awaited
window of opportunity opening for a military attack on their South Korean
17
counterparts.
(c) CCP’s Military Victory and the Backing of Stalin and Mao
The military victory of the Chinese Communists forces over the
Guomindang forces in China and the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China in October 1949 were a tremendous psychological boost for Kim Il Sung to
activate his fundamental power motive to remove his rival state makers in the
South and to invoke his militant belief-value system. It is known that Kim Il
Sung expressed his motive to Joseph Stalin to conquer the South after the
founding of the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed.75
Stalin expressed reservations about Kim Il Sung’s plans to go to war at
first. Mao Zedong is known to have been more reserved about Kim’s plans than
Stalin. Both Stalin and Mao are known to have been concerned about U.S.
intervention.76 Stalin, however, impressed by Kim’s repeated pleas to exploit the
extremely favorable window of opportunity for removing the South Korean state
and unify the peninsula by force, was persuaded and showed interest in the plan in
the pursuit of Soviet interests in East Asia.
In April 1950, Kim Il Sung made a secret visit to Moscow.77 In May
1950, Stalin pressured Mao to concur with Kim’s plan. Mao finally agreed.
Kim visited Beijing this time in May 1950, finding Mao still not enthusiastic about
the war. But under the circumstances, it was not easy for Mao to oppose Stalin's
decision.78
The Soviet advisors completed a basic attack-operation plan,79 and seven
combat divisions out of ten (including three reserve divisions) of the Korean
People’s Army were to participate in the attack. The weapons and ammunition
Kim had requested from Stalin arrived and were distributed to the newly
established divisions.80 Stalin was not willing to get the Soviet army involved in
the war, mainly for the fear of any potential confrontation with the United States.81
But the attack on June 25 was approved by Stalin and supported by Mao.
All in all, compared with their South Korean counterparts, the North
Korean state makers were far more successful in establishing the state apparatus
and obtaining coercive, war-making, and extractive capabilities. The successful
socioeconomic restructuring of North Korean society through a series of
revolutionary reforms, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Korea in 1949, the
18
military victory of the CCP in China in 1949, and the backing of Stalin and Mao
Zedong for Kim Il Sung—all provided favorable political opportunities for the
North Korean state makers to launch an attack on South Korea. The purpose of
the attack was to monopolize authority on the Korean peninsula by eliminating the
competing authority in the South. That attack took place on June 25, 1950,
triggering a state formation war—the Korean War.
CONCLUSION
This study has put forward a theory of state formation war based on state
formation theories, and proposed a new perspective in interpreting the origins and
character of the Korean War. I have argued that the Korean War was basically a
conflict provoked by the power motive and motivational tendency of the North
Korean state makers and that it was typically a "state formation war," in which one
group of the rival state makers attempted to remove the other group within the
territory-to-be in order to monopolize authority and loyalty. The North Korean
state makers attacked their South Korean rival state makers in order to monopolize
authority and loyalty on the Korean peninsula by removing them. In this sense,
the Korean War was fundamentally a civil war in nature,82 even though the North
Korean state makers received the backing of the Soviet Union and China, and the
United Nations forces were involved in the war for South Korea’s support.
My focus has been on the state makers (1) by identifying their ideas and
interests based on their enduring power motivational tendency toward
monopolistic authority and exclusive loyalty; (2) by looking into their statemaking activities that included the establishment of the state apparatus and the
achievement of coercive, war-making, and resource-extracting capabilities; and (3)
by examining how they made efforts to build up and transform political
opportunity structures, domestic and external, favorable for state formation, and
seized and exploited the windows of opportunity resulting from changes in the
opportunity structures.
I have also identified the importance of the influence of structural variables
on the state-making process in North Korea. North Korea being a small,
dependent state, the external structural influence on that country was more visible
than North Korea's influence in international politics. Kim Il Sung could not
have started the war without the backing of the Soviet Union and China.
The establishment of an exclusive state authority by removing or
19
neutralizing rival state makers above the 38th parallel would have been enough for
North Korean state formation, if the North Korean state makers had recognized
only the northern part of Korea as their proper territory-to-be. If that had been
the case, North Korean state formation would have been already achieved in
September 1948 when the founding of the DPRK was declared in the northern half
of the Korean peninsula.
For Koreans, however, the concept of territorial boundary was historical
and psychological as well as physical. Territorial division had been unknown to
Koreans for more than a millennium, and the rival state makers in the North and
South were both locked up on the Korean peninsula, an indivisible and identical
field of contention and struggle for exclusive authority and survival. Both Kim Il
Sung and Syngman Rhee had the same power motive, ideas, and interests to
remove each other. Both used the same language: Kim used the expression of
the “complete unification of the national territory” and Rhee that of “advancing
northward and unifying the country.” Unlike Rhee, however, Kim in fact
possessed the capabilities to implement his war plan in a highly favorable
opportunity structure.
I have not included any details of the Korean War itself in this study. But
the outcome of the war was that the North Korean state makers failed to conquer
the South and unify the peninsula. The Korean War was a "failed" state
formation war for the North Korean state makers due to external military
intervention. The decisive external influence in the form of U.S. and United
Nations military intervention thwarted the North Korean state makers' attempts to
complete territorial unification by removing the South Korean rivals.
The Korean War was also a “failed” state formation war for the South
Korean state makers. Although they themselves did not initiate the war, they
advanced to the Yalu River and almost defeated North Korea with the support of
the American and United Nations troops.
What happened to state making in North and South Korea after the Korean
War? The same state makers with the same motivational tendency to monopolize
authority and loyalty survived the war. Both Kim and Rhee, however, seemed to
have acknowledged the practical obstacles and pondered on the cost and
feasibility of unifying the Korean peninsula. In other words, both seemed to
have realistically adjusted their proper territory-to-rule, even though they
continued to claim verbally the land of the other side as belonging to their own
territory-to-be.83
20
Have Koreans completed their state formation on the Korean peninsula?
The answer is both yes and no. The answer is yes, because political leaders and
people in both North and South Korea have recognized their current territory as
their practical territory-to-rule, particularly after the Korean War, as explained
above. The answer is no, however, because political leaders and people in both
South and North Korea are well aware that the division of their fatherland cannot
be tolerated indefinitely and that a unified Korea is always high on the political
agenda as one of the most challenging tasks for all Korean people as well as the
political leaders in both North and South Korea.
Finally, it is hoped that the theory of state formation war put forward in
this study will explain many other wars that have taken place in the past. Some
of the recent wars that the theory of state formation war can be applied to may
include the American Civil War, the Russian Civil War, the Chinese Civil War,
and the Vietnam War. It is noteworthy that many civil wars could be interpreted
as state formation wars.
21
APPENDIXES
I. Captured North Korean Documents
The Record Seized by U.S. Military Forces in Korea: Record Group 242, National
Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, 1941- , Shipping Advice Nos.
2005-2013.
2005-2-4. Honguk Pae. Inmin kyongje-ui unyong-gwa kyehoek-ui chojik
(Administration of the
people's economy and organization of plans).
P’yongyang: Kukga Kyehoek Wiwonhoe
Ch'ulp'ansa, 1948.
2005-2-17. Kim Il Sung. Sanop pumun kyongje mit chikmaeng yolsongja
taehoe-eso
chinsul-han Kim
Il Sung susang-ui ch'onggyol yonsol
(Premier Kim Il Sung's
concluding speech at the
conference of
enthusiasts of industry, economy, and trade unions). (Oct. 1949).
2005-5-6. The Standing Committee, North Korean People's Assembly (1947).
The Minutes of
the First Session of the North Korean People's Assembly
(P'yongyang: Rodong
Shinmunsa).
2005-5-9. Puk-choson Inmin Hoeui Sangim Uiwonhoe. Puk-choson inmin hoeui
che 4 ch'a
hoeui hoeuirok (Minutes of the fourth session of the North Korean
People's Assembly). Apr. 1948.
2005-5-24. Choguk T'ongil Minjujuui Chonson Chungang Sangmu Wiwonhoe
Sogiguk. Choguk t'ongil minjujuui chonson kyolsong taehoe
munhonjip (Collection of documents of the ounding conference of the
Fatherland Unification Democratic Front). Aug. 1949.
2005-5-44-A. (Hwanghae-do) Sohung-gun Inmin Wiwonhoe. Inmin kundae
mojip kwan'gye
soryu (Documents regarding the recruitment of the Korean
People's Army). 1948.
2005-5-44-B. (Hwanghae-do) Sohung-gun Inmin Wiwonhoe. (Documents
regarding the recruitment of the Korean People's Army). 1949.
22
2006-15-25. Puk-choson t'ongsin (North Korean correspondence). Nos. 1-10.
Puk-choson T'ongsinsa, July 21-Oct. 21, 1947.
2007-7-38. Rodongdang Chungang Ponbu Sonjon Sondongbu. Choson
inmin-durrun
choguk-ui pugang paljon-gwa inmin-ui pongni-rul wihan kukga
kongch'ae-rul palhaeng-hal go-sul yolyolhi hwanyong-hago itta (The
Korean people are enthusiastically welcoming the issuance of the state
bonds for the fatherland's prosperity and development and people's
welfare). 1950.
2007-10-46. Kim Ch'an. Kyeyak chedo silsi-e taehan pogo (Report on the
implementation of
contract production] system). P’yongyang: Puk-choson
Chungang Unhaeng, Mar. 1948.
2008-4-9. Puk-choson Inmin Wiwonhoe Sanopguk. Sanop (Industry). No. 1.
Puk-choson Inmin
wiwonhoe Sanopguk Ch'ulp'anbu, Aug. 1948.
2008-10-53. Puk-choson Rodongdang Chungang Ponbu Sonjon Sondongbu.
Inmin minjujuui
mit inmin minjujuui kukga-ui songgyok (People's
democracy and the character of the people's democratic states). P’yongyang:
Rodongdang Ch'ulp'ansa, Dec. 1949.
2008-10-102. Minjok munhwa-ron (Thesis on national culture). [The cover of
the booklet
carries the title, “Minjok munhwa-ron," and Hong Ch'ol-u as its
author, but its contents
are Pak
Hon-yong's Report delivered for the
commemoration of the 70th birthday of
Stalin]. Pangmun Ch'ulp'ansa, Feb.
1949.
2009-2-168. Puk-choson Rodongdang Chungang Ponbu Sonjon Sondongbu.
Sonjonwon
such'aek (Handbook for propagandists). No. 1. Jan. 1947.
2009-3-15. Puk-choson Rodongdang Chungang Ponbu Sonjon Sondongbu.
Soviet sahoejuui-jok minjujuui-nun ch'oego hyongt'ae-ui minjujuui-ida
(Soviet socialist democracy is the highest form of democracy).
P’yongyang: Rodongdang Ch'ulp'ansa, May 1949.
23
2009-3-72. Inmin Kundae-wa Ch'ongnyon (People's Army and Youth), Youth
League's
Material for Lecture, Vol. 2. 1949.
2009-3-113. Puk-choson Imsi Inmin Wiwonhoe Sonjonbu. Haebang-doen
puk-choson-ui minju konsol (Democratic construction in the liberated North
Korea). Oct. 1946.
2009-3-133. Choson Minjujuui Inmin Konghwaguk Munhwa Sonjonsong.
Sanop pumun kyongje mit chikmaeng yolsongja taehoe muhonjip (Collection of
materials from the
conference of the enthusiasts of the industrial, economic
sectors, and trade unions). Nov.
1949.
2009-7-86. Che 2 Taedae Munhwa Pudae-jang Yu Chun-gi. (A roster of
members of the
Korean Democratic Party and the Ch'ondogyo Young
Friends' Party). Apr. 4, 1950.
2009-7-91. Che 1 Taedae Munhwabu. (A roster of members of the [Korean]
Workers' Party).
Apr. 1950.
2009-8-32. Kim Il Sung Changgun-ui Ryaksa (Brief History of General Kim Il
Sung) (mimeograph: published after the declaration of the DPRK).
2010-5-12. Kangwon-do Komch'also. Puk-choson che 2-ch'a sabop ch'aegimja
hoehui
Kangwon-do saop pogoso: Komch'also kwan'gye (The report of the
works of Kangwon Province on the public prosecutor's office at the second
conference of the chiefs of the
justice departments and bureaus of North
Korea). Apr. 1946.
2012-1-100. Han Chae-dok . "The Combat History of General Kim Il Sung's
Guerilla Unit," in Han Sol-ya, ed., Uri-ui T’aeyang (Our Sun)
(P'yongyang: General Union of Artists in North Korea, 1946).
2012-8-45. Munhwa Sonjonsong. Choguk-ui Tongnip-gwa Chayu-wa Yongye-rul
Suhohagi Wihan Choguk Haebang Chonjaeng-esoui Choson Inmin-ui
Yongung-jok T’ujaeng (Korean People's Heroic Struggle in the Fatherland
24
Liberation War for the Protection of Fatherland's Independence and
Freedom, and Honor ). Sept. 1951.
2013-1-58. Choson Rodongdang Chungang Wiwonhoe Sonjon Sondongbu. Kim Il
Sung
Changgun-ui Ryakjon (Brief History of General Kim Il Sung) (P'yongyang:
Choson Rodongdang Ch’ulp’ansa, 1952).
II. Intelligence Reports of the United States Army Forces in Korea and the
United
States Military Advisory Group in Korea
Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Korea, Intelligence Summary:
Northern Korea
(ISNK), Nos. 12, 28, 30, 35, 38, 39, 40, 45, 47, 49, 50.
Headquarters, U. S. Military Advisory Group in Korea, “G-2 Periodic Report”
(KMAG: P/R),
No. 285.
Headquarters, U. S. Military Forces in Korea, “G-2 Periodic Report” (P/R), Nos.
1097, 1127.
Headquarters, U. S. Military Forces in Korea, “G-2 Weekly Summary” (W/S), Nos.
150, 152.
25
ENDNOTES
1
For instance, a comprehensive bibliography of English-language literature on the Korean War contains more
than 2,300 citations as of 1986. See Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986).
2
Here are my definitions of the state, state makers, and state formation: I will define the state as "essentially an
organization of domination over other societal organizations inside the territory through its predominant capabilities
of coercion and extraction, coupled with competing (or war-making) capability with other states outside the
territory"; state makers as "a group of people who exclusively seek the monopoly of authority by removing or
neutralizing competing authorities within a certain territory"; and state formation as "the processes in which state
makers seek domination over a population by eliminating or neutralizing rivals inside the territories." These
Weberian definitions contain minimum defining values for the conceptualization of the state, state makers, and state
formation, but they will provide a conceptual tool for putting forward a theory of state formation war and the
explanation of the Korean War. For the critical variables of state formation, see the section of “State Formation:
Critical Variables” in this paper.
3
John W. Atkinson, Personality, Motivation, and Action: Selected Papers (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 60, 95.
4
Heinz Keckhausen, Motivation and Action, trans. by Peter K. Leppmann (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991), p. 8;
and J. W. Atkinson, Personality, Motivation, and Action, p. 64.
5
Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1975), pp. 71-74. Tilly views war makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs. The
typical four different activities of the agents of states--war making, state making, protection, and extraction--depend
on the state's tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion. See Charles Tilly, "War Making and
State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemyer, & Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the
State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 181.
6
Michael Mann argues that, human motivational drives being a constant, emergent organizational power sources,
i.e., means to achieve goals, are more important that original motivations and goals. See Michael Mann, The
Sources of Social Power: Vol. I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986), pp. 4-6.
7
See the section of “CCP’s Military Victory and the Backing of Stalin and Mao” in this paper.
8
Frederic Schick, Understanding Action: An Essay on Reasons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
pp. 84-88.
9
Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in
International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1-44; and David
Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" International Organization 43 (Summer 1989): 454-58.
10
See D. Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" 441-73; Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and
Human Emancipation (London: Verso, 1986); Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action,
26
Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and Anthony
Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984). Also
see Alexander E. Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," International
Organization 41 (Summer 1987): 335-70.
11
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976), chap. 6.
12
C. Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, passim.
13
D. Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?”: 457.
14
Douglas G. Mook, Motivation: The Organization of Action (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987), pp. 395401; and R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 11.
15
In sorting out critical variables of state formation I draw upon the state formation theories that have been
constructed upon the extensive historical experiences of state formation over the last five hundred years. With the
spread of the European modern nation-state system to the rest of the world, the state formation experiences of
Western Europe since 1500 have given a useful point of relevance to other cases of state formation outside Western
Europe. This includes the state formation experiences of both North and South Korea during 1945-1950. See
Charles Tilly, “Western State-Making and Theories of Political Transformation,” in C. Tilly, ed., The Formation of
National States in Western Europe, pp. 601-38; and Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 9901990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), chap. 7. For a cautious application of the theoretical construct born of
European experience to non-European societies, see Lisa Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia
and Libya, 1830-1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), Bibliographical Note, p. 283.
16
David Collier and Deborah L. Norden, "Strategic Choice Model of Political Change in Latin America" (Review
Article), Comparative Political Analysis 24 (Jan. 1992): 229-30; John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public
Policies (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1984), pp. 21, 173-76, 182-87; John T. S. Keeler, "Opening the Window for
Reform," Comparative Political Analysis 25 (Jan. 1993): 436-42.
17
Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1933), pp. 1-18; Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 3-30; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast, “Ideas,
Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market,” in J. Goldstein and R. O.
Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, pp. 173-206; Helen V. Milner,
Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997), chaps. 1-2.
18
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 185-
86.
19
R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 239-71.
20
C. Tilly, ed. The Formation of National States in Western Europe, pp. 71-74.
21
See T. R. Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," Comparative Political Studies 21
(April 1988): 47; Margaret Levi, "Appendix to Chapter II: Excursus on the Acquisition of Rule," in Margaret Levi,
Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 41-47; Theda Skocpol, States & Social
27
Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
p. 32; Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984), p. 84; Charles Bright and Susan Harding, eds., State Making and Social Movements: Essays
in History and Theory (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1984), p. 4; Karen A. Rasler & William R.
Thompson, War and State Making: Studies in International Conflict Vol. II (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 3;
Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 22.
22
Jonathan R. Adelman, Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1985), Pts. 2-3; Brian Moynahan, Claws of the Bear: The History of the Red Army from the Revolution to
the Present (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), pp. 3-50; Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1982), pp. 65-70; Moshe Lewin, "The Civil War: Dynamics and Legacy," in Diane P. Koenker et
al., eds., Party, State, and Society in the Russian Civil War: Explorations in Social History (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1989), pp. 399-400; John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967), chaps. 1-2; Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986).
23
According to Charles Tilly, "opportunity" is "the relationship between a group and the world around it" (p. 7),
and argues that changes in opportunity sometimes "threaten the group's interests" and sometimes "provide new
chances to act on those interests." In other words, a collective actor's external relationship influences its internal
structure and the collective action itself (p. 98). See Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York:
Random House, 1978). In the similar vein, Risto Alapuro, borrowing the concept of "opportunity" from Tilly,
emphasizes the importance of opportunities for the state formation and revolution in latecomer, dependent, small
states. See Risto Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
24
Charles E. Brockett, “The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America,”
Comparative Politics 23 (April 1991): 254.
25
Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," in American Political Science
Review 67 (1973): 11-28; Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-70
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), chap. 3; Herbert P. Kitschelt, "Political Opportunity Structures and
Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies, " British Journal of Political Science 16 (Jan.
1986): 57-85; Sidney Tarrow, Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of
Protest (Western Societies Program Occasional Paper No. 21) (Center for International Studies, Cornell University,
1989), chap. 5; C. E. Brockett, “The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central
America”: 254. See also Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They
Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), chap. 1.
26
I propose the following components of political opportunity structure for the study of North Korean state
formation: (1) domestic class coalitions, political alignments, institutional arrangements, the configuration of
resources in domestic realm, and their change; and (2) international geopolitical and military alignments and their
change.
27
Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A.F.K. Organski argue that there is no difference between the early
phases of state making in Western Europe and the initial phases of state making in the new states after World War II.
Both are periods of "primitive accumulation of state power." During this period, state makers and societal groups
compete for power resources, and the processes whereby state makers obtain domination over society is basically
violent. Thus, violence is regarded as "a usual feature of the process of primitive accumulation of state power" (p.
909). See Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A.F.K. Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The
Violent Creation of Order," American Political Science Review 75 (Dec. 1981): 901-10.
28
28
There are differences between the processes of the emergence of "a few early national states" in Europe and
those of the "latecomer states" whose emergence was constrained by the initial system of the early states. See C.
Tilly ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, pp. 636-38. See also C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital,
and European States, AD 990-1990, pp. 14, 15, 27-28, 192-93, 206-7; R. Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland,
p. 6, 10-11.
29
I have benefited for the literature review here from the following comprehensive literature reviews of the
origins and character of the Korean War. See John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War (Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 1989), pp. 19-54; Kim Hakjoon, “International Trends in Korean War Studies: A
Review of the Documentary Literature,” Korea and World Affairs 14, 2 (Summer 1990): 326-70; Kim Hakjoon,
"International Trend of the Study of the June 25 [the Korean War]: A Literature Review of the Study of the June 25
[the Korean War]," in Kim Chullbaum, ed., Han’guk Chonjaeng-ul Ponun Sigak (Perspectives of the Korean War)
(Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing Co., 1990), pp. 11-51; Ch'oe Pong-Dae, "Some Problems Regarding the Origins and
Character of the Korean War: A Review of the Existing Arguments," in Ch'oe Chang-Jip, ed., Han’guk Chonjaeng
Yon’gu: Han’guk Hyondaesa-ui Ihae I (A Study of the Korean War: An Understanding of the Contemporary History
of Korea, No. 1) (Seoul: T'aeam Publisher, 1990), pp. 15-53; and Ch'oe Kwang-Nyong, "The Origin of the Korean
War," in Ha Yong-Son, ed., Han’guk Chonjaeng-ui Saeroun Chopgun: Chont’ongjuui-wa Sujongjuui-rul Nomoso
(A New Approach to the Korean War: Beyond Traditionalism and Revisionism) (Seoul: Nanam, 1990), pp. 263-340.
30
The official U.S. position and the official North Korean position typically charge the expansionary global
policies of the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, with regard to the Korean War. See U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1950: Korea, Vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 148-49; The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1977). Note that North Korea’s position regarding the character of the Korean War
emphasizes the defense of North Korean democratic base from imperialist and feudalistic forces, the righteousness of
liberation and the independence of the Korean nation. See Department of Culture and Propaganda, Korean
People's Heroic Struggle in the Fatherland Liberation War for the Protection of Fatherland's Independence and
Freedom, and Honor (Pyongyang: National Press, 1951). See the Record Seized by U.S. Military Forces in Korea:
Record Group 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, 1941- , Shipping Advice No. 2012,
Box No. 8, Item No. 45 (hereafter referred to as SA 2012-8-45). For some of the recent works that emphasize the
international influence on Korea in explaining the Korean War, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue
Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); William
Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Priceton University Press, 1995); Yong-ho Kim,
Han’guk Chonjaeng-ui Kiwon-gwa Chon’gaegwajong (The Origins and Development of the Korean War) (Seoul:
Dure, 1998).
31
The works that belong to this category include: for the North Korean side, Kim Ch’ang-sun, Pukhan
Siponyonsa (Fifteen Years of North Korean History) (Seoul: Chimungak, 1961); Robert Simmons, The Strained
Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975); and
Pak Kap-dong, Pak Hon-yong: Ku Iltaegirul T'onghan Hyontaesau Chaejomyong (Pak Hon-yong: Re-illumination
of the [Korean] Contemporary History through His Life History) (Seoul: Ingansa, 1983); and for the South Korean
side, I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952); and Joyce
Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New
York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 565-99.
32
Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes,
1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II:
The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and J. Merrill, Korea: The
Peninsular Origins of the War.
29
33
Okonogi Masao, "The Domestic Roots of the Korean War," in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., The
Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: University of Tokyo Press, 1977), pp. 299-320; Yonosuke Nagai, "The
Korean War: An Interpretive Essay," The Japanese Journal of American Studies No. 1 (1981): 151-174; MyungLim Park, Han’guk Chonjaeng-ui Palbal-gwa Kiwon (The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins), 2 Vols.
(Seoul: Nanam, 1996); Peter Lowe, The Origins of the Korean War (London and New York: Longman, 1986); B. K.
Gills, Korea versus Korea: A Case of Contested Legitimacy (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 45-51;
Man-Ho Heo, “From Civil War to an International War: A Dialectical Interpretation of the Origins of the Korean
War, Korea and World Affairs 14, 2 (Summer 1990): 303-25.
34
M. L. Park, Han’guk Chonjaeng-ui Palbal-gwa Kiwon, 2 Vols.
35
Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 83-101 and Vol. II., p. 894.
36
The question of Kim Il Sung’s autonomy in North Korean state formation may produce a controversy on the
identity of the agent of North Korean state making. It may particularly do so because the Soviet-backed core group
of the socialist revolutionary elite of North Korea, that is, the Kim Il Sung group, may have failed to operate as a full
agent in North Korean state formation at the beginning, particularly, for the earlier months, until the North Korean
Interim People's Committee was established in early February 1946. The extent of Kim Il Sung's autonomy or
independence of the Soviet Union in the critical early months of North Korean state formation may even raise the
question of "hidden agency" in North Korean state formation. Some may want to designate the Soviet Union and
the Kim Il Sung group as "double agents" in North Korean state making. Others may even argue that the Soviet
army, not Kim Il Sung, was the state maker in North Korea at the initial phase of North Korean state formation, and
that Kim Il Sung began gradually to play a significant role after the North Korean Interim People’s Committee was
installed. But for conceptual and analytic purposes, I will regard the winning Korean Communists in North Korea
as the North Korean state makers, treating the Soviet army and Soviet policies in North Korea as elements of the
external political opportunity structure for the North Korean state makers in forming a state. For the discussion of
the importance and problems of actor designation in political analysis, see Frederick W. Frey, "The Problem of
Actor Designation in Political Analysis," Comparative Politics 17 (Jan. 1985): 127-52.
37
As early as in September 1947, U.S. military intelligence assessed the North Korean Army as having "reached
a state of training, discipline and morale which compares favorably with that of any other Oriental national ... and
currently capable of overrunning any combination of native troops raised and trained in South Korea." See
Headquarters, United States Army Forces in Korea, “Intelligence Summary: Northern Korea “(hereafter referred to
as ISNK), no. 45, p. 15. The U.S. military intelligence concluded in November 1947 that the North Korean army
would be a small, but cohesive force "with more firepower than is possessed by an other Oriental Army with the
possible exception of those Chinese Nationalist divisions trained and equipped by the US Army." See ISNK, no.
49, p. 8.
38
The South Korean state makers had the difficulty satisfying even the most basic needs of the people, such as
food, let alone achieving a satisfactory level of coercive, war-making, and resource-extracting capabilities. There
was even a military rebellion in South Korea in 1948, and the South Korean state makers were incapable of wiping
out the communist guerrilla by the time of the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950.
39
The U.S. intervention in the Korean War was more unthinkable to any reasonable Korean observer at the time.
Given the fact that the Koreans' close contact with the U.S. after 1945 was fairly new and unprecedented, it would be
too much if we expect from the North Korean state makers enough knowledge about the dynamics of U.S. politics to
predict the U.S. military intervention in the Korean conflict. Moreover, the U.S. troops were withdrawn from
Korea some months before. My point is that Kim Il Sung should not be discredited simply for his failure to predict
U.S. military intervention in the Korean War. For an excellent analysis of the U.S. foreign policy regarding the
military decision in the Korean War, see B. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, chaps. 1-5.
30
40
See Kim Il Sung Changgun-ui Ryaksa (Brief History of General Kim Il Sung) (mimeograph: published after the
declaration of the DPRK)(SA 2009-8-32); Han Chae-dok, "The Combat History of General Kim Il Sung's Guerilla
Unit," in Han Sol-ya, ed., Uri-ui T’aeyang (Our Sun) (Pyongyang: General Union of Artists in North Korea, 1946),
pp. 3-12 (SA 2012-1-100); and Propaganda and Agitation Bureau, the Central Committee of Korean Workers' Party,
Kim Il Sung Changgun-ui Ryakjon (Brief History of General Kim Il Sung) (Pyongyang: Choson Rodongdang
Ch’ulp’ansa, 1952) (SA 2013-1-26); Robert A. Scalapino & Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I:
Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 202-32; Dae-Sook Suh, The Korean Communist
Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), chap. 9; Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The
North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), pp. 1-54; Lim Un, The Founding of A Dynasty
in North Korea: An Authentic Biography of Kim Il-song (Japan: Jiyu-sa, 1982), chaps. 1-3; and Eric Van Ree,
Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947 (Oxford: Berg, 1989), pp. 23-32.
41
D. G. Mook, Motivation: The Organization of Action, pp. 387-94.
42
Ted Robert Gurr puts forward two interesting points that: (1) “successful use of coercion enhances their
assessment of its future utility,” and (2) “elites who are successful in the violent pursuit and defense of power
become habituated to the political uses of violence, and their acceptance of coercive violence becomes part of the
elite political culture or myth of their cadre and successors.” See Ted Robert Gurr, “War, Revolution, and the
Growth of the Coercive State”: 49-50.
43
Basically I accept the idea of the "party-state" in which party and state get fused and function closely together
in governing the society in the socialist countries.
44
For the full text of the internal directive issued on Sept. 20, 1945, by Stalin and A. I. Antonov to A. M.
Vasilevskii, the Military Council of the Maritime Military District, see Mainichi Shinbun, Feb. 26, 1993.
45
E. V. Ree, Socialism in One Zone, chap. 11.
46
The Standing Committee, North Korean People's Assembly, Puk-choson Inmin Hoeui Che 1 ch’a Hoeui
Hoeuirok (The Minutes of the First Session of the North Korean People's Assembly) (Pyongyang: Rodong
Shinmunsa, 1947), p. 16 (SA 2005-5-6).
47
Vertical depth refers to how much an institutional structure is penetrated in defining individual actors' identity,
and horizontal breadth (or linkage) refers to the number of links to be changed for an institution between a particular
activity and other activities. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," Comparative
Political Studies 21 (April 1988): 66-94.
48
ISNK, no. 39, Incl. no. 1, p. 2.
49
Ibid., p. 1.
50
Ibid., p. 3.
51
ISNK, no. 40, p. 24. Later the influence of the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) from China became also
strong in the North Korean police force. See ISNK, no. 28, p. 4.
52
ISNK, no. 47, pp. 3-6.
53
Ibid., p. 3.
31
54
Headquarters, U.S. Military Forces in Korea, “G-2 Weekly Summary” (hereafter referred to as W/S), no. 152,
p. 27.
55
Headquarters, U.S. Military Forces in Korea, “G-2 Periodic Report” (hereafter referred to as P/R), no. 1127, p.
10.
56
ISNK, no. 45, p. 12; ISNK, no. 39, Incl. no. 1, insert between pp. 14-15; ISNK, no. 30, p. 12; and ISNK, no.
35, p. 15. The Security Cadre Training Centers (SCTCs), a cover for the North Korean military, was created in
December 1946.
57
By April 1, 1947, "there were few troops training under the Bo An Kan Boo [the SCTC] system that lacked
Soviet armaments." See ISNK, no. 39, Incl. no. 1, p. 10; ISNK, no. 50, pp. 15, 18.
58
ISNK, no. 50, p. 16; W/S, no. 152, p. 39.
59
W/S, no. 150, Pt 2, p. 3.
60
See Andrei A. Gromyko’s top-secret Soviet document to Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang on June 4, 1949.
See the de-classified top-secret Russian archival documents (116 items, 269 pages in total) regarding the Korean
War (Jan. 1949-Aug. 1953) delivered by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to South Korean President Kim Young-sam
on June 2, 1994 (hereafter referred to as “Russian documents delivered by Boris Yeltsin to Kim Young-sam
regarding the Korean War”).
61
See A.Y. Vyshinsky’s coded top-secret telegram to the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang on Feb. 9, 1950 in the
“Russian documents delivered by Boris Yeltsin to Kim Young-sam regarding the Korean War.”
62
ISNK, no. 30, p. 6. Korean Communists’ military aid to the Chinese Communists in the Chinese civil war
was paid back in kind by China during the Korean War. The Chinese military aid rescued North Korea from the
United Nations Forces during the Korean War.
63
Headquarters, U.S. Military Advisory Group in Korea, “G-2 Periodic Report” (hereafter referred to as
KMAG:P/R), no. 285, p. 4.
64
ISNK, no. 38, p. 13; P/R, no. 1097, p. 9.
65
People's Army and Youth (Inmin Kundae wa Ch'ongnyon), Youth League's Material for Lecture, Vol. 2
(published in 1949) (SA 2009-3-72), pp. 6-54. The qualification of the Korean People's Army recruits includes: (1)
ideological reliability born out of worker or poor peasant family; and (2) political reliability with no family or
relatives living in South Korea (SA 2005-5-44-A & B). If we look at the lists of party members of the 1st battalion
of an unknown regiment of the Korean People's Army as of April 1950, all of the Korean People's Army officers are
Korean Workers' Party members. All military personnel, both officers and soldiers, are from poor peasant and
worker family (SA 2009-7-91; SA 2009-7-86).
66
See the famous Kim Che-won Patriotic Rice Donation Campaign (SA 2009-2-168, pp. 28-29).
67
They include: unitary management system, independent accounting system, and contract system between
economic agencies and enterprises, and contract wage system to the workers, etc. See SA 2005-2-17, no. 1, pp. 109,
112; SA 2005-2-4, p. 29; SA 2007-10-46, p. 1; SA 2009-3-133, pp. 68-70.
68
SA 2009-3-113, p. 18; SA 2008-4-9, no. 1, p. 82; SA 2006-15-25, Vol. 1, no. 3 (early Aug. 1947), p. 2; SA 200532
5-9, pp. 55-56; SA 2005-2-44 (Jan. 1949), p. 72. Also see SA 2005-5-24, pp. 1; SA 2005-5-24, pp. 164, 169.
69
A full-scale state loan through bond sales occurred in 1950, the year of the outbreak of the Korean War. The
Fifth Session of the Supreme People’s Assembly decided to issue government bonds for the people's economic
development and delegated the task to the Cabinet on March 1, 1950. See SA 2007-7-38, p. 1.
70
But the sacrifice imposed upon the peasants and the workers was unbearable from the objective point of view.
Although the peasants nominally came to have their own land, they were forced to give up "voluntarily" whatever
harvest they had except for their own provisions. The industrial workers suffered enormous exploitation as well.
There was a case, for instance, in which workers at a workplace "voluntarily" decided to shorten their lunch hour
even to ten minutes in order to increase production. See SA 2005-5-9, pp. 61-62.
71
The new land reform law in North Korea allowed the landlords to choose to receive land in “other counties”
just as the farm employees, landless sharecroppers, and small-landholder sharecroppers. There is no exact
information available on what happened to the 94.4 percent (3,911 households) of the former landlords who did not
choose to receive land in other counties, but most of them appear to have left North Korea. See ISNK, no. 12, p. 4;
ISNK, no. 40, p. 22; SA 2010-5-12; R. A. Scalapino and C. S. Lee, Communism in Korea, Part I: The Movement, p.
349 n. 66; Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations,
1959), p. 17.
72
C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990, pp. 192-93. For Skocpol’s emphasis on
the changes and transmission in “world time” in the international sphere, that is, her emphasis on the importance of
analyzing social revolutions with a "systemic reference to international structures and world-historical
developments," see T. Skocpol, States & Social Revolutions, pp. 14, 19-24.
73
North Korean sources from 1949 contend that the Soviet socialist democracy was "the supreme form of
democracy," and explain the People's Democracy and the character of the People's Democratic states—i.e., the
Soviet-engineered socialist states in Eastern and Central Europe—whose character held exactly for North Korea as
well. See SA 2009-3-15; SA 2008-10-53, pp. 61-62. For Glenn D. Paige's concept of "emulative behavior" of a
`modernizing' elite, see Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in A.
Doak Barnett, ed., Communist Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 228, 230.
74
Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of United States Policy,” speech delivered at National Press
Club, Washington, D.C., Jan. 12, 1950.
75
T. F. Shtykov's report of Sept. 15, 1949 to Stalin regarding the political, economic, and military situations of both
South and North Korea, in which the ideas and interests of Kim Il Sung to unify Korea was conveyed, and Shtykov’s
top-secret report of Jan. 19, 1950 to Vyshinsky in the “Russian documents delivered by Boris Yeltsin to Kim Youngsam regarding the Korean War.” Also see Ken’ei Shu, Mo Takuto no chosen senso: Chugoku ga oryokko o wataru
made (Mao Zedong’s Korean War: Until China Crossed the Yulu River) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991), p. 25; SA
2008-10-102, pp. 33-40; M. L. Park, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, Vol. I, pp.135-38.
76
Kim Chae-hong, "Kim Il Sung-Stalin Kremlin pimil hoedamnok" (The record of Kim Il Sung-Stalin secret meeting
at Kremlin), Shindong-a 35 (Sept. 1992): 208; Asahi Shinbun, June 26, 1993; Shu, Mo Takuto no chosen senso, pp. 2931.
77
Shtykov’s coded top-secret telegram to Vyshinsky on March 24, 1950 in the “Russian documents delivered by
Boris Yeltsin to Kim Young-sam regarding the Korean War”; M. L. Park, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its
Origins, Vol. I. pp.140-52.
33
78
Vyshinsky’s coded top-secret telegram of May 14, 1950 to the Soviet ambassador to the People’s Republic of
China in the “Russian documents delivered by Boris Yeltsin to Kim Young-sam regarding the Korean War”; Kim,
"Kim Il Sung-Stalin Kremlin pimil hoedamnok," p. 209; Asahi Shinbun, June 26, 1993; Shu, Mo Takuto no chosen
senso, p. 31; M. L. Park, The Korean War: The Outbreak and Its Origins, Vol. I, pp.154-59.
79
Its title is known to have been "Preemptive Strike Operational Plan." See Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in
Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives." Working Paper No. 8,
Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Nov. 1993, p. 25.
80
Kim, "Kim Il Sung-Stalin Kremlin pimil hoedamnok," pp. 209-10; Asahi Shinbun, June 26, 1993. Chu Yong-bok
testifies that he received a Russian-written operation order for engineering units on June 19, 1950. See Chu Yong-bok,
Naega kyokkun choson chonjaeng (My Experience of the Korean War) (Seoul: Koryowon, 1990), Vol. 1, pp. 237-39.
81
Kim then solicited the help of T. K. Shtykov to persuade Stalin to send Soviet advisors to the front units after
June 25. Shtykov promised Kim that he would help in that matter. But Shtykov was reprimanded by Stalin for not
having behaved in the interests of the Soviet Union. See Kim, "Kim Il Sung-Stalin Kremlin pimil hoedamnok," p.
211; Asahi Shinbun, June 26, 1993. See also Chu, Naega kyokkun choson chonjaeng, Vol. 1, pp. 258-61, 268.
82
This characterization of the Korean War as a civil war stems from different theoretical perspective than the civil
war perspectives presented so far by others. See the section of "Competing Explanations of the Korean War" in
this paper.
83
For instance, having downgraded the use of force as an option for territorial unification, Kim Il Sung decided
“to consolidate a democratic base politically, economically, and militarily by further strengthening the people’s
democratic system in the northern half” of Korea. See Kim Il Sung, “Modungoss-ul Chonhu Inminkyongje Pokgu
Paljon-ul Wihayo”(Everything for the Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy) (Report
delivered at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, August 5, 1953),
Kim Il Sung: Chojak Sonjip (Kim Il Sung: Selected Works), Vol. I (Pyongyang: Choson Rodongdang Ch’ulp’ansa,
1967), p. 400. It is also noteworthy that North Korea’s 1948 Constitution designated “Seoul” as the capital of the
DPRK, but that the 1972 Constitution designated “Pyongyang” as its capital.
34