THE LIBERAL WELFARE REFORMS
There were many participants in the creation of the Liberal reforms who had no thought of
creating a ‘welfare state’ of the type which developed in Britain after 1945. Indeed many of the
Liberals of 1906-14 would been appalled by the prospect. Moreover the measures adopted
always had a tactical significance in the parliamentary struggle between the parties: each was a
response to a specific electoral situation, as was the case with the decision to proceed with
labour exchanges and unemployment insurance in 1908-9. But this does not mean that social
reform can be completely explained in such terms. Key figures, like Lloyd George and
Churchill, looked beyond individual pieces of legislation towards the creation of a society in
which the worst ravages of poverty would be eliminated. They saw the strategic importance of
welfare measures which would, at one and the same time, act as an antidote to socialism and
hinder the polarisation of the electorate between Labour and Conservatives in Britain,
contribute to the efficiency of the British economy by preventing the physical and mental
deterioration of the workers, and provide a measure of social justice which would help to attract
working-class votes without alienating the middle classes.
The welfare reforms did not, however, originate exclusively in the heroic vision of a few
Liberal individuals. There were other competing proposal for social reform in Britain in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Liberal Unionists sought to achieve substantially
similar results to the Liberals, though by different fiscal and legislative means. The working
classes, or rather organisations representing them, also had proposals for social reform which
sometimes started from different assumptions and pointed to widely different conclusions. Part
of the problem is to explain why the Liberal solutions were adopted; but the more fundamental
question is, why were all these various proposals under simultaneous discussion? This is the
ultimate justification for concentrating on the common influences on the origins of the reforms.
…other societies, facing similar problems, adopted similar measures, and the British social
reforms have to be seen in the wider context of the response of capitalist societies to the
experience of economic growth …
Much more is now known about the influence of economic, political, ideological and
institutional changes. The desire to retain as much as possible of the existing capitalist
economic system, at a time when it was under increasing pressure from within and without,
seems to have been the most important motive in the origins of the Liberal reforms.
In the end … it will still be necessary to put the reform back into the context of late
Victorian and Edwardian society. It is not sufficient to continue accumulating fragments of
knowledge about specific aspects of the reforms. They will have to be related to the other
changes in the economy which governments increasingly sought to control. There is a need for
a return to the breadth of vision of Halévy and some of his predecessors, who were aware that
social reform was only one part of a search for ways of preserving British imperial society.
J. R. Hay, The Origins of/the Liberal Welfare Reforms 1906-14, 1975,pp 61—3
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It is easy to criticise the Labour Party of the 1910—14 period. Its M.P’s were divided in
their views on a number of important issues — most notably National Insurance — and they
could hardly impress the observer of the parliamentary scene. Mrs Webb’s view, though
obviously that of a dissatisfied socialist, was not really untypical.
The Labour M.P.s seem to me to be drifting into futility ... J. R. MacDonald bas ceased to be a
socialist, the Trade Union M.P.s never were socialists, Snowden is embittered and Lansbury is
wild. At present there is no co-operation among the Labour M.P.s themselves nor between them
and the Trade Union leaders.
Yet the difference between the Labour Party and other political parties was that its principal
strength lay in its extra-parliamentary organisation, and in this period that organisation was
constantly strengthened. Between 1906 and 1914 the number of affiliated trade union
members rose from 904,496 to 1,575,391, with a consequent improvement of party funds. If
this very largely reflects the growth of trade unionism in the country, the actual expansion of
political influence is exemplified by the increase in the number of affiliated trades councils
and local Labour Parties, which rose from 73 in 1905/6 to 177 in 1914. The number of
persons elected as Labour members of local government authorities advanced from 56 in the
year 1907 to 184 in 1914.
These developments occurred in spite of the concurrent development of interest in the
ideas of Syndicalism and direct action, rather than parliamentary methods. There is no real
evidence that the ‘labour unrest’ of these years weakened the performance of the Labour
Party in elections; and it is clear that the party’s strength was increasing precisely among
those workers whose younger militants had taken up with Syndicalism — the South Wales
miners and the railwaymen. Among the workers who were not Syndicalists nor even
Socialists — arid they were still by far the majority — a sort of undogmatic ‘Labourism’
was establishing itself, which consisted in little more than the opinion that the Labour Party,
and not the Liberal, was the party for working men to belong to. This was of course
particularly the case now with the miners, whose political solidarity was unmatched by other
occupational groups.
Sooner or later — and there were indications that it would be sooner — the remnant of
Liberalism among the Midland miners would be eliminated and they would be brought into
line with their English, Welsh and Scottish fellows.
From H. Pelling’s ‘Labour and the Downfall of Liberalism’, published in Popular
Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain, Macmillan, 1968, pp. 117—18.
Questions
a What criticisms of the party between 1910 and 1914 does Pelling accept can be made
about Labour?
b What does he believe to be the principal strength of the Labour Party vis-à-vis the other
political parties?
c How serious a danger does Pelling believe syndicalism to have been to the Labour Party
in this period? From your own reading, and from extracts in this chapter, would you
accept his evaluation?
d
Define Pelling’s ‘undogmatic Labourism’ (line 32).
e Compare Clarke and Pelling’s estimation of the Labour Party’s prospects in 1914. Had a
major and destructive war not broken out in 1914, could the Liberal Party have prevented
the seemingly inexorable rise of Labour?
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The road to universal suffrage
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Both before 1832 and in subsequent periods few politicians approached the franchise as a matter of
natural rights. Instead, voters were supposed to be people whose fitness was demonstrable. What
seemed to be wrong with the unreformed system was that far too many unfit people enjoyed the
suffrage; rash extensions of the vote would only enfranchise the dependent poor, thereby increasing
the scope for corruption. For all practical purposes fitness for voting was assumed to manifest itself in
terms of property or some material form. Thus one would disqualify those who received poor relief or
who did not pay their rates personally…
The 1918 Representation of the People Act constituted the major turning-point in British electoral
history. By multiplying the electorate more than two and a half times it dwarfed all previous reform
bills, and through a multitude of other innovations moulded the electoral system for the rest of the
century. It also signalled a new era in which reform would come about with relatively little
controversy.
The central contribution of the 1918 Act to a democratic system lay in the virtual achievement of oneman-one vote. The traditional disqualification for those in receipt of poor relief was swept aside. in a
great simplification, Parliament created a franchise for men aged 21 years on the basis of six months
residence. It was not until 1948 that a qualifying period was abandoned altogether though it had little
practical significance by then. Women were allowed to qualify in 1918 if they were local government
voters or the wives of local government voters, provided they had attained the age of 30. This age limit
for women was so illogical that it was assumed that it would be withdrawn after a decent interval, and
during the 1920s the main parties engaged in a competition to demonstrate their support for equal
suffrage. When, in 1928, Baldwin’s government took the plunge, it defended the reform by arguing
that, since no distinct ‘women’s vote’ had emerged. there would be no danger of enfranchising the
female majority. Thus the Equal franchise Act allowed a woman to qualify at 21 on the basis of her
residence just as a man would do. Of The five and a half million new women voters, two-thirds were
actually under 30 years of age. Ultimately the politicians had concluded in 1928, as in 1832 and 1867,
that this new group would be likely to enhance the stability of the electoral system not to undermine it
Parliamentary Voters in the United Kingdom 1833-1970
1833
717,000
1866
1,364,000
1869
2,445,000
1883
3,152,000
1885
5,708,000
1911
7,904,000
1918
21,394,000
1929
28,854,000
1966
35,957,000
1970
39,342,000
approximately 1 in 5 adult males
approximately 1 in 3 adult males
Approximately 6 in 10 adult males
12,913,000 males
8,479,000 females
60.4%
39.6%
13,657,000 males
47.3%
15,193,000 females 52.7%
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Source : M. PUGH, The Evolution of the British Electoral System 1832-1987 (London, The Historical Association,
1988) pp.6-9General Election Results, 1832- 1900
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