The Schlieffen Plan fails (1)
SOURCE 1
Account by historian John Terraine
The Schlieffen Plan … required from the German Army an effort beyond
its strength, as von Schlieffen himself apprehended before he died.
Von Kluck and von Bülow were ill-fitted by temperament to work in double
harness. Von Bülow was slow and cautious … von Kluck was bold but
opinionated, so that his manoeuvres against the British frequently lacked
reality.
… whole divisions of [German] cavalry were immobilised for want of
such a simple commodity as horseshoe nails.
Terraine (1987: 5, 30-1)
SOURCE 2
Extract from a letter by the British
general Sir John French to a friend,
10 September 1914
For five solid days we have been pursuing instead
of pursued and the Germans have had simple Hell.
This day we have captured several hundred, cut off
a whole lot of transport and got ten to twelve guns
– and the ground is strewn with dead and wounded
Germans. Something like this happened yesterday,
and the day before … They are indeed fairly on the
run and we are following hard.
Gilbert (1995: 76)
SOURCE 3
Statement by the German admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, 6 September 1914
We haven’t succeeded in entrapping and taking prisoner large masses of troops;
in consequence the French army, by means of their network of railways, are constantly
taking up new positions.
Gilbert (1995: 71)
SOURCE 4
The Western Front in August–November 1914
The Schlieffen Plan fails (2)
SOURCE 1
Account by historian B H Liddell Hart
SOURCE 3
The German Command lost touch with the advancing armies and the movement of these became disjointed.
This vital breakdown was essentially due to the failure of the German higher command to grasp the importance
of good communication ...
The Germans had advanced so rapidly, outrunning their timetable, that their supplies failed to keep pace,
so that the fatigue of the troops was increased by hunger. Indeed when the chance of battle came, their fighting
power was practically numbed by physical exhaustion ...
Too often in this war did the leaders fight each other while the troops fought the foe ...
Liddell Hart (1973: 56–7)
Description of German soldiers by
one of von Kluck’s officers,
4 September 1914
The men stagger forward, their faces coated with
dust, their uniforms in rags, they look like living
scarecrows. They march with their eyes closed,
singing in chorus so that they shall not fall asleep
on the march. The certainty of early victory and
of triumphal entry into Paris keeps them going and
acts as a spur to their enthusiasm. Without this
certainty of victory they would fall exhausted.
Terraine (1987: 33–4)
SOURCE 2
German troops marching through Belgium, 1914
SOURCE 4
Account by historian Marc Ferro
The armies, both inspired by the greatest patriotism, had fought equally well, and had
lost heavily. But the commands had not been equal. On the Allied side, [the leaders]
gave the chance to plan and carry out a manoeuvre that gave the Allies the initiative,
restored their morale and their will to win. On the German side there was by contrast
unceasing discord between Kluck and Bülow, each of them anxious to grab victory for
himself ...
The role of the British ‘contemptible little army’ should not be underestimated.
Kluck himself subsequently declared that he would have taken Paris but for the British.
The victory of the Marne appears to be as much a result of [the French commander]
Joffre’s strategic intelligence as of German blunders ... he had foreseen that his victory,
the Marne, would be won on the French railways.
Ferro (1987: 54-5)
Gilbert (1995: photo 11)