Strengthening Civil Service
Accountability and
Performance
Submission by ACESA in relation to the
consultation process
March 2014
Submission by ACESA in relation to the consultation process on Strengthening
Civil Service Accountability and Performance
Introduction
ACESA is the Association of Chief Executives of State Agencies in Ireland. The
Association provides a forum for chief executives of non-commercial State Agencies to
discuss issues of mutual concern and enables them to develop and express a collective
voice on issues that affect the sector. The broad objectives of the association are:

To create networking opportunities

To identify and promote best management practice through information
sharing and training

To initiate and share relevant research

To keep up to date on relevant developments

To foster international links

To represent CEOs collectively on relevant matters
The current membership of ACESA is 80, comprising a broad range of agencies across
the sector. ACESA represents non-commercial State Agencies, with less than 3% of the
total public sector staff, and less than 3% of the entire vote but serving in excess of
80% of society and its needs.
The Irish Public Service:
The numbers employed in the public service (excluding commercial state agencies) has
experienced a nine percent reduction from its peak in 2008 of 310,000 to its current
level of 291,000 in 2013 (Boyle, Jan 2014).
While numbers have fallen in all sectors since 2008, some have been affected
significantly more than others. The biggest drop proportionally has been in the non commercial state agencies where there has been a 21% drop, with local authorities
experiencing an 18% reduction, and education and civil service a four and seven
percent drop respectively.
Details of employment figures are presented in Table 1:
Health
101,000
Education
91,000
Civil Services
39,000
Local Authorities
30,000
Defence/Justice
18,000
Non- Commercial State Agencies
12,000
Total
291,000
[Source Boyle, Jan 2014 – figures are approximates and rounded based on graphs in
report]
Whilst there has been on one level a reduction in the numbers employed in the public
sector in the context of the overall labour market the numbers have remained relatively
constant at around 15 – 16% of the labour market.
Roles and Functions of the non-commercial State Agencies:
Considering the role and function of agencies, it is important to bear in mind that the
numbers employed in the non-commercial state agencies is equivalent to a third of the
total civil service (into which the agencies report to varying extents). This number is
important in the context of ‘spans of control’, autonomy and independence.
The Centre, the Agency and Contractual Relations:
In preparing our submission to this most welcome of Government initiatives, we
considered it important to frame our response in the context of Agencification and
where Ireland is positioned on the trajectories of (a) organisational
proliferation/retraction and (b) levels of co-ordination and consolidation. (Bouckaert,
Peters & Verhoest, 2010). Figure (i) illustrates the model which we believe best
facilitates discussion on the issues relating to ACESA, as it reflects a dynamic that
changes over time and depending on circumstances in society.
Prior to application of this model to the world of Irish agencies, it is useful to reflect on
the historical context of Agencification and the principles underpinning the
coordination and consolidation of agency performance. Performance and experiences
are highly contextual as are the politico-administrative traditions, cultures, and legal
systems within the state. The caveat is that comparisons across EU states provide
useful results though lessons to be applied must be considered in the context of the
state and indeed its economic wellbeing.
Furthermore, this model allows for consideration of issues, regardless of the ‘agency
model’ per se as the COST 2011 study asserts that… ‘There is no one single best agency
model that can be uniformly applied across countries. (p.11 2011)’.
The authors of the COST (2011) study, Verhoest et al, describe the process of
agencification across EU countries as ‘bodies having been set up or ‘hived off’ from
departments to free or exempt specific units or services from strict regulations and
procedures regarding the use of resources and management that apply to core
departments’. The enhanced flexibility is believed to allow these services to act in a
more efficient, innovative or cost-oriented way. Agencies can bring service delivery
close to the citizens and create the political will to deal with specific problems visible to
citizens. Other reasons to agencify are to group and build specialised expertise on a
specific topic that is not found in the core administration or even, although rarely, to
coordinate and/or integrate expertise scattered across ministries.
In some cases agencies are set up to foster expert decision-making, independent from
political interference (at ‘arm’s length’ so to speak), in order to enhance timeconsistency and credible commitment, as in the case of regulatory agencies,
Ombudsman’s offices etc. ( illustrated in Figure (i) below).
Figure (i) - Specialisation and coordination of organisations and policy cycles
This diagram reflects the trajectory of the monolithic centralised administration to the
agencies of the state along the horizontal plane, and the level of co-ordination (through
co-ordinating mechanisms) on the vertical plane.
Evolution is reflected in the progress from Q1 to Q4 in respect of autonomy and
allowing agencies to manage themselves. Verhoest et al (2011) present data which
illustrates the variations of control and co-ordination in agencies across countries in
Europe including Ireland, as in appendix (i). However with the financial crisis there
has been a tightening of co-ordination.
There can be a blurring of the policy process and the respective roles of Departments
and Governments in making policy. ( Osborne and Gaebler (1992) use the analogy of
Departments and Governments ‘steering’ and agencies ‘rowing’ in the policy process,
This change in dynamic requires new competencies within Departments and Ministries
and it is this changing role that arguably leads to misunderstandings and causes too
much or ‘over-steering’.
Therefore one needs to invest in new modes/instruments & skills for horizontal
steering such as:

Relational contracting

Account management – liaison officers- interfaces

Performance dialogue

Risk management
Autonomy; Control; Accountability – the Values:
Success is achieved by striking the balance between control and autonomy thereby
building a trusting relationship. Regardless of the rationale for the establishment of the
agency, certain key concepts and values are inherent to its functioning and are based
entirely around the relational contract with its parent Department. These values and
concepts are autonomy, control and accountability
Autonomy:
A majority of agencies are established under statute with functions provided for in
legislation i.e. formal autonomy
The capacity for autonomous decision-making is provided for in the legislation but is
restricted to management or policy.
Within these broad parameters, autonomy can be further defined (in the context of
agencies) in terms of discretion in decision making concerning matters that it
considers important. This can further broken down into the following areas of decision
making:

Human resource management

Numbers (FTEs) vs. budgetary control and power to decide quantity vs.
quality...

Rewards

Power of unions

Financial management – types of budgeting accruals vs. zero based; setting
tariffs; reporting standards

Policy autonomy – what issues can the agency take decisions about –
operational /strategic?
Control:
In this framework the concept of control refers to the instruments, mechanisms and
procedures used by the ‘control actor’ (Department/Minister) over the controlled, in
terms of influencing decision making and behaviour of the organisation. Whilst control
and autonomy are not mutually exclusive in this model it is the ‘constraining force’ that
matters,
The control system can operate at three different levels or stages of activity:

Ex ante – planning target setting etc.

Ex nunc – monitoring /measurement

Ex post – evaluation, rewards/sanctions
Integral to the concept of control is accountability which in this context can be
ambiguous - yet it is the determination of the ‘shape’ of the relationship of the
organisation and its department. Whilst accountability is throughout organisations, it
is the UPWARDS /VERTICAL accountability of CEOs to Minister’s and Departments
that is the defining feature.
Accountability:
Accountability at the input stage i.e. ex ante – inputs and processes vs. outputs ex post
– results and performance.
Issues identified in the context of the non-commercial state Agency Model (as
illustrated in Fig (i))
The following issues have been identified by one or more agencies in our network.
These issues were expressed not only in terms of areas of concern but as areas where
there is scope to improve overall performance and increased effectiveness and
efficiency in the delivery of public service and the programme for government by
empowering people and facilitating innovation and the drive for continuous
improvement. The specific issues identified below are not presented in a prioritised
order.
Delivery of the Programme for Government: The civil and public service is
accountable for the effective delivery of the programme for government. In this context
there are areas which work well but there are also significant and widespread
disconnects across both sectors: There is no macro pathway or framework in place
articulating an integrated approach and an expectation to deliver, with consequences
for non-delivery at all levels. It should be noted that there are areas of excellence and
connected, joined up working in some departments, but this is not the norm or a
consistent approach. We would actively encourage the identification of good practice
throughout the civil service which would be replicated across the system as
appropriate. An inconsistent approach facilitates a silo mentality and poor cross
functional engagement, culminating in pockets of delivery despite (rather than because
of) the system, and in many corners stagnation - if not regressive behaviours. This
situation reflects the movement through the quadrants 1-IV in Fig (i) as the agency
/department relational contract moves from low control and high co-ordination as
environmental factors such as the economic downturn create enormous pressures in
the overall system.
We consider that more formal mechanisms for assessing the impact of public policy
initiatives need to be developed, so as to better inform whatever accountability
mechanisms may be developed arising from this consultation. Organisations such as
the Centre for Effective Services (CES) offer models worth considering in this regard.
Command and Control Model of Management: In the current economic
environment the default position in the civil service has been to adopt a command and
control management style. When this is explored further with individual departments
where the genesis of this approach is not clear as the dialogue between agencies and
their departments are often replicated in the dialogue between individual departments
and DPER. This has been accompanied in many instances by a departure from the
operation of the governing structures in place, governing structures which are
enshrined in the specific legislation. There is evidence of micro management.
Actions/decisions are taken which are at odds with the formal authority and autonomy
provided for within the legislative frameworks of the agencies. This approach and the
behavioural changes are a source of concern and frustration in agencies, with
responses from the agency sectors ranging from despondency /complacency (being
disempowered) to significant and unproductive tensions.
The “hub and spoke” agency Model: The “hub and spoke” agency model remains
the delivery model of choice across Europe and is commended in a wide variety of
academic studies. Irish Public Administration has experienced a substantial
proliferation of agencies of various types, some having a specific legal framework and
others not so. This proliferation is represented as a shift to the right along the
horizontal plane illustrated in Fig (i). The proliferation of entities not only led
eventually to a deep cynicism in society about the role, purpose and efficacy of all
‘agencies/quangos’ per se, but more significantly to concerns about the efficacy of the
public administration machinery, as control and autonomy was reined back to the
centre. Such movement and shift in relations is a consequence of major externalities
(in this case the major fiscal restraints/constraints applied due to the economic
collapse).
However, this model is quite different to what many would consider an unnecessary
and inappropriate proliferation of non- statutory based agencies. The response to the
latter, driven by a political agenda, has led to a blunt and unrefined reaction from the
centre. In some agency quarters there is a perception that this period also afforded an
opportunity for the civil service to reassert the traditional command and control model
which does not facilitate innovation, learning, and progressive and modern behaviours
and attitudes. Such behaviours are arguably at odds with what should happen in the
relational contract with the agency and department. Based on the model presented
earlier there should be high co-ordinating activities and low levels of control
mechanisms.
Overall framework for the Public Service: To combat this landscape we propose
an articulation of not just the programme for government but the framework within
which the public and agency sector must operate. The foundations of such a framework
would be clarity of roles and responsibilities; accountabilities; demarcations;
expectations; attitudes, behaviours and ‘values sets’ expected; and tangible
consequences for non - performance. In this context an independent oversight office
with direct access to the Taoiseach’s Office, outside the civil /public service could drive
overall transparency and support the necessary cultural shift.
‘Senior Public Service’- This is a very welcome development but there is some
concern that this will not extend far beyond the civil service (despite a commitment to
include the wider agency sector). Currently there is evidence that CEO contracts are
being significantly downgraded by the civil service at renewal or on advertisement,
without clarity or transparency as to the legal basis for this change. There is concern
that over a period of time this will lead to leadership roles in agencies not being
attractive for high performers. In many cases the new grades will not qualify for
participation in the SPS. ACESA anecdotal evidence suggests that contracts and
renewals are not being carried out in a transparent or indeed timely framework.
Inconsistent and tardy approaches (e.g. CEOs being informed of the change in their
terms and conditions, four days before their contract has to be signed) have led to
extreme frustrations including Labour Relations Commission referrals. There are great
tensions created in regard to downsizing/downgrading, when the emphasis should be
on transparent processes with appropriate business cases/target outcomes. For many
agencies, the cut in salary and grade has led to additional costs to the agencies to deal
with the matter, not only financially, but in time and unnecessary energy away from
the required work of the agency. It also reduces opportunities for staff to develop. This
demotivator can result in good people leaving the service. Awareness of this factor is
apparently not being felt in the civil service.
Civil Service Operational delivery experience: ACESA has a deep and extensive
level of engagement with the public, which is worth studying in the context of any work
in the future on public service delivery. There is a sense that the Civil service has a
great depth of experience of policy making with little or no customer
facing/operational experience. The further hollowing out of expertise with the exodus
of senior staff on early retirements (many to leave as the economy takes up) or with an
extended timeframe for applications to early retirement schemes is leading to forecasts
of a lean - but not fit for purpose - public sector within 3 to 5 years. This has potential
to create a problematic system, with control and command policies being the order of
the day. Such a ‘system’ would damage customer service focus. Such circumstances
cause inevitable disconnects as the agencies are not allowed to work ahead without
budget/agreed targets but are rather micro managed. This disconnect is an example of
what Bouckaert, et al (2010) describe as the difference between the legitimate
autonomy of the agency and the day to day ‘de facto autonomy’.
Service Level Agreements: The term SLA is not currently operated as a two way
agreement between two parties. Such agreements are frequently implemented on a
“one way “basis and without obligation from the centre to deliver as part of a two way
interdependent workflow. There is no evidence of accountability at the centre, be it
qualitative or quantitative. There is no apparent clear link with an integrated, overall
government strategy/policy/objectives. Best business practices appear to be adopted
on an ad hoc basis, leading to conflict with the agency sector, where operational
expertise resides - remembering that almost 50% of agency CEOs bring with them
private sector experience using modern business operational models.
Consistent with ACESA’s view that both the civil and public service are responsible for
the delivery of public services, we feel that the way in which SLA’s are agreed and
implemented could more explicitly recognise the mutual responsibilities of both
Departments and agencies. The perception at the moment is that there is an excessive
emphasis on the agencies only. This mitigates against the achievement of the most
effective and sustainable model of service delivery possible.
Role of Boards (governing bodies). Whilst agency CEOs report to Boards
/Councils and the Chairs/Presidents are accountable to the relevant Minister, these
roles and responsibilities are being indirectly (and arguably directly) undermined
through the practice of positioning a civil servant between the Chair and the Minister.
Thus confusion, if not conflict, will be an inevitable outcome given that this practice is
at odds with the legislative frameworks of the agencies. ACESA agencies are keen to
enhance their working relationships with Ministers. While there is an understandable
concern around what may be perceived as excessive access, ACESA believes that the
interaction between officials, advisers, Ministers and Chairs and CEOs of agencies
could be facilitated in a more open and transparent way
Board appointments. Over the last three years or so, many agencies have
experienced significant delays in making appointments, in accordance with the
provisions of the relevant legislation, to State boards. In some cases this has
compromised the statutory role of the agency and threatened the presence of
appropriate levels of oversight and accountability in agencies so affected. While there
has been a welcome move to having an open transparent process it is recommended
that the excessive delays in making appointments be addressed. From an external
perspective it is not possible to determine if the delays and difficulties exist in the
administrative system or in the political system. Consideration should be given to
matching broad experience in management, governance and ethics to the requirements
of State boards.
Politicisation of the system: ‘The System’ is not politicised or corrupt and whilst
this is to be expected, it must be acknowledged. This is considered to be one of the
great strengths of the civil service. However, there is a risk that ‘The System’ may
become politicised as the controls become tighter not just with the agencies but within
the core. Maintenance of the present high standard of ethics and non-politicisation are
critical to the ongoing success of the civil service and is an attribute that must be valued
and protected.
UK Experience: There have been a number of reform programmes in the UK over
the last decade and it has been found that there was a significant operational delivery
skills deficit in the UK civil service. This is explored in more detail in the attached
papers from the ACESA international conference. There are indications of the same
issues in Ireland from the work of Dr Maureen Lynott, former Chair of TLAC. The
issues have been addressed in the UK through revising the competencies required for
advancement to the most senior positions in the Civil and Public service. The revised
competency profile for Assistant Secretary Levels and above is welcome but we suggest
there could be benefit in further exploring the recent evolution in the UK. Papers
presented by Ms Penny Ciniewicz and Dr Alice Moseley at the ACESA international
conferences in 2013 relevant to this topic are appended.
Chief Operating Officer (COO): Often the Secretary General appears to be almost
fully occupied with Ministerial support, and also has high level engagement with
operations within departments. This situation has arguably led to hybrid approach to
modus operandi of departments’ management teams (MAC). Such approaches can
apparently extend to some working in isolation, following their own agenda
/interpretation of central policy with no clear accountability. On this basis
consideration has been given to the benefits of having a COO working with the
management team (MAC) in all departments, tasked with running it on a more
business like basis, with internal business units being accountable to each other even
before the agency connection comes into play. Whilst there is certainly benefit to this
model, there is a need to give careful consideration of the model for implementing a
measure such as this to ensure the right balance is achieved between accountability,
political considerations and oversight.
Joint Oireachtas Committees /Public Accounts Committee. The roles of joint
Oireachtas committees need to be reviewed in the context of any changed model of
operations or accountability in the civil or public service. The current model of enquiry
when appearing as a witness before PAC or other Joint Oireachtas Committees could
be a significant disincentive to many experienced civil servants. The approach is highly
politicised and the experience of many people is that it can be very stressful leading
people to feel under personal attack. In some of the JOC’s the approach is very
constructive and focussed on achieving a better understanding of the detailed work of
the civil service and ensuring a level of political oversight and accountability. This
should become the norm. Consideration should be given to providing
training/coaching or workshops to JOC Chairs in this area.
‘Materiality’ and ‘Risk Appetite’: The concept of ‘materiality’ should be considered
in the public accounting domain as there can be disproportionate amounts of times
focussed on non-material issues while major issues of national concern go almost
unnoticed. The current accountability model encourages civil and public servants to
operate in a risk averse manner, as the tolerance for error is very low. This has the
effect of slowing down productivity and stifling innovation.
Hierarchical Organisational. Compared with major private sector organisations
the civil service organisational pyramid is very tall with some eight grades from top to
bottom and more in some cases when professional technical grades are considered.
Decision making may work its way through many layers in the hierarchy on a regular
basis without clarity as to where the decision is actually made. This can lead to
accountability being lost in the vertical journey. Consideration should be given to delayering the civil service and getting better integration between general administrative
grades and professional technical grades allied to a professionalisation of the service.
Legislative Drafting process. Arising from the work of the Troika and public sector
transformation and reform programmes there is a major backlog in legislative
development, both primary and secondary. This is affecting progress on issues such as
transposition of EU directives and regulation, as well as delaying the Government
programme on agency rationalisation. The experience of a number of agencies involved
in legislative drafting and policy formulation is that the system for legal drafting and
settlement is slow and inflexible. In a number of cases, there would appear to be
resistance within the Attorney General’s office to taking direction on policy matters
from the relevant agencies and civil servants and accountability or willingness to
engage in dialogue seems challenging. It is recommended that as part of the overall
process consideration be given to ‘different ways of working’ and defining clear
accountabilities and delegated authorities.
Specific issues of concern identified include the specification of fees and other financial
matters within primary legislation, which does not then allow for an indexation process
without bringing forward amendments to primary legislation. This can be difficult to
achieve when there is a significant legislative work load. In such situations, the
continued commercial viability of statutory agencies which are self-funding can be
compromised.
Rules based service delivery model: Consideration should be given to
introduction of an administrative based service delivery system detached from the
Minister and the political system. This model applies in many EU states and applies in
the agency sector. Examples of this include revenue services, taxation, and many
services provided by the non-commercial state agencies. In this scenario, there is no
need to engage the political system in the implementation of the rules based system
and service should not be provided either on a ‘grace and favour’ basis or based on
political patronage.
Ministers, the cabinet and the Oireachtas of course determine the policies and
statutory entitlements but implementation should be detached from the Minister and
the political system. Oversight by the minister and the Houses of the Oireachtas should
be maintained and strengthened.
Ministerial advisors: It is not at all clear in the context of the Ministers and
Secretaries act and the PSMA ’97 where the special advisors to the ministers fit into the
model of decision making and accountability. In many cases this may create a level of
confusion. While they are not decision makers per se, there is no doubt that they
influence many decisions and create a sense of adopting the mantle of authority of the
Minister or the Minister of State to whom they report. This anomaly should be
explored further with a view to reconciling the roles of Ministers, civil servants and
special advisors.
Unintended consequences of Freedom of Information legislation.
The objective of FOI legislation is to increase the level of transparency in policy and
decision making in public life. This is to be welcomed but regrettably one of the
unfortunate unintended consequences is that much decision making now happens
through informal meetings and dialogue without there being formal proposals
submitted , argued through and refined with a broad range of legitimate inputs.
Consequently, this is leading to fewer formal records of the decision making process,
and confusion and vagueness on accountability. A similar situation has arisen in the
UK and has been addressed in the Reith lectures by the philosopher Baroness Onora
O’Neill, who articulates a case for more sensible measured approaches to setting of
metrics and performance evaluation. Setting wrong or inappropriate performance
metrics can drive inappropriate behaviours and achieve sub optimal outcomes.
Active management of under performers. It is very important to have an
active management process in place for underperformers. The absence of such a
system is a disincentive for those people who are committed to delivering the best
service possible. This has been achieved to a greater degree in the agencies where there
is clarity on the role of the CEO and senior executives. While the Departmental
Secretary General has the appropriate powers to impose sanctions on levels below PO
this is generally not known and rarely invoked. Management of under performers
should be carried out in a balanced way alongside recognition and reward of top
performers and active support and coaching for the majority (80%) in between who are
the backbone of service delivery.
Collective decision making: Where there are decisions made collectively or
through a committee system the senior responsible person should be considered to be
the accountable person for the decision and the relevant point of review or appeal of
the decision. Records should also be retained if decision making is delegated to a
committee. This is analogous to decisions made by boards of statutory agencies.
Oversight of self-funding non-commercial state agencies. It is estimated
(ACESA survey 2013) that more than 30% of non-commercial state agencies are
funded through non-exchequer sources e.g. self-generated fees and charges, levies and
European funding. Others have a level of self-funding at a level lower than their overall
operational costs and the balance is covered by a grant in aid from the exchequer voted
either directly to the organisation or through the vote of the parent department. The
funding models applicable are set out in the primary legislation establishing the
agencies and in many cases fees are set with the agreement of the line minister and the
consent of the minister for finance. The recommendations on fees will be determined
by the statutory boards of these agencies but it has been found in some cases that there
has been central direction issued in respect of fee thresholds by civil servants without
clarity on the basis in law or delegated authority for such direction.
Furthermore there have been cases where the operational autonomy has been
compromised and the ability of the agency to deliver its legal mandate has been
compromised through limitation of resources as set out in the Employment control
framework (ECF) and central direction to the agency to remit part of its funding to the
exchequer. Essentially in this case it could be argued that the fees being charged to the
service recipients becomes a form of taxation and counter to the specified purpose as
set out in legislation. The legislative basis for these tight controls is unclear and in
many cases it is not possible to determine who the decision maker is or the process for
appeal of such decisions. Such controls run counter to the philosophy of achieving
service delivery and economic regulation through statutorily independent agencies e.g.
energy regulation, telecommunications, aviation, medicine, injuries compensation etc.
Civil and public service remuneration and reward system: The current
model of remuneration of civil servants and public servants is rigid and cannot
differentiate between exemplary performance and poor to average performance. There
is a case to be made to examine remuneration and reward models e.g. introduction of
performance related elements of pay and other incentives. Caution will need to be
exercised in this area as the recent experience of some civil servants and public
servants in senior positions has been tainted by the experience where there were
performance related pay elements in contracts of Assistant Secretaries in the civil
service and CEOs in state agencies. These were introduced in lieu of pay increase and
were determined annually by boards and Secretaries General within established
parameters. This reflected pay withheld and determined by performance rather than a
bonus model. However in the political and media arena they were characterised as
bonuses and, one could arguably say, were scapegoated. There needs to be a very clear
differentiation between a performance related element of pay and a bonus.
Civil service training and development: Based on our experience interacting
with the civil service it would appear the level of training across a broad range of areas
has significantly diminished. The civil service training centre appears to have ceased
operation. While there is some training provided by external suppliers in transactional
and functional areas the level of training in areas such as exploring the role and vision
of the civil service, its mission, ethos etc. seems to have diminished. Consideration
should be given to putting in place proactive training programmes in ‘soft’ skills such
as people management, motivation, communication, leadership etc. The competency
profile for senior civil servants could form a useful basis for developing such a model.
Opportunities for learning between and within the system should also be explored and
developed e.g. identifying mid-level managers with good potential to work across
agencies, departments and direct services provision on a two year programme, would
strengthen the system, and will bring good knowledge and skills to each section and
facilitate the personal and professional development of the individual(s).
This would have potential to make the civil service an attractive or even ‘great place to
work’ and attractive as a career choice for graduates.
Key Questions
Q1. What are the hallmarks of a system of effective civil service
accountability? What would such a system look like?
An organisation with a clear vision, mission that is communicated consistently and
known to all
Transparency,
Customer centric service delivery including internal customers.
Clear accountability (i.e. everyone knows who the decision maker is/was including the
decision maker and the basis on which the decision was made),
Appropriate administrative appeal mechanisms which are not defensive,
Systems where civil servants have an explicit understanding of the values rather than a
sense of historical traditional values and that the behaviours associated with the values
are identified. The values should be lived.
Clear departmental strategies signed off by the minister and Sec Gen and then mapped
through the PMDS system to the role profile of each person.
Comprehensive training programmes, coaching, mentoring and supports for people at
all levels in bringing total clarity to the accountability system.
Active management of underperformance
Appropriate recognition and reward for excellence linked to a good working PMDS
system. If you focus on rewarding the top 10%, or “punishing” the bottom 10%, by
definition, you ignore the 80% in the middle who are still responsible for delivering a
high quality service.
Inter-service Executive Training – opportunities for learning between and within the
system e.g. identifying mid-level managers with good potential to work across agencies,
departments and direct services provision on a two year programme, would strengthen
the system, and will bring good knowledge and skills to each section therein not to
mention the personal and professional development of the individual(s) who
participate in the programme.
Q2. Do you think civil servants are sufficiently accountable? If not, what
are the main weaknesses in the system? To whom should civil servants be
directly accountable and what form should this accountability take?
There are systems in place through the Minster’s and secretaries’ act and the PSMA
1997 but in many cases these are more not implemented consistently across all
departments. If these were fully and consistently implemented there would be more
visibility and transparency in the overall process. In carrying out a search on a number
of departmental websites it was possible to obtain high level organisation charts and
broadly defined roles but it was not possible to determine who a decision maker would
be in respect of specific policy or operational matters.
The notion of accountability is explored in the consultation document and the
legislation referenced sets out accountabilities but for the average person/ service user
they have a more fundamental interpretation as set out in a number of dictionaries
such as being liable or answerable.
While there would appear to be accountability through the structure and through
legislative provisions and reflected in PMDS profiles it is almost impossible to identify
a ‘decision maker’ and when this is explored it becomes vague or the Carltona principle
is invoked.
Q3. To what extent do current arrangements for civil service accountability
meet the following four principles of accountability (as explained further at
page 36 below)?
Clarity of accountability;
We consider that the clarity of accountability is very variable within the Civil service
and varies significantly depending on department, within departments and grades.
There would appear to be a sense of accountability to the hierarchy of the departmental
organisation but very little sense of accountability to the external stakeholders. The
tone varies and is strongly influenced by departmental leadership. It could be
informative to carry out a survey of people across departments and grades to obtain
their sense of accountability.
Sufficiency of control;
Based on the ACESA experience it would appear that this is variable throughout the
system. In some cases it can be shown there is sufficiency of control whereas in others
this is not the case. In a well-developed and successfully operating PMDS system this
can be addressed as area for ongoing review between any person and their line
manager. In many PMDS models there is scope for identifying Critical Success Factors
(CSF’s) which detail the resources and competencies, co-operation, empowerment,
team working etc. necessary to achieve the right outcomes.
It is vitally important that there is a match between accountability and responsibility
and that a person is appropriately empowered or the system could become discredited
and used as a time consuming ‘tick-box’ exercise.
Clarity of consequences
There does not appear to be any significant awareness or clarity of consequences in the
current model. The introduction of the revised system of PMDS is to be welcomed but
it is expected it will take some time between introduction and its effective operation.
The linking of increment payment to performance at the lower performance level is
welcome but this is a negative incentive and there does not appear to be any
corresponding positive incentive to recognise and reward excellence.
Sufficiency of information?
There should be a very clear linkage between the organisational strategy, the plan or
programme of work, specified outcomes with timelines and quality metrics. These
should be reflected into the role profile/PMDS of every person and they should map
onto the departmental or office deliverables. Every person should understand clearly
the vision, mission, strategy, goals, key performance indicators/ metrics for the
department and their specific part in delivering on these. This should cascade right
down through the organisation.
Having regard to organisational scale considerations it has been possible to achieve
this level of information sufficiency in some agencies.
It is also notable that there are at times conflicts between the need for confidentiality
and having information on ‘need to know’ basis versus openness and team working and
facilitating innovation and new insights into problem solving.
Q4. How could civil service accountability be strengthened? Could
such mechanisms be expected to lead to a significant improvement in
civil service performance or are there additional measures that would
be more effective in achieving this goal?
The implementation of the revised PMDS across the civil service is to be welcomed but
it will be vitally important to map the PMDS personal role profiles on to the Strategies
and programmes of work of the department and set out accountability thresholds and
levels.
Delegated authorities and responsibilities should be clearly defined and agreed for each
person and communicated to all relevant parties.
Where decisions are taken collectively e.g. at MAC or other meetings chaired by a
senior person then that person should be clearly defined as the decision maker/the
accountable person and it should be made known to those affected by the decision who
the decision maker is.
Q5. What could be the likely impact, including the practical changes, in
strengthening civil service accountability? What could be the impact
on the civil service, Ministers, the overall political system, and on
individual civil servants? Consideration could be given to any possible
unintended consequences.
The approach to accounting officers and ‘accountable’ officers should be examined to
bring the accountability in line with the powers specified in legislation. There is
significant reliance placed on the Carltona principle which has its roots in the British
model of the 19th century. With the establishment of service delivery agencies across
the public sector there has been a process of defining and delegating authorities to
specific people. Delegated authorities are commensurate with seniority, role and
resources etc. This is particularly the case among regulators who must be accountable
to Joint Oireachtas committees and whose decisions are regularly challenged on vires
and process through the courts by way of appeals mechanisms as defined in legislation
and by judicial review. Accepting of accountability brings responsibility and this must
be recognised throughout the system. Resources should be made available
commensurate with the level of accountability and responsibility. It is noted that in
many cases in the Civil service roles are defined by the grade of job rather than the role
or service they provide whether policy or service delivery. We believe the linking of
accountability to role should be explored rather than the current model where it is
associated with grade or rank.
Q6. What, if any, are the implications of the measures proposed in this
Paper for traditional civil service values such as honesty, impartiality
and integrity? Are there other measures that could usefully be taken to
reinforce such values?
The values should not be limited to those articulated above. Consideration should be
given to transparency/accountability, commitment to customers, speed agility and
innovation, quality and continuous improvement. These should be explicitly
articulated and reflected in every civil servant PMDS. The behaviours associated with
the values should be described and made known s to all civil servants and the PMDS
end of year and mid-term conversation should have regard to the values and
behaviours. Values and behaviours are implicitly linked to ‘organisational culture’ and
it is vital that is developed and strengthened as culture will dominate strategy in most
cases.
Q7. What are the main advantages and the main disadvantages of the
specific reform options set out in Section 11 of this Paper? What
options merit further consideration and what options could be
discounted? How would the different elements of the reform options
be likely to influence each other?
The accountability model in relation to the accounting officer role, the role of
accountable officers and the inter relationship with joint Oireachtas committees
including PAC needs to be examined. Introducing downward accountability in the
current model of interrelationship with the PAC would probably drive more risk averse
and conservative behaviours and stifle innovation and originality in service delivery
options.
There is a very serious issue not addressed in the paper and that is the age profile of the
civil service and indeed the broader public service. Private sector innovation and
service delivery changes are taking place driven by new entrant graduates but there is
no such cohort within the civil or public service. The current cohort is innately
conservative and change averse whereas recent graduates would bring energy,
enthusiasm, innovation to the space but it is also questionable if the middle
management in the civil service would be best positioned to exploit these talents or if
there would be mutual frustration.
Q8. What elements of the Public Service Management Act 1997 have
been successful and what elements have not been? Has this had an
impact on the performance of Government Departments? What are the
practical steps that need to be taken to ensure the sound and effective
implementation of legislative measures in place?
The ideas and concepts within the PSMA 97 are good and still valid but inconsistently
implemented and it’s not possible to determine who the decision maker is. This
question is to some level putting constraints on thinking in terms of the model for the
civil service and it could be useful to do some ‘blue sky’ thinking on what a modern best
in Europe civil service would look like and then proceed on evaluating the options
identified in this process.
Q9. Would legislative change, in particular to the Ministers and
Secretaries Act 1924 and the Public Service Management Act 1997, be
an effective way to strengthen the accountability of civil servants?
These could potentially be used as instruments to facilitate change but this is
analogous to ‘brown field’ development and it might be important to get effective
transformation to do some ‘green field’ development. It would be useful to start with a
vision for the civil service and based on this vision determine what the operational
model for the civil service would be and then proceed to roll this out on a systematic
basis. It’s important to drive a culture of service delivery and accountability and this
must be driven by committed leaders in the civil service.
It can be seen that in many cases where there are agencies established for service
delivery in specific areas the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities are clearly
defined in the legislation. The equivalent grades in the Civil service for the majority of
cases are Assistant secretary and Principal Officer. The legislative provisions on
accountability in the ‘agencies’ legislation or similar provisions could be used as the
basis for introduction of similar legislation for the civil service.
Q10. What is the appropriate balance between the accountability of
civil servants and the maintenance of the traditional doctrine of
ministerial responsibility?
In determining the appropriate model for achieving the appropriate balance it would
be informative to examine the agency model where primary roles and responsibilities
and delegated authorities and powers reserved are defined in legislation establishing
the agencies or in secondary codes of practice introduced under the primary
legislation. We recommend that there is a migration in operational accountability
residing with Civil servants as appropriate.
Q11. Has the assessment contained in the 2002 Report of the Working
Group on the Accountability of Secretaries General and Accounting
Officers2 stood the test of time? In what specific respects may the
analysis, conclusions and recommendations in the report need to be
updated?
2 Available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=935
It has not been possible to locate this report on either Dept. of Finance or DPER
websites and the URL included in the consultation document does not work
Q12. Is there any scope for extending the accountability model for
Accounting Officers to other aspects of the role of Secretaries General
and also to other senior-level civil service personnel?
It would be useful to consider extending accountability to at least Principal Officer and
equivalents in the first instance. This could be relatively quickly achieved in offices and
operational areas and could be piloted in perhaps two departments for consideration.
Once again the evolution of the agency model could be very informative and indeed
might already be a ready-made pilot for the roll-out of such a model. Many agencies
have been established from operational and regulatory functions within departments,
and established under primary legislation, to achieve exactly the issues of clearer
accountability, transparency and independence and separation from the political
system. In many cases this has significantly increased public and political confidence.
There is corporate memory within many agencies on the process which could help with
such transformations.
Q13. Are there factors specific to the Irish political and administrative
context that need to be considered when addressing the issue of civil
service accountability and performance?
Each case should be examined on its merits and a business case developed exploring
the options. However it would be worth considering the agency model and how the
balance has been achieved in many agencies.
Q14. What are the main lessons to be learned from the international
experience of civil service reform? What international reforms are
believed to be most relevant to civil service reform in Ireland (evidence
from non-Westminster models will be appropriate)? What elements of
civil service reforms undertaken or envisaged in other jurisdictions
are not believed to be appropriate to the civil service and Ireland?
At an international conference hosted by ACESA in May 2013 (and attended by
academics and practitioners from civil and public service areas from Europe and
America) it was emphasised in a paper presented on reform in the UK that to succeed
in progression to the role of Permanent under-secretary (PUS) it was mandatory to
have operational experience in service delivery. The change in requirements stimulated
a change in behaviour of aspirants to senior office where they embarked on a career
progression making them contenders for such posts.
Q15. What are the lessons to be learned from the experience and
practices of accountability and corporate governance in the private
sector that could be examined and considered?
It’s probably important to observe that the private sector is not the sole repository of
‘best practice’ in terms of corporate governance and accountability. Having said that it
is noteworthy that the private sector is willing to learn from the lessons of failure and
implement appropriate measures. Significant change has in many cases been driven by
the response to a crisis. There are many governance models readily available - the
Combined Code, the Companies Act, the Code of Conduct for the Governance of State
Bodies and various publications from the Institute of Directors- and all can be applied
in the Civil Service. In addition more attention could usefully be paid to auditing
mechanisms which are broader than pure financial auditing.
Q16. If delegating greater individual accountability to civil servants,
does the delegation of greater authority also need to be considered? To
what extent could this involve changes in the current allocation of
decision making authority between ministers and civil servants and/or
between individual departments and those departments exercising
central controls?
This is addressed in responses to earlier questions and the foregoing commentary.
Q17. Should differentiated accountability arrangements apply
depending on a civil servant’s role e.g. providing advice to a Minister,
execution of agreed policies and programmes etc.? If so, in what way?
We believe there needs to be a model of accountability that recognises the various and
divergent roles of civil servants and the approach should be different between policy
advisors and operational / service delivery/ implementation/execution people. This
has become the norm in a number of EU states e.g. Netherlands, Denmark etc.
Q18. What aspects of previous reform elements were successful and
what were not? What lessons can be learnt from these reform
experiences?
Reform and change should be viewed as constantly taking place rather than a discrete
set of actions delivered as a time bounded project. The cliché ‘change is the new
constant’ may be relevant in this context i.e. change and consolidation of new work
practices and approaches must be a continuous process and not necessarily a
homogeneous process across all of the civil service. There should be scope for
individual innovation within departments and offices where people involved in delivery
of services can be a part of the service delivery design process.
Q19. Does the summary assessment of the legal / constitutional basis
to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility presented in this Paper
encompass all relevant considerations?
We consider that that is a fundamental starting point but the process of
transformation should not be bounded by this doctrine. It would be beneficial to review
the models for service delivery on an administrative basis in a number of other EU
countries. Particular consideration should be given to having a rules based processes
for service delivery on an administrative basis similar to that applicable for taxation
and revenue services and many services provided by agencies. In this scenario there is
no need to engage the political system in the implementation of the rules based system,
and service should not be provided either on a ‘grace and favour’ basis or based on
political patronage. Ministers, the cabinet and the Oireachtas of course determine the
policies and statutory entitlements but implementation should be detached from the
Minister and the political system. Oversight by the minister and the Houses of the
Oireachtas should be put in place.
Q20. What
necessary?
organisational
and
operational
reforms
would
be
Additional supports to ministers and civil servants and safeguards - to ensure the
effective implementation of the reform options set out in this Paper (see Section 11) - if
they were to be adopted.
We would recommend a consultation process on achieving the balance and ensuring
appropriate safeguards are put in place.
Reference List:
Boyle, R (2014) State of the Public Service Series: Research paper No. 11. Jan 2014.
Bouckaert, G, Peters, B. G & Veerhoest, K (eds) (2010) The Coordination of Public
Sector Organisations: Shifting patterns of public management, Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan.
Osborne, D & Gaebler, T (1992) 1st edt. Reinventing Government: How The
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. Basic Books US.
Appendix
Two papers presented at the ACESA international conference in Trinity College on 30th
May 2103 are attached to the mail
Succession Planning in the UK context, Penny Ciniewicz, Chair,
Association of (UK) Chief Executives, ACESA Conference, 30 May 2013
Excellence in Public Service Delivery: Agencies’ Role in Shaping
the Future
Presented by Dr Alice Moseley, University of Exeter,
ESRC Chief Executive Succession Project
Project team: Prof Oliver James, University of Exeter
(PI); Dr Nicolai Petrovsky, University of Kentucky;
Prof George Boyne, Cardiff University