The Diffusion of the Civil
Service Reform Act of
1978 in OECD Countries
Review of Public Personnel
Administration
Volume 28 Number 3
September 2008 282-299
© 2008 Sage Publications
10.1177/0734371X08319950
http://roppa.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
A Tale of Two Paths to Reform
T. J. Lah
Yonsei University
James L. Perry
Indiana University
This study investigates cross-national diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
(CSRA). Two theoretical lenses are used to analyze the diffusion of performance
appraisal, merit pay, the Senior Executive Service (SES), and the separation of positive
and regulatory functions. The analysis indicates that most CSRA provisions have
diffused more broadly internationally than would be expected based on their technical
efficiency and effectiveness in the United States. Both the extent and patterns of
diffusion indicate that institutional theory better explains diffusion than does
communication theory. Although communication theory is helpful for explaining the
early diffusion of CSRA provisions, primarily to English-speaking countries, later
diffusion appears to be the result of institutional isomorphism. Regardless of which
theories account for their diffusion, provisions from CSRA have diffused widely
among OECD countries. The analysis suggests that CSRA has profoundly influenced
civil service systems around the world.
Keywords: civil service reform; institutions; isomorphism; innovation diffusion;
international
I
n the 30 years since passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), the
meaning and effectiveness of the act have been dissected repeatedly. Two themes
that consistently emanate from the literature on CSRA are effectiveness and legitimacy. The legitimacy theme dates to the origins of the legislation, when President
Jimmy Carter (as cited in Campbell, 1978) declared that America needs “a government that is efficient, open, and truly worthy of our people’s understanding and
respect” (p. 99). Attacks on the merit system as it was practiced leading up to CSRA
Authors’ Note: The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and John Halligan for
their suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. They also thank Hyung Jun Park for giving access to
data sources and Milena Neshkova for educating them about the process for structural adjustments by the
European Commission and European Union.
282
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Lah, Perry / Diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 283
(Savas & Ginsburg, 1973) raised appropriate questions about its legitimacy, that is,
whether it deserved the public’s understanding and respect.
Although CSRA sought to redefine the federal merit system for the late 20th century, its effectiveness, the second theme consistently discussed in association with
the act, has been widely criticized by scholars. Douglas Brook (2000) observed on
the 20th anniversary of CSRA,
Assessments at the five-year point were markedly unfavorable. . . . By the tenth year,
the general conclusion was that CSRA had fallen short of its loftiest objectives. Though
CSRA had been successfully implemented as a personnel management system,
achievement of its higher goals of greater efficiency and effectiveness, and improved
government performance had been less successful. (p. 4)
Many of the failures of CSRA involve discrete provisions, such as merit pay and the
Senior Executive Service (SES), which fell short of the goals articulated by the act’s
framers.
The extent to which CSRA has increased the effectiveness and legitimacy of the
federal government are two metrics by which we can assess the act’s legacy. Another
measure of CSRA’s legacy is to look at its acceptance as represented by its diffusion
to other governments over time. We know, for instance, that CSRA’s provisions have
diffused widely across the American states (Dresang, 1982; Ingraham, 1993). We
have less information, however, about diffusion in the transnational context (Lyon &
Manor, 1983; Thomas, 1987).
This study looks at the cross-national diffusion of four discrete policy provisions
that were centrally identified with CSRA. These provisions are performance appraisal,
merit pay, SES, and the separation of positive and regulatory functions. We explore
three related questions. First, what are the diffusion patterns of key provisions of
CSRA internationally? Second, what conclusions might be drawn about significant
influences on the patterns of diffusion, specifically the speed and extent of diffusion?
Finally, what do the diffusion patterns tell us about the two themes of legitimacy and
effectiveness—political control and administrative capacity—so frequently sounded
since civil service reform was first proposed by the Carter administration in 1977? We
use the analysis of CSRA’s diffusion to close the circle with the two themes that have
routinely been used to frame analysis and debate of the act since its passage.
Theoretical Explanations for Innovation Diffusion
Diffusion is “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain
channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 2003, p. 35). Two
of the primary approaches to modeling diffusion are represented by communication
theory and institutional theory. Underlying these two theories are different rationales
for innovation diffusion.1
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284 Review of Public Personnel Administration
The primary logic of diffusion as a communications process is that information
about new practices is exchanged through various communication channels between
users and nonusers of new technologies (Rogers, 2003). Rogers traces the communication tradition in diffusion research to mid-20th century. The new ideas that innovations represent are likely to spread more rapidly when communication channels
are well developed, information is available that helps to reduce uncertainty about
new ideas, and participants in the process are relatively similar in salient attributes
such as social status, education, and beliefs.
Institutional theorists argue that diffusion is the result of several types of isomorphic processes, that is, processes that lead organizations to take similar forms by
adopting practices from other organizations and making them their solutions
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995). Organizations
copy innovative policies of other organizations through diffusion mechanisms.
Policy borrowing may occur in a broad context and include general concepts, policy
tools, or highly specific program design (Wolman, 1992).
Institutional isomorphism may take several forms, which bring with them different
underlying processes by which innovations diffuse. Coercive isomorphism occurs
when behavior is constrained or legally required by higher-level organizations (Scott,
1995). Given the autonomy of nation states, this form of institutional isomorphism is
likely to be less influential in cross-national diffusion of civil service provisions.
The second isomorphic process, mimetic isomorphism, entails a strong drive by
organizations to imitate others. Mimicry is likely to be influential when an organization’s understanding of technologies is weak, goals are ambiguous, and the environment
displays uncertainties (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Mimetic isomorphism is facilitated
indirectly through employee mobility and directly through consultants and associations,
such as the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Mimicking what other countries are doing under conditions of
uncertainty both increases an adopter’s comfort zone and acts as an efficient avenue for
designing systems from the ground up without specialized knowledge.
Normative isomorphism governs legitimacy morally, typically through the efforts of
professionals. Professionals seek to define the conditions and methods of their work and
to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Professionals facilitate diffusion because of their similarities in skills and knowledge as the result of common education and their membership
in networks. In this regard, normative isomorphism parallels communication theory
processes. The theories differ, however, in that normative isomorphism is based on
social obligation and a logic of appropriateness (Scott, 1995) rather than on information
flows and a logic of consequence usually associated with communication theory.
Roy and Seguin (2000) pointed out that technical efficiency may not be the main
reason for public organizations to adopt a system. Analyzing use of cost–benefit
analysis using institutional isomorphism, they argue that the rationality and efficiency gains may be incidental, random, or even detrimental. They contend that in
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Lah, Perry / Diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 285
the innovation diffusion stages, there is a threshold where adoption provides legitimacy rather than improving performance.
Communication and institutional theory are conceptually distinct but have been
used in tandem to explain different stages of diffusion processes. Tolbert and Zucker
(1981) observed that early adoption of civil service reforms was related to internal
government needs. However, for later adopters, civil service reforms were better
explained as means for legitimating the organization to external actors (Tolbert &
Zucker, 1981). They argue that the presence of early adopters prompts legitimacy
concerns among the remaining nonadopters. Because isomorphism enhances legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and enhanced legitimacy produces bandwagon
effects (Abrahamson, 1991; Painter, 1988), countries trying to overcome uncertainty
would consider imitating others. The results would be striking homogeneity across
countries—but with doubtful efficiency improvements.
Four Provisions of CSRA
We next discuss the intent and design of the four CSRA provisions whose crossnational diffusion we analyze. We couple with this discussion consideration of how
the effectiveness of each provision was perceived after its implementation.
Performance Appraisal
In 1977, the year before CSRA was passed, one-half million federal employees
received within-grade pay increases and only 700 were denied (Campbell, 1978).
Performance appraisals throughout the federal government were perceived as having
little relationship to motivating, rewarding, or separating employees. The act sought
to create objectives-based performance appraisal systems to replace more informal
and subjective systems. Title II of the CSRA mandated evaluations at least yearly,
“establishing performance standards which will, to the maximum extent feasible,
permit the accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of objective criteria” (§ 4302 [b][1]). In addition to objectives-based appraisals, CSRA sought to
link performance appraisals directly with individual and organizational outcomes
(Campbell, 1978).
Evaluations of CSRA’s performance appraisal provisions show mixed results.
Many federal managers valued the new systems for their ability to help them establish
work plans (Gaertner & Gaertner, 1984; Nigro, 1982). At the same time, managers
were uncertain about the ability of the systems to discriminate between high and low
performers (Nigro, 1982; Pearce & Perry, 1983). Moreover, federal employees did
not believe that performance appraisal leads to improved performance—a major reason for its establishment (Nigro, 1981, 1982; Pearce & Perry, 1983).
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286 Review of Public Personnel Administration
Merit Pay
CSRA instituted merit pay for managers in grades 13 to 15 of the General
Schedule. The merit pay system initiated a process of eliminating automatic pay
increments based on time in grade and allocating differential increases based on
appraised performance (Campbell, 1978).
The merit pay provision of CSRA failed to meet expectations (Ingraham, 1993;
Kellough & Lu, 1993; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry,
1985; Perry, 1986; Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2008). In 1984, Congress abandoned the
merit pay system established in the original statute for the Performance Management
and Recognition System. Performance Management and Recognition System suffered a fate similar to the original merit pay system in the early 1990s. Although
many federal employees agreed with the policy in theory, most expressed skepticism
about its ability to be implemented effectively (Nigro, 1982; Pearce & Perry, 1983).
Research has found no statistical relationship between merit pay and public responsiveness or organizational effectiveness (Daley, 1987; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Pearce
et al., 1985; Perry et al., 2008).
SES
The SES was established to better manage higher-level public officials in
General Schedule grades 16 through 18. SES is a rank-in-person system in contrast to the rank-in-position system it replaced. Similar to military and Foreign
Service systems, the SES includes both career and noncareer executives and is not
tied to specific positions. The president and agency heads can place noncareer
executives into positions once held by career executives as long as the number of
noncareer executives in SES does not exceed 10% of the total (Campbell, 1978).
The SES was designed to overcome executive staffing challenges and improve
managerial motivation (Perry & Miller, 1991; Ring & Perry, 1983). Another important
purpose of SES was to increase responsiveness of the bureaucracy to political
direction. Alan K. (Scotty) Campbell, first director of the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), stated that one of the goals of the SES was “appropriate
responsiveness to the government’s political leadership while resisting improper
political influence” (Rohr, 1980, p. 205).
The SES has generally been assessed as falling short of its goals. In an early
assessment, Colby and Ingraham (1981) concluded that SES contributed to a negative work environment; senior executives were disinclined to support it; and its
theory of motivation, including executive bonuses, had no real impact (Colby &
Ingraham, 1981). Ring and Perry (1983) reported that few federal managers perceived SES as leading to improved individual or agency performance. The most
recent assessment of the effects of the statutory provisions of SES (Perry &
Miller, 1991) offers a more nuanced and complex picture of potential outcomes
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Lah, Perry / Diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 287
associated with SES, but the analysis did not sustain the original SES program
design logic model.
Separating Positive and Regulatory Personnel Functions
Reorganization Plan No. 2, an element of CSRA, replaced the U.S. Civil
Service Commission with the OPM and the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB). The OPM reports directly to the president and is responsible for designing federal personnel systems. The OPM is charged with establishing and implementing human resource policies for federal organizations. The MSPB is responsible
for hearing employee appeals and ensuring that the merit principles specified in
CSRA are being implemented. When MSPB was created, Congress also established the Office of Special Counsel, which was attached to MSPB, to investigate
and protect employees and applicants from prohibited personnel practices, especially reprisal for whistle-blowing.
The creation of OPM was successful in shifting emphasis from the personnel
community as primary customers to serving line managers (Lane, 1982). This shift
also increased the amount of partisan involvement in human resource decisions
(Lane, 1982; Rosen, 1986). A U.S. General Accounting Office (1987) study of
MSPB found that MSPB is largely seen as objective, independent, and fair, but this
is truer among union presidents and private attorneys than among employee
groups. A criticism that the roles of MSPB and the Office of Special Council were
sometimes confused (Vaughn, 1982) was addressed when the Office of Special
Council was formally separated from MSPB in 1989.
Summary
This brief review of four CSRA provisions provides a mixed picture of both their
short and long-term success. The statutory provision that fared worst is merit pay.
The SES is viewed less unfavorably, but few have made the case that it has achieved
even a modest portion of the intent of the framers. Performance appraisal and the
reorganization of personnel functions have met with some success but have also been
criticized. Given what Douglas Brook (2000) characterized in the introduction as
“markedly unfavorable” at the 5-year mark and at the 10-year mark as falling “short
of its loftiest objectives,” how has the diffusion of CSRA fared cross-nationally? We
turn to that question next.
Results for Diffusion Patterns of Key CSRA Provisions
Using a variety of data sources (see appendix), we constructed a database for
adoption of the four CSRA provisions by the 30 member countries of the OECD.
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288 Review of Public Personnel Administration
Table 1 summarizes whether member countries adopted the provisions and the year
in which a provision was adopted.
The table shows the extent to which developed countries followed the United States’
lead in adopting the core ideas of CSRA. In light of what we know about the mixed
record for CSRA’s technical efficiency and effectiveness, the extent of diffusion is surprising. Almost all (93.3%) countries have come to rely on individual performance
appraisals. Eighty percent of the OECD countries have adopted some form of merit pay
and have also created a form of SES. The CSRA provision that diffused least widely is
the creation of a positive personnel management organization. In brief, key provisions
of CSRA have diffused widely internationally over the 30 years since passage of the act.
Several additional generalizations can be drawn based on the data in Table 1. A
few countries, primarily English-speaking, were relatively consistent in being early
followers of the U.S. Canada, the closest neighbor of United States, adopted performance appraisal at almost the same time as the United States, and merit pay and SES
soon thereafter. Other Commonwealth countries, notably Australia, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom, were also among early adopters of one or more of the provisions. Among the countries that adopted performance appraisal in the recent years
are two Asian countries, Japan and Korea, and two European countries, Germany
and France. Greece was the only consistent nonadopter.
The diffusion curves in Figure 1 provide additional insights. The most obvious is
the absence of the classic S-shaped diffusion curve (Rogers, 2003) for any of the four
provisions. The adoption of an innovation usually follows a normal, bell-shaped
curve so that when the cumulative number of adoptions is plotted, the resulting curve
is S-shaped. Although Everett Rogers (2003) notes that the S-shaped pattern is far
from inevitable, it “is so ubiquitous that students of diffusion may expect every innovation to be adopted over time in an S-shaped pattern” (p. 260). All four of the
CSRA provisions investigated in the present study, however, are exceptions to the
S-shaped curve. We explore reasons for this finding later in the discussion.
Another obvious conclusion from Figure 1 and Table 1 is that the spread of the
four CSRA provisions is quite different. By the end of the period since passage of
CSRA, the practice of performance appraisal has diffused almost universally. Merit
pay is not far behind in terms of percentage of countries adopting. The provision that
has diffused the least is separating positive and regulatory personnel functions,
which has been adopted by just half of OECD members.
The CSRA was a comprehensive reform in the United States, but it has seldom
been adopted as a package in other OECD countries. Adoption of some provisions
within OECD countries lagged the adoption of other provisions by significant periods.
For example, Australia adopted SES in 1984 but embraced merit pay 13 years later in
1997. In contrast, Korea approved merit pay in 1999 but adopted SES in 2006. Eleven
years separate adoption of merit pay and SES in the United Kingdom. The long periods
between adoptions of provisions within a country indicate that civil service reform was
usually not the product of comprehensive reforms as it was in the United States.
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Lah, Perry / Diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 289
Figure 1
Comparison of the Diffusion of Four CSRA Provisions
Note: The diffusion curves include only observations for which a specific adoption date or period could be identified. Observations for which only Yes appeared in Table 1 are excluded. SES = Senior Executive Service.
Table 2 shows high convergence of adoptions between countries. More than 40%
of the OECD countries adopted all four provisions. The countries that adopted at
least three of the four CSRA provisions amount to 73.3%. Countries that adopted
only two provisions account for 16.7% of all OECD members. Every country that
adopted SES also adopted merit pay, except for Luxembourg, Portugal, Turkey, and
Iceland. Austria adopted only performance appraisal, whereas Iceland adopted only
SES. Greece is the only OECD country that did not adopt any provision. The results
suggest that an adoption of a provision eventually leads to further adoptions, with the
exception of creating an agency to separate positive and regulatory personnel functions.
Discussion
The results of this analysis provide evidence that cross-national diffusion of civil
service reforms is driven more by considerations of legitimacy than by technical
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290 Review of Public Personnel Administration
Table 1
Adoption of Four CSRA Provisions in OECD Countries
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Total number
of adopters
Separation of
Personnel
Function
Merit Pay
SES
Performance
Appraisal
1997
No
Yes
Yes (early 1980s)
Yes (early 2000s)
1987
1992
2004
1997
No
2002
No
2002
1993
2001
1999
No
1994
1989
1988
Yes
Yes (early 2000s)
No
Yes (early 2000s)
1984
1989
2002
No
1985
1979
1984
No
Yes
1981
Yes (early 2000s)
Yes (late 1980s)
Yes (early 1990s)
Yes (early 2000s)
No
No
Yes (early 2000s)
Yes
Yes (early 2000s)
Yes (early 1990s)
Yes (late 2000s)
2006
Yes
Yes (early 1990s)
Yes (late 1980s)
1988
Yes
Yes (early 2000s)
1979
Yes (early 2000s)
No
No
No
Yes
1996
1979
1999
Yes
Yes
1979
Yes (early 2000s)
Yes (late 1980s)
Yes (early 1990s)
2002
Yes (early 2000s)
No
Yes (early 2000s)
No
Yes (late 1990s)
Yes (early 1990s)
2007
2006
Yes
Yes (early 1990s)
Yes (late 1980s)
Yes (late 1980s)
Yes
Yes (early 2000s)
Yes
Yes (early 2000s)
Yes (early 1980s)
Yes (late 1980s)
Yes (early 2000s)
Yes
Yes (late 1980s)
1979
1984
No
No
Yes (early 1980s)
Yes (early 2000s)
No
No
Yes (early 2000s)
Yes (early 2000s)
No
No
No
No
Yes (early 1990s)
Yes (late 2000s)
1999
No
Yes (early 1990s)
No
Yes (late 1980s)
No
Yes (early 2000s)
No
Yes (early 2000s)
No
Yes (late 1980s)
No
No
Yes
1979
24/30 (80.0%)
24/30 (80.0%)
28/30 (93.3%)
15/30 (50.0%)
Note: Yes indicates that the provision was adopted, but a precise adoption year could not be specified from
available data. Parenthetical dates indicate likely period during which adoption occurred. SES = Senior
Executive Service.
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Lah, Perry / Diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 291
Table 2
Types of Adopted CSRA Provisions by Country
Type of CSRA Provisions
Number of
Adopted
Provisions
Merit
Pay
SES
Performance
Appraisal
OPM
4
X
X
X
X
3
X
X
X
3
X
2
2
X
1
1
0
Total
X
Total (%)
Australia, Canada,
13 (43.3)
Czech Republic,
France, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Mexico,
New Zealand, Poland,
Slovak Republic,
United Kingdom,
United States
13 (43.3)
Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Hungary,
Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway
Germany, Sweden
7 (23.3)
9 (30.0)
X
X
Spain, Switzerland
Luxembourg, Portugal,
Turkey
2 (6.7)
3 (10.0)
5 (16.7)
X
Austria
Iceland
1 (3.3)
1 (3.3)
2 (6.7)
Greece
1 (3.3)
1 (3.3)
30 (100)
30 (100)
X
X
Countries
Total (%) by
Number of
Adopted
Provisions
X
2 (6.7)
Note: X indicates the provision was adopted. SES = Senior Executive Service; OPM = Office of Personnel
Management.
efficiency or effectiveness. This does not mean that the effectiveness of a reform
plays no role in innovation adoption, but instead that the preponderance of evidence
supports institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) rather than communication theory (Rogers, 2003) explanations. Using the sharp distinction employed
by March and Olsen (1983), realpolitik wins out over administration and politics
over administrative capacity.
Some evidence clearly supports the traditional communication of innovations
model, even if it is of lesser importance than institutional isomorphism. The fact that
a few, primarily English-speaking, countries were early followers after passage of
CSRA is one indicator that innovation communication processes are influential.
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Australia’s comprehensive public service reforms in 1984 resulted, in part, from
close interaction between U.S. and Australian administrative leaders (Halligan,
1996). The Australian reforms also preceded most effectiveness evaluations of
CSRA. Thus, a reasonable case can be made that Australia and other early followers
of CSRA were likely not acting based on institutional isomorphism. Halligan (1996)
concluded that Australia’s 1984 legislation was the result of “voluntary borrowing”
(p. 291) in contrast to some form of international coercion or advice from external
agents and consultants.
The general conclusion that the spread of CSRA’s provisions is largely an exercise in legitimation is not altogether surprising given what we know about the origins of CSRA. Perhaps the most noteworthy facet of CSRA is that it was passed at
all. President Carter and his political appointees, leaders such as Scotty Campbell,
demonstrated great skill in selling the reform package to Congress. Their success
was a textbook illustration of political legitimation. The effectiveness of CSRA was
a lesser consideration. This point is made by the founding director of OPM. Scotty
Campbell, when asked about his expectations for whether the merit pay provisions
of the act would be effective, remarked, “I saw no need. It was my perception that it
worked fine in the private sector” (Ingraham, 1993, p. 349).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that in the presence of weak understanding
of technology, ambiguous goals, and an uncertain environment, rational actors pursue isomorphic solutions. DiMaggio and Powell contended,
Structural change in organizations seems less and less driven by competition or by the
need for efficiency. Instead, bureaucratization and other forms of organizational change
occur as the result of processes that make organizations more similar without necessarily making them more efficient. (p. 147)
In light of the lack of demonstrated effectiveness of key provisions of CSRA,
especially merit pay and SES, isomorphic processes were more influential than
processes associated with technical efficiency.
The fact that this study involves cross-national diffusion among developed countries
reduces the likelihood that coercive isomorphism explains diffusion, but a form of coercion probably played a role in some instances. The most likely instance of coercive isomorphism involves the spread of CSRA’s provisions to transition economies in Eastern
Europe, specifically the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. In
leading up to the fifth enlargement of the European Union (EU), the European
Commission’s 1993 Copenhagen criteria and 1995 Madrid Council additions
(European Commission, 2008) applied to candidate countries, which included the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. These countries were
required to meet the European Commission’s (2008) criteria to be accepted into the EU
before their accession to membership. Thus, the almost simultaneous adoption of
administrative adjustments related to CSRA’s provisions in the early 2000s by the
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Lah, Perry / Diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 293
Eastern Europe countries was not random; rather, it was a direct response to conditions
established for entry into the EU. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak
Republic were accepted into the EU on May 1, 2004.
Although coercive isomorphism may explain some spread of CSRA’s provisions,
diffusion between independent, developed nation states is more likely the consequence of mimetic or normative isomorphic processes. Adoption of CSRA by the
United States, coupled with other countries following suit, increases the prospects of
adoption by other countries. The increasing numbers of countries adopting policies
grounded in CSRA might not only lead nonadopters to mimic their counterparts but
could also pressure countries to “join the club” because of “normative sanctions”
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). In the presence of uncertainty, countries copy
others, taking a safe path that is the result of either signals or pressure from adopters.
Even if the system does not produce expected results, the adopter government is less
vulnerable to public criticism when it adopts another country’s system than when it
pursues something unique.
The “safe path” that many countries followed did not preclude substantial reinvention (Rogers, 2003) by adopting countries. One of the first examples of such reinvention is documented by Van Riper (1958): when the United States borrowed from
Great Britain to create the Pendleton Act in 1883. In Halligan’s (1996) study of early
cross-national diffusion following CSRA, he noted a need to distinguish between
civil service reforms as a package and specific reform provisions within the comprehensive package. Although Halligan made a strong case that the SES, for
example, quickly diffused from the United States to Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand under essentially the same name, important components of the SES such as
performance appraisal, performance pay, and basic employment contracts differed
significantly across the countries. More recently, Halligan (2003) pointed out that
not all senior services are SES systems as in the United States, but senior services
bear striking similarities from country to country regardless of what they are called.
Merit pay has been similarly reinvented as it diffused cross-nationally. OECD
(2005) reported that only Denmark, Finland, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom have formalized merit pay systems, but other adopters opted for
informal systems. Countries also vary widely in who is covered by merit pay.
Canada, Ireland, Italy, and Norway cover top and middle management levels only.
Programs in Ireland, Norway, and France have broader scope of coverage. Australia,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom apply merit pay to all levels of government employees (OECD, 2002).
Variations of design dimensions include target group, extent of standardization, and
the forms of payment and funding sources. In an early analysis of selected OECD
countries, Eisenberg and Ingraham (1993) argued that the intent, design, and level of
financial support of pay-for-performance plans vary substantially, but they also
pointed to striking commonalities in systems across countries.
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It is worth emphasizing that many developments other than CSRA likely affected
choices countries have made about civil service or personnel reforms. The new
public management movement, which many scholars associate with reforms of the
1980s and 1990s, has no doubt influenced decisions countries have made about
reforms. But the new public management movement is among the normative shifts
that have legitimated the spread of provisions originally embedded in CSRA.
Contending that the impetus and pressures for reform arise from many sources does
not invalidate the operation of processes we associate with communications and
institutional theory. We instead view multiple pressures as cutting a path that reinforces preferences for CSRA-like reforms in many countries. The reforms may have
been the result of direct communications among leaders and professionals in different countries. They may also be the product of countries adopting or reinventing
practices that have become taken for granted and therefore cannot be readily identified with an originating country.
Although we urge caution in attributing civil service reforms worldwide solely or
even primarily to CSRA, our analysis indicates that CSRA has strongly influenced
developments globally. In at least one respect, the analysis may understate the scope
of CSRA’s influence. In many countries, for example, performance appraisal or
merit pay was first applied to senior executives but soon diffused across the bureaucracy. This means the policy idea diffuses internationally between countries and then
diffuses once again from upper to lower echelons within national governments. In
addition, civil service reforms have also diffused between national, state, and substate governments (Halligan, 1996). Thus, over the course of the past 30 years,
CSRA has likely profoundly influenced policies and structures around the globe.
Conclusion
The analysis of diffusion of key provisions of CSRA 30 years after the act’s passage provides insights about the long-standing debate about what drives administrative reform. In the context of personnel reforms triggered worldwide by CSRA,
legitimacy appears to trump technical efficiency and effectiveness. The widespread
diffusion of policies and practices associated with CSRA are testimony to its legacy.
Our findings raise interesting questions about how to do reform right. Democratic
public administration demands reforms that are both legitimate and effective. These two
reform paths sometimes converge, but in other instances, as with government merit pay
systems (Perry et al., 2008), they are at odds. Although some scholars argue that management should become more evidence based (Pfeffer & Sutton, 2006) so that we avoid
taking—and retaking—the path of “bad management” (Ghoshal, 2005), institutional
processes sometimes stand in the way. Public administration scholars and practitioners
need to find ways to make their case for effective administrative practices at the same
time that they satisfy stakeholder expectations regarding legitimacy.
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Lah, Perry / Diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 295
Appendix
Notes and Data Sources for Table 1
Notes
Merit Pay
1. Norway and Ireland began use of merit pay for senior staff in 2006.
2. Belgium is preparing an implementation plan for merit pay. Currently, only a limited number of departments have been delegated authority for pay determination.
3. Merit pay is used for senior executives in six French departments.
4. Mexico’s merit pay program applies to education officials. In 1994, the Education
Ministry introduced a 5-level merit pay program that would raise teachers’ pay by
as much as 300%. The program, known as Teacher’s Career, ranks teachers according
to educational attainment, supervisors’ evaluations, and other criteria.
5. Norway’s merit pay program applies to senior executives in some pilot departments.
Senior Executive Service (SES)
1. Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States have formally adopted the
Senior Executive Service at the institutional level.
2. France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and the Slovak Republic have informally adopted the SES.
3. Top Belgium civil servants are not centrally managed but receive special training
and recognition. Mobility among senior executives is recognized as desirable, but
the federal system lacks an intentional program.
4. Denmark’s Tjenestemænd is a special group of high-ranking officials, including permanent under-secretaries, top law enforcement, and military leaders appointed by
the Queen.
5. Informally, Finnish pay scales A28-A34, including the Secretary of State, UnderSecretaries of State, Directors General, Heads of Agency, Heads of Office, and
Heads of Department are considered senior civil servants. There is no distinct office
for senior civil servants.
6. The French Directorate General for the Civil Service monitors career development
of senior civil servants, the legality of appointments, the completion of the statutory
period of mobility, and some general matters concerning senior civil servants. The
senior civil servants are appointed for life to a particular corps.
7. German civil law specifies no central office for managing the civil service. The
enabling legislation has been fleshed out into separate Civil Service Acts for civil
servants of the Federations and of the Federal States.
8. Mexico has not formally defined an SES, but it has an identifiable senior management.
9. Portuguese public administration has five professional groups, the top group of
which is called the Senior Civil Service (SCS). The SCS dates from 1979, when
there was a movement to organize the career system. There is no special and formal
attention to networking with regard to the senior civil servants.
(continued)
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296 Review of Public Personnel Administration
Appendix (continued)
Performance Appraisal
1. Danish allowances are decided on the basis of individual appraisals.
2. Finnish principles of performance assessment are specified independently for each
unit within the general framework of New Pay System.
3. Since 2002, the evaluation and rating of civil servants in France must be part of an
integrated policy process.
4. The aptitude and professional achievements of German civil servants must be evaluated at least every 5 years.
5. Hungarian key objectives are annually set by ministers or heads of public administration organizations.
6. Italian managers are evaluated based on performance and organizational skills.
7. Korean managers are subject to two measures: MBO for higher-level employees
and performance appraisal rating for mid- and lower-level employees.
8. New Zealand has a less standardized performance appraisal system.
9. Spain has a less standardized performance appraisal system.
10. Sweden has a less standardized performance appraisal system, but nearly all agencies use some kind of performance appraisal system.
11. Swiss performance targets are set by employees with their immediate supervisor.
Independent Personnel Management Organization
1. In Denmark, the Finance Ministry is responsible for personnel management. There
is a separate organization for training.
2. In France, the Direction Generale de l’Administration et de la Gonction Publique
is responsible for personnel administration.
3. In Sweden, the SAGE is responsible organization for public personnel recruitment.
Data Sources
Berenschot, B. V. (1998). The senior civil service: A comparison of personnel development for top managers in fourteen OECD member countries. Maastricht, Netherlands: European Institute of Public
Administration.
Chung, J. M. (2006). A comparative study for public personnel system in developed countries (in Korean).
Seoul: The Korea Institute of Public Administration.
Gault, D. A. (1999). Mexican public sector reform: Patrimonialist values and governmental organizational
culture in Mexico. International Review of Public Administration, 4(2), 67-77.
Goss, W. (2001). Appraisal, pay and reward. Asian Review of Public Administration, 13, 118-124.
The Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office. (2005). The Hungarian public administration in the system of
state organs. Budapest, Hungary: Author.
Kim, S. R. (2006). The trend of government human resource management in OECD Countries. Korean
Delegation to the OECD. Retrieved May 17, 2008, from http://www.oecd.org/LongAbstract/
0,3425,es_33873108_33873555_27903109_1_1_1_1,00.html
Namgung, G., Ha, T. K., Park, C. O., & Kim, Y. W. (2005). The study on problem and improvement plan
concerning introduction of senior executive service in developed countries. Seoul: The Korea Institute
of Public Administration.
(continued)
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Lah, Perry / Diffusion of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 297
Appendix (continued)
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2003). Managing senior management:
Senior civil service reform in OECD member countries. Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2004a). Performance pay policies across 12
OECD countries: Brief overview. Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2004b). Trends in human resource management policies in OECD countries: An analysis of the results of the OECD Survey on Strategic Human
Resources Management. Paris: OECD HRM Working Party.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2005a). Questionnaire on performance information. Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2005b). Modernizing government: The way
forward. Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2005c). Trends in human resources management policies in OECD countries: An analysis of the results of the OECD survey on strategic human
resources management. Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2006a). Preliminary sample results from the
Survey on Strategic Human Resources in Government. Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2006b). Towards better measurement of government. Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2006c). Strategic human resources management survey. Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2007a). The state of public service: Policy
Brief 5: The senior management in the public service (Public Employment and Management Working
Paper). Paris: Author.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2007b). The state of the public service: Policy
Brief 3: Managing the performance of government employees. Paris: OECD Public Employment and
Management Working Party.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2007c). Reviews of human resource management in government. Paris: Author.
Web Sites Referred to in This Research
OECD: http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_2649_34139_2731761_1_1_1_1,00.html
Germany: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/07/feature/de9707123f.htm
Japan: http://www.jinji.go.jp, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/971228finalreport.html (English
executive summary), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/gyokaku/report-final/ (Japanese full text)
Mexico: http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/mexico/resources/teachers.html
Portugal: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2007/05/articles/pt0705019i.htm
Slovakia: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2006/05/articles/sk0605019i.htm
Spain: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/03/feature/es9803143f.htm
Note
1. Our use of the term innovation is consistent with how the term is currently understood among innovation scholars. As Rogers (2003) observed, innovations were originally viewed as invariant, but recent
research acknowledges that innovations are often reinvented and customized as they diffuse.
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298 Review of Public Personnel Administration
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T. J. Lah ([email protected]) is an associate professor in the Public Administration Department at
Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea. He has authored a book and more than 60 scholarly publications in the
fields of public management and environmental policy.
James L. Perry ([email protected].) is chancellor’s professor, School of Public and Environmental Affairs
(SPEA), Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. He is recipient of the 2008 Dwight Waldo Award and
coeditor of Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service (Oxford University Press, 2008).
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