Following the Leaders The Role of Religion in the Policy of Ultra-­‐
Religious Political Parties By: Oren Rabinowitz (SIS 2013) Advisor: Shadi Mokhtari (SIS) University Honors Spring 2013 Rabinowitz 2
Abstract
How much does religion play a role in the policy and political actions of ultra-religious
political parties? This study explores how ultra-religious political parties interact within the
democratic system, with the goal of determining if these parties moderate. The project was
carried out as a small-N study, focusing on the cases of Egypt and Israel. Data was obtained by
conducting expert interviews with academics in the Washington DC area. This paper argues that
ultra-religious political parties do not moderate due to several factors, primarily the influence of
religious leaders who do not hold political office and the makeup of these parties’ constituencies
who will remain loyal to the party. These parties focus on certain core issues and are willing to
act pragmatically on other issues in order to secure their interests. These findings challenge the
validity of how we understand moderation theory.
Rabinowitz 3
Following the Leaders:
The Role of Religion in the Policy of Ultra-Religious Political Parties1
With the recent rise and importance of ultra-religious political parties throughout the
Middle East, many in the West are unsure of the character of this relatively new phenomenon.
More importantly, how do these political parties work within the confines of democracy, which
often calls for pragmatism and compromise, when their ideology does not lend to such concepts?
While it is correct that religious parties have in the past successfully joined the democratic
system, those parties have tended to be moderates in comparison to these ultra-religious parties.
Most notably, are ultra-religious parties a new kind of political actor, based in religious ideology
and unwilling to budge from this worldview, or are they simply like any other political party,
except they represent an ultra-religious community, placing them at an extreme position to start
in the political spectrum. Accordingly, my research question is: How much does religion play a
role in the policy and political actions of ultra-religious political parties?
Two countries which have seen ultra-religious parties play a major role in their political
environment are Egypt and Israel. In Egypt, the biggest surprise of the first parliamentary
elections held since the fall of President Mubarak was not the victory of the Muslim
Brotherhood, who most saw as the odds on favorite, but the second place finish by the coalition
of newly formed Salafist2 parties, a newcomer to the political sphere. Since their electoral
success, their star has only grown brighter, with many seeing Salafists as the biggest threat to the
Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in the next elections. In Israel, where the
issues of war and peace have seemingly always taken center stage in political campaigns, the
1
2
I would like to thank my advisor Professor Shadi Mokhtari for her help and guidance on this capstone
Salafis are ultra-conservative Muslims
Rabinowitz 4
Chareidi3 community was at the center of both the election season and the subsequent coalition
negotiations. The Chareidi parties, usually courted by the winning party during the coalition
building process, were this time forced to sit on the outside, as potential coalition partners
refused to join a coalition containing the Chareidi parties.
The juxtaposition of these two countries makes for an excellent comparison for looking at
ultra-religious political parties. Egypt and Israel are neighbors and on paper allies, per the 1979
Camp David Accords, however their relationship is quite shaky, in part due to religious parties
and their views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While Israel and Egypt are both part of the
Middle East, there exist many differences between these countries, including ethnicity, religion,
and language. In addition to the comparison of countries, comparing Islamic and Jewish ultrareligious political parties also adds a layer to this study, as it explores to very similar but also
different religious traditions. Does the role religion plays in policy differ between these two
countries and religions or are they in fact very similar?
This paper argues that religion does exist as a religious ideology which ultra-religious
political parties use to influence their policy. Generally, these parties will take a hard line rather
than compromise their values. This can be attributed to the influence of religious leaders over all
party action, whereby they dictate to the political leaders how to act. However, these parties will
also act pragmatically when doing so benefits the interests of the parties, such as obtaining
funding for programs the parties deem to be most important. These parties can act in such a way
without fear of losing support based on the makeup of their constituency. Their supporters are
either followers of the religious leaders and will continue to vote for the parties so long as the
religious leader is affiliated with the party, and/or are beneficiaries from the interests which the
party pursues. As a result, a cycle has been created in which it is not in the interest of the ultra3
Chareidim are ultra-Orthodox Jews.
Rabinowitz 5
religious political parties to moderate their positions, and they in fact gain a lot while giving up
little under the current system.
Scholars have in the past looked at the relationship between religion and policy in
religious political parties. In the past, most studies of religion and politics have focused on what
would be termed moderate religious parties, parties which wish to work within the political
system. This has excluded a different type of religious party, the ultra-religious party, which
often is skeptical of the entire political system. Yet, interestingly, how does religion, supposedly
the ideology behind these parties, play a role in the policy and actions taken by these parties?
Much has been written to explain how radical political parties act in the realm of politics. The
overwhelming majority of this literature deals with moderation theory, though within the theory
there are two primary schools of thought: that parties moderate because of democracy and that
parties moderate because of politics.
Democracy Driven Moderation
The father of moderation theory in general is Robert Michels, who identified two ideas
that cause radical parties to moderate: the desire to get more votes and the desire to sustain the
party within the system.4 Both ideas derive from the belief that it is good to allow radical groups
to enter the world of democracy and elections, since it will ultimately cause these groups to
moderate towards the center. However, it is important to note that each idea is also distinct. The
notion of sustaining the party is further developed by Schumpeter, who explains that parties
would often discard many of their unpopular positions in order to avoid losses in elections.5 If
parties lose support because of fringe positions, they will not last in the long haul. Keck
4
Tezcür, Günes. "The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors." Party
Politics 16, no. 1 (2010): 69-88. 71.
5
Ibid.
Rabinowitz 6
elaborates that the reason for moderation is that parties want to make themselves a more viable
party that can continue to compete.6 For these scholars, moderation is a means of survival in the
jungle of electoral politics.
A slightly different variant of this approach is to focus on voter maximization.7 In order
to win elections, parties must appeal to a much broader segment of the population. As
Kirschheimer, who was influenced by the work of Anthony Downs, puts it, for a party to
maximize its voters, it needs to appeal to the “median voters,” the moderates.8 In order to appeal
to these voters, parties must do away with strong radical positions which lack broad support, as
Lipset argues.9 This is especially true once parties have achieved any kind of electoral success,
since they are reluctant to take positions that could cause them to lose their seats.10 In a way, this
way of viewing moderation looks at how parties sell their souls (idealogy) to win.
This notion of moderation driven by democracy does have many strong points. It is very
much respondent to the wishes and desires of the people, whom parties must appeal to in a
democratic system. It also explains where the rationale for moderating comes from, in this case,
the desire to survive and thrive in the world of electoral politics. At the same time, it has
weaknesses both as a general approach to moderation theory and in the context of ultra-religious
parties. While many moderate actions may be attributed to wanting to maintain or broaden
support for the party, there are times that these actions derive from the need to act pragmatically.
In reference to ultra-religious parties, they do not need to worry about staying viable since they
have a base of voters who will vote for them as long as their religious leaders tell them to do so.
6
Schwedler, Jillian. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006. 12.
7
El-Ghobashy, Mona. "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brother." International Journal of
Middle East Studies 37, no. 3 (2005): 373-395. 393 footnote 5.
8
Ibid., 375.
9
Tezcür, 71-72.
10
Demiralp, Seda. "The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in
Turkey." Comparative Politics 41, no. 3 (2009): 315-335. 317.
Rabinowitz 7
In addition, what benefit is there to ultra-religious parties to moderate and become more centeroriented when there already exists moderate religious parties?
Politics Driven Moderation
Many scholars posit that it is not elections, but rather the “game” of politics that propels
parties towards moderation. According to this school of thought, allowing radical parties to
participate will lead them to moderate once they enter the political sphere. One optimistic way
of understanding this transformation is that taken by Waterbury and Sen, who each argue that
when taking part in the political climate, radical parties adopt the principles and values of
democratic politics, and therefore moderate their positions.11 While the party might have had
anti-democratic views prior to joining, upon experiencing democratic politics, the party will have
a change of heart.
A more prevalent view within this frame of politics driven moderation is that put forward
by scholars like Przeworski and Kalyvas. They posit that participating in politics requires radical
and religious parties to moderate their positions in order to play the game of politics.12 In
essence, radical political parties get more than what they bargained for when they enter politics;
Przeworski and Sprague argue that instead of changing the system, the system changes them.13
Kalyvas further states that in order for the party to show that it is committed to playing politics, it
must make real and credible commitments, in the form of moderating, that it wishes to be
included in the discussion.14 However, unlike the optimists who claim that moderation is done
11
Ibid.
Tezcür, 72; Tepe, Sultan. "Moderation of Religious Parties: Electoral Constraints, Ideological
Commitments, and the Democratic Capacities of Religious Parties in Israel and Turkey." Political Research
Quarterly65, no. 3 (2012): 467- 485. 467.
13
El-Ghobashy, 375.
14
Ibid.
12
Rabinowitz 8
because of participation, members of this camp argue that moderation occurs for strategic
reasons.15
A third approach, put forth by Piven and Cloward, states that participating in politics
moderates radical parties because it forces them to act pragmatically.16 While radical positions
may help parties get elected, in the world of politics these positions are often impractical. As a
result, Brown and Hamzawy argue that over time parties have adopted more pragmatic
approaches to issues.17 Lowi also points out that once involved in politics, leaders of these
radical parties must defend their positions, leading them to abandon the more radical ones and
adopt more moderate and restrained ones.18 Once reality sets in, it simply becomes necessary to
take up more practical and moderate positions.
This approach to moderation theory is strong in that it offers a more pragmatic
explanation of what forces parties to moderate. This school of thought also has some major
weaknesses. Primarily that emphasizes that the parties and their leadership choose to moderate,
but it fails to account for the electorate. In addition, it does not explain why parties, especially
ultra-religious parties, will act moderately on certain issues, but will maintain radical views on
other issues.
Key Terms
For this study, the term policy connotes actual political actions taken by ultra-religious
political parties. Policy is not merely rhetoric or a campaign platform, a choice which reflects the
belief that actions speak louder than words. Looking only at policy is also a more accurate way
15
Tezcür, 72.
Schwedler, 12.
17
Brown, Nathan J., and Amr Hamzawy. Between Religion and Politics. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace :, 2010. 2.
18
Schwedler, 12.
16
Rabinowitz 9
of measuring the values and worldview of the political party, as some parties, even ultrareligious parties, have become quite adept at saying the right things in public, especially when
dealing with the media and Westerners.19
The term ultra-religious political party is conceptualized in this study as political parties
which have a clear ideology based in a strict interpretation of religion. This definition excludes
ultra-religious groups and organizations which do not form political parties, often claiming that
their religious law should govern the state and be the law of the land, not secular law enacted
through democratic elections.20 At the same time, ultra-religious political parties are not the
same as other parties termed religious political parties. What differentiates ultra-religious from
religious political parties is that while religious political parties wish to incorporate religion in
the state and law, ultra-religious political parties wish to replace the state and law with religious
law.21
Methods and Data Sources
This project is a qualitative small-N study, focusing on ultra-religious political parties in
two countries as case studies. This is because there are not many examples of ultra-religious
political parties to choose from, since often ultra-religious groups believe that democracy and
elections are not in line with their religion.22 As a result, a quantitative study would be
inappropriate. Therefore, it made sense to focus on two cases that involve different countries
and religions. The contrast between the two cases also adds an element to this research, since it
19
20
Abdo, Geneive. Interview by author. Personal interview. American University, April 9, 2013.
Brown, Jonathan. “Salafis and Sufis in Egypt.” The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2011. 4; Friedman, Menachem. “The Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) Society: Sources, Trends and
Processes.” The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Research Series, 1991. 4.
21
Brown, Jonathan. “Salafis and Sufis in Egypt.” 4.
22
McCants, William. “The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to Party Politics in Egypt.” Brookings
Middle East Memo, 2012. 2.
Rabinowitz 10
can show very differing examples of how ultra-religious political parties function within the
world of electoral politics.
The data was obtained through interviews with experts in the Washington DC area who
study or cover the political landscape, including ultra-religious parties, in the respective
countries. All of the experts interviewed for this project are academics, which lends credibility
to their statements. The data will then be analyzed by looking at the examples cited in the
interviews and how these examples explain the actions and motivations of these parties.
Case Selection
Two cases were chosen for this project, the ultra-religious political parties of Egypt and
Israel. Each case has more than one ultra-religious political party, which should provide multiple
examples, and allows to further explore not only how ultra-religious political parties interact with
the political system, but also how they interact with each other. In Israel, the two major Chareidi
parties are Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), with other small Chareidi parties which have
never actually been elected to the Israeli Parliament. For Egypt, the major Salafist players are
Al-Nour, the recently formed Al-Watan, and the Building and Development Party (al-Gama’a alIslamia), however there are many more smaller Salafi factions and all of these parties are
relatively new and therefore are subject to fluctuation.
Furthermore, as explained earlier, aside from studying each case individually, these cases
also provide an excellent comparative perspective. Israel and Egypt are similar geographically
and are neighbors, but are quite different in terms of ethnicity, religion, and language. It is also
fascinating to compare Islamic and Jewish ultra-religious political parties, two religions which
are very alike and dissimilar simultaneously.
Rabinowitz 11
Analysis
This study finds and argues that ultra-religious political parties do in fact stick to their
ideology and do not moderate their values. The cause of this can perhaps be attributed to several
factors, most notably the leadership structure of these political parties. Unlike most political
parties, which are led by political leaders, ultra-religious political parties are in fact led by
religious leaders associated with the party, who dictate to the political leaders how to act on
issues, on everything from positions to take to how to vote.23 The religious leaders will take a
position more in line with their ultra-religious worldview rather than a more politically viable
position. At the same time, the religious leaders stay above the fray of politics by not actually
becoming the political candidates and entering parliament because this is “beneath them.”24 This
allows the religious leaders to stay out of the tainted impure world of politics but also has an
unintended consequence, which heavily affects the ability of moderation to occur with the party.
One component of moderation theory is that by participating in the political process and dealing
with differing political positions on a day-to-day basis, extreme political parties will moderate
their views.25 However, with ultra-religious political parties, the fact that political leaders
participate in the political process is essentially irrelevant, because they are not the ultimate
deciders for the policy positions taken by the party. Those making these decisions, the religious
leaders, actually prevent moderation from occurring as a result of their staying out of the political
process.
23
Rynhold, Jonathan. Interview by author. Personal interview. George Washington University, April
16, 2013.; Sachs, Natan. Interview by author. Phone interview. American University, April 22, 2013.
24
25
Sachs.
Demiralp, 317.
Rabinowitz 12
While the religious leaders do in fact call the shots, that does not mean that they are
always making the decision on their own. Aware of the fact that the religious leaders must issue
the policy the political party will take, the political leaders will at times attempt to influence the
religious leaders to take up their position through persuasion, as in Israel where “politicians are
quite skilled at getting rabbis to say what they want them to say.”26 Nevertheless, this influence
must still be framed within an ultra-religious perspective to make it palpable for the religious
leaders, but unlike religious leaders, political leaders may be informed by more than religious
dogma. While the religious leaders still make the final call, political leaders many times will be
given the decision that they in fact wanted to receive.27
It should also be noted that while the religious leaders generally make the final decisions,
the political leaders are more than simply figureheads. In Egypt, in part due to how new Salafi
political parties are, they have had a little more autonomy to act on their own or at least to a
degree.28 This inexperience has also presented Salafi political parties with new challenges. For
instance, in 2012 a Salafi parliamentary member named Anwar El-Balkimy from Al-Nour was
kicked out of his party and resigned his position in parliament after it became apparent that he
had lied about being assaulted in order to cover up the fact that he had gotten plastic surgery
done on his nose.29 This was a problem because it violated the Islamic principle of avoiding
vanity, but it became a political issue for Al-Nour because it now had to deal with a politician
who was not in line with the values of the party.
26
27
28
Rynhold.
Sachs.
Brown, Jonathan. "From Quietism to Parliamentary Giant: Salafism in Egypt and the Nour Party of
Alexandria."Publication Forthcoming. 22.; Brown, Nathan. Interview by author. Personal interview. George
Washington University, April 22, 2013.
29
El Gundy, Zeinab. "Nose job ends Salafist MP's political career." Ahram Online.
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/36016/Egypt/Politics-/Nose-job-ends-Salafist-MPs-politicalcareer.aspx
Rabinowitz 13
There similarly exists a degree of personality to political leaders in Chareidi political
parties. This is much more so with Shas, the main Sephardic Chareidi party, where charismatic
leaders like Aryeh Deri draw supporters to the political party who might not otherwise vote for
Shas.30 Deri is a perfect example of a Chareidi politician who has gained recognition throughout
Israeli politics because he plays a vocal role and has remained popular with the Shas base despite
being convicted of taking bribes while serving as Minister of Interior during the 1990s. Shas
religious leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef recently reinstated Deri as sole head of the political party.
With UTJ, there is not necessarily the same kind of role for politicians within the party, making
the party extremely predictable when it comes to policy, which has made UTJ a favorite choice
for coalition partners. However, the political leaders should not be wholly disregarded, as there
certainly are major Chareidi political families who serve as politicians.31 Overall though,
political leaders in ultra-religious political parties will always defer to the religious leaders and
will certainly never entertain the possibility of challenging their leadership.
The result of having religious leaders involved with political parties has also presented
ultra-religious communities with a new challenge, because they open themselves up to public
criticism and critique.
[Something] that is most jarring for the Salafi rank and file is the
rudeness of Egyptian political life itself. Salafis treat their teachers
with reverence based on their superior learning, but they are
suddenly finding such respected figues lampooned, ridiculed, and
criticized.32
As religious leaders, these are supposed to be respected individuals and these communities
consider an attack on them to be inappropriate and also an attack on religion. However, when
30
31
32
Rynhold.
Ibid.
Brown, Nathan J. "Islam and Politics in the New Egypt." The Carnegie Papers (2013): 1-26. 11.
Rabinowitz 14
involved in politics, there will be those who disagree and criticize the policy of ultra-religious
political parties, an action which the ultra-religious communities see as off-limits. The issue
goes a step further with the popularity of comedy shows like Al Bernameg in Egypt and Erertz
Nehederet in Israel, which often parody politics and leaders of parties33. However, the ultrareligious do not see this as comedy at their expense, but rather an attack against their way of life
and their spiritual leaders.
The realities of politics have also impacted the policy of ultra-religious political parties to
a certain extent. While the parties would like to impose their interpretation of religious law as
the law of the land, they also realize that without a majority of votes, this is not possible, as Nour
realized when it determined it
Would not be able to achieve Sharia law in Egypt in the
foreseeable future. Politics was always the art of the possible, and
the party should not consider the infeasibility of achieving its goals
immediately as a reason not to pursue its goals gradually.34
Therefore, they do not pursue implementing all of religious law since to do so would not
be a successful course of action. Instead, ultra-religious parties have tried to implement or
preserve certain parts or aspects of religious law, which they see as achievable goals. However,
this should not be confused as evidence that ultra-religious political parties moderate. There is a
clear distinction between moderating positions and adjusting short-term expectations. “They are
extremely optimistic that they’re following the right path. They know they can’t get everything
they want now, but their political ambitions are growing.”35 Ultra-religious political parties
would implement religious law immediately if presented with the opportunity, and still view
33
34
Brown, Nathan. Interview by Author.
Brown, Jonathan. "From Quietism to Parliamentary Giant: Salafism in Egypt and the Nour Party of
Alexandria." 20.
35
Brown, Nathan. Interview by Author.
Rabinowitz 15
implementing religious law and creating a religious state as their ultimate goals, just a goal that
is currently unachievable.
Not only do ultra-religious political parties view the current political landscape for
implementing religious law un-ideal, they view the entire democratic, political, and state system
as un-ideal. However, given the system they are in, most of the ultra-religious communities have
determined that it is better to participate in a broken system then to be left out of the system
completely. Indeed, when describing the decision by Salafist leaders to form political parties,
the conclusion was reached that “when in the desert one is permitted to eat carrion in order to
survive.”36 For UTJ, who struggle with the notion of recognizing a secular Jewish government
in the Holy Land, especially prior to the coming of the Messiah, their compromise is to run in
elections and even join coalitions, but never to join the government by taking Ministerial
portfolios.37 Instead they participate by becoming deputy ministers and member of
parliamentary committees in order to secure their interests. Participating in politics is seen as a
necessary evil in order to secure the interests of the ultra-religious community.
Nevertheless, ultra-religious political parties are not naïve about the benefits to political
participation. As one scholar described regarding the decision by Salafits to end their policy of
political quietism:
Even though there was a lot of ideological resistance about
forming parties and even participating in parliament… [ultrareligious political parties] recognize the benefits of doing this…
when the political arena opens and when there is definite interest in
doing so, they will find the ideological justifications for entering.38
36
37
38
Brown, Nathan. Interview by author.
Rynhold.
Diwan, Kristin. Interview by author. Personal interview. American University, April 9, 2013.
Rabinowitz 16
The justification for doing so after the fall of Mubarak was that “this was clearly a transitional
moment in the country’s history, and it was the duty of pious Muslims to help steer it in a
direction more attentive to God’s law.”39 Though not the path they would have preferred to take,
Salafists realized that to not act would be more costly.
When engaged in the realm of politics, ultra-religious political parties focus on issues that
are most important to their interests. In this respect, more than by anything else, does any degree
of moderating occur with ultra-religious political parties. In Egypt, it is hard to identify yet what
exactly the interests of Salafists are due to the short amount of time these parties have existed
and because the Egyptian Parliament was dissolved within a year of the first parliamentary
elections. However, some information on issue importance can be gleaned from the actions of
Salafi political parties during the writing and formation process of the new Egyptian constitution.
For example, tucked away in article 219 of the new Egyptian constitution is this statement about
how the principles of Islamic law are to be interpreted:
The principles of Islamic law (sharia) include general evidence,
the foundational principles of Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh),
the reliable sources from among the Sunni schools of thought
(madhahib).40
This was a statement that members of Al-Nour fought hard to get included in the final version,
since they saw this as an important first step to enacting Islamic laws in the Egyptian
parliament.41 However, in order to get the support to include such articles in the constitution,
39
Brown, Jonathan. "From Quietism to Parliamentary Giant: Salafism in Egypt and the Nour Party of
Alexandria." 19.
40
"The 2012 Constitution of Egypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index." Nivien Saleh | Middle
East, Information Technology, Foreign Policy. http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-2012translation/#ch-one-1 (accessed April 22, 2013). Article 219.
41
The desire for Salafi political parties to want this article included in the constitution seems perplexing
since in effect it legitimizes the traditional interpretations of Al-Azhar and similar institutions by giving importance
to fiqh, a concept which Salafism rejects. According to Nathan Brown, the motivation behind this might be that
Rabinowitz 17
Salafists had to go along with articles giving certain powers to the military, including positions
which Salafi political parties probably would not have taken on their own, yet also an issue
which is not of much importance to Salafis. Thus, it appears that when presented with an
opportunity to secure a major interest of the party, Salafi political parties are willing to give in on
other issues that are less important to them.
The same can be said about Chareidi political parties in Israel regarding the importance
of securing interests. For Chareidi political parties, there are several issues which are of most
importance, namely, funding for religious schools, welfare programs, army exceptions, and
religion vs. state issues, such as public transportation operating on the Jewish Sabbath or stores
selling pork.42 As long as the government gives these parties what they want for these issues,
Chareidi political parties are much more willing to go along with the rest of the government
agenda. Funding for religious schools, or Yeshivot, contains two aspects, both funding for the
educational services as well as for free hot meals provided to students coming from primarily
poor households. This, along with obtaining funding for welfare programs, allows the Chareidi
political parties to garner support from the beneficiaries while it pursues its other two major
interests, army exemptions for Yeshiva students and religion vs. state issue. Regarding the
former, Chareidi religious leaders do not want their community members to go to the army since
they see the army as a secularizing force in society.43 Therefore, army exemptions for Yeshiva
students are a policy which has been in place since the founding of the state of Israel. At that
time, Prime Minister Ben Gurion created an understanding with the religious leaders of the
Chareidi community that a certain number of military service exemptions would be given to
Salafists hope that they will eventually infiltrate the ranks of Al-Azhar and will then start to interpret Shari’a in a
Salafist fashion.
42
Sachs.
43
Rynhold.
Rabinowitz 18
Yeshiva students, a policy which been expanded over the years in large part due to the work of
Chareidi political parties. The Chareidi political parties have also had a large influence in issues
of religion vs. state, especially in regard to marriage (and divorce), conversions to Judaism, the
running of business on the Jewish Sabbath, the representation of non-Orthodox Jewish customs
in public, and issues pertaining to Kashrut (Jewish dietary restrictions).44 This can also be
attributed to the Chareidi community’s influence on the Chief Rabbinate, which has authority
over many of these issues and plays a major role in any changes made to the religious status quo.
As far as the importance of securing political interests and going along with everything
else, UTJ in Israel exemplifies this the most, even if inadvertently. As mentioned earlier,
members of UTJ do not take ministerial posts due to sensitivities amongst the Ashkenazic
Chareidi community on legitimizing a secular Jewish government prior to the coming of the
Messiah.45 As a result, they will only take deputy ministerial positions and be part of Israeli
parliamentary committees. However, they only get involved with ministries and committees that
pertain to their interests, such as education, interior, and finance to name a few.46 This has an
unintended consequence, though, which is quite pertinent to this discussion. Since they do not
take ministerial portfolios, they are not part of the Prime Minister’s cabinet, and therefore do not
have to vote on issues which are not part of their interests. Under this system, they will never
even slightly moderate because they will never be faced with a need to give their support on
issues that are not important to them, but may not be popular choices with their constituency.
With regards to Shas, since the party leaders do accept ministerial portfolios, they do
serve as cabinet members. As a result, they must vote on not only issues which are part of their
44
Sachs.
Rynhold.
46
Sachs.
45
Rabinowitz 19
interests, but a broad range of issues.47 On these issues of less importance to Shas, they will
often go along with the coalition even if that is not in line with the desires of their constituencies.
For example, Shas went along with the Oslo Accords and has at times proven to be quite dovish,
despite the fact that most of the supporters of Shas are more hawkish and are to the right on
issues of peace.48 The main spiritual leader of Shas, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, has stated that he
would approve of a deal that would result in relinquishing land that is considered part of Biblical
Israel if it would result in peace, a position at odds with many rabbis in the moderate Orthodox
circles.49
As far as making the argument that giving in on issues that are of less importance to
ultra-religious political parties in order to secure their own interests is an example of moderation,
it should be noted that ultra-religious political parties have not moderated their stances on issues
pertaining to their own interests. If anything, they have emboldened their positions on these
issues. The Chareidi political parties have expanded the number of army exemptions for Yeshiva
students and have gotten more funding for educational and welfare programs over the years. It
was even pointed out that “at one point [during the 1990s], the average welfare transfer payment
was higher than the average salary in Israel.”50 Salafi political parties tried to push the Freedom
and Justice Party dominated Constituent Assembly to remove the word “principles” from the
language of Article 2 of the constitution so that it would say that “Shari’a forms the main source
of legislation” instead of “principles of Shari’a.”51 These examples do not indicate that
moderation is taking effect with ultra-religious political parties.
47
48
Ibid.
Arbell, Dan. Interview by author. Personal interview. American University, April 15, 2013.;
Rynhold.
49
50
51
Rynhold.
Ibid.
"The 2012 Constitution of Egypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index." Article 2.; Diwan.
Rabinowitz 20
Perhaps the only indication of moderation by ultra-religious political parties has to do
with coalition politics. In order for ultra-religious political parties to secure their interests, the
party needs to join the coalition. However, this presents a major problem to ultra-religious
political parties because they are joining a coalition comprised mainly of parties that are not
religious by their standards, or are not religious in character at all. Therefore, by joining the
coalition, ultra-religious political parties do get themselves further entrenched into the political
game. While their policy does not change, this does put ultra-religious politicians in positions
they would prefer to remain out of.
This is not a factor that can be measured with Egyptian Salafi political parties yet, but
this certainly occurs with Chareidi political parties, and has occurred with Salifi political parties
in Kuwait.52 It is important to stress that there is no evidence that this does results in any change
in policy, but it certainly forces ultra-religious politicians to compromise their values. For
instance, while Chareidi and Salafi political parties either have the required number of female
candidates at the bottom of their party list (Egypt) or do not have any females on their party list
at all (Israel), the parties must deal with female politicians from other parties, especially when
they are a member of the coalition.53 Not only are they dealing with female politicians, but in
many cases female politicians who do not cover their hair, which is a problem for Salafists in all
cases and a problem for Chareidim when dealing with a married woman. This may seem to be
insignificant, but ultra-religious politicians are making major sacrifices in their beliefs and values
by participating in politics.
Yet, despite what the politicians sacrifice in order to secure the party’s interests, the
political party does not moderate its policy. This is because while ultra-religious political parties
52
53
Diwan.
Sachs.
Rabinowitz 21
gain a lot from joining coalitions, there are fewer consequences for the actions taken by the
party.54 An assumption in moderation theory is that the party must respond to the demands of its
constituencies. However, with ultra-religious political parties, the parties do not have to worry
about losing support as long as they maintain the status quo, which in effect incentivizes not
moderating their positions. This can be explained by examining the voters and supporters of
ultra-religious political parties.
Although many view the ultra-religious as monolithic communities, the supporters of
ultra-religious political parties are in fact quite diverse and different. There are differences in
terms of leadership, traditions, and geography, all factors which distinguish ultra-religious from
one another. This is one of the major factors which explains the existence of multiple ultrareligious political parties in each of the two cases of this study, Egypt and Israel.
In Israel, there are two major Chareidi political parties, Shas and UTJ, which represent
the two major Chareidi communities, Sephardim and Ashkenazim respectively. The difference
between these two communities is based in their separate traditions and interpretations of Jewish
law, or Halacha.55 Sephardim originate primarily from across the Middle East and North Africa
region, and most of their communities were traditional and united. By traditional, this means
that “they may attend synagogue frequently, eat only kosher food, but drive on the Sabbath to
attend family picnics, an outing at the beach, or a football game.”56 This is an important point to
highlight with regard to Sephardic Jews, because while the majority of the members of this
community are not Chareidi in practice and most serve in the army, they do respect the
Sephardic Chareidi religious leadership and still consider their religious identity to be important.
54
Rynhold.
Brown, Nathan. Interview byAuthor.
56
Sharkansky, Ira. The Politics of Religion and the Religion of Politics: Looking at Israel. Lanham, MD.:
Lexington Books, 2000. 4.
55
Rabinowitz 22
As a result of the relationship between the political party Shas and the Sephardic religious
leadership, primarily the party’s spiritual leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, many non-Chareidi
Sephardim vote for Shas out of respect for their religious leaders. Many Sephardim also vote for
Shas regardless of their personal religious practices because they see Shas as defenders of the
Sephardic community against the Ashkenazic Zionist elite who have historically mistreated the
immigrant Sephardic community. Or to put this another way:
The reason traditional [Sephardim] vote Shas is partly due to
ethnic pride, Sephardic pride, and partly that Shas provides a range
of services to their supporters, so if you go to a Shas school, your
child is going to get a hot lunch.
Shas voters are often among the most poor, so that’s important to
them.57
On the other hand, UTJ, representing the Ashkenazic Chareidi community, is very much
different from Shas with respect to its voter base. Only the Chareidi community votes for UTJ,
since most Israeli Ashkenazic Jews are secular. The Ashkenazic Jewish community originates
from Europe, and experienced the haskala movement, what is termed the Jewish enlightenment,
during which time many Jews abandoned Orthodox practice. The early Zionists were from the
Ashkenazic community, but they were very secular, and the Chareidi community likewise had no
interest in establishing a Zionist state. While their base is only the Ashkenazic Chareidi
population, this does not mean that this is a monolithic community. In fact, supports of UTJ are
an extremely splintered community. Within the Ashkenazic Chareidi world, there is a split
between the Chassidic dynasties and the Lithuanian Yeshivot, in which the different groups
jockey for positions of leadership in the party, both as political leaders and on the council of
57
Rynhold.
Rabinowitz 23
great rabbis.58 UTJ itself is an amalgamation of two rival Chareidi parties, Agudat Yisrael
(Chassidic) and Degel HaTorah (Lithuanian).59 In addition to UTJ, there are other Ashkenazic
Chareidi groups which have formed their own smaller (but to this point unsuccessful) political
parties, or do not support being involved in a secular state at all. This latter group, most notably
the Neturei Karta, does not vote, often demonstrates against the state, and is known for allying
itself with enemies of the state of Israel like Iranian President Ahmadinejad.60
In Egypt, Salafists can be divided into three groups, Alexandria Salafists, Cairo Salafists,
and rural Salafists. Yet this is not the same as the Sephardic-Ashkenazic division, since “the
distinctions between Salafists are more geographical and less rigid.”61 In the 2011 Egyptian
parliamentary elections, these distinctions were less noticed because the newly formed Salafi
political parties ran together as a coalition. Since then, there has been a great deal of splintering
amongst Salafi political parties. This was at the forefront when a group of Salafis broke off from
Al-Nour and formed the new political party Al-Watan. Yet despite breaking off, Al-Watan
leaders indicated that they support Al-Nour and share the same positions as Al-Nour.62 The only
distinction between Al-Nour and Al-Watan is that Al-Nour is heavily influenced by the
Alexandria-based Salafist Calling, while many who joined Al-Watan were Cairo Salafists. The
second largest Salafi political party in the Al-Nour led Islamist Bloc at the time of the elections
in Egypt is the Building and Development Party, which is the political branch of al-Gama’a alIslamia, received nearly all of its seats in parliament from rural districts in Upper Egypt.63 It is
58
Sachs.
Ibid.
60
Rynhold.; Sachs.
61
Brown, Nathan. Interview by Author.
62
Ibid.
59
63
"Islamist Bloc (Al Nour)." Ahram Online.
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/103/26940/Elections-/Electoral-Alliances/Islamist-Bloc-AlNour.aspx
(accessed April 24, 2013).
Rabinowitz 24
clear that a main distinction between Salafi political parties in Egypt has to do with where the
constituency of the party is based.
However, with Salafi political parties, another trend has emerged, namely the growing
number of Salafi political parties. At the time of writing there exist too many to try to pin down
a certain number, nor can it be certain that all of these parties still exist.64 This trend stems from
the nature of Salafi Islam, which is that Islam is to be interpreted by each individual by studying
the Koran and Hadiths and rejects much of the ideas derived from fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence.65
As a result, individual Salafi leaders can emerge, interpreting Islam in a new way and drawing
supporters. When these leaders then want to get involved in politics, they create their own party
based on their specific ideology. The result is a large number of small Salafi political parties
which are not very viable.66 The problem is that “…there are influencial charismatic people that
other people tend to turn to, and they don’t do as well in reconciling the clash of personalities.”67
With time, it is possible that major Salafi parties will be cemented to prevent splintering and loss
of votes.
Interestingly, not all supporters of ultra-religious political parties are ultra-religious. As
mentioned before, many Israelis who vote for Shas are not Chareidi, but traditional Sephardim
due to the party promoting Sephardic issues and out of respect to the religious leaders. In
addition, both Salafi and Chareidi political parties are popular with beneficiaries of the social
programs the parties provide or pursue. So long as the parties continue to pursue these interests,
these voters will continue to support ultra-religious parties. A great example of this is that
Chareidi political parties consistently finish better amongst Israeli Arabs than any other Jewish
64
Brown, Jonathan. "From Quietism to Parliamentary Giant: Salafism in Egypt and the Nour Party of
Alexandria." 23.
65
Diwan.
66
Brown, Jonathan. "From Quietism to Parliamentary Giant: Salafism in Egypt and the Nour Party of
Alexandria." 23.
67
Diwan.
Rabinowitz 25
political parties because the Chareidi initiatives to provide welfare based on number of children
also benefits the Israeli Arab community, known for a high birth rate. Knowing this, Chareidi
political parties have actually campaigned in many Arab villages in recent elections on a
platform of social services.68 Again, as long as they pursue these interests, they will continue to
garner these votes, so it is not in the parties’ interest to moderate their positions.
Each party also benefits from the electoral system in which it participates in. In Egypt,
parliamentary seats are distributed based on proportional votes for party lists in addition to
voting for individual candidates. This is all done within a system of geographic districts as well.
Salafists benefit from this system because unlike other parties who send a candidate from Cairo
to the periphery, Salafi political candidates are locals who actually live in the districts and are
popular with the local population.69 In Israel the parliamentary seats are distributed based only
on proportional votes, and Israel is one of the few countries in the world with a multi-member
district, in which the entire country is treated as one single constituency. The Chareidi
communities benefit from this because they tend to heavily concentrated in certain areas. In
single-member district system, Chareidi political parties would win handily in their district, but
would probably gain fewer seats because they are not represented in all areas of the country. As
a result, Chareidi and Salafi political parties are in the systems which give them the most power
and influence, reducing their need to moderate to get more votes.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that Chareidim and Salafists view their role in society
very differently. As one scholar points out:
68
Beno, Goel. "At Arab village, Shas is met with enthusiasm." Israel News: Ynetnews.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4328217,00.html (accessed January 3, 2013).
69
Singerman, Diane. Interview by author. Personal interview. American University, April 24, 2013.
Rabinowitz 26
The whole essence of ultra-Orthodoxy is that modern society is
inimical to religion as they understand it, and then therefore, you
must separate yourself off from it in order to stop it from
influencing and secularizing your people.70
What this means is that Chareidim fundamentally do not want to be part of the greater society.
This is in contrast with Salafists, who face the opposite problem, that:
They complained that they were the victims of racism
(‘unsyriyya)…. What they meant to communicate was a feeling of
exclusion and discrimination. There were places they did not feel
welcome or could not go, professions (such as the police in the
past) they could not enter, and public locations where they would
not be treated with respect.71
Salafis want to be part of mainstream Egypt while maintaining their values and beliefs and
perhaps influencing others to become more religious. While both view society as secular and
impure, they each have a different reaction.
Conclusion
This paper argues that ultra-religious political parties do not moderate because the
premises behind moderation theory do not fit when applied to ultra-religious political parties.
Democracy driven moderation does not occur because ultra-religious political parties do not need
to moderate to gain popular support since they have a uniquely loyal constituency due to their
ultra-religious identity and pursue interests which also draw outside supporters. Politics driven
moderation also does not apply to ultra-religious political parties because the real decision
makers for the policy of the party are not those engaged in politics, eliminating the influence the
70
71
Rynhold.
Brown, Nathan J. "Islam and Politics in the New Egypt." 12.
Rabinowitz 27
game of politics has on the parties. As a result, ultra-religious political parties remain religiously
ideological and it is in fact in their political interest to remain this way.
There were several challenges in conducting this project. Due to a lack of funding, field
research was not an option, making it more difficult to study the day to day activities of these
political parties. In addition, I was unable to obtain interviews with members of the political
parties because at the time I was conducting this research it was an election season in Israel, and
in Egypt there was political flux and a near collapse of the economy. Actually interviewing the
religious and political leaders of these political parties would have made the arguments of this
paper stronger one way or the other.
This paper is only the tip of the iceberg in regards to studying ultra-religious political
parties. The literature on these parties has only begun to emerge and as stated in the
introduction, ultra-religious political parties are becoming more and more important. One future
research opportunity would be to look at individual countries and see how ultra-religious
political parties interact within their country’s political environment, how they work with other
religious political parties, or how ultra-religious political parties interact with each other.
Another possible avenue to pursue regarding ultra-religious political parties would be to more
closely study the relationship between the political party and the individuals or organizations
affiliated with the party, and how each affects the other. A third possibility would be to conduct
a similar study to this one in a few years once Egyptian Salafists have had more experience with
politics to see if these findings will continue to hold true.
While this paper argues that ultra-religious political parties do not moderate their policy,
this should not be taken to mean that the ultra-religious should be kept out of politics. To the
contrary, ultra-religious political parties provide an important counterweight to many of the
Rabinowitz 28
liberal, secular political parties and while these parties might not love the notion of democracy
and elections, they certainly have embraced these concepts and are now part of the political
spectrum. Therefore, ultra-religious political parties provide a different voice from the
mainstream, but they are a voice that should be heard nonetheless. After all, within any
democratic system there must be parties to the left and right of the center, so why not have them
be the ultra-religious?
Rabinowitz 29
Bibliography
Abdo, Geneive. Interview by author. Personal interview. American University, April 9, 2013.
Diwan, Kristin. Interview by author. Personal interview. American University, April 9, 2013.
Arbell, Dan. Interview by author. Personal interview. American University, April 15, 2013.
Rynhold, Jonathan. Interview by author. Personal interview. George Washington University,
April 16, 2013.
Brown, Jonathan. Interview by author. Personal interview. Georgetown University, April 16,
2013.
Brown, Nathan. Interview by author. Personal interview. George Washington University, April
22, 2013.
Sachs, Natan. Interview by author. Phone interview. American University, April 22, 2013.
Singerman, Diane. Interview by author. Personal interview. American University, April 24,
2013.
Beno, Goel. "At Arab village, Shas is met with enthusiasm." Israel News: Ynetnews.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4328217,00.html (accessed January 3,
2013).
Brown, Jonathan. "From Quietism to Parliamentary Giant: Salafism in Egypt and the Nour Party
of Alexandria."Publication Forthcoming.
Brown, Jonathan. “Salafis and Sufis in Egypt.” The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2011.
Brown, Nathan J., and Amr Hamzawy. Between Religion and Politics. Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 2010.
Brown, Nathan J. "Islam and Politics in the New Egypt." The Carnegie Papers (2013): 1-26.
Rabinowitz 30
Brown, Nathan. “When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Confronts
Success.” The Carnegie Papers, 2012.
Brown, Nathan J. When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2012.
Demiralp, Seda. “The Periphery's March to the Center: The Rise and Decline of Islamist and
Kurdish Extremism in Turkey.” PhD diss., American University, 2008.
Demiralp, Seda. "The Rise of Islamic Capital and the Decline of Islamic Radicalism in
Turkey." Comparative Politics 41, no. 3 (2009): 315-335.
El-Ghobashy, Mona. "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brother." International
Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 3 (2005): 373-395.
El Gundy, Zeinab. "Nose job ends Salafist MP's political career." Ahram Online.
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/36016/Egypt/Politics-/Nose-job-ends-SalafistMPs-political-career.aspx
Friedman, Menachem. “The Haredi (Ultra-Orthodox) Society: Sources, Trends and Processes.”
The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Research Series, 1991.
"Islamist Bloc (Al Nour)." Ahram Online.
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/33/103/26940/Elections-/ElectoralAlliances/Islamist-Bloc-AlNour.aspx (accessed April 24, 2013).
McCants, William. “The Lesser of Two Evils: The Salafi Turn to Party Politics in Egypt.”
Brookings Middle East Memo, 2012.
Schwedler, Jillian. Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Rabinowitz 31
Sharkansky, Ira. The Politics of Religion and the Religion of Politics: Looking at Israel. Lanham,
MD.: Lexington Books, 2000.
Tepe, Sultan. Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Religion in Israel and Turkey. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008.
Tepe, Sultan. "Moderation of Religious Parties: Electoral Constraints, Ideological Commitments,
and the Democratic Capacities of Religious Parties in Israel and Turkey." Political
Research Quarterly65, no. 3 (2012): 467- 485.
Tezcür, Günes. "The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors." Party
Politics 16, no. 1 (2010): 69-88.
"The 2012 Constitution of Egypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index." Nivien Saleh |
Middle East, Information Technology, Foreign Policy.
http://niviensaleh.info/constitution-egypt-2012-translation/#ch-one-1 (accessed April 22,
2013)