Geopolitics, 11:317—347, 2006
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1465-0045 print / 1557-3028 online
DO!: 10.1080/14650040600598585
Ta)lo
i Rou
Post-Imperial Third Romes: Resurrection
Russian Orthodox Geopolitical Metaph
DMITRII SIDOROV
Department of Geography, California State University— Lang Beach, Long Beach,
Shortly after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, a Russian Or
dox monk nominated Russia as the 'Third Rome', or successo
the Roman and Byzantine empires. Some analysts have seen M
covite Third Romism (that allegedly persisted into the Bolshevik
of the Soviet Union) as the Russian equivalent of the USA 's M
fest Destiny, and other concepts used to rationalise imperialism
This paper attempts to broaden and deepen similar interpr
tions of the major geopolitical dictum coming from Russian Or
doxy: questionably a direct justification for Russian imperi
messianism and farfmm being just a feature of the past, this m
phor is an essential element of post-imperial Russian geopolit
discourse as evident in its usage in writings of politically dive
authors. The paper focuses on resurrections of the metaphor in p
imperial Russia nowadays, and, ultimately, broadens our und
standing of 'religion as geopolitics' nexus by presenting the
frequently overlooked field of Russian Orthodoxy-related geopoli
INTRODUCTION
The main goal of this paper is to overview the contemporary Russ
political thinking from an often overlooked angle of the Russian O
form of Christianity (Russian Orthodoxy). At risk of oversimplific
seems that most of Western scholarly attention to the resurgence o
litical thinking in post-Soviet Russia is focused on two geopolitical curre
pects for Russia's rapproachment with the West (Westemism) and a re-
alternative, the ideology of Russia's uniqueness in Eurasia (Euras
Address correspondence to Dmirril Sidorov, Assistant Professor, Department of G
California State University-Long Beach, 1250 Beilfiower Blvd., Long Beach, CA 908
E-mail: [email protected]
317
DmItrII Sidorov
ntiate the field and highlight contrasts. These ideologies are further
grouped as Russia-focused isolationists, Europe-minded neosts and statists, and Eurasia-centred expansionists (Table 1).
eviewing modem Russian Orthodoxy-related geopolitics, I hope to
a larger goal of contributing to the discipline of geopolitics as a
oth Tsygankov's and O'Loughlin's studies are methodologically part
-called new geopolitics school that 'emphasizes a socially con-
nature of geographical space', need to 'move toward delineating the
r cultural myths underlying Estate] practices, such as the myth of
uniqueness', concern with boundaries in a broader sense (than only
d domination), and plurality of geographic space.6 However, actual
of these and similar studies are arguably only partially consistent
agenda if the major Russian cultural myth (of the Third Rome)
n the shadow, and plurality of geopolitical space underrepresents
religion of the realm. The main reason for such partiality seems to
e authors' biases but rather the chronological limitation of the 'new'
w geopolitics' that is commonly conceived as a departure from the
western geopolitics and going beyond 'the traditional boundaries of
phalian world'.7 This paper argues for further broadening of the
gical and topical scope of the new geopolitics: as in many instances
erging religious geopolitics throughout the world, the case of Rushodoxy-related geopolitics shows that to understand the country's
eopolitical imaginations, its 'myth of national uniqueness', scholars
o not only beyond classical geopolitics but also prior to it, take
iously imaginary pmto-boundaries of the pi-Westphalian world.
ore flexible version of the new geopolitics would attempt combinrious take on the imaginary and the postmodern with attention to
ional and the pre-modern, and should allow for greater latitude in
cultural and political boundaries across different eras.
MAIN RUSSIAN ORTHODOX GEOPOUTICAL METAPHOR
Orthodoxy is more than a major religion in the country. From very
ory, it played the utmost political and geopolitical role in the counnstance, the conversion to a Byzantine form of Christianity (OrthoPrince Vladimir of Kiev in 988 not only allowed the creation of the
ian state (Kievan Rus'), but also later assured its survival when the
was again decentralised by the invasion of Central Asian nomads
rected around Moscow in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries8
e 1).
53 the original hearth of Russian religion, the Byzantine Empire,
Turks. Only a few years later, in 1480, the nomadic invaders were
and their domination came to an end. It is likely that to the Russians
Post-Imperial Third Romes
FIGURE 1 Byzantine Christianity and the Slays by 1000 AD.
Source: D. Sidorov, Orthodoxy and Difference: Essays on the Geography of Russ
Churcb(es) In the 2OthCentury (Princeton Theological Monograph Series 46) (S
Pickwick Publications 2001).
it seemed no coincidence that at the very moment when the
Empire, the Orthodox Second Rome, came to an end, they thems
at last throwing off the few remaining vestiges of Mongol cont
seemed, was granting them their freedom because He had chos
be the successors of Byzantium. The new (Muscovite) Russia was
to take Byzantium's place as protector of the Orthodox world, bec
the only Orthodox country (besides Georgia) which remained i
at this tinie.9
In short, in the second half of the fifteenth century and the ear
century, the idea developed that Moscow had a unique religious a
mission as the successor of Rome and Byzantium. The earliest sur
mulations of this idea are in several works attributed to the m
For instance, in 1511 Fiofei addressed his Tsar, Vasily Ill,
(Philotheus), the elder (stareL) of the Eleazarov monastery in Pskov
words:
"The Church of old Rome fell because of the impiety of the Apoll
heresy; the Church of the Second Rome, Constantinople, was s
Dmitri( Sidorov
The monk Filofei of Pskov prophesying the Third Rome.
er the battle-axes of the Agarenes; but this present Church of the
.
d, New Rome, of Thy sovereign
empire:
the
Holy
Catholic
Apostolic
rch . .sbines in the whole universe more resplendent
than the sun.
let it be known to Thy Lordship, 0 pious Czar, that all the empires
e Orthodox Christian Faith
have
converged
into
Thine
one empire.
u art the sole Emperor of all the Christians in the whole
universe
or two Romes have fallen, and the Third
stands, and a fourth shall
r be, for Thy Christian Empire shall never devolve upon others.'°
way, Fiofei's writings appeared several times: first, in the Medieval
of the sixteenth
century,
second,
in
the
imperial
Russia
of
the ninentury, and, third, in the West through interpretations by
Berdiaev
in
eth century. All three had different audiences, produced
different
al ideals, and have different degrees of appeal nowadays.
holars increasingly agree, in Muscovite Russia Fiofei's writings
iniained known only in
limited
church
circles;
there
is
no evidence that
used to design
state
policies.
The
ultimate
scholarly
authority on
the author of the fundamental volume Third
Rome, Nataliia Sinoncludes that the original Fiofei's dictum perhaps was not a trium-
e to the newly born global empire, as some later interpreters
ather a mix of flattery and mild
warning
to
fight
against
astrology
icism;12 it was not a messianic imperialist
claim,
but
rather an
ical warning, not a spatial expansionism but temporal
extension-
original concept was not imperialist but imperial:
'empire' here has
Post-Imperial Third Romes
a special religio-political meaning, an expression of translatio e
that Christian empire (Roman and Byzantine ones) could be i
translated geographically and has a spiritual reason for existenc
dox theology, the Third Rome, the Orthodox Russian Empire,
seen as a third embodiment of what in the Bible (2 Thessalonia
called 'hold back', 'restraining' power (in Greek, catehon) against
rule of lawlessness. Therefore, the Russian Empire had a sacral m
its fall, Fiofei wrote, the Christian world would be over because
lawlessness, of Satan, would prevail and there could be no 'Four
restrain it. That would be the Latter Times, the apocalyptical time
ond Coming of Jesus Christ.'4 The original idea was about Russia
and the metaphor 'Moscow the Third Rome' is its later localisa
understanding could be called eschatological; its geopolitical i
prntected and protecting Russian O?lhodox empire-catebon.
A second appearance of Fiofei's writings was their public
centuries later in 1861_1863;16 only after that did the concept o
Rome become part of scholarly and publicist discourses, which h
increasingly popular and influential'7 Some major Russian ph
(e.g., Vladimir Solov'ev) reflected on the concept.18 The Mediev
logical expectations of the Muscovy by the nineteenth century w
lost, then limited to the Old Believers circles.'9 This time the con
be called pan-Orthodox; unlike in the Muscovy time, geopolitical
cept was most often interpreted as the ideal of taking over Cons
spiritual leadeibp in Orthodox Europe and the establishment of
union. It was very important in the context of the Russo-Turki
wars and the Eastern Question over the straits allowing access to
terranean Sea.20 After the bloody 1905 revolution, the doctrin
new significance for Russian intellectuals, especially those who re
icalism of the leftist political movements.
Between World War I and World War II the Third Rome co
attract the attention of researchers and thinkers as before.21 The
surfacing of Fiofei's writings was in the early twentieth century, t
the West. The arrival of Communism in Russia provided the doc
new imperialist messianist resonances: its geopolitical ideal this t
to be seen as imperialist expansionism. Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1
the main defender of such a view. 'Russian messianism' was the m
ing force of Bolshevism as the main element of 'Russian religiou
ogy',22 the core of Russian spirituality: "Growing out from the sp
unconscious into the conscious, the idea changes its name and
Filofei's 'third Rome' appears Lenin's Third International."23 Berdia
pretation of international communism as reincarnated 'Russian m
has been widely publicised in the West; he has become the m
known Russian philosopher in the West, His interpretation was
welcomed especially by conservative, anticommunist, and Russophobic
Dmitrii Sidomv
tion of Bolshevism as modified 'Russian messianism'. Many
et occupation of East Europe gave rise to the concept later called
pansionism'. Many of the post-war analysts tumed to Berdiaev's
at Communist imperialism could be understood as a modem reinof the alleged original Russian desire to become the Third Rome.25
r II. For Poe, the culminating point of national-Bolshevik interpre-
re I shift to a discussion of how these three geopolitical forms of
Rome re-emerged nowadays, it may be interesting to mention a
ver fully developed historical form. In the USSR itself during the
e the concept had only limited, episodic circulation, primarily a
he revival of Russian nationalism under Stalin during and after
he idea was the S. Eisenstein film, Ivan the Terrible:26 in the first
he film the tsar announces the goal of uniting Russian lands,
g inner opposition, and defending the tsardom from German
Ivan closed his speech with a pompous citation from Fiofei.27
highlighted as the 'culminating point' would pale compared to
ggest yet understudied post-World War II geopolitical scheme: in
1943—1948 he hoped to use the Russian Orthodox Church as a
nt for bringing Eastern Europe and the Middle East under Soviet
o that end, he planned the creation of a 'Moscow Vatican', a Mosred transformation of the Orthodox world. When he failed to get
val of patriarchs of national Orthodox churches for transfer of the
enter of Orthodoxy from Istanbul (Constantinople) to Moscow
to bring the independent state of Israel into the Soviet sphere, he
st in the project,28 and the concept of the Third Rome became
stly invisible in public intellectual discourse until the end of the
tem (see, for example, references to it in Ilya Glazunov's monunting Eternal Russia, Figure 3).
mmarise, historically there have been several major understandconcept with distinctive geopolitical ideals attached: its original
n Muscovy was eschatological and primarily inward-looking, proeals of a protective Orthodox empire; in the nineteenth century
pt often had pan-Orthodox meaning and connoted taking over the
ome (Constantinople); in the twentieth century in the West the
as understood as justification of Russian imperialist messianism.
s post-World War II geopolitical schemes are implemented, we
would have another geopolitical understanding of the Third
ars of geopolitics rarely pay significant attention to the concept of
Rome: in their writing it is most often marginalised, misinterpreted
ored. For example, the well-known book by Liberal Westemer
no reference to the concept.29 The textbook by Vasilenko has a
of Russian messianism without reference to the Third Rome, havassing reference to the second Rome and its loss.30 The textbook
Post-Imperial Third Romes
FIGURE 3 llya Glazunov, Eternal Russia (1988). Ilya Glazunov is modem Russia
artist. This gigantic painting represents the totality of Russian history as an unint
cession of the country's key figures originating at MoscoWs Kremlin cathedrals. T
cross and Moscow, the Third Rome, visually constitute the central complex of the
Source: <http://www.glazunOv.ru>
gies,
including the popular Eurasianism, are more particula
by Nartov has a chapter on Eurasianists while the Third Rome i
tioned.31 In Dergachev's textbook the theory has no special consi
the text (unlike Eurasianism), only reference in the book's glos
textbook by Kolossov and Mironenko33 does consider the Third R
cept in some depth and eclectically interprets it essentially as a
Panslavic, pan-Orthodox concept that was geopolitically importa
the context of the liberation of Balkan Orthodox peoples from th
Empire at the end of the nineteenth century.
Politologists of Russian Orthodoxy, too, are frequently sil
concept. Mitrofanova's work34 itself perhaps belongs to the Libera
ised ideological tradition, if judged by its intentions, choice of fo
ideological predecessors and conclusions. Funded by a Weste
Mitrofanova's rare and useful study on politicisation of the Russ
dox religion was to assess primarily issues of interest for Weste
issues: relative popularity of various currents of modern Orthodo
ideologies and the extent to which an Orthodox equivalent of t
world is possible. Paradoxically, she traces roots of modern politi
doxy only to relatively recent ideologies (Panslavism and Eurasi
does not consider Third Romism. Therefore, it is not a surprise th
cludes that there is no major ideology in political Orthodoxy: m
universalist and therefore can't unite various currents of political O
and possibilities of an Orthodox political unity are slim.
D,nitrij Sidorov
paper aims not at challenging the reigning positions of Eurasianism
emism in representations of contemporary Russian geopolitical disut rather at highlighting an essential additional pillar of Russian geohinking, Third Romist geopolitics. It is arguably between or around
ee ideological poles, Eurasianism, Westernism, and Orthodoxy-
opolitics that modem Russian geopolitical imaginations revolve.
remainder of this paper will look at the metaphor's three historical
urrections in post-Soviet, post-imperial Russia and in doing so will
various currents of contemporary Russian Orthodoxy-related geohought.
VARJETIES OF POST-SOVIET THIRD ROMISMS
oints of Russian history: the establishment of an independent
ept of the Third Rome has often been perceived as "one of the
ificant (if not most significant) historiosophical concepts forming
ogy and character of the Muscovite state and staying in Russian
several centuries. It is the archetype of Russian nationalism."35
entially about the nature of the Russian Empire and the country's
ical identity, the concept seemingly has always been emerging at
state, the end of the Russian Empire, and World War II. Therefore
rstandable that the trauma of the fall of the Soviet Empire has
ot only the current renaissance of geopolitical imperial thought in
but specifically a resurgent interest in the concept of the Third
owever, as the remainder of this paper shows, the revived modem
omisms' are quite different from each other (see Table 1). I will
at modern geopolitical ideologies that are tied to Filofei's original
ogical treatment of the concept with essentially isolationist or
reservist geopolitical goals. Second, I will look at how the
h-century, Europe and Constantinople-oriented 'Third Rome' of
kii and Solov'yev finds modern adherents. Lastly, Berdiaev's impepansionist Third Rome perhaps characterises modem Eurasianists
supporters.
hird Rome' as a Catehon-Island
chatologists/lsolationists/Russia-centrism)
X GEOPOLITICAL NATIONALISTS/FUNDAMENTALISTS
al Russian Orthodox Church and its Patriarch are usually silent on
sted issues of geopolitics.36 The ideology of Nationalists/Fundas (hereafter N/F) still stems from conservative currents inside or
post-Imperial Third Romes
around the church itself: characteristically, many authors named b
to belong to various schismatic Orthodox Churches such as the O
Edinoverie (Dugin, Karpets), the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad
Kholmogorov) that are traditionionally most respective of apocaly
conservative ideas such as the late imperial teachings of Ioann of K
(1829—1908) and the writings of Metropolitan Ioann of Metro
Saint-Petersburg and Ladoga (Snychev) (1927—I995).
Of various contemporary authors, this paper highlights Mikh
who is becoming arguably the most outspoken voice of Russian n
What makes his writings a noteworthy case is, first, his visibility
publicist with the experience of a protracted stay in the West, he
in the spotlight in 2005 as one of the initiators of several letters t
Duma requesting that all Jewish organisations in Russia be made
the grounds that one of the publications, a collection of Jewis
regulations 'Kitzur Shulchan Aruch", ignites religious intolerance.
public defender of the request, he got a lot of publicity from the
ing him to promote his recently published nationalist manifesto
nous book entitled matter-of-factly To the Ruler of the Third Rome
Nazarov's two-fold historiosophical worldview is based o
original eschatological meaning of the Third Rome, and is repres
most Orthodox N/F:40 Russia is opposed to the rest of the world
country that potentially could keep it from the alleged apostasy
the coming anti-Christian kingdom (often equated to globalisa
the USA). Therefore (and not 'just because of its natural reso
world conspiracy forces consider Russia its main enemy in their
without full control over Russia, the world 'behind-the-scen
(mirovaia zakulisa) can't establish the kingdom of anti-Christ.
fate of the world is dependent on the Third Rome, its catehon,
hold-back power of the Russian empire to provide humanity w
house for salvation. If Russia fails to restore the Third Rome, th
would be able to prevent the world from its own collapse.41
Mitrofanova believes that the (geo)political project suggested
dox N/F for the restoration of Russia as an Orthodox kingdom of r
'lethal' globalisation processes has limited possibilities for any act
'Not one of the [F]undamentalist authors develops a theory of Orth
lution and moreover does not suggest real steps for its achiev
instance, by calling for an uprising)".42 According to Mitrofanova,
gists write little about foreign policies: if the world is destined
God anyway, the ultimate possible goal for N/F is to convert Ru
Orthodox fortress; she believes that their political project is limited
borders at best — borders of the Orthodox world. This localisation
in-character project is also reflected in the common support of
idea of economic autarchy of Russia.43 Thus, Mitrofanova dow
political and geopolitical potential of this ideology.
Post-Imperial ThIrd Romes
327
the church itself: characteristically, many authors named below used
ng to various schismatic Orthodox Churches such as the Old Belieferie (Dugin, Karpets), the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (Nazarov,
ogorov) that are traditionionally most respective of apocalyptical and
ative ideas such as the late imperial teachings of Ioann of Kronshtadt
—1908) and the writings of Metropolitan Ioann of Metropolitan of
etersburg and Ladoga (Snychev) (1927—1995).
various contemporary authors, this paper highlights Mikhail Nazarov
becoming arguably the most outspoken voice of Russian nationalists.
akes his writings a noteworthy case is, first, his visibility: a talented
t with the experience of a protracted stay in the West, he was often
potlight in 2005 as one of the initiators of several letters to the State
equesting that all Jewish organisations in Russia be made illegal on
unds that one of the publications, a collection of Jewish religious
ns "Kitzur Shulchan Aruch", ignites religious intolerance. A major
efender of the request, he got a lot of publicity from the case, helpto promote his recently published nationalist manifesto, a volumiok entitled rnatter-of-factly To the Ruler of the Third Rome.39
arov's two-fold historiosophical worldview is based on Fiofei's
eschatological meaning of the Third Rome, and is representative of
hodox N/F:40 Russia is opposed to the rest of the world as the only
hat potentially could keep it from the alleged apostasy (decline) of
ng anti-Christian kingdom (often equated to globalisation and/or
). Therefore (and not 'just because of its natural resources') the
nspiracy forces consider Russia its main enemy in their global war:
full control over Russia, the world 'behind-the-scenes' system
a zakulisa) can't establish the kingdom of anti-Christ. Hence the
e world is dependent on the Third Rome, its catehon, restraining,
k power of the Russian empire to provide humanity with a lightsalvation. If Russia fails to restore the Third Rome, then nothing
able to prevent the world from its own collapse.41
ofanova believes that the (geo)political project suggested by Orthoor the restoration of Russia as an Orthodox kingdom of resistance to
obalisation processes has limited possibilities for any active politics:
of the [Flundamentalist authors develops a theory of Orthodox revo-
d moreover does not suggest real steps for its achievement (for
by calling for an uprising)".42 According to Mitrofanova, N/F ideolo.-
e little about foreign policies: if the world is destined to fall from
way, the ultimate possible goal for N/F is to convert Russia into an
fortress; she believes that their political project is limited to Russia's
best — borders of the Orthodox world. This localisation of a globaler project is also reflected in the common support of N/F for the
onomic autarchy of Russia.43 Thus, Mitrofanova downplays the
nd geopolitical potential of this ideology.
Post-Imperial Third Romes
I—m
—
II —
FIGURE 4 The Russian Federation (2005) compared to the Russian Empire (1
Soviet Union (1991). Tuva and Kaliningrad regions are parts of the Russian F
of the USSR but have not been parts of the Russian Empire.
Source: the author, redrawn from a map by Billie Bielckus (SIPRI 1997).
the territory of the Russian Empire in its last legitimate boundaries
1917. We must accept other peoples if they have similar historic id
all, the Serbjaris).... We also understand that the move to restore
Rome will cause resistance of the Judeo-American anti-Rome (the
potenthlity for war. Perhaps that would be the last page of history
in the Apocalypses. We can't prevent it or hide in some Eurasian
r
Our goal is to accept the apocalyptical challenge and give the
a
God awaits." Still, in my opinion, Nazarov should be considered
p
an isolationist because he is essentially an escapist; he does no
world beyond the Third
Rome.
His
limited
expansionism
is
jus
achieve the ideal isolation (within the Third Rome's 'legitimate
bord
Nazarov's views are very common even if extreme. For exampl
shared by less nationalist and more Orthodox fundamentalist publi
Kholmogorov (Figure 8), who writes less for a mass audience and
intelligentsia cirdes: sharing with Nazarov geopolitical thought of th
revanchist kind, he also rejects postulates of Eurasianism and attem
thesise the ideas of Byzantism and the Russian Empire with
(advanced) geopolitical models. Kholmogorov is similar to Nazarov
torical account of the idea of the Third Rome;57 the difference is in t
restoring the Third Rome and his appeal to a wider intellectual
Dmitrii Sldorov
fferences in tactics are, for example, in Nazarov's criticism of
Putin and Yegor Kholmogorov's openness to collaboration with
nt authorities as visible in his participation in an Orthodox conseroject 'Russkaia Doktrina' [Russian Doctrine] that is allegedly supthe authorities.58
lmogorov argues for Russian a,giopolitics, a program of rational
actions aimed at strengthening the 'sacral infrastructure' of the
Orthodox world. Kholmogorov is the most ardent apologist for
'political religions of the latter days'. For him, the eschatology of
days should be the foundation of Russian national mythology; the
n of the future should be conceived as the restoration of Russia's
gical fate.59 For Kholmogorov, the emergence of political Orthon undeniable phenomenon. It is not an anti-modemisational reacspecifically Orthodox form of realisation of the deep processes in
ous conscience of the contemporary world. It is not a departure
odox dogmatics and is not similar to the emergent political Islam;
ted to support the state rather than the people ('political Orthocomes Christian, imperial supranational order'). The goal of politidoxy is not the creation of an Orthodox state but rather secession
space where salvation is most possible.6° For example, Kholmoges for the establishment of an Orthodox political order and restoa holistic national Orthodox salvation infrastructure (e.g., 'ideally,
uld be no place in Russia from where a church is not visible'). The
thodox geopolitics for Khomogorov is twofold. First, it is geopoliThird Rome, Russia as the catebon, the restraining world power.
le it must aim at those geopolitical goals that are needed for
ing Russia's status as a strong state in the world system. Second,
specific Orthodox geopolitics, the geopolitics of Byzantism that
ablishing an Orthodox political order and restoring the infrastrucvation in the territories with a population where Orthodoxy is a
identity factor.6' This logically leads to a call for 'Russian irrend Orthodox missionary expansionist claims.6
LYPTICS OF THE POSTMODEIU
nion of the author of this paper, the most interesting although
overlooked current of Orthodoxy-related geopolitical ideas are
mming from a new wave of philosophers like Alexandr Neklessa
Tsymburskii (Yegor Kholmogorov could be part of the group).
scholars and prolffic writers, they are frequent contributors to
al academic/intellectual journals, and Orthodox-historiosophicalal venues. Reflecting on Orthodox theology, the latest western
cal discourses and respective of such Russian geopolitical thinkers
as Tyutchev, Leont'iev, Danilevskii, Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, Savitskii,
Post-Imperial Third Romes
and Gorshkov, they innovatively advance Orthodox geopolitica
They are often critical of both modem Russian Liberal Weste
"have not suggested original geopolitical concepts" and concepts
Nationalists that are "underdeveloped".65 They could for conve
labeled here together as postmodernist for they believe that the
entered a new epoch that could be variously labeled as the epo
modem, the epoch of latter days, last times, and so on. Grigorii
(Kremnev) suggests calling this line of geopolitical reasoning ge
tics (geoapokalptika).
Tsymburskii is the author of several innovative geopolitical
Kholmogorov rightly characterises his famous metaphor of 'Island
isolationism directly oppositional to the neo-Eurasianism of
Dugin.67 Tsymburskii also challenges Huntington's vision of cont
civiisations by highlighting instead inter-civilisational cultural sp
itrof) that lack certain civiisational identity and could be invaded
bouring civilisational platforms (civiisations' areas of stable
Russia's space for expansion is its Great Limitrof the belt of cu
rounding it, primarily in the south. Tsymburskii is also critical of P
he sees the roots of the current Russian imperialism's crisis in its a
expand into Europe (instead of the Great Limitrof). Tsymbursk
optimist about post-imperial Russia's new reduced territory: its
Europe and loss of dominance iii the Great Lirnitrof could lead to
of the 'Island Russia' project (e.g., focus on Russia's own civilisat
form and its final settlement, especially of Siberia and the Far E
burskii even suggests a transfer of the Russian capital to the Urals
Third Rome problematics enters Tsymburskii's geopolitics
ways. First, for him "the fall of Byzantium and Russian emancipa
the Mediterranean paradise (signified by the emblem of the Th
was the first factor for emergence of [Russian] civilization there
following Lamanskii, Spengler and Toynbee, Tsymburskii's rese
ests migrate now into the sphere of what he calls chronopolitics,
heterogeneity of historical time and its implications for geopolitic
ment.® He believes that civilisations tend to treat their geopolit
along a certain repetitive spatial metaphor. For Tsymburskii, Russ
'proto-phenomenon' is not the popular metaphor of 'endless pla
of an 'island': "Fiofei's Third Rome is an island amidst the apos
verse." He finds here that real Russian geopolitics occurs as a cha
ifestations of this 'islandic' proto-phenomenon as reflected both i
basic myth of the Third Rome,70 and its current status of 'Islan
Tsymburskii's model 'Island Russia' rejects attempts to trea
reduced post-imperial Russia as if exisiting 'instead of Russia';
treats it as part of the country's continuing historical tradition.71
A ,geoeconomic approach to Russian geopolitics has been su
the concepts of Alexandr Neklessa, who analyses the structUre of the
Dmltrjj Sidorov
In his view, the modern world 'division of
labor'
creates
a sharp
g of the world into economic macrostructures that
depend on the
y's 'modernization' and its place in the global community. The
eveloped prosperous 'North' (aka West') is economically
and
politminating; it enters the stage of 'postindustrial culture', in
which
the
ect of production is high technology and ideas. The place
of induser passes to the 'new
East',
Asian,
primarily
Pacific
countries, that
n and are experiencing 'an economic miracle'. Located
along the
cean, the
'South',
has
been
experiencing
the
troubles
of
failed
ation or exhausted natural
resources,
first
of
all
oil.
Since
the
colhe USSR, Eurasia has been in a state of uncertainty;
it
seeks
a 'Rusect' that would allow a return to its former place in the
world. A
f the modem epoch is in transgeographic
structures: 'quasi-North',
of globalisation, of
international dealers, bureaucrats and all that
g depends on new financial and virtual 'post-economics',
and
th', the zone of decay
of
the
civiisation
structures, degradation of
tes', rule of terrorism and criminality. As a
geoeconomic Russian
eklessa puts forward
a
concept
of
formation
of
'hyper-North'
as a
istinction to the postmodem 'quasi-North' —
the
transfonnation
of
o the zone of super intensive scientific-technological
development
technologies.73
rding to Tsymburskii, the works of Neklessa constitute the
'most
contribution to Russian geoeconomics."74 Partially overlapping
r, these works form one metatext characterised by a dialog
wo domains: the field of 'humanitarian esotericism' and 'esoterioeconomics'.75
Neklessa,
a
prominent
member
of
the
Russian
of Sciences, fully adopts
Orthodox
metahistorical
schemes:
he
history as a Big Myth and utilises the six-day Biblical
cosmogony
e historical modes of
production.
Neklessa
is
also
an isolationist:
mall science and production towns of the
Russian North as
meaning', networks of the Third Rome.
However, his version of
yptics is the most pessimistic about possibilities of the Third
urrection, prophesying instead emergence of a non-Christian
'Fourth Rome'. In that he is increasingly reminiscent of conspirs like Nationalist Nazarov and Eurasianist Dugin.
hird Rome' with Europe
kjj/Neo-pslav
and-or Europeanists/Russia-and-Europe)
THODOX NEO-PANSIAVISTS
under of
Panslavism,
Danilevskii
(1822—1885),
the
essence of
y is a struggle between Roman (Catholic) and Byzantine
(Orthodox)
Post-Imperial Third Romes
civiisations that nowadays are represented by Germanic and Sl
entities.6 in his geopolitical utopia Danilevskii predicted 'the th
the Eastern Question': creation of an Eastern (e.g., Orthodox-Sla
an all-Slavic union of Russia, the Czech Republic, Moravia, Slov
(including Bosnia and Herzegovina), Croatia, Slovenia, Bulgari
Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, part of Turkey77 Danilevskli s
empire's universality, non-Russianness, insisting that the cap
empire should be not Saint-Petersburg or Moscow, but Con
(Tsar-City, Tsargrad).
I have not found any serious modem discussion of rec
Istanbul, and the possibility of an All-Slavic (or All-Orthodox
discussed by few authors. The main problem of modern Pan
with the Panslavism of the nineteenth century, is its refusal to
obvious: unified 'Slavic', and moreover 'Orthodox-Slavic' civ
far does not exist. K. A. Smirnov and 0. V. Kataeva write ab
society (soobschestvo)' that 'includes 12 states'.78 Most Panslavi
ally conclude that the Slavic world consists at best of three
Russia, Belarus, and Serbia.79
Those who Mitrofanova labels as neo-Panslavists are diff
their predecessors, focusing more on the issues of interaction w
cally the European civiisation. Natalia Narochnitskaia's volum
Russia and Russians in World Histor° is representative of this t
tion of modern Panslavists.81 In my opinion, many of them cou
labeled as Europeanists (Table 1) or even as post-Panslavists. H
essentially a critical review of the history of international rela
mostly Europe from an Orthodox point of view. It shares with
dox Fundamentalists a rejection of the West and globalisation
rejects McKinder's belief in the Eurasian Heartland. For Naro
throughout history the pivotal area of world geopolitics is so-ca
Byzantine space', the area of the Eastern Question, the Balka
Europe and Western Russia (Figure 1). For Narochnitskaia, Rus
Balkans constitute the Orthodox world, 'post-Byzantine space'
different from Western civilisation. The collapse of the Soviet
again intensified struggle for the post-Byzantine space (that seem
graphically corresponds to the territory of All-Slavic union o
Panslavists82) between the interests of Orthodox, Latin (We
Islamic civilisations. Narochnitskaia concludes that 'the comm
goal of western powers in the past and nowadays is the same —
in the strategic region of the straits and the Mediterranean the fo
a large Slavic Orthodox state with a clearly distinctive independe
spirit."83
Narochnitskaia makes frequent references to the Thi
superficially in the eschatological way described above. Yet e
her take is not Nationalist/Fundamentalist in her minimisat
s.
Dmttrii Sidorov
dimension: following Synitsyna, Narochnitskaia claims that
Rome was not a major concept in Muscovy; instead, the idea
ine heritage for Moscow was promoted by the West (the Pope
and Holy Roman emperor) to make Russia its ally in the fight
man Turkey. A deeper goal was to spread Catholicism to the
would be facilitated if Russia was weakened in her fight with
tually, the book's main message is the following: true unity
d bring growth and independence to Europe should be based
nition of the universally equal values of our experiences. The
s in constructively merging all cultural components of Europe
ssentially an 'appeal'. The future of Russia is Europe's future
g the Slavic and Orthodox). Therefore, the Russian 'chal-
ough historically a major geopolitical current in Orthodoxy,
eo-Panslavism is a less popular and, as mentioned, somewhat
ideology now. It accepts Danilevskii's basic reasoning in
he Slavic-Orthodox world under Russia's leadership and of
nce with other worlds or civilisations (also popular are the
d by many modern neo-Panslavists as less dangerous for
Toynbee and Huntington). Unlike N/F, Panslavists recognise
lues of other civilisations, their right to existence, and do not
Panslavic civilisation as universalist.86 Yet the N/F branch is
d even as a temporary ally in the fight against 'the alliance of
, pan-Turkic and Israeli forces'.87 The modern neo-Panslavist
o Eurasianism and specifically Islam is inconsistent; some
ept a special value of not only Islam, but also of Hinduism.
vely borrow concepts from the ideology of so-called 'Russian
that have been rejected by the Church as heresy and do not
ng wrong in the teaching of Roerichs.88 Mitrofanova believes
Panslavism is increasingly an ideology of not 'Slavism' but
ationalism and could merge with political N/F becoming their
version.89
ps the most extensive examination of the Third Rome concept
tist (derzhavnost) perspective point of view could be found in
trofanov's book. Not a neo-Panslavist, he is nevetheless similar to
skaia in his focus on relations with Europe: his book is characterded Russia: Between Collapse or Joining the European Union.90 A
sation.91
deputy of Russian parliament and the head of its committee on
al issues, Mitrofanov discusses the concept of the Third Rome as
m of a strong centralised Russian state. His conclusion is that
s only one choice: either to disintegrate or to establish a strong
d unitary state and join the European Union to create a global
I
Post-Imperial Third Romes
III. The Eurasian 'Thvtird Rome'
(Berdiaev/Imperialists/EXpansiOflists/Eurasiamsts)
ORTHODOX NE0-EURASIANIST TRADITIONALISTS
Eurasianism was formulated in the 1920s in the circle of Russian e
particular in works by Nikolai Trubetskoi and Petr Savitskii. In
the idea of All-Slavic union of Danilevskii, they put forward the
Eurasian 'continental state' that includes many ethnic and religio
At the same time, Eurasianism was conceived at the core as an
ideology: Savitskii argued that 'the Eurasianists are Orthodox
However, Eurasianists interpreted Orthodoxy far more broadly
the Church teaches. 'Paganism is a potential Orthodoxy', claime
referring primarily to Buddhism. Islam is also a kind of Orthodox
According to Savitskii, the two religions both reflect different side
doxy. Orthodoxy, therefore, for most radical Eurasianists, is the
larger religious-cultural world that is called 'potential Orthodoxy
still does not belong to the Orthodox Church. With all its distanc
canonical Orthodoxy, the Eurasianists believed that politics is on
for realisation of religious goals.93 This is why Eurasianism could
ered as an Orthodoxy-related geopolitical ideology.
Most of neo-Eurasiariist intellectual projects are connected t
Dugin, whose project is more ambitious than that of the early E
Dugin aims at integration of all existing traditionalist (and anti-glob
ogies. Orthodoxy is presumably a major ideology (tradition) for
the Eurasian empire is called its natural geographical embodimen
Dugin's major works make reference to the Third Rome idea.
Dugin's take on the concept reflects his adherence to the Old Be
of Orthodoxy: he believes that the ideal was hollowed after t
reforms of the mid-seventeeth century. and the resultant schism;
westemisation further betrayed the Third Rome: "with the transfer
ital to St. Petersburg and the abolition of the Patriarchate . . .Russi
be dogmatically legitimate Orthodox empire in the theological a
logical senses". Dugin is among few authors who consider the So
as essentially a reincarnation of the Orthodox Third Roman empire
Neo-Eurasianists are expansionists: the 'Orthodox world' fo
ists is by far bigger than the 'Slavic world' of the Panslavists and
expansion. This breadth allows for inclusion into the Orthodox
so-called Pan-Eurasian Zone, Figure 5) the peoples of Turkey
India that have never even lived in Russia. For many analysts, Eur
the most influencial of the Orthodoxy-related ideologies due t
understanding of Orthodoxy, allowing for inclusion of almos
Western religion. The Eurasianist project is not local, rather univ
Dmitrij Sidorov
-—
IG
L.Jsp
.igp 5.
2-d map of multipolar world. Four zones big spaces.
LN.8Am.d,
5.
an-Eurasian Zone and Big Spaces.
author's modification of one of the neo-Eurasianist maps available at <http://
.org/modules.php? ame""News& lie Jcle&sjd='1885> "Brief presentation of Eurur maps. Map 4: Structure of multipolar world. The Eurasianist vision of the future."
hade is applied here to the so-called Pan-Eurasian Zone (one of the four dividing
or neo-Eurasianists it includes Russia-Eurasian Big Space, Islamic Continental Big
indu Big Space).
, for example, the spread of the Eurasianist ideology throughout
it seems that neo-Eurasianism tends to transform itself into a gloy.95 At the same time, it positions itself as an Orthodoxy-related
Figure 6).
ii Maler's recent work is an attempt to reposition neo-Eurasianism
odox geopolitical ideology by balancing it with the Third Romism
tism, an Orthodox ideology of symphony between the Church
thorities.98 Similarly, Vladimir Karpets in Eurasianism seeks a balen the monarchist ideals, Third Romism, and the Eurasian contiire (of the Jean Parvulesco and Alexandr Dugin kind that means a
under the slogan Paris-Berlin-Moscow, and further to Beijin.
OLOGY
m is an influential ideology, and the New Chronology of Anatoly
nd Gleb Nosovskii could be treated as its peculiar reincarnation.
rlier theories of Nikolai Morozov, the two professors at Moscow
Post-Imperial Third Romes
FIGURE 6 Neo-Eurasianists and the Orthodox mix together at a meeting-proce
cated to the Battle of Kuilkovo, Moscow 21 September 2005.
Source: <http://ww.evrazia.org/modules.php?name"'News&file"'article&sid=267
State University use mathematics and astronomy to provide evidence
chronology as we know it today is fundamentally flawed, compiled
ans from numerous sources and is full of duplications of historical ev
history is, they claim, fifty centuries shorter than we traditionally believ
According to the New Chronology, the first Rome was A
(Egypt), the second Rome was Constantinople (a.k.a. Jerusalem).
Third Rome split into three Third Romes (Constantinople, Rom
and Moscow).'°1 The Third Rome as Moscow was the capital o
Russian Empire that embraced practically the entire world (Figure
created by the Grand Russian Prince Georgy Danilovich and his
The empire disintegrated at the beginning of the seventeenth cen
result of big political intrigues.
The New Chronology is essentially about "the true grandeur o
Russian history, about the strength of the Russian spirit and weapon
power that managed to unite the peoples of the world. One can't c
Homeland, yet one can choose the history of the Homeland that is c
more daring."102 While shrinking world history, New Chronologis
enlarge Russia's imperial space and the geopolitical importance of
the past. New Chronology could be viewed as a far-right version of E
ism and a prime example of post-imperial geopolitical imagining.
pa
Dmitrjj Sidorov
pcc1nepa £loaitwa u pyccsto-rypsiuaR
za ritaa via XW—XV na.:
The Third Romes of the New Chronologists: for them, the first Rome was Alexan-
), the second Rome was Constantinople (aka. Jerusalem). Then the Third Rome
hree Third Romes (Constantinople, Rome of Italy, and Moscow). Source: the
ckground map: "The kingdom of Presbyter Ioann or Russo-Turkic Horde as the
in the XIV-XV cc."
Nosovskii and A. Fomenko, Imperiia (Moscow: Faktorial Press 2000), Part 4,
Histoiy of Several Romes: First (Ancient) Rome, Second (New) Rome, and, third,
Romes"; available at <hap://lib.ru/FOMENKOAT/impeth2.txt http://xk.narod.ru>
000x COMMUNISTS
ost its reigning position in Russian politics, the Communist party
o reposition itself in post-Soviet politics. As evident in writings of
Zyuganov, the party tries to represent its Marxist doctrine as conth and rooted in other popular ideologies. Written from the civilperspective, Zyuganov's manifesto of the party's new position, The
hy of Victoiy103, develops the image of Russia as a self-sufficient
, political, and cultural unit in the middle of Eurasia. Zyuganov
world in terrn.s of traditional geopolitics and defends the notion of
a Eurasian empire within the former Soviet borders.104
lars have a tendency to underrepresent the Orthodox dimension
w Communist geopolitics. For example, Tsygankov makes no refthe religious dimension and Mitrofanova characterises Zyuganov
as a leftist Eura.sianist.105 Meanwhile, Orthodoxy is an essential
of Zyuganov's new eclectic ideology (together with Eurasianism
ational geopolitics).
'oceanic' Carthage.106
Post-Imperial Third Romes
According to Zyuganov, Russian 'practical geopolitics' was b
sixteenth century together with the birth of the first Russian centr
and emergence of the first Russian geopolitical doctrine (the Th
Zyuganov highlights the role of spiritual, moral and religious fac
creation of the united Russian state and contrasts it to 'naked prof
(elsewhere). He puts the USSR in the same imperial perspective an
the modern world as continuing the struggle between 'continental'
If previously the value of the state (derzhava) was for ide
Russian communism clearly above the value of Orthodoxy, Zyu
already supports the Third Rome formula and therefore accep
main goal of Russia as a state is protection of Orthodox faith in
Orthodoxy meanwhile is equated with the ideas of social justice,
tually with Communism.107 Mitrofanova observes conflicts betwe
larism (Fundamentalism) and universalism (Eurasianism) in Z
woridview and concludes that Zyuganov's interpretation of Ortho
munism is increasingly reminiscent of N/F with its idea of the enc
of Holy Russia.106
CONCLUSION: POST-SOVIET THIRD ROMES
The empire is dead, long live the imperial geopolitics? The coll
Soviet Union, one of the biggest empires in history, has made th
theme only more relevant for Russian geopolitics. The country's
to its new post-imperial status and the new world order of one
superpower (the USA) unsurprisingly corresponds with the reviv
rial geopolitics in the realm and beyond. It is hoped that this p
understanding of the varieties of post-imperial Russian geopolit
gies by shedding light on the often overlooked Orthodoxy-rela
such as the Third Roman empire(s).
Three forms of interpreting the Third Rome idea have b
fied as well as their contemporary reincarnations. Orthodox n
and fundamentalists together with geoapocalypticians argue f
isolationism and find some religious meaning in the empir
them, it is part of the predicted Christian historiosophy, an
dence of Russia's special role in the world. Neo-Panslavists an
anists see the Third Rome in a mutually respective ci
relationship or alliance with Europe. Finally, Berdiaev's criticis
Romism as a perpetual expansionist idea finds some evide
neo-Eurasianist vision of the Third Rome as a Eurasian (conti
potentially global) empire.
This paper attempts to shed light on the apparent gap in m
accounts of the post-Soviet revival of geopolitics in Russia, their i
Dmitrii Sidorov
to various geopolitical ideologies in post-Soviet Russia stemming
nturies-old Russian Orthodox woridview as expressed in the preem-
aphor of Russian 'Third Rome'. Several reasons and counterarguuld be suggested for this ignorance. First, unlike in the political
orld, the Orthodox religion is often viewed as a feature of the past,
n as relatively marginal in contemporary politics and ideological
n the country. However, as this paper shows, many (if not all) of the
onsidered here are powerful politicians and prominent intellectuals;
tructs are often modem (if not postmodem), and an analysis of their
ted intellectual constructions shows their increasing politicisation.
nd, the underrepresentation of Orthodox discourses in accounts of
geopolitics could be a result of the fact that those in other discissian/Slavic politico-sociological and historico-ideological studies)
ady researched the topic: there have been numerous studies of the
Orthodox Church, its domestic and foreign politics, its role in ideolh as nationalism and messianism and so forth. This paper focuses
ncept of Third Rome while it may seem that the topic has already
l analysed, even if only partially from the geopolitical point of
erefore, to understand Russian geopolitical Orthodoxy, one must
effort to learn from works of other disciplines.
d, the lack of attention to Orthodoxy in geopolitics is a legacy of
War. And that period itself remains one of the least researched
Hopefully, scholars will be able to put aside such arresting metahe Empire of Evil and look more in depth into the geopolitics of
et period. For example, the geopolitical visions of Alexandr
syn, the preeminent Russian philosopher of the second half of the
century, await scrunity. While this paper is on Orthodoxy-related
s, there should be, perhaps, a more specific examination of strictly
geopolitics of the Russian Orthodox Church and other OrthOdox
in the realm.
e that there will be further research into the major Russian Ortho-
olitical metaphor, the concept of Russian Third Rome, since
dly it will continue to occupy one of the central places in the
ussian geopolitical imagi(nation) (Figure 8). I am currently writing
n the urban dimension of this metaphor ("Moscow the Third
nd a paper on Stalin's Third Romism. Further studies perhaps
look at Third Romisms in a comparative international perspective
ideologies existed in, for instance, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Germany
the United States. As I am finalising this paper, I have just learned
cently published book by an American history revisionist, Matel Johnston, called The Third Rome: Holy Russia, Tsarism, and
y.1°9 Its purpose is "to alter the political universe of those who
eligion remains one of the most exciting frontiers for further geosearch.
Post-Imperial Third RomeS
FIGURE 8 "Russia is everything, the rest is nothing" — these are the last words
publicist Yegor Kholmogorov at a nationalist meeting in the center of Moscow t
new national holiday, People's Unity Day (November 4th, 2005; effectively a rep
November 7th, the October Revolution Day). This was the first major public ma
the political Right, an emergent force in post-Soviet Russia. Yegor KholmogorO
the crowd with an icon in an attempt to remind the Orthodox foundation of th
(sources: photo adopted fmm http://www.ljplus.rU/imWa/y/aYsaJesm47
livejournal.com/users/holmOgOr; http://rossia3.ru/PraWmar).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Mark Bassiri for early advice, Prof. Harol
for help and encouragement, Dr. Gregorii B. Nikolaev (Kre
insights into Orthodox geoapocalyptics, Dr. Sergei Shubin and a
reviewers for criticism, participants of a session at the IBG Annu
in London (2005) and of the Interdisciplinary Research Seminar
Borderlands: Frontiers, Borders, and Boundaries in Modem Easte
(CSULB, Fall 2005) for questions and comments (especially Pasc
also would like to thank the Soya Center for help in obtaining
Mitrofanova's book that proved to be very influential for this stud
Dmitrii Sidomv
NOTES
nkov, 'Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet
unist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003) pp. 101—127.
ughlin, 'Geopolitical Fantasies and Ordinary Russians: Perception and Reality in the
Geopolitics 6 (2001) pp. 17—48. See also J. O'Loughlin and P. Talbot, Where in the
Geopolitical Perceptions and Preferences of Ordinary Russians', Eurasian Geography
1) (2005) pp. 23—50.
ssov and N. Mironenko, Geopolitika I Politicheskata Geograflia [Geopolitics and PolitiMoscow: Aspekt Press 2001) pp. 162—172. Their discussion of modem Russian nationalas avoids any Orthodox references; These ideas are rather presented as influenced by
ilevskii and anti-Westernism. V. Tsymburskii is superficially representted as neo-WestThird Romist temptations.
o presentations at an international conference "Between Ethnos and Eurasia. Ideas
L.N. Gumilev" (Moscow: The Institute for History of Natural Sciences and Technics
ademy of Sciences, 27 June, 2005), especially papera by Konstantin A.xenov 'Ideas
in Modem Russian Geopolitical Conceptions', and Viktor Shnirel'man Alternative
ia Mitrofanova Politizatsiia 'Pravoslavno,go Mira' [Politicization of the 'Orthodox
Nauka 2004). In a rare study of contemporary ideologies of political Orthodoxy, po11va evaluates the possibility of formation of an Orthodox world' as a cultural-political
o the 'Islamic world' and its consequences for security. Although socio-political rather
study, Mitrofanova's book provides a useful staiting point for classification of various
al Orthodoxy. Another work on the topic is Alexandr Verkhovskii's study Politlcbeskoe
ie Pravoslavnye Natsionalisty I Fundamentallsly, 1995-2001 [Political Orthodoxy: Rusionalists and Fundamentalists] (Moscow: Tsentr Soya 2003).
ov (note 1).
ov (note 1) p. 105.
e numerous accounts; I draw here on D. Sidorov, Orthodoxy and Difference: Essays on
Russian Orthodox Churcb(es) In the 20" Century (Princeton Theological Monograph
se, CA: Pickwick Publications 2001) ch. 2.
ial expectations abounded: the Church predicted that the world would end in 1492,
yptic premonitions came in 1500. When the world failed to end in 1492, the Metropolmarked the event by proclaiming Ivan In to be the "new Emperor Constantine of the
ple - Moscow." Another prophecy of the time, which recurred frequentiy in Russian
t, was that the Third Rome would liberate the Second: Moscow would capture Condes of Moscow as successor of Byzantium was assisted by the marriage of a Russian
the last Byzantine Emperor. The Grand Duke of Moscow began to assume the Byzana version of the Roman 'Caesar') and to use as his state emblem the double-headed
m (symbolising the East-West duality of the culture). P. Duncan, Russian Messianism:
lution, Communism and After (London and New York: Routledge 2000) pp. 10—12.
Russian Messianism (note 9) pp. 10—12, emphasis mine.
Sinitsyna, Treiiy Rim: Istoki I Evoliutsila Russkoy Srednevekovoy Kontseptsil (XV-XV7 vv.)
ns and Evolution of Russian Medieval Concept (XV-XVIth c.)l (Moscow: Indrik 1998). See
Uchrezhdenie Patriarshestva I Tretly Rim' [Patriarchate's Establishment and Third Rome],
deniia Pa arsbestsa V RossItVIV Centenarlo Dellistituzione del Patria,vbato in Rutsia
tiice E Libreria 1991) pp. 59-80; N. Soboleva, 'Kontseptsila 'Moskva - Tretiy Rim' i Ofta Simvolika Vtoroy Poloviny XVffl-XIX v.' [Concept of 'Moscow the Third Rome' and the
mbolics of the Second Half of XVUI-XIX ci, Rossiia i Mimvaia Tslviltzalslia k 70-leiliu
entaRANA.iV. Sakbamna (Moscow: Institut Rossiyskoy Istorii 2000) pp. 195-210.
a Tretiy Rim (note 11) pp. 327—328; M. Poe, 'tzobretenie Kontseptsii "Moskva — Tretii
on of the Theory 'Moscow, Third Rome'l, Ab Imperio 2 (2000) p. 68.
a Tretiy Rim (note 11) p. 328; Poe (note 12) pp. 78—79.
ow you know what is holding him back, so that he may be revealed at the proper time.
wer of lawlessness is already at work; but the one who now holds it back will continue
ken out of the way. "And then the lawless one will be revealed, whom the Lord Jesus
Post-Imperial Third Romes
will overthrow with the breath of his mouth and destroy by the splendor of his coming.
nians 2:6-8) The Bible. New International Version (International Bible Society 1984).
15. The urban dimension of the topic will not be considered here, see my paper in
16. In Prazxelavnyy Sobesednik in 1861—1863 (Sinitsyna Tretiy Rim [note 111 p. 13).
156—165.
17. Contrary to common beliefs, the doctrine of the Third Rome was unknown to t
and had not been occupying a key position in Panslavists' teaching (see Poe [note 121 p. 7
18. For further studies, see I. Kirillov, Trstiy Rim: Ocbei* Istoricheskogo Razuitlia
Messianisma [Third Rome: Essay on Historical Evolution of Russian Messianism Idea] (M
Tipo-Litografii VI.M.Mashistova 1914); K. Belova, 'Konstantinopol' i "Tretiy Rim" v "Dne
F.M.Dostoevskogo (1876—1877)' [Constantinople and Third Rome in F.M. Dostoevskii's
(1876-1877)'], Vostok V Russkoy Literature XVHI-Nacbala XX veka. Znakomstvo. Perevo
(Moscow: IMLI 2004) pp. 197—215; S. Nosov, 'Ideia "Mdskva — Tretiy Rim" v Interpretat
Leont'eva i Viadimira Solov'eva' [Moscow the Third Rome Idea in Interpretation of Konst
and Vladimir Solov'evl Russkaia Literatura I Kul'iura Novogo Vnaneni (St. Petersburg: Na
19. V. thr'ye, TriEskbatologii: Russkaia Eckbatologlia Do iPcele VelikogoRo.slaala [Three
Russian Eschatology Before and After the Great Schism] available at <http://www.hgr.narod.ru
20. L Saraskina, 'F.M. Dostoevskii i "Vostochnyy Vopros"' [F.M. Dostoevskii and the
tion'], Sine Arte, Nihil: Sbornik Naucbnykb Trudov v Dar Plvfrssoru Millvoefovanovichu (
Issledovaniis Russkoy Kul'tury 1) (Belgrade-Moscow: Piataia Strana 2002) pp. 250—263; Yu.
Kuznetsov, V. Sergeev, and A. Chumakov, Vostocbnyy Vopres v Mezhdunaivdnykb Oi
23. N. Berdiaev, The Russian Revolution (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michig
Vtoroy Polovine XVJII-NacbaleXX v. [The Eastern Question in International Relations in the
XVIII-eaily XX c.1 (Kaliningrad: Kalinigradskii Gosudarstvennyy Universitet 1997); S. Khatun
nyy Vopros v Rabotakh K N. Leont'eva' rme Eastern Question in I( Leont'ev'S Works], S
Istorlografli Otecbestva 2 (Voronezh: Izdatel'stvo Voronezhskogo Universiteta 1999) pp. 6321. For example, N. Zemoy, 'Moskva — Tretiy Rim' [Moscow Third Rome], Put' 51 (1
N. Zernov, Moscow the Third Rome [Moscow Third Rome] (London: Soc. for Promoting Ch
edge; New York: Macmillan 1937).
22. N. Berdiaev, The Origin of Russian Communism (Ann Arbor, MI: University of
1931/1960) p. 144. N. Berdiaev, The Russian Revolution (Ann Arbor, MI: University of
1931/1971) p. 41.
1971) p. 41.
24. See, for example, Mikhail Agursky, The Third Romst National Bolshevism in the U
CO: Westview Press 1987) or a more recent Russophobic treatise by Roman Kis', Final
Rosiys'ka Meslans'ka idela na Ziami Tisiacholit [The End of the Third Rome: The Russi
Turn of the Millennium] (L'viv: Institut Narodoznavstva NAN Ukraini 1998).
25. Poe (note 12) p. 82.
26. And a paper by historian N. S. Chaev, '"Moskva — Tretiy Rim" v Politiche
Moskovskogo Pravitel'stva XVI veka' [Moscow the Third Rome in the Political Practic
cow Government of the 16th ci, Istoricheskie Zaplski 17 (1945) pp. 3—23. According
idea of Fiofei was not a iranslailo Imperil theory, rather a declaration of independen
ator imperialist states.
27. Even if there is no evidence of Ivan's familiarity with the concept or ever sayin
(Poe [nOte 12] pp. 81—82). This is actually not the first scene in the film.
28. See 0. Vasil'eva, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov' v Polb'ike Sovetskogo Gosud
1948 gg. [Russian Orthodox Church in the Politics of the Soviet State in 1943—1948] (M
Rossiyskoy Istoril 2001) and/or my paper in progress.
29. D. Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and
(Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2001).
30.1. Vasileriko, Geopolitlka: Ucbebnoe POSObIe [Geopolitics: Textbook] (Moscow
pp. 68-73.
31. N. Nartov, Geopolltika: (Jchebnik, [Geopolitics: Texthookl 3" ed. (Moscow: Unity/E
32. V. Dergachev, Geopolitika: Ucbebnlk [Geopolitics: Textbook] (Moscow: Unity-D
33. Kolossov and Mironenko (note 3) themselves emphasise the importance of geo
politico-economic strategies.
34. Mitrofanova (note 5).
Dmltrii Sidorov
zaii, Neskol'ko Zamechanii po Povodu Idei Moskvy — Tret'ego Rims, V Russkoy Mysli XIX
ments Regarding the Idea of Moscow the Third Rome in Russian Thought of the XlXth c.l
a Dawnef Rusi (Lodz: Acta Universitatis Lodziensis, Folia Litteraria 32 1992) p. 149.
khovskjj (note 5) p. 113.
ann (Snychev), Russkala Simfonila [Russian Symphony] (St Petersburg: Tsarskoe Delo 2004).
other source of inspiration. Writings of Archimandiite Konstantin (Zaytsev), especially his
Lcto,1( [The Miracle of Russian History] (Jordanville: Holy Trinity Orthodox Seminary 1970),
or recovery of the original Third Rome idea from lierdiaev's (mis)interpretations.
il Nazarov, Vozhdiu Tret'ego Rima: k Poznaniiu Russkoy Idel v Apokalipsicheskoe Vremla
ia, Prosecutorial Answer to Jewish Question' (23 June 2005), translated and posted on
www.porta!-credo.ru>.
Third Rome: Towards Understanding the Russian tdea in Apocalyptic Time] (Moscow:
05). See also I. Kuz'menko, Geopolitiks Sviatoy Rust' [Geopolitics of Holy Russia], III Rim:
b 1 (1994) pp. 7—12; Moskovskii istoriko-Politologicheskii Tsentr, 'Osnovnye Kontseprsii
zopasnosti v Istorii Rossii' [Main Concepts of National Security in Russia's Historyl, III Rim:
kb 2 (1997) pp. 10-45; Moskovskii Istoriko-Politologicheskii Tsentr, 'Vvedenie' [Introducsskii A1'manakh 1 (1994) pp. 3-5; V. Maniagin, Tretil Rim I Belyy Dorn: Ochei*i Russkoy
me and White House: Essays on Russian History] (Moscow: Sviataia Rus' 2002).
ample, Petrov claims that geopolitics in terms of Orthodox historiosophy is contestation
ebon Russian Orthodox civilisation and apostate anti-Christian civilisation (V. Petrov,
Sli: Vozrozbdenie ill FoR Ibel' [Geopolitics of Russia: Revival or Death?] (Moscow: Veche
r instance: Mikhail Golovanov 'Russkaia Doktrina na Ostrove Russkoy Slavy' [The
ov (note 39) p. 753.
anova (note 5) p. 123.
anova (note 5) p. 122.
v (note 39) pp. 782—789.
v (note 39) pp. 789—798.
ov (note 39) p. 798.
v (note 39) p. 829.
v (note 39) p. 832.
v (note 39) p. 886.
v (note 39) p. 887. On 2 March 1917, the last Russian Tsar Nicholas U abdicated the throne.
v (note 39) pp. 888—909.
v (note 39) pp. 888—889.
v (note 39) p. 889.
v (note 39) p. 890.
v (note 39) p. 893.
v (note 39) p. 913.
olmogorov, Russ/ely Proekt: Restavratsila Buduscbego [The Russian Project: Restauration
oscow: Eksmo, Algoritm 2005). The book was published too late for this review but it
lection of essays previously placed online. Kholmogorov's interpretation of the Third
ound in his essay rretii Rim: Ocherk Proiskhozhdeniia Ideologii' [Third Rome: An Essay
deology] (2004), available at <http://www.pravaya.ru>.
on the Island of Russian Glory] (12 Oct 2005), available at <http://www.pravaya.ruj
print=1>. There is evidence that Kholmogorov plans to participate in the elections of
ma (Fall 2005).
olmogorov, 'Restavratsiia Buduschego' [Restoration of the Futurel (15 Mar 2005), availww.apn.ru/index.php?chapter_nameadvert&data_id-403&do—view single)>.
olmogorov, 'Religii Poslednego Vremeni' [Religions of the latter Time] (24 May 2005),
://www.apn.mJ?chapter_nameprinLadvert&datajd-499&do.view_single)>.
olrnogorov, Politicheskoe Pravoslavie' lPolitical Orthodoxy] (9 June 2005), available at
ru>.
olmogorov, Pragmaticheskaia Irredenta' [Pragmatic Irredentism] (11 May 2005), availw.apn.ru/?chapter.name—advert&datajd—483&do—view..single>.
olmogorov, 'Politicheskoe Pravoslavie' [Political Orthodoxy] (9 June 2005), available at
nj>.
Post-Imperial Third Romes
64. Such as websites as pravaya.ru, apn.ru, intelros.ru, and russ.ru.
65. Ye. Kholmogorov, 'Geopolitika' [Geopolitics] (23 July 2004), available at <h
sidel9/712)>.
66. Gregorii Nikolaev, 'Vyzov Geo-apokaliptiki' [Challenge of Geoapocalyptics
available at <http://www.pravaya.ru/faith/11/4707?priflt - 1>; also in G. Nikolaev Vyzov
[Challange of Geoapocalyptics] in Fskba tologlcbeskll sbornik (St. Alteyia 2006, in press) pp
also Vadim Tsymburskii, 'Russkie i Geoekonomika' [Russians and Geoeconomicsl, in P
(2003) p. 216, available at <http://www.carnegie.rU/ru/pUbS/prOcontral69ol8.htm>.
67. Khohnogomv (note 65).
68. V. Tsymburskii, RussIa - Zeinila za Veil/elm Limitmfom: Tslvllizatslla I Ee Geo
the Land behind the Great Limittof: Civilisation and Its Geopolitics] (Moscow: URSS 2000
69. V. Tsymburskii, 'Skol'ko Tsiviizatsiy? (S Lamanskim, Shpenglerom I Toynbi nad
VekaY [How Many Civilizations? (With Lamanskii, Spengler and Toynbee Over the 21g c.
Contra 5/3 (2000), available at <http://www.camegie.ru/ru/printJ5592l-print.htifl>.
70. As well as the legendary Kitezh-City that sunk underwater to stay uncorrup
72. Alexandr Neklessa is a prolific writer. Examples of his numerous publica
marshy lands St. Petersburg is another example.
71. V. Tsymburskii, "'Ostrov Rossila" as Sem' Let (Prikliucheniia Odnoy Geopolit
septsiiY [Seven Years of Island Russia': Adventures of a Geopolitical Concept], Polls (Ma
able at <http://www.politstudies.ru/univerSum/eSSe/2zmb.htm>.
Vozdukba, Ill Kirj Stroll Mir? [Homines Aeris or Who Builds the World?] (Moscow: In
icheskikh Stiategiy 2005); (ed.), G/obal'noe Soobscheswo: Ka#ograJiia Postsovremenno,
Society: Cartography of Post-Modern World] (Moscow 2002); Mirovoy Sever I Mlmvoy Yug
zatsionnyy Kontekst [The World's North and the World's South: A New Civiizational Co
Rossiyskaia Akademiia Nauk 2002); Transgranlcb'e, Ego Landscbafty I Obitatell [TransLandscapes and Enhabitants [Moscow: Nauchnyy Sovet RAI'I 2002). This review draws
tion of Neklessa's works by Yegor Kholmogorov (note 65) and Vadim Tsymburskii (note
73. Kholmogorov (note 65).
74. See also Tsymburskii (note 66).
75. Ibid.
76. Mitrofanova (note 5) p. 103.
77. The same geographical extension of the Slavic-Orthodox state could be seen
RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHY
Tyutchev, the prominent poet and famous ideologist of Panslavism.
Moscow, Peter's city, and Constantine's city
Are the holy capitals of the Russian realm.
But where its outer limit, where its border,
To north, to east, to south, and where the sun sets?
Destiny will unmask them in ftiture times.
Seven inland seas, and seven great rivers,
From Nile to Neva, from Elbe to China, from Volga
To Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube —
That is the Russian realm. And never will
It pass, as the Spirit foresaw and Daniel predicted. (1848 or 1849)
F. Tyutchev, Poems & politic-al le#ers ofF. I. Tyutcbev. Translated with introd. an
Zeldin (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press 1973), p. 131. Original Russian version:
T. Sokolova (eds). Tn Rima (Moscow: OLMA-Press 2001) p. 5.
78. Mitrofanova (note 5) p. 131.
79. Serbia plays big role in the political mythology of modem Panslavism. It is p
only the natural (and seemingly the only) ally of Russia, but also as a preserve of truly
Orthodox values that have already been lost in Russia. Joint actions of the Westem
Yugoslavia under Miosevic and Republic Serpska under Radovan Karajic have been
Panslavists as proof of their theory of the fight between 'Slavdom' and 'Latindom' (Mitro
p. 132).
80. Nataliia Narochnitskaia, Rossila I Russkle v Mlmvoy Istorli [Russia and Russian
tory] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia 2004); see also N. Narochnitskaia, 'Borb
tiyskoe Pmstranstvo' [Fight for Post-Byzantine Spacel, Nash Sovremennlk 4 (1997).
Thn itt-li Sidorov
s also a specialist on the history of international relations. Narochnitskaia has worked
at the UN headquarters in New York City; currently she is a member of the Russian
puty head of its committee on international affairs.
lo, Mezhdu Zapadom I Vostokom: Opyt Geopollticbeskogo I Istoriosopbskogo Analiza
t and the East: An Experience of Geopolitical and Historiosophical Analysisl (Moscow:
. "Rossiia i Mir: Itogi XX veka' al'manakh, 5/2003.) (Moscow: Russkiy National'nyy
published: Moskva (1996)1 pp. 11—12; A. Nazrenko, Russkoe Samosoznanle Mezbdu
koviu [Russian Self-Conscience: Between Kingdom and Church] Moskva: zhumal
2 (2000), pp. 133—144. K. Smimov and 0. Kataeva, Istoricbeskis V)izov Slavlanskomu
torical Challenge to Slavic Society] (Moscow 2000); Russko-Slavianskaia Tslvlllzatsila:
, Sovrsmennye Geopollticbeskle Pmblemy, Perspektlty Slavlanskoy Vzaimnosti. Comp.
ow 1998).
nova (note 5) p. 129.
nitskaia (note 80) p. 401.
njtskaia (note 80) pp. 125—126
nitskaia (note 80) p. 8.
nova (note 5) p. 128.
nova (note 5) p. 131; Narochnitskaia, ('Bor'ba' note 80) p. 235.
same time, most Panslavists are similar to Fundamentalists (and differ from Eurasiande to the Islamic world, and to a different extent criticise the Eurasianist approach.
that the ideology of Panslavism in modem interpretation is increasingly amorphous
cts becomes reminiscent of Eurasianism. Some Panslavists even support the purely
union of the Orthodox world with the world of Islam. For example, N. Narochnitsal negative (neprlalznennoe) attitude towards Islam, accepts that 'Islamic and Orthot absolute antipodes and have possibility of constructive coexistence in geopolitical
e)", Mitrufanova (note 5) p. 131.
nova (note 5) p. 135.
Mitrofanov, Rossliapered Raspadom Ill Vstuplenlem v Evmsoluz [Russia Between Collapse
pean Union] (Moscow: Ad Marginem 2005). Alexey Mitrofanov is one of the leaders of
R party of Vladimir Zhhmnovskii. In the West LDPR is often erroneously perceived as a
nalist party; however, behind their clever yet superficial right-wing rhetorics is essentially
sation ideology expressed in the party's name, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.
ofanov (note 90) p. 309.
itskii, Kontinent Eurasia [Continent Eurasia] (Moscow: Agraf 1997) p. 92.
nova (note 5) pp. 112—113.
n, Osnovy Geopolitikl [Foundations of Geopolitics] (Moscow: Arktogeia-Tsentr 2000)
nova (note 5) p. 139.
ii Maler, Strategli Sakral'nogo Smysla [Strategies of Scared Meaning] (Moscow:
manifestations of the future Byzantism ideology can be found in works by K. N.
antism I Slavianstijo, Pls'ma Solov'evu, Vladimir Solov'evprohv Danllevskogo) who
t the ideas of Slavic brotherhood.
political and political component of Maler's Eurasian neo-Byzantism is the following:
yzantine (Orthodox) statehood is 'imperial democracy', a strong hierarchical and ceneology is threefold: "1. Russia is the successor of the historical mission of Byzantium,
[is] the Third Rome; 2. The main principle of Russian statehood is the symphony of
f the state and the church. Orthodoxy is the state religion. 3. The main geopolitical
is expansion of the Orthodox tradition, construction of the Eurasian Orthodox empire
whole globe.' Source: A. Maler, 'Sotsial'naia doktrina neovizantizima' [Social Doctrine
(25 August 2005), available at: http://w.w.w.pravaya.ru/governj392/4583.
mple V. Karpets, Imperiia Neizbezhna' [Empire Is Inevitable] (24 June, 1 July 2005),
www.pravaya.ru/1ook13760?print—1>.
dakovskii, Tretly Rim [Third Rome] (Moscow: AIF-Print 2002) p. 15. It is not easy to
of works on the New Chronology: Morozov's works alone constitute 8 big volumes,
sand pages, Fomenko and Nosovskii — more than 10 thousand pages. There are also
ostnikov, books by Valianskii and Kaliuzhny, Guts, Zhabinskii, Efimov and others not
Post-Imperial Third Romes
counting the internet and works by foreign authors. I use here G. Nosovskii and A. Fomen
Rus', Turtsila, Kitay, Evmpa, Egipet. Novala Matematiebeskala KbronOlOgila Drevnostey [
Turkey, China, Europe, Egypt. New Mathematical Chronology of the Ancient] (Moscow: Fa
Also, I draw upon Khodakovskii's book because it is essentially a popular representation o
It provides an accessible overview of various monographs of A. Fomenko and G. Nosov
followers of the New Chronology. For English translations see A. Fomenko, History: Ficti
(Douglas, UK: Delamere Resources Ltd. 2003); 7 volumes expected, so far only two are av
rare scholarly analysis of the New Chronology look at Konstantin Sheiko "LomonoSOV'S B
Identity" (unpu
tom Fomenko, Pseudo-History and Russia's Search for a Post-Communist
thesis) (University of Wollongong 2004).
101. Nosovskii and Fomenko Imperila (note 100), Part 4, Chapter 3 'History of Se
First Ancient Rome, Second New Rome, and three "Third Romes', pp. 358-361, 398—404;
/lib.ru/POMENKOAT/imperia2.Ixt>.
102. Khoclakovskii (note 100) p. 6.
103. Gennady Zyuganov, Geograflia Po&edy [Geography of Victory] (Moscow: Zyu
See also P
available at
PostlzbenleRossii [Understanding Russia] (Moscow: MysI' 2000).
104. Tsygankov (note 1) p. 120.
105. Tsygankov (note 1); Mitrofanova (note 5).
106. Zyuganov (note 103).
107. Zyuganov in 3 Nov. 2000 interview said he would not contrast Communist ideo
gion (Orthodoxy) and repeated the widespread idea that the Mt. Sinai Preaching (Nagoma
and the Moral Codex of the Builders of Communism are essentially not different (Mitrofa
p. 144).
108. Mitrofanova (note 5) p. 147. Perhaps the revanchist Third Romisms of Nazarov
could constitute a special category; they could be treated as a new, specifically post-imper
Third Rome.
109. Matthew Rafael Johnston, The Third Rome: Holy Russia, Tsarlsm; and Ortho
(Washington: The Foundation for Economic Liberty 2004).