ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION1
An international panel of leading experts on terrorism met in Oslo on 9-11 June 2003 to
discuss the root causes of terrorism. This international expert meeting represents the
contribution from the academic and research community to the high-level conference on
“Fighting Terrorism for Humanity” being convened in New York on 22 September 2003. The
findings of the Oslo panel are offered in the form of Issues and Questions for Discussion to
be further developed or elaborated upon during the official statements and panel discussions
of the high-level conference.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section will analyse the preconditions for
terrorism, which are grouped into four different sets of factors: hegemony and power
relations, governance issues, socio-economic factors and cultural and ideological causes. This
section will also illustrate that several widely held ideas about what causes terrorism are
invalid. The second section will look at factors that sustain terrorism. These are often
different from those that cause terrorism and might therefore require different policy
prescriptions. The third section deals with international responses to terrorism and focuses
particularly on the potential and actual role of the United Nations.
I. The Causes of Terrorism
The term “terrorism” is applied to actions by a great diversity of groups with different origins
and goals. Terrorism occurs in wealthy countries as well as in poor countries, in democracies
as well as in authoritarian states. There is no single root cause of terrorism, or even a
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This “Issues for Discussion Paper” is based on Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Findings from an
International Expert Meeting, Conference Report, The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 9–11
June 2003.
common set of causes. There are, however, a number of preconditions and precipitants for the
emergence of various forms of terrorism.
This is not to say, however, that terrorists are just passive pawns of the social, economic and
psychological forces around them. Terrorists make their choices between different options
and tactics, on the basis of the limitations and possibilities of the situation. Terrorism is better
understood as emerging from a process of interaction between different parties rather than
from a mechanical cause-and-effect relationship. It is nevertheless useful to try to identify
some conditions and circumstances that give rise to terrorism, or that at least provide a fertile
ground for radical groups wanting to use terrorist methods to achieve their objectives.
The actual outbreak of terrorism usually follows a specific triggering event. Such a trigger
can be an outrageous act committed by the enemy, defeat in wars, massacres, contested
elections, police brutality, or other provocative events that call for revenge or action. Even
peace talks may trigger terrorist action by spoilers on both sides. The following (and not allinclusive) sets of factors will not address these triggers, but is limited to more structural and
long-term causes.
1) Hegemony and Power Relations
•
Hegemony and inequality of power. When local or international actors possess an
overwhelming power compared to oppositional groups, and the latter see no other
realistic ways to forward their cause by normal political or military means, “asymmetrical
warfare” can represent a tempting option. Terrorism offers the possibility of achieving
high political impact with limited means.
•
Powerful external actors upholding illegitimate governments may be seen as an
insurmountable obstacle to the possibility of regime change. Such external support to
illegitimate governments is frequently seen as foreign domination through puppet regimes
serving the political and economic interests of foreign sponsors.
•
Repression by foreign occupation or by colonial powers has given rise to a great many
national liberation movements that have adopted terrorist tactics or guerrilla warfare.
Despite their use of terrorist methods, some liberation movements enjoy considerable
support and legitimacy among their own constituencies, and sometimes also from
segments of international public opinion.
In this context state sponsorship should not be viewed as a root cause of terrorism. Used
as an instrument in their foreign policies, some states have capitalised on pre-existing terrorist
groups rather than creating them. Terrorist groups have often been the initiators of these
relationships, at times courting several potential state sponsors in order to enhance their own
independence. State sponsorship is clearly an enabling factor of terrorism, giving terrorist
groups a far greater capacity and lethality than they would have on their own. States have
exercised varying degrees of control over the groups they have sponsored, ranging from using
terrorists as “guns for hire” to having virtually no influence at all over their operations. Tight
state control is rare. It is noted that Western democratic governments have occasionally
supported terrorist organizations as a foreign policy means.
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2) Governance Issues
•
Failed or weak states lack the capacity or will to exercise territorial control and maintain
a monopoly of violence. This leaves a power vacuum that terrorist organizations may
exploit to maintain safe havens, training facilities and bases for launching terrorist
operations. At the same time, terrorists may also find safe havens and carry out support
functions in strong and stable democracies, due to the greater liberties that residents
enjoy.
•
Lack of democracy, human rights and the rule of law is a precondition for many forms
of domestic and international terrorism. Moderate levels of coercive violence from the
government or occupying power tend to fuel the fire of dissent. Dissident activities may
in some circumstances be suppressed by governments willing to resort to extreme
brutality. However, such draconian force is beyond the limits of what democratic nations
should be willing to use. And, as discussed below, reprisals may actually help to sustain
terrorism.
•
Illegitimate or corrupt governments frequently give rise to opposition that may turn to
terrorist means if other avenues are not seen as realistic options for replacing these
regimes with a more credible and legitimate government – or a regime which represents
the values and interests of the opposition movement.
•
Failure or unwillingness by the state to integrate dissident groups or emerging social
classes may lead to their alienation from the political system. Some groups are excluded
because they hold views or represent political traditions considered irreconcilable with
the basic values of the state. Large groups of highly educated young people with few
prospects of meaningful careers within a blocked system will tend to feel alienated and
frustrated. Excluded groups are likely to search for alternative channels through which to
express and promote political influence and change. To some, terrorism can seem the
most effective and tempting option.
3) Socio-Economic Factors
•
Rapid modernization in the form of high economic growth has also been found to
correlate strongly with the emergence of ideological terrorism, but not with ethnonationalist terrorism. This may be particularly important in countries where sudden
wealth (e.g. from oil) has precipitated a change from traditional to high-tech societies in
one generation or less. When traditional norms and social patterns crumble or are made to
seem irrelevant, new radical ideologies (sometimes based on religion and/or nostalgia for
a glorious past) may become attractive to certain segments of society. Modern society
also facilitates terrorism by providing access to rapid transportation and communication,
news media, weapons, etc.
•
The experience of social injustice is a main motivating cause behind social
revolutionary terrorism. Relative deprivation or great differences in income distribution
(rather than absolute deprivation or poverty) in a society have in some studies been found
to correlate rather strongly with the emergence of social revolutionary political violence
and terrorism, but less with ethno-nationalist terrorism.
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•
The experience of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin is the chief
root cause of ethno-nationalist terrorism. When sizeable minorities are systematically
deprived of their rights to equal social and economic opportunities, obstructed from
expressing their cultural identities (e.g. forbidden to use their language or practice their
religion), or excluded from political influence, this can give rise to secessionist
movements that may turn to terrorism or other forms of violent struggle. Ethnic
nationalisms are more likely to give rise to (and justify) terrorism than are moderate and
inclusive civic nationalisms.
Contrary to widely held belief, however, there is only a weak and indirect relationship
between poverty and terrorism. At the individual level, terrorists are generally not drawn
from the poorest segments of their societies. Typically, they are at average or above average
levels in terms of education and socio-economic background. Poor people are more likely to
take part in simpler forms of political violence than terrorism, such as riots. Moreover, the
level of terrorism is not particularly high in the poorest countries of the world. Terrorism is
more commonly associated with countries with a medium level of economic development,
often emerging in societies characterized by rapid modernization and transition. However,
poverty has frequently been used as justification for social revolutionary terrorists, who may
claim to represent the poor and marginalized without being poor themselves. Although not
specifically a root cause of terrorism, poverty is a social evil that should be fought for its own
reasons.
4) Ideological and Cultural Factors
•
A culture of violence. Historical antecedents of political violence, civil wars, revolutions,
dictatorships or occupation may lower the threshold for acceptance of political violence
and terrorism, and impede the development of non-violent norms among all segments of
society. The victim role as well as longstanding historical injustices and grievances may
be constructed to serve as justifications for terrorism. When young children are socialized
into cultural value systems that celebrate martyrdom, revenge and hatred of other ethnic
or national groups, this is likely to increase their readiness to support or commit violent
atrocities when they grow up.
•
Extremist ideologies of a secular or religious nature are at least an intermediate
cause of terrorism, although people usually adopt such extremist ideologies as a
consequence of more fundamental political or personal reasons. When these worldviews
are adopted and applied in order to interpret situations and guide action, they tend to take
on a dynamic of their own, and may serve to dehumanise the enemy and justify atrocities.
•
The presence of charismatic ideological leaders able to transform widespread
grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle is a decisive factor
behind the emergence of a terrorist movement or group. The existence of grievances
alone is only a precondition: someone is needed who can translate that into a program for
violent action.
All this, of course, is not to say that terrorism, in particular suicide terrorism, is caused
by religion (or more specifically Islam) as such. Many suicide terrorists around the world
are secular, or belong to religions other than Islam. Suicide terrorists are motivated mainly by
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political goals—usually to end foreign occupation or domestic domination by a different
ethnic group. Their “martyrdom” is, however, frequently legitimized and glorified with
reference to religious ideas and values.
In this context it should also be pointed out that terrorists are not insane or irrational
actors. Symptoms of psychopathology are not common among terrorists. Neither do suicide
terrorists, as individuals, possess the typical risk factors of suicide. There is no common
personality profile that characterizes most terrorists, who appear to be relatively normal
individuals. Terrorists may follow their own rationalities based on extremist ideologies or
particular terrorist logics, but they are not irrational.
Questions for Consideration
1) Two years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, what conditions and circumstances
continue to give rise to terrorism or at least provide a fertile ground for radical groups
wanting to use terrorist methods to achieve their objectives?
2) Terrorism occurs in many countries in both the developed and developing world. Why
has terrorism emanated more from some regions – e.g., the Middle East, Asia and Latin
America –rather than from others – e.g., Africa, which also experiences profound
poverty and social inequities? What conclusions can be drawn?
3) How can the cleavages in perceptions and experience between the West and the
Islamic world be overcome?
4) To what extent is terrorism in the post-Cold War era driven by ideological and/or
historical antecedents? To what extent are terrorist groups driven into “asymmetrical
warfare” by the reality or perception of contemporary inequitable power relations?
II. Factors Sustaining Terrorism
Terrorism is often sustained for reasons different from those which gave rise to it in the first
place. It is therefore not certain that terrorism will end even if the grievances that gave rise to
it, or the root causes, are somehow addressed. Terrorist groups may change purpose, goals
and motivation over time.
•
Cycles of revenge. As a response to terrorist atrocities, reprisals are generally popular
with broad segments of the public. However, this tends to be the case on both sides,
which may try to outdo each other in taking revenge to satisfy their respective
constituencies. Deterrence often does not work against non-state terrorist actors. Violent
reprisals may even have the opposite effect of deterrence because many terrorist groups
want to provoke over-reactions. Policies of military reprisal to terrorist actions may
become an incentive to further terrorism, as uncompromising militants seek to undermine
moderation and political compromise.
•
The need of the group to provide for its members or for the survival of the group
itself may also cause a terrorist group to change its main objectives or to continue its
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struggle longer than it otherwise would have - e.g. to effect the release of imprisoned
members or to sustain its members economically.
•
Profitable criminal activities to finance their political and terrorist campaigns may
eventually give terrorist groups vested interests in continuing their actions long after they
realize that their political cause is lost. Alternatively, some continue even if many of their
political demands have been met.
•
No exit. With “blood on their hands” and having burnt all bridges back to mainstream
society, some terrorist groups and individuals continue their underground struggle
because the only alternative is long-term imprisonment or death. Serious consideration
should be given to ways of bringing the insurgent movement back into the political
process, or at least offering individual terrorists a way out (such as reduced sentences or
amnesty) if they break with their terrorist past and cooperate with the authorities. Such
policies have in fact helped to bring terrorism to an end in several countries.
Questions for Consideration
1) Which strategies are more effective in combating terrorism – those addressing
preconditions or those addressing sustaining factors of terrorism?
2) Under what circumstances is it feasible to offer groups espousing terrorist tactics
the alternative possibility of participation in a legitimate political process?
III. International Responses to Global Terrorism
Several of the causes of terrorism described above are of such a nature that they might be
addressed and influenced in a direction that would make them less likely to produce
terrorism. However, there are also a number of root causes (or preconditions) of terrorism
that cannot be “removed” because they are beyond our capacity to change.
Many terrorist insurgencies will not come to an end before their root causes are addressed
and fundamental grievances and rights are provided for. However, terrorism will not
necessarily disappear even if the root causes are dealt with – because terrorism is often
sustained for reasons other than those which produced it. That is why the international
community should pay particular attention to the factors that sustain terrorism.
In counter-terrorism efforts, it is crucial to uphold democratic principles and maintain moral
and ethical standards while fighting terrorism. Increased repression and coercion are likely to
feed terrorism, rather than reducing it. Extremist ideologies that promote hatred and terrorism
should be confronted on ideological grounds by investing more effort into challenging them
politically, and not only by the use of coercive force.
Many of the causes of terrorism are also the causes of rebellious guerrilla warfare, riots and
other forms of political violence. What distinguishes terrorist violence from other forms of
violence used in waging political and armed conflict is its criminal and normless character,
with deliberate attacks on civilians, indiscriminate bombings, the taking of hostages – tactics
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that would qualify as war crimes in conventional armed conflicts. Thus, acts of terrorism can
be seen as the peacetime equivalents of war crimes.
We need insights into the causes and processes leading up to terrorist atrocities if we are to
identify possible avenues of prevention, early intervention, or ways of breaking the vicious
circle of terrorist revenge and counter-revenge. Such understanding does not mean accepting
or justifying the use of terrorist methods. The political goals for which terrorists wage
conflict may be legitimate in some cases and unjust in others – but deliberate and indiscriminate targeting of civilians as a tactic to achieve these goals is never acceptable.
The Role of the United Nations Since 9/11
The United Nations has a long-standing involvement in the global fight against terrorism.
Since 1973 twelve anti-terrorism Conventions have been adopted within the framework of the
United Nations General Assembly. These Conventions play a major role in providing for
universal jurisdiction and a global extradition regime. Over the last decade the UN Security
Council has adopted sanctions regimes against several states involved in assisting and
harbouring international terrorist organizations.
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 focused
unprecedented attention on the issue of international terrorism as an urgent matter for the
United Nations. The Security Council responded promptly on 12 September 2001, with an
unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks (UNSC Resolution 1368) and on 28
September 2001, with Resolution 1373, a landmark resolution which requires all member
states, under Chapter of the UN Charter, to take specific actions to combat terrorism. The
resolution also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee to assist member states in
developing the legal, political and operational capacity to carry out their responsibilities
under this resolution.
However, it is broadly recognized that much more needs to be done in order to enable the
United Nations to play an even stronger role in mobilizing governments and NGOs to deal
cooperatively with the continuing threat of international terrorism. At an IPA Conference in
October 2002 a number of representatives from developing countries held that the UN needed
to adopt a holistic approach that integrates responsiveness to the perceived and actual
grievances of peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America with the post-9/11 security agenda.
These are the challenges that confront participants at this conference.
Questions for Consideration
1) What steps can the international community take to encourage greater respect for
democracy, human rights and the rule of law?
2) What priority steps can be taken to assist weak states to develop their capacity to
prevent terrorist groups from operating on their territory?
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3) How can the perceived and/or actual adverse impact of modernization and
globalization on developing societies be constructively addressed in a manner that
will reduce or transform ideological terrorism into viable political dialogue?
4) What steps can the international community take - e.g. through the influence of
religious leaders, reform of educational curricula, or other non-coercive steps - to
reduce the recourse to cycles of revenge and demonization of perceived or actual
political opponents?
5) How can the international community advance the understanding that the deliberate
targeting and killing of civilians is unacceptable in all circumstances, regardless of
the perceived or actual legitimacy of the goals?
IV. Appendix: The International Expert Panel
The experts listed below were speakers and chairs at the International Expert Meeting on
“Root Causes of Terrorism” in Oslo. Summaries of their individual presentations and
biographical details are available at the following address: http://www.end-terror.org. The
findings described are conclusions drawn by the chairman on the basis of presentations and
discussions. Each individual expert on the panel may not necessarily agree with every
conclusion or statement in this report.
Speakers (in order of appearance in the conference program):
Dr. Tore Bjørgo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway
(Introduction on “Root Causes of Terrorism”)
Prof. Dipak Gupta, San Diego State University, USA/India (Exploring Roots of
Terrorism)
Dr. Michael Stohl, Univ. of California, Santa Barbara, USA (Expected Utility and State
Terrorism)
Prof. Farid el-Khazen, American University of Beirut, Lebanon (Patterns of State
Failure: The Case of Lebanon)
Executive Dean Louise Richardson, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard
University, USA/Ireland (State Sponsorship − A Root Cause of Terrorism?)
Asst. Prof. Jitka Melackova, Charles University, Czech Republic (Poverty and Terrorism
– Is There a Causal Connection?)
Dr. Abdullah Sahar Mohammed, University of Kuwait (Roots of Terrorism in the Middle
East: Internal Pressures and International Constraints)
Prof. Jerrold M. Post, George Washington University, USA (When Hatred is Bred in the
Bone: Social Psychology Dimensions of Terrorism)
Prof. Ariel Merari, University of Tel Aviv, Israel (Social, Organisational and
Psychological Factors in Suicide Terrorism)
Dr. John Horgan, University College, Cork, Ireland (Social and Psychological
Characteristics of Terrorism and Terrorists)
Dir. Francois Burgat, French Centre for Yemeni Studies, Yemen/France (Root Causes to
Local and International Terrorism: Between Analysis and Obscuring Lenses)
Dr. Hisham Ahmed, Birzeit University, Palestine (Palestinian Resistance and ‘Suicide
Bombing’)
Prof. Bassam Tibi, University of Göttingen, Germany/Syria (Islamist Fundamentalism
and Terrorism)
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Prof. Fernando Reinares, King Juan Carlos University, Spain (National Separatism and
Terrorism)
Prof. Em. Peter Waldmann, University of Augsburg, Germany (Left-wing Terrorism in
Latin America and Europe)
Prof. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, University of Bielefeld, Germany (Right-wing Terrorism)
Consultant Alison Jamieson, Italy/Britain (The Use of Terrorism by Organised Crime)
Dr. Charles Goredema, Institute for Security Studies, Cape Town (Organised Crime, War
& Terror in Southern Africa - An Analysis of a Noxious Cocktail)
Dr. Andrew Silke, University of Leicester, UK (Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State
Counter-measures in Causing Terrorism, and What Needs to be Done)
Federico Andreu-Guzman, International Commission of Jurists, Geneva/Colombia
(Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights Abuses in Colombia) [could not
attend due to illness]
D.R. Kaarthikeyan, legal consultant, New Delhi, India (Root Causes of Terrorism: A
Case Study of the Tamil Insurgency and the LTTE)
Dr. Joshua Sinai, Anser Analytic Services, Virginia, USA (Which Root Causes are
Possible to Influence?)
Dr. Alex P. Schmid, Terrorism Prevention Branch, UN Office of Drugs and Crime,
Vienna (Prevention of Terrorism: Towards a Multi-pronged Approach)
Additional session chairs:
Espen Barth Eide, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway.
Uzi Arad, Institute of Policy and Strategy, Israel.
Ekaterina Stepanova, Center for International Security, Russian Academy of Sciences,
Russia.
Brynjar Lia, The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Norway.
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