"Greatness" Revisited: Evaluating the Performance of Early American Presidents in Terms of
Cultural Dilemmas
Author(s): Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky
Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, Presidential Greatness in Peace and in
War (Winter, 1991), pp. 15-34
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27550661 .
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"Greatness" Revisited: Evaluating
The Performance of Early American
in Terms of Cultural Dilemmas
Presidents
RICHARD ELLIS
AARON WILDAVSKY
Political ScienceDepartment
and Survey Research Center
University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
A president'sability to resolveculturaldilemmasprovidesa standardbywhich we
can
judge presidential
success and
failure.
"Great"
presidents,
we
suggest,
are those who
provide
solutions to culturaldilemmas.Using this criterion,wefind that of thefirst sixteenpresidents
(fromthe
founding of therepublicthroughtheCivilWar), GeorgeWashington,ThomasJefferson,
as great
We also conclude that
Jackson, and Abraham Lincoln qualify
presidents.
andJames Polk,
considered "near great" presidents, are
John Adams
commonly
greatly overrated.
Andrew
What
is themark of a "great" president?Will Ronald Reagan be inducted
into this select class? If not
he be remembered
as
merely
a Great
then how
Average,
about
or worse
a Near
still,
Great president? Or will
a Failure? Does
he deserve a
ranking higher or lower thanJimmy Carter? Lyndon Johnson? Dwight Eisenhower?
Truman?
How
does his performance
that of James Madison,
compare with
or
Andrew
and academics will soon earnestly address
John Tyler
Jackson? Journalists
to the
themselves
of how our 39th president measures
question
up against his illus
trious and less than illustrious
predecessors.
a
the accepted way of rendering
Polling
panel of "experts" has become
history's
of
The
judgement
presidential
greatness game began in ear
performance.
presidential
nest in 1948, when Arthur
to grade
asked fifty-five prominent
historians
Schlesinger
our past
A
presidents:
signified Great; B, Near Great; C, Average; D, Below Average;
and E, Failure. Believing
there to be wisdom
in numbers,
surveys have
subsequent
the
of
to
in
571
from
1970
953
in
1983.1
expanded
panel
"experts"
The practice of evaluating presidential
is a cu
performance
by polling historians
are
rious one. Characteristically
to
conducted
obtain information
about the
surveys
either in the form of preferences?which
candidate or party do you prefer?
respondent,
or beliefs about the
are in the House of
many members
empirical world?how
Represen
tatives. We do not as a rule conduct
to
a claim.
the
surveys
gauge
validity of
Why
then do we do so with
The answer is that we
respect to presidential
performance?
Harry
lack agreed upon
criteria
for making
these judgements.
15
If we
had accepted
criteria,
16
STUDIES QUARTERLY
I PRESIDENTIAL
we would
to
be superfluous
need only
surveys would
(and subject
corroboration);
to check presidential
the
established
against
yardsticks.
performance
?
about the respondents
While
these surveys have yielded interesting information
historians
and Blessing's
Murray
poll, for instance, finds that American
specializing
esteem
in
in women's
much
than the sample
hold
lower
George Washington
history
are not a
as a whole
is
There
?they
good tool to evaluate presidential
performance.
no reason to think the mean
of 1000 historians more valid than the esti
judgement
mate of a single scholar
in
In so far as our aim is to com
past presidents.
specializing
rather
than
the
of
about the pollees,
pare
presidents,
gather information
performances
energies should be directed to devising appropriate criteria for evaluating performance.
The original Schlesinger
the issue of criteria to
survey completely
sidestepped
instructions
in the first poll
The
be used in appraising presidential
only
performance.
case
were that "the test in each
in
is
anything done before
performance
office, omitting
or after."2 How
one was to gauge the
was left
in
In
office
unspecified.
performance
the absence of such criteria, the finding that president X ranked higher than president
to interpret.
Y was difficult
to remedy this
Stephen Bailey attempted
deficiency
by
He came up with
which
be
measured.
could
identifying
through
presidents
for measuring
administra
achievement,
greatness:
forty-three yardsticks
presidential
tive capacity, appointees,
blunders,
industriousness,
scandals,
sensitivity,
eloquence,
as to
and many more.3
If the Schlesinger
survey suffered from a lack of guidelines
In Presidential
Greatness,
criteria
the surfeit of tests devised by Bailey left the reader with
of comparability,
broader view of the many facets of the presidency but equally helpless.
commendably
and excluding nothing we were no better than before at evalu
By including everything
the unit
a
ating
presidential
performance.
the standard of presidential
Often
measures
such as amount
greatness
employs
or number of
of legislation
passed, activity in office,
objectives
pursued. But these
criteria create a pronounced
bias towards activist presidents. That such criteria sneak
in ideological judgements
about the ends of government
is indicated by Schlesinger's
conclusion
that the 1962 survey showed that average or mediocre
presidents "believed
to the
in negative government,
in self-subordination
should
legislative power."4 Why
a contemporary
to
activist view?the
is
best
that
adds
functions
govern
presidency
a standard for scholars?
ment
and/or the presidency?be
of presidential
Though
acutely aware of the limitations
ratings as presently con
we
not
a
do
the
claim
eminent
that
ducted,
accept
"comparing
figures is only
game,"
or that "each
a
within
environment."5
unique political
By taking
[president] operated
aim at the easy target of presidential
is deflected
away from what
ratings, attention
we
to wrap each
is a more
contend
defect ?the
and
significant
tendency
president
to
his times in a unique cocoon,
the
of
the
thereby reducing
study
presidency
political
as James
Burns correctly pointed out two decades
biography. The result,
MacGregor
about the Presidents
and nothing
about the Presi
ago, is that "We know everything
dency."6
compare
parisons
It would
be both
ironic and unfortunate
to discredit
presidencies
administrations.
among
for the most
well-known
effort
to
com
the laudable, indeed essential, goal of making
The presidential greatness game remains popular pre
REVISITED| 17
"GREATNESS"
it holds up
cisely because
aim is to do just that.
Resolving
presidents
to resolve
ability
provide
evaded,
to
solutions
culture we
By political
tries. All those residing
political culture. Rather
i.e. the conflict
peting
political
between
cultures:
of comparing
A Mark
presidencies.
Our
of Greatness
kinds and intensi
dilemmas,
a
we
criterion for evalu
these dilemmas,
believe, provides
can be evaluated in terms
Our hypothesis
is that presidencies
face cultural
ating their performance.
of dilemmas
confronted,
who
prospect
Cultural Dilemmas:
All
ties. Their
the tantalizing
created
albeit of different
or overcome.
"Great"
induced dilemmas.
culturally
do not mean national customs.
Nor
presidents
are those
are cultures
coun
are not,
as we use the term, adherents of the same
we
a
of cultural dissensus,
analyze politics from
perspective
cultures or ways of life.We posit the existence of three com
and egalitarian.7 The type of leader
hierarchical,
individualist,
in America
and the kinds of support given to and demands made upon
ship preferred
we
culture.
leaders,
vary by political
hypothesize,
to maximize
au
is
The individualist
the scope of individual
regime
organized
minimize
and
thus
need
the
for
Individualist
tonomy
regimes perform a
authority.
and feared,
act between
are needed and
leaders when
rid
balancing
having
they
getting
are not.
as
of them when
as
much
im
the
they
Ideally, they give up only
autonomy
mediate
the leader who overstays his
dread most
engagement
requires. Individualists
welcome.
Adherents
of individualist
that from the leader flows the
regimes know
delicate
ranks are found policemen
and tax collectors.
hierarchy and among its multitudinous
Not wanting
the one, they choose not to have the other any
longer than absolutely
Groucho
that
to
believe
leader
Marx,
necessary. Following
any
they
strong enough
too
to
is
them
be trusted.
strong
help
are dedicated
to
differences
Egalitarians
among people. Would-be
diminishing
are thus in trouble before
leaders
for
is a prima-facie
egalitarian
they start,
authority
case of
to
of one person
inequality. Followership,
egalitarians,
implies subordination
to another. If
to
themselves
lead
rather
than merely
forward, attempting
they push
or
leaders will be attacked for attempting
to lord
discussion,
convening
facilitating
it over others. Aspiring
at once
leaders must
therefore dissemble,
about
persuasive
as if
the right course to follow and
were
not
at
all.
self-effacing,
they
leading
a
easier. Prospective
leaders
Exercising
leadership in hierarchical
regime is much
are
to lead;
in
inheres
con
The
that
and
expected
authority
position.
regime
guides
strains them gives consistent
advice: leadership is necessary,
should
and, therefore,
be supported. Fearing disorder, hierarchies
shore up authority
in every way they can.
in
are
While
the
absolved from blame. Differences
credit, leaders
sharing
generally
or
in prestige
that
are
of authority
in a hierarchy
accompany
privilege
positions
the
sacrifices
of
name
in
the
the
of
the
whole.
greater
legitimized by
required
superior
Errors are attributed to the deviance of subordinates. Because
somuch
they give
backing
to leaders, however, hierarchies
fear the charismatic
leader who,
instead of working
its notions of
through the hierarchy, obeying
reciprocal restraints, substitutes himself
for the law, thereby breaking
down all previous distinctions.
18
STUDIES QUARTERLY
I PRESIDENTIAL
not a substitute
theory is
in interaction with
historical
for historical
Cultural
analysis. The instruments of policy
was a
that government
Believing
emerge
experience.
source of
in the early republic sought to limit
for instance, egalitarians
inequality,
to interfere with
the central government's
the natural equality generated by
ability
of the
American
conditions. After the rise of corporate capitalism and the depression
came to believe that the national government
was a
1930s, by contrast,
egalitarians
source of greater
experience had altered their beliefs about
equality. Historical
potential
the desirability of government
action, but their objective?increased
equality?remained
the same. Similarly,
active national
more
the Federalist
government
successors
their Republican
however,
ment because of a belief
America
and hierarchy desired a
in the modern
era,
tendencies;
of individualism
egalitarian
have wished
for a less interventionist
that it would
govern
in redistributive
engage
policies.
weak hier
strong individualism,
by relatively
and waning
This means what Alexis de Tocqueville
egalitarianism.
is
have said it does: support for authority
and Samuel Huntington
has been
archy, and waxing
and Louis Hartz
alliance
to counter
characterized
individuals desiring
relatively weak in America.8 With
egalitarians rejecting authority,
to
to escape from it, and hierarchical
forces too weak
impose it, presidents
seeking
are in a
to rely on formal
alone
This anti-authority
precarious
position.
authority
's emphasis on persuasion,9
cultural context justifies Richard Neustadt
for that iswhat
inherent in their position.
presidents must do when
they cannot rely on the authority
are
like
other
National
social
political parties,
organizations,
complex
composed
of more
culture. The Democratic
than one political
under
Andrew
Jackson,
party
for example,
its opposition
constituted
to
an alliance
of individualism
this coalition
was
and egalitarianism.
United
by
The
Jackso
virulently
anti-authority.
a belief that minimal
in
intervention
government
together by
increase equality of condition.
individual
their
shared distrust
Despite
of hierarchy, however,
the individualist
is
alliance with
egalitarianism
problematic,
to
for individualists may find egalitarian opposition
their prefer
inequality constrains
ence for
personal gain through
risk-taking.
nian
hierarchy,
alliance was
kept
lives would
rule by individualism
in cur
and hierarchy, a cultural combination
known
rent
as "the establishment,"
an
to
is
those
individualists
who
parlance
option open
find the alliance with
undesirable.
Individualists
order
sufficient
get
egalitarianism
to carry on
and bargaining, while
and flexibility
bidding
hierarchy gains the growth
itmight
lack. Despite
these mutual benefits,
otherwise
the establishment
alliance too
Joint
suffers from disagreements.
of conditions
If individualists
find the egalitarian benchmark
of equality
also be frustrated by hierarchy's penchant
for
constricting,
they may
and regulations.
are drawn from a
The following
examples
larger project that applies this cultural
to
all
from
analysis
presidents
Washington
through Lincoln. We have focused on early
in
so that
because
the
of
part
yesteryear have cooled sufficiently
presidents
passions
are more
to
these presidencies
we
be
treated dispassionately.
Were
concerned
likely
rules
the performance
of recent presidents, we fear that disagreement
with
evaluating
the policies of these presidents would
interfere with
the purpose of evaluating
and
we
To
those
who
doubt
this
remind
them
of
the
comparing
presidencies.
proposition
with
REVISITED| 19
"GREATNESS"
angry
reaction
low ranking in a recent greatness poll drew from Atlanta
accused the raters of "insensitive
elitism."10 Speaking
who
that Carter's
Mayor Andrew Young,
or James
ill of John Adams
Four
Great
Polk, we
Presidents:
trust, will
Washington,
not
the same reaction.
engender
Jefferson,
Jackson
and
Lincoln
We
propose
the president with
two primary
categories
of cultural dilemmas.
The
first involves
some blend of egalitarian and individualist cultural propensities.
All
and Jacksonian
labored, with
Jeffersonian
presidents
varying degrees of success,
to square their own and their followers'
the exercise
anti-authority
principles with
of executive authority. The second type is the president of hierarchical cultural propen
sities. While
the precise contours of the dilemma varied with
the historical
situation
and configuration
all hierarchical
of cultures,
in one form or
presidents
struggled,
to
reconcile their, and their party's, hierarchical
cultural preferences with
the
another,
anti-hierarchical
in the society and polity. This conflict animated the
ethos dominant
presidencies
of George Washington,
as hamstringing Whig
John Adams
and John Quincy
Adams,
as well
leaders such asHenry Clay andDaniel Webster who aspired
to the
Jefferson and Andrew
Jackson provided
presidency. Thomas
tural dilemmas
of the first type, George Washington
and Abraham
second type.
solutions
Lincoln
to cul
to the
George Washington
President-raters
agree
was a great
that George Washington
president. But
liesWashington's
the
greatness? Stripping away
myths surrounding "the godlike
has
left
the
basis
con
of
his
unclear.
If, asMarcus Cunliffe
Washington"
preeminence
wherein
he was
"a good man, not a saint; a competent
soldier, not a great one; an
a
not
statesman
of genius," what made him "an exceptional
administrator,
can
How
and honest ?a
which
characterization
well
figure?"11
good,
competent
a
to
describes Jimmy Carter?sum
up
great president?
The deepest fear of an individualist
is the
culture, we have suggested,
political
leader who overstays his welcome.
con
conscious
of
this
fear, Washington
Acutely
reassured
his
to
of
his
desire
down
after he
countrymen
tinually
step
immediately
had completed
his assigned task. Before assuming command
ar
of the Revolutionary
a
that
he
"no
harbored
mies, he told the Continental
lust
for
In
Congress
power."
letter to the governors
of the states upon the
of
the
disbanding
Army, Washington
to "share in
insisted that he had no wish
public business hereafter," longing only for
"the shade of retirement."12 Both as
general and as president he repeatedly declared
his aversion to the glare of public life and his
for "the shadow of my own
preference
vine and my own fig tree."13While
were
Washington's
public pronouncements
ideally
suited to alleviate the prevalent fears of power, itwas his actions ? twice
retiring from
the most powerful office in the land ? that
him
the
brought
country's highest accolades.
to make his
and
offers
power,
By voluntarily
relinquishing
spurning
leadership
the
became
of
individualist political leadership. "Com
permanent, Washington
paragon
to a
mitment
culture," Barry Schwartz
argues, "showed up in the form of
political
cludes,
honest
I PRESIDENTIAL
20
STUDIES QUARTERLY
a "visible
to aman." Washington's
self-denying behavior made him
symbol"
In being good he thus became great. That
values and tendencies.14
of individualist
devotion
was
Washington
in office.
he was
revered for leaving
office did not,
however,
guarantee
support when
cultural dilemma was that he was a president
pri
president, Washington's
a society where
was
in
hierarchical
individualism
of
propensities15
predomi
marily
severe limits on the substance of power,
nant. With
had to make do with
Washington
As
aware of the
bias against central
Painfully
Revolutionary
an
new government's
the
nurtured
Before
rule, Washington
reputation.
carefully
assurances
nominee
federal
for
he
that
the
instance,
nouncing
appointments,
sought
a
would
accept in order to avoid the government
being embarrassed by candidate refusing
the appearance
to
of power.
serve.16
Where
ment
seemly
he could, Washington
factions
among disputatious
among
disagreements
over
create agree
that would
presided
bargains
that he could neither control nor overawe. Un
he believed, undermined
Secretary Alexander Hamilton's
elites,
Washington
supported Treasury
because he was persuaded by his experience
was essential
to gaining
financial
solvency
the domestic
Rather
under
the Articles
for authority.
funding of the debt
respect
of Confederation
that
the respect of foreign governments
and
Hamilton's
financial schemes were
than ask whether
population.
con
Madison
and Jefferson did?Washington
asked whether
equitable?as
they would
to
the
tribute
of the central government.
prestige
to
tried
enhance the government's
and strength
image of competence
Washington
was
not
to
it
federal
where
the
power
purpose but
by employing
merely
adequate
as in the
were
So
anxious
Hamilton
Rebellion.
andWashington
overwhelming,
Whiskey
to demonstrate
to put down
that the military
force they gathered
authority,
rivaled the total fighting
force of the entire Revolutionary
army.
the impressive
Beneath
lurked the government's
appearance of strength
thinly dis
for the massive military
force was not awell-trained
national standing
guised weakness,
a
state
but
rather
of
militias.
army,
disorganized
conglomeration
It was in the realm of foreign relations
was most
that Washington
successful
federal
the local rebellion
in avoiding the embarrassments
that might discredit central authority. The first presi
dent's foreign policy resolved the dilemma of a hierarchical regime in a nonhierarchical
a commitment
to a strong central government with
an
by combining
appreci
for the limits of authority
in America.
National
defense had been a compelling
the Articles
for jettisoning
argument
in favor of a stronger central government.17
of Confederation
But having ceded the au
to secure the nation from attack, individualists
and
thority they believed necessary
context
ation
were loathe to further extend its influence.
to minimize
the need
egalitarians
Hoping
for authority, Jefferson and his followers were driven to constantly
the
threat
downplay
on
nations.
Great
William
Branch
Giles
the
House
Britain,
posed by foreign
argued
a Court,
a no
under the weight
of a King,
floor, was a dying hierarchy "tottering
a
and
all
the
of
armies, navies, debts,
bility,
priesthood,
op
complicated machinery
pression.18 The Federalists, in contrast, desiring to promote hierarchical relations domes
tically,
continually
played
up
threats
from
abroad.
REVISITED| 21
"GREATNESS"
When Citizen Edmond Gen?t arrived in theUnited States in the spring of 1793
as a
with
special emissary from
enthusiastic
popular
of France, he was greeted
Republic
all European
declared itself at war with
applause. Having
that sending Gen?t to America would
promote American
the newly-proclaimed
France hoped
monarchies,
for
the cause of "liberty, equality and fraternity." Republicans
support
adopted the
as akin to their own. "The
French Revolution
earth," gushed
liberty of the whole
on
success
armies.
the
of
the
French
that
Jefferson, hinged
Fearing
popular enthusiasm
an
nation
into a holy war
a Proclamation
on behalf
of liberty and equality,
of
Neutrality.19
Washington
responded by issuing
was
news that Britain
Popular antipathy towards the British
subsequently fanned by
had seized 250 unsuspecting
in
and unarmed American
the West
Indies. The
ships
might
sweep
unprepared
anx
Federalists,
press urged retaliation; war seemed imminent.
Republican
though
ious to avoid war with Britain, were nonetheless
determined
that the nation be ade
and his allies in Congress
quately prepared for that eventuality. Hamilton
pressed for
taxes and strengthened
armed forces. But while Republicans
a
to
with
hard
line
restrictions
eager
respect to commercial
adopt
increased
were
in Congress
against the
to
to
still
refused
efforts
national
defense.
British,
support
they
strengthen
Given
to support a
the opposition's
reluctance
in national
defense,
build-up
to
in
that involvement
affairs was
Washington
correctly perceived
European
likely
result in a humiliated
national government. Washington's
Farewell Address provided
a creative solution to this dilemma.
It disarmed the Republican
opposition
by echoing
the familiar warning
alliances." Republicans
could see in these
against "entangling
words an affirmation of their isolationism.
In the
view, European
struggles
Republican
were
to be avoided because power
was the road to
executive
ag
politics
corruption,
and standing armies.
motivation
for warning
in foreign dis
embroiled
Washington's
against becoming
was
new
He
different.
feared
that
the
nation,
putes, however,
radically
through mis
or
fortune
dis
fervor, would be drawn into awar that would
ideological
thoroughly
grandizement
the new national government.
Once
the revolutionary
"infancy" had passed
to
and the people had gotten over their hostility
standing armies, executive power,
central government,
taxation and debt, then and only then,
believed,
Washington
credit
would
a
America
leading position
time preparations,
tures that
might
be able to throw
in the world
itself onto
the global scales of power and assume
In the absence of public support for peace
American military
forces to ven
committing
of nations.20
avoided
Washington
the
weakness
beneath
expose
the carefully
cultivated
appearance
of
strength.
at
So successful was Washington
the appearance of power for the
substituting
the erroneous
reality of power that his successor, John Adams, was left with
impres
a hierarchical
sion that the president
in
Where
system.
operated
political
Washington,
that hierarchy was weak
in America,
recognizing
support for au
carefully nurtured
Adams
assumed
that
in
inhered
thority,
support for authority
position. The president,
in Adams'
the correct decision
and others would
view, had only to announce
obey.
His solomon-like
to
in
1799
the French,
pronouncement
reopen negotiations with
early
as
throwing his party into total disarray, reflected his vision of the president
perched
22
I
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
structure, responsible
atop a hierarchical
the parts in the name of the whole. Not
for keeping the peace by arbitrating between
having consulted anyone prior to announcing
no one had a stake in
it. Long time congressional
supporters
defending
his decision,
of the President
hurled
abuse at Adams;
cabinet members
ran for cover, assuring
friends
no part in the "insane" action.
they had
his own hierar
Adams'
son, John Quincy Adams, was no better at reconciling
the anti-authority
chical dispositions with
bias of the political system. His presidency
a refusal to
was
to advance his
severely hampered by
exploit patronage
policy objec
a matter
to be agreed upon,
tives. Believing
and
of neutral
policy
implementation
that
as above or apart from
Adams viewed his subordinates
competence,
politics. Conse
was
even if,
to dismiss
those whom
he considered
unwilling
quently he
qualified,
as in the case of the postmaster
to
McLean,
patronage
general John
they dispensed
It is no coincidence
that John Quincy Adams,
like John Adams,
opponents.
a
term in the
lasted only
or, for that matter, Jimmy Carter,
single
presidency. These
were hierarchs without
a
i.e.
leaders un
presidents
hierarchy,
hierarchically
disposed
to make allowances
nature of the American
able or unwilling
for the anti-leadership
Adams'
system.
political
Thomas Jefferson
With
Thomas
Jefferson's
in 1800, Jeffersonian Republicans
faced the task of reconciling
their deep
election
(a fu
sion of egalitarianism
and individualism)
suspi
as Lance
cion of authority with
the exercise of executive power. Jefferson's dilemma,
was "to govern in accordance with
an
that taught that
Banning
phrases it,
ideology
a
was
monster
was
overt
and governing
power
wrong."21 Aware that
displays of presi
were
to raise the cry of executive
Jefferson opted
leadership
likely
usurpation,
for a covert leadership style. Jefferson's biographer, Dumas Malone,
finds his protagonist
a "conscious
effort to avoid all appearances of dictation." The key to
always making
was that "he did not
Jefferson's political
leadership, continues Malone,
permit his fol
dential
to think of him as a boss
at all."22 He led without
appearing to do so, instructed
to
to defer.
while
suggest, guiding
appearing only
seeming
was
a
informal influence
Jefferson's
carefully concealed behind
public facade of
In a formal Reply to notification
deference to Congress.
of his election, Jefferson vowed
to be
to express
and patriotism
of those to whom
it belongs
"guided by the wisdom
. . .
a
to
the legislative will of the nation
that
execution."
will
faithful
give
[and]
as "the great
His first presidential
address opened by referring to Congress
respectfully
council" of the nation and closed with a pledge to "carry . . . the legislative
judgement
. . . into faithful execution."23
to submit the annual mes
Indeed Jefferson's decision
rather than deliver it in person ?a practice which many Republicans
sage in writing
?
as
view
aping the British custom of having the monarch
speak to parliament in person
was calculated to underline
to the legislative branch. Despite
executive
subordination
to Congress'
this formal acquiescence
in
all im
hegemony
virtually
policy-making,
tenure
in
executive
the
branch.
portant
legislation
during Jefferson's
originated
lowers
while
While
gram,
Jefferson's messages
politely
he swiftly followed
these up with
a pro
suggested only the broad outlines of
to
communications
leaders
private
legislative
"greatness"
It was
revisited
I 23
for Jefferson actually to draft the
and sympathetic members
of Con
confidants
the value of keeping
gress. Jefferson always impressed upon his congressional
to copy
his leadership of Congress
hidden from public view, often asking the member
and then burn or return the original.24
the policy
specifying
bill himself and then
in detail.
send his draft
not unusual
to influential
to build
Jefferson's nightly dinners provided a regular opportunity
sympathy for
to
himself and his legislative program without
issue
The table
commands.
appearing
at these small, informal
was circular, in order to break down hierarchical
gatherings
distinctions
It was
and facilitate an air of collegiality.
the rare dinner guest, notes
historian
president's
Robert
who
Johnstone,
could
"withstand
entirely
the seductive
force of the
personality."25
distaste for public
one of his favorite
was expressed
confrontation
by
their
smooth
handle."
Like
the
Eisenhower,
things always by
Dwight
so
not
"hidden-hand"
much
chal
resembles, Jefferson would
president he
publicly
even the most
abusive
of
When
abused
John Randolph
opponents.
lenge
recklessly
as did Eisenhower
and villified the administration,
to
Jefferson responded,
McCarthy,
rather than publicly
his
by privately undercutting
attacking
adversary.26
Jefferson's
maxims?"take
his department
heads displayed
the same emphasis on
Jefferson's relations with
conciliation
and
that
discussion
characterized
his
persuasion,
leadership of the Repub
lican party in Congress.
Cabinet members were
treated as peers rather than subor
dinates.
ever
and reasoning," claimed Jefferson,
the Cabinet
"By conversing
"scarcely
so to
as
to
a
each
other's
unanimous
result." In fact,
ideas,
modify
produce
as Johnstone makes clear,
"dominated
their
collective
however,
Jefferson
proceedings
?
and insured his final authority."27 By leading
the act of leadership
consensually
decisions?was
setting the agenda and making
disguised.
failed
...
Jefferson's
an
"hidden-hand"
culture
of leadership in
leadership style resolved the dilemma
on the
for himself but had failed to educate his followers
anti-leadership
need for leadership. Jefferson's successors, Madison
and Monroe,
who
lacked his skill,
stature or luck, were
to
unable
in
much
the
way of presidential
consequently
provide
as
soon
was
Hidden-hand
Madison
ill
discovered,
leadership.
leadership,
particularly
awar. With
suited to preparing for and
the disastrous
setbacks of the War
fighting
of 1812 fresh in their minds, Madison
more success
and then Monroe
attempted, with
than is commonly
to
the
dominant
cultural
in a less
coalition
acknowledged,
modify
direction. As the post-war retreat from Jeffersonian
virulently
anti-authority
orthodoxy
accelerated under Madison,
Monroe
and particularly
however,
John Quincy Adams,
true believers
issued a call for a rededication
to
original Jeffersonian
principles.
Andrew Jackson
was a
The Jacksonian movement
ical culture. Believing
the central government
to
Jacksonians
petition,
attempted
strictly
The Jacksonian
aversion to central authority
reconciling
anti-authority
dispositions with
sonians had had to face.
self-conscious
created
limit
revival of Jeffersonian polit
inequalities and suppressed com
the scope of government
created the same presidential
the exercise of authority?that
activity.28
?
dilemma
the Jeffer
24
STUDIES QUARTERLY
I PRESIDENTIAL
a limited
in fusing an energetic chief executive with
activism was justified
in the name of limiting
the
even
the
"Monster
institutions,
Bank," "King Caucus,"
govern
powers were to be enlisted in the battle to remove the institu
Jackson's greatness consisted
Presidential
central government.
activities
ment
of hierarchical
itself. Presidential
to increased
be increased by
impediments
equality. Public participation would
caucus
the
the
Senatorial
franchise, overthrowing
system for nominating
extending
in
rotation
and
conferred by
office.
the
instituting
Terminating
presidents,
privileges
upon private industry through charters and franchises would
government
permit the
free
of
unfettered
and, thereby, promote
operation
enterprise
equality.
Since its founding,
the presidency had been regarded with widespread
suspicion
tional
as the institutional
of hierarchy. Jefferson, Madison
all
and Monroe
a
to
act
constitute
would
of
their
by
betrayal
openly
ideals. By demonstrating
that the executive could be used to undermine
anti-authority
the presidency
and
hierarchy, Jackson smashed the link in the popular mind between
were
troubled
representation
the sense that
hierarchy. Where
carefully masked
removals
for instance, fearing cries of executive "corruption,"
had
Jefferson,
the removal of Federalists from public office, Jackson trumpeted his
in full view of the
in office to
the principle
of rotation
public,
elevating
the positive
good.29
as mandated
the president
Jackson portrayed
by the people to check concentra
tions of political and economic power. Rather
than emboldening
hierarchy, he argued,
the presidency would
flatten the hierarchy by increasing popular con
strengthening
trol of those in positions of authority. The concept of the mandated
presidency provided
cover under which
leaders could exercise power while denying
they were
more
out
was
man
than carrying
the popular will.
If the president
doing anything
dated to carry out a policy, he could not be exercising personal discretion
and therefore
there was no reason to fear "executive usurpation."
insisted
that
he
could hear
Jackson
not only the voice of the
in
his
elections
their
but
people
precise words. The 1832
as
for instance, Jackson publicly construed
of his Bank
election,
popular vindication
to continue
veto and a mandate
his financial policies.30
more
The negative power of the veto, which Jackson
than
employed
frequently
more
all his predecessors
combined
and
than any other pre-Civil War president,
fit
well with
the anti-authority
Democratic
was
veto
culture.
The
in
exercised
political
the name of curbing power, checking
cor
the wasteful
the
expenditures
produced by
Since the veto could
rupting mix of public and private power in the halls of Congress.
reasoned that it could pose no danger
"only be exercised in a negative sense," Democrats
to liberty.31
as a check upon
the
Federalists
the
Originally
designed by
democracy,
executive veto was now portrayed as the
to
main
in
battle
their
weapon
pro
people's
an effective
mote
equality by limiting government.
As the most visible concentration
of financial and political power within
the na
a
to
around
unite
which
the
tion, the national Bank provided
symbol
compelling
two
was
veto
cultures.
to
crafted
fuse
the
Jackson's
message
anti-authority
carefully
concern with economic
individualist
the egalitarian fear of inequali
competition with
ties. "The
ment
rich and powerful," Jackson declared, "too often bend the acts of govern
selfish purposes." Jackson acknowledged
in society
that "distinctions
to their
"greatness"
revisited
I 25
to add
"the laws undertake
but when
will always exist under every just government,"
. . . artificial distinctions,
to make
to grant titles, gratuities,
and exclusive privileges,
of society?the
the rich richer and the potent more powerful,
the humble members
and laborers?who
have neither the time nor the means of securing
farmers, mechanics,
of the injustice of their govern
have a right to complain
like favors to themselves,
on
exclusive privileges
the government
ment."32 By conferring
selected institutions,
If
thwarted economic
and
competition
thereby fostering
opportunity,
inequalities.
be an increase not only in
alone, there would
also in equality. The belief that increased economic
would
opportunity
to
unite
of
with
condition
individu
egalitarians
produce greater equality
permitted
alists, a fusion of cultures nicely captured by Charles Sellers' label "egalitarian enterprise."33
left his Democratic
Jackson
By slaying the "monster Bank," however, Andrew
leave individuals
would
government
liberty but
successors without
a visible
and egalitarianism.
Buren could have
and onto
Had
shifted
blame
the Bank. While
policies
that the hierarchical
to unite individualism
target around which
Bank been retained, for instance, Martin
Van
for the depression
of 1837 away from Democratic
hierarchical
the national
Bank was
both
noxious,
individualists
they could
and egalitarian Democrats
agreed
not agree on what
to do after
ridding the nation of the Biddle's Bank. Individualists had objected to the powerful
central
bank
bank war
it had regulated
the economy,
but now hoped to call off the
the entrepeneurial
that
energies of the nation. Finding
was
a
of the "monster Bank"
of banks and increasing
causing
proliferation
because
in order
destruction
to unleash
the egalitarian wing
speculation,
tend the war to all banks.
of the Democratic
party,
in contrast,
desired
to ex
re
like Jackson's Bank war, would
James Polk hoped that territorial expansion,
the Democratic
alliance of egalitarianism
and individualism.
If expansion
could
as John O'Sullivan
the "universality
of freedom and equality,"34
promote,
rhapsodized,
was
a cultural
Young Hickory
(as Polk
called) could emulate Jackson's forging of
hy
unite
the two political cultures.
avoiding Van Buren's fate of being torn between
as
for
became
entwined
with
Polk,
Unfortunately
expansion
slavery, the egalitarian
party pulled back from supporting it. To egalitarian Democrats,
wing of the Democratic
to the Money
the Slave power was analogous
Power?both
that "privi
demonstrated
never restrains its ambition
to
more
rule."35
the
lege
By alienating
egalitarian wing,
Polk's expansionist
policies drained the party of the crusading idealism that had charac
terized it during the 1830s and early 1840s, giving the party an
southern
increasingly
cast. His most
as
a
was
an
leader
to
conspicuous
grasp that,
failing
political
inability
because of slavery, expansion was creating more problems
than it was solving, both
for the Democratic
party and the nation.
brid, while
The
in the decade
string of failed cultural solutions, and hence failed presidencies,
to
to
the
Civil
War
the
to
testifies
prior
extraordinary impediments
presidential leadership
the Jacksonian
coalition
of
produced by slavery. Franklin Pierce tried to reestablish
individualism
to the fore the hitherto
sub
slavery brought
a
rule and the property
of
The
merged
rights
minority.
doctrine
that liberty and equality were mutually
able
optimistic
supportive, while
to soften class conflict, could not, in the end, cope with racial conflict. Millard Fillmore
and egalitarianism,
tension between majority
but
26
I PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
hoped to hold together theWhig
alliance of individualism and hierarchy, theWhig
and Daniel Webster,
slavery from the national
by removing
economic
the
1850
and
of
national
develop
agenda through
Compromise
elevating
ment
to the forefront of the
the cultural
solution reproduced
agenda. But Fillmore's
gery of William
Seward
de
the Whig
party laud economic
as the
without
civilization
of
velopment
capitalism
highest stage
on the eco
as
a
blight
looking upon the South's "peculiar institution"
anything but
nomic potential
the failure of both Pierce and Fillmore
of the nation? Witnessing
to create a
to reconstitute
their old cultural coalitions,
James Buchanan
attempted
new alliance that would
But
unite the establishment
abolitionists.
against egalitarian
contradiction
within Whiggery?for
and celebrate industrial
were
how
could
to protect slave property where
it already existed,
the issue of the expansion
individualists
of slavery into the territories forced many
an establishment
to
alliance
with
hierarchy.
repudiate
individualists
while
Abraham
content
Lincoln
party for as long as it had remained in exis
loyal adherent of theWhig
on weak
its
Lincoln
resolved
dilemma
of
tence,
basing government
hierarchy by a)
in Chief
in wartime
he could invoke the Commander
where
clause, and
operating
A
b) creating
dividualism.
a new
cultural
combination
in which
hierarchy
was
subordinated
to in
a strong
were a cultural alliance,
The Whigs
hierarchical, yet with
predominantly
economic
times were hard the paternalism
admixture of individualism. When
of the
them
well.
After
served
had
offered
and
all, Jacksonians
party
only "cupping
bleeding"
to those hurt by the depression
that followed
the Panic of 1837.36 But, for the most
too restrictive
to a nation eager to
the resources
appeared
exploit
continent. Henry Clay, theWhig
boundless
standard-bearer
and Lin
lost
all
three
elections
he
in.
The
idol,
presidential
participated
only
successes in
in 1840 and Zachary
Henry Harrison
presidential contests, William
part, Whiggery
of a seemingly
coln's political
Whigs'
on
and policies
in
party principles
submerging
Taylor in 1848, had been dependent
heroes.
favor of popular military
that "little engine that knew no rest,"37 was thwarted
Lincoln's political ambition,
by his
defeats
identification
in 1836
with
and 1844
the Whig
party. From
as well
as the victories
the sobering experience
of Clay's
the apolitical generals
in 1840
of
on
that his own personal advancement
creating
depended
war
an
not
to the
elevate
Illinois party politician
heroes but
only
a
the
office.
party
party required subordinating
majority
Making
Whig
presidential
to individualism.
The central figure inWhiggery's
Lin
hierarchy
metamorphosis,38
in creating a new Republican
in
coln was
which
instrumental
individualism
party
was
not led by hierarchy. He thus helped to give the majority
but
culture
tempered
in America?individualism
?the
dominant place in governing
the nation. The Repub
and 1848, Lincoln
a party that could
learned
and social hierarchy would dominate Amer
individualism
lican amalgam of economic
in the same way that Jefferson and Jackson's
ican politics
for the next half century
had dominated
alliance of egalitarianism
and individualism
the previous half century.
The Whigs
only popular
cause had been
the cry of executive
usurpation.
In the
"greatness"
revisited
I 27
into the charis
of egalitarianism
mind, King Andrew
signified the degeneration
were
his
leader who would
the
Thus
law
wishes.
with
replace
Whigs
personal
torn between
to support central
their hierarchical
inclination
and
their
fear
authority
Whig
matic
doctrine, was
power. The result, inWhig
not actually exercising
for while
authority.
The chief executive was to enforce the laws of the land, but otherwise was confined
veto power, no
within
circumscribed
limits ?no
influence.
narrowly
congressional
of presidential
of the disruptive
potential
an anomolous
one who
stood
executive,
As president, Lincoln had to reconcile Whig
doctrine with his will to power, restora
tion of the Union,
and the success of the Republican
party.
a
Were
faced only with what
theWhigs
considered
of democ
they
degeneration
a
to
lawless
executive
the
have
or, at
racy,
pandering
they might
populace,
managed
were
To
the
survived.
confronted
with
least,
south, however, Whigs
something worse,
the ultimate
in
of
hierarchical
form
of
the
the master-slave
degeneration
principles
to abide its arbitrariness or to condone upsetting
its legal status,
relationship. Unable
not
between
Northern
and
but also (and
Southern
they floundered,
split
only
Whigs
more
the apparent necessity of giving up either their individu
between
importantly)
to free labor or their hierarchical
to
alistic adherence
attachment
patriarchy. Before
Lincoln freed the slaves, he had to free his party from being immobilized by this
dilemma?an
immoral
legality,
through
acceptance
of slavery, or an illegal moralism
its abolition.
through
A Lincoln
on
firing
Sumter
to avoid his
the opportunity
fate by recon
predecessors'
the
dilemmas
his
The
which
had
shackled the
issue,
ciling
party.
handcuffing
slavery
as
in
now
means
a
the
served
for
presidency
previous decade,
unleashing
presidential
presidency
gave Lincoln
Fort
outside
of the Civil War
is inconceivable.
The
power.
Lincoln
oath
to
wrung
from the Commander
authority
and
defend the Constitution
protect,
in Chief
role, the presidential
of the U.S.," as well as the
take Care that the Laws be faith
"preserve,
constitutional
that the President
"shall
injunction
or invasion comes," reasoned Lincoln,
executed."
"When
rebellion
"the people
fully
under
the
in
made
the
commander
chief
of
their
have,
Constitution,
army and navy
. . . the man who
holds the power and bears the
of . . . [deciding]
responsibility
the public safety requires." Lincoln
what
Proclamation
began the Emancipation
by
as
me
vested
in
"the
in
Commander
On
Chief."39
the
basis of these
power
invoking
formal roles, Lincoln distinguished
his decree, which
he termed "a fit and necessary
war measure,"
from General John Fremont's declaration
of emancipation
that Lincoln
as
condemned
"simply
'dictatorship'."40
Support for presidential
authority, however, even during war, was far from auto
as
matic. Lincoln's behavior
reflected an acute awareness of the paucity of
president
Better than any previous
support for leadership in America.
president, Lincoln under
stood that given the anti-authority
cultural context, popular wrath was bound to shower
down
the national
One of Lincoln's
was to set
government.
accomplishments
rods
that
would
him
from
the
full brunt of popular anger
up lightning
protect
bearing
the Union
when
this end Lincoln
army suffered reverses. Towards
skillfully used the
old Whig
executive doctrine to shield himself from the torrent of abuse. The
necessity
upon
28
I PRESIDENTIAL
STUDIES QUARTERLY
of exerting leadership in an anti-leadership
system, in our opinion,
explains the "pecu
in his seminal
liar paradox" of Lincoln's presidency
first pointed out by David Donald
in
House."41
White
the
essay, "Whig
use of executive
in re
vigorous
authority
extra-legal
re
non-use
virtual
of presidential
power with his timid, obsequious,
to influence domestic policy. Over awide range of domestic
policies, including
contrasts
Donald
Lincoln's
to his war
gard
sources
of the first income tax, the creation of aDepartment
of Agriculture,
and
Donald
contends
that Lincoln
showed little
tariffs, banking,
land-grant colleges,
his proposed
interest. When
turned down by the Senate, Lincoln
appointees were
to resubmit their names. Donald
it
resolves the paradox of a simul
improper
thought
executive
and
weak
that
chief
Lincoln was unable to "rid
taneously strong
by arguing
the introduction
ideas with which
he had been raised."42
of the political
not explicitly
issue
with
Donald's
thesis, G.S. Boritt provides an
taking
con
in
House
Lincoln's
behavior
the
White
that undercuts Donald's
of
interpretation
himself
While
tention
education"
the paradox of his presidency.
that Lincoln's
"political
explains
a
a
out
dominated
faced
Boritt,
Lincoln,
party that
points
Congress
by Republican
was in essential agreement with Lincoln's
economic
"there
Therefore
preferred
policies.
was little call for Lincoln
to pressure Senators and Congressmen,
to use those 'certain
indirect
on behalf
influences'
of
'sound'
economics."
Lincoln
did not have
to work
so hard because
was
to do much of what he would
have liked with
Congress
disposed
con
to tariffs, internal improvements,
and
finance
homestead
legislation. Boritt
regard
thus had the pleasure of signing into law much of the program
cludes that "Lincoln
he had worked
to what
Boritt
the better part of his political life," legislation that amounted
a
America."43
for modern
Curry
"blueprint
was
more
in
much
active
shows that Lincoln
domestic
policy than
for through
Leonard
also
has called
as well as to
it came to the establish
When
he appeared to Donald
contemporaries.
to
ment of a national banking
Lincoln
He
did
influence Congress.
system,
attempt
sent one of his private secretaries to influence wavering
Senators, persuaded influential
to go to bat for him, talked the matter up in the Cabinet,
and even seems
to have cashed in on patronage, all the while exclaiming to New York financiers, "Money,
I don't know
about 'money'."44
anything
Senators
That
Lincoln
was
not
trays is indicated by Lincoln's
ment. Jackson-like,
Lincoln
the enthralled
active
captive ofWhig
on behalf
involvement
doctrine
that Donald
of the Thirteenth
por
Amend
the lame-duck
session of Congress
that in the
the
in
the
of
favor of
people" had been expressed
proposed
a
He did not, however, rest content with
amendment.
worded
message
firmly
urging
The president employed his considerable powers of persua
passage of the amendment.
aswell as
to enlist conservative Republicans
sion and patronage
wavering Democratic
recent election
members
What
as
to back
the amendment.45
"curious
about Lincoln's
failure"
of the grip theWhig
the tremendous
neglects
evidence
compelling
This
interpretation
distance between himself
executive
informed
"the voice
direction,"
and the cabinet.
points
out Boritt,
to control
sees
his cabinet, which Donald
of the presidency had on Lincoln.
advantages Lincoln
reaped by keeping
view
"When
"the
showed unhappiness with
Congress
the President
and his
separation between
"greatness"
revisited
I 29
to attacking
the Cabinet
the latter. With
family often diverted the legislators
the
House
the
White
often
untorched."
much
of
fire,
Attorney
absorbing
escaped
General Edward Bates, for example,
took most of the heat from the radicals for Lin
official
coln's
decision
not
to enforce
congressional
acts
confiscating
the property
of
slave
owners.46
an in
of as formidable
that a man possessed
may be excused for believing
tellect as this nation has produced was putting on his publics by his avowals of naivete
or disinterest
inmatters of banking, finance and foreign affairs?"you
understand
these
We
told Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon Chase.47 Allowing
things. I do not," Lincoln
to think themselves
his Cabinet members
against
superior gave Lincoln
protection
a
what would
otherwise
His humble posture,
have been
crescendo cry of usurpation.
the log cabin stories and the like served as a shield against the pervasive anti-authority bias.
From the individualist perspective, Lincoln's greatness consisted in
demonstrating
a transforma
that an individualist
could
crises
with
without
cope
regime
large-scale
tion in its cultural
identity. Lincoln's example offered hope that individualist
regimes
an "inherent
to
and fatal weakness;"
such a regime could be strong
subject
to maintain
its existence
in an emergency without
enough
permanently
altering in
ternal social relations in a hierarchical direction.
emergency
Temporary
leadership in
times of total war, they now knew, did not lead
to permanent
inexorably
dictatorship
in peacetime.
were
not
From
the hierarchical
for very different reasons.
America
"from a divided,
organic state."48 Lincoln's
standpoint, Lincoln's
leadership was equally exemplary, but
InWoodrow
Wilson's
view, Lincoln's greatness lay inmoving
to a unified,
association
self-interested
contractual
spiritual,
a
also
had
recreated
the
alliance
of
presidency
strong govern
a strong executive,
rent asunder
previously
by the party battles of the 1830s
and 1840s. By elevating the prestige and
the prerogatives
of the presidential
expanding
office Lincoln
on which
left a permanent
future
hierarchs
would
try to build.
legacy
ment with
Greatness
Has
Its Limits
If these four presidents were great in that
they resolved cultural dilemmas,
were not
for
their
had
solutions
limits.
to com
they
perfect,
attempt
Washington's
of hierarchy by stressing the appearance of strong
pensate for the weakness
leadership
was limited because
those who did not share the cultural
of hierarchy
assumptions
often found the display of power anywhere from
alarming to ridiculous. Washington
was
a dilemma
in
a
in which
of behavior designed
mode
to compensate
for
caught
weakness
often
it
undermined
still
further.
For
while
the
ad
instance,
authority's
a firm response to the
ministration
inwestern
Rebellion
Penn
expected that
Whiskey
increase respect for the central government,
leaders
found
sylvania would
Republican
itmenacing
that the government would arm
at
their
"against people
plows." Washington,
of crowns and coronets."49
lamented, had been "dazzled by the glittering
Jefferson
Far from impressing,
the administration's
had evoked images of op
display of might
without
III proved
pressive monarchy.
up authority
Building
appearing as a George
As
difficult.
became
identified with
the hierar
extremely
Washington
increasingly
30
STUDIES QUARTERLY
I PRESIDENTIAL
term, his reputation was greatly tarnished; it could
was
once again
be mended
power.
only through the route it
gained?by
relinquishing
The limits of Jefferson's "hidden-hand"
became
strategy
apparent in his embargo
on
to suffer restrictions
than publicly defend the need for individuals
policy. Rather
chical Federalists
during
his second
in the words
Jefferson presented,
to the nation."50 The
silence
sphinxlike
their freedom,
almost
of Leonard
"an imperturbable,
severe economic
produced
Levy,
embargo
segments of the public and therefore required public explanation
for individual
sacrifice to further a collective goal. But rather than trying
to rally the country around him, Jefferson, asMalone
the general
"followed
comments,
as much out of
as
A
of
which
had
policy
keeping
sight
possible."51
leadership style,
so
hitherto served Jefferson
insured that the embargo would be a disaster. Previous
well,
taxes or the Louisiana Purchase, did not call for indi
like
Jeffersonian policies,
cutting
for many
deprivation
of the need
to make material
sacrifices nor did people need persuading
that a great public
was
to
achieve popular goals, Jefferson's covert style
good
being furthered. Well-suited
to manage
of leadership was ill-equipped
tasks that required the leader
unpleasant
to be a
educator.
public
viduals
to the
over the head of
solution of appealing directly
Jackson's
people
to his negative
Congress was well-suited
policy aims. Because he did not have a posi
tive legislative program
that required the support of a majority,
he could afford to
The national Bank had been struck down by presidential
alienate Congress.
veto, the
were removed without
the
and
bank
system was
pet
deposits
congressional
approval,
executive
But
fiat.
the
of
limits
be
Jackson's energetic negativism
managed
through
came apparent when his successor, Martin Van Buren,
to calls for
responding
positive
action during the depression
the panic of 1837, tried to secure the Inde
that followed
Andrew
assent. If Van Buren was to
that required congressional
pendent Treasury proposal
vetoes and the angry
direct the legislative process, he could not afford the provocative
over
battles
that had soured Jackson's relations with Congress.52
appointments
Even Abraham Lincoln's
solutions had limitations.
By keeping his war aims am
so as to attract the support of all three cultures, Lincoln
left his successor
biguous
a
as
to how to
Andrew
lack of guidance
Johnson, with
reconstructing
proceed with
on his powers as Commander
the Union.
in Chief
Moreover,
by relying vigorously
on his own,
and spending money
to
his
actions
the
after
asking Congress
only
ratify
to
he
made
to
its constitutional
fact,
eager
Congress
bring the presidency back
posi
tion as soon as the war ended. One wonders
to what
extent Johnson's
impeachment
was a
on Lincoln's
In resolving one set of cultural dilemmas,
judgement
usurpations.
create
thus
insoluble
dilemmas
for their successors. Presidential
great presidents may
is
to
thus intimately
related
failure.
greatness
presidential
Presidential
Failure
never guaran
greatness
presidential
(or, more modestly,
success) is
are
are
teed to any president,
never
there
in the running. This
many presidents who
may be, as we have indicated above, on account of an intractable dilemma bequeathed
for instance, although
the most
adroit
by a "great" predecessor. Martin Van Buren,
not
his
of
could
hold
and
in
individualists
the
politician
day,
together
egalitarians
While
"greatness"
revisited
I 31
of Jackson's destruction of the national Bank. The act that helped give Jackson
a
Van Buren without
of greatness ?destroying
the "money power"?left
on
to
and
the
financial
hierarchical
which
blame
enemy
ensuing
depression.
panic
is
Van Buren's fate indicates that being an accomplished
insufficient
politician
aftermath
his mantle
ever?
to guarantee success in theWhite
House. While
poor politicians have rarely?if
come from the ranks of
often
been successful presidents,
have
faltering presidencies
Madison,
James Buchanan, Lyndon Johnson, Richard
politicians?James
accomplished
acumen that barred the door
to name a few. If it is not a lack of
Nixon,
political
to greatness for these
to
emphasize
presidents what did? The usual response would be
or
self
features: Madison's
Buchanan's
indecisiveness,
Johnson's
timidity,
personal
we
remain
dis
Without
the
of
characteristics,
loathing.
minimizing
impact
personal
satisfied by explanations
that stop here.
A
House
focus
comes
on
the president's
fares poorly when
failure in the White
personality
on the heels of other
successes. Take, for instance, John Quincy
political
as
and Secretary of State must
rank among
the greatest
this
diplomat
Adams, who
nation has produced, yet as president was a disappointment.
that focus
Explanations
?
on
us
leave
how such
personality?psychological
rigidity, compulsiveness
wondering
an inflexible,
man could have been the most
of
successful
uncompromising
diplomat
we
his age. Not Adams' prickly personality,
contend, but his hierarchical propensities
best explain why he could succeed so spectacularly
in the realm of diplomacy
yet be
such an ineffective president. The hierarch's forte, negotiating
has
jurisdictions?who
a
the right to do what ?and
statuses, while valuable talents for diplomat,
adjudicating
were ill-suited to the
and his posi
president's competitive
relationship with Congress
tion as the leader of a political party.
?
Nor will
it do to explain the three failed presidencies
prior to the Civil War
Fillmore, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan were ranked 24th, 26th, and
?
(out of 29) in the 1948 Schlesinger poll
solely in terms of personal inadequacies.
All three were accomplished
Buchanan who was one of the
politicians,
particularly
most
men ever to occupy the White
House.
Each offered a
politically
experienced
Millard
27th
credible
political
solution
to the cultural
expansionist
policies of James Polk?rated
In the absence of civil war, slavery proved
that Lincoln
wonder
seemed to welcome
dilemma
in large part by the
bequeathed
as a "Near Great."
the
by
Schlesinger
polls
to be an insoluble national
problem. Little
the onset of war.
success followed
The pattern of pre-presidential
failure can also
by presidential
be seen in the public career of James Madison.
So successful as a congressional
leader
and constitution-maker,
he is considered by many
scholars to be a flop as president.
a need for affection ?can
The usual explanations ?personal
not explain
compliancy,
in Congress
his bold maneuvering
and at the Constitutional
Convention.
Madison's
in the presidency, we contend,
to do with
difficulties
had more
the anti-authority
of his followers
cultural propensities
than with
any features of Madison's
personality.
no one is
to follow, no one, no matter how
Where
disposed
psychologically
healthy,
can lead. When,
in the aftermath of the War
of 1812, people were more disposed
to support authority, Madison
performed
ably.
Will
it do, to take examples
closer
to home,
to
explain
the troubled
presidencies
32
STUDIES QUARTERLY
I PRESIDENTIAL
now Ronald
of Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon,
Jimmy Carter, and
Reagan
solely
as a
in terms of their personal
Is
the
historical
shortcomings?
reading of America
new
a
to
be replaced by
favored by providence
land particularly
myth of Americans
as an unlucky
that there
people done in by unworthy
denying
presidents? Without
to criticize,
ismuch
there is also much
that might be praised: Johnson's Great Society,
to China, Carter's Camp David Accords, Reagan's
Nixon's
reduction of mar
opening
as
hear only that these were
failed presidencies,
leave the reader with
the following
reports
hypothesis:
movements
of failed presidencies
have risen along with
egalitarian
(civil rights, femi
to reducing
children's
and
the
because
dedication
nism, environmentalism,
rights,
like)
differences among people leads to rejection of leadership, for the very concept of leadership
as that
consideration
deserves at least as much
implies inequality. This proposition
do we
tax rates. Why,
then,
ginal
if that is all there was? We
our wonderful
commonly
given to the claim that
saddled with
inferior presidents.
people mysteriously
keep
getting
Notes
1. Arthur
M.
"A Yardstick
Schlesinger,
in Paths
for Presidents,"
to the Present
York:
(New
MacMillan,
1949), pp. 93-111; Gary M. Maranell, "The Evaluation of Presidents: An Extension of the Schlesinger
Polls,"Journal ofAmericanHistory (June 1970), pp. 104-113; Robert K. Murray andTim H. Blessing,
"The Presidential Performance Study: A Progress Report "Journal ofAmerican History (December
1983),
pp. 535-555.
Other
greatness
polls
in the past decade
conducted
the U.S.
include
Historical
Society's 1977 survey of the heads of one hundred history departments (Robert E. DiClerico, The
American President, Prentice Hall, 1979, p. 332), David L. Potter's 1981 unpublished survey of 41
historians (Murray and Blessing, p. 536), and the Chicago Tribune's 1982 survey of 49 presidential
scholars
"Our
(Steve Neal,
Best
15, 18).
pp. 8-13,
2. Thomas
A. Bailey, Presidential
Greatness:
(New York: Appleton-Century,
3.
Ibid.,
4. Arthur
pp.
M.
and Worst
Presidents,"
The
Chicago
and theMan
Image
Tribune Magazine,
from
George
Jan.
10,
1982,
to the Present
Washington
1966), p. 24. Emphasis in original.
262-266.
"Rating
Schlesinger,
the Presidents,"
in Paths
to the Present
(Boston:
Mifflin,
Houghton
1964), p. 107.
5. Bailey,
Presidential
Greatness,
p. 34; Curtis
Arthur
Amlund,
A Criticism,"
"President-Ranking:
Midwest Journal of Political Science (August 1964), pp. 309-315, quotation on p. 309.
6. James MacGregor Burns, Presidential Government: The Crucible of
Leadership (New York: Avon,
1965),
7. These
p. xi.
categories
are
adapted
from
the work
of Mary
Douglas.
See
especially
Natural
Symbols:
Ex
plorations inCosmology (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1970), and "Cultural Bias" in In theActive
Voice (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). The theory is further elaborated inMary Douglas
and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
8. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy inAmerica (New York: Harper & Row, 1966): Louis Hartz, The
Liberal
Tradition
American
Politics:
inAmerica
Brace Jovanovich,
(New York: Harcourt
1955); Samuel P. Huntington,
The Promise
Mass.:
Harvard
Press,
of Disharmony
(Cambridge,
University
1981).
9. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of
Leadership (New York: Wiley,
10. Arthur
B. Murphy,
"Evaluating
the Presidents
of
the United
(Winter 1984), p. 117.
11. Marcus
12.
Washington
Cunliffe,
George
to President
Washington:
of Congress,
Man
and Monument
December
20,1776,
States,"
Presidential
Studies
1980).
Quarterly
Little,
Brown,
(Boston:
1958), p. 212.
in Saul K. Padover,
ed., The Washington
Papers (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1955), p. 100; Circular Letter to the Governors of All the
States on Disbanding the Army, June 8, 1783, in ibid., pp. 206, 213.
revisited
"greatness"
I 33
13. See e.g. letters toArchibald Cary, June 15,1782; toRobert Stewart, August 10,1783; to Lafayette,
February 1,1784; to JamesMadison, May 20,1792; toDavid Humphries, June 12, 1796; toHenry
Knox, March 2, 1797; and to Oliver Wolcott, May 15, 1797; in ibid., pp. 78, 79, 83, 88, 90,
91,
14.
92,
on
quotation
Schwartz,
Barry
p.
"George
Review
Sociological
15. On Washington's
83.
and the Whig
of Heroic
Conception
on p. 30.
pp. 18-33,
quotation
1983),
to hierarchical
see David
Hackett
Federalism,
Washington
(February
adherence
American
Leadership,"
The Revolution
Fischer,
ofAmerican Conservatism:The FederalistParty in theEra ojJeffersonianDemocracy (New York: Harper
& Row, 1965), pp. 377-379.
16.
James
R.
Perry,
Court
"Supreme
1789-1801:
Appointments,
Presidential
Criteria,
and
Style,
the
Press of Events," journal of theEarly Republic (Winter 1986), pp. 371-410, esp. pp. 373, 397.
17. FrederickW. Marks III, "Foreign Affairs: A Winning
Issue in the Campaign for Ratification
of the United States Constitution," Political ScienceQuarterly (September 1971), pp. 444-469.
18. Drew R. McCoy, The ElusiveRepublic:PoliticalEconomy inJeffersonianAmerica (ChapelHill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 141.
19. Jefferson toWilliam Short, Jan. 3, 1793, cited in Gilbert Lycan, Alexander Hamilton & American
Foreign Policy: A Design for Greatness (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), p. 134.
20.
Ira Kaufman,
Burton
Farewell
"Washington's
A
Address:
Statement
of Empire,"
in Kaufman,
Washington's FarewellAddress: The View from the 20th Century (Chicago: Quadrangle,
ed.,
1969), pp.
169-187.
21. Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion:Evolution of a Party
Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1978), p. 273. See also James Sterling Young, The Washington Community, 1800-1828 (New
York:
Harcourt
Brace,
p. 207.
esp.
1966),
22. Dumas Malone, Jefferson thePresident:First Term, 1801-1805 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 112;
Dumas Malone, Thomas Jefferson asPolitical Leader (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1963),
p. 34.
23. Jefferson quoted in Robert M. Johnstone, Jr., Jefferson and thePresidency:Leadership in theYoung
Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 128;Malone, First Term, p. 95; Edward S.
Corwin, The President:Office and Powers, 1181-1951 (New York University Press, 1957), p. 18.
24.
E. Cunningham,
Noble
Jr., The Process
of Government
Under
Jefferson,
IX,
chapter
esp. pp.
188-193.
25. Johnstone, Jefferson and thePresidency, pp. 144-148.
26. Fred I.Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency:Eisenhower asLeader (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
On
Jefferson's
attempts
to
undercut
quietly
see Dumas
Randolph,
Malone,
Jefferson
the President:
Second Term, 1805-1809 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 108-109, 161-162; andNobel E. Cun
ningham, Jr., The JeffersonianRepublicans inPower:PartyOperations, 1801-1809 (ChapelHill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1963) pp. 86-88.
27.
Johnstone,
Jefferson
and the
Presidency,
pp. 86,
95-98;
Process
Cunningham,
of Government,
pp. 60-71,
319-320; Dumas Malone, "Presidential Leadership andNational Unity: The Jeffersonian Example,"
Journal of SouthernHistory (February 1969), p. 16; Jefferson, quoted in Leonard D. White, The
Jeffersonians:A Study inAdministrative History: 1801-1829 (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 80.
28. Richard B. Latner, The PresidencyofAndrewJackson:White House Politics, 1829-1831 (Athens:Univer
sity of Georgia Press, 1979), pp. 7-30; Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and theCourse ofAmer
icanFreedom, 1822-1832 (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 12-155.
29.
Jackson,
according
to Arthur
Jr.,
Schlesinger,
"ousted
no
greater
than Jefferson" (The Age ofJackson, Boston: Little, Brown,
30.
Latner,
Presidency
pp.
of Jackson,
165.
See also
ibid.,
a
proportion
of officeholders
1945, p. 47).
p. 50; Remini,
Jackson
and American
Freedom,
p. 323; andWilfred Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Vintage, 1962), p. 83.
31. John Ashworth, Agrarians' andAristocrats': Party Political Ideology in theUnited States, 1831-1846
(New
32.
Remini,
Jersey:
Humanities
Jackson
Press,
and American
1983),
Freedom,
p.
pp.
35.
367-369.
33. Charles Sellers, "Introduction" in Sellers, ed., Andrew Jackson: A Profile (New York: Hill & Wang,
34
STUDIES QUARTERLY
I PRESIDENTIAL
1971), p. xvi. See alsoDaniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of theAmerican Whigs (University
of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 22.
34.
35.
Schlesinger,
Eric Foner
that was
p. 427. O'Sullivan
Age
of Jackson,
and John Ashworth,
others,
among
most
to banks,
hostile
corporations,
coined
have
the phrase
"Manifest
Destiny."
that the wing
of the Democratic
and tariffs was most
attracted
shown
monopolies
party
to the
free soil cause and most likely to defect to the Republican party. See Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free
Labor,FreeMen: The Ideology of theRepublican Party beforetheCivil War (New York: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1970), esp. pp. 168-169; John Ashworth, "The Democratic-Republicans before theCivil
War: Political Ideology and Economic Change," Journal ofAmerican Studies (December 1986), pp.
375-390, Kinsley Bingham, quoted on p. 380.
36. Azariah Flagg toMartin Van Buren, April 10, 1837, quoted inMajor L. Wilson, The Presidency
of
Martin
Van Buren
(Lawrence:
Press
University
of Kansas,
1984),
p.
143.
H. Herndon cited in Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York:
Vintage, 1973), p. 118.
38. See Howe, Political Culture ofWhigs, chapter eleven.
39. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The ImperialPresidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 60-63.
40. J.G. Randall, Lincoln thePresident:Springfield toGettysburg (2 vols; New York: Dodd, Mead, 1945),
37. William
II, pp.
165-166.
41. David Donald, "Abraham Lincoln: Whig
in theWhite House," in Norman Graebner, ed., The
Lincoln
of
Illinois
Press, 1959), p. 47.
(Urbana: University
Enduring
42.
Ibid.,
pp.
60.
51-53,
43. G.S. Boritt, Lincoln and theEconomics of theAmerican Dream (Memphis State University Press,
1978), pp. 196-197; Leonard P. Curry, Blueprintfor Modern America: Nonmilitary Legislation of the
First Civil War Congress (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968).
44.
Boritt,
Lincoln
and
the American
Dream,
pp.
201-203.
45. Ibid., p. 299; Richard Current, The Lincoln Nobody Knows (New York: Hill & Wang, 1958), p.
230; Stephen Oates, "Abraham Lincoln: Republican in theWhite House," in John L. Thomas,
ed., Abraham Lincoln and theAmerican Political Tradition (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1986), p. 106; J.G. Randall and Richard Current, Lincoln thePresident: Last Full Measure
(New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955), p. 309, Lincoln quoted on p. 308.
46. Donald, "Whig in theWhite House," p. 59; Boritt, Lincoln and theAmerican Dream, p. 228.
47.
Boritt,
Lincoln
and
the American
Dream,
p.
199.
48. Michael Paul Rogin, "The King's Two Bodies: Lincoln, Wilson, Nixon, and Presidential Self
Sacrifice," in J.David Greenstone, ed., Public Values andPrivatePower inAmerican Politics (University
of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 80.
49. Jefferson quoted inDumas Malone, Jefferson and theOrdeal of
Liberty (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962),
p. 188; James Thomas Flexner, GeorgeWashington: Anguish andFarewell, 1795-1799 (Boston: Little,
Brown,
1969),
p.
191.
50. LeonardW. Levy,Jefferson andCivil Liberties: The Darker Side (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer
sity Press, 1963), p. 96.
51. Malone,
Second
Term,
p.
576.
52. James C. Curtis, "In the Shadow of Old Hickory: The Political Travail of Martin Van Buren,"
Journal of theEarly American Republic (Fall 1981), pp. 258-259, 263.