STV2360 1 Political Institutions and Politics in Democracies
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STV2360 1 Political Institutions and Politics in Democracies
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Candidate 138
The US President, Legislation and polarization
Course: STV2360
Semester: Autumn 2016
Word count: 3634
Candidate number: 138
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The US President, Legislation and polarization
Introduction
The presidential election was on the 8. November, and Donald Trump was elected president.
During their campaigns the candidates talked about how they would implement new reforms
and make old ones better. Nevertheless, it is not given that they will be able to implement
their legislation, they depend on the Congress. Polarization may make it more difficult for
Trump to implement legislation, if does not have support of the Republicans in Congress, he
may have to cooperate with the Democrats. Is this possible? Will he have a strong veto power
or will the Congress easily override it? Considering this context my research question for this
paper is: Does polarization affect the President’s possibility to influence legislation through
formal and informal procedures? By affect I mean how polarization, increases or decreases
the likelihood that the president will be successful in influencing legislation. My hypothesis is
that polarization will decrease and increase the president’s possibility to influence legislation
depending on what mechanism he uses. I have chosen to focus on the president’s possibility
of going public and his possibility to veto legislation. It seems that going public might not
have the same effect as it used to, and that polarization have made the president’s veto power
stronger. Therefore the first part of the paper will deal with what party polarization is, I will
then present some important aspects of how a bill becomes a law, afterwards how the
president can influence legislation and then an analysis of the effects of polarization by
comparing the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama, which were presidents at
different times and under different stages of polarization, and I will try to explain why Obama
had trouble passing Obamacare under unified government, while Reagan could pass The
Economic Recovery Tax act of 1981 under divided government.
What is party polarization?
Party polarization in the US Congress is defined “by the large (and growing) ideological
differences between the Democratic and Republican parties” (Schaffner, 2011, p. 528).
Hetherington notes that in the 1960 and the 1970s we saw a lot of polarized rhetoric by party
members, but these differences did not follow party lines, today the polarization follows party
lines and the ideological differences between the parties in congress are getting bigger
(Schaffner, 2011, p. 528).
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Poole and Rosenthal developed a measure the for ideological positions of parties, the
theoretical base for this measure is a theory developed by Philip Converse. His theory is that
the answer to one issue you can predict the position of the politicians on another issue (Poole
Rosenthal, 2001, p. 6). The NOMINATE measure uses roll-call voting, congressmen voting
by saying “yay” or “nay”, and uses this to place the ideological position of each party in
Congress (Poole and Rosenthal, 2001, p. 7). If a party is placed at -1 it indicates that it is far
left, and 1 indicates far right (Bonica, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal, 2013, p. 106).
Table 1
The table is based on the NOMINATE measure developed by Poole and Rosenthal. Source:
(Bonica et al., 2013, p.106).
If we look at table 1, which shows polarization in the House of Representatives based on the
NOMINATE measure, we see that in 1977 the Democrats had a score of -0.3, and the
Republicans had a score of 0,2. I we look at the results for 2012, the democrats had a score of
-0.4 and the Republicans had a score of 0.7. This means that the gap between them in 1977
was 0.5 and in 2012 1,1. The gap has more than doubled over a period of 35 years.
In the Senate the Democrats had a score of -0.3 in 1977 and the Republicans had a score of
0.2. In 2012 the Democrats had a score of -0.4 and the Republicans a score of 0.6. This means
that the gap between them in 1977 was 0.5 and in 2012 1.0 (Kernell, Jacobsen, Kousser &
Vavreck, 2016, p. 243).
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Looking at these findings it is important to note that measuring polarization using roll-call
voting has some limitations. We cannot separate the preferences of Congressmen and the
preferences imposed by the party leader, this can make the legislator look more partisan than
what is the case (Schaffner, 2011, p. 530). Also, the roll-call voting does not cover all
legislative behavior, so we are limited to only a part of the full legislative image (Schaffner,
2011, p. 530).
As we have seen using the NOMINATE measure the ideological gaps between the two parties
have grown since the 1970s. Poole and Rosenthal concluded that during the last 20 years the
parties in Congress “have become more homogeneous and polarized” (Poole & Rosenthal,
2001, p. 21). Using these findings as a starting point the analysis section of the paper will
compare the presidency of Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama to see if party polarization has
affected their possibilities to influence legislation. The reason for choosing Obama and
Reagans presidencies is that it seems that in the time between the two presidencies there
something have changed, both in the Congress and in the public, the possibilities to address
the public has increased and they both had issues they focused on during their campaign
which they managed implement.
How do bills become legislation?
The US Congress has two chambers, the Senate and the Congress. The members of Congress
and the president is elected separately, because it is a presidential system (Kernell et al, 2016,
p. 219). The congressmen can run as incumbents, without a party, but in recent years the
electoral process has become more party-centered, which makes it harder for incumbents to
get elected (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 225-228).
Only members of the House or the Senate can introduce legislation, this means that if the
president wants to introduce his legislation a member must sponsor it (Kernell et al., 2016, p.
256). The Speaker is the leader of the majority party in the House and he can assign a bill to
an ad-hoc committee if there are disagreements about what committee the bill should be
assigned to, this mandate gives the Speaker possibilities to manipulate the outcome, for
example secure majority for the bill in the committee (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 257). In the
Senate, disputes about referrals are handled by the party leaders (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 257).
The House of Representatives have rules to end a debate, the Rules Committee decides the
length of the debate and the procedures (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 259). The Senate does not
have the same system, unless the party leaders negotiates unanimous agreements there is no
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end date to a debate (Kernell et al., 2016, p. s261). The result is that small groups of members
can continue the debate until the majority gives up. This is called filibustering. To end this
three-fifths majority is needed, 60 votes, to invoke cloture and end the debate (Kernell et al.,
2016, p. 261). This means that for controversial bills to pass support of 60 senators is needed.
Some important aspects of how a bill is passed in Congress have been presented. It is
important to note that the president cannot introduce legislation to Congress, the legislation
must be sponsored by a congressman. This gives us the context for the next section, which
will focus on how the president can influence legislation, is his only possibilities to sign or
veto the bill sent from the Congress?
How can the president influence legislation?
Formal ways of influencing legislation
When we look at how bills becomes laws the presidents direct influence is placed at the end
of the process, he can veto or sign a bill (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 267). The president gets this
power from Article 1, section 7 in the constitution: “the president approves or disapprove
(through the veto) 'every bill' and 'every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of
the Senate and the House may be necessary.'” (Pika & Maltese, 2013, p. 217). The president
has three alternatives when he receives a bill passed in both the House and the Senate. He
could sign the bill and it becomes law, veto it and return it with a report of why he rejected it,
take no action and it becomes law in ten days, or if the congress adjourns before the ten days
are up it becomes a pocket veto (Pika & Maltese, 2013, p. 219). To override a veto a twothirds majority is needed in both houses (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 267).
According to Pika and Maltese the Veto can be perceived as both negative and positive,
negative because it is a sign of disagreement, positive because it could be used to shape
legislation (2013, p. 220). How strongly the Congress must consider the president’s
preferences depends on “how close the Withe House’s priorities are to the status quo
compared with the priorities of Congress” (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 298). The fact that the
president can veto legislation will always be a consideration for Congressmen. But if the
president wants to be involved more directly he can threaten to veto legislation, the threat
must be both credible and explicit (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 298).
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Informal ways of Influencing Legislation
In Richard Neustadt opinion, the Constitution views the presidency as mostly about providing
services to others, and that “presidential power … is the power to persuade” (Pika & Maltese,
2013, p. 222). This implies that if the president want real influence he cannot solely rely on
the power of the veto.
On way to influence is to use indirect influence. Rather than going directly to the Congress,
he can mobilize the public and interest groups (Pika and Maltese 2013: 222). The State of the
Union speech is a formal way to do this, but in recent years the platforms for informal public
addresses have increased. Because congressmen are motivated by reelection they are sensitive
to the opinions of the people, especially the opinions of the constituents. (Kernell et al., 2016,
p. 300)
Has Party Polarization Affected the Presidents Possibilities to
Influence Legislation?
In 1981 Ronald Reagan became the 40th president of the United States of America,
representing the Republican party (Miller Center of Public Affairs, 2016a). He ran against
democrat Jimmy Carter who had been president from 1977-1981. Economy was an important
issue. In Carter’s view the economy was rebounding, while Reagan’s opinion was that the
economy was in recession: "Recession is when your neighbor loses his job. Depression is
when you lose yours. And recovery is when Jimmy Carter loses his” (Miller Center of Public
affairs, 2016a). Reagan focused on tax cuts and balancing the budget, this led to a landslide
election for Reagan with 489 electoral votes, Carter only received 49 in comparison (Miller
Center of Public affairs, 2016a).
Reagan had succeeded in getting the public onboard with his plans, and set the agenda for the
97th Congress, using the many possibilities to go public available throughout a presidential
campaign, for example televised debates. The Problem for Reagan was that, as we see in
Table 2, even though he had a 53 to 46 majority in the Senate, with one independent, the
Democrats had a majority in the House of Representatives 243 to 192. Shortly after the
inauguration Reagan addressed the Congress, and put forth his plan. It called for tax cuts and
reduced government spending, which would reverse the social programs the Democrats had
fought for (Stathis, 2009, p. 437). The first step in this process was to pass the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The Republican controlled Senate wanted to cut the budgets with
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over twice as much as the Democratic controlled House (Stathis, 2009, p. 437). Upon
receiving news about the proposal from the House president Reagan held a press conference,
and called the proposal: “unconscionable” (Stathis, 2009, p. 451). Despite the Democrats
being reluctant the result was that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 passed in both the
Senate and the House. In the Senate with 67-8 and in the House with 282-95, this led to $37.7
billion reduction in tax for individuals and business (Library of Congress, 2016a; Stathis,
2009, p. 438).
Table 2
The D after a number in the incumbents Colom indicates that the incumbent caucus with the
Democratic Party. Sources: (History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, 2016a;
The U.S Senate, 2016).
The reason for choosing to compare Obama and Reagan and their presidencies is that while
they both succeeded to implement legislation about the issue in focus of their campaign, there
are some differences that could shed light on the affect of polarization on the president’s
possibilities to influence legislation. While Reagan was a victim of divided government when
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was passed, President Obama started his presidency
with unified Government. As we see in Table 2 There were 57 Democrats in the Senate and
41 Republicans, as well as two incumbents. In the House there were 257 Democrats and 178
Republicans. Many presidents before Obama had tried to pass a health care reform, and failed.
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In Obama’s view, he had to pass it in 2009, it would be impossible later in his term (Alter,
2014, p. 43). In his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in Denver he
promised “affordable, accessible health care for every single American” (Miller Center of
Public Affairs, 2016b). His approval after the 2009 election was approximately 65 % (Kernell
et al., 2016, p. 307). Obamacare was introduced in the House on 17/09-09 and was signed by
the president 23/03-10, cloture was invoked in the Senate on a 60 to 39 vote, and the House
agreed to the amendments done by the Senate in a 219 to 212 vote (Library of Congress,
2016b).
How is it possible that Reagan managed to pass The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
with 26 votes missing, while President Obama had more trouble passing Obamacare under
unified government? They both used their campaign to front their message, and got the
legislation introduced in congress shortly after they entered office. As we saw above the
polarization of congress seems to be stronger now than in the 1970s. In addition, Shcaffner
notes that the American public might be as polarized as the US Congress (2011, p. 532). The
presidents both used the mechanism of “going public” to put pressure on the Congress. After
Reagans landslide election in the 1980s he had a strong mandate. The Republicans controlled
the Senate and presented huge cuts, the democrats were reluctant to accept his proposals, but
did it in the end. If we look at the composition of the house in attachment 2 it seems like it
should be easier to pass Obamacare than Reagan’s tax cuts. It is possible that Reagans attempt
of going public was more successful than Obamas attempt. If we look at how many who
views the Presidents speeches on television the percentage was just over 50 percent in 1965,
and today it is under 25 percent that does the same (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 305). This means
that is just one-fourth of the American population are the viewers, and we cannot assume that
everybody are mobilized, and of course the mobilization will vary by issue (Kernell et al.,
2016, p. 307). If schaffner’s assumption is right this could be a contribution to the
explanation.
So, if the pressure from the public to the Congress was greater in 1981 than in 2009, how did
the Congress respond to the pressure? Reagan was able to get a 285 to 95 vote for his
proposal, even though the Republicans only controlled 192 seats (Library of Congress, 2016a;
Table 2). If we look at Table 1, the southern democrats were much closer to the Republicans
in 1981, in the House,than they were in 2012 (Bonica et al., 2013, p. 106). This helped
Reagan, he could build a majority conservative coalition to pass the bill (Stathis, 2009, p.
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437). When we see how the situation was for President Obama, in Table 2, he had 57
democratic representatives in the Senate, 59 if we include the two incumbents who caucused
with the Democrats, this means that they were unable to invoke cloture without support of at
least one Republican. The bill passed in the House by a 219 to 212 vote, even though he had
ha solid majority (Library of Congress 2016b.). Convington argues “that a president’s
successful coalition-building efforts often depend not on his base, but rather the marginal
sources of support: cross-pressured members of Congress” (Rohde & Barthelemy, 2009, p.
298). Because polarization can decrease the number of members that are cross-pressured, if
we follow Convington’s agrument, current presidents should have a harder time building
majority coalitions than former presidents (Rohde & Barthelemy, 2009, p. 298). If we use this
logic on our two examples it seems that the Southern Democrats was pressured by the public
in 1981 and their own ideological preferences, and because the distance between the
ideological differences was not as wide as it is today, they could accept Reagan’s proposal.
While Obama had no such pressured group to build a coalition with, because of the increasing
polarization (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 243)
The formal ways of influencing legislation include the veto (Pika & Maltese, 2013, p. 217).
During his presidential terms from 1981 to 1989 Reagan vetoed 78 bills, and 9 of these were
overridden (Pika & Maltese, 2013, p. 220). During Obama’s presidential terms from 2009
until today he has vetoed 10 bills, and one has been overridden (History, Art and Archives,
U.S. House of Representatives, 2016b). Reagan used the veto much more frequently than
Obama, and it seems that his veto was weaker than Obama’s. The ideological differences
were present between the two parties, of course, but the ideological gap between them was not
as big as today (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 243). There were possibilities for coalition building
against the president. Reagan built a coalition to pass the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981. And since the Democrats had a majority in the House of Representatives during his
terms they had fewer to convince. This implies that low polarization weakens the veto, while
high polarization strengthens the veto, because it is harder to build a coalition that is needed to
override it. This is especially true in cases were the seats in Congress are distributed evenly
between the two parties.
Research shows that the use of veto threats has increased in line with the polarization (Rohde
& Barthemely, 2009, p. 298). As mentioned earlier the threat of using the veto must be both
credible and explicit (Kernell et al., 2016, p. 298). Because an override of a veto needs a two8
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thirds majority it is a difficult mechanism to use (Pika & Maltese, 2013, p. 219). When
polarization increases, it is increasingly difficult for the parties to build a cross-party coalition
(Rohde & Barthemely, 2009, p. 298). If it is more difficult for the Congress to build a
coalition, then the credibility of the veto threat increases. So, if the Congress has a strong
enough desire to pass a bill the president could use the threat of veto to push the legislation
towards the president’s preferences (Rohde & Barthelemy, 2009, p. 298). If we look at the
distribution of seats during Obamas presidency, in Table 2, in the Senate the seats are evenly
distributed. During the three last Congresses, the Republicans has had a majority in the
House, even so they have only succeeded overriding one veto. This can imply that has
become more difficult to override a veto and that the treat is more credible, because of
polarization, not just when the seats are evenly allocated, but also if it is the case that one
party has a larger number of seats. If no party has the all the seats needed to override a veto.
Conclusion
According to the NOMINATE measure of polarization developed by Pool and Rosenthal the
Congress has become increasingly polarized since the 1970s, and the polarization is
approximately at the same stage in both houses. We have looked at how this can affect the
president’s possibility to influence legislation through the veto and the mechanism of going
public. I have compared the Presidencies of Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) and Obama (2009present). The comparison of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and Obamacare, shows
that in this case polarization has reduced the president’s possibilities to influence legislation
by “going public”, Reagan was able to unite a divided government to pass his bill. Obama
struggled even though he only needed one republican to invoke cloture, and he lost many
Democratic votes in the House. A reason for the reduction in influence using this method of
influence is that the number of cross-pressed congressmen has decreased because of
polarization. When we look at the veto and the threat of using veto, it seems that the
credibility of the veto threat has increased because of polarization. It is harder for the
Congress to build a coalition because of the increasing ideological differences, and the
number of vetoes has decreased since Reagan’s presidency. This imply that polarization affect
the president’s possibilities to influence legislation in two different ways: It decreases the
influence of going public, but strengthens the influence of a veto and a veto threat. Will this
have consequences for the President Elect Donald Trump? He has been able to mobilize
enough people to get elected, even so it seems like the American people are divided, will the
pressure from the people that support him be enough to get the Congress to pass his
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legislation? Or will he have to rely on the veto, and the veto threat to push legislation in his
direction?
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Literature
Alter, J. (2014). Failure to launch. Foreign Affairs, 93, 39-50.
Adam, B., McCarty, N., Poole, K.T., & Rosenthal, H. (2013). Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed
Rising Inequality? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 103-123.
History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives. (2016a, 11.04.). Party Divisions of
the House of Representatives*. Retrieved from http://history.house.gov/Institution/PartyDivisions/Party-Divisions/
History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives. (2016b, 11.04.). Presidential Vetoes.
Retrieved from http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidential-Vetoes/Presidential-Vetoes/
Kernell, S., Jacobsen G.C., Kousser T., & Vavreck L. (2016). The Logic of American Politics.
7th ed. Washington DC: CQ Press.
Library of Congress. (2016a, 11.19.). H.R.4242 - Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
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Poole, K.T., & Rosenthal, H. (2001). D-NOMINATE after 10 Years: A Comparative Update
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26(1), 5-29.
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Rohde, D.W. & Barthelemy, M. (2009). “The President and Congressional Parties in an Era
of Polarization”. In G.C. Edwards III & W.G. Howell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the
American Presidency (p. 209-308). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schaffner, B. F. (2011). «Party Polarization». In G. C. Edwards III, F. E. Lee & E. Schickler
(ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress (p. 528-549). Oxford: Oxford
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Stathis, S.W. (2009). Landmark Debates in Congress: From the Declaration of Independence
to the War in Iraq. Washington DC: CQ Press
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from http://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm
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