Inside the Fortress: Policies of Immigrant Integration for Third Country
and European Citizens in Spain and Italy
Roxana Barbulescu, SPS researcher, EUI
Abstract
Migration scholars have traditionally regarded immigrants as a homogenous analytical
category (Joppke 2001, Bosniak 2006, Plascenia 2003, Bauböck 1994, Soysal 1994) and
the state enforced models of integration as singular. The variation between philosophies
of integration is attributed to the differences across states (Brubaker 1992, Castles and
Miller 1998, Favell 1998, 2001) and, more recently, to the difference between levels of
government (Penninx and Martiniello 2004, Alexander 2004, 2007). This paper
questions these assumptions and critically examines the different philosophies of
integration developed for different immigrant groups in two new immigration countries:
Italy and Spain.
The study builds on empirical evidence collected in 2010 and 2011 – official documents
and expert interview with key stakeholders – across the three levels of decision- and
policy-making (national, regional and city level) in the two countries.
The paper argues that two main strategies of integration are pursued in parallel in both
locations: the first one targets the non-European citizens and it is assimilationist in
character and based on interventionist principles according to which the government (be
it national, regional or municipal) actively pursues the inclusion of migrants; the second
one targets the EU citizens and is a laissez-faire scenario where foreigners enjoy rights
and live their entire lives in the host country without the state or the local authorities
seeking their integration. Thus, I posit that there is a continuum of models, from less to
more inclusive, for different foreign groups that are simultaneously enforced within one
Member State. I further discuss the implications of the multiple strategy approach for
the immigrant integration in general.
The last section of the paper is dedicated to a case study of consultative bodies and
discusses their role as means of political inclusion in the absence of political rights in
the host country.
Keywords: Immigrant integration, (national) models of integration, European
citizenship, Italy, Spain
1 Migration scholars have traditionally regarded immigrants as a homogenous analytical
category (Joppke 2001; Soysal 1994; Bauböck 1994; Plascenia 2003; Bosniak 2006)and
the state enforced models of integration as singular. The variation between philosophies
of integration isattributed to the differences across states (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998;
Castles and Miller 1998; Favell 2001) and, more recently, to the difference between
levels of government(Penninx and Martiniello 2004; Caponio and Borkert 2010;
Alexander 2007, 2004). This paper questions these assumptions and critically examines
the differentphilosophies of integration developed for different immigrant groups in two
new immigration countries: Italy and Spain. I posit that there are multiple philosophies
of integration that target different migrant groups but which are simultaneously
pursuedby a governmentand discuss the implications of such an approach for immigrant
integration in general. I begin with a gloss on the concept of immigrant integration and
specify the definition that would guide this study. I continue with a brief empirical
overview the immigration history in the two countries. The third section critically
examines the strategies of immigrant integration - philosophies of integration developed in the two locations as reflected in relevant laws and plans on immigration
for the period 1985-2011. I further outline and evaluate the conceptual frames usedfor
different immigrant groups.Finally, the last section is dedicated to a case study of the
consultative bodies introduced in Rome and Madrid. I explore the two models proposed
and their role as means of political participation in the absence of political rights.
Something old and something new on immigrant integration
The term “integration”is generally refuted by scholars as well immigrantsthemselves.
They purposefully opt for more open,flexible and balanced concepts such as
incorporation, accommodation or inclusion(for instance Kostakopoulou 2010; Glick
Schiller and Caglar 2009; Martiniello and Rath 2010). They argue that the term
“integration” reproduces and perpetuates a hegemonic power relation between the host
society and the immigrant where the latter is the one who has to adapt to the latter. The
hegemony is clear once we observe the expressions commonly used in daily speech and
political statements: “integration of the immigrants” - where the activity of “integrating”
is attributed to the migrant and not the host society. Alternative expressions that contain
the term such as “immigrant integration” also hints that it is a special activity which is
reserved only to the immigrant. The other participants to the process, i.e. the members
2 of the host society are the omitted references although integration has been recognized
by the EU member states as a two way process, at least at the declarative level by EU
(COM 2003; Common Basic Principles 2004) and relevant national programs for
migrants which I discuss later in the paper.1
The negative associationsthat the term evokes havemotivated many researchers to
use alternative terms. In this paper, I opt the concept of “immigrant integration” mainly
because this is the term used by public policies that I examine and in public discourse.
Furthermore, just like in the case of “race” and “racism”, there is no reason to suspect
the words alone but the use there are put to. Thus, I argue for the reintegration of this
term in scholarly discourse would normalize the term and contribute towards revival of
a dialogue on the same basis with a wider public. The simple change of terminology
from “integration” to “incorporation” or “inclusion” would equate to a denial to engage
with thecontemporary debate on the role and position of immigrants in most countries.It
is well known that Roman and Medieval cartographers while meticulously portrayed the
known world in their times, they customary wrote hit sunt leones literally “here are
lions” to depict the unknown territories. As cartographers conformed with depicting
wild beats at the margins of the known world, the lack of engagement with the term and
the connotations of the term “integration” merely the lions at the margins of scholarly
discourse.
The ubiquitous concept “immigrant integration” itself is confusing and has been
little problematized in what regards the both participating actors: the host society and
the individual. Firstly, when scholars and policy makers employ this expression, they
assume that the host society is itself neutral, “well-integrated” and homogenous (Joppke
and Morawska 2003; Favell 2001).
But, the host society is considered to be not only homogenous, but also atemporal
and reference is made to an ambiguous, if not mythical, point in time in which the
society would have been be an indivisible one. Yet, societies evolve in time as all social
entities. For instance, if reference would be made to Italian society 150 years ago,
before Italy became a sovereign state it would be hard to imagine that this is the society
in which todays migrants would be expected to integrate. So would the Italian fascist
period, or the era of the great internal migration between the South and North in the 60s
1
I am aware of the recent debate about immigrant integration “three way process” according to which
sending countries play or could play an active role in the integration of their expat communities. I do not
include it here because my interest lies in the responses of the host countries. 3 and the 70s not be good candidates: the first for obvious reasons and the second because
of the intense conflicts and racist episodes between the Northern Italians and Southern
and Central Italians (called terroni or “people of the earth”). From the 70s onwards the
foreigners already become an important share of the Italian society and even full
citizens. From an analytical point of view, from this moment, the reference point should
evolve towards a more pluralistic Italian society. We can therefore conclude that host
societies, they are dynamic entities,highly dependent of their place in time and space.
The fact that the philosophies of integration continue to propagate a “unified” image of
the receiving society formed exclusively by natives and where the contribution of the
new citizens is refuted, as we will later see in the paper, is an indicator of state’s
ambition to reassert itself as a nation-state.
What is even more surprising in classical accounts is that the claim of homogeneity
that isalsoattributed the immigrants. In my view, given the recent development in
migratory movements, in particular of the intra-European migration, this has become a
too narrow approach.
Although multiculturalists and differentialists have well documented the
plurality and heterogeneity inside the receiving countries themselves, “immigrants” are
still regarded as a uniform group. The underlying picture that emerges is that of a
pluralistic and multilayered society which accommodates “strangers” , “foreigners” or
“migrants”. Distinctions within the immigrant group,however, are made but they
consider ethnic and religious belonging. This approach, indeed represents to some
extent the diversity but it does not exhaust it. Ethnicy, religion or race are not the only
indicators of this heterogeneity:legal status, citizenship and citizenship group are
equally responsible and account for diversity among migrants.
The concept of immigrant as an analytical category has been perpetuated in the
literature in slightly different manners: as aliens in the research on rights of the noncitizens in a host country (Joppke 2001; Bosniak 2006; Plascenia 2003) or as foreigners
in the literature on the public policy provisions for non-citizens (Guiraudon 1998);
astransnational citizens i.e. citizen of another country with translational rights in the
host country (Bauböck 1994); or symbolically as guestworkers(Soysal 1994).
However, European countries have recently become receivers of new groups of
immigrants. Indeed, in the context of European Union countries, the boundaries
between EU citizens and natives of the host member states are blurred because the two
groups share a common commitment to the political, social and symbolic project of the
4 European Union. This is explicitly acknowledged by (Favell 2008) who argues that
“textbook narratives in terms of standard accounts of immigration, integration and
citizenship based on models of post-colonial, guestworker and asylum migration, and
historical distinctions between pre- and post 1973 -are finished and need to be
rethought” (701). EU citizens have the fundamental right to free movement within the
EU (Charter of Fundamental Rightsof the EU) and enjoy rights comparable with those
of the (national) citizens. While it amounts to 40 per cent of the total immigration in
Europe (Herm 2008)the intra-European movement and settlement has been little
scrutinized (Recchi and Favell 2009; Favell 2008; Spencer et al. 2007). I consider the
EU citizens together with the non-EU migrants because generally fit the definitions for
“migrants” employed in migration studies: “foreign born” or “foreign citizen” and
because the question at the core of this study is how do governments respond the
migrant dilemma in general.
Furthermore, boundaries are not clear-cut in the case of the co-ethnic migrants
who are either i) descendants of former nationals or ii) nationals of kin countries that
share cultural, linguistic and historical bonds with the host country. These two cases
fundamentally challenge the paradigm we –the other that dominated the knowledge
production in immigration studies and posits thereconsideration of the category other as
pluralistic and highly heterogeneous (the others).
With this new starting point, I examine in this paper how governments (be then
national, regional, local) respond to the presence of different categories of migrants by
engaging in a more permissive or more restrictive strategy of integration. The dilemma
of integration as I define it is a search for the “abolition of all disabilities of alienage” in
Preuss words (1998). More broadly speaking, the approach I defend but do not discuss
here is grounded in the search for full inclusionindependently of the acquisition of
nationality (see Soysal 1994; Kostakopoulou 2007, 2010).
Methodological concerns
In particular, I focus onidentifying the different set of rights that EU and non-EU
citizens have (as depicted by the national, regional and local legislation and the relevant
programs of immigrant integration at these levels). Within these two categories, I
further distinguish between old and new EU citizens (EU15 and EU12) where the latter
are thenationals of the new member states (EU regime); and between third country
nationals and co-ethnic third country national (general regime). In order to identify the
5 co-ethnic group, I pick up the categories to which statesascribe rights based on their
origin not a universal principle that would extend these rights to all migrants (Joppke
2005). This method allows for some flexibility makes possible the “definitions” for coethnics that the countries themselves develop. In the case of Italy, the co-ethnic group is
formed by descendants of Italians who have massively emigrated in the beginning of the
20th century2. In the case of Spain, the co-ethnic migrant includes the descendants of
Spaniards as well asthe nationals of the Latin American countries, countries with which
Spain recognizes a historical bond in the past and in the present legal provisions.
Italy and Spain are suitable study cases because of the following reasons.
- The arrival of the same immigrant groups at the same time. This is a rare natural social
experiment for the study of the role of the institutional setting in immigrant integration.
For the first time we have two countries that experienced little or no immigration before
1970s but simultaneously receive significant numbers of immigrants that also belong to
the same groups: in both countries Romanians are the largest, the old EU migrants
especially Brits and Germans represent a significant share of the foreign resident
population in both destination countries as well as Moroccans and the newer
immigration of the Latin Americans.
Secondly, after having experimenta long periodemigration and colonial
relations in the case of Spain, the two countries have strong policiestowards their coethnics.
The following section briefly sketches the main figures of the immigration in
Italy and Spain that pertain to this particular study.
Immigration to Spain and Italy in the European Context
The two Southern European countries have witnessed a fast transformation from
emigration to immigration countries with percentages of the foreign residents now
reaching the ones of the more traditional European destinations and even outnumbering
the ones in France, Belgium or The Netherlands. More specifically, 12.3 per cent of the
total Spanish population and 6.5 per cent of the total Italian population that represent
5.6 million and 3.8 million respectively are foreign residents. Yet the table below is to
be read carefully because for Spain and unlike for Italy, it also records the migrants in
irregular situation but who registered with the local authorities (empardronados). When
2
Between 1861 and 1990, 28.690.101 Italians emigrated (qtd. In Tintori 2009: 35) 6 taking into account the irregular migration, it is estimated that circa 5 million foreigners
and 8 per cents of its total population live in Italy (2011). Table 1. Total and foreign resident population in the first ten European countries. Years 2000, 2008 and 2009
(in thousands and in % for annual variation and share of the foreign population)
country
Total population
Foreign
Variation %
Variation %
Population
00-08
08-09
2000
2008
2009
2000
2008
2009
total foreign total foreign
% foreign
2000
2009
Germany
Spain
UK
Italy
France
Belgium
Greece
Austria
The
Netherlands
82.163
40.050
58.662
57.680
60.269
10.239
10.880
8.002
15.864
82.218
45.283
61.176
59.619
63.753
10.667
11.214
8.319
16.405
82.002
45.828
61.595
60.045
64.367
10.750
11.260
8.355
16.486
7.336
820
2.391
1.271
3.764
897
402
699
652
7.255
5.262
4.021
3.433
3.674
971
906
835
688
7.186
5.651
4.214
3.891
3.738
1.103
930
871
719
0,0
1,5
0,5
0,7
0,4
0,5
0,4
0,5
0,4
-0,1
26,2
6,7
13,2
-0,3
1,0
10,7
2,3
0,7
-0,3
1,2
0,7
0,7
1,0
0,8
0,4
0,4
0,5
-0,1
7,4
4,8
13,4
1,7
13,5
2,6
4,3
4,5
8,9
2,0
4,1
2,2
6,2
8,8
3,7
8,7
4,1
8,8
12,3
6,8
6,5
5,8
10,3
8,3
10,4
4,4
Ireland
Area Euro
(16)
EU 27
3.787
313.288
4.401
326.908
4.450
328.646
127
16.598
554
24.615
512
25.672
1.9
0´5
20,3
5,0
1,1
0,5
-7,5
4,3
3,3
5,3
11,5
7,9
475.121
497.431
499.432
23.047
30.779
32.116
0,6
3,7
0,4
4,3
4,9
6,4
Source: Report Labour Immigration in Italy, Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 2011 based on Eurostat data.
The profile of the foreign population in regards to nationality
In terms of the most represented foreign groupsRomanians (new EU citizens) are the
most numerous group in Spain with 751.688 residing legally in 2009, followed
byMoroccans (third county nationals) with 737.798 nationals, Ecuador (co-ethnics) with
413.915 citizens, 222.039 Brits, 150.940 Italians, 149.155 Chinese, 147.080 Bulgarians
and 126.928 Portuguese.3 On the other hand, in Italy the most numerous groups are
625.278 are Romanians (new EU citizens),401.949 are Albanians and 365.908 are
Moroccans (third country nationals); 90.218 Poles (new EU citizens); 37.848 Brazilians,
12.492 Argentineans (co-ethnics), and, finally, 40.0163 Germans and 20.448 British
(EU citizens).4
Philosophies of integration: origins and evolution
In the mid-nineties Freeman (1995) argued that the new immigration countries in
Southern Europe would imitate the states’ responses and policy initiative of the more
experiencedNorthern countries. However, the new immigration countries proved to
3
Annuario estadistico 2009
http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/InformacionEstadistica/Anuarios/Anuario2009.html , 4
National Census 2008, http://demo.istat.it/str2007/index.html 7 detached themselves from the models implemented by their counterparts and find
“alternative ways”. For example, the Migration and Integration Policy Index (MIPEX,
"Migrant integration policy. Index III" 2011)5 finds remarkable diversity amongst
them. Table 2 below lists the scores Italy and Spain receive together with the scores for
the other new immigration countries and the Northern immigration countries. Not only
have the new immigration countries reacted differently than their counterparts but the
Southern European countries themselves took various positions.
Table 2. Degree of legal equality of EU citizens with TCN immigrants. Italy and Spain compared with the
traditional European countries of immigration, the new immigration countries and their Southern
counterparts
Old European
New European
New Southern
Italy
Spain
immigration
immigration
European
countries
countries
countries
MIPEX score
60
84
Sweden (100)
Finland (71)
Portugal (94)
high score=high
(ranks
(ranks
Belgium (53)
Ireland (39)
Greece (50)
legal integration* 10th)
4th)
UK (55)
61
79
France (49)
(MIPEX
(MIPEX
Germany (77)
II)
II)
* From Max. 100 Sweden to min. 21 Slovakia
Source: MIPEX III Overall ranking across 6 stands, 2011
As Alien Law predated the Community Law, the general regime for nationals of
third countries is the first to develop in both countries. New countries of immigration,
Spain and Italy have only recently started to convert their law into an immigration law
which would respond to the arrival of the immigrants and also set provisions for their
integration. As Marco Martinelli notes “before 1986 no Italian immigration policy as
such existed” (1992: 207). Prior to this date a single document, a police decree dated in
the fascist period of the thirties, made reference to foreigners entering the country
(773/1931). During this period the police had discretionary power to give or refuse a
working permit. Almost simultaneously, Spain also put forward the first comprehensive
immigration law for foreigners - only in 1985 namely Law 7/1985 (Corredera et al.
1992).
Despite the growing numbers of immigrant flows in the seventies and eighties, the
legislative packages that provide the framework for the integration of foreign residents
were introduced relatively late and in the case of Spain as part of the last legal
5
MIPEX has been developed by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group and assets the
degree of legal equality of third country nationals in EU 25 countries, Norway, Switzerland and Canada.
The index cover 140 indicators in six areas: access to nationality, long-term residence, antidiscrimination, family reunification, labour market access and political participation. 8 adjustments before it joined the EU. The Union played a key role as main engine in the
initial policy making in this area of legislation. Martiniello (1992) notes that “Italian
migration policy is largely inspired by the European politics and by the orientation
proposed by the European Community in terms of migration policy in 1985” (p. 210).
In the same vein, Cornelius (1994) observes that in Spain “the legislation is almost
entirely the result of external pressures associated with Spain’s accession to the
European Union, on the first of January 1986” (my Italics, p. 345).
In the early nineties, Freeman (1995) classified the political responses of
governments in Southern European countries as “partial and ineffective attempts to
organize legal entry, curtail illegal entry, and regularize those already inside the country
without authorization” (p. 895). Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, Italy and Spain
adapted to the new immigration by passing new legislation aimed mainly at controlling
and periodically regularizing the situation of the growing foreign population. In both
cases, the periodic “exceptional” amnesties (sanatoria and regularizacion) were the
main “integration” instrument as they transformed irregular migrants into qualified
users of social services and lawful inhabitants of Spanish and Italian localities.
If the first Italian laws that regard immigration are 943/1986 and 39/1990 (known as
the Martelli law), and then the 40/1998 law (known as Turco-Napolitano law) later
transformed unified text for immigration with the law 286/1998 the state moves towards
a comprehensive approach to managing the settlement of foreigners. These regulations
review the prior provisions on governing entry and settlement in the country and
continue to be the main legal framework for immigrant incorporation. Supported by the
right wing governments, two subsequent revisions give a restrictive approach to
managing immigration. The Fini-Bossi law (189/2002) reforms the residence permit
system creating incentives and disincentives for good conduct. Part of the package of
Dispositions on Matters of Public Safety, the recent revision Law 94/2009, takes these
measures further by criminalizing illegal immigration and conditioning the concession
of residence permits upon fulfillment of integration conditions (mainly language
acquisition) set in an agreement of integration.
In Spain, as I mentioned earlier, the revision of the existing regulation started with
Law 7/1985. The most recent regulations were introduced in 4/2000 revised by 8/2000,
13/2004 and, finally modified by Law 2/2009.In general, the first law of immigration
passed in 1985 under a socialist government has a pronounced restrictive character for
both co-ethnics and third country nationals with 9 out of the 36 of its articles dealing
9 with sanction and expatriation situations while very few concern the rights and liberties
the text announces in its title (Aja 2006).
The law was reformed in 2000 when under a right wing government that did not
have the absolute majority which allowed for a wider compromise between the parties
and make possible a law a more permissive approach to immigration and immigrants’
rights. The law takes a more permissive stance that the 1985 law and opens efficient
tracks for legalization by arraigoand gives full access to the national health system for
the irregular but registered migrants (empadronados).When winning a new mandate in
2000, and this time with absolute majority, the PP makes it a priority to revise it. The
Law 8/2000 brings major revisions to nearly all articles of the previous text. For
instance, it increases sanctions for both the immigrant worker and their employer. It also
raises the requirements for family reunification, and for the concession of work and
residence permits.With last law 2/2009, integration becomes a dominant policy area in
the new text and on the government’s immigration agenda.The draft of the procedural
document implementing the law (reglamento) which is currently under debate appears
to introduce a form of integration agreement which would be administrated by the local
authorities ("Borrador del Reglamento de la Ley Organica sobre derechos y libertades
de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, tras su reforma por Ley Organica
2/2009" 2011). In addition, the lawfurther restricts family reunification and continues
giving a dominant role to measures combating irregular migration but introduces
provisions of special protection for the victims of human trafficking and gender
violence.
It is paradoxical that it is the general regime which supposedly treats all (third
country) migrants equally is the place of birth of ethnic favouristism. The latter
translates into an engagement that country makes to favour the nationals of specific
countries or descendants of former nationals which in practical terms translates into
concessions of additional rights. The 1985 Spanish Law announces in its Preamble that
it includes privileged arrangements for the co-ethnics : “[I]f the law on the rights and
freedoms of the foreign nationals is not the adequate place to deal with the acquisition
of nationality, instead it is the place to favour those presumably better to adapt to the
Spanish life” (my italics, 1985). The same Preamble, points out to the groups who are
deemed better equipped to integrate: the foreigners born in the country, the long term
10 residents, refugees but also Latin-Americans6, Portuguese, Filipinos, Andorrans,
Equatorial Guineans, Sephardic Jews and residents of the city of Gibraltar.
In particular, the favouritism for the co-ethnics translates in the Spanish 1985
law in: i) priority access to work permits (dependent on the labour market test) and their
renewals, ii) reduced time requirement from 5 to 2 years for the transformation of the
work permit into a permanent one, iii) fast track access to citizenship after 2 years rather
than 10 years for the other non-nationals and, iv) exemption from administrative fees.
Many of these engagements have been cancelled in the Royal Decree implementing the
law and nearly disappear with the 2000 law. In its “think” form, the ethnic favouritism
survives in the Nationality Law in both Italy and Spain whose strong preference for coethnics have been proven surprisingly stable over the last century and in the face of the
contemporary immigration realities.
In both Italy and Spain, the EU regime is consolidated via mere implementation
of Community law. Some authors have interpreted the absence of initiatives of the
member states that would go beyond verbatim transpositions as a lack ofsupport to the
European citizenship project (Vink 2005).
Multiple philosophies of integration and their implications for immigrant
integration
The table below gives an overview of the rights and duties of the non-nationals
in key areas. It distinguishes between those of the EU citizens (EU 12 and EU15) and
Non-EU citizens (non-EU co-ethnics and non EU non co-ethnics). For the purpose of
simplification in this paper, I restrict the table to the following domains: socio-economic
rights, access to citizenship, political rights, language requirements, entry or labour
market.
The table registers source of the right or duty indicating whether the political
arena where it was introduced is: the national (Italy and Spain) arena, indicated in the
table with the label “(N); regional (Regione Lazio, Comunidad Autonoma de Madrid)
one label “(R)”, provincial (Provincia di Roma, in the case of Madrid the Province is
suppressed) label “(P)” and, finally, municipal (the cities of Rome and Madrid) arena
label “(C)”.
6
LA countries 11 Table 3. Overview of non-citizens’ rights and duties in key policy areas. Italy & Spain
ITALY
Non
EU
EU
Area
Non EU, non coCo-ethnics
EU12 citizens
EU15
ethnics
citizens
Generous,
Generous,
Socio-economic Generous but
Generous but dependent
similar with
similar with
dependent on legal
on legal (working) status
(working) status (N)
(N)
national (N)
nationals (N)
SPAIN
Non EU
Non EU, non coCo-ethnics
ethnics
Generous but
Additional transfer of
partially dependent
social contribution to
on legal (working)
country of origin (N)
status (N)
EU
EU12
citizens
Generous, similar
with nationals (N)
EU15
citizens
Generous,
similar with
nationals (N)
Economic contribution
for reentry descendants
of Italians +families(R)
Access to
citizenship
10 years of legal
residence (N)
Fast track
(N)
Fast track (N)
Fast track (N)
10 years of legal
residence
(N)
Fast track (N)
10 years of legal
residence (N)
10 years of legal
residence (N)
Political rights
Consultative body (C)
Consultative body (C)
Local and
European voting
rights (N)
Local and
European voting
rights (N)
Local voting rights
for specific
countries (N)
Local voting rights for
specific countries(n)
Local and
European voting
rights (N)
Local and
European voting
rights (N)
:
:
consultative body (N,C)
consultative body
(N,C)
Integration
Entry & labour
market
Integration
Agreement&
Mandatory language
test (as of Jan.2011)
(N)
Annual quota (N)
Integration Agreement
&Mandatory language
test (as of Jan.2011) (N)
Reserved share in the
annual immigration quota
(N)
Multiannual plans
(N,R,C)
:
:
Free movement
(N)
Free movement
(N)
Transitory
restrictions (N)
Free access to
labour market
(N)
Source: Legal provisions developed in Italy and Spain, my elaboration.:
12 Annual quota (N)
Multiannual plans
(N,R,C)
For descendants of
Spaniards simplified,
track for work permits
(N)
Free movement
(N)
Free movement
(N)
Free access to
labour market
(N)(as of Jan.
2009)
Free access to
labour market
(N)
If all citizens are equal in the face of law, the table clearly shows that noncitizens are not. Like in all countries with strong labour migration,the non EU migrants
enjoy generous rights comparable with those of the native workers. Yet these rights are
conditioned upon thepreservation their legal status of workers. In Italy, for instance,
once the work contract finishes, migrants lose their status if they do not return in a
contractual relationship within a period of 6 months. This is precisely Achilles’s heel is
migrants access to rights in the two Southern European countries: even if they, indeed,
renter the labour market it is probable that the new contract would be precarious and,
therefore cannot constitute sufficient base for the renewal of his or her work permit on
which the residence permit is issued(see also Calavita 2005).
In what concerns political rights, the recent introduction ofvoting rightsin local
elections in Spain will bring the non-EU migrants on an equal foot with their fellows
EU citizens who had enjoyed political rights from the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992. The enfranchisement process was not conducted on a universal basis
that would give voting rights to all (legal) foreign residents but via a series of bilateral
agreements with countries which reciprocally recognize the political rights of citizens
living in the other country. In contrast, Italy is one of the lagging European countries
with voting rights restricted to EU citizens and national citizens and no perspective of
extending enfranchisement to other non-citizens in the near future (interview, Italian
Ministry of Interior, 2010). There are, however, local initiatives introducing alternative
consultative bodies such as Group of the Adjunct Councilors in the Assembly of the city
of Rome to mainstream the political participation in the absence of voting rights (see
last section of this paper).
More privileged are the co-ethnics, who, in comparison with other non- EU
migrants, are net winners- in the sense defined by Kriesi (2008)- because of the
privileged access to citizenship, labour marker as well as special arrangements for
transfers of social contribution to home countries for the co-ethnics in Spain and
economic assistance at arrival for the co-ethnics in Italy.
In addition, the government of Regione Lazio gives economic assistance to the
descendants of Italians who settle on the territory of the region which include: monthly
payments for the first 6 months,reimbursement of the trip from the country of origin to
Italy, reimbursement of the reallocation costs, possibility of payment of 50 per cent of
the minimum contribution necessary for the public pension, contribution to starting up a
business and for return to education as well as lifetime contribution for the mortgage for
13 families is precarious situation (Legge Regionale 23/2003- Interventi in favore dei
laziali emigrati all’estero e dei loro familiari).Contrary to the indication in the title of
the law, the beneficiaries are not restricted to descendants of laziali but can come from
all Italian regions and only need to show current residence on the Latium solis. This is
not a singular case but rather a frequent case because most of the Italian regions have
implemented generous policies to assist the “return” of the co-ethnics (Tintori 2009: 5066).
Interestingly enough,Spain also gives access to enrolment in the Spanish Armed,
a symbolic institution, to nationals of the Latin American countries7 to the Spanish
Armed Forces, a symbolic institution, which until 2002 when the law no. 32 of the same
year was introduced, it exclusively recruited Spanish citizens. The option for this group
is motivated in art 68.1 which notes that these countries “have historical, cultural and
linguistic bonds that united them with Spain”("Ley 32 de 5 de julio, de modificación de
la Ley 17/1999, de 18 mayo, de Régimen del Personal de las Fuerzas Armadas, al
objeto de permitir el accesso de extranjeros a la condición de militar profesional de
tropa y marinería"
2002).The law goes on andclaims that, although, the national
defense is responsibility of the Spanish nationals, the entry of Latin Americans in the
Armed Forces“would not provoke a qualitative shift in the Forces” while helping them
with the transition to a professional army. Moreover the participation of this group in
the Forces and “serving under the flag” is literaryportrayed as reaching the aim of”full
integration”.8The restriction to Latin Americans as the only eligible foreign group to
enter the Spanish Army, indicates one more time the favouritism towards these coethnics and the assumed compatibility between these nationals and the Spanish
nationals. In his Nobel Lecture “In praise of reading and fiction” Mario Vargas Llosa, a
Peruvian and Spanish citizen himself,wrote
7
Only nationals of Cuba cannot join the Spanish Army. They could enroll until 2007 when the reform of
the law excluded Cuba from the list of the eligible countries. 8
The entire article reads as follows: “la Defensa Nacional y, como parte de ella, la defensa militar es
responsabilidad esencial de los ciudadanos españoles. Por ello, el acceso de extranjeros a las Fuerzas
Armadas ha de restringirse de forma proporcionada al objetivo perseguido, con el propósito de evitar un
desplazamiento cuantitativo y cualitativo de aquélla. Para lograrlo, se adecúa la carrera militar de los
extranjeros que acceden a las mismas, en la medida precisa para la consecución de la doble finalidad de
su plena integración y de su colaboración en la política de personal de las Fuerzas Armadas dentro del
proceso de plena profesionalización de estas últimas, lo que conduce a limitar los países cuyos nacionales
pueden optar al acceso a los Ejércitos en función de los especiales y tradicionales vínculos históricos,
culturales e incluso lingüísticos que les unen a España”
14 “[S]pain granted me a second nationality when I could have lost mine. (…)I
have never felt the slightest incompatibility between being Peruvian and having
a Spanish passport, because I have always felt that Spain and Peru are two sides
of the same coin, not only in my small person but in essential realities like
history, language and culture (2010).”
Nevertheless, in order to introduce a fairer and more universalistic treatment, the
enrolment in the Forces could be based on a test that would require sufficient language
and knowledge skills instead of accepting or refuting the entry of non-citizens based
only on their origin.
To conclude, the philosophy of integration for the co-ethnics is characterized by
giving access to symbolic institutions: National Defense and Citizenship (for Spain) and
Citizenship (Italy), and by a generalizedpreferential treatment which in practical terms
translates intoa series of concessions such as state sponsored assistance to entry of
descendants (Italy) or transfer of social contributions to home countries (Spain).
Compared with the rights of the non-EU citizens as a whole, the EU citizens are
under a more generous regime in nearly all policy areas. One notable exception is
access to citizenship. They enjoy generous socio-economic rights, the right to vote in
local and European elections and freedom of movement and direct access to the labour
market of the host member state. Only in Italy, the citizens of last two new Member
States, Romania and Bulgaria, cannot freely take jobs in certain sectors of the labour
market. At the accession of these two countries in 2007, Italy has introduced temporary
restrictions and renewed them annually despite advice from the Italian Ministry of
Labour to lift them because, in practice, they proved superfluous and only adds
paperwork to the public administration (interview, General Direction for Immigration,
Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 2010). Spain too has initially enforced the
transitory measures but these were lifted in January 2009 because of the fast increase in
“false self-employed”9 immediately after the accession (interview, General Direction for
Integration, Spanish Ministry of Labour and Immigration, 2010).
The multiple philosophies of integration are already sketched in legal provisions
we have examined by become clearer once we examine the integration measures and
plans that the governments developed with this purpose. I list belowpolicy “toolkit”
across the three levels.
9
Self-employment was not subject to restriction during the temporary measures. 15 Italy
“Charter of Values and Citizenship” (Charter, 2007)
“Integration in Security. Encounter and Identity” (national plan, 2010)
“Integration Agreement” (contract, 2011)
“Plan of Rome Province of interventions for the integration of new European citizens”
(plan of the Province of Rome, 2007-2011)
Spain
“The Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants” (national plan, 1994)
“Global Programme to Regulate and Coordinate Foreign Residents” (known as
GRECO, national plan, 2001-2004)
“Strategic Plan of Citizenship and Integration”(national plan, 2007-2010)
“Regional Plan for Immigration for Madrid Community” (regional plan, 2001-2003)
“Plan of Integration. Autonomous Community Madrid (regional plan 2006-2008, 20092012)
“Plan Madrid for Social and Intercultural Cohabitation (convivencia)” I and II (city
plan, 2005-2012)
There two main strategies of integration are pursued in parallel in both Madrid
(Spain) and Rome (Italy): the first one isassimilationist and restrictionist in character,
based on interventionist principles according to which the government (be it national,
regional or municipal) has to actively pursue the inclusion of migrants for the nonEuropean citizens; the second one targets the EU citizens and is a laissez-fairescenario
where foreigners enjoy rights and live their entire lives in the host country and without
the state or the local authorities seeking their integration. Thus, in the second scenario
the state or the government in general is a passive actor.
In practical terms, the two strategies of integration are unsustainable because of
the growing communities of European residents across Europe. In some countries such
as Spain, they represent the largest foreign population and make up for half of the total
foreign population. In these circumstances, the concomitant enforcement of the two
contrasting philosophies of integration is difficult to legitimate in front of the citizens
but also in front of the migrants.
Furthermore, the two way strategy is already sabotaged by government’s own
decision to extend the restrictionist regime to some of the some of the new EU citizens.
16 Italy and Spain both target the citizens of two new Member States, Romanians and
Bulgarians, in their plans for immigrant integration.In case of Rome, it is the Province
of Rome that first extends the treatment of the non- EU citizens by introducing a plan
for the integration of the new EU citizens (neocomunitari).
In Madrid, the regional of the city plans specifically mention inclusion of the
two groups in addition to the Third country nationals. The “Strategic Plan of Citizenship
and Integration” of the central government prefers to establish the targeted population
with the ambiguous term “migrants”. However, the Romanian and Bulgarians are
included in the same category as non-EU citizens when calculating the size “immigrant
population” based on which the central government allocates financial resources for
integration programs to the Autonomous Communities.
In this way, the EU policy of not having a policy for the integration of the EU
citizens is sabotage by state as well as sub-state governments.The EU has adopted an
asymmetrical policy with strong commitment to free movement and the rights of the EU
citizens and expressed no engagement towards their situation as long term denizens.The
European citizen, “free mover” in EU parlance, cannot be a perpetual free mover. As all
human beings, she has a general tendency to settle and construct their lives in one place.
Because of the no-policy policy, integration of the EU nationals is a blank space which
can and, as we have seen, is indeed used by national and local authorities.
The shift fromthe hithertopassive treatment of the EU citizens to a more
proactive one can be pinpointed in time to the last two EU enlargements. In fact, they
are the only ones included in the active plans for immigrant integration. Nevertheless,
they are not included in the programs with mandatory requirements such as the point
based Integration Agreement recently implemented in Italy. Thus, the philosophy of
integration for the new EU citizens (EU12) is one intermediatebased on the
interventionist principle but between the assimilationist philosophy for the non EU
migrants and the laissez faire strategy EU15 nationals.
Announced in the Italian Security Act of 2009, the Integration Agreement links
the legal status and access to rights dependent of a successfully passing a series of tests.
The Agreement works on a principle of gaining or losing points:winning points when
passing the tests on Italian language and civic culture as well as completing a series of
activities such as being enrolled in an Italian school or volunteering; and losing points
when being found guilty of a crime.
17 The novelty of the sanction based, law enforcement approach introduced in the
Italian case by the Agreement is that it places “the burden of integration on Third
Country Nationals who have to meet mandatory integration conditions and face the
ensuing consequences”(Kostakopoulou et al. 2009: 168)and a relegation from the twoway process understanding of integration (Guiraudon 2008).
In this vein, the sanctions based approach marks “the restrictionist turn” in the
integration policy but the shift from the hitherto widely accepted argumentthat there is a
tradeoff between fighting irregular immigration and improving the conditions of the
legal migrants. This argument was commonly used in the political discourse to justify
harsher measures to combat irregular migration. With the introduction of the sanctionsbased approach, this tradeoff is substituted by a nexus between immigration-integration.
Moreover, the introduction of the Agreement is also the indicator of the “return
to assimilation” paradigm because non-EU migrants would have to pass culture specific
tests. The tests have been introduced already introduced in several countries and are a
result of the fashionable neo-nationalistic narrative on the rise in Europe.
The particularity of the Italian case is that the Agreement and the test of the
Italian language where introduced under the Security Act and not in the immigration
law. In this vein, not meeting simple points of the contract such as not learning Italian is
portrayed as a “security threat”. Thisconceptual frame is reproduced in the plan for
immigrant integration “Integration in Security. Encounter and Identity“of the Italian
central government. Here also, the overall theme is that of security despite the fact that
the fix axes of the plan – education and formation, work, accommodation and local
government, access to essential services and finally, minors and the second generationare rather related with social issues.
In
Spain,
the
plans
(convivencia),“interculturality
frame
immigrant
integration
(interculturalidad)”and
“a
as
“cohabitation”
social
processof
adaptation”(integración social de los inmigrantes) which recreate the image of the
immigrants as ethnically different. It is worth adding that despite the fact that it is
frequently repeated that integration is a two way process and the concepts used - cohabitation, inter-culturality -also stress the fact that integration it is a shared action, the
plans assign no role or duty to the members of the host society.
Finally, rejoining the two main philosophies of integration for the EU- and nonEU migrants and comparing them,the difference between the strategies and approaches
that governmentstake it is striking: while for the former, it pursues a laissez fair agenda
18 with no tests to pass to enjoy generous rights, for the latter it pursues active agenda “in
the search of the perfect citizen” via a repertoire of policy instruments and
byconditioningthealready restricted rights to passing tests on country specific
knowledge. From these observations two questions arise: the first one refers to causes of
the relegating trend integration policies whose answer has to do with the rise of the
extreme right wing and xenophobic as well as populist parties. The second refers to the
causes that explain the passive role that governments took towards the EU long term
settlers. The first possible answer is that the laissez fair approach is based on a liberal
principle of non-interference. But if so, how sustainable is the two way approach to
integration –liberal for EU citizens, statist and assimilations for the non-EU? The
second possible answer is that the passive role of the government is explained by the
fact that it sees no reasons to intervene because it does not recognizes the EU citizens as
ethnically or socially different.
Political inclusion in the absence of voting rights: The Case of the Consultative Bodies
Until recently, neither Italy nor Spain enfranchised non-nationals. Voting rights were
the privileged of their citizens. From the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the
birth of the EU-citizen in 1992 voting rights were also extended to foreign nationals of
the other member states. This section brings in question the limits of political
participation for legal foreign residents in the absence of voting rights. This is a
particular relevant question in the case of countries with little or delayed access to
citizenship. Italy and Spain restrictive policy for citizenship acquisition requiring ten
years of legal residence in order to be eligible and another one or two years to
naturalize(Rubio Marin and Sobrino 2009; Arena et al. 2006).
From the repertoire of forms of political participation, in this section I focus on
the consultative body and critically examine its role as means for political inclusion and
political representation. Although they can also emerge at the national level (see
Anderson 1990), the ones I consider here are local consultative bodies:Group of the
Adjunct Councilors in the Municipal Council of the city of Rome and Forum Madrid
for dialoguein Madrid. The arguments made here also apply in a state context.
When introducing the consultative bodies, the local authorities aim at
compensating lack of political rights with the alternative structures which, would assure
19 the participation of the migrants in the decision making progress. But, as Vertovec
notes, consultative bodies may be established with very different raison d’etre:
“[L]ocal authorities may have set-up such institutions for immigrants and ethnics
minorities as an alternative to voting rights, as a channel for immigrant and
ethnic minority opinion, as a kind of educational step toward eventual full
participation, as a symbolic gesture to encourage racial harmony and combat
discrimination, or as a supportive mechanism to avoid alienation and
resentment” (Vertovec 1999: 10)
The two consultative bodies introduced in Rome and Madrid representtwo
genuine models of political inclusion:
- partial representation within the main political arena and
-fullrepresentation in a democratic forum detached from the main political arena.
The two models do not exhaust the variety of the consultative bodies that have
appeared as mushrooms given the creativity of the authorities to find forms of
inclusionwithout full empowerment for the representation of immigrants. However, the
two consultative bodies represent the two of the most frequent forms of organization
and empowerment of these bodies and good discussion cases for the role of such
institutions.
The first one is the Group of Adjunct Councilors exists since 2004 in the City
Council (Municipal Assembly) and it is intended as a means of mainstreaming
immigrants in the local politics. It is composed of 4 councilors representing migrants
from the four continents: Europe, Asia, Africa and America. The councilors are elected
and have a mandate for a 5 year period like their Italian Councilors in the Municipal
Assembly with the right to participate to meetings but not to vote. Because they cannot
actively participate in the voting process, the Councilors are not full partners in the
decision making partners and their constituencies are not democratically represented in
the Assembly.
Authorities motivate their decision to restrict the voting rights of the Adjunct
Councilors as a consequence of the absence of voting rights of the constituencies that
the Councilors represent. They further argue that the Councilors themselves lack active
enfranchisement as non-citizens and non-EU citizens and therefore cannot exercise
voting rights in the Assembly.
20 Following this logic, a naturalized Adjunct Councilor could argue to exercise her
franchise in the Assembly on the basis of her status of citizen.Yet, this situation is ex
ante prevented by authorities because Adjunct Councilor must not have acquired the
Italian citizenship in order to first qualify for the position and run for the position.
However, the source of the enfranchisement of the Adjunct Councilors should
notbe their own political rights or those of her constituency but should originate from
her status of elected representatives in the Municipal Assembly as it is the case with
other fellow Councilors.To better illustrate this argument, let us consider the case of
aregular Councilor: as a simple Italian citizen she cannot vote in the Assembly and nor
can she do it as an Italian citizen who has been elected the representative of a fully
franchised constituency but of a different institution as, for example, the Italian Senate
or Municipal Assembly of the city of Florence. If the two statuses do not constitute base
for her right to vote in the Assembly of Rome, it followsthat the origin of the
enfranchisement is precisely the quality of been elected representative in the Assembly
of the City of Rome. It further follows that the two statuses mentioned above are no
necessary or sufficient conditions for having this right which, means that it is
independent of them. The implication of this reasoning is that if democratically elected,
in similar political arenas be them at the local or national level, the representatives
ought to have voting rights in equality of conditions with their fellows.
In the Assembly of the city of Rome, the consequence of the absence of voting
rights for the Adjunct Councilors keeps them at the margins of the political negotiations
with the party groups (Interview, Head of the Group of Adjunct Councilor, City Council
Rome, 2011). It is worth mentioning that even if elected, the Councilors representing
non-EU citizens are not affiliated with a political party, nor do they identify themselves
with a particular ideological position but rather run for office based on a platform.
Nevertheless, the group redefined its role by becoming the main mediator
between the communities they represent and the public local administration and
viceversa. Paradoxically, the lack of the full political empowerment transformed them
in privileged participants who are not regarded as political competitors and who can
surpasses the political and facilitates concrete solutions to the claims of immigrant
communities.
The Adjunct Councilors frequently meet with the heads of the department for
social affairs, health, family and education in the local government. In my stay in Rome
I accompanied the 4 Councilors and have witnessed how they organized the Latin
21 American Carnival - a half a day parade of traditional dances performed by members of
the Latin American associations in the center of Rome; how they received a space for a
Sunday School for the children in the Ukrainian community from the Head of the
Department for Social Affairs; and how the Adjunct Councilor for Asia met with the
associations in his constituency to discuss issues of transliteration of the names from
Asian languages to the Latin alphabet, following that he would afterwards approach the
relevant department of the city administration.
It should also be mentioned that the Group of the Adjunct hold 4 of the 64 seats
based on the continent-based system of representation coined here. This probably
explains why did Roman legislators decided to represent only 4 of the world continents
as 6 seats wouldhave raised the weight of the group to nearly 10 per cent in the
Assembly. Likewise, four are also the seats held by women Councilors. Irony makes
that one of them is an Adjunct Councilor, a Ukrainian national, who represents the
continent of Europe. The Group of Adjunct Councilors also contributes to the
representation of diversity in terms of race and ethnicity in the Municipal Assembly.
In turn, in Madrid consultative body is“Forum Madrid for dialogue and
coexistence”. The main difference with the Adjunct Councillors in Rome is that the
Forum serves as places of encounter and deliberation for a series of key stakeholders
who have an interest in immigration: migrant association, union members, NGOs and
delegates of the local administration. The forums open a genuine democratic space of
encounter and debate for actors who would not otherwise share a common arena.
Indeed, in a functionalist interpretation, the forum plays the role of the back room for
debate for the local policy. However, the disconnection between the Forum and the City
Council which represented by few permanent local administrators who act as
Rapporteurs impends that emergence of a direct dialogue with the both local political
authorities and local administration.
To sum up, the consultative bodies not are fully franchised in Rome nor in
Madrid but they are effective in informally setting the agenda of the local government
and in opening the local administration, the public services and resources to the
immigrants. In this sense their role go well beyond “community leaders” and “ethnic
brokers” of the communities they represent in the relation local authorities (Werbner
1991)and become agents of democratization for the structures of the local government.
In the absence of voting rights in local and national election, the consultative body
empowers the non-EU migrants by bringing more leverage with political actors for as
22 long as they remain non-citizens. In order to enjoy full political rights “the immigrant
will need to disappear into the presumed unity of the nation, and exhibit a
transformation from the abnormal non-national to the juridical construction of the
citizen”(Guild et al. 2009: 16)In conclusion, for the legal resident, the consultative body
is a means of participation while she is presumably waitingin the anti-chamber of
citizenship.
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