Law and Social Capital:
Evidence from the Code Napoleon in Germany∗
Johannes C. Buggle†
Abstract
I test whether legal institutions crowd-in social cooperation in the long-run, using the introduction of the
Code Napoleon in parts of 19th century Germany as a historical experiment. I find that the application of
the Code Napoleon is associated with higher levels of trust and cooperation today. This finding is robust
to an identification strategy that uses only individuals located around a discontinuity in the number of
years the Code Civil was used. Results from a falsification test that moves this discontinuity artificially,
as well as the comparison of pre-treatment characteristics support the interpretation of a causal effect.
In addition, regions around the discontinuity are similar in post-treatment economic development and
inequality. On the contrary, the positive social consequences of the Code Civil manifest themselves in
less political fraud in elections from 1871 to 1900, and in more “bridging” social capital in the 1920’s.
Keywords: Institutions, Long-Term Persistence, Trust, Social Capital.
JEL-Classification: N43, O10, P48, Z10
∗I
am grateful to Yann Algan for his support and to Francesco Amodio, Sascha Becker, Davide Cantoni, Francesco
D’Acunto, Barry Eichengreen, Pauline Grosjean, Emeric Henry, Marc Sangnier, Andrei Shleifer, Guido Tabellini, and Joachim
Voth for helpful comments. Seminar participants at the FRESH Meeting London, the UPF Reading Group on Persistence, the
Spring Meeting for Young Economists 2013, Sciences Po, and the Warsaw-Penn Workshop on “Institutions, Culture and LongTerms Effects” provided useful suggestions. I thank Davide Cantoni and Joachim Voth for kindly sharing data, and the DIW
Berlin for help with the SOEP data access. Valuable research assistance was provided by Ferdinand Lutz and Malte Syman.
All errors remain my own.
† Department of Economics, University of Lausanne, [email protected].
1
Introduction
“If the laws are good, morality is good. If the laws are bad, morality‘s bad”- Diderot1
At least since the work by Banfield (1967), Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2001), social capital has been
associated with many beneficial economic and social outcomes. Trust, as one dimension of social capital,
for example eases cooperation between individuals and collective action.2 Why people trust each other
and cooperate in some societies, but not in others, is therefore a pertinent question. In this paper, I
research whether legal institutions that govern social interactions promote a culture of cooperation and
trust. While there exists a strong correlation between the quality of legal institutions and trust across
countries that seems to support Diderot’s notion (see above 1), this association does not necessarily
reflect a causal impact of the law.3
[Figure 1 about here]
The identification of a causal link is made difficult by the endogeneity of legal institutions, which are
themselves a function of cultural attitudes and preferences. To overcome this common identification
problem, I make use of a historical experiment that is characterized by the imposition of a legal system
on a society from outside. This historical experiment is the introduction of the Code Napoleon in parts
of 19th century Germany, a dramatic positive shock to the quality of existing law. The Code Napoleon
was the most modern legal code at that time, created to spread the ideas of the French Revolution and
to modernize the pre-existing social order of European societies. Its most revolutionary concept was
to treat all individuals as equals. This unprecedented degree of legal equality removed existing barriers
to inter- and intra-class cooperation, and “encouraged the liberation of the individual from corporative
bonds and the establishment of a civil society" (Fehrenbach, 2008). By showing that the application of
the Napoleonic Civil Code throughout the 19th century goes along with higher levels of social trust today,
I provide novel evidence on the relationship between the law and social cooperation from estimating on
the micro-level within a country.4
Formal theories have modeled a positive relationship between legal enforcement and norms of trust (e.g.
1 From the “Continuation of the Dialogue between A and B” (Diderot, 1992). The extended quote is: “A: What do you mean
by morality? - B: I mean a general obedience to laws, either good or bad, and such conduct as follows from that obedience. If
the laws are good, morality is good. If the laws are bad, morality’s bad.”
2 See Algan and Cahuc (2013) for a review of the literature on the impact of trust on economic outcomes.
3 An association between historical political institutions and cooperation has recently been shown by Putnam, 1994;
Tabellini, 2008 and Tabellini, 2010; as well as Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008a.
4 The long-run consequences of the law for economic outcomes has been intensively described by scholars researching
different legal origins. See for example López-de-Silanes et al. (1998) and La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
2
Tabellini, 2008; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008b). Theoretically, a shift from a state of the world
with weak (or partial) law enforcement and high incentives for exploitative behavior, to an environment
where legal enforcement is strong (or impartial) and individuals are incentivized to cooperate, can lead
to a permanent increase in social trust in the society. Rather than limiting their actions to a small circle of
persons, individuals will apply good conduct towards everyone in a society if law enforcement is strong
and impartial (“limited" versus “generalized" morality in Tabellini, 2008). A large, positive shocks to
the quality of institutions can manifest themselves in higher trust even several generations later, as beliefs transmitted inter-generationally from parents to children incorporate past experiences from different
institutional environments. To test whether the rule of law crowds-in norms of cooperation over time,
one would ideally randomly select and expose parts of a society for several generations to different legal
systems, and compare levels of social cooperation afterwards. The spread of the Code Napoleon to some
areas of 19th century Germany approximates such an experiment. The Code was an institution that had
not been created by the individuals to which it applied, but it had been imposed from outside on some
regions of historical Germany during the Napoleonic Wars. It was the centerpiece of a modern legal system that established universal access and equality, that enlarged commercial freedom and that restricted
elite’s privileges. Importantly, the Code lasted in several regions for a sufficiently long time period in
order to affect beliefs long-lastingly, i.e. for more than three generations (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales,
2008b).
My empirical analysis of the long-term effects of the Code Civil starts by comparing social trust and
cooperation of regions that have used the Code Civil in the 19th century to regions that did not apply
it, defining treatment as the number of years the Code Civil was applied before 1900.5 I estimate a
robust positive association between the duration of application of the Code Civil and contemporaneous
levels of trust. However, the Napoleonic occupation did not only alter the law. In addition, serfdom and
guilds were abolished, and land was freed. The treatment variable might proxy for the legacy of those
reforms. Testing alternative institutional reform definitions against the Code Civil, I find that the Code
Civil has clearly the strongest influence on social capital levels today. However, the regional analysis is
is susceptible to unobserved heterogeneity across regions. For example, differences in initial conditions
across regions that applied the Code Civil could drive the observed results.6 In this case, rather than
identifying a treatment effect, the estimation would just pick up path dependency of pre-existing differ-
5A
unified civil code was installed in all German provinces in 1900, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch.
my identification strategy requires the adoption of the Code Civil to be uncorrelated with initial social capital
6 Indeed,
levels.
3
ences. To address concerns about the endogeneity of the Code Civil, I use a second empirical strategy
that compares individuals living in neighboring districts separated only by the duration of application of
the French legal system. While in some districts the Code Civil was used for more than 90 years, their
neighbors either never used it or only for a short duration. I argue that close-by districts are very similar
along many dimensions, and that treatment status along this artificial “border" discontinuity results from
a number of historical accidents and district idiosyncrasies, but does not reflect any underlying systematic
difference. I show that border districts are indeed very similar across a number of geographic and socioeconomic pre-treatment characteristics. Empirical estimates are consistent with those obtained from the
cross-regional comparison: treated localities have significantly higher levels of trust. This result appears
robustly in local linear regressions, a spatial regression discontinuity design, and even when fixed effects
for neighbor-pairs are controlled for. However, in the absence of any treatment one would not expect
to find sizable differences in norms across nearby individuals. Indeed, a falsification test confirms this
presumption. Coefficients from placebo treatments that move the discontinuity artificially outwards to
the North-East or inwards to the South-West are small and insignificant.
I then investigate the mechanisms that explain the uncovered relationship. A first likely candidate is
economic development, as Acemoglu et al. (2011) document a positive effect of the Napoleonic institutions on urbanization. Contemporaneous trust might be a result of differences in economic development,
and only indirectly be ascribed to the legal code. I investigate extensively whether there is evidence for
different paths of post-treatment economic development. My results suggest that observable economic
differences are not very likely to be the main driver of the observed relationship. I find only limited evidence for persisting differences in long-run economic development when considering the cross-section
of all sampled regions. More importantly, districts along the discontinuity are balanced regarding a broad
range of early and late 19th century development outcomes, including growth in city population, and per
capita income today.7
Regarding alternative channels, I analyze potential effects of the Code Napoleon on inequalities in the
distribution of land. Land was, according to my estimations, not more equally distributed at the end
of the 19th century on either side of the border. In addition, in the spirit of Fisman and Miguel (2007),
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2012), and Nannicini et al. (2013), I investigate whether the Code Civil is
7 Results from a difference-in-difference estimation using city population over the period 1700 to 1910 and considering the
entire sample of regions confirm the positive effects found in Acemoglu et al. (2011). However, the same estimation does not
show any significant differences across the border. In addition, examining the evolution of urbanization rates as in Acemoglu
et al. (2011) in a restricted sample consisting of only territories at the border, it appears that while “treated” regions grow faster
in the first half of the 19th century, the gap in urbanization is closed by the turn of the 19th century. Therefore, differences in
income cannot account for the differences in trust observed across the Code Civil discontinuity.
4
associated with stronger rule compliance and less “cheating”. My results show that elites were less likely
to commit electoral fraud in national elections to the German Reichstag from 1871-1900 in the treated
areas of the border. Although, elites are not representative for the entire society, I interpret this result as
evidence for the spread of norms of generalized morality, potentially facilitated by the emergence of a
new political class in the regions that used the Code Napoleon. Moreover, I document the existence of
differences in historical cooperation in 1920’s Germany using the composition of social associations as
indicators for social trust and generalized morality. Consistent with the results on contemporary trust,
I find that the application of a legal system that emphasizes equality goes along with a higher share
of associations that foster cooperation between members of different societal groups (“bridging” social
capital Putnam, 2001). Supplementary evidence obtained from tracing the evolution of one particular
type of club over time (shooting clubs, or Schützenvereine), shows an increase in the number of clubs
founded in the second half of the 19th century in the treated province Rhineland compared to its neighbor
Westphalia.
This paper adds to the growing literature documenting the importance of historical events and institutions
for explaining differences in current beliefs.8 In contrast to existing contributions researching the effect
of a past institution on trust and social capital, in particular Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008a),
and Tabellini (2010), I focus specifically on the effect of legal institutions that regulate interpersonal
interactions. Apart from institutions, other historical shocks have been found to alter norms and beliefs of
societies long-lastingly (see e.g. Africa’s slave trade in Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011, or the Stasi in East
Germany in Jacob and Tyrell, 2010) and Voigtländer and Voth (2012) document persistence of cultural
norms over centuries.9 In addition, several papers modeled the persistence of cultural norms, following
the seminal model in Bisin and Verdier (2001), and their interaction with formal institutions. Tabellini
(2008) studies the determinants of cooperation and the evolution of norms over time. In his model, an
exogenous shock to the quality of the enforcement institution increases the scope of cooperation. He
further argues that when individuals can choose institutions by participating in the political process,
good institutions will be reinforced. Similarly, the model in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008b) gives
a rationale as to why differences in social capital originating from historical shocks are still observable
today.10
A very interesting and related paper is Becker et al. (2015), who research the persistent impact of the
8 See
Nunn (2012) for a comprehensive summary of this literature.
et al. (2010) provide evidence for a potentially detrimental role of the state for trust in the case of extensive
regulation.
10 Empirical evidence of the intergenerational transmission of values can be found in Dohmen et al. (2012).
9 Aghion
5
Habsburg Empire, a kingdom characterized by its efficient state bureaucracy, on trust in state actors.
Focusing on individuals living not more than 200 kilometers around the Empire’s former border, the
authors find that those living in the former Habsburg territory have more trust in institutions today,
but are similar with respect to trust in other people. While methodologically the papers share many
similarities, the novelty in my paper is the empirical investigation of a legal enforcement institution that
regulates primarily citizen-citizen interactions and its effect on cooperation between citizens, rather than
the interaction between citizens and the state. Moreover, the historical experiment under study gives
additional insights about the role of imposed institutions and relates to the literature on the effects of
legal transplants around the world (e.g. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). Furthermore, I
address some of the potential mechanisms that link institutions and trust in the long-run empirically.
While my research design is targeted at identifying long-term implications of institutions on social cooperation, laboratory experiments are generally better suited to investigate short-term behavioral changes
associated with punishment and contract enforcement (see for example Fehr and Gächter, 2000 for experimental evidence; Fisman and Miguel, 2007 for evidence from a field experiment). Most recently
Cassar, d’Adda, and Grosjean (2013) gathered interesting evidence for a causal link between institutions
and norms of cooperation from experiments conducted in Italy and Kosovo. Finally, my findings add
to the analysis of the socio-economic consequences attributed to institutions in general (see for example
Smith, 1776; Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990; De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson, 2001; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008; Cantoni and Yuchtman, 2014)11
and the Napoleonic institutions, as described in Acemoglu et al. (2011), in particular. Relative to Acemoglu et al. (2011), my study differs in the outcomes studied, the long-term perspective, as well as the
identification strategy that exploits a geographic discontinuity on the micro level.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the historical context. Section 3
assesses the effects of the Napoleonic institutions on current social capital outcomes, both across historical regions and across districts along the Code Civil discontinuity. Section 4 tests for the importance of
several potential channels. Section 5 concludes.
11 Another strand of the literature disputes the fundamental role of institutions for economic growth and development. See
for example Glaeser et al. (2004) for the debate on the importance of human capital versus institutions, or Gennaioli et al.
(2014).
6
2
Historical Background: The Code Civil in 19th Century Germany
2.1
Introduction and Reception of the Code Civil
At the time of the French Revolution in 1789, Germany was fragmented into more than 300 states with
a social organization characterized by feudal institutions privileging the nobility and the clergy (Grab,
2003). Germany’s legal system consisted of a plurality of legal norms that differed often within the same
political entity from one town to another.12 Equality before the law did not exist, and peasants were
subject to different courts and laws than the nobility (Acemoglu et al., 2011).
The introduction of the Code Napoleon parallels the territorial expansion of the French Empire and the
strategic occupations of the German lands during the Napoleonic Wars. The French influence in Germany
started in 1798 with the occupation and annexation of the Rhineland, the entire German part on the left
bank of the Rhine. The occupation was quickly followed by the the introduction of French revolutionary
institutions, chief among which was the Code Civil in 1802. Napoleon subsequently invaded large parts
of the current German territory, primarily to defend the French Empire against Prussia.13 Between 1802
and 1814 Napoleon reorganized the German map and integrated many of the small Imperial Estates
into larger states. The satellite states that Napoleon created, as well as other territories that came under
direct French control, also adopted the French legal system. These states include Westphalia (Code
Civil from 1810-1815), Brunswick (1808-1814), Province of Saxony (1808-1815), Hanover (1808-1813)
and Hesse-Kassel (1808-1814). Moreover, in the indirectly controlled states that became part of the
Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon pushed for the adoption of his legal code (Arvind and Stirton,
2010). Some states, motivated by the fear of a French invasion, considered or announced its introduction,
such as Bavaria, others, such as Baden in 1810, actually adopted the Code Civil.14
The reception of the Code Civil was not uniform. A number of German areas adopted the Code Civil
12 These
legal norms were derived from roman and canon law, the law of the church, and together constituted the so called
common law (Gemeines Recht), not to be confused with the British law system. It was a mixture of customary law and traditions
and was executed by the local elite, the church or judges appointed by them.
13 The motives for occupying a particular region have been twofold, as described in Acemoglu et al. (2011). First, in order
to defend France against Prussia and Austria, the territories in-between the Empires were strategically important. Second, the
French revolutionaries wanted to enlarge the territory of the Empire to its natural borders: the Rhine, the Atlantic Ocean and
the Alps, (Doyle, 1990, p. 199). The revolutionary leader Danton proclaimed on January, 31st 1793: “The limits of France are
marked out by nature. We shall reach them at their four points: the Ocean, at the Rhine, at the Alps, at the Pyrenees.” (quoted
in Doyle (1990, p. 200).
14 The Code Civil offered the possibility to the newly formed Grand Duchy of Baden to unify the eight different legal systems
used in its traditional and freshly gained territories (Sturm, 2011). However, while Baden was put under pressure by Napoleon
to adopt the French legal system, it did not get the Code Civil through direct Napoleonic control. In the empirical section I show
that results are robust to excluding Baden. In addition, Baden used a modified version of the Code with around 500 additions.
The modifications concerned primarily the persistence of some peasant obligations towards landowners, although, serfdom had
already been abolished in 1783 by the liberal Grand Duke Charles Frederick, and the inheritance legislation that forbade the
splitting of large estates (Sturm, 2011).
7
and used it until 1900, the year when the first civil code that applied to the entire unified German Reich,
the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, was introduced. Other regions used it for a much shorter time period.15
For the persistence of the Napoleonic institutions the allocation of regions at the Congress of Vienna in
1815 proved to be crucial. As a result of the Congress, several of the old rulers regained their power.
They rolled back the Napoleonic institutions in regions such as Brunswick, Saxony, Hanover and HesseKassel. Several other territories that used the Code Civil were allocated to new rulers. The Code prevailed
in those areas where the new rulers could not offer an equivalent civil code, as in the case of the Bavarian
Palatinate (Stein, 2004). In all former Prussian territories, as well as in those that it obtained after the
Congress, Prussia sought to install its own civil code, the Allgemeines Landrecht (ALR) of 1794. The
introduction of the ALR in the Kingdom of Westphalia was therefore not a matter of discussion, as
about half of the population belonged to Prussia before the French occupation. Only in the newly gained
parts west of the Rhine which prior to 1815 were part of the French Empire, there was a debate about
whether the Code Civil was to be replaced by the ALR.16 The Rhineland was in a unique situation
as it had been applying the Code Civil particularly long before 1815. Acknowledging that the French
reforms had already changed the Rheinish society considerably, the Prussian administration under the
lead of the liberal Prime Minister Hardenberg decided that it was incompatible with the old-Prussian
privileges codified in the ALR (Heymann, 1914). Therefore, Frederick William III of Prussia decided in
1818 to first modernize the ALR and to introduce it afterwards in the entire Prussian Empire (Siebels,
2011). The revision of the Prussian ALR did, however, never take place. That the Code Civil was
retained in the Rhine province can on the one hand be attributed to “reform-minded Prussian officials"
like Hardenberg that “played a crucial role in ensuring that [it] was not immediately swept aside", (Rowe,
2003, p. 281). On the other hand, its continuation was also favored by the local population, in particular
the legal profession and the emerging commercial class of the Rhineland that, unsurprisingly, preferred
the business friendly Code Civil.17,18
Overall, the length of application of the Code Civil can not be attributed to any singular factor, but it
was the result of a complex historical process. Empirical evidence in Arvind and Stirton (2010) support
this interpretation. They find a diverse set of factors to be important, but none to be sufficient, to explain
15 The treatment in the empirical analysis is based on the number of years the Code Civil was used in a territory before 1900.
16 Among
the formerly Prussian parts of the Rhine province, the introduction of the ALR was only executed in districts on
the right bank of the Rhine, such as the districts Duisburg, Essen, and Rees.
17 The preference for retention is not surprising as the Code Civil had already changed the Rheinish society drastically.
Feedback effects between a change in values and the choice of institutions are therefore likely, as in Tabellini, 2008.
18 For the population of the Rhine area the Code Civil also provided a protection against the interference of the new unknown
rulers from the East and even “[...] served as a a substitute constitution" (Rowe, 2003, p. 259).
8
the reception of the Code. Among the most important factors are direct French control, the number of
territories a region gained in 1815, the presence of a liberal ruler, popular anti-french sentiment as a
result of French occupation, and the presence of a proto-industrial economy before 1800.19 Results from
regressing the duration of adoption on a set of pre-treatment variables confirms that French rule and
proximity to France are two important factors that determined the reception of French law, see Appendix
Table B1.20
As Figure 2 illustrates, the Code Civil existed throughout the 19th century in the Rhineland, consisting
of the areas West to the Rhine river and small parts on the right bank of the Rhine, formerly belonging to
the Duchy of Berg, as well as the Bavarian Palatinate (given to Bavaria), as well as Baden. In addition,
I follow the coding in Acemoglu et al. (2011) and regard the civil code of Saxony, the Sächsisches
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, as an equivalent legal Code guaranteeing similar rights as the Napoleonic
Civil Code. The areas that used the Napoleonic Code Civil in the Western parts of Germany bordered
territories that either used common law or the Prussian ALR.
[Figure 2 about here]
2.2
The Code Civil versus alternative Legal Systems in 19th Century Germany
The Code Civil incorporated the ideas of the enlightenment and put into practice the principles of the
French Revolution (Schlosser, 1995). It established a new set of civil liberties that were exceptional for
19th century Germany (Sperber, 1992). The revolutionary characteristic that differentiated it the most
from all other existing legal systems was universal equality before the law. Legal equality was granted
to all men, removed any form of privileged treatment for the nobility and guaranteed the application of
the same rules to everyone independent of income and status (Lyons, 1994). Legal equality was in stark
19 In parts of the empirical analysis, I compare the regions of Rhineland that kept the Code to Westphalia that did not keep it.
According to Arvind and Stirton (2010), the main dimension along which the Rhineland differed from its neighbor Westphalia
was its more advanced economy prior to 1800. In the empirical specification, I take into account pre-treatment differences in
economic development.
20 Treated regions were occupied significantly longer by the Napoleonic Army, which allowed to install the institutions
properly. Secondly, treated regions are located closer to Paris, equally important for whether a region was actually occupied
or not. In contrast, one could think that, because of the geographical closeness to France, people in the Western territory were
much more in favor of the Revolutionary ideas when it broke out in 1789, and thus much more involved in political activities,
such as being member of Jacobin clubs. This was not the case. In the Rhineland for example, “there were hardly any local
Jacobins or self-styled patriots sympathetic to the Revolution” (Doyle, 1990, p. 352) compared to other parts of Germany,
and even if, these groups were small and consistent only of “scattered individual activists” (Sperber, 1992, p. 489). Contrary
to Arvind and Stirton (2010), I find that that the treated regions were less urbanized before 1800. In addition, the literature
on the determinants of social capital has shown that Protestantism is favorable for social attitudes and cooperation (Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2002; Tabellini, 2008). The share of Protestants enters the regression with a negative coefficient, however.
Finally, the number of territories from which the regions were created goes along with a longer adoption of the Code. Changing
the institutions and reverting back to former institutions after the Napoleonic occupation was therefore much more costly in
the light of the integration of those many small states. That a unified legal code made the integration of additionally gained
territories easier was also emphasized by several scholars (see e.g. Becker, 1985; Arvind and Stirton, 2010).
9
contrast to the traditionally used common law, but also to the Code’s main competitor, the Prussian civil
code, that was build on the idea of class differences.21 The ALR perpetuated these differences and the
privileges of the nobility (Kleinheyer, 1979).22 Contrary to the French law that was constructed for a
bourgeois civil society, the Prussian ALR aimed at cementing the feudal society in all aspects of the
law (Kleinheyer, 1979). This difference in legal equality is, for instance, visible in the economic sphere.
The Code Civil guaranteed property rights and commercial freedom to all individuals (Lyons, 1994).
Starting a business, for example, only required a business license from the local city administration
(Becker, 1985). The ALR did not allow peasants to engage in commerce and put restrictions on property
ownership, the bourgeoisie could not own feudal property, and commercial activities of the nobility
were equally restricted (Schmon, 2007). Alexis de Tocqueville (2015) who studied the ALR in the mid19th century summarized the antiquity of the Prussian law: “Most of the landowners privileges are
consecrated by the Code. [...] In this same Code the bourgois remains carefully separate from the
peasants. [...] It is thus the case that this law code [...] put into practice after the outbreak of the French
Revolution, is the most authentic and recent legislative document that gives a legal basis to the very
feudal inequalities that the French Revolution was going to abolish throughout Europe."
Furthermore, the Napoleonic Code increased the predictability of the law by unifying and replacing entirely traditional and local law. In contrast, the ALR and common law were only subsidiary to local law.
Where local legal customs differed from the written law they were given preference. Therefore, in areas
where the Code Civil was not applied, nobles continued to administer the law themselves (Patrimonialgerichtsbarkeit). The Code Civil also established a separation of powers between the judiciary and the
administration and increased legal transparency through its clarity, as well as through the publicity of
trials and hearings. In the Rhineland it went along with an extensive reformation of the entire judicial
procedures and the installation of new courts of appeal and commercial courts.23
21 Legal equality also differentiated the Code Civil from Bavarian civil code, the Bavarian Codex Maximilianeus created in
1756.
22 Already the titles of the chapters in part II of the ALR (“The peasant class", “The bourgeoisie", and “The rights and duties
of the nobility") make a clear reference to the desired social order.
23 In these territories, ordinary people were appointed as Justices of Peace (JP), being in charge of pre-trial settlements of
minor cases. They were, in particular, appealed in labor conflicts in an increasingly industrialized society (Haferkamp), settling
disputes in the market about the quality of work between masters and manufacturers, as well as those between masters and
journeymen or apprentices, who often breached contracts and left their masters on their own (Sperber, 1992, p. 55). “Courts
would provide a remedy by ensuring the exact fulfillment of [...] contracts”, writes Sperber (1992, p. 56) and refers to the
manufacturing tribunals, which provided a form of “industrial mediation” between manufacturers, workers and journeymen
(Sperber, 1992, p. 55).
10
2.3
Social Consequences
The French institutions aimed at modernizing a social system that had been predominant for hundreds
of years, with view to a more equal society, the abolition of privilege and the removal of social barriers
(Lyons, 1994). Its legal code guaranteed equal rights and encouraged cooperation between different
parts of the population and the creation of a civil society. This transformation is most well documented
for the Rhineland, a region that prior to 1800 was characterized by a “particularly old-fashioned, preabsolutistic, feudal system"24 (Nipperdey, 1983, p. 78). However, "the French law and its idea of a
society made up of free and equal property owners have penetrated the civil movement"25 (Nipperdey,
1983, p. 79) and led to a society that was “well advanced socially compared to the rest of Germany"26 ,
(Nipperdey, 1983, p. 78). Comparing the Rhineland to other provinces of 19th century Prussia, Sperber
describes the latter as far less progressive, characterized by social structures and institutions “too different
from those [...] along the Rhine” (Sperber, 1992, p. 38). While in the Rhenish territories, “the tone was
set by the bourgeois elite of bankers, merchants, manufactures, rentiers, lawyers and notaries” (Sperber,
1992, p. 38), i.e. a large and important bourgeoisie and middle class, the nobility remained highly
influential in Prussia.
3
Estimating the Effect on Contemporaneous Social Capital
This section estimates the impact of the Napoleonic Code Civil on norms of trust and cooperation in
current day Germany. I start by analyzing the association between the duration of application of the
Code Civil and social capital in a sample of 16 historical territories that cover almost the entire current
Federal Republic. I then restrict the sample to observations around a border separating regions that
applied the Code Civil for on average over 90 years from regions that applied it for only about 5 years.
To validate the border design, I test for pre-existing differences between the treated and untreated districts
along the Code Civil discontinuity. In addition, I create a placebo treatment by moving the border as an
additional test for the existence of a “true" treatment effect.
3.1
Data
Measures for contemporaneous social capital are obtained using individual survey data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp, 2007), wave 2003. The outcome variable
24 Author’s
translation.
translation.
26 Author’s translation.
25 Author’s
11
I am primarily interested in is interpersonal trust. In the survey, respondents were asked to evaluate
(“totally agree”, “slightly agree”, “disagree slightly”, “totally disagree”) the following three statements
related to interpersonal trust: “On the whole one can trust people”, “Nowadays one cannot rely on
anyone”, and “If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust them”. I
recode the variables on a scale from 1 to 4, such that the highest value is assigned to the highest level of
trust. The variable Trust is then computed as the average out of the individual scores for each question.27
Trust, while widely used, might be insufficient as a stand-alone measure of social cooperation. I therefore
construct two additional variables measuring norms of cooperation. The SOEP asks respondents about
the perceived behavior of others with respect to fairness: “Do you agree that most people... a) exploit
you if they had the opportunity or b) would attempt to be fair towards you?”, as well as with respect to
helpfulness: “Would you say that for most of the time, people... a) attempt to be helpful? b) or only act in
their own interests?”. Out of those questions I construct two binary outcome variables, labeled Fair and
Coop, such that the value 1 indicates a higher level of perceived fairness and willingness to help and act
cooperatively, respectively. As Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2012) show for the WVS, answers from
social value survey questions concerning trust reflect the beliefs of the sender about the trustworthiness
of the receiver. Survey measures are therefore well suited to elicit the updating and persistence of beliefs
following a exogenous legal change.
The geographical level at which individuals can be observed is the district (county or Kreis). There are
more than 400 districts in Germany, and one district is equivalent to the NUTS 3 level of the Statistical Units of the European Union.28 To account for other influences of social capital on the individual
level, all regressions control for personal characteristics of the respondent, such as age and its square,
as well as a dummy variables for gender. To control for the legacy of the former Communist regime
in Germany, I include a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the respondent lived in the former
East of Germany before 1990. Furthermore, I control for five categories of religious affiliation which are
Protestant, Catholic, any other Christian religion, a different religion that is not Christian or none. The
personal characteristics, as well as the location before 1990 and the religious denomination are plausible
exogenous to the Napoleonic treatment and will serve as my baseline controls. Additionally, differences in educational attainment are controlled for using six different indicator variables for schooling
that disringuish between having no school degree at all, having attended school for a total of 9 years and
27 Using a principal component instead of the mean produces almost identical results, as both measures are strongly correlated (0.99).
28 Because of the confidentiality requirements of the data on this detailed regional level, it was accessed via a remote access.
12
obtained a degree from the middle school (Hauptschule), 10 year middle school (Realschule), 12 year
secondary school (Fachhochschulreife) or having obtained the highest secondary school degree after 13
years (Abitur). To capture the economic situation of the respondent, I use a dummy measuring unemployed during the last year, as well as the household income in the last month. Since educational and
economic outcomes might have been affected by the Napoleonic institutions, they are added separately
to the baseline controls.29 Table 1 provides summary statistics for all individual variables from the SOEP.
[Table 1 about here]
The current districts of residence of the observed individuals are matched with 16 historical territories for
which historical territory characteristics are available (urbanization rate in 1800 and 1850, the share of
Protestants in 1800, the longitude and latitude of the territories’ capital and its distance to Paris, as well
as the coding of different reforms in 19th century Germany). The definition of the territories follows
Acemoglu et al. (2011), from where I also take the historical territory data. Historical borders match
remarkably well with current district borders and cut only through very few counties. Current counties
that straddle a historical border are assigned to a historical region depending of the historical location
of the counties’ current capital. The matched sample contains more than 17000 individual observations
included in the SOEP. In addition to historical territory characteristics, I control for geographic differences across districts, i.e. the distance of its centroid to a major European river, the distance to the closest
coast, the slope of the terrain, and the suitability of the soil for growing wheat. Slope and wheat suitability are taken from the FAO-GAEZ database. Table 2 displays summary statistics for the historical and
geographic controls.
[Table 2 about here]
3.2
Results for the Complete Sample
I begin by estimating the effect of the Code Civil on current trust in the sample of 16 historical regions.
The treatment variable is the number of years the Code Civil was in place in a region before 1900. Figure
3 displays the spatial distribution of the treatment.30
29 As my focus of attention lies on the intergenerational transfer of individuals’ beliefs from their ancestors that have lived
in the particular historical territory many years ago, ideally I would like to consider only individuals for which I can identify
the historical territory of their ancestors residence during the 19th century. Except for the location of individuals before the fall
of the Berlin Wall, the SOEP data does not provide information about the location of ancestors.
30 Table D1 in the Appendix gives the name and definition of the territories included in the sample and the treatment definition. The inclusion and definition of territories follows Acemoglu et al. (2011). Figure D.1 in the Appendix shows a map of the
historical territories.
13
[Figure 3 about here]
The following base model is regressed:
0
0
0
yi,d,h,m = α + βcivilh + Xi δ + geod γ + histh ω + ηm + ui,d,h,m
(1)
where yi,d,h,m measures one of the social capital related outcomes of individual i living in district d,
belonging to historical territory h and macro-region m. civilh measures the number of years the Code
Civil was applied in historical region h before the year 1900. The matrix Xi contains a list of individual
controls, specified above. ηm denote fixed effects for German macro-regions. geod contains geographical
controls evaluated at the district level and histh denotes historical controls, both pre- and post-treatment,
measured at the historical territory. Standard errors are clustered at the level of a district.
Results of the regressions are displayed in Table 3.31 Panel A shows the basic correlation between the
Code Civil and the different measures for social trust, controlling only for macro-region dummies of the
four macro-regions north, south, east and west, as well as the baseline individual controls (age, gender,
religion, location before 1990). I estimate a positive and significant coefficient for all three outcome
variables. Thus, individual trust and cooperation increases in the number of years the Code Civil was
used in a historical region. Panel B adds potential pre-treatment correlates of the Code Civil evaluated
at the territory level, such as the rate of urbanization in 1800, the share of Protestants in 1800, the
longitude and latitude of the capital and its distance to Paris. Urbanization and Protestantism are both
proxies of pre-existing differences in economic development, and the latter has been also shown to be
related to higher levels of literacy (Becker and Woessmann, 2009). In addition, religion as a measure of
“culture” can also explain differences in norms and beliefs. Protestantism has been associated with high
levels of social cooperation and trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Tabellini, 2008). Including those
controls increases the effect of the Code Civil on all three outcome variables considerably, see Panel B
of Table 3. The coefficient for Trust for example doubles in magnitude and gains significance. Historical
characteristics of the territories are thus important covariates of both the Napoleonic treatment and social
trust today.
[Table 3 about here]
31 Additional regressions examining different definitions of the treatment and functional forms are shown in the Appendix,
Table B2.
14
Panel C of Table 3 adds another set of plausible exogenous controls, which relate to geographic characteristics of districts. Adding geographic controls increases the magnitudes of the coefficients further.
Finally, in Panel D I include a set of post-treatment variables, both at the individual and historical territory, that were potentially affected by the Napoleonic treatment (Acemoglu et al., 2011). More precisely,
Panel D adds educational attainment, household income and unemployment status of the individual, as
well as the urbanization rate of the territory in 1850. Estimated coefficients stay relatively stable in
magnitude when post-treatment controls are included and they retain their significance.32
3.3
Robustness of the Complete Sample
The robustness of the results in the complete sample is assessed further in Table 4, using a specification
with the entire set of pre-treatment controls similar to Panel C of Table 3. In the first specification the historical territories Baden and Saxony are dropped, which chose to adopt a civil code that guaranteed legal
equality - although this choice was severely constrained in the case of Baden. The finding of a positive,
significant effect is robust to this specification, as column 1 in Table 4 shows. Next, within Prussia, i.e.
holding Prussian kingdom characteristics constant, the positive association holds true. Prussia is defined
in either the borders of 1815 (column 2) or 1866 (column 3).
[Table 4 about here]
Finally, I use self-reported life satisfaction and interest in politics as placebo outcomes, on which the
Code Civil should not have had any long-run influence. Columns 4 and 5 indeed display estimated
coefficients which are not statistically different from zero.
3.4
Code Civil versus Further Napoleonic Reforms
The package of French reforms did not only consist of the introduction of the legal code, but it also
included the abolition of guilds, the abolition of serfdom and land reforms. The potentially highly correlated Code Civil treatment variable could pick up the effects of these reforms, instead of having an
independent impact. I test this hypothesis by using these alternative reforms as treatment in the econometric specification of the complete sample, controlling for pre-treatment and geographic controls similar
to Table 3 Panel C. The measures for the abolition of serfdom, the agrarian reform and the abolition of
32 Table B3 in the Appendix shows the estimated coefficients for all variables included in Panel D. As expected, having lived
in the GDR before 1990 decreases trust, more educated individuals have more trust, unemployed individuals trust less, and
income is positively associated with higher trust. For the variables on the territory level only the share of Protestants in 1800
shows significant association with higher cooperation.
15
guilds are the time span between the years of enactment of the respective reform before 1900. The reform index is a combined measure of all reforms - including the Code Civil - evaluated as of the year
1900.33 Table 5 displays estimation results. In Panel A, each alternative reform is included separately as
treatment variable. As expected, the reform index that itself contains the Code Civil shows a positive and
significant association with Trust, and Coop (see the first row, columns 1 and 2). Regarding each reform
independently, the only one that is significantly correlated with the outcomes of interest is the abolition
of serfdom, while all other coefficients turn out not to be different from zero.
[Table 5 about here]
More interesting than each reform by itself is the robustness of the main treatment when each of the
alternative reforms is controlled for. In Panel B I run such “horse races” between the Code Civil and
each alternative reform, by including, one at a time, the latter to the estimation of Trust on the Code
Civil. As reported in columns 1 - 4, the estimated coefficient for the Code Civil treatment variable is
robust and stays positive, and highly significant. It moves between 0.11 and 0.15 in magnitude (Table 5,
Panel C). All other estimated coefficients turn out to be insignificant. Even when including all reforms
at the same time, the the duration of application of the Code Civil is the only significant predictor of
trust today (column 5). These results indicate that the Napoleonic Code has an independent effect on
cooperation and does not simply proxy for other institutional reforms.34
3.5
Identification from Neighboring Districts
So far, the section has established a robust positive association between the application of the Napoleonic
legal code throughout the 19th century and social capital today. However, this association could be
driven by (potentially unobserved) territory characteristics that have not been included in the regressions
(omitted variable bias), or by initial differences in social capital that are correlated with the reception
of the Code Civil (reverse causality). In the following, I use an empirical strategy that exploits the
geographic spread of the Code Civil and the circumstance that in the Western parts of Germany nearby
districts differ greatly in the number of years the Code Civil was used. This strategy, which is similar
to a geographic discontinuity design, allows me to focus on close-by districts and thereby to reduce
heterogeneity in fundamental pre-treatment characteristics. The comparison of neighboring districts
33 The definitions of the reforms and their duration are taken from Acemoglu et al. (2011). Table D1 in the Appendix displays
the variable for each territory, and Table D2 the correlation of each measure with the duration of the Code Civil.
34 Further reforms that Napoleon undertook concerned the educational system and the administration. However, in the case
of education the reforms turned out to be a failure, see Schmenk (2008), or were adjusted after the Prussian takeover, as in the
case of the administration system, see Rowe (2003). Reassuringly, the results of both the complete and border sample hold true
within Prussia, that is holding education, the administrative system and political rights constant.
16
follows the idea that these localities were supposedly very similar in terms of geography, economic
potential, and culture, already prior to the Napoleonic treatment. For this empirical strategy, I restrict the
sample to districts that are located not more than 50 km around a boundary that separates areas that used
the Code Civil for at least 90 years from those that used it a maximum of 13 years.35 The map in Figure
4 displays the counties that are located within the 50 km bandwidth around the Code Civil discontinuity.
Summary statistics for the border sample are displayed in Table 1.
[Figure 4 about here]
The discontinuity is derived from the number of years that a territory applied the Code Civil, but does
not overlap with a geographical obstacle, or a long-existing common political border.36 A threat to this
identification strategy is therefore that the assignment variable (number of years the Code Civil was used
in a region) was potentially manipulated by the inhabitants of the historical territories.37 However, I claim
that the discontinuity can offer plausible exogenous variation at the local level, even if one acknowledges
that the duration of application of the Code Civil in a territory was to some extent influenced by regionspecific characteristics. Whether a district located along the border used the Code Civil in the 19th
century, while its neighbor did not, is as good as randomly assigned when comparing nearby districts.
The assignment of treatment status stems from a number of historical accidents, including the precise
geographic extent of French occupation (e.g. until its “natural border”, the river Rhine), the reallocation
of territories at the congress of Vienna and the subsequent state-wide policies adopted by new rulers,
and from other local idiosyncrasies. Some of these idiosyncrasies are linked to the historical formation
and reshuffling of political borders that determined the affiliation of localities to historical states, either
prior or during the Napoleonic period. This historical process can be illustrated by the many changes that
occurred to the city of Duisburg located at the discontinuity on the right bank of the river Rhine. From the
13th century onwards, Duisburg belonged to the territory of Cleve. In the 17th century Cleve fell in the
hands of Prussia, which made Duisburg a part of the Prussian Empire. After the Peace of Basel in 1795
the left bank of Cleve was given to France. Duisburg remained Prussian and used its Civil Code until
the right bank came under Napoleonic occupation in 1805. The entire territory of Cleve subsequently
used the Code Civil until 1815, when it was integrated into the Prussian Rhine province (Rhineland).
35 If the institutional and legal reform had an effect on culture, a slowly moving and hard to change variable, it is more likely
that the effect of the Code Civil needed several years to disperse. Indeed, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008b) estimate, that
a shock requires about 75 years (2 to 3 generations) to have a long-lasting effect on social capital. The time span of the longest
adoption of the Code in the sample, more than 90 years, fits very well to this estimation.
36 However, the Code Civil border is in fact largely equivalent to the borders of the historical German territories, many of
which were created in the reorganization of Germany during the Napoleonic Wars. In addition, the border segment in the North
follows the course of the river Rhine.
37 Precise manipulation by the agents makes a regression discontinuity design invalid (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
17
However, contrary to other Rheinish districts and even to neighboring areas of former Cleve located on
the left bank of the Rhine, Duisburg (and few other Rheinish districts) had to abolish the Code Civil.
This followed the Prussian agenda to (re-) install Prussian law in territories that belonged to Prussia and
that had already used the Prussian Civil Code before 1800 (Heymann, 1914). That Duisburg ended up
not using the Code Civil is therefore not linked to any underlying city-specific characteristic, but results
from a number of arbitrary historical events. Therefore, at the local level the treatment assignment can
be plausibly assumed to be as good as random.
My empirical strategy consists primarily of estimating local linear regressions with a fixed bandwidth of
50 km. I show robustness of the results to the estimation of a standard regression discontinuity design that
controls for location of the district, and a neighbor-pair fixed effect estimation in the spirit of Acemoglu,
García-Jimeno, and Robinson (2012). In addition, following the regression discontinuity literature, I
conduct two falsification tests in section 3.7. The first test consists of a placebo treatment generated by
moving the border. The second exercise examines empirically whether districts that received treatment
were systematically different from those that did not.
Local Linear Regressions The first approach to estimate differences in social capital at the discontinuity are local linear regressions with fixed bandwidth of 50 km.
The following model is estimated:
0
yi,d,h = α + βborder + Xi,d δ + ui,d,h
(2)
where border = 1 if Code Civil ≥ 90, and 0 otherwise. In all specifications standard errors are clustered
at the district level.
Table 6 shows the estimation results.
[Table 6 about here]
Using only base controls in row a), I estimate a coefficient of the treatment border that is positive and
significant for all three outcome variables. Individuals living in the treated regions have, on average, a
0.06 higher level of trust. Row b) adds Federal States fixed effects. Being a federal republic, Germany
has transferred some of its administrative duties to the sixteen federal states (Länder) that are, for example, in charge of the education, the police and court system. It is possible that current differences in
18
the functioning of local institutions influence social capital, and thus potentially bias the results. Estimated coefficients controlling for Federal States dummies increase in both magnitudes and significance
levels. Results are robust when the full set of individual controls is included in row c), and when the
sample of territories is restricted to those that belonged to Prussia in row e). The sample restriction follows the same reasoning as in the complete sample analysis, as Baden, which did not directly adopt the
Code Civil through French occupation, is dropped. This specification estimates effects within Prussia,
as the Rhineland, Mark and Westphalia were part of Prussia after 1815. In other words, holding all other
common Prussian characteristics constant, the estimation produces a positive and significant coefficient,
albeit the effects are somewhat weaker. The inclusion of geographic controls in row e) increases coefficients in magnitude and significance.38 Results are very similar in magnitude and significance if the
dichotomous treatment variable is replaced by the number of years the Code Civil was applied in row
f). Finally, average trust levels in the districts used around the Code Civil discontinuity are displayed
graphically in Figure 5.
[Figure 5 about here]
Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design Alternatively, I use a spatial regression discontinuity design
(RDD) within the same 50 km corridor that controls for the two-dimensional location (longitude and
latitude) of the district:
0
yi,d,h = α + βborder + f (locationd ) + Xi,d ∗ δ + ui,d,h
(3)
Equation (3) adds to equation (2) the function f (locationd ) of either the first, second or third order
polynomial of the district’s two-dimensional location, following the work by Dell (2010).39
[Table 7 about here]
As Panel A of Table 7 shows, estimated coefficients are robust to including the longitude – latitude
polynomial, and very similar compared to those obtained without locational controls in Table 6, row e).
38 Table
B4 in the Appendix shows that the results are robust to including each geographic control separately.
important assumption of any RDD is the smoothness of the covariates at the discontinuity. Table B5 in the Appendix
regresses the covariates on the border dummy. There exist few significant differences in individual characteristics at the border
with the exception for religious variables (Catholics, Other Christian religion).
39 An
19
Neighbor-Pair Fixed Effects Estimator
Finally, I implement a neighbor-pair fixed estimator, similar
to a matching estimator, that compares pairs of treated and untreated districts that share a common border
(following Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson, 2012). I create couples (neighbor-pairs) of adjacent
districts that either used the Code Civil for at least 90 years, or that used it for less than 90 years. The
main advantage of the neighbor-pair estimator is that it allows to include neighbor-pair fixed effects that
take into account all unobservable characteristics that are shared by a pair of districts. Adjacent districts
are most likely very similar across geographic and economic conditions, contemporary institutions, as
well as any other unobservable. The identification strategy assumes that the number of years the Code
Civil was used is the only exogenous source of variation within each neighbor-pair. As argued above,
whether the French legal system reached a district was as good as randomly allocated within a pair of
neighbors.
Estimation results are provided in Panel B of Table 7. The estimated coefficients from the neighbor-pair
fixed effects model are positive and highly significant for Trust and Coop, and small and statistically
equal to zero for Fair. Coefficient magnitudes for Trust and Coop are larger than the comparable ones
obtained from local linear regressions. Keeping in mind the smaller sample size, this could indicate that
not taking into account unobservables across adjacent municipalities biases the estimation downwards.40
3.6
Falsification Tests
Moving the Border The first falsification exercise tests whether the treatment effect found in the previous subsection reflects a general geographic pattern, or a genuine treatment effect.41 To generate a false
treatment the border is moved twice. The first time it is moved outwards, that is to the North-East. This
allows to generate a placebo treatment comparing individuals living in regions unaffected by the true
treatment on both sides of the border. Second, the border is moved inwards, that is to the South-West,
so to compare regions that have been treated on each side of the border. I construct two new borderlines
which are the joint outline of the regions included in the original border sample. For the inward shift this
is the common outline of the treated, for the outward shift this is the common outline of the untreated
group. Treatment is assigned to regions on the “left" to the border. See Figure 4 for a graphical representation of the regions included in the different samples. If the results found in the previous section are
40 A disadvantage of the neighbor-pair fixed effects estimator is that it needs a sufficiently large number of neighboring
districts. With historical and city-level data the number of cross-sectional units that share a border is even lower. Therefore,
in the remainder of the paper I will estimate local linear regressions along the border. Local linear regressions with bandwidth
50km have the additional advantage that they are less sensitive to measurement error in the border assignment (the “true” border
cuts through several modern districts), by using additional observations that are not located directly at the border.
41 This exercise is inspired by the paper Becker et al. (2015).
20
due to the true treatment, moving the border and performing the same regressions as above should not
display an effect of the fictitious treatment on social capital outcomes in both cases. For the outwards
shift because there was no true long-term Napoleonic treatment. For the inward shift because regions
that actually were treated should be similar with respect to trust levels.
[Table 8 about here]
Results from this falsification test are shown in Table 8. Panel A display the results from moving the
border outwards, Panel B respectively the results from a moving the border inwards. Panel A shows that
moving the border outwards produces statistically insignificant coefficients. The estimated coefficients
are very small and tend towards zero, either using only base individual controls or the full set of individual
controls. A similar picture appears in Panel B for the inwards shift of the border. The coefficient for
Trust is insignificant and about one third of the magnitude of the coefficient obtained in the “true” border
specification. The only significant, but negative, difference exists when using the dependent variable
Coop. Thus, only in the correct border specification, significant and positive treatment effects for regions
on the left of the border can be found. Hence, the falsification tests and the original results suggest a
peculiarity at the border, that I argue can be attributed to the Napoleonic institutions.
Differences in Pre-Treatment Characteristics A further threat to my empirical strategy comes from
the possibility that variation in initial characteristics are responsible for the observed differences in social
capital. The border estimation offers only a valid comparison if districts were similar prior to receiving
treatment. Table 9 tests for pre-existing discontinuities in observables at the border. In Panel A, I regress
geographic characteristics on the border indicator. The only significant difference appears with respect to
the proximity to a river (column 1), i.e. treated regions are on average located closer to major rivers. This
is problematic if the presence of a river is associated with more trust. Districts are similar with respect
to the slope of the terrain, the suitability of the soil for growing wheat, or the distance to the coast. As
reported above, all estimation results are robust to the inclusion of all four geographic characteristics, in
both the complete and the border sample.
[Table 9 about here]
Border regions could have differed with respect to socio-political outcomes prior to 1802. To proxy for
early socio-political development, I use information about characteristics of medieval cities taken from
Jacob (2010). In particular I investigate whether contemporary districts contained a Free city, a Hanseatic
21
city, a city with a Bishop or with a University.42 Results are shown in Panel B of Table 9. I proxy for early
political institutions by the presence of a medieval Free city. As Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008a)
have shown for Italy and Jacob (2010) for Germany, the presence of Free cities goes along with higher
levels of social capital. However, districts that used the Code Civil are on average not significantly more
likely to have hosted a Free city. Another dimension that matters for cooperation is trade and economic
exchange. I proxy for the importance of trade by city membership in the Hanseatic League, a network
of trade cities that existed from about the 13th to the 17th century. Jacob (2010), for example, finds that
former Hanseatic cities have more social capital today. Again, I do not find a statistically significant
difference along the border regarding city membership in the Hanseatic trade network (column 2). In
addition, districts located at the discontinuity are also balanced with respect to the presence of a Bishop
or a university (columns 3 and 4).
Finally, I analyze city sizes along the border prior to 1800 to test for pre-existing differences in local
economic activity. The data is taken from Bairoch, Batou, and Chevre (1988). I use the log population of
cities along the border discontinuity at different points in time. As columns 1 - 4 of Panel C show, city
population in 1500, 1600, 1700 and 1800 is balanced across cities that adopted the Code Civil and those
that did not. In conclusion, the results suggest that important pre-existing historical socio-economic
characteristics, which are potential determinants of social cooperation, were balanced along the border.
3.7
Magnitudes
How large are the above documented effects of the Napoleonic Code on contemporary social capital?
Given that one expects the Code Civil to have an influence only after a substantially long application,
the relevant comparison is a very long duration (above 90 years) to very short duration of usage. In the
complete sample the magnitudes vary between an increase of 0.09 to 0.24 of a standard deviation in Trust
(about 0.54), between 0.17 and 0.3 of a standard deviation in Coop (about 0.48), and between 0.06 and
0.07 of a standard deviation in Fair (about 0.5), depending on the specification. In the border sample
differences in social capital range between a 0.1 to 0.2 of a standard deviation in Trust, and between 0.15
and 0.19 of a standard deviation in Coop. Magnitudes in the spatial regression discontinuity design, and
those obtained from the neighbor-pair fixed effects estimation are very similar. Putting the magnitudes
into relation, having lived in East Germany before 1990 reduces trust by about 0.14 of a standard deviation, being unemployed by around 0.23 of a standard deviation and individuals that finished a 13-year
42 To assign treatment to cities, I match city locations to current county borders as of 2003 that are included in the border
sample.
22
secondary school report 0.28 of a standard deviation more trust than individuals without any school degree. Compared to similar studies, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) for example report “beta” coefficients
of between -0.10 and -0.16 of the impact of the slave trade on trust, and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2008a) find that Italian free cities are associated with an increase of 0.15 of a standard deviation in
associational membership. The findings are therefore economically meaningful and comparable to other
historical events.
4
Potential Channels
The previous section uncovered a robust, positive association between the historical application of the
Napoleonic Code Civil and contemporary norms of cooperation. This section investigates the underlying
mechanisms of the relationship between the legal code and trust today. It first analyzes whether the documented effects are a direct consequence of the legal system or mediated through its effect on economic
development. And second, it investigates alternative possible mechanisms, in particular the distribution
of wealth, the emergence of generalized morality and effects on early social cooperation.
4.1
Short and Long-Term Economic Development
Acemoglu et al. (2011) document a positive effect of the Napoleonic institutions on urbanization in
German regions, especially from mid-19th century onward. That income and social trust are positively
correlated on the individual and aggregate level is a firm result in the trust literature, although there exists
only limited causal evidence that income affects trust (see e.g. Algan and Cahuc, 2013). The positive
effects on income of the Napoleonic institutions could be a potential explanation why trust is elevated
today. I examine in the following whether economic development is indeed the main channel at work in
the samples that I consider. Starting with the complete sample, Panel A of Table 10 regresses log city
population as a measure for historical economic development and contemporaneous income per capita
on the Code Civil treatment.
[Table 10 about here]
Based on these cross-sectional estimates, I find that regions that used the Code Civil do not have larger
cities in 1850 (column 1) or 1900 (column 2), and cities did not grow faster on average during the 19th
century (column 3). I also estimate non-significant coefficients for city sizes in the years 1875 and 1910,
as well as regarding city growth between 1850 and 1900, see Appendix Table B6. Estimated coefficients
for the years 1800 to 1910 and 95 % confidence intervals are plotted in the Appendix Figure C.2 a).
23
However, districts today seem to have slightly higher levels of per capita incomes (column 4), and this
effect is significant at the 5 % level. According to this estimation, a 90 year application of the Code Civil
goes along with a 3.9 % higher income per capita today.
Considering only observations around the border, the cross-sectional estimates reported in Panel B of
Table 10 suggest that post-treatment differences in economic development are small and non-significant.
Economic outcomes measured in the 19th century (columns 1 - 3), as well as contemporary economic
development (column 4) is balanced around the border. The magnitude of the non-significant estimate
on contemporary income is small, too: treated areas have only about 0.8% higher incomes per capita. I
also estimate non-significant coefficients for city sizes in the years 1875 and 1910, as well as regarding
population growth from 1850 to 1900, see Appendix Table B6. Estimated coefficients for the years
1800 to 1910 and 95 % confidence intervals are plotted in the Appendix Figure C.2 b), while those per
capita income are plotted in Appendix Figure C.3. Appendix Table B7 reports similar results from an
estimation that controls for a quadratic function in longitude and latitude, and from the border movement
falsification tests. Coefficients from the falsification tests are oftentimes of similar magnitude, sometimes
even larger (see columns 1 and 2 of Panel B), than in the original border specification.
In Panel C of Table 10, I exploit the panel structure of the city population data from 1700 to 1910 and
estimate difference-in-differences specifications for cities along the border. Column 1 runs a simple
difference-in-difference estimation and reports that treated cities did not grow faster after 1800. This
finding is robust to including city and time dummies in column 2, or when considering the number of
years the Code Civil was in place instead of the border dummy in column 3. The fully flexible estimation
that interacts the border treatment with year fixed effects in column 4 confirms that city growth around
the border did not differ prior to or post 1800. The parallel evolution of city sizes can be seen graphically
in the Appendix Figure C.5 a).43 Estimated coefficients from the fully flexible estimation and 95 %
confidence intervals are plotted in the Appendix Figure C.4.
Table 11 analyzes further outcomes of 19th century socio-economic development taken from the ifo
Prussian History Database.44 Unfortunately, the data is only available for Prussian territories, i.e. the
upper part of the border. The first set of outcomes closely follows Becker and Woessmann (2009) and
43 Figure C.5 b) in the Appendix plots the evolution of urbanization rates in the territories close to the border. In this reduced
sample, most of the difference in urbanization rates between treated and untreated regions appear in the first half of the 19th
century as untreated regions stagnate (compare to Acemoglu et al. (2011) Figures 2A and 2B). In the first decade after 1850
both groups grow equally fast, and at the end of the century territories in the control group catch up and close the gap that
existed in 1850 by 1900.
44 Since counties in 1871 have different borders as today, to assign treatment I match the centroids of the historical counties
to contemporaneous county borders of counties included in the border sample.
24
takes the log average wage of teachers (1886), the tax income per person (1877) and occupational shares
in manufacturing and service or agriculture (all for 1882) as proxies for late 19th century development.
Counties on both sides of the border are balanced regarding these outcomes, see Panel A of Table 11.
Additional socio-economic outcomes that I consider are religion and literacy rates in 1871. Columns 1
and 2 of Panel B show that the border is not a cultural border separating religious groups.45 Individuals
on the treated side of the border were, however, significantly less literate in 1871 (see columns 3 and
4).46
[Table 11 about here]
Overall, the results do not give much support for economic development - around the border - as the
dominant channel explaining the positive association between the Code Civil and trust. While the results
diverge locally from those in Acemoglu et al. (2011), I still find some evidence that the Code Civil has had
a positive effect on city growth in the complete sample using a difference-in-differences estimation (see
Appendix Table B8.), and a small effect on incomes per capita today. However, the complete sample
compares very heterogeneous areas. Once a more demanding specification is used and the sample is
narrowed to more similar neighboring areas, economic differences become negligable.47 Therefore,
economic differences cannot explain the differences in social capital observed around the Code Civil
discontinuity.
4.2
Redistribution and Inequality
As a manifestation of the ideas of the French Revolution, one of the central topics in the Code Civil
was the promotion of equality of economic incomes and wealth (Lyons, 1994). Through the removal
of primogeniture, the inheritance right of the firstborn, and introduction of equal inheritance between
siblings, the creators of the Code Civil sought to end the concentration of wealth in the hands of few. The
equal partition of estates was argued to have been successful and to have led to the division of land into
small parcels (Mokyr, 2003). The resulting change in the wealth distribution could have promoted social
45 Religious denomination was potentially quite stable since the Reformation, so one might expect this result to hold in the
pre-treatment period, too. However, individual data from the SOEP shows differences in Catholicism at the border, see Table
B5 in the Appendix.
46 This confirms the historical literature arguing that the Napoleonic education reform was a failure, as a shortage of teachers
and funds led to the decay of the school system. Schmenk (2008, p. 232) for example estimates that in the Rhineland three
fourths of the population could not read and write in 1814 and regular schooling was an exception.
47 Keller and Shiue (2015) show that city growth in 19th century was much more affected by market integration than by
institutional reforms, using the French rule in Germany as instrumental variable for the latter. They argue that market integration
is a mechanism from institutions to growth. It may be that increased economic integration and trade is an additional channel
that links institutions with social trust and cooperation. Data limitations does not allow me to test this channel empirically.
25
cooperation if mitigating class distinctions based on economic fortune eases inter-class cooperation. To
test whether economic inequality was linked to the Code Civil, I use a measure of land concentration,
e.g. a land Gini index, taken from Ziblatt (2009), for the entire German Empire as of 1898.48 Results
are shown in Panel A of Table 12. Using the complete sample, I estimate a positive and non-significant
coefficient without controls (column 1) and a negative and marginally significant coefficient in the model
using all controls (column 2). Around the border I find small and non-significant coefficients that suggest
that differences in wealth inequality were not important.
[Table 12 about here]
4.3
Generalized Morality and Social Cooperation
Cheating and Elite Behavior
A theoretical mechanism through which legal institutions could increase
social capital is through a reduction in cheating and an increase in moral behavior towards everybody
in a society (what Tabellini (2008) calls generalized morality). By enforcing legal equality, the Code
Napoleon might have discouraged exploitative behavior, cheating and the exposition of negative externalities on others. “Cheating” has been used as an outcome measure of civic behavior, e.g. for example
by Fisman and Miguel (2007) who study violation of parking tickets by diplomats, or by Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2012) who use data on the share of pupils that cheat in school exams. I apply this idea in the
context of 19th century Germany, and use data on electoral fraud in elections to the Reichstag between
1871 and 1912, assembled by Ziblatt (2009). Electoral fraud can be defined as an illegal interference
with an election, i.e. a “violation of the law” (Lehoucq, 2003), and it includes “violence, coercion, influence, voting-buying, or procedural manipulations” (Ziblatt, 2009). Electoral fraud thus undermines the
fairness of an election and is a form of cheating for private gain on the society as a whole. The data lists
the number of disputed elections be constituency and year. Disputed elections encompass manipulations
on the election day, local government intervention into election campaigns, influence of private individuals, for example agrarian or industrial employers, or vote buying. I aggregate the number of disputed
elections per district prior to 1900 as the legal framework was equalized afterwards. Results are robust
to adding post-1900 years. While the data has the advantage of coming from elections with a uniform
electoral institutional framework, it has several caveats. First, it only measures the degree of cheating
for political elites. Second, as all eligible voters were able to file a complaint against an election, high
cheating could reflect differences in the willingness of voters to complain. I account for the latter by
48 As above, the original data is measured on the level of a historical administrative unit, the electoral constituency. I
therefore match the centroids of historical constituencies with county borders in 2003.
26
controlling for voter mobilization with voter turnout.
As Panel B of 12 shows, the number of contested elections decreases significantly with the years the
Code Civil was used (column 1), controlling for population, turnout, electoral competition and the share
of Catholics. This difference goes away, however, in the more demanding specification using the full set
of geographic and historical controls (column 2). Considering the border sample, treated districts have
a significantly lower number of contested elections (column 3) conditional on population, turnout, and
the share of Catholics. Controlling for geographic characteristics of the district reduces the magnitude
of the coefficient, but it stays significant at the 5% significance level. The magnitude of the coefficient is
sizable, about -0.6, given the mean (1.70) and standard deviation (1.64) of the dependent variable.
Although, the evidence is restricted to political elites, the lower levels of cheating could be interpreted
as the existence of a norm guided behavior that complies more often with the “rule of law”, and a greater
willingness to behave civic. Consistent with a political economy mechanism in which elites act unselfish,
because cheating is costly under the modern impartial legal system that does not differentiate anymore
between elites and the rest of the society, and elite behavior might feed back on social cooperation.49
Moreover, in a society with strong norms of generalized morality, people are likely to demand higher
standards of behavior from their politicians.50,51
Social Capital and Associations
Next, I investigate in a more direct fashion the effects of the Code
Civil on social cooperation in an intermediate period. One way to measure the degree of social cooperation in historical societies and in the absence of survey data is to rely on outcome measures, such
as participation in voluntary associations (Putnam, 1994; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008a). A
comprehensive dataset of associations in cities in Weimar Germany has been collected by Satyanath,
Voigtländer, and Voth (2016). For each city, the data contains information about the number of clubs for
a wide range of types, from animal breeders to music and military clubs. The type of club is particularly
valuable for my purpose, since it allows to divide associations into “bonding” and “bridging” types of
social capital, following Putnam (2001). Bonding social capital characterizes cooperation between people with homogeneous backgrounds, and strengthens divisions between groups in a society. In contrast,
49 In
the same vein but in a different context, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) argue that the weak legal system was a potential
factor for the persistence of mistrust in regions affected by the slave trade. They argue that unconstrained political leaders were
not forced to behave trustworthy, and could misbehave without being held responsible.
50 Nannicini et al. (2013) show that social capital is associated with lower levels of political misbehavior in contemporary
Italy.
51 The effects can also be reconciled with the theory and empirical findings described in Aghion et al. (2010), where low
regulation goes along with high trust. Indeed, the Code helped to remove entry barriers and to establish a new elite, characterized
by economic success.
27
bridging social capital refers to interactions between people with socially heterogeneous backgrounds.
Translated into categories of social trust, bonding social capital goes along with limited morality and
a small radius of trust between individuals that belong to well-defined groups. Bridging social capital,
however, widens the radius of trust to outsiders. It is associated with strong trust in strangers and generalized morality. Following the classification in Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth (2016), I characterize
each club as either bonding or bridging.52 I then construct a measure of association density, that divides
the total number of bridging and bonding associations by population, and a second measure that gives
the share of bridging associations over total associations to assess the composition of social capital.
[Table 13 about here]
Table 13 reports the estimation results for the complete sample in columns 1 - 3, and for the border
specification in columns 4 - 6. As column 1 shows, cities that used the Code Civil during the 19th century
where not significantly different with respect to the density of associations in the 1920’s. Considering the
composition of associations, however, cities where the Code Civil was used show a significantly higher
share of bridging associations (see column 2). This finding is robust to a large set of controls (column 3).
A 90 year application of the Code Civil goes along with an increase in the share of bridging social capital
associations, of about 0.5 of a standard deviation. Results for the border sample reported in columns 4
- 6 are similar. There is no effect on association density, but a positive effect on the share of bridging
associations. In terms of magnitudes, coefficients range between a 0.4 to a 0.5 of a standard deviation
increase in the share of clubs that fall into the bridging social capital category. Overall, the finding of
a positive association between the Napoleonic legal system and bridging social capital measured in an
intermediate period are in line with the results on contemporary social trust in strangers documented
above. The findings support the interpretation that the removal of barriers to cooperation through legal
equality also led to more social interactions between diverse societal groups. Complementarities between
the types of social associations created and norms of cooperation could be one mechanism through which
differences in social cooperation were perpetuated.
Cross-sectional estimations at a given point in time are informative, ideally, however, one would like to
trace the evolution of associations over time. This is possible for one type of associations, the shooting
associations (Schützenvereine), as information on the number of clubs founded per county, from the Mid-
52 See
the Appendix for the classification of clubs.
28
dle Ages to 1939 at a yearly level, in the two Prussian provinces Rhineland and Westphalia exists.53,54
I use the years from 1700 to 1900. The data has the advantage to track the historical evolution of one
particular association over time. However, shooting associations are an ambiguous measure of social
capital as they were neither clearly bridging nor necessarily bonding associations.55 Furthermore, shooting associations played a role in 19th century political life. Keeping these caveats in mind, I use the
foundation dates of shooting clubs available in a panel of 128 counties and an annual time period from
1700 to 1900. I aggregate the data on the county level into four different periods composed of 50 years,
i.e. 1700 – 1750, 1750 – 1800, 1800 – 1850 and 1850 – 1900. I estimate a set of binary regressions
- equivalent to simple t-tests - comparing the mean number of clubs founded per province per period.
Results are shown in Table 14 and the graphical illustration of the evolution of clubs is provided in Figure
C.6 in the Appendix.
[Table 14 about here]
The results indicate that both provinces did not differ significantly in the average number of clubs founded
during the period from 1700 to 1750. However, starting from the second period there appears a significant
difference between the two provinces. From 1750 to 1800 on average an addition of 0.5 shooting clubs
per county were founded in Westphalia. The negative difference aggravates in the period between 1800
and 1850. Only from 1850 onwards, a the sign of the mean difference changes and gets positive. From
1850, more clubs were founded in the Rhineland using the Code Civil then in the neighboring province
of Westphalia. The same pattern shows up when the lagged cumulative number of clubs per county is
controlled for in Panel B. Generalizing the results is difficult, as the type of association is very particular.
However, the data shows roughly the expected pattern. While before 1800 there was a negative difference, this trend turns in the second half of the 19th century. Why the increase in associations did not start
right after 1800 can only be answered speculatively. One possibility could relate to the ban of shooting associations by Napoleon in the occupied areas in 1808. The disruption of participation in shooting
associations might have been aggravated in areas that were occupied longer and more intensively, such
as the Rhineland. Second, in the years from 1815 to the March revolution in 1848 (Vormärz), shooting
53 The source of the data is Plett (1991), who gathered this information by directly surveying current day shooting clubs
about their year of foundation. In the data, a club is reported to exist in year t, if its date of foundation falls in this year. See
section A.1 in the Appendix for further information.
54 In 19th century Prussia the major types of associations were the singing clubs, the gymnasts, and the shooters (often jointly
referred to as the “cloverleaf”) (Klenke, 1998, p. 20). These clubs were engaged in all kinds of community life, especially
important for organizing big folk festivals (Klenke, 1998, p. 20). The marksmen’s festival (Schützenfest), organized by the
shooters sometimes attracted hundreds of people. While the shooters started out as a para-military organization in the middle
ages, from the 16th century on they changed their focus from defending cities and villages to a place of social gathering and
celebrations.
55 They are therefore excluded in the above analysis of social capital in Weimar Germany.
29
associations where locus of political opposition against rulers. Different levels of political discontent
and participation in revolutionary activities might be another reason for the diverge in the first half of the
19th century. A further possibility is that it took norms of generalized morality several decades to diffuse
before they manifested themselves in increased associational engagement. Finally, the empirical results
cannot discard the possibility that differences in the rate of urbanization in late 19th century played an
important role in the evolution of shooting associations.
5
Conclusion
The Code Napoleon was created to serve as the backbone of a new social order in European societies.
It modernized legal institutions radically in parts of 19th century Germany. This paper documents that
its application goes along with desirable social outcomes in the long-run. My empirical results suggest
a strong complementarity between having applied the Code Civil and contemporaneous norms of trust
and cooperation. Identification from individuals living in close-by districts separated by the historical
application of the Code Civil, a falsification test consisting in moving the Code Civil border, and the
comparison of pre-treatment characteristics, point towards a causal legacy of the French legal system.
Disentangling direct from indirect effects and identifying mechanisms of persistence is an important, but
difficult task faced by the persistence literature. I analyze a variety of intermediate outcomes to better
understand the relationship between past legal institutions and trust today. The post-treatment evolution
of economic development and the distribution of wealth cannot explain this association. In contrast, I
find evidence that the Code Napoleon fostered generalized morality, evident for 19th century political
elites who were significantly less likely to commit electoral fraud. Its application also went along with
a higher share of social associations emphasizing intra-group cooperation, and a general increase in the
formation of social associations.
My findings suggest that impartial legal institution can remove barriers to cooperation and shift a society’s equilibrium to high cooperation for generations, even when those institutions were imposed. Strong
norms towards cooperation persisted in the long-run, albeit institutions converged. Thus, persistence of
norms can be expected to be exacerbated in situations where formal institutions remain weak. My results
also relate to the negative long-term effects attributed to civil law systems (La Porta, López-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer, 2008). In contrast, my findings imply that a civil law system is not inherently bad, but can
create beneficial outcomes relative to other legals systems that do not guarantee equivalent rights.
30
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A
Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics SOEP Data
Full Sample
Border = 0
N
Mean
StDev
Min Max
17664
24.85
37.90
0
17664
17664
17664
2.31
0.36
0.53
0.54
0.48
0.5
1
0
0
Personal Characteristics
Age
Age sq.
Male
GDR before 1990
17664
17664
17664
17664
47.01
2502.96
0.49
0.25
17.13
1697.27
0.5
0.43
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Other Christian
Other Non-Christian
None
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
0.33
0.32
0.02
0.04
0.29
0.47
0.46
0.15
0.2
0.46
0
0
0
0
0
Education
Secondary School (13 years)
Secondary School (12 years)
Middle School (10 years)
Middle School (9 years)
Other degree
No degree
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
0.2
0.05
0.29
0.35
0.07
0.05
0.4
0.21
0.45
0.48
0.25
0.22
Economic Controls
HH Income
Unemployment
17664
17664
2811.49
0.07
2091.13
0.25
Border = 1
N
Mean
StDev
N
Mean
StDev
98
3242
3242
3.31
0
4.45
0
3117
3117
95.73
1
3.61
0
4
1
1
3242
3242
3242
2.30
0.36
0.54
0.56
0.48
0.50
3117
3117
3117
2.36
0.44
0.57
0.56
0.50
0.49
3242
3242
3242
3242
46.43
2444.60
0.49
0.03
16.99
1672.42
0.50
0.18
3117
3117
3117
3117
46.82
2479.56
0.48
0.03
16.96
1701.50
0.50
0.16
1
1
1
1
1
3242
3242
3242
3242
3242
0.36
0.36
0.04
0.07
0.17
0.48
0.48
0.21
0.26
0.37
3117
3117
3117
3117
3117
0.32
0.45
0.02
0.05
0.16
0.47
0.50
0.14
0.22
0.36
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
3242
3242
3242
3242
3242
3242
0.19
0.05
0.23
0.38
0.09
0.07
0.39
0.23
0.42
0.48
0.28
0.25
3117
3117
3117
3117
3117
3117
0.22
0.06
0.21
0.37
0.09
0.06
0.42
0.23
0.41
0.48
0.28
0.23
0
0
85000
1
3242
3242
3018.66
0.05
1987.66
0.22
3117
3117
3005.77
0.05
1829.61
0.21
Treatment
Code Civil
Border
Social Capital
Trust
Coop
Fair
Control Variables
17 100
289 10000
0
1
0
1
36
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Historical and Geographic Controls
Panel A: SOEP Sample
N
Mean
StDev
Min
Max
Historical Controls (evaluated at the historical territory)
Urbanization Rate 1800
Urbanization Rate 1850
Share of Protestants 1800
Latitude
Longitude
Distance to Paris
Reform Index
Abolition of Serfdom
Agrarian Reform
Abolition of Guilds
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
17664
11.19
5.23
3.39 22.50
15.20
7.84
5.44 33.29
0.57
0.36
0.05
1
50.66
1.73
48.13 54.52
10.05
2.09
7.60 13.73
615.74 157.96 413.06 851.01
64.56 19.47 37.25 100.25
89.97 11.88 68.00 117.00
78.71 11.77 38.00 96.00
62.59 30.69 31.00 105.00
Geographic Controls (evaluated at the district)
Distance Major River (in km)
Slope Index
Wheat Suitability
Distance Coast (in km)
17664 36.39 25.37
0.19 143.43
17664 8350.80 1225.84 2920.14 9965
17664 4.58
0.81
1
6.24
17664 255.17 126.05 0.99 483.12
Panel B: Other Dependent Variables
N
Mean
StDev
Min
Max
122
153
171
214
209
211
211
211
211
1.51
1.54
1.47
1.86
2.30
2.70
3.17
3.37
1.29
0.83
0.82
0.75
0.70
0.76
0.90
1.07
1.15
0.75
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.94
1.17
1.17
-0.56
3.81
3.81
4.01
5.15
6.08
6.87
7.54
7.64
4.14
223
223
223
223
0.19
0.30
0.12
0.11
0.39
0.46
0.32
0.32
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
241
241
0.70
1.70
0.12
1.64
0.46
0.00
0.95
8.00
62
62
62
62
62
43
62
62
352
0.31
0.01
0.92
0.06
7.03
2.14
0.19
0.15
9.76
0.31
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.21
0.59
0.07
0.09
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.86
0.01
6.69
0.88
0.07
0.00
9.51
0.95
0.03
0.99
0.12
7.52
3.49
0.34
0.29
10.25
188
187
512
2.93
0.81
2.81
5.59
0.12
4.84
0.00
0.42
0.00
72.73
1.00
31.00
City Population
(ln) City Population 1500
(ln) City Population 1600
(ln) City Population 1700
(ln) City Population 1800
(ln) City Population 1850
(ln) City Population 1875
(ln) City Population 1900
(ln) City Population 1910
City Population Growth 1800-1900
City Characteristics
Free City
Hanseatic City
Bishop City
University City
Inequality and Electoral Fraud
Land Gini 1898
No of Contested Elections 1871-1900
Post-Treatment Development, Education and Religion
Share of Protestants 1871
Share of Jews 1871
% Literate 1871
% Illiterate 1871
(ln) Teacher Wage 1886
Income Tax p.c. 1878
Share Manuf. & Service 1882
Share Agriculture 1882
(ln) GDP p.c. 2005
Post-Treatment Social Capital
Assoc Density 1920’s
Share “Bridging” Assoc 1920’s
Number of Shooting Clubs founded
Notes: See section A.1 in the Appendix for further information.
37
Table 3: Complete Sample
Panel A: Macroregion FE and Base Controls
Dependent variables:
Code Civil (x100)
Observations
R-squared
No. of Clusters
(1)
Trust
(2)
Coop
(3)
Fair
(4)
Trust
(5)
Coop
(6)
Fair
0.057∗∗
(0.027)
0.091∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.031∗
(0.018)
0.120∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.154∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.040
(0.018)
17664
0.02
349
17664
0.04
349
17664
0.02
349
17664
0.02
349
17664
0.04
349
17664
0.02
349
Panel C: Adding Geographic Controls
Dependent variables:
Code Civil (x100)
Observations
R-squared
No. of Clusters
Panel B: Adding Pre-Treatment Controls
Panel D: Adding Post-Treatment Controls
(1)
Trust
(2)
Coop
(3)
Fair
(4)
Trust
(5)
Coop
(6)
Fair
0.144∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.161∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.042
(0.026)
0.126∗∗∗
(0.038)
0.163∗∗∗
(0.039)
0.041
(0.028)
17664
0.02
349
17664
0.04
349
17664
0.02
349
17664
0.07
349
17664
0.05
349
17664
0.04
349
Notes: OLS regressions. The unit of observation is the individual. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables.
Panel A controls for macro-region dummies and base controls (age, age sq., gender, religion, location before 1990). Panel B adds pre-treatment
controls measured at the historical territory (urbanization rate 1800, share of Protestants 1800, longitude and latitude of the territory, distance to
Paris). Panel C adds geographic controls measured at the district (suitability for growing wheat, distance to coast, distance to river, slope). Panel D
adds post-treatment controls on the individual level (education, household income, unemployment indicator) and territory level (urbanization rate
1850). Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
38
Table 4: Complete Sample: Robustness
Without Baden/Saxony
Prussia 1815
Prussia 1866
(2)
(3)
(4)
Life Satisfaction
(5)
Political Interest
0.097∗∗
(0.038)
0.122∗∗
(0.057)
0.121∗∗
(0.058)
-0.097
(0.092)
-0.002
(0.051)
15340
0.02
319
7470
0.03
109
9823
0.03
166
17643
0.04
349
17623
0.10
349
(1)
Dependent variables
Code Civil (x100)
Observations
R-squared
No. of Clusters
Trust
Placebo Outcomes
Notes: OLS regressions. The unit of observation is the individual. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. All
regressions control for the full set of controls at the individual level, as well as geographic and historical controls as in Table 3, Panel C. Standard errors
clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
39
Table 5: Further Dimensions of the Napoleonic Reforms and Social Capital
Panel A: Alternative Reforms, one at a time.
(1)
Trust
(2)
Coop
(3)
Fair
Reform Index (x100)
0.416∗∗∗
(0.110)
0.503∗∗∗
(0.111)
0.095
(0.083)
Abolition of Serfdom (x100)
0.386∗∗∗
(0.135)
0.256∗
(0.154)
0.038
(0.095)
Agrarian Reform (x100)
0.212∗
(0.108)
0.088
(0.108)
0.026
(0.087)
Abolition of Guilds (x100)
-0.034
(0.074)
0.009
(0.076)
-0.023
(0.057)
Observations
No. of Clusters
17664
349
17664
349
17664
349
Dependent variables:
Panel B: Horse Race
(1)
(2)
(3)
Trust
Code Civil (x100)
0.113∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.122∗∗∗
(0.036)
Reform Index (x100)
0.162
(0.129)
Dependent variable:
Abolition of Serfdom (x100)
0.137∗∗∗
(0.036)
(5)
0.154∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.131∗∗∗
(0.036)
0.211
(0.133)
0.250
(0.183)
Agrarian Reform (x100)
0.126
(0.104)
Abolition of Guilds (x100)
Observations
No. of Clusters
(4)
17664
349
17664
349
17664
349
-0.066
(0.150)
0.070
(0.065)
0.059
(0.071)
17664
349
17664
349
Notes: OLS regressions, controlling for macro-region fixed effects, as well as geographic and historical controls as in Table 3, Panel C. The unit of
observation is an individual. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. Panel A reports results for estimations
using alternative institutional reforms one at a time. Panel B adds alternative reforms to the regression using the duration of the Code Civil as the
independent variable. Abolition of Serfdom, Agrarian Reform and Abolition of Guilds measure the years of enactment of the respective reform, as of
1900. The reform index is a combined measure of all reforms - including the Code Civil - evaluated as of the year 1900. Reform variables are taken
from Acemoglu et al. (2011). Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
40
Table 6: Border Estimations: Local Linear Regressions, 50km
(1)
Trust
(2)
Coop
(3)
Fair
0.059∗
(0.030)
0.083∗∗∗
(0.027)
0.034∗
(0.020)
6359
0.01
6359
0.04
6359
0.01
0.087∗∗∗
(0.032)
0.074∗∗
(0.030)
0.044∗∗
(0.022)
6359
0.02
6359
0.04
6359
0.01
0.072∗∗
(0.029)
6359
0.05
0.035∗
(0.020)
6359
0.04
0.070∗∗∗
(0.024)
3,368
0.03
0.033
(0.026)
3,368
0.04
0.078∗∗
(0.034)
6359
0.06
0.049∗
(0.029)
6359
0.04
0.113∗∗∗
(0.042)
6359
0.08
0.089∗∗
(0.037)
6359
0.05
0.058∗
(0.033)
6359
0.04
110
110
110
Dependent variables:
a) Base controls
Border
Observations
R-squared
b) Adding State FE
Border
Observations
R-squared
c) Adding full set of individual controls
Border
Observations
R-squared
0.072∗∗
(0.030)
6359
0.07
d) Only Rhineland, Westphalia and Mark
Border
Observations
R-squared
0.050∗
(0.028)
3,368
0.08
e) Adding geographic controls
Border
Observations
R-squared
0.100∗∗∗
(0.038)
6359
0.08
f) Duration of application of Code Civil
Code Civil (x100)
Observations
R-squared
No. of Clusters
Notes: OLS regressions. The unit of observation is the individual. Base controls include
age, age sq., gender, religion and location before 1990. The full set of individual controls
adds household income, unemployment and educational categories. Geographic controls
are distance to a river, distance to coast, wheat suitability of the soil and the average
slope. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables.
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
41
Table 7: Border Estimations: Alternative Specifications
Panel A: Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design, < 50 km
Dependent variables:
(1)
Trust
(2)
Coop
(3)
Fair
0.084∗∗
(0.033)
0.047
(0.028)
0.067∗
(0.034)
0.031
(0.036)
0.102∗∗
(0.046)
0.057∗
(0.029)
0.027
(0.034)
6359
Yes
110
6359
Yes
110
6359
Yes
110
i) f(location): Linear in Long/Lat
0.109∗∗∗
(0.040)
Border
ii) f(location): Quadratic in Long/Lat
0.106∗∗
(0.050)
Border
iii) f(location): Cubic in Long/Lat
Border
Observations
State FE
No. of Clusters
Panel B: Neighbor Pair Fixed Effects
Dependent variables:
(1)
Trust
(2)
Coop
(3)
Fair
0.098∗∗
(0.037)
0.095∗∗
(0.038)
0.041
(0.035)
a) dichotomous treatment
Border
b) duration of application of Code Civil
Code Civil (x100)
0.110∗∗∗
(0.041)
0.108∗∗
(0.041)
0.047
(0.039)
Neighbor-Pair FE
Observations
No. of Clusters
Yes
3046
48
Yes
3046
48
Yes
3046
48
Notes: OLS regressions. The unit of observation is the individual. Panel A reports estimates
from a spatial regression discontinuity design controlling for polynomials in longitude and
latitude. All regressions control for the full set of individual controls and geographic controls. Panel B reports estimates from neighbor-pair fixed effect estimation that include fixed
effects for couples of adjacent districts. All regressions control for the full set of individual controls. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the
variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
42
Table 8: Placebo Estimates: Moving the Border
Panel A: Moving the Border Outwards
(1)
Trust
(2)
Coop
(3)
Fair
(4)
Trust
(5)
Coop
(6)
Fair
-0.008
(0.028)
0.032
(0.022)
-0.022
(0.024)
-0.026
(0.032)
0.022
(0.021)
-0.036
(0.024)
Observations
R-squared
No. of Clusters
4768
0.02
94
4768
0.05
94
4768
0.02
94
4768
0.08
94
4768
0.06
94
4768
0.04
94
Base Controls
Full Controls
State FE
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Dependent variables:
Border
Panel B: Moving the Border Inwards
(1)
Trust
(2)
Coop
(3)
Fair
(4)
Trust
(5)
Coop
(6)
Fair
0.036
(0.046)
-0.110∗∗
(0.053)
-0.027
(0.034)
0.023
(0.044)
-0.081∗
(0.042)
-0.037
(0.038)
Observations
R-squared
No. of Clusters
3679
0.01
74
3679
0.03
74
3679
0.01
74
3679
0.07
74
3679
0.07
74
3679
0.04
74
Base Controls
Full Controls
State FE
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Dependent variables:
Border
Notes: OLS regressions. The unit of observation is an individual. Base controls include age, age sq., gender, religion and
location before 1990. Full controls add household income, unemployment and educational categories, as well as geographic
controls. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. Standard errors clustered at the
district level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
43
Table 9: Balancedness of Pre-Treatment Characteristics at the Border
Panel A: Geography
Dependent variables:
Border
Observations
R-squared
(1)
Dist. River
(2)
Slope
(3)
Wheat Suitability
(4)
Dist. Coast
-13.218***
(3.801)
97.337
(111.244)
-0.229
(0.156)
-23.612
(22.553)
110
0.10
110
0.01
110
0.02
110
0.01
Panel B: City Characteristics
Dependent variables:
Border
Observations
R-squared
(1)
Free City
(2)
Hanseatic City
(3)
Bishop City
(4)
University
0.028
(0.101)
-0.135
(0.101)
0.074
(0.057)
-0.009
(0.065)
74
0.00
74
0.02
74
0.02
74
0.00
Panel C: Economic Development
Dependent variables:
Border
Observations
R-squared
(1)
(ln) City Pop. 1500
(2)
(ln) City Pop. 1600
(3)
(ln) City Pop. 1700
(4)
(ln) City Pop. 1800
0.079
(0.299)
-0.238
(0.207)
0.094
(0.208)
0.070
(0.151)
33
0.00
45
0.03
54
0.00
68
0.00
Notes: This table examines balancedness of geographic characteristics (Panel A), city characteristics (Panel B) and city size (Panel C) around
the border. The unit of observation is the district in columns (1), (2) and the city in column (3). See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix
for a description of the variables. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
44
Table 10: Short and Long-Run Development Outcomes
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Estimation in the Complete Sample
Dependent variables:
Code Civil (x100)
(1)
(2)
(ln) City Population
1850
1900
(3)
City Population Growth
1800-1900
(4)
(ln) Gdp p.c. 2005
0.021
(0.192)
-0.031
(0.140)
-0.078
(0.209)
0.165**
(0.069)
0.045**
(0.020)
Macro-Region Fe
Geographic Controls
Historical Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
R-squared
209
0.09
211
0.08
211
0.13
352
0.50
(ln) Population 1800
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Estimation in the Border Sample
Dependent variables:
Border
(1)
(2)
(ln) City Population
1850
1900
(3)
City Population Growth
1800-1900
(4)
(ln) Gdp p.c. 2005
0.176
(0.183)
0.190
(0.311)
0.178
(0.267)
0.123
(0.183)
0.008
(0.016)
Geographic Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
R-squared
65
0.07
67
0.08
67
0.10
110
0.17
(ln) Population 1800
Panel C: Difference-in-Differences Estimation at the Border (1700-1910)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(ln) City Population
0.076
(0.215)
0.132
(0.155)
1.323***
(0.165)
0.188
(0.206)
Dependent variable:
Post 1800 x Border
Border
Post 1800
Post 1800 x Code Civil
0.002
(0.002)
Border x Year 1750
0.061
(0.109)
0.132
(0.184)
0.268
(0.212)
0.205
(0.252)
0.330
(0.289)
0.232
(0.319)
Border x Year 1800
Border x Year 1850
Border x Year 1875
Border x Year 1900
Border x Year 1910
Observations
R-squared
City FE
Year FE
No. of Clusters
(4)
444
0.33
No
No
68
444
0.74
Yes
Yes
68
444
0.74
Yes
Yes
68
444
0.74
Yes
Yes
68
Notes: This table reports the following estimation results: Cross-sectional regressions in the complete sample in Panel A, controlling for macro-region fixed effects, as well as geographic and historical controls as in Table 3, Panel C. The unit of observation is
the city in columns (1) - (3), and the district in column (4). Standard errors clustered at the historical territory reported in parentheses. Panel B reports cross-sectional regressions in the border sample, controlling for geographical characteristics. The unit of
observation is the city in columns (1) - (3), and the district in column (4). Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Panel C reports difference-in-differences estimation in the border sample for the period 1700 to 1910. The unit of observation is the
city. Standard errors clustered at the city reported in parentheses. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description
of the variables. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
45
Table 11: Additional Post-Treatment Development Outcomes at the Border
Panel A: Economic Outcomes
Dependent variables:
Border
Observations
R-squared
(1)
(ln) Teacher Wage
1886
(2)
Income Tax p.c.
1878
(3)
Share Manuf. and Service
1882
(4)
Share Agriculture
1882
0.017
(0.060)
-0.197
(0.214)
-0.002
(0.019)
0.022
(0.026)
62
0.00
43
0.02
62
0.00
62
0.01
Panel B: Religion & Education
Dependent variables:
Border
Observations
R-squared
(1)
% Protestants
1871
(2)
% Jews
1871
(3)
% Literate
1871
(4)
% Illiterate
1871
-0.107
(0.087)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.025***
(0.008)
0.023***
(0.007)
62
0.03
62
0.02
62
0.15
62
0.13
Notes: This table reports regressions using the border sample. The unit of observation is the district. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix
for a description of the variables. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
46
Table 12: Land Inequality and Electoral Fraud
Panel A: Inequality
Complete Sample
(1)
(2)
(3)
Land Gini 1898
Dependent variable
Code Civil (x100)
0.017
(0.059)
Share Catholics
Macro-Region Fe
Geographic Controls
Historical Controls
Observations
R-squared
(4)
-0.026*
(0.013)
Border
(ln) Population
Border Sample
0.069**
(0.030)
-0.002***
(0.000)
0.046*
(0.024)
-0.001*
(0.000)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
241
0.72
241
0.28
0.016
(0.022)
-0.007
(0.015)
0.268***
(0.027)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.097***
(0.025)
-0.000
(0.000)
Yes
73
0.46
73
0.82
Panel B: Electoral Fraud
Complete Sample
(1)
Dependent variable:
Code Civil (x100)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Number of Contested Elections 1871-1900
-0.684**
(0.255)
-0.063
(0.301)
Border
(ln) Population
Turnout
Competition
Share Catholics
Macro-Region Fe
Geographic Controls
Historical Controls
Observations
R-squared
Border Sample
1.383***
(0.306)
-0.787
(2.534)
-2.659***
(0.808)
-0.003
(0.004)
1.418***
(0.331)
-0.197
(2.608)
-2.626***
(0.803)
-0.002
(0.005)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
241
0.39
241
0.36
-0.740**
(0.304)
-0.608**
(0.299)
2.982***
(0.754)
6.432*
(3.241)
-0.953
(0.735)
0.009
(0.006)
2.711***
(0.782)
6.260*
(3.446)
-1.733
(1.053)
0.016*
(0.009)
Yes
73
0.51
73
0.54
Notes: This table reports regressions with land Gini in 1898 as dependent variable in Panel A, and the
number of contested elections between 1871 and 1900 in Panel B. The unit of observation is the district.
See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. Heteroscedastic-robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the historical territory level in columns (1) and (2). * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
47
Table 13: Social Capital in the 1920s
Complete Sample
Dependent variables:
Code Civil (x100)
(1)
Assoc Density
-1.321
(0.867)
Border Sample
(2)
(3)
Share “Bridging” Assoc
0.074***
(0.025)
(ln) Population
Macro-Region Fe
Geographic Controls
Territory Controls
Observations
R-squared
4.802
(5.344)
-1.315***
(0.433)
0.010
(0.055)
-0.012
(0.009)
0.053
(0.044)
-0.010
(0.008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
187
0.23
188
0.16
(5)
(6)
Share “Bridging” Assoc
0.072**
(0.028)
Border
Share Catholics
(4)
Assoc Density
187
0.17
0.118
(0.202)
0.047*
(0.025)
0.061*
(0.036)
-0.613*
(0.362)
-0.629***
(0.071)
0.037
(0.045)
-0.003
(0.009)
0.024
(0.058)
-0.006
(0.011)
Yes
81
0.46
81
0.07
81
0.08
Notes: The unit of observation is the city. Assoc Density is the total number of associations per 1,000 city inhabitants. Share “Bridging”
Assoc is the share of all associations that can be defined as bridging (versus bonding) following the classification in Satyanath, Voigtländer, and Voth, 2016. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix for a description of the variables. Heteroscedastic-robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the historical territory level in columns (1) - (3). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
48
Table 14: Shooting Clubs
Panel A
(1)
Dependent variable:
1700 – 1750
Code Civil
Observations
(2)
(3)
Number of Clubs founded in
1750 – 1800
1800 – 1850
(4)
1850 – 1900
-0.147
(0.288)
-0.500**
(0.236)
-2.782***
(0.959)
1.954*
(1.100)
128
128
128
128
Panel B
(1)
Dependent variable:
1700 – 1750
Code Civil
Lagged No Clubs
Observations
(2)
(3)
Number of Clubs founded in
1750 – 1800
1800 – 1850
(4)
1850 – 1900
-0.704***
(0.207)
0.082***
(0.014)
-3.310***
(0.842)
0.265***
(0.076)
2.180**
(0.934)
0.284***
(0.063)
128
128
128
Notes: OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the number of clubs founded per county. See main text and section A.1 in the Appendix
for a description of the variables. Code Civil equals 1 for counties belonging to the province Rhineland, and 0 for counties belonging to
Westphalia. Source: Plett, W. (1991). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
49
B
Figures
Figure 1: Law and Trust
(a) Unconditional Correlation
(b) Conditional Correlation
Notes: The figure shows cross-country correlation between legal quality and social trust. Countries
with greater protection of individual property, and in which courts and judges are independent and
impartial display higher levels of interpersonal trust. This does not merely mirror an income effect,
since the positive association is robust to controlling for population, income per capita, education and
ethnic fractionalization as shown in Figure 1 b)). Sources: World Values Survey, Economic Freedom
of the World Index 2010.
50
Figure 2: Legal Systems in 19th Century German
Notes: This map illustrates the distribution of legal systems in 19th century Germany. See
the Appendix for the original map that is taken from Stein (2004).
51
Figure 3: Treatment in the Complete Sample
Notes: This map shows the distribution of the number of years the Code Civil was in
place in different parts of Germany. Polygons represent contemporary districts. White
areas represent those historical territories that are not included in the sample (the sample
definition follows Acemoglu et al. (2011)).
52
Figure 4: Border Treatment
Notes: This map shows the border sample. Circles represent the centroids of the counties
included in the original border sample with distances smaller than 50 km to the borderline.
Triangles and squares represent centroids of the counties that are added in the falsification
exercise. Region borders represent historical territories.
53
Figure 5: Trust at the Border
Notes: This map shows average levels of trust for the 110 districts included in the border sample.
54