June2,2016
To:
OurPartnersandStakeholders
From: TheMadisonInitiativeTeam
Re:
UpdateonourworktodateandplansforarenewaloftheInitiative
ThegoaloftheMadisonInitiativeistohelpcreatetheconditionsinwhichCongressandits
memberscandeliberate,negotiate,andcompromiseinwaysthatworkformoreAmericans.Thisupdate
memoprovidesanoverviewofourworktodateandconveysourpreliminaryplansforhowwemight
proceedinthefuture.Wearesharingitwithkeypartnersandstakeholderssothatyouknowwhatwe
havebeenupto,whatwearelearning,andthedirectioninwhichweareheaded.Wealsowantto
solicityourinputaboutourevolvingplansasweprepareforapotentialrenewaloftheInitiativebythe
HewlettFoundation’sboardinNovember.
Thememobeginswitharecapoftheorigins,scope,andguidingprinciplesoftheInitiative.We
thentakestockofwhatwehavelearnedsofarregardingtheprospectsforpartnershipswithother
funders,thecurrentstateofgranteecapacityinthefield,andthetypesofsolutionsandapproaches
thataremostrelevantforourgoal.Next,wetracetheevolvingpoliticallandscapeandconsiderwhatit
entailsforourefforts.Fromtherewesketchoutouremergingtheoryofchangeandfivefunding
prioritiestomakeithappen.Thememoconcludeswithadescriptionofthevitalsignswewilluseto
measureandassessourprogress.
Thanksinadvanceforreviewingit.Welookforwardtoconstructivefeedbackfromcritical
friendswhocanpointouttheblindspotsandweaklinksinouremergingstrategy.
1
I)Theorigins,scope,andguidingprinciplesoftheMadisonInitiative
AfunctioningAmericandemocracyandlegislativeprocessmatters–hereintheUS,ofcourse,
butalsoglobally,giventhepracticalandsymbolicleadershiproleournationplaysintheworld.Thatwas
thebasicconsiderationthatpromptedustobeginthinkinginearly2013abouttheworkthatwould
becometheMadisonInitiative.Atthatpoint,FreedomHousewasobservingthatwewereinthe
seventhstraightyearofaglobal“democraticrecession,”withmorecountriesseeingsignificantdeclines
inthepoliticalrightsandcivillibertiesoftheircitizensthanhadexperiencedgains.1Itdidnothelpthat
democracyintheUSwassettingsuchapoorexample.Indeed,laterthatyear,politicalbrinksmanshipin
Washingtonwouldshutdownthefederalgovernment,promptingPresidentObama’slamentthat,
“We’retheUnitedStatesofAmerica—thisisnotsomebananarepublic!”
Inadditiontowantingtosupportthedemocraticidealatafraughttimeinitshistory,wealso
appreciatedthatpolarizationinWashingtonwasunderminingtheHewlettFoundation’sworkinother
domains.Thefoundationcannotalwayscountonpersuadinggovernmenttoadoptpolicieswefavorin
ourdifferentprogramareas,ofcourse.However,ourgrantmakinginmanyoftheseareas–e.g.,
mitigatingclimatechange,reducingpovertyinthedevelopingworld,reformingeducationintheUS–
presumesaminimallyrationalandeffectivepolicymakingprocessinWashington
SoinMarch2014welaunchedathree-year,$50millionexploratoryefforttodetermine
whethertheFoundationcoulddosomethingtoalleviatetheproblemsassociatedwithpolarization.2To
groundtheinquiry,wedecidedtofocusoureffortsonCongress,wheretheseproblemsweremost
prominentlyondisplayandfromwhichtheywereinfectingotherpartsofthepoliticalsystem.Giventhe
preliminarynatureofourexploration,aswellasthecomplexanddynamicnatureofthepoliticalsystem,
wechosetoplaceanumberofsmallerbetsacrossarangeofpotentialinterventionpointsinorderlearn
whereandhowwemightbeabletohaveapositiveimpact.
Thoughwedidnotdevelopafull-blowntheoryofchange,wedididentifyafewguiding
principlestohelpuskeepourbearingsduringtheexploration.First,werecognizedthatthiswasahuge
undertakingthatwouldrequirecollaborationacrossfunders–programmaticallyandattheinstitutional
level.Wehavebeenengagingwithotherfoundationsandtheirleadersaccordingly.Second,asinany
field,theassessmentofthekeyproblemsandhowtoaddressthemshouldbebasedonthebest
evidenceavailable.Wehavethussoughttoinvestinandrelyontheworkofleadingsocialscientists
focusedonthehealthofrepresentativedemocracy,evenwhentheirresearchhasruncountertothe
conventionalwisdomofpunditsorthelongstandingidealsofdemocracyreformers.Third,givenhow
closelydividedweareasanation,anypracticalsolutionswillrequiresupportacrossthepolitical
spectrum.Wethereforehavebeenworkingwithleadersandorganizationsfromtheright,left,and
centerwithwhomwehavegoalsincommon.Finally,andperhapsmostimportantly,theMadison
Initiativeshouldremainagnosticaboutpolicyoutcomesoutsideofdemocracy-enhancingreforms.To
proceedotherwisewouldmissthepoint.Anyassessmentofademocracy’seffectivenessshoulddepend
notontheadoptionofparticularpolicies,butonwhetheritsrepresentativeinstitutionsareaddressing
problemsinwaysthepubliccansupport.
1
“FreedomintheWorld2013,”retrievedfromhttps://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013.
Weidentifiedthreeinter-relatedbutdistinctcomponentstopolarization:increasedideologicalcoherencewithinand
divergencebetweentheDemocraticandRepublicanparties;hyper-partisanshipandthedeclineininstitutionalcivilityand
normsofreciprocity;andlegislativegridlock.Formoreonthesecomponents,seeNatePersilyed.,SolutionstoPolarizationin
America(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015),pp.4-10.
2
2
II)Whatwehavelearnedfromourworksofar
Wearenowinthehomestretchoftheexploratorygrantmakingphaseauthorizedbythe
foundation’sboardinMarch2014.Todate,wehavemade140grantstotaling$40million.3Duringthis
initialexploration,wehavebeenworkingtoanswerthreebroadquestionsthattheBoardwillconsider
indecidingwhetheralonger-termeffortiswarranted.First,aretheresolutionsandapproaches
availablethatcanhelpachieveourgoal?Second,istheresufficientgranteecapacity(orcanwehelp
buildit)topursuethesesolutionsandapproacheseffectively?Third,aretherefundingpartnerswith
whomwecanworktomakeithappen?Wewilltacklethesequestionsinreverseorder,beginningwith
thoseinvolvingfundingpartnersandgranteecapacity,wherewehavethemostconfidenceinour
informationandanswers,thenturningtoourworkinghypothesesabouttheviabilityofvarioustypesof
solutionsandapproaches.
A) Fundingpartners
Wehadseveralquestionsaboutfoundationfundinginthisareaaswebeganconsideringitin
2013.Weknewthatmanydifferentfoundationsweresupportingdifferentgranteesondemocracyrelatedissues.Butwedidnothaveagoodunderstandingofwhowasfundingwhom,atwhatlevels,and
todowhat?Wouldtherebephilanthropicpartnerswecouldjoinforceswith?Wherewasthebiggest
needformorefundingrelativetothatwhichalreadyexisted?
Akeysteptowardansweringthesequestionswasanearlyjointeffortwithsixotherfundersand
theFoundationCentertocreateacomprehensiveandfreelyavailablemapofFoundationFundingfor
USDemocracy.Thisdatasetincorporatesallgrantsover$10,000madeto5categoriesand18subcategoriesofdemocracy-relatedfundingbythe1,000largestUSfoundations,plusotherfunderswho
alsosubmittheirdataforinclusion.
Thegoodnews,wediscovered,isthatthereisagreatdealoffundingalreadyflowingtosupport
democracyintheUS,andplentyofphilanthropicpartnerstoworkwith.Todate,wehavedeveloped
reciprocalrelationshipswithroughly20foundationsacrosstheleft,right,andcenterofthepolitical
spectrumwithwhomwecomparenotesonissuesandorganizations,jointlyfundgrantees,and/or
undertakeprojectstogetherwithsomeregularity.Thissetoffoundationsalonemakesgrantstotaling
morethan$150millionannuallytosupportdemocracy-relatedwork.4
Ourabilitytocollaboratewithotherfundersisshapedbyseveralfactors.Forexample,ourclose
partnershipwiththeDemocracyFund’sGovernanceInitiative—whichinvolvesmutualinputintoeach
other’sstrategies,multiplecommongrantees,andjointlyhostedconvenings—benefitsfromshared
goals,acommonbeliefintheneedtoworkwithpartnersonbothsidesoftheaisle,andthefactthat
ourrespectiveinitiativesareatthesamestageofdevelopment.
3
Detailsabouteachofthesegrantscanbereviewedonouronlinegrantsdatabaseat
http://hewlett.org/grants/search?order=field_date_of_award&sort=desc&keywords=&year=&term_node_tid_depth_1=All&pr
ogram_id=152
4
Thephilanthropicinstitutionswehavepartneredwithwhosecollectivegivingexceeds$150millionannuallyincludesthe
following:theArnold,Bauman,Bradley,Ford,Irvine,Joyce,JPB,Knight,MacArthur,OpenSociety,Peterson,Rodel,RitaAllen,
andSmithRichardsonfoundationsaswellastheCarnegieCorporation,DemocracyFund,PewCharitableTrusts,Rockefeller
BrothersFund,SearleFreedomTrust,andWellspringAdvisors.
3
Otherfundingpartnershavedifferentgoals,arecommittedtoworkingexclusivelywithpartners
ontheprogressiveortheconservativesideinordertorealizespecificpolicyoutcomes,andhavewelldevelopedgrantmakingstrategiesthattheyhavebeenpursuingforyearsifnotdecades.Inthese
instances,weandourpotentialco-fundersmayneedtoworkhardertofindcommongroundfor
collaboration,butinmultipleinstanceswehavebeenabletomakeitwork.Iffoundationscannotfinda
waytoworkandgetthingsdonetogetherinthefaceofdisagreementsoverultimategoals,howcanwe
expectourelectedrepresentatives–accountabletomuchmoredemandingconstituencies–to
negotiateandcompromisewitheachother?
Ratherthangetcaughtupinwhatareoftensubtlestrategicdifferenceswithourfunding
partners,inthecourseofthisgive-and-takewehavefoundithelpfultoproceedinthespiritofdiffuse
reciprocity.Thisisanormthatentailswesupportsharedinfrastructure,discreteprojects,andgrantees
withandforotherfunders“withoutdemandingorexpectinganimmediatepaybackorreturn,knowing
that…otherswilldothesamelaterandthatwe’llallbebetteroffinthelongrunasaresult.Diffuse
reciprocityisanattitude,awillingnesstogivewithoutdemandingapreciseaccountingofequivalent
benefitsforeachaction,albeitbecauseothersinthecommunitydosoaswell.”5Iffundersonlysupport
workthatiscompletelyalignedwithourown(different)strategies,thenourprospectsforphilanthropic
collaborationaregreatlydiminished.Fortunately,wehavejoinedafundingcommunityinwhichmany
foundationsaretakingthisbroaderview.
B) Granteecapacity
Thismemodescribesthedevelopmentandemergingstrategyofafoundationinitiative,butwe
knowthatultimatelyitisthroughtheworkofourgranteesthatwewillhaveapositiveimpact.Weare
inthebusinessofsupportingothersintheachievementoftheirmissions.Hencethequestionfromour
boardabouttheavailabilityofstronggranteeorganizationsalignedwithourgoals.Thegoodnewsis
that,havingmadegrantsto84differentorganizationsthusfar,wecansaywithconfidencethatwehave
anamplenumberofqualitygranteestosupportinvirtuallyeveryareawehavebeeninterestedin
exploring.
Balancedagainstthisstrength,achallenge:inaggregate,thefieldofgranteesthatwefundhasa
sustainabilityproblemarisingfromtheprevalenceoftheshortterm,smaller,andrestrictedproject
grantstheyreceive.Considerarecentanalysiswecommissionedoffundingpatternsinsixdifferent
subfieldsthattheFoundationCentertracksinitsdatabase.Welearnedthat,outofmorethan2,000
grantstotaling$340millionoverathree-yearperiod,only1%ofthegrantsand5%ofthegrantdollars
weredevotedtogeneralsupportgrantsof$100,000orgreaterwithadurationofmorethantwoyears.
Afewfactorsdrivethesefundingpatterns.Therecurringtwo-yearelectoralcyclereproducesa
boomandbustfundingdynamic.Manyfoundationsworkinginthisfieldhavethemselvesarticulated
comprehensivestrategiesinsupportofbroaderpolicyobjectives,whichcanincreasethetemptationto
fundgranteestoworkascontractorsproducingcarefullyspecified“deliverables.”Andimportantly,
manygranteesinthefield—fromnationaladvocatestograssrootsorganizers—aresimplytoosmall
toabsorbandmakegooduseoflargesix-orseven-figuregrantsinatimelyway.
Wehaveseentimeandagainhowthepredominanceofprojectfundingthrowsgrantee
organizationsintothenonprofit“starvationcycle.”Inthiscycle,nonprofitssubmitprojectgrantbudgets
5
LarryKramer,“Collaborationand‘DiffuseReciprocity,’”StanfordSocialInnovationReview,April25,2014,retrievedat
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/collaboration_and_diffuse_reciprocity
4
tofundersthatdonotfullycovertheindirectoroverheadcoststhatarenecessaryfortheirorganization
tofunction,produceresults,andsustainthemovertime.Theydosoeitherbecausetheyarenotfully
awareoftheirtrueindirectcostsand/orbecausetheyassumethatfunderswillnotpaythem.Fortheir
part,fundersacceleratethecyclewhentheyimposearbitraryandlowcapsforindirectcostsorrefuse
topayforthemaltogether.6
However,whetherfoundationsdeigntopayforthemornot,granteesstillincurtheseindirect
costs.Indeed,arecentanalysisconductedbytheBridgespanGroupfoundthattheindirectcostsofsix
US-basedadvocacyorganizations(fourofwhichareMadisonInitiativegrantees)rangedfrom23%to
61%oftheirdirectcosts.Thevastmajorityofprojectfundinginthisfieldthussimplydoesnotpaywhat
ittakestodotheworkinquestion,leavinggranteestoscrambletomakeupthedifference.7
Wehavecometorecognizethewaysinwhichourinitialfundingapproachwasinadvertently
contributingtotheseproblems.In2014-15,thefirsttwofullyearsoftheMadisonInitiative,whenwe
wereintentionallymakingarangeofsmallerbets,roughlyhalfofourgrantswererestrictedforshort
termprojects.Andinfundingawidearrayoforganizations,includingmanyworkinginthesameareas,
wewereperpetuatinganotherprobleminthesector:toomanyundercapitalizednonprofit
organizationsarecaughtupinthestarvationcycle,pursuingthesamelimitedamountoffunding
available.Granteesinthissituationaremoreinclinedtotakeonprojectsthat,bynotfullyfundingtheir
indirectcosts,areunsustainableinthelongrun,eveniftheyhelpkeepthelightsoninthenear-term.
Wereceivedsomeclearsignalsinthisregardviaagranteeperceptionreportpreparedbythe
CenterforEffectivePhilanthropy,inwhichinputfromMadisonInitiativegranteeswasbenchmarked
againstthatfromtheFoundation’sothergranteesaswellasthoseofacustomizedcohortof15
foundationsofsimilarsizeandscope.Granteesratedushighlyrelativetothesebenchmarksfor
understandingtheirstrategiesandgoals,forcommunicatingourownstrategiesandgoalstothem,and
forbeingtransparentwithandopentonewideasfromgrantees.Thiswasaffirmingfeedback.However,
relativetothesesamebenchmarks,MadisonInitiativegranteesperceivedusashavinglessimpacton
theirorganizations,theirfields,andpublicpolicy.Whilewemighthaveexpectedtheseaggregate
perceptionsasarelativelynewinitiative,itisthroughsuchimpactthatourfundingwillintheendpay
off.Asweworkedtomakesenseofthesefindings,wehadtoacknowledgethatthestrategywehave
intentionallypursuedinthefirsttwoyearsoftheInitiativehaskeptus,andourgrantees,spreadthin.
Thesefindingsunderscoredforusthatthetimewasripeforatransitionthatwehadplanned
andnowhavefullyunderway.Wewillbemakinglarger,longer-term,generalsupportgrantsinthesubfieldsandgranteeswherewebelieveourfundingwillmakethemostdifference.Inthefirsttwoyearsof
ourwork,ourmediangrantsizewas$200,000,ouraveragegranttermwas20months,and50%ofour
grantswererestrictedforuseinpre-setprojects.Forgrantswehavemadeandareplanningtomakein
2016,ourmediangrantsizehasrisento$300,000,ouraveragegranttermto27months,andonly15%
ofourfundingwillberestrictedtospecificprojects.Weexpectthesizeanddurationofouraverage
granttocontinuetoincrease.Adaptingourgrantmakinginthiswayshouldenableustohavemoreofa
positiveimpactintheworkthatwearesupporting.Tobesure,thereisatrade-offhere–more
concentratedfundingforselectsub-fieldsandgranteesmeanslessfundingwillbeavailableforothers.
6
AnnGogginsGregoryandDonHoward,“TheNonprofitStarvationCycle,”StanfordSocialInnovationReview,Fall2009.
JeriEckhart-Queenan,MichaelEtzel,andSridharPrasad,“PayWhatItTakesPhilanthropy,”StanfordSocialInnovationReview,
Summer2016.
7
5
Thetransitionwillthusneedtobeagradualonethatwecommunicateinatimely,clearandrespectful
waytominimizethepotentialdisruptionforthegranteesandfundingpartnersaffectedbyit.
Onelastpointabouttheneedtoimprovehowwefundgranteecapacity.TheMadison
Initiative’sbudgetasapercentageofthetotalannualfundingforUSdemocracyacrossallfoundationsis
inthelowsingledigitsandwillremainsounderanyrenewalscenario.Adjustmentsinourownpractices
willnotbesufficienttochangethepatternsoutlinedabove.Fortunately,wearenottheonlyfunder
concernedabouttheseissues.8Weplantojoinwithpartnerfoundationstobringaboutneeded
improvements.Wehavetodosocollectivelyifweexpectasuitablereturnonthefundingweareall
investinginsupportofUSdemocracy.Giventhegravityoftheproblemsweareaddressing,wecannot
affordtobepenny-wiseandpoundfoolish.
C) Solutionsandapproaches9
Inthissectionwewillreviewwhatwehavelearnedinbroadstrokesaboutthetypesof
solutionsandapproachesthataremostrelevantforourgoal.(Furtherbelow,inthesectiononour
emergingtheoryofchange,wewillgetintomoredetailwithfiveareasweareplanningtoprioritizefor
futurefunding).Togainapurchaseontheseoveralllessons,wemightstartbycomparinghowwehave
allocatedourresourceswiththe$40millioningrantswehavemadetodatewithourinitialthinking
aboutwherewewouldfindopportunities.Thisdataisarrayedinthetablebelow.
InvestmentAreas
Originalplans
Actualallocations
1)Congress:buildingbipartisanrelationshipsamongmembersandstaff;
improvingtherules,norms,processes,andcapacityoftheinstitution.
30%
50%
2)Campaignsandelections:reformingelectionadministration,campaign
finance,primaryelections,districting,rankedchoicevoting,etc.
30%
23%
3)Citizenengagement:primaryelectionturnout,voterinformation,
mediacoverageofCongress,“bridging”civicengagement.
30%
12%
4)Informationandinfrastructure:e.g.,sharedresearch,surveysonkey
trendsinpublicopinion,platformsanddatatohelpfunderscollaborate.
10%
15%
Theinitialplanswesharedwithourboardhadusinvestinginroughlyequalamountsacross
Congress,campaignsandelectionsreform,andcitizenengagement,withabitleftovertosupportcrosscuttinginformationandinfrastructurethatwouldbenefitthefieldasawhole.Wegaveourboardthe
caveatthatwewouldadjusttheseplansaswelearnedmoreaboutthefundingopportunitiesthatwere
8
SeeforexampletheblogfromDarrenWalker,presidentofthelargestfunderinthedemocracyfield,“MovingtheFord
FoundationForward,”postedonNovember8,2015athttps://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-changeblog/posts/moving-the-ford-foundation-forward/
9
Althoughsomeofthesubsequentdiscussioninthisplanningdocumentmayreflectorentailthepassageoflegislation,the
HewlettFoundationdoesnotlobbyorearmarkitsfundsforprohibitedlobbyingactivities,asdefinedinthefederaltax
laws.TheMadisonInitiative’sfundingforpolicyworkislimitedtopermissibleformsofsupportonly,suchasgeneraloperating
supportgrantsthatgranteescanallocateattheirdiscretionandprojectsupportgrantsfornonlobbyingactivities(e.g.,public
educationandnonpartisanresearch).TheInitiativemayfundnonpartisanpoliticalactivitiesbygranteesincompliancewiththe
electioneeringrules.TheInitiativedoesnotengageinoruseitsresourcestosupportoropposepoliticalcandidatesorpartiesor
supportvoterregistrationdrives.
6
mostrelevantforourgoal.Wethendevelopedasystemsmaptohelpusidentifyandassess
interventionpointsandopportunitiesacrossalloftheseareas.10
Inthesubsequenttwoyears,aswehavesizedupopportunities,madegrants,andlearnedfrom
ourexperience,wehaveendedupinvestingtwiceasmuchwithgranteesworkinginandaround
Congressaswehavewiththoseworkingonreformingcampaignsandelections.Wespentconsiderably
lessthanwehadplannedoncitizenengagement,andabitmorethanwehadplannedininformation
andinfrastructure.Insofarasbudgetallocationsrevealanentity’sactual(asopposedtotheoretical)
strategy,theseproportionsarearoughbutsturdyindicationofwherewehaveconcludedwecanhave
themostimpactwithourfunding.
TheadvantageoffundingcharitableworkfocusedonCongressanditsmembersisthatthe
resourcesaredirectlyconcentratedontheinstitutionwhosehealthandperformancewearededicated
toimproving.Someofourpartnersandadvisorshaveneverthelesssuggestedthatwearegrabbingthe
wrongendoftheproblem.TheyarguethatwhathappensinCongressisdeterminedbywhatis
happeningoutsideofit—thepoliticalandculturalforcesatworkinthesocietywritlarge.Thereissome
truthtothis.WerewetofocusonlyonCongress,wewouldnotbeinapositiontoaddressthe
underlyingfactorsthathelpdeterminewhichindividualsenduprunningforandgettingelectedto
Congressandhowtheybehavewithintheinstitution.Butwearenotfocusedexclusivelyonwhatis
happeninginCongress.Wealsoarepersuadedthattheinstitutionanditsmembersarenotsimply
shapedbythoselargerpoliticalandculturalforces;legislatorsputtheirownstamponthemthrough
theirbeliefs,behaviors,andwhatDavidMayhew,thedeanofcongressionalscholars,hastermedtheir
“actionsinthepublicsphere.”11Wearepersuadedthatfundinggranteesworkingtoimprovehowthe
institutionitselfoperatescanthushaveapositiveimpact.
Wehavebeenencouragedinthisregardbysomeadditionaldevelopments.Oneistheprofound
dissatisfactionthatmanymembersfrombothpartieshaveexpressed–tojournalists,tousinprivate
conversations,andintheirownwritingaboutCongress–abouthowtheinstitutioniscurrently
operating,andtheircorrespondingdesireforchanges.12Wehavealsoseenanoutburstof“procedural
entrepreneurism”asmembersofCongressinbothchambers,includingnotleastHouseSpeakerPaul
Ryan,areactivelylookingforwaysinwhichCongresscangetitshouseinorderandrestoreits
institutionalpositionasthefirstbranchofgovernment.ThereisamoveafoottoestablishaJointSelect
CommitteeontheCongressofTomorrowthatwoulddevelopacomprehensivereformagendafor
institutionalreformasearlierjointcommitteesdidforCongressin1946and1970.13Lastbutnotleast,
10
Youcanreviewoursystemsmapathttps://www.kumu.io/hewlettfoundation/hewlett-foundation-madison-initiative
AsMayhewhasobserved,“Constitutionsdonotseemtomarchthroughtimeunattendedbypoliticians.IntheUnitedStates,
itisimpossibletocomprehendtherolesofHouseandSenatememberswithoutseeingthemas,atleastsometimes,performers
ataconstitutionallevel….theemphasishereisontheendogeneityofpolitics.Thisistheideathatpreferenceformation,
deliberation,andpolicy-makingalltendtooccurinapublicspherethatengagesbothelectedofficialsandatleastanattentive
sectorofthepublic—asopposedtotheideathatexogenouslyformedinterestssomehowsimplypenetrateintoofficial
processestoberegistered.”America’sCongress:ActionsinthePublicSphere,JamesMadisonthroughNewtGingrich(New
Haven,Connecticut:YaleUniversityPress,2001),pp.27-28.
12
SeeforexampleMarkWarren,“Help,WeAreinaLivingHellandDon’tKnowHowtoGetOut,”Esquire,October15,2014,
retrievedfromhttp://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a23553/congress-living-hell-1114/;Anonymous,“Confessionsofa
Congressman,”vox.com,July12,2015,retrievedfromhttp://www.vox.com/2015/2/5/7978823/congress-secrets;Rep.Jim
Cooper,“OpeningtheDebate,”BostonReview,May2,2011,retrievedfromhttp://bostonreview.net/cooper-fixing-congress;
Rep.JustinAmash,“HouseGOP’s‘GovernbyCrisis”ModelisBroken,cnn.com,October4,2015,retrievedfrom
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/04/opinions/amash-house-gop-leadership-is-broken/.
13
SeeSen.MikeLeeandRep.JebHensarling,“AStrongerCongress,AHealthierRepublic,”NationalReview,February2,2016,
retrievedfromhttp://www.nationalreview.com/article/430703/step-congress-reclaim-constitutional-authority;Officeof
11
7
thereisaburgeoningcoalitionofadvocates,researchers,andjournalistsworkingacrossthepolitical
spectrumintheWashington,DCpolicycommunitythatrecognizestheneedforcongressionalreform
andiscollaboratingwithmembersandstaffinbothpartiestohelpbringitabout.14Thecombinationof
widespreadfrustrationwiththestatusquoandnewlevelsofinterestininstitutionalsolutionsbodes
wellforpositivechange.
Thebenefitofzeroinginontherulesofthegamethroughwhichmemberscampaignforandare
electedtoCongressisthatreformsatthislevelhaveasystemicknock-oneffectovertime.Theychange
thepoliticalincentivesandcalculationsofchallengers,incumbents,theirsupporters,andpartyelites.
Moreover,whenanelectoralreformideahasapowerfulconsensusbehindit,alotofchangecan
happeninashortperiodoftime.15
Buttherearechallengesandriskshere,too.Muchofthisworkneedstobedonebygranteeson
astate-by-stateandevenacity-by-citybasis.Theconditionsfavoringareforminoneplacemaynot
applyinmanyothers.Moreover,preciselybecausechangestotherulesoftheelectoralgamecanbeso
decisive,theyarehotlycontestedbypoliticalpartiesandotherinterestscompetingforpowerand
influence.Finally,becauseofthepoliticalstakesandsweepingsystemiceffects,itisinthisareawhere
well-intentionedreformscanreadilygoawryandproducenegativeandevenperverseconsequences,as
anumberofpoliticalrealistshavepointedout.16
Withallthisinmind,wehaveproceededwithcautioninsupportingcampaignandelection
reforms.Wearefocusingonalimitednumberofissues(aboutwhich,morelateron)wherethebest
socialsciencesuggestswehaveareasonablechanceofalleviatingpolarizationandhyper-partisanship,
allthewhileremainingwaryoftheunintendedconsequencesproblem.Thuswehavedecided,for
example,nottofundattemptstoreplicatethenonpartisanredistrictingprocessandthetoptwo
primarythatCaliforniarecentlyadopted.Theremaybeotherreasonstohaveredistrictingand
candidateselectiondoneonanonpartisanbasis;however–counterasitmaybetotheconventional
wisdom–basedontheavailableresearchwedonotbelievethatthesereformswouldplayamajorrole
inreducingpolarizationandhyper-partisanship.Indeed,theycouldactuallyservetoworsenit.17
SpeakerPaulRyan,“TaskForceonRestoringConstitutionalAuthorityIssuesMissionStatement,”February24,2016,retrieved
fromhttp://www.speaker.gov/press-release/task-force-restoring-constitutional-authority-releases-mission-statement;seealso
anoverviewoftheJointCommitteeproposalathttp://conginst.org/congressional-reform-project/.
14
SeeforexampleKevinKosarandvariousauthors,“RestoringCongressastheFirstBranch,”RStreetInstitutePolicyStudyNo.
50,January2016.
15
Wehaveseenthisoccurforexamplewithsupportwehaveprovidedtohelpimplementthebipartisanrecommendationsof
thePresident’sCommissiononElectionAdministration(PCEA).SinceJan.1,2014,throughtheworkofseveralgrantees,
includingmostnotablyPew’sElectionsInitiativesandtheBipartisanPolicyCenter,17morestatesandtheDistrictofColumbia
haveimplementedonlinevoterregistrationsystems(bringingthetotalto31statesandDC),andatleast13morestatesand
theDistrictofColumbiahavejoinedtheElectronicRegistrationInformationCenter(ERIC),amulti-statevoterdatasharing
systemtocleanupandexpandvoterrolls(bringingthetotalto20statesandDC),bothimprovementswhichthePCEA
endorsed.Wehavefundedgrantsof$1.5millioninthisareaandhaveanadditional$1.5millionplannedinordertotake
advantageofthewindowofopportunityopenedupbythePCEA,andinthespiritofdiffusereciprocitygiventheinterest
amongmultipledemocracyfunderstosupportthisoveralleffort.
16
SeeBruceCain,DemocracyMoreorLess:America’sPoliticalReformQuandary(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015);
RayLaRajaandBrianSchaffer,CampaignFinanceandPoliticalPolarization:WhenPuristsPrevail(AnnArbor,MI:Universityof
MichiganPress,2015);SethMasket,TheInevitableParty:WhyAttemptstoKillthePartySystemFailandHowTheyWeaken
Democracy(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2016);onpoliticalrealismingeneralseeJonathanRauch,“PoliticalRealism:
HowHacks,Machines,BigMoneyandBackRoomDealsCanStrengthenAmericanDemocracy,”BrookingsInstitution,2015.
17
SeeNolanMcCarty,“ReducingPolarization:SomeFactsforReformers,”UniversityofChicagoLegalForum,2016forareview
oftheevidenceontheseandrelatedissues.
8
Weunderstandthatthesuccessofrepresentativedemocracyhingesnotjustonwhatthe
representativesdo,butalsoonthelinksbetweentherepresentativesandthosetheyrepresent.Of
particularimportancehereistheextenttowhichthelatterfeelconnectedinsomepracticalwaywith
thelegislatorsservingontheirbehalfandsensethattheirviewsandinterestsarebeingadequately
represented.Wehavegrappledwithwhetherandhowfundingforworkrelatedtocitizenengagement
wouldcontributetoourgoalofimprovingdeliberation,negotiation,andcompromiseinCongress.
Ifwewereallmodelcitizens–stayinginformedabouttheissues,weighingdispassionately
whichpartiesandcandidatesbestrepresentourviewsandinterests,votingaccordinglyinallrelevant
elections,communicatingperiodicallywithourlegislatorsbetweenelectionswhenwewanttoconvey
somethinginparticulartothem,andrecognizingthattheyareservinginanationalCongresswithmany
otherlegislatorsrepresentingpeopleandplacesthatseetheworlddifferently–thenmostifnotallof
theproblemsweareseekingtoaddressmightbesolved.Butaspoliticalsciencehasmoreorless
consistentlyfound,thisidealrepresentsa“folktheory”ofdemocracythatbearslittleresemblanceto
reality.18Thevastmajorityofusarenotmodelcitizens,andasmuchaswemightwishitso,thisisnot
goingtochange.Wethusdecidedearlyonthatwewerenotevengoingtotrytotacklediffuseissues
likeimprovingciviceducationorincreasingvoterturnoutingeneralelections.
Wehaveexperimentedwithseverallinesofgrantmakingwherewesensedthattargetedand
nonpartisaninvestmentscouldpotentiallyhaveapositiveimpactoncitizenengagement.19Wehave
beenpleasedtosupportthesevariouseffortsandbelievethattheyaremakingpositivecontributions.
Butwehavealsocometoappreciatethechallengesofbuildinguptheirimpactinwaysthatwould
ultimatelyresonateinCongress.
Lookingbackoverourdefactobudgetallocationstothesethreebroadareas(Congress,
campaignsandelections,andcitizenengagement),itisworthnotingthattheyaremoreorlessthe
inverseofthepatternfordemocracyfundinginthefieldasawhole.WeknowfromtheFoundation
Center’sdatabasethatoverthepastfiveyears,democracyfundershavecollectivelyallocatedmore
than50%oftheirfundingtosupportworkintheareasrelatedtocitizenengagementthatweare
fundingmostlightly,abitmorethan10%oftheirfundingtothereformofcampaignsandelectionsthat
wearefundingwithnearly25%ofourresources,andlessthan5%oftheirfundingtothecategoryof
“legislativeperformance,”whereweareputtingfully50%ofourresources.
Therearetwowaysoflookingatthisinversepattern.Wehavegenerallysoughttocomplement
ratherthanreplicatetheprevailingfundingpatterns.Butthedifferenceslikelyalsoreflectalternative
hypothesesaboutthewaysinwhichprivatefoundationscanmaximizetheirimpactonthiscomplex
systemofsystems,andaboutthepotentialsourcesofpoliticalandinstitutionalchangeinour
representativedemocracy.Relativetomanyofourpeers,wearelessoptimisticabouttheprospectsfor
18
OnthispointChristopherH.AchenandLarryM.Bartels,DemocracyforRealists:WhyElectionsDoNotProduceResponsive
Government(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2016).
19
Thesehaveincludedgrantsforplatformsthatprovidevoterswithbetterinformationaboutcandidatesandissues(tothe
SeattleCityClubandMaplight’sVoter’sEdge);foracademicresearchonwaystoimprovetheaccuracyandobjectivityand
increasethecivilityofpoliticalreportingandcommentary,aswellasthepublic’sengagementwithitinonlineplatforms(tothe
AmericanPressInstituteandtheEngagingNewsProjectattheUniversityofTexasatAustin);forinitiativesworkingtobridge
dividesbetweendifferentgroupsandperspectivesthatareatincreasinglyatoddsinoursociety(totheFranklinProject,
CIRCLE,CitizenUniversity,theEthicsandPublicPolicyCenter,andLivingRoomConversations);andforresearchontheeffects
ofget-out-the-votestrategiesincongressionalprimaries(toresearchersattheUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiegoandYale
University).
9
ourmakingameaningfulcontributiontobottoms-updemocraticchange,andmoreopentothe
possibilityofhelpingtocatalyzechangevialeadersandelitesinourgoverninginstitutionsandparties.
Relatedtothislastpoint,abouthowchangeoccursinoursystem,wehaveonefinalobservation
aboutthesolutionsandapproacheswehavebeensupporting.Overandaboveanyparticular
democraticreform,oranygrantmeanttoadvanceit,wehaveincreasinglyfelttheneedtoelevateaset
ofbasicvaluesandprincipleswovenintothefabricofourConstitutionandthesystemofgovernmentit
created.Negotiationandcompromisearetypicallyseenastechniquesordispositionsinpolitics,and—in
anagemarkedbygrowingnumbersofpuristsonbothsides–asunsavory,evencorruptingonesatthat.
Yetinourconstitutionalsystem,i.e.,oneofseparated,checked,balanced,anddecentralizedpowers
governingadiversesocietyonacontinentalscale,negotiationandcompromisearefundamentalvalues.
Theyarenotjustrequiredtomakethesystemwork;thesystemitselfwasdesignedtoevokethemin
ordertohelpitweatherthepitchedpoliticalcontestsandcontroversiesthattheFoundersknewwould
inevitablyarise.Ourrepresentativegovernmentismeanttochannelthesedisputesinwaysthatresult
inareasonableaccommodationofcompetinginterests,beliefs,andagendas.Whileitmaybetempting
forfundersandreformerstofocusondiscretefixes–solutionsandapproachesinourparlance–there
isanoverarchingcontestofvaluesthatmustbewonfortherightsolutionsandapproachestotake
hold.Ourfundingisfirmlyonthesideofnegotiationandcompromiseinthatcontest.20
III)Makingsenseoftheevolvingpoliticallandscape
Wealsoneedtotakestockoftheevolvingpoliticallandscapeaswedevelopourplansfora
renewaloftheinitiative.Weseedauntingsignsinthislandscape,butalsosomedevelopmentsthat
couldsupportacautiousoptimism.Fromaglobalperspective,thechallengestodemocracythat
promptedustolaunchtheMadisonInitiativehaveonlygottenworse.FreedomHouseobservedinits
annualreportfor2016,entitled“AnxiousDictators,WaveringDemocracies,”thatoverthepastyear,
“theworldwasbatteredbycrisesthatfueledxenophobicsentimentindemocraticcountries…andled
authoritarianregimestocrackdownharderondissent.Thesedevelopmentscontributedtothe10th
consecutiveyearofdeclineinglobalfreedom.”72countrieswitnessedadeclineindemocraticfreedoms
intheprioryear,thebiggestbackslidesincethedemocraticrecessionbegan.21
Moreover,wenowarewitnessingthegrowinginfluenceofleadersandpracticesof“illiberal
democracy,”whichblendsnationalismandpopulismwithdisdainfor“Western”valueslikefreedomof
thepressandassociationincivilsociety.22Thereisincreasinglywidespreadbeliefintheneedfora
strongleadertocutthroughparliamentarypusillanimityandsquabbling—notjustinRussia,Hungary,
andTurkey,whoserulersopenlyprofesstobeingilliberaldemocrats,butincreasinglyinFrance,theUK,
and,alas,nowintheUS,whereleadersofpartiesontherightspeakofVladimirPutininflatteringterms.
20
JonathanRauch,“RescuingCompromise,”NationalAffairs,Fall2013,p.125.SeealsoLarryKramer,“ToAdjustTheseClashing
th
Interests:NegotiationandCompromiseasCoreConstitutionalValues,”54 AnnualOwenJ.RobertsMemorialLecture,
UniversityofPennsylvaniaLawSchool,February11,2015;andPeterBerkowitz,ConstitutionalConservatism:Liberty,SelfGovernment,andPoliticalModeration(Stanford,CA:HooverInstitutionPress,2013).
21
Retrievedfromhttps://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016.
22
VictorOrban,“Speechattheatthe25thBálványosSummerFreeUniversityandStudentCamp,”July262014,
Retrievedfromhttp://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-sspeech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp.
10
TakingstockofthesedevelopmentshelpsustoputrecenteventsintheUSincontext.Inmany
oftheestablisheddemocraciesofEurope,weseesimilarpatterns:increasinglypolarizedparties,the
waninginfluenceofpragmaticproblem-solversonthecenter-leftandcenter-right,thegrowingappeal
ofpoliticiansontheleftcallingformorefar-reaching,evenrevolutionaryreformstoreduceeconomic
inequality,andxenophobicappealsbyright-wingnationalistsandpopulistsspeakingtotheangerand
diminishedpositionofthewhiteworkingclass.FromBudapestandParistoLondonandWashington,a
hostofissuesassociatedwithglobalization–trade,immigration,refugeecrises,terrorism,etc.–are
jumblingthetraditionalpoliticaldividesofrightandleft.Astheincumbentpoliticalpartiesstruggleto
respondtotheseeruptingcleavages,citizensacrossthespectrumareconcludingthatthesepartiesand
theirestablishmentleadersarepartoftheproblem,thatthe“gameisrigged,”touseabattlecryfrom
thecurrentUSpresidentialcampaign.23Thisisnotanenvironmentinwhichtheactivitiesatthecoreof
governinginrepresentativedemocracies–deliberation,negotiation,andcompromiseamongelites–
arelikelytoenjoymuchlegitimacy.
ZeroinginontheUS,thesuccessofDonaldTrumpandBernieSandersandthemovementsthey
haveledinthecurrentpresidentialcampaign–whichwecertainlywerenotexpectingwhenwebegan
ourworktwoyearsago–pointstoaprofoundfailureofthepolarizedpartysysteminrecentyears.We
cannowclearlyseethattherehasbeenmuchmoreanxietyandangerabouttheeffectsofglobalization
andWallStreet’sroleintheGreatRecessionthanhadpreviouslybeenarticulatedbyeitherparty.The
neo-liberalconsensusonthebenefitsofglobalizationandthesupportforthefinancialsectorinboth
parties,alongwithintensepolarizationandanunwillingnesstocompromiseonarangeofissues,has
muffleddeep-seatedfrustrationintheelectorate.Intheabsenceofpartiesthataremoreresponsiveto
widespreadpublicconcerns,andofpolicy-makinginCongressthatmeaningfullyaddressesthem,
leaderscallingforimpracticalorilliberalsolutionswillgainfollowers.Thusoursenseofurgencyto
improvetheconditionsfordeliberation,negotiationandcompromiseinCongresshasonlyincreased.
Wealsohaveabetterfeelfortheproblemofpolarization.Inourinitialconception,wesawthis
asprimarilyafunctionofideologicalpolarizationamongelites.Butwehavecometounderstandhow
old-fashionedpoliticalandinstitutionalcombatdrivesmuchofit.AsFrancesLeehaspointedout,the
twopartiesareboggeddowninanunusuallyprotractedbattleforcontrolofCongress.Traditionally,one
partyortheotherhasdominated,withamplemajoritiesinbothhouses.Theotherparty,relegatedtoa
smallminority,andwithlittleifanyhopeofwinningpowerinthenearfuture,hasgenerallyseenfitto
“goalongtogetalong.”Forexample,fortheGOPcontrolledthevastmajorityofcongressesfrom1896
uptotheNewDeal.Then,fromtheearly1930’stothemid-1990s,theDemocratshadavirtuallockon
Congress.Butthepast20yearshavebeenmarkedbyintermittentperiodsofredandbluecontrol,and
muchnarrowermajorities.Thosemajoritiesarepoliticallyinsecure,andthusloathetoworkwiththe
minoritiesworkingtounhorsethem.Fortheirpart,theminoritieswanttodoeverythingintheirpower
toisolateandembarrassthemajoritypartysoastoincreasetheirownoddsofwinningpowerinthe
nextelection.ThelasttimeweexperiencedsuchintensepolarizationwastheGildedAge,another
periodwhenthepartieshadnarrowgoverningmajoritiesandfrequentlytradedcontrolofCongress.24
23
ChristianCaryl,“TheEndofPoliticsasWeKnowit,”ForeignPolicy,May3,2016,retrievedfrom
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/03/the-end-of-politics-as-we-know-it-left-right-sanders-trump-corbyn/;MichaelLind,“This
IsWhattheFutureofAmericanPoliticsLooksLike,”Politico,May22,2016,retrievedfrom
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-election-realignment-partisan-political-party-policy-democratsrepublicans-politics-213909.
24
FrancesLee,“Americanpoliticsismorecompetitivethanever.Thatismakingpartisanshipworse.”WashingtonPost,January
9,2014,retrievedfromhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/09/american-politics-is-more-
11
Whenweturnfromtheelitetothemasslevel,itseemsasthoughthecontestforcontrolatthe
nationalleveliscoincidingwith,ifnotaccelerating,thesortingoftheelectorateintotwoincreasingly
hostilecamps.ConsiderthefollowingdatafromthePewResearchCenter.Ina2014surveyof10,000
Americans,Pewfoundthat,“TheoverallshareofAmericanswhoexpressconsistentlyconservativeor
consistentlyliberalopinionshasdoubledoverthepasttwodecadesfrom10%to21%.Andideological
thinkingisnowmuchmorecloselyalignedwithpartisanshipthaninthepast.Asaresult,ideological
overlapbetweenthetwopartieshasdiminished:Today,92%ofRepublicansaretotherightofthe
medianDemocrat,and94%ofDemocratsaretotheleftofthemedianRepublican.”25Thisgrowing
ideologicalconsistency,orwhatresearcherscall“constraint”amongcitizens,isinkeepingwithwhatwe
haveobservedincomparativecontexts.
ButaswiththepolarizationinCongress,thisisnotsimplyanideologicalphenomenon.Thereis
alsogrowingpartisanantipathyamongAmericans.ThesamesurveydatafromPewindicatesthat2out
of5ofushavecometohold“veryunfavorable”viewsoftheotherparty.In2014,Pewaddedanew
questiontoitsrecurringsurveyandfoundthat27%ofDemocratsand36%ofRepublicansregardedthe
opposingpartyasnothinglessthana“threattothenation’swell-being.”Itisnotsomuchthatthatwe
likeourownpartymore,itisthatwereallydonotlikethoseotherguys!Socialpsychologistshavea
termforthisgrowingantipathy–affectivepolarization.Thisisreallyabouttribalism.
AttheoutsetoftheMadisonInitiative,wetoldourboardthatithadtakenthecountryseveral
decadestotieitselfintothispoliticalstraightjacket,anditwouldlikelytakeadecadeortwoforusto
workourcollectivewayoutofit.Theprecedingdiscussionwouldsuggestthistimehorizonstillholds.
Thatsaid,weshouldtakenoteofwhatmayturnouttobeearlysignalsofpromisingchanges.
TherehavebeensomeencouragingdevelopmentsonCapitolHill.Thepastyearhaswitnesseda
numberofsignificantbipartisanlegislativeachievementsofthesortthat,inthedoldrumsof2013,it
seemedlikewemightnotseeagain.Theseincludethepassageoftradepromotionauthority,Medicare
reformviaapermanent“DocFix,”thereauthorizationoflongawaitedtransportationandeducation
bills,asurveillancebill,andatwo-yearbudgetagreement.IndicatorstrackedbytheBipartisanPolicy
CenterinitsHealthyCongressindexsuggestthatinsomeareas,e.g.,billsbeingreportedoutof
committees,amendmentsbeingconsideredontheSenatefloor,andtheuseofconferencecommittees,
therehasbeensomehaltingprogresstowardre-establishingnormallegislativeprocedures.26
Moreover,thesilverlininginthecloudthatisthe2016presidentialraceisthatweappeartobe
witnessinganewdimensionofpoliticalconflictemergingineachparty.Thisfaultline,stemmingfrom
theconstellationofissuesrelatedtoglobalizationandthestateoftheeconomydescribedabove,cuts
acrossthetraditionalleft-rightpolarizationbetweentheparties.Theopeningupofintra-partyconflicts
couldbeagoodsigninsofarasitinterminglesopposingpartyfactionsondifferentissuesandhelps
speedthereturnofthebargainingandcoalition-basedpoliticsbetweenheterogeneouspartiesthat
characterizedUSpoliticsformuchofitshistory.However,atthisstage,itistoosoontotellhowallthis
willplayout.
competitive-than-ever-thats-making-partisanship-worse/;andLee,InsecureMajorities:CongressandthePerpetualCampaign
(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,forthcoming2016).
25
PewResearchCenter,“PoliticalPolarizationandtheAmericanPublic,”June12,2014,p.6.
26
BipartisanPolicyCenter,“HealthCongressIndex,”May6,2016,retrievedfromhttp://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/BPC-Healthy-Congress-Index-2016-Q1.pdf
12
Foralloftheconflictanddisruptioninourpolitics,infactbecauseofit,weremainconvinced
thattheover-ridingimperativeistogetCongressanditsmembersbackinthebusinessofperforming
theirinstitutional–indeed,constitutional–dutiesinwaysthataremoreresponsivetopublicsentiment,
andthatreflectthedeliberation,negotiation,andcompromiseneededtogovernintheUS.
IV)Ouremergingtheoryofchange
TheHewlettFoundationstrivestopracticeoutcomes-focusedphilanthropy.Thismeansthatour
grantmakingshouldbeguidedbyastrategicframeworkconsistingofacleargoal;aviable,evidencebasedtheoryofchangeforrealizingit;andmeasuresforassessingprogress(orthelackthereof)along
theway.Attheoutsetofourwork,weidentifiedthegoaloftheMadisonInitiativeashelpingtocreate
theconditionsinwhichCongressanditsmemberscandeliberate,negotiate,andcompromiseinways
thatworkformoreAmericans.Butgiventhecomplexityoftheproblem,wethoughtitwouldbe
prudenttowaittospecifyourtheoryofchangeandmeasuresofprogressuntilwehadtakensome
initialexploratorystepsandgainedabettersenseofthelandscape,possiblepathsforwardwithinit,and
howwemighttellifweweresucceeding.Twoyearsin,wefindourselvesatajuncturewherewecan
begintosketchouttheothercomponentsofourstrategicframework.
Ouremergingtheoryofchangeforrealizingourgoalisanunconventionalone.Itdoesnot
presumetogoallthewaydowntotherootcausesoftheproblemsweareseekingtoaddressbutrather
toamelioratesomeoftheirmoreprominentsymptomsandby-products.Severalcriticalfriendshave
pointedouttousthatpolarizationisnotacausebutaneffectofdeep-seatedhistoricalandcultural
forces.Weagree.Theseforcesinclude,firstandforemost,thepoliticalrealignmentsetinmotionbythe
successofthecivilrightsmovement,whoseramificationsintheensuingdecadessortedouttheparties
suchthattheDemocratsbecameuniformlyliberalandtheRepublicansuniformlyconservative.27The
forcesalsoincludetheentrenchedpoliticalconflictthatflaredupbetween“intensepolicydemanders”
ontherightandleftinresponsetotheexpandedsizeandscopeofgovernmentinthe1960sand1970s,
abattlethatcontinuesunabatedtothisday.28Andtheyincludemorerecentdevelopmentsdescribed
earlier—hyper-partisanshipinCongressfueledbytheprotractedelectoralcontestforcontrolofthe
institutionoverthepasttwodecadesandtheriseofaffectivepolarizationamongcitizenstakinginallof
thesedevelopments.
Thesolutionsandapproacheswearesupportingarenotgoingtoreversetheseforcesontheir
own.Anyreversalwouldrequireareshufflingofthepartiesattheeliteandmasslevelsuchthat
ideologyandpartyaffiliationarenotsoheavilycorrelated.Sucharesortingislikelytooccuratsome
point,anditsbeginningmayalreadybevisibleintheintra-partydebatesofthe2016campaign.A
reversaloftheseforcesmayalsohingeontheemergenceofadominantpartyinCongresstoresolvethe
chronicpoliticalconflictarisingfrominsecuremajoritieswithintheinstitutionandovercomethe
decades-longimpasseovertheproperroleofgovernment.Inourview,thesedevelopmentsarelargely
27
SeeRickPildes,“WhytheCenterDoesNotHold:TheCausesofHyperpolarizedDemocracyinAmerica,”CaliforniaLawReview,
April2011,pp.273-334.
28
Ontheoriginsofthisconflict,seetheessaysinPaulPiersonandThedaSkocpol,eds.TheTransformationofAmericanPolitics:
ActivistGovernmentandtheRiseofConservatism(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007).Ontheinterplaybetween
“intensepolicydemanders”andourpolarizedpoliticalparties,seeKathleenBawn,MartinCohen,DavidKarol,SethMasket,
HansNoel,andJohnZaller,“ATheoryofPoliticalParties:Groups,Demands,andNominationsinAmericanPolitics,”
PerspectivesonPolitics,September2013,pp.571-597;andHansNoel,PoliticalIdeologiesandPoliticalPartiesinAmerica(New
York:CambridgeUniversityPress,2014).
13
beyondthelegalandpracticalcapacityofprivatefoundationsandtheirgranteestoshapeinany
materialway.
Itisimportanttokeepinmind,however,thatpolarizationisnotjustaneffect;inthecomplex
politicalandgovernmentalsystemofsystemsinwhichitnowprevails,itisalsoservingascauseinits
ownrightthroughamyriadofnegativefeedbackloops.Theideologicaldividebetweentheparties
raisesthestakesforcontrolofCongress,exacerbatingtit-for-tatpartisanshipandbrinksmanshipwithin
theinstitution.Thesefactorsinturnproducedeadlockthatfurthermobilizespartisansandideologues
whilemarginalizingmembersandcitizensinclinedtosupportnegotiationandcompromise.
Stepsthatworktocounter-actthesenegativecyclescanpotentiallyhelpenablemoreinstances
ofcollaborationwithinapolarizedCongress,contributetotheforcesspurringtheawaitedresorting,and
makecooperationeasierandmoreroutineasthepoliticalconditionsarisetosupportit.Theseefforts
canthushelpCongressandthebroaderpoliticalsystemcopewithpolarization,notleastbysupporting
thevaluesofnegotiationandcompromisethatareessentialandevenconstitutionalintheAmerican
system.Ifandwhenthebroaderhistoricalandculturaltrendsthathavepolarizedourpoliticschange,
givingthepartiesandrepresentativesmoreroomtomaneuver,thesesameinterventionswillhaveset
thestageforaquickerrecoveryamidsttheopening.Wedonotbelievethatanyoneinterventionwillbe
dispositive.Butinaggregate,overtime,theycanhaveabeneficialcumulativeeffect.
Theremainderofthissectionreviewsfivelinesofgrantmakingthatweareplanningtofocuson
inourfutureworkshouldtheFoundationboardrenewtheMadisonInitiative:buildingbipartisan
relationshipsamongpolicy-makers,strengtheningCongressasaninstitution,improvingcampaign
finance,makingelectionsmorerepresentative,andshoringupmediacoverageofCongressandits
members.
A) Buildingbipartisanrelationshipsamongpolicy-makers
WeseebuildingbipartisanrelationshipsamongmembersandstaffinCongressasanecessary
thoughinsufficientstepalongthewaytowardtherealizationofourultimategoal.Electedofficialsand
thestafftheyrelyonneedtohavepersonalrelationshipswitheachother,andultimatelyamodicumof
trust,inordertoengageinthereciprocalgive-and-takethatisneededforproductivepolicy-making.We
fundanumberoforganizationsthatworkindifferentwaystocultivatetheseconnections.29Theydoso
throughhostingmeetings,dinners,retreats,tripsofvarioussorts,aswellasongoingcaucusesinwhich
theparticipantsaredrawnfrombothmajorpoliticalparties.Inmanyinstancesfamilymembersalso
participate.Someofthegroupsfocusonsubstantivepolicyissues,othersonsharedexperiencesor
practicalmatterspertainingtodifferentlegislativeroles.
ArecentassessmentconductedbytheCenterforEvaluationInnovationgaveusabetterfeelfor
theworkbeingdonebyourgranteesinthisarea.Theparticipationismoreextensive—andbipartisan
—thanwehadexpected.Ananalysisofprogramdatafromsevengranteesindicatedthat,overthelast
twocongresses,approximately65%oflegislatorsortheirstaffrepresentativesparticipatedinatleast
oneeventsponsoredbytheseorganizations.Thisincluded76%ofDemocratsand48%ofRepublicansin
theHouse,alongwith86%ofDemocratsand83%ofRepublicansintheSenate.
29
GranteesincludetheAspenInstitute’sCongressionalandRodelFellowshipprograms,theBipartisanPolicyCenter,the
CongressionalResearchService,theFaithandPoliticsInstitute,theLibraryofCongress,theLugarCenter,theMillennialAction
Project,theNationalInstituteforCivilDiscourse,NoLabels,andthePewCharitableTrusts.
14
Isthisbipartisanprogrammingandparticipationhavingapositiveimpact?Atthispoint,given
thepreliminaryandincompletenatureofthedata,wearenotinapositiontodrawfirmconclusions.
However,theevaluationdiddiscernaweakbutstatisticallysignificantrelationshipbetween
participationinbipartisanprogramsandbipartisanbehaviorinsponsorshippatternsforlegislation.This
relationshipwasstrongerforRepublicanparticipants.Thesecorrelationsshouldnotbemistakenfor
causation,butalongwithourobservationsofandconversationswithcongressionalparticipants,they
giveussomeconfidencethatweshouldcontinuetosupportworkinthisarea.Weareencouraging
granteestotrackprogramdatamoresystematically,andwearefundingnewwavesofscholarshipon
thepre-conditionsforsuccessfulnegotiationsinCongressinordertogainmoreinsightintohowto
proceedwiththislineofgrantmakingoverthelongerterm.30
B) StrengtheningCongressasaninstitution
Polarizationandhyper-partisanshiphaveunderminedtheabilityofCongresstocarryoutits
Constitutionalresponsibilities,fromlaw-makingandexercisingthepowerofthepursetooverseeingthe
administrationofpolicyandgenerallycheckingandbalancingtheothertwobranchesofgovernment.
Withthegranteesthatwesupportinthisarea,weareendeavoringtohelpstrengthentheinstitutionas
awholebyimprovingtherulesandnorms,coreworkprocesses,andstaffcapacityofCongresssothatit
isinabetterpositiontocarryouttheseresponsibilities.
ExamplesofevolvingrulesandassociatednormsthatarehamperingCongressincludethe
increasinglyroutinizeduseofthefilibusterbybothpartieswhentheyareintheminorityintheSenate
andtheself-imposedconstraintoftheso-calledHastertRule(reallyanorm)observedbyRepublicansin
theHouse.Werecognizethatboththegradualevolutioninrulesandnormsaswellassuddenchanges
intheiruseareinherentlypoliticalanddrivenbythecontestforcontrolofbothhousesofCongress.
Therearelimitstowhatresearchersandadvocatescandirectlydotoinformhowtheserulesandnorms
areobservedandadaptedovertime.Thatsaid,severalofourgranteeshavedeveloped(orare
developing)proposalsandcommentaryforhowCongressmightproceedwhenthetimeisripefor
consideringsuchchanges.31
Webelievethereismoreroomforourgranteestocontributetobroaderimprovementsinthe
institutionalprocessesandstaffcapacityofCongress.Forexample,severalofourgranteeshavebeen
playingaleadingroleinexploringhowCongressmightimprovethecoreprocessesitusestoexercise
thepowerofthepurse.32Reforminthisareawillnotmagicallyfixdeepdisagreementsovertaxingand
spendingpriorities;weseethetruthintheoldWashingtonbudgeteer’ssawthat“theprocessisnotthe
problem,theproblemistheproblem!”Thatsaid,ifCongressisgoingtomeetitsArticleIresponsibilities,
30
SeeforexampletheSocialScienceResearchCouncil’srecentlyannouncedNegotiatingAgreementInCongressResearch
Grantsprojectathttp://www.ssrc.org/fellowships/view/negotiating-agreement-in-congress-research-grants/
31
ThesegranteesincludetheBipartisanPolicyCenter,theBrookingsInstitution’sGovernanceStudiesProgram,theFederalist
Society,theHudsonInstitute,theNationalConferenceonStateLegislatures,NewAmerica’sPoliticalReformProgram,andthe
RStreetInstitute’sGovernanceProject.
32
Herewearereferringnotonlytotheworkofthebudgetcommitteesandtheformalbudgetprocessesinbothhousesof
Congress,buttoallaspectsofthecongressionaltaxingandspendingpower,includingthosethatintertwinewithexecutive
branchbudgetingfunctionsandinvolvetherelevantworkoftheWaysandMeans/Finance,authorizing,andappropriations
committeesinbothchambers.GranteesinthisareaincludetheBrookingsInstitution’sEconomicStudiesprogram,theCenter
foraResponsibleFederalBudget,theConvergenceCenterforPolicyResolution,andresearchersatGeorgeMasonUniversity
andGeorgeWashingtonUniversity.
15
itneedstofindawaytonegotiateandcompromisemoreeffectivelyinthismission-criticalsetof
institutionalprocesses.
Anotherprocessthatneedstobeimprovedinwaysthatcouldalleviatepolarizationandhyperpartisanshipiscongressionaloversightoftheexecutivebranch.33SeveralMadisonInitiativegranteesin
thisareaareledandstaffedbyexperiencedpractitionersworkingtoprovidetrainingandtechnical
assistanceonhowtoconductmoreproductiveoversighttomembersandstaffonabipartisanbasis.
OthergranteeshavebeenworkingtoelevatetheimportanceofoversightasapriorityforCongressin
theWashingtonpolicycommunityandtodevelopnewapproaches(orunderscoretime-testedones)for
howitcanandshouldbeconducted.34
Congressneedsampleexpertiseandstaffcapacityifitisgoingtoplayitsappointedroleinour
constitutionalsystem.ThisseemslikeastraightforwardstatementthatmembersofCongress
themselveswouldacknowledge.Alas,inrecentdecadesCongresshasbeenmiserlyinequippingand
fundingitselftocarryoutitscorefunctions.SeveralMadisonInitiativegranteeshaveplayedaleading
roleinhighlightingtheneedforCongresstoprovidesufficientfundingfortheinstitutional,committee,
andofficestaffresourcesitneedstocarryoutitsresponsibilitiesmoreeffectively.Wearealso
supportingworktoenableindividuallegislatorstooptimizethefunctioningoftheirstaffandoffices,not
leastbygainingabettersenseforthedeliberateandinformedopinionoftheconstituentsthey
represent.35
Finally,wearecurrentlyexploringsomeadditionaltypesofsupportinandaroundCongressthat
wemaydecidetoexpandanddeepenasweproceed.Theseincludehelpingmembersandcongressional
staffgetbetteratnegotiatingwitheachother;bolsteringtheproblem-solvingdispositionofpotential
candidatesforCongress;andunderwritingpragmaticpolicyadvocacyontheleft,right,andcenterthat
acknowledgestheneedformemberstonegotiateandcompromiseacrosstheaisle.
C) Improvingcampaignfinance
Tostatetheobvious:thecongressionalcampaignfinancesystemissomethingofarunaway
train.AccordingtotheCenterforResponsivePolitics,inthe2013-14electioncycle,$3.8billionwas
spentoncongressionalelections.Weseethreeproblemswiththissituationthatmakeitrelevantfor
ourwork.Thefirstisprosaic,butalsoperhapsmostgermane:manymembersofCongresshaveto
spendsomuchtimeraisingmoneythattheirlegislativeresponsibilities,roles,andrelationshipsget
shortshrift.Thesecondisthat,asmembersgoaboutraisingthismoney,whetheritbefromlargeor
smalldonors,theyaredoingsofromcontributorsthataremorelikelytoholdmorepartisanand
ideologicalperspectivesthantheirnoncontributingpeers,whichworsenspolarization.Finally,the
problemsofthecurrentsystemofcampaignfinanceunderminepublictrustinCongressandthe
electoralprocess.
33
Herealsowedefinetheprocessbroadlytoincludeoversighthearings,investigations,andongoingmonitoringcarriedoutby
variouscommitteesandsub-committeesinCongress,aswellasbyentitiesthatworkinserviceofCongresssuchasthe
GovernmentAccountabilityOfficeandtheinspectorsgeneral.
34
GranteesprovidingtrainingandtechnicalassistanceincludeTheConstitutionProject,TheLevinCenter,theLugarCenter,and
theProjectonGovernmentOversight.GranteesworkingonpolicyincludetheFederalistSociety,theHudsonInstitute,New
America’sPoliticalReformProgram,andtheRStreet’sInstitute’sGovernanceProject.
35
GranteesincludetheBrookingsInstitution’sGovernanceStudiesProgram,theCongressionalManagementFoundation,New
America’sPoliticalReformProgram,thePewCharitableTrust,RStreetInstitute’sGovernanceProject,theWashington
Monthly,andVoiceofthePeople.OtherpartnersworkinginthisareaincludetheCongressionalInstituteandPopVox.
16
Oneobjectiveofourinitialgrantmakinghasbeentoilluminatehowpatternsofcampaign
financearerapidlyevolving,forexamplethroughtheriseofSuperPACsandtheshiftfromtelevisionto
socialmedia-basedpoliticaladvertising.Ourbasicassumptionisthatanyworkablesolutionhastobe
basedonthelatestandbestdataabouthowcampaignfinanceisactuallyflowing.Afocusedevaluation
oftheworkwehavesupportedinthisareaconcluded,infact,thatitisessentialforinformingthe
broaderpublicdebate.36
Anotherobjectiveofourearlygrantmakinghasbeentosupportthedevelopmentofabipartisan
movementforcampaignfinancereform,whichwebelieveiscriticaltoadoptingandsustainingareform
effortovertime.Giventheprevalenceofcampaignfinancereformersontheprogressivesideofthe
debate,wehavefocusedonhelpingtoidentifyandfundadvocatescallingforreformfromtherightof
centerorworkingonademonstrablybipartisanbasistodoso.37
Wehavenotyetfoundaspecificreformagendathatweseeasthepathforward.Thereare
someinterestingexperimentsinpublicfinancingnowunderwayinNewYorkCityandSeattlethatare
focusedongivingmorecitizensarealvoiceinthesystem,andwearesupportinggranteeswhobelieve
thisgeneralapproachmayholdpromiseforbroaderapplication.38Wearealsosupportinggrantees
seekingtoputpoliticalpartiesonmoreofanequalfootingwithoutsidegroupsincampaignfinance.
Theyacknowledgethecrucialintermediaryrolesthatpoliticalpartiesplayinaggregatinginterestsand
assemblingworkablemajorities.39Anotherpotentialrouteweareconsideringhasbeenopenedupby
thevacancyontheSupremeCourt.Thejudicialprecedentsthathavemadeeffectiveregulationdifficult
couldnowberevisitedthroughalitigation-basedeffort.However,giventhelitigationstrategiesalready
launchedbythoseseekingtofurtherderegulatecampaignfinanceandthoseseekingtore-regulateit
usingtraditionalreformframeworks,itmaybehardtomovethingsinanalternativedirection.
D) Makingelectionsmorerepresentative
Oneofthechallengeswithoursinglememberdistrict,top-of-the-heapsystemofcongressional
electionsisthatiteffectivelyforcesvoterstomakebinarychoicesthatmaypoorlyreflecttheiractual
preferences.Whenthissystemofelectioniscombinedwithprimaryelectionstonominatecandidatesin
whichasmallsubsetofmoreideologicalandpartisanactiviststurnout,themismatchwidensbetween
thepreferencesoflessideologicalandpartisanvotersandthecandidatestheyhavetochoosebetween
ingeneralelections.Weareinterestedinsupportingelectoralinnovationsthatwouldmovebeyond
thesewinner-take-alldynamicsandelectlegislatorsthatbetterrepresenttherangeanddiversityof
preferencesamongtheirconstituents.
Onewayofgoingaboutthisisthroughrankedchoicevoting,wherebyvotersordertheir
preferencesacrossallcandidatestheywouldsupportforagivenoffice.Thismethodprovidesafinergrainedregisterofpublicopinionasitisaggregatedacrosseachindividualvoter.Italsoproduces
differentcampaigndynamics,ascandidateshaveapracticalinterestinrankinghigherontheballotsof
votersforwhomtheymaynotbethefirstchoice.Severalcitiesusethisformofvotingformunicipal
officesatpresent,andthisfallthevotersofMainewilldecideonastate-wideinitiativetoestablish
36
GranteeshereincludetheCenterforResponsivePoliticsandtheNationalInstituteforMoneyinStatePolitics.Wealsohave
supportedresearchersatmultipleuniversitiesthroughagranttoNewYorkUniversityundertheauspicesofataskforceledby
ProfessorNathanPersilyofStanfordUniversityandattorneysRobertBauerofPerkinsCoieandBenjaminGinsbergofJonesDay.
37
GranteesincludetheCampaignLegalCenter,IssueOne,andTakeBackOurRepublic.
38
GranteesincludetheBrennanCenter,theCampaignFinanceInstitute,andNewAmerica’sPoliticalReformProgram.
39
GranteesincludetheBrennanCenter,theBrookingsInstitution’sGovernanceStudiesProgram,andresearchersatthe
UniversityofMassachusettsatAmherst.
17
rankedchoicevotinginbothprimaryandgeneralelectionsforcongressionalofficesaswellasforthe
governorandstatelegislativeoffices.
Anotherwayofmovingbeyondwinner-take-alldynamicsisthroughtheuseofmulti-member
districtsforlegislativeoffices,potentially(thoughnotnecessarily)incombinationwithformsof
proportionalrepresentation.Currently15%ofstatehouseseatsnation-widerepresentmulti-member
districts.Severalstateswereusingmulti-memberdistrictsforFederalHouseseatsupintothe1960s.We
recognizethatelectoralinnovationsofthissortfacelongodds,atleastatthenationallevel.Butweare
persuadedthatthepotentialimprovementsinrepresentationwarrantongoinginvestmentinthese
possibilities.40
Anincrementalimprovementthatcouldmakeourcurrentelectoralsystemmorerepresentative
ofcitizenpreferenceswouldbeschedulingcongressionalprimariestooptimizeforturnout,especiallyin
mid-termswherethenumberofeligiblevoterscastingballotsoftendipsintosingledigits.Thiscould
involveestablishinganationalprimarydaythatwouldfocusmediaandpublicattentionontheseraces.
Theremayalsoberegionalpermutations.Thiswouldbenoeasytaskgiventhatstatepartiesand
electionofficialscontroltheschedulingofprimaries.Butitwouldstrengthendemocraticparticipation
andaccountabilityinourelections.41
E) ShoringupmediacoverageofCongressanditsmembers
Muchoftheconventionalwisdomaboutmediacoverageofpoliticsisthatithasbecomeovertly
partisan.Peoplearegettingtheirnewsservedupwithoutanyopposingviewpointsinpolarizedecho
chambers.Perhapsabiggerproblemisthatmostpeoplearenotreallygettingmuchnewsaboutpolitics
andgovernmentatallduetotheproliferationofmediaoptionsandthedifficulteconomicsofpolitical
journalism.AreportwecommissionedfromthePewResearchCenteronmediacoverageofCongress
foundthat21stateshavenoreporterfromanin-statemediaoutletcoveringgovernmentandpoliticsin
Washington.42ToomanycitizensaresimplyuninformedaboutwhatCongressanditsmembersare
doing,andhowthisrelatestothelivestheyarelivinginSacramentoorPaducah.Acorelinkof
accountabilitybetweenmembersofCongressandtheirconstituenciesistherebyfraying.
Toseewhetherwecanhelpshoreupthislink,wearefundingsomeexperimentstohelp
nonprofitnewsoutletssubstantiallyimprovecoverageoftheircongressionaldelegationsaboutwhat
theyaredoingandwhyinwaysthatarerelevantforlocalaudiences.43Wearealsoexploringwaysof
encouragingandstimulatingsimilarcoveragefrommoremediaoutletsacrossthecountry.Anothergoal
wouldbetochangethetone,focusingmoreonexplanatoryandlesson“gotcha”stories,withamore
positivebalanceofsolutions-andproblem-orientedjournalism.Aninitialinquiryweconductedwitha
rangeofmediaoutletsandfunders,journalists,andcongressionalobserverssuggestedthattheseideas
holdsomepromise.
40
In1967,Congresspassedalawrequiringstatestousesingle-memberdistrictsforHouseseats.Thislawwouldneedtobe
repealedtoreturntotheuseofmulti-memberdistrictsandtheirpermutationsinHouseelections,butthebarrierisstatutory,
notconstitutional.GranteesinthisareaincludeFairVote,NewAmerica’sPoliticalReformProgram,andStanfordUniversity’s
CenterforAmericanPoliticsinComparativePerspective.
41
GranteesaddressingthisissueincludetheBipartisanPolicyCenterandBrookingsInstitution’sGovernanceStudiesProgram.
42
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/07/in-21-states-local-newspapers-lack-a-dedicated-reporter-keeping-tabson-congress/
43
GranteesincludetheTexasTribuneandNewYorkPublicRadio.
18
V)Vitalsignsformeasuringprogress
Wearepursuingaloftygoalthatinthebestcasewouldtakeadecadeormoretoachieve.This
raisesthequestion:howwouldweknowifweweremakingprogresstowardsit?Howwouldweknow
whenwerealizedit?Weneedindicatorsthatwillhelpusunderstandwhether,how,andtowhatextent
thepatternsofdeliberation,negotiation,andcompromiseinCongressthatweseektosupportare
materializing.Wehavebegunevaluatingclustersofgrantswearemakingindifferentareas,andthe
evaluationofthese“micro”effectswillinturninformtheevolutionofourgrantmakingandbroader
strategy.Yet,atthesametime,wealsoneedsome“macro”indicatorsthatcantellushowthebroader
systemofrepresentativedemocracywhosefunctioningweareseekingtoimproveisfaring,overand
abovetheevaluationofthespecificworkwearefunding.
Wearecallingthesemacroindicators“vitalsigns.”Theanaloguetothebasicinformation
gatheredaboutapatientattheoutsetofadoctor’sappointmentisapthere,e.g.,weight,blood
pressure,bodytemperature,pulse,reflexes,breathingpatterns,etc.Typicallynoneoftheseindicatorsis
byitselfdispositive,butcollectivelytheyprovideimportantinformationaboutthepatient’shealth,
especiallywhentheresultsofindividualindicatorsarejuxtaposedwithandrelatedtoothers,andwhen
theindicatorsarecomparedwithlongerruntrendsinthepatient’smedicalrecords.
Thelistbelowoutlinesaninitialsetofindicatorsthatcouldpotentiallyserveasvitalsignsforthe
MadisonInitiative.Whilenotanexactprogression,asweworkdownthelistwemoveinthetermsof
evaluationfrominputsatthetoptooutputsandintermediateoutcomesinthemiddletotheultimate
outcomeatthebottomofthelist,namely,publicsupportfortheinstitutionofCongress.
•
•
•
•
•
Ideologicalpolarization:ThestandardindicatorhereattheelitelevelisthedistributionofDW
NominatescoresasdevelopedbyKeithPooleandHowardRosenthalforindividualmembersofboth
housesofCongress.Forconstituents,thePewResearchCenter’spoliticaltypologysurveyhas
trackedasetofmeasuresofideologicalpolarizationandpartyaffiliationformorethantwodecades.
CongressionalWorkSchedule:Keyindicatorshere–HouseandSenateworkingdaysanddaysin
session–arenowbeingcapturedandreportedintheBipartisanPolicyCenter’sHealthyCongress
Indexonaquarterlybasisinaformatthatenablescomparisonwithrecentcongresses.(Subsequent
indicatorsthatarealsotrackedinBPC’sIndexaremarkedbelowwithanasterisk).
UseofCommitteeProcessandRegularOrder:Thereareseveralpotentialindicatorshere,including
billsorderedreportedbycommitteesintheHouseandSenate*;timelyagreementontheannual
concurrentbudgetresolutionandsubsequentpassageofindividualappropriationsbillsbyboth
houses;theproportionofcongressionalappropriationsthatareunauthorized;andtheappointment
ofconferencecommitteesandadoptionoftheirreportsbybothchambers.*
Opennessoffloordebate:IntheHouse,indicatorswouldbetheuseofopen,closed,andstructured
rulesforfloordebate;intheSenate,indicatorswouldbeuseofthefilibusterandthenumberof
amendmentsconsideredfromtheminorityparty.*
Bipartisanship:Onemacroindicatorherewouldbetheproportionandnumberofpartyunityvotes
inagivenCongressinwhichamajorityofDemocratsopposeamajorityofRepublicansineach
19
•
•
chamber.Anotherindicatorwouldbepatternsofbipartisanco-sponsorshipoflegislationfor
individualmembersandtheinstitutionasawhole,afocusoftheLugarCenter’sBipartisanIndex.44
Legislativeproductivity:Wewouldwanttoavoidthesimplisticstandardmeasureofthenumberof
billspassedinagivensession.Alternativescouldincludethenumberofbillspassedthataddressthe
mostsalientissuesfacingthenationastracked,forexample,bySarahBinder’smeasureof
legislativegridlock.45WearealsounderwritingaprojectledbyScottAdlerattheUniversityof
Coloradotosystematicallyidentifythenumberofexpiringlegislativeprovisionsinagivenperiod
andwhetherCongressisrevisitingtheminatimelyway,consistentwiththeplansithassetforitself
inearlierlegislation.Thatcouldalsoprovideausefulbenchmarkofproductivity.
PublicSupportofCongressasanInstitution:Indicatorshereincludepublicapprovalratesfor
Congressorthepublic’sconfidencelevelinCongressvis-à-visotherpublicinstitutions,bothof
whicharetrackedbyGalluponanongoingbasis.Thisisinmanyrespectstheindicatorthatbest
trackstheultimateoutcomeweseek,namely,citizensexpressingamodicumofapprovalofand
confidenceintheirnationalrepresentativeinstitutions,apartfromtheirsupportforanyparticular
policyorparty.Weknowthatthisisamessyindicatorandmanyfactorsfeedintoit,somerelevant,
somenot.WealsoknowthatpublicapprovalratesforCongressrarelyriseabove50%.Butwehave
alsoobservedthatinperiodswhenCongressisreachingworkablecompromises,e.g.,withSocial
Securityandtaxreforminthe1980s,welfareandbudgetreforminthe1990s,ortheresponseto
theFinancialCrisis,theseapprovalrateshavefluctuatedinthe30-45%range.46Thatmaybea
reasonablestandard.Itisalowbar,tobesure,buteventhatwouldbea3ximprovementover
wherethingsstandtoday.
Ofcourse,anyoneoftheseindicators,takenonitsown,canmisleadasmuchasitcanilluminate.47We
arethusseekingtoidentifyasetofindicatorsthat,whenconsideredcollectively,inrelationshiptoeach
other,canhelpusassesspatternsofdeliberation,negotiation,andcompromiseinCongress.
********
ThankyouforreviewingouremergingplansasweprepareforapotentialrenewaloftheMadison
Initiativelaterthisyear.Weappreciatethethoughtfulnessandcandorthatcolleagueshavebroughtto
conversationsaboutourworkthusfar,andwelookforwardtogettingyourquestionsandfeedback
aboutthisdocument.
44
http://www.thelugarcenter.org/ourwork-Bipartisan-Index.html
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/27-polarized-we-governbinder/brookingscepm_polarized_figreplacedtextrevtablerev.pdf
46
SeeJessicaGerrity,“UnderstandingCongressionalApproval:PublicOpinionfrom1974to2014,”inCongressionalResearch
Service,TheEvolvingCongress(Washington,DC:USGovernmentPrintingOffice,2014),pp.189-216.
47
ConsiderthewidespreadrelianceonDWNominatescoresasameasureofideologicalpolarizationinCongress.Nominate
scoresarebasedonaseriesofordinal(spatial)rankingsofrollcallvotesthatarethenconvertedtoonecardinalranking,which
cansuggestafalseprecisioninmeasuringtheideologyunderlyingthesevotes.Moreover,asFrancesLee,SeanTheriaultand
othershavepointedout,thereismorethanideologyreflectedinthescores.Forexampletheyalsocapturestrongnormsof
partydisciplineonproceduralvotesaswellaspartisanin-fightingdrivenbythecloselycontestedstruggleforcontrolof
Congress,whichleadstothestructuringofrollcallvotesmeanttohighlightdifferencesbetweentheparties.
45
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