Why do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers?: Lessons from the
African Experience
Author(s): Susan Aurelia Gitelson
Reviewed work(s):
Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1974), pp. 451-484
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association
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WhyDo Small States Break
DiplomaticRelations with
OutsidePowers?
Lessons from the African Experience
SUSANAURELIA GITELSON
Departmentof InternationalRelations
Hebrew University
of Jerusalem
Some states tryingto influencemajor, or even middle,
powers are inherentlyat a disadvantagebecause of theirmore
limitedcapabilities.Theirleadersare stilllikelyto searchfora
strategicbargainingposition to enhance whateverpotential
power they possess. They are shrewdestif theycan capitalize
upon any powerinstruments
at theirdisposalor upon theirvery
limitationsto bargainfromweaknessso as to maximizetheir
value positions(Schelling,1963; Suhrke,1973).
Some small states are able to make use of economic
capabilitiesor strategiclocations to influencemajor powers.
They have access to valuable natural resources,such as oil,
copper, or uranium,which enhancestheirpower position.An
outstandingexample has been the abilityof the oil-producing
countriesto group together,whetherfor economicreasonsin
the Organizationof PetroleumExportingCountries(OPEC) or
formore politicalgainsin the Organizationof Arab Petroletum
ExportingCountries(OAPEC), both to obtain a highprice for
theirbasic commodityand to altersome majorpowers'policies
toward Israel. Other small states have a strategiclocation on
major communicationslinks,stuchas the Indian Ocean or the
Red Sea, or at a centralplace, suchas Zairein the middleof the
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Research for this paper was conducted with the help of
grantsfromthe Leonard Davis Instituteof InternationalRelationisand the Faculty of
Social Sciences of the Hebrew Universityof Jerusalem.The author wishes to thank
Nehemia Levtzion and RaymoindTanter for theirinspiration,Janice Stein for her
comments,and Yitzhak Eldan anidMeirSteiglitzfortheirresearchassistance.
INTERNATIONAL
(C1974 I.S.A.
STUDIES
QUARTERLY,
Vol. 18 No. 4, December 1974
[4511
[4521 INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
Africancontinent.Possessingsuch attractionsgivesthemgreater
influencethantheymightotherwisehave.
In the generalabsence of significant
militaryand economic
power,' however,most otherstatesmustrelyto a greatextent
upon politicalinstruments,
especiallyon diplomacy.One of the
best strategiessmall statesmayuse to enhancetheirinfluenceis
to combinein variousgroupings,
whichmaybe institutionalized
at the regionalor global levels, such as the Organizationof
AfricanUnity(OAU) or the UnitedNations,or whichmay be
convenedon an ad hoc basis, such as the BandungConference
of Afro-Asianstatesin 1955 or the Algierssummitconference
of Arab leaders in 1973. No matterwhat device is chosen,its
successwill depend a greatdeal upon thequalityof leadership.
This has been particularlyevident among such leaders as
JawaharlalNehru of India, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, and
KwameNkrumahof Ghana.
Althoughmost of the noneconomicforeignpolicyactionsof
small states in the global internationalsystemare likelyto be
concentratedin diplomacy,this area has not yet been fully
exploredin theliterature.2Existingdiscussionsof diplomacyor
otherpoliticalinstruments
(Holsti, 1972; Lall, 1966; Nicolson,
1955; Ikle, 1964) usuallyanalyzecooperativemethodsand then
referto coercivemeasures.The analysesoftencoverprocedures
for establishingrelations,the functionsand qualitiesof diplomats,and negotiatingprocedures.Relativelylittleattentionis
given,however,to rupturing
diplomaticrelations.Nicolson,for
instance,in just two pages of his classic workindicates(1955:
191-192) that the main reasons for breaking diplomatic
of an envoy,the
relationsinclude the personalundesirability
end of a country'sexistence,as in the case of Austriain 1938,
1. The classic situationfor a small state with limited militaryand economic
resourceshavinga chance to succeed militarilyand politicallyin challenginga major
power is guerrillawarfare,as in Vietnam, where national cohesion, morale, and
dispersed settlements have proven formidable even against vast technological
superiority.
2. Recently there has been increasingconcern with bargainingpossibilitiesfor
small states-e.g., Curryand Rothchild(1974). Small-statestrategiesforsurvivalhave
also been exploredin Vital (1967 and 1971) and in Suhrke(1973).
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [453]
the declarationof war,or the need for "a meansof expressing
profoundmoralindignation."
Lerche and Said (1963: 74-75) give ratherunusual prominence to the negativeuses of diplomacy.They make coercion
the firstdiplomaticfunctionand indicatethat "the ruptureof
diplomatic relations has a coercive element, as does the
exclusion of a targetstate frominternationalconferencesor
organizations."Coercionmayalso be appliedin negotiationsby
ultimatum(Lauren, 1972), by establishmentof a rigidtime
or by registering
limit for the conclusionof an arrangement,
formalor informalprotestsor complaints.SubsequentlyLerche
and Said discuss three additional functionsof diplomacy:
persuasion,adjustment,and reachingagreement.
In view of the limitedtreatmentso farof theuse of coercive
especiallyas employedby smallstates,3
diplomaticinstruments,
it is importantto examine them more closely. Why in a
smallstatesdo only
situationwhichmay affectmanydifferent
some of thembreakdiplomaticrelations,whileothersdo not?
In makingsuch choices, which is more important:domestic
needs?Does thesize of
or foreign-policy
politicalconsiderations
an outsidecountryaffectitsprominenceas a target?
This study will analyze the major reasons for breaking
diplomatic relations and try to determinewhich factors,
whetherinternalor external,at thebilateral,regional,or global
levels,are the most important.It willalso examinewhetherthe
power position of the targetstate affectsthe likelihood of
breakingrelations.
Leadersof smallstatesmay take strongactionin responseto
A conventionalway
changeswithinthe domesticenvironment.
for governmentleaders to indicate shiftsin foreign-policy
orientations,to symbolizetheirascendancyoverotherleaders
or groups which are known to have strongsupport froma
aftera changein regime,
particularcountryor bloc, particularly
3. East (1973) also makes a useful distinction between small and large
developingstates.These categorieshave not been pursuedherebecause probablyonly
Nigeriawould be a trulysatisfactorycandidate for a large developingstate in Black
Africa.
[454] INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
or to divert attentionfrom internalproblems,is to expel
another country'srepresentative
or to break diplomaticties
with a countryknown to be a prime exponentof opposite
views,whetherradicalor moderate.For instance,if theleaders
wish to show that they are radical in order to satisfycritical
domestic groups, usually students,intellectuals,and trade
unionists,they can make speeches denouncinga moderate
Westernpower and even break relationswitha bloc leaderor
with a smallermemberof the group. The newlyindependent
states are unlikelyto have the fullydeveloped bureaucracies
which lend themselvesto the domestic infightingthat can
determinepolicy (compare Allison, 1971), but they do have
sufficientpersonal,ethnic,and regionalrivalriesfor domestic
considerations
to affectdecision-making.
Bilateral foreign-policyconcerns may also dominate the
choice of whetheror not to breakrelations.Leadersmaysever
ties with a state which threatenstheir possibilitiesfor independence or development,or both. They may object strenuously if outsidepowers,evenimportantpatrons,tryto interfere
with theirdomesticaffairs,particularly
throughreal or alleged
subversiveactivities.Moreover,since the leaders are searching
forgenerousand dependablesourcesof aid, attractivemarkets,
and political and militarysupportin timesof crisis,theymay
break relationswiththose statestheybelieveare not livingup
to expectations, especially if rival sources of support are
available.
The major impetus for breakingdiplomaticrelationsmay
come at the regionallevelfroma collectivedesireto further
the
security,prestige,and developmentof the area as a whole,and
to enhance the group's diplomatic, ideological, racial, or
cultural identity.Taking such coercive action may also be
considered an important expression of regional solidarity
against a perceived externalthreat.It is likely that once a
majorityof stateshas brokenrelationswithan outside power,
the rest will followthrough,even if thisdoes not accord with
theirown predilections
at thebilaterallevel.
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [455]
Leaders of small statesmay also threatento breakrelations
or actually do so in response to conditions in the global
internationalenvironment.In a tightbipolar world, for instance,they may feel constrainedto dependenceupon one of
the bloc leaders.In a loose bipolaror a multipolarsystem,they
may have morealternatives
availableto themand therefore
may
be more likelyto breakrelationswithvariousoutside powers.
The changingpower arrangements
in variousissue-areas,whether political,strategic,economic,or ideological,may influence
choices among contendingstates from other international
subsystems.Relationsmay also be affectedby an intervening
variable, such as a global war or a conflict in another
subordinatestatesystem.The effectmaybe to forcetheleaders
of thesmallstateto choose betweentwo rivalcountriesor blocs
withwhomit has establishedrelations.
The importanceof the targetcountrymay also affectthe
decision about breakingrelations.Small states may be more
likely to take strongactions against other small states than
againstmajor powers. If the leaders have looked to a smaller
countryforsupportand it has failedto supplyit as expected,it
may be much easier to threatento break relationswith that
country,or even to actually do so, than it would be with a
major power. On the otherhand, it may be unwiseto create
problemswitha dominantsupplierof economicor militaryaid
or of international
politicalsupport.In such a case, theleaders
may consider the provocationreally serious, or they may
believethatan alternative
sourceof aid is readilyavailable.
METHODOLOGY
This study will try to determine,throughanalyzingprominent cases, the main reasonsleadingthe governments
of small
states to break diplomaticrelationswith outside powers,and
the countrieswhichhave been the mostfrequenttargets.All of
the cases are derivedfromthe Black Africanexperiencesince
Ghana in 1957 became the firstBlack Africanstate to gain its
independencein the twentiethcentury.They includeconflicts
[456] INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
withthe main colonial powers: France,GreatBritain,Belgium,
and Portugal;the major powerswithglobal politicalinterests:
the United States,the SovietUnion,and CommunistChina;the
white-minority
regimeson the Africancontinentwhichare not
membersof the regionalinternationalorganization,especially
South Africa;and Israel,the declaredenemyof theOAU's Arab
members.
On the basis of an analysis of documents,newspapers,
compendiaof newsevents,interviews
withpoliticalleaders,and
the extensive secondary literature,it has been possible to
discernthe major causes in a numberof cases whereleaders
threatenedcoercive action or actuallybroke diplomaticrelations.The cases are summarizedin Table 1.
The Domestic Factor
Leaders facing strong criticismor opposition from rival
individualsor groupsmay tryto detractattentionby breaking
diplomaticrelationswithothercountries.Thosejust comingto
powermay wishto emphasizethe changesin regimesby acting
againstthe countrieswhich supportedtheirpredecessors.The
targetswill usually be those states which are visible to both
internaland externalaudiences, but which are not the most
importantsourcesof economic,political,or militarysupport.
COMMUNIST CHINA
CommunistChina offersan excellentexampleof the possibilities for breaking relations with an outside power for
domesticreasons. AlthoughPremierChou En-lai'sassertionin
1963, while in Somalia, that "an excellent revolutionary
situationexists in Africa"(Larkin, 1971a: 70) offendedmany
leaders who were concernedabout domesticstability(McKay,
1966: 14), none went so far as to break relationsfor this
reason.In factonlyfourBlack Africanstatesdid severrelations,
and in each case the leaders were motivatedby domestic
TABLE 1
MAJORCASES OF BLACK AFRICAN STATES BREAKING RELATIONS
WITH OUTSIDE POWERS, 1958-1973
OutsidePower
Superpowers
United States
Soviet Union
FormerColonial Powers
France
Great Britain
Belgium
Colonial Countries
South Africa
Portugal
OtherEuropean Countries
WestGermany
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
CompetingAsian Powers
CommunistChina
African
State
Year
Zanzibar
Congo (L)
IvoryCoast
1960
1960
1969
Nigeria
Guinea
Somalia
Congo (B)
Ghana
Guinea
Mali
Mauritania
Tanzania
Congo (L)
Ghana
1960
1965
1963
1965
1965
1965
1965
1965
1965
1960
1960
Congo (L)
Senegal
Mali
Ethiopia
Guinea
Kenya
MalagasyRepublic
Congo (B)
Congo (L)
1960
1961
1962
1963
1963
1963
1963
1965
1966
Guinea
Congo (L)
Ghana
Congo (L)
Congo (L)
1971
1961
1966
1960
1969
Burundi
CentralAfricanRep.
Dahomey
Ghana
1965
1966
1966
1966
1457]
TABLE 1 (Cont.)
OutsidePower
NationalistChina
CompetingMiddle East Countries
Egypt
Israel
African
State
Senegal
Cameroon
SierraLeone
Togo
MalagasyRepublic
Senegal
Zaire
Dahomey
1964
1971
1971
1971
1972
1972
1972
1973
Congo (L)
Guinea
Uganda
Chad
Congo (B)
Niger
Mali
1960
1967
1972
1972
1972
1973
1973
Togo
Zaire
Rwanda
Dahomey
UpperVolta
Cameroon
Equatorial Guinea
Tanzania
MalagasyRepublic
CentralAfricanRep.
Ethiopia
Nigeria
Zambia
Gambia
SierraLeone
1973
1973
War
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
Senegal
Gabon
Kenya
Liberia
IvoryCoast
Botswana
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
Burundi
Ghana
[458]
Year
1973
1973
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [4591
political considerations(Larkin, 1971a). They took thisaction
during1965-1966, afterthe mainChinesediplomaticoffensive,
when it was already apparent that China was not makinga
majorimpactin termsof the aid or the politicaland ideological
leadershipit could offer.
The most frequentoccasion forseveringrelationswithChina
was the change in regimeand the desire to disavow,at least
symbolically,the policies at the previousruler.This could not
be done by causing substantialcomplicationswith a major
source of aid or trade. Since, however,China's programswere
relativelysmall, while its rhetoricwas ratherstrong,it made a
good target.Thus, forexample,MwamiMwambutsaof Burundi
suspendeddiplomaticrelationson January29, 1965, without
specific charges.In the complicatedfactionalpolitics of the
state,however,the Chinesewere consideredto be too close to
the rivalTutsi group.A few monthslaterthe Mwamistrengthened relationswith Taiwan. In the CentralAfricanRepublic,
Colonel JeanBokassa broke relationson January5, 1966, five
days afterhe had overthrownDavid Dacko, on the basis of
opposition to a plot allegedly sponsored by the Chinese
Communists.The main reason for opposition,however,was a
rivalradicalgroupratherthanthe Chinesethemselves.
in
Ghana cut relationswithChinaafterNkrumah'soverthrow
February1966 because of the oppositionof the new regime,
the National Liberation Council (NLC), to all Eastern bloc
efforts.It was undoubtedlydue to China's fairlymoderate
presencein Ghana that the break did not come until eight
monthslater.On the otherhand,it would appearthattheNLC
consideredChinaless importantthanRussia,sincetheyactually
broke relations with the formerwhile they only expelled
nationals of the latter.Yet thereis also evidencethat China
wished to provoke its own dismissal because of its close
remainingties with Nkrumah and the other more radical
leaders.
Kenya expelled the Chinesecharged'affairesin June1967 to
indicatedisapprovalto internaland externalaudiences,but did
not go so far as breakingrelations.The main occasion for
[4601 INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
officialsanctionsagain was domesticand reflectedthe fallfrom
power of Oginga Odinga, the formervice-president,
who had
been supportedby China and Russia in his strugglefor power
with Tom Mboya, the Westernfavorite.As a result of the
showdownbetweenthe two mainrivalswithinthemajorparty,
the Kenyan African National Union, Odinga formed the
opposition Kenya People's Union in 1966. PresidentJomo
Kenyatta then indicated his displeasurewith this action by
curtailingthe activitiesof the outsidepowerssupporting
Odinga
(Larkin,1971a: 127-139; Attwood,1967).
Senegal,on the otherhand,severeddiplomaticrelationswith
Taiwan in September 1964, probably because of domestic
pressuresfrom leftistgroups; but later it resumedrelations
(Larkin,1971a: 178).
ISRAEL
A numberof Africanleaders broke relationswith Israel in
1972-1973 because, in part, they were searchingfora way to
appease young,radical criticsat home, who wereupset about
theircountries'dependenceupon the West.This was true,for
instance,in Niger,Mali, and Congo (Brazzaville),whoseleaders
apparentlyfound it easierto severties withIsrael,a relatively
minorsource of assistance,than with their countries'major
patron, France. Similar considerationsundoubtedlyhad an
effectin Ethiopia,whereradicalgroupshave been denouncing
both Americanand Israeli imperialism.The costs for taking
action against Israel were apparentlyperceivedas lower than
thoseforseveringtieswiththe UnitedStates.Bilateral,regional,
and global factorsalso affectedthese choices, as will become
apparentbelow.
The Bilateral Factor
Leaders of smallstatesmay take offenseif theirpossibilities
forindependenceor developmentare threatened.They maybe
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [461]
sensitiveto outside interferencein their countries'internal
affairs,especiallywhentheybelievethat otherstatesare trying
to subverttheir regimes.They may also indicate displeasure
towarda state or othermembersof its perceivedgroupingif a
patronhas lowered the formerlevel of its economic,political,
or militarysupport, especially if an alternativesource is
available.They are morelikely,however,to choose as a targeta
relatively
insignificant
countryratherthana majorone.
FRANCE
The range and depth of France's political, military,economic, and culturalties, both formaland informal,with its
formerdependencieshave been greaterthan thoseof any other
majorpower. Since the benefitsit has offeredhave appearedso
attractive,most "francophone"stateshavenot wishedto break
diplomaticrelationswiththeirformermetropole(Hayter,1965;
Morgenthau,1971; Nielsen,1969).
The most notable exception occurredwhen Ahmed Sekou
Toure, the Guineanleader,urgedhis people to vote no on the
1958 referendumconducted by General Charlesde Gaulle to
obtain approval for a French Community(Tandon, 1972:
226-230). The effectof this independentposition was even
greaterthan a formalbreakin diplomaticrelations(which was
legallyimpossiblefora colony) mighthavebeen. On one hand,
this action signaled the end of the Communityand the
beginningof the decolonizationprocess for the francophone
colonies. On the other,it broughtfar-reaching
consequencesto
Guinea as France harshlywithdrewall its aid. Toure tried
franticallyto secure alternativesources of supportfromboth
theglobalinternational
system,especiallythe SovietUnion,and
the regionalsystem,particularlyGhana. He did not actually
breakdiplomaticrelationswiththe formermetropole,however,
untilNovember1965, whenhe accused Franceof assistingin an
alleged plot against him. Guinea then closed its embassy in
[462] INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
Paris,and France shutits missionin Conakry(thisinformation
was drawn fromn
the 1965-1966 edition of Keesing'sContemporaryArchives,p. 21260, and fromthe 1965 editionof the
AfricaResearchBulletin[ARB], pp. 401, 414, and 434).
Modibo Keita of Mali also tried to demonstratehis independence fromFrance at the bilaterallevel by abrogatingall
treatiesand agreementswithFrance in September1960 and by
securingthe evacuationof FrenchforcesfromMalian territory
in March 1961.4 No other francophoneleader, however,has
risked the possible consequences of losing economic, diplomatic,and militarysupportbecause of open defiance.
OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Sekou Toure of Guinea also turnedagainstotherEuropean
countries in his fear of subversion.He charged that the
Portuguesehad led an attemptedinvasionby Guineanexilesin
November1970. Subsequentlyhe maintainedthatotherattacks
were being planned in neighboringterritories.
At the end of
December he expelled a numberof specialistswho had been
suppliedby WestGermany.AlthoughtheWestGermangovernment continued to deny its complicity,Guinea broke diplomaticties withit in January1971 (accordingto the 1971-1972
editionof Keesing's,p. 24525).
Congo (Leopoldville) broke diplomaticrelationswith Belgiumon July14, 1960, chargingthatBelgiumhad abrogatedits
friendshiptreaty,especiallythe section againstmilitaryintervention, and had interferedwith Congolese sovereigntyby
supportingthe Katangan secession (Hoskyns, 1965; Lefever,
1967; Mohan. 1969). Nonetheless.theCongo renewedrelations
4. The Sudanese Assemblyon September 20, 1960, proclaimedthe country's
independenceunder the name of the Republic of Mali. Concurrentlyit declaredthat
the Federation of Mali no longer existed and that the new republic was freeof all
agreementsand political links with France. In its resolutions,the assemblyindicated
its wrath with France for having recognized Senegal as an independent state.
Nonetheless, at this time it rejected resolutions calling for the breaking off of
diplomaticrelationswith France and the evacuationof Frenchmilitaryand air bases
in Malian territory.(This informationwas drawn fromKeesing's, 1959-1960, pp.
17687-17688.)
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [463]
with its formermetropolein December 1961. It also broke
relationswiththe Soviet Unionand Czechoslovakiaon September 14, 1960, and expelledthe East Germancharged'affaireson
September 29, 1961, for interveningin Congolese domestic
affairs.AfterMobutu Sese Seko had taken powerand renamed
the countryZaire, he broke relationswith Bulgariain 1969
because of itsallegedinvolvement
in studentprotests.
Somalia broke relationswith Great Britainin March 1963
over its irridentist
claims to the NorthernFrontierDistrictof
Kenya, whichthe Britishhad made into a separateprovinceof
that country, despite its predominantlySomali population
(accordingto the 1963-1964 editionof Keesing's,p. 19432).
SUPERPO WERS
The Africanstateshave been carefulabout jeopardizingtheir
relations with the superpowers.No state has ever broken
relationswith the United States, except Zanzibar on January
13, 1964, afterits revolution.The MalagasyRepublicalso went
so far as expellingthe Americanambassador and five other
in
diplomats in June 1971 after allegations of interfering
Malagasy internal affairs,but PresidentPhilibertTsiranana
withdrewhis accusations in May 1972 (according to the
1971-1972editionof Keesing's,pp. 24712 and 25285).5
The Africanshave also been waryabout breakingdiplomatic
relationswiththe Soviet Union. Only Congo (L) and the Ivory
Coast have actually done so. Nonetheless,both radical and
moderatestateshave quarreledwiththe SovietUnion,particuwiththeirdomesticaffairs.
larlyin relationto interference
Leaders of avowedlyradicalregimes,such as Sekou Toure in
Guinea, and Modibo Keita in Mali. who had turned to the
5. Algeria,Mauritania,the Sudan, and the UAR broke relationswiththe United
States afterthe Six Day Warof 1967 because of its alleged air supportforIsrael. This
was one of the few cases of strongaction againsta superpower,but it is outside the
purviewof this paper. Such a rupturewas feasiblebecause the Arabs could count on
substantialmaterialand political supportfromthe Soviet Union. Mauritaniawas the
first state to renew relations in 1969. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the
subsequentAmericannegotiationeffortshave servedas the occasion forthe renewal
of relationsby Egyptand otherArab countrieswiththe UnitedStates.
[464] INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
Russians throughthe desire to be nonalignedand to benefit
from alternativesources of aid, sometimes became disenchanted. The same Sekou Toure who had approached the
Russiansso eagerlyfor assistanceexpelled the Russianambassador, Daniel Solod, in December 1961 for "not takingthe
Guineans seriously."The ambassadorhad angered Toure by
meddlingin a studentdemonstration.The Guineans,in addition, were distressedby Communistdelays in implementing
theiraid programsand deliveringpromisedtradegoods. On the
other hand, the Russians complained about the Guineans'
inefficientplanning and their lack of gratitude.Basically,
however, Toure was concerned lest the Russians try to
overextendtheirinfluencein his country.Since he wishedto
have more balanced internationalcontacts,he turnedagain to
the Westwhen JohnKennedybecame the Americanpresident,
buthe also did not completelybreaktieswiththe SovietUnion.
Modibo Keita also became disillusionedabout Soviet aid
policies, particularlythe growingdebts. In 1965 he followed
Toure to Moscow fora personalplea to the Soviet leadersfor
greaterconsideration.When this was not forthcoming,
Keita
asked for the Soviet ambassador,I. A. Melnik,to be recalled
fromBamako(Legvold, 1970; Duncan, 1970).
Ghana,especiallyunderNkrumah,also had activelinkswith
the Russiansin theattemptto diversify
the sourcesof assistance
and to follow a nonalignedpolicy (Thompson, 1969). Nkrumah's pro-Communist
orientationcaused a sharpreactionafter
his overthrowin February1966, when the NLC government
endeavoredto curtailties with the East and to strengthen
its
ties withthe West.Althoughthe NLC expelled more than 500
Soviettechniciansand closed down Sovietsponsoredprojects,it
never actually broke diplomatic relations. It did sever ties,
however,withEast Germany.
Othermoderateregimeshavealso takenissue withthe Soviet
Union. Kenya, for instance,reduced the amount of technical
and financialassistanceit would accept fromthe Soviet Union
and closed the LumumbaIdeological Instituteit had sponsored
in 1965 after the Kenyan leader supportedby the Russians,
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [465]
Oginga Odinga, had lost power (Legvold, 1970). Of course,
Kenya could look to Great Britain,the United States, the
United Nations,and other donors forcontinuedassistance,so
thismovedid not representa majorloss.
The IvoryCoast, whichin any case has verystrongtieswith
France,was the only countrybesidesCongo (L) whichactually
broke diplomaticrelationswiththe SovietUnion.Accordingto
the 1969 editionof Keesing's,p. 23532, and the 1969 edition
of ARB, p. 1422, the declared reason was the charge of
of Abidjanin May
in studentriotsat the University
interfering
1961. On the other hand, the chairmanof the Novosti news
agency stated in Moscow that the rupturemighthave been
caused by the "false report" distributedin Abidjan by its
correspondent,which accused the Ivory Coast of having
remaineda colonial country,"sold body and soul to imperialfor
ism," as well as of havingtrainedSouthAfricanmercenaries
servicein Biafra(fromthe 1969 editionof Keesing's,p. 23532).
TAIWAN
The outside countrywhichhas taken the strongeststandat
the bilaterallevel has probablybeen Taiwan, especiallyafterit
lost its place at the United Nations in 1971. Consequently
Communist China has had greaterinternationallegitimacy,
whileTaiwanhas been in a defensiveposition.
The eighteencountrieswith which Taiwan had relationsin
February1972 includedfivewhichhad votedfavorablyforthe
admission of the People's Republic of China to the United
Nations. Accordingto the 1971-1972 edition of Keesing's,p.
25282, they were Botswana, Libya, Rwanda, Senegal, and
Togo. This indicates that the Africanswere quite willingto
maintainrelationswithboth Chinas.Taiwan,however,rejected
since it maintaineda "one China" policy. It
this arrangement,
thereforebroke diplomaticrelationswiththe Africancountries
that had established ties with Peking, such as Cameroon,
[466] INTERNATIONAL STUD IES QUARTERLY
Dahomey,the MalagasyRepublic,Senegal,SierraLeone, Togo,
and Zaire in 1971-1973.6
compromisein Senegal: it
Taiwan made its most interesting
recalledits ambassadorbut maintainedconsularrepresentation
and allowed a technical-assistancemission of about fifty
to remain.This
and market-gardening
specialistsin rice-growing
apparentlywas the firsttimethat the "two Chinas"had agreed
to the coexistenceof theirmissionsin othercountries(fromthe
1971-1972editionof Keesing's,p. 25464).
Mobutu of Zaire, however,was less successfulthan Leopold
Senghorhad been in the attemptto play both sides.At firsthe
triedto strengthen
his linkswithTaiwan duringa visitin April
1971. He even went so far as to say that Zaire would "never
turnitsback on its commitments
to Taipeh." Nonetheless,after
Pekinggained representationin the United Nations,Mobutu
began to follow a more nonaligned policy by officially
recognizingthe People's Republic of China on November26,
1972, and by visitingPekingin January1973. The 1973 edition
of Keesing's,p. 25751, statesthatTaiwan reactedby recalling
its74 agricultural
experts.
NIGERIA-BIAFRA
Nigeria consideredseveringdiplomaticrelationswith Israel
and France because of theirallegedsupportforBiafra.7Despite
heated feelings on the subject, the Nigerian government
extended to Israel and France its generalpolicy of reconciliation and neveractuallyrupturedrelations.It indicatedthereby
its pragmatic policy of having diplomatic ties, as well as
widespreadtrade and aid links, with as many countriesas
possible.
6. No one source gives complete information.This listingis a combinationof
Keesing's ContemporaryArchives,Africa Research Bulletin,Facts on File, and the
Statesman's Yearbook (all 1971-1973). Facts on File in thiscase is the most meager
source, since it refersonly to Sierra Leone, in 1971 on p. 684. On the otherhand,
Keesing's and the ARB do not mentionSierraLeone at all.
7. One of the major Nigerian newspapers,the Daily Timnes,called for the
severanceof diplomatic relations with Israel and France for their"active financial,
moral and other forms of support for the Nigerianinsurgents."Reported in the
JerusalemPost, January21, 1970.
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [467]
ISRAEL
Several African leaders broke with Israel in 1972-1973
mainlyforbilateralreasons.PresidentIdi Aminof Uganda,for
instance,accused both Great Britainand Israel of interfering
with his policies,but broke relationsonly withthe latter.8He
expelled the Israelis in 1972 even though his predecessor,
Milton Obote, had chargedIsrael withhavinghelped Aminget
into power in the 1971 coup d'etat. He was offendedbecause
militaryequipment
the Israeliswould not offerhim sufficient
and would not help him to mountan armedexpeditionagainst
Tanzania in orderto gain the port of Tanga as an outletto the
sea (Legum, 1973; Gitelson, 1973). Both were exaggerated
requests and beyond Israel's will or capabilities. He also
complainedabout his debts to the Israelisand theiroverextendedpresence.Moreover,Aminapparentlywishedto indicate
a moreradicalpostureto obtain Arabfundsand to drawcloser
to Arableadersin the Sudan, Libya,and elsewhere.
PresidentFrancois Tombalbaye of Chad urgentlyneeded
additionalfinancialand militaryresourcesin orderto maintain
his countryduringa severedroughtand to continuethe struggle
againstthe rebel Moslem National LiberationFront(Frolinat)
on the borderwithLibya. WhenFranceindicatedthatit would
not continueits economicand militaryassistanceas in the past,
withColoniel MuammarQadTombalbaye made arrangements
dafi to lessen Libyan supportforthe rebelsand to assistChad
The pricewas severingrelationswithIsrael.9
financially.
PresidentHamani Diori in neighboringNiger,which has a
majorityMoslempopulation,but whichhad alwaysmaintained
8. Idi Amindeveloped bad relationswithGreatBritainand Israel,both of which
had been his major external supportersafter the 1971 coup d'etat. See section on
Uganda in the Africa ContemporaryRecord ((ACR), 1972-1973, 1973, pp.
B269-B297. On deteriorationof relations with Great Britain, see especially pp.
B286-B287. For the turnof eventswithIsrael,see Legum, 1973.
9. On Chad's dramatic restoration of relations with Libya and consequent
breach with Israel afterthe overt withdrawalof France's forcesin September1972,
and on Chad's economic difficulties,see article on Chad in ACR, 1973, pp.
B519-B531, especially pp. B519 and B526-B527. Libya actually offeredChad $92
million,whichwas twice the latter'sannual budget(fromACR, 1973, p. A70).
[468] INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
relationswithIsrael,also came underincreasing
pressureto find
alternativesources of revenue to the French during the
devastatingdroughtperiod."0 Mali and Congo (B) also wanted
to show greaterindependencefromthe Westerncountriesand
to findnew sourcesof financialassistance.'1
Ethiopia, which broke relationsat the end of 1973 mainly
forregionalreasons,also had importantbilateralconsiderations.
EmperorHaile Selassie I had been extremelyconcernedabout
Arab support for the secessionistEritreanLiberationFront
(ELF) and the irridentist
Somalis who wish to join a Greater
Somalia (Clapham, 1972). He hoped thisaid would diminishif
he cut ties withtherivalof theArab states.
The Regional Factor
The purposesoutlinedin the OAU Charterincludepromoting
"the unityand solidarityof theAfricanStates"; defendingtheir
sovereignty,
territorial
and independence:and eradiintegrity,
cating "all formsof colonialismfrom Africa." The need to
preventforeignintervention
in Africanaffairsand to unitein
the anti-colonialstrugglewas reaffirmed
by manyleadersboth
beforeand afterthe OAU was formedin 1963. Yet evenduring
the gravestAfricancrises,the Africanstatesgenerallyproved
10. On France's shiftingrelations in Africa, see ACR, 1973, pp. A65-A71,
especiallyp. A70. The articleon Nigerin ACR, 1973, pp. B652-B685, especiallypp.
B679-B681, emphasizes PresidentDiori's ambivalentrelationshipwith France. He
could not afford to cut relations with the formermetropole because Niger's
economic and commercialties were mostly with France. The break with Israel in
January 1973 was the "result of Niger's wish for better relations with the Arab
world,but particularlywith Libya whichhas shown its readinessto rewardIsrael's
enemies." Niger's main tradingpartnerswere France, West Germany,the Netherlands,and GreatBritain.
11. On Mali, see ACR, 1973, pp. B652-B662. Mali has been sufferingfrom
economic problems which have led it to attempt to returnto the franczone. The
leadershave been attemptingto demonstrateMali's independencewhiletryingnot to
alienate prospectiveFrench investors,according to p. B652 of the 1973 ACR. In
foreignpolicy they have been maintaininga delicate balance between the wish to
retainthe country'simage as a progressivestateand a cautiousdrifttowardthe West
(fromp. B656 of the 1973 ACR). Mali's main tradingpartnerswere France, Japan,
West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. For Congo (B), see ACR, 1973:
B533-B544. The Congo's main tradingpartnerswere see France, West Germany,
Italy,GreatBritain,Japan,and Israel.
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [4691
unwillingto join in major coercive action against perceived
opponents. Their regional solidaritywas tested severelyin
regard to the French nuclear tests in the Sahara and the
Algerian war, during the Congo crises, in the strugglewith
Portugal,South Africa,and Rhodesia, and in the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTS IN
THE SAHARA AND ALGERIA
Most of the francophoneAfrican leaders, besides Sekou
Toure and Modibo Keita, proved reluctantto criticizeFrance
openly,even on questionsof major concernto the region,lest
they jeopardize their bilaterialrelationswith the metropole.
Strikingevidence of thissituationappearedin the early 1960s
in regardto the protestsagainst French atomic tests in the
Saharaand the Frenchattemptto hold on to Algeria.
When France became the fourthworld nuclear power on
February13, 1960, throughits Saharantests,manyAfro-Asian
countries criticized it soundly for advancing itself at the
expense of the developingcountries.Ghana took the most
directaction of all the Africanstatesby freezingFrenchassets
in the country.Afterthe secondtestin April,Ghanarecalledits
ambassadorfrom Paris and formallyprotestedto the French
government.
The thirdtestin Decemberbroughtstrongprotests
again from Ghana and the Sudan. The Nigeriangovernment
expelled the Frenchambassador.It also bannedall Frenchships
and aircraftfromNigerianportsand airfields(accordingto the
1959-1960 editionof Keesing's,pp. 17280 and 17349, and the
1961-1962edition,p. 17844).
Whenradical states,includingGhana, Guinea,and Mali (but
not Nigeria), gatheredin Casablanca in January1961, they
condemned France outright (Legum, 1965: 208-209). In
evident contrast,the moderatefrancophonestates which had
met in Brazzavillea week earliertook a much more cautious
positionon Algeria.They did not evenmentionthe Saharatests
therefore
thatthey
(Legum, 1965: 194-200). It is not surprising
also did not threatento breakdiplomaticrelations.
[470] INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
THE CONGO CRISES
AfricanrelationswiththeWestwereagaintestedsignificantly
in connectionwith the Congo crisesof 1960 and 1964. The
decolonizationof the Congo fromBelgianruleand theguarding
of "Africaforthe Africans"againstforeignintervention
wereat
issue. At the diplomaticlevel, only the most activistradical
state,Ghana,joined the Congo in breakingdiplomaticrelations
with Belgium in 1960. It renewedthem,however,in August
1963.
The real test of whetherthe Congo and other countries
would endangertheir vital ties with the West came with the
parachutedrop of Belgian paratroopersfromAmericanplanes
into Stanleyvilleon November24, 1964. To the Americansand
the Belgiansthis was a humanitarian
missionto save the livesof
theircountrymen.To the Africans,however,it was seen as an
infringement
of theirsovereignty
at the verytimethatan OAU
committee,headed by PresidentJomoKenyattaof Kenya,was
tryingto settle the relationsbetween the centralgovernment
and the rebels. Their statementsat the time indicatedtheir
anti-Westernfeelings (see the 1964 edition of ARB, pp.
183-184;also Emerson,1967; 1-3; Shepherd,1970: 44-49).
Despite all the speeches and articles,however,none of the
Africanstates broke relationswith the United States or even
with Belgium.They proclaimedtheirdismayat the perceived
racialismand neocolonialismwhich threatenedall of them at
the regionallevel, but they did not endangertheir national
interests,whichdependedon existingties foraid and trade,by
goingso faras to breakdiplomaticrelations.
PORTUGAL-SOUTH AFRICA
rule in southernAfrica,espeOppositionto white-minority
ciallyin South Africa,Rhodesia,and thePorttuguese
Territories
of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau,has been one of
OAU's cardinal principles.All leaders of the Black African
statesobject to the whiteracistregimes,but theydifferat times
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [471]
in the instruments
they are willingto employto bringabout a
changein the situation.
The centralityof the issue was evident at the founding
meetingof the OAU in May 1963 in Addis Ababa, when the
memberstatesresolvedto break all diplomatic,consular,and
culturalrelationswithPortugaland South Africa.The issuehad
ideologicalmeaningforall, but practicalsignificance
mainlyfor
the statesborderingthe white-minority
regimes.
Portugalhad embassiesin 1962 in the Congo (L), Ethiopia,
Madagascar,Mali, Morocco, and the UAR, and a legationin
Tunisia,accordingto the 1962 Statesman's Yearbook (SYB, p.
1336). All of themcontinuedin 1963 except Mali (1963 SYB,
p. 1366). By 1964, only the Congo stillhad an embassy(1964
SYB, p. 1349). The formalsituationwith South Africawas
much simpler.Accordingto the 1962 SYB, p. 1377, in 1961
South Africa had a High Commissionin the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which changed to a diplomatic
missionafterSouth Africaleftthe Commonwealth(1963 SYB,
p. 1409). In 1964, South Africahad no diplomaticrepresentation in the Black Africancountries,accordingto the 1964
SYB, p. 1392.
A majorityof the Black Africanstates took some overt
action to breakties,dependingof courseon whatlinksalready
existed. Cameroon,Chad, Ivory Coast, Mauritania,and Sudan
banned air and sea ports to Portugueseand South African
aircraftand shipping.Congo (L) severeddiplomaticties with
South Africa,while the MalagasyRepublic broke diplomatic
relationswith Portugal.Guinea brokediplomatic,commercial,
and cultural relations with Portugal and banned entry of
Portuguesenationalsinto Guinea (thiswas especiallyimportant
for PortugueseGuinea in WestAfrica).Liberiaimpoundedthe
passportsof Portuguesenationalsin the countrybeforedeciding
whetherto expel them. Senegal, which had brokenrelations
with Portugalin July 1961, also severedconsularties. Tanganyikaformallyended all importsand exports,director indirect,
to South Africa,while Uganda proclaimeda boycott of all
South Africanimports,and denied exports to that country.
[472] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the UAR also took
nonviolentaction, accordingto the 1963 Keesing's,p. 19699.
Almost total unanimitywas secured in support of the
resolution.OnlyCongo (L) maintainedtieswithPortugalduring
the firstyearsof the OAU. The Africanstatesmeanwhilewent
on to condemnPortugaland South Africawithinthe OAU and
in global internationalorganizations,such as the United
Nations.They also demandedcoerciveactionon the partof the
othermembersof the global international
system,particularly
the United States and Great Britain,which was not readily
forthcoming.
As a result,some countries,such as Malawi and
the Ivory Coast, have advocated "dialogue," especially with
South Africa(Cervenka,1973; Legum, 1972). By 1970 Malawi
had establishedrelationswithPortugaland in 1971, withSouth
Africa(fromthe SYB, 1970, p. 1256, and 197 1, p. 1305).
GREA T BRITAIN-RHODESIA
One of the other main test cases of Africanoppositionto
rule arose as a reactionto Ian Smith'sUnilateral
white-minority
Declarationof Independence(UDI) for Rhodesiaon November
11, 1965. Most of the Africanswereincensedat thisact, but
had difficulties
in agreeingupon a response.Whenthe Council
of ForeignMinistersmet in Addis Ababa on December3-5,the
radical states urged the immediateuse of armed forcesunder
OAU auspices. The moderates,on the otherhand, would have
a plannedcampaignor the use of sanctionscombined
preferred
withsupportforthe liberationmovements.
Directmilitaryaction,however,was not reallyfeasible.Since
the Africansthemselveslacked the coerciveinstruments
to stop
Smith,they demandedthat the formercolonial power,Great
Britain,halt UDI, or they would sever diplomaticrelations.
Whenthe Britishdid not take action,however,onlynineout of
35 OAU membersactuallybrokerelations:Algeria,Congo (B),
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania,Sudan, Tanzania, and the
UAR. Apparentlythe heads of state were not as preparedfor
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [473]
such a strongmeasureas theirmore activistforeignministers
had been (Woronoff, 1970: 240-245; Shepherd, 1970:
58-60).1 2
The stateswhichdid breakrelationsweregenerallythe more
radical ones. All of themat that time had diplomaticrelations
withCommunistChina,althoughnot all stateshavingsuchties
broke relations.This is undoubtedlybecause in countriessuch
as Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria,Uganda, and Zambia, wherethe
Easternbloc countrieswere well represented(Morrisonet al.,
1972: 156), ties with the West were more importantfor
political,diplomatic,military,economic,and culturalreasons,
despite declared nonalignedpolicies. It was especiallydifficult
for "anglophone" countries to break ties with the former
metropole,since they were still closely linked throughtrade
preferences,financialand technical assistance,and in some
cases, such as Kenya and Nigeria,militaryaid as well. Only
Ghana and Tanzania of the Commonwealthcountriesactually
broke relations,and Ghana restoredthem two monthslater.
The reason for this reversalwas mainlythe change of regime
afterNkrumah'sfallin February1966.
Of those which had most to lose by breakingdiplomatic
relations,Tanzania was the only countryactually to do so
(Nyerere, 1968: 130-131).13 When some Tanzanians complained about the economic consequences of this act-since
Great Britainfroze financialassistanceit had alreadypromised-President Julius Nyerere explained to them that the
rulehad
principlesof unityand freedomfromracialistminority
caused his country "to break diplomatic relations with
12. See the 1965 ARB, pp. 423-424, forleaders' explanationsof why theydid or
did not breakdiplomaticrelationswithGreat Britain.
13. Great Britainhas concentratedits aid on the Commonwealth,withoverhalf
of it going to Africa.In the early 1960's, Kenya, Tanganyika,and Uganda werethe
mostimportantrecipientsafterIndia (Little and Clifford,1966: 60).
For more on Nyerere'sriskingof foreignaid withWest Germanyand the United
States, as well as with Great Britain,see Nyerere,(1968) and Niblock,(1971). For a
generalanalysisof Tanzanian foreignpolicy,see Hoskyns(1968).
[474] INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
Britain-the country which has, up to now, given us more
economic aid than any other" (1968: 195).14
Tanzania was also the only country within geographic
proximityto SouthernRhodesia whichbroke relations.All the
others which severed ties were far enough away not to fear
militaryor economic reprisals.It was in fact the extremely
vulnerable security and economic position of Zaibia, the
formerNorthernRhodesia,whichpreventedit fromjoiningin
the rupturewithGreat Britain.Afterall, KennethKaunda and
his countrymen
weredependingupon Britainforan airliftof oil
and other supplies immediatelyafter UDI. Furthermore,
Kaunda was hopingthat the Labour government
underHarold
Wilsonwould take actionto vitiateUDI (Hall, 1969).
On thismost fundamentalquestionof regionalideologyand
principle,therefore,the Black Africanstates did not even act
togetherto break diplomaticrelationswith one of the major
of the OAU membersactuallycarried
powers.Only one-fourth
out the threat,and most of thosewhichdid so lacked the close
bonds to exertreal influence.The Tanzanianexampleindicates
that since the Britishleaders,mainlyfordomesticreasons,were
unwillingto use force in this situation,therewas apparently
littlethe Africanscould have done to changetheirminds.Most
of the African leaders, in any case, preferredto respond
pragmaticallyin terms of their perceivednational interests.
Nonetheless,Nyererepersonallygained respect among many
people at home and abroad because he acted on the basis of
principle.Since his courageousmovecould not bringthe desired
results,however,even Tanzania restoredrelationswith Great
Britainin 1968. It was the last countryto do so in thatyear,
followingAlgeria, Congo (B), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania,the
Sudan,and the UAR.
14. Britishfinancialaid and trade werenot importantto the otherBlack African
countries which broke diplomatic relations in 1965. For instance,no mention is
made of economic transactionswithGuinea, Mali, or Mauritaniafor 1964 or 1965 in
ARB (Economic, Financial, and Technical [EFT] Series,1964-1965). Congo (B) was
to receiveaid to build glass and pulp factories(ARB, EFT Series, 1965, pp. 369 and
370). For trade and aid figuresforGreat Britainand the Commonwealth,see Nielsen
(1969: ch. 2).
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [475]
ISRAEL
The only time that the Africanstates acted with manifest
solidarityin rupturingdiplomaticrelations,aside fromactions
againstPortugaland South Africa,was withIsrael in 1973. By
the end of thatyear only fourstatesmaintainedfullties.Such
unanimityof action was possiblebecause Israelis not a major
power which can offer substantial economic and military
benefits,and because the Arabs mounted a major campaign
whichculminatedin the Yom KippurWarof October 1973.
Previously,only Guinea had actually broken diplomatic
relationsin 1967 afterthe Six Day War,as a protestagainst
The otherstatesat the time
Israelioccupationof the territories.
preferred
to maintainrelationswithboth Israel and the Arabs.
The situation began to change in 1972 when several
individualAfricanstates,suchas Uganda,Chad,Niger,Mali,and
Congo (B), broke relationsfor mainly domestic or bilateral
reasons.There was littleindication,however,thatmost of the
other countries would follow suit, but here the situation
surroundingthe Yom Kippur War acted as an intervening
variablewhich precipitateda snowballeffect(Gitelson,1974).
By this time, the bilateral level had become much less
important,as indicated by the fact that the states breaking
itsmost
relationsincludedthose whereIsrael had been offering
substantialassistanceand where it had developed strongties
with the governingregimes,such as Ethiopia and the Ivory
Coast, as well as those whereits effortshad been negligible,
suchas Burundiand Cameroon.
The main explanationlies at the regionallevelas a reflection
of the increasedactivitiesof the Arab membersof the OAU,
especially since 1971. This was evident,for instance,in the
successive election' of two Arab leaders as chairmenof the
in 1971 and 1972:
Assemblyof Heads of Stateand Government
PresidentMoktarOuld Daddah of Mauritaniaand King Hassan
II of Morocco. The Arabshave givenincreasedsupportto the
Black African campaign against white racist regimes,for
instanceduringthe NonalignedConferencesheld in Lusaka,
[476] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
Zambia, in 1970 and in Algiersin 1973. In turn,throughOAU
resolutionsand United Nations votes, African leaders have
indicated increased opposition to the Israeli occupation of
formerArab territories.
Afterthe Yom KippurWarhad broken
out and Israel had crossed the Suez Canal into the African
continent,
the Africanswerespurredto unitedaction.The OAU
Nzo Ekangaki,called upon all Africanstates
secretary-general,
to show solidaritywith theirbrothercountry,Egypt. Once a
majorityof states had broken relations,most of the rest,
includingcountries with positive ties, like Ivory Coast and
Liberia,followed suit. Only four states;Lesotho,Malawi,and
Swaziland,all of whichare dependentupon South Africa,and
did not.
Mauritius,
The immediategainsfortheAfricansweresoon evident.The
Arabsestablishedan AfricanDevelopmentBank at theirAlgiers
conferenceof November1973, withan initialcapitalizationof
almost $200 million.In addition,theyshowedthattheywould
increasethe offensive
againstsouthernAfricaby extendingtheir
oil boycott and presumablystrengthening
their diplomatic
pressure.The Africanswere thus indicatingcontinentalsolidarity without incurringthe threat of substantiallosses to
themselves,
as theyhad fearedfromGreatBritainat UDI.
For the long run the African leaders may have erred,
which was
however. They have lost their maneuverability,
possible only when they were comparatively"nonaligned"on
the Middle East question.They wereprobablymorevaluableto
the Arabs when there was a possibilitythat theymightbreak
relationsthan they could be aftertheyhad actuallydone so.' 5
Afterall, what else of importancedid theyhave to offerto the
Arabs? That the Arabs would not risktheirown vitalinterests
to
for the Africanswas evidentby theirinitialunwillingness
reduce the oil prices to the poorer,developingcountriesfrom
those demandedof theirostensibletargets,the industrialized
15. Uwechwe (1974) in an editorialcautions the Africanleaders about the need
to act prudentlyand to preventthe Arabs from having too much influenceupon
Africanconcerns.
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [477]
states. In effect,the Arabs apparentlytried to step into a
patron-client
relationship,forwhichtheyhad always criticized
the Westerncountries.They would be glad to chargehighprices
fortheirgoods and then offerfinancialassistanceon theirown
the Africans
termsto the Africans.Underthese circumstances,
would have been wiserto keep theiroptionsamongtheMiddle
to breakrelations
East protagonistsopen by merelythreatening
withIsraelratherthan actuallydoingso. This sortof approach,
whichhad been used by Ghana withthe Soviet Union and by
Kenya with both that countryand CommunistChina,appears
to be moresuitableforsmallstates.
The Global Factor
The global internationalsystemhas not proven to be an
the behaviorof the Black
importantfactordirectlyinfluencing
Africanstates in relationsto outside powers,althoughit may
have a predisposingeffect. The internationalenvironment
appears to have had its greatestinfluenceindirectlyin narrowing or expandingthe optionsavailableto theAfricanstates.For
instance, as the United States and the Soviet Union have
become less competitivewitheach otherin the searchforclient
states in Africa, they have also offeredfewer aid benefits
(Cohen, 1973). Similarly,as France has indicatedthatit would
concentrateless attentionand fewerbenefitson Black Africa
because of internalpressuresand competitionfromits Mediterfor
raneanand European programs,it has createdopportunities
other states to gain more influencein the French-speaking
states.
CHINA
China's enhancedinternational
Comnmunist
politicalprestige
duringthe early 1970's, as evidencedby gainingrepresentation
at the UnitedNationsand receivingthe Americanpresidentin
Peking,has made it moreattractiveto manycountriesthanits
[478] INTERNATIONAL STUDI ES QUARTERLY
major rival, Nationalist China. It has also been in a better
financialposition to offeraid projects,especiallythe railroad
between Tanzania and Zambia. Since 1970, accordingly,no
Africanstatehas brokenrelationswithCommunistChina.This
is undoubtedlydue to the lack of a majorprovocation,but it is
also due to China's enhanced status which demands more
seriousconsiderationbeforetakingstrongaction. The converse
has been trueforTaiwan, whichhas followedits international
debacle at the UnitedNationsby the ruptureof relationswitha
growingnumberof Black Africanstates.
ISRAEL
The generallyhostileinternational
climatecreatedby mostof
the majorpowers,includingthe SovietUnion,and of theThird
World,may have been a backgroundfactoraffectingAfrican
willingnessto break diplomatic relations with Israel. The
countriesof WesternEurope (includingBritainand France) and
most of Latin Americaand Asia did not go as faras severing
diplomaticrelations.It is also questionablewhetherthe former
metropolesactuallyurged the states dependentupon themto
breakrelations.Nonetheless,theirnegativedispositionstoward
Israel,particularlybecause of the oil crisis,may have had an
indirecteffect.
Conclusions
The African states on the whole have behaved rather
pragmaticallyin their use of diplomaticinstruments.
Despite
theirrhetoricagainstneocolonialism,imperialism,and racism,
theyhave been waryof actuallyseveringrelationswithoutside
if these countriesare importantto themat
powers,particularly
the bilaterallevel. This indicatesan unwillingness
to sacrifice
concretebenefitsconsiderednecessaryfordevelopmentand for
the retentionof domesticpower in orderto pursueideological
goals (Holsti, 1972: ch. 5). At the same time, it inidicatesan
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [479]
awarenessof the limitationsof theirinfluenceon majorpowers
evenon issuesof greatconcernto theirown continent.
Generallystates whichhave had unstablepoliticalhistories,
such as Congo (L, laterZaire), stateswhichhave changedtheir
political orientations,for instance,Congo (B) and Ghana, or
states which have pursuedactive nonalignedpolicies, such as
Guinea or Tanzania, have been more likely to break relations
withoutsidepowersthan have stateswithstableleadershipand
more definedrelationshipswithone majorpoweror bloc. Thus
Congo (L-Zaire) by 1973 had the most active record of
breakingrelations(eightcases), followedby Guinea and Ghana
(five cases each). Whilestatesthat changepoliticalregimesare
the most likelyto changepoliticalallegiancesas well, at times
thosestateswhichhavemaintainedthe same leaderin powerfor
a long timemay stillmakeactiveuse of the coercivediplomatic
instrument.This has occurred,since heads of state, such as
Sekou Toure in Guinea (five cases) and Leopold Senghorin
Senegal (four cases), have tried to bolster their domestic
politicalstrengththroughactiveforeignpolicies and the search
for alternativesources of support.More stable patternshave
been indicatedby Kenya,whichhas maintainedits tieswiththe
WestunderKenyatta'scontinuousleadership.It brokerelations
withtwo statesthrough1973. Gabon, whichhas sustainedclose
relations with France under both Leon M'Ba and AlbertBernardBongo, broke relationswith only one state. In these
cases, coercive action was carriedout under the pressurefor
continentalsolidarityagainstPortugaland Israel. Both Kenya
and Gabon wereamongthe last statesto cut tieswithIsraeland
thenonly afterthe majorityof Black Africanstateshad already
done so.
Small states or relativelyunimportantoutside powers have
been the most frequent targets of diplomacy by severing
relations.Of a total of seventycases of Black Africanstates
breakingrelations,listedin Table 1, only fourteen(20%) were
with superpowersor formercolonial countries.The other 56
(80%) werewithless importantpowers.
Accordingto Table 2, whichsummarizesthe frequencywith
which differentfactorshave led Black Africanstatesto break
[480] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
TABLE 2
FREQUENCY OF MAJOR FACTORS CAUSING BLACK AFRICAN STATES
TO BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH OUTSIDE POWERS, 1958 - 1973
OutsidePower
Factors (by numberof cases)
Domestic
Bilateral
Regional
Global
Superpowersand FormerColonial Powers
United States
Soviet Union
France
Great Britain
Belgium
Subtotal
-
1
2
1
1
1
1
6
1
-
6
8
4
-
1
8
-
-
-
OtherCountries
South Africa
Portugal
West Germany
East Germany
Czechoslovakia
Bulgaria
Communist China
NationalistChina
1
-
1
1
-
-
-
1
1
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
28
24
-
Egypt
-
Israel
4
8
1
6
Subtotal
9
19
37
31
Total
9
25
45
31
7
relationswithoutsidepowers,regionalreasonspredominate(45
cases). Thirty-onestates acted forglobal reasons(but thiswas
only a backgroundcondition) and 25 because of bilateral
motivations.Only nine states were especiallyconcernedwith
domesticfactors.
In termsof actual significance,
externalcauses,especiallythe
bilateraland regionalfactors,have been more importantfor
breakingrelationsthan domestic ones. The leaders of some
Gitelson/ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS [481]
states, such as Congo (L) and Guinea, have been particularly
at the
sensitiveto perceivedthreatsto theirnationalsovereignty
bilaterallevel fromthe formercolonialpowerand otheroutside
countries.Heads of states such as Togo, Zaire, and Congo (B)
have brokenrelationswithexistingsourcesof developmentand
otherassistance,such as Taiwan or Israel,in theexpectationof
receivinggreaterbenefitsfromrivalsources,suchas Communist
Chinaor theArab states.
At the regionallevel,the more militantstates,Ghana (under
Nkrumah),Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania, have also taken strong
action,especiallyin relationto the decolonizationof Rhodesia
The more moderatestateshave generally
and other territories.
been reluctantto jeopardizetheirnationalinterestsby breaking
diplomaticrelations.Nonetheless,the great majorityof Black
Africanstatesdid severties,if theyexisted,with South Africa
and Portugalas a solidaritymeasuretowardthe eliminationof
rule on the continent.They also acted withnear
white-minority
continental
unanimityagainstIsrael in an effortto strengthen
ties with the Arab states,to encourageArab supportfor the
decolonizationstrugglein southernAfrica,and in the expectation of receivingpolitical and economic rewards from the
Arabs.
Domestic reasons, while presumablyofferinga useful distractionfrominternalproblems,havebeen the cause of coercive
actiononlyagainstthe two Chinasin the 1960s and Israelin the
early 1970s. The global factor,as it operatedin the Chineseand
condition,rather
Israelicases, appears to be only a predisposing
thanan immediateprecipitating
cause forbreakingrelations.
The generalreluctanceto break diplomaticrelations,except
occasionallywithsmallor middlepowersand only rarelywith
of
major powers,indicatesan awarenessof the ineffectiveness
such extremetactics. The Black Africanstatesby themselves,
for example, were unable to persuade Great Britain and
Portugalto changetheirpolicies. They also had minimaleffect
of pressuresfrom
upon Israel,except as a fringereinforcement
the United States,the SovietUnion,and WesternEurope. Since
the actual severanceof diplomaticrelationsappearsto be such
[482] INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
an ineffectivediplomaticinstrumentfor small states,16 their
leaders have had to search for other political and economic
measuresto tryto influenceoutsidepowers.
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