LEBANON’S TRANSITION TO STABILITY AND OPENNESS
By: Alicia Parseghian * ( [email protected] )
The American College of Greece-Institute of Diplomacy and
Global Affairs
*Alicia Parseghian serves her internship at the Institute of Diplomacy
and Global Affairs of the American College of Greece. She holds a
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from Deree College of
the American College of Greece in Human Resources Management,
International Business & European Affairs and is now an MBA student at
the Graduate School of the American College of Greece.
1
Abstract
Given its particular socio-political structure, Lebanon maybe ranked under the
“open albeit unstable” countries, even though it has made considerable
progress particularly in recent years, in order to complete successfully its
transitional phases and to consolidate stability and openness.
Lebanon’s socio-political specificity with predominant characteristic, the
allocation of governmental, parliamentary, military and social appointments
based solely on religious criteria, has created an atmosphere of constant
tension and social friction as well as a continuous polarization of social groups
which on the one hand deprived Lebanon from forming a unified, free and
sovereign country, on the other hand captivated Lebanon on a civil war for
more than fifteen years as well as on a continuous external interference.
Lebanon, with the Cedar Revolution of 2005, followed by the Doha
Agreement of 2008, and the recent elections results of 2009, has entered a
new page in its turbulent history. All the above indicate that Lebanon has at
least managed to make some visible steps towards social cohesion which
may gradually lead towards the establishment of political and social stability.
A key success factor toward a successful completion of its transition is the
complete abolishment of sectarianism in allocation of governmental, military,
parliamentary and social appointments; and reform in security, economic and
electoral matters.
2
Lebanon’s Transition to Stability and Openness
Introduction
In attempting to assess whether Lebanon is a society in transition or not, it is
perhaps wise to introduce the theme of transition and its fundamental
principles and then apply them to the case of Lebanon.
Transition refers to the process whereby a close but a stable country passes
through a period of hazardous instability in order to become at the very end a
stable and an open society. History has proven that some countries remained
alive from this adventure, whereas some others seriously collapsed. 1
In his book, “The J Curve”, Ian Bremmer states the two most critical
aspects that define the transition process: openness and stability. External
openness can be measured in terms of a nation’s broadness or narrowness
related to the tendencies of globalization. In other words, a country is
characterized as open, if it broadly accepts the economic, political, cultural
and technological unification among countries in the world; the essential
element of globalization. Besides external openness, internal openness also
exists and is measured inside a nation’s borders; in terms for example of the
freedom of communication between a nation’s citizens or in terms of its
governmental transparency. 2
The critical determinants of stability are the: Shock, Democracy, Economic
and Political Capital. Given that stability is a feature (an action) of a country’s
capability, adaptability and readiness to enforce the right government policy in
any shock case, how could we determine shock? Usually shocks take any of
the following three forms: physical, man-made or shocks that emerge from
within the country’s social and cultural characteristics. Thus, a country’s
stability is measured along three competences: The first competence has to
do with a country’s ability to prevent producing shocks, the second
1
Bremmer, Ian. 2006. “The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall” .New
York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:5-25
2
Bremmer, Ian. 2006. “The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall” .New
York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:5-25
3
competence is closely related with a country’s resistance to shocks and the
third and most crucial one refers to a country’s competence of deciding and
implementing the right to reform strategy in any shock case.
No country, however, no matter how stable or unstable it might be, has the
capability to anticipate all shocks from occurring. Less stable states have
more probabilities than stable ones not only to create their own shocks but
also to encounter shocks coming from outside their borders. Overall, stability
not only strengthens a country’s ability to prevent political, economic and
cultural conflicts, but also facilitates a nation to remain as such. If none of the
above components exist within a country, then it can be characterized as
unstable. 3
Democracy also plays a critical role in countries that are considered stable.
However, we have to distinguish between the appearance of liberalization and
democratization.
Liberalization may be defined as a global process of
establishing certain rights in order to safeguard human beings
individually
and collectively from illegitimate violence exercised by government or other
private parties. In the individual level, liberalization encompasses the rulings
of the liberal tradition, whereas in the collective level it includes the right to
oppose the government without fear of punishment, to free speech, to enjoy
free media as well as to have the right of free association with other citizens.
On the other hand, democratization refers to the process of a country’s
transition from a completely authoritarian political system towards full
democracy or from a semi-authoritarian regime towards a democratic one. In
addition, democratization includes such rights as the right to vote and the
establishment of fair elections. It is strongly determined by several implied
factors like economic prosperity, societal development and the context of
history.
Democratic or not, countries in which stability is ambiguous are more
exposed to unexpected crises, they are more likely to create their own
conflicts as well as prone to suffer from the worst effects of political shock. 4
3
Ibid
Bremmer, Ian.2006. “The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall’ .New
York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:10
4
4
Economic reform, particularly a transition from a centrally planned
economy towards a free-market regime produces strains and social instability.
Ineffective industries may close down or their labor force downsized.5
However, the most critical moment for a so called emerging market, with its
transition process risking failure, lies exactly at the inflection point between
the two systems. Governments have therefore limited capital in hand to
develop and retain a functioning state.
For the above reasons economic reforms are usually destabilizing and
expenditure of the economic capital is more than needed. 6
Political Capital, like economic capital is very precious. When a country
decides to move from an authoritarian political system to full democracy, in
other words to enter into a transition phase; this movement necessitates that
the political capital has to be spent just like the economic capital. When a
country’s government attempts political reform, there is always a great risk of
running into a political capital deficit.7
On the other side, a great political scholar, Samuel Huntington portrays out
his catalytic ideas and opinions about political reform and change that have
been used as a reference point by many political theorists throughout the
years. He illustrates reform as a modification in the direction of social or
economic equality. In other words, a positive change can result in more
equality as well as definitely reform can be a core ingredient of political
change.
In addition, political parties can be characterized as a very crucial instrument
of political stability and are highly correlated with the concept of
modernization. Political parties, therefore, can be defined as a form of political
institution which is imperative for the overall stability of the system as a whole.
To be more concrete, political parties constitute political participation and
influence greatly the extent to which this participation can be expanded or not.
5
Bremmer, Ian.2006. “The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall” .New
York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:15
6
Bremmer, Ian.2006. “The J Curve. A New Way To Understand Why Nations Rise and Fal”l .New
York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks:16
7
Ibid
5
If political parties are absent, in order to constitute and mobilize the political
participation, modernization is therefore altered.8
The research paper at hand has three central aims: Firstly, to develop a
clear and understandable framework towards the concept of transition and its
emergence nowadays. Secondly, to investigate and analyze briefly the
reasons that led Lebanon to enter into a long-lasting face of transition. Lastly,
to suggest and specify some possible areas of improvement with main
purpose to help Lebanon manage and complete successfully its transition.
Thus, the main objective of the research paper is to prove whether or not
Lebanon is a country that has been entered into a long-lasting phase and how
it will manage to complete its transition successfully.
In order to complete the objective of our research paper successfully we
have developed a set of research and investigative questions in order to
facilitate the purpose of our paper. Some of them are presented below:
•
For which reasons Lebanon is characterized as a special
case of transition?
•
Which reasons led Lebanon to enter in a long-lasting phase
of transition and how it will manage to cope successfully?
•
Is there room for hope after the incidents of 2005 and 2009
respectively in order for Lebanon to be characterized as an
open and stable country in the upcoming years?
•
In which extent sectarianism affects the transition of Lebanon
and how it can be successfully managed ?
To conclude with, the research design used in the paper at hand is a
combination of exploratory as well as descriptive study. Exploratory study is
used to develop hypotheses or questions for further research. In other words,
at the very end of this paper scholars and scientists would be able to extract
another set of investigative and research questions in order to conduct an
even deeper analysis of Lebanon’s transition. Descriptive study from the other
hand tries to explain relationships among variables. In this particular paper,
the dependent variable is the transition of Lebanon and is measured against
independent variables such as the fifteen year civil war and the Lebanese
8
Huntington, Samuel.1968. “ Political Order in Changing Societies ”. Yale University Press: 140
6
intra-political issues and treaties. In other words, the use of descriptive study
is of vital importance for understanding whether or not the dependent
variables are positively or negatively correlated with the independent variable.
7
The Case of Lebanon
Lebanon demonstrates an interesting case of transition for many reasons;
some of them will be presented, briefly due to lack of space, in the present
paper. Lebanon is an open country, albeit unstable that struggles for many
years to complete its transition towards overall openness and stability.
It is therefore our working hypothesis, that Lebanon has entered a cycle of
transitional phases. Political events seem to be the main forces of enactment
for each cycle of transition. As political events we may consider
assassinations, invasions, occupations and third-party interventions. In the
brief analysis at hand, we will try to show how these cycles begin, how they
may end and which forces sustain them.
1. Back
and
Forth
between
restricted
liberalization
and
de-
liberalization:
Although in Lebanon, significant developments have been achieved
in the sector of political liberalization there still exist substantial
restrictions due partially to local security issues. A Muslim-oriented
nation in its majority, Lebanon still enjoys certain universal rights such
as freedom of press, freedom of association, freedom of trade union
creation as well as the right to strike; all of which render it as
Democratic.
This democratic tolerance signifies an initial step for Lebanon in
achieving liberalization. It may also signify a step toward a successful
transition phase and further democratization. These steps by
themselves cannot guarantee a smooth transition process. Incremental
changes, like a shift in the mentality of the Lebanese citizens in terms
of the way they perceive, assess and judge political as well as religious
matters may effectively contribute tothe democratization process. Also,
the effective management of foreign affairs, economic and political
stability and security, better communication between Lebanese
governmental members and even quicker and more efficient resolution
of all internal affairs seem feasible goals for the immediate future.
I. Ineffective democratization:
8
Lebanon demonstrates a distinctive democratic system, the so-called
“confessional” democracy. “Confessionalism” is a model of consociationalism.
Political scholars define a consociational country as a country which acts
despite its major internal divisions in terms of ethnicity or religion in which no
sub-group is able to demand majority role . Common-known examples of
countries that demonstrate “confessionalism” are Belgium, Switzerland, India,
Spain, Lebanon and the Netherlands. In other words, “confessionalism” is a
type of consociational government which gives out political as well as
institutional power proportionally among its religious sects. “Confessional
democracy” as it functions in Lebanon, distributes in each of its religious sects
various parliamentary, governmental and public service appointments.
Appointments are allocated to religious sects according to their numbers in
Lebanese society. There exist seventeen different religious sects in Lebanon.
“Confessional democracy” becomes further complicated since religious
dominance is apparent everywhere. 9
Theoretically, the “confessional” type of democracy in Lebanon facilitates
the harmonious co-existence of all different religious and ethnic sects by
allocating power to each of them based on their demographic weight.
However, Lebanon’s vulnerable “confessional” equilibrium within a society of
many large minorities makes it excessively delicate to manage in cases of
internal rearrangements and external intervention. Every time changes occur
they seem to energize instability and uncertainty. Thus, the “confessional”
democracy of Lebanon finally produces instability rather than stability.10
When considering Lebanon’s instability as a consequence of its
“confessional” democracy we may notice the following :
1. Demographic Change: The inflow of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
during the early 70’s was
whole -heartedly accepted by the
Lebanese Sunni Community as they regarded the Sunni Palestinians
as an expansion of their own demographic weight. Other religious
communities, particularly the Maronite, felt threatened by the
Palestinian entry. 11
9
“Understanding the Lebanese Confessionalism”. Available from http://www.cjpme.ca
Ibid
11
“Lebanon”. Available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833
10
9
2. Political and Demographic Control: During the early 50’s, Lebanon’s
Maronite President Camille Chamoun gave approval to Palestinian
Christians to apply for the Lebanese citizenship, thus attempting to
increase the number of Lebanese Christians. The same action was
repeated in 1994. This time however lead to an increase of the
Muslim population.12
3. Foreign Intervention: Foreign intervention played a great role in
Lebanon’s instability. Countries such as Israel, Syria, the United
States and Iran with their intervention in Lebanon’s internal as well
as external politics, contributed to its internal instability while
promoting their own interests. 13
4. Militia Equilibrium: One of the reforms that the “Taif Accord”,
attempted to bring, was the prohibition of arms to all other militia
except the Lebanese Army. However, Hezbollah continued to be
armed and this action was considered by many as one of the
impetus of Lebanon’s instability. 14
12
El Khazen, Farid. 1997. “Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon”. Journal of Refugee
Studies, Volume 10, No. 3.
13
“Lebanon”. Available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35833
14
Ibid
10
2. Lebanon’s fifteen year civil war (1975-1990)
Almost twenty years after its conclusion, the Lebanese civil war remains
rather enigmatic and complicated not only due to its devastating
consequences, but also due to its fundamental causes.
Three central theses help establish the controversial views concerning the
nature and the causes of the Lebanese Civil War. One concentrates on the
basis of the conflict and the downfall of the local sociopolitical and economical
Lebanese structures. Another presents the role of foreign leverage as
dominant and claims that it was the interaction of parochial events and local
politics that led towards the complete functional breakdown of the Lebanese
government. The latter blames the origin, intensity and violence of the civil
war on foreign intervention, apart from internal religious matters.15
Foreign intervention has reinforced and extended the clash, but it seems
rather unrealistic to blame solely foreign intervention as the one major cause.
Lebanon is constituted on a pluralistic, multi-communal basis and the core
causes of the civil war may be deeply found mostly within the complete
transformation of the Lebanese sociopolitical structure that aroused specific
behavioral patterns which in turn triggered oppositional tendencies within the
system. These oppositional tendencies enhanced the presence of a
fragmented sociopolitical structure. Thus, collective barriers were solidified
and factional loyalties were boosted in the Lebanese society. As the structure
of the Lebanese society became more strict and static, Lebanon became
unable to manage effectively neither internal demands rising from
socioeconomic change nor external demands coming from local political
conflicts. Some internal as well as external factors are presented here. 16
15
16
Latif, Abdul-Husn.1998. “The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward”. Lynne Rieener Publishers:54
Ibid
11
Internal Factors
a. Rich versus poor:
While Christians were classified among the wealthy class with their
dominance in all business sectors being noticeable, Shii Muslims
represented the poor and working classes which regarded themselves as
marginalized from all business and industrial sectors. Due to the
deregulation and privatization of the Lebanese economic system, great
discrepancy in terms of wealth became apparent in the Lebanese society.
Great contradictions concerning social inequality and its power distribution
constituted every sect.17
b. Unequal distribution of political power and governmental authority:
The Lebanese National Pact of 1943 gave the highest political positions
according to religious sects and also riveted parliament representation at a 6
to 5 ratio of Christians and Muslims respectively based on the –doubtfulcensus of 1932. The National Pact became the base of the subsequent
establishment of the Lebanese Confessional type of Democracy that has
been analyzed previously in this paper. It would be rational to assume that in
political power and authority would be distributed according to population
size. Since Muslims traditionally represented the majority of the Lebanese
population, Christians always challenged their power. 18
c. Lebanon’s Identity:
Basically, three troublesome questions arise when examining Lebanon’s
identity. Is Lebanon an indispensable part of the Arab world which would
therefore encourage Arab unity and Arab nationalism as the majority of
Sunni Muslims believe? Is Lebanon an internal part of the Muslim world as
many Shii groups claim? Or is it a distinctive nation of minorities with a
history and sovereignty that is uniquely Lebanese as the majority of
Lebanese Christians seem to believe?19
17
Julie, Denney and Martha, Wenger. 1990. Lebanon’s Fifteen Year 1975-1990 .Middle East Report
162: 23-25
18
Ibid
19
Ibid
12
d. Christians versus Muslims:
Divergent value perceptions, behavioral patterns and intentions have
been altering Christians-Muslims relations. Muslims regard themselves as
marginalized as they acquired minor positions in terms of power, status and
rewards systems in a Christian- dominated country. On the other hand,
Christians perceived Muslims as detached from the fundamental value
system an independent Lebanese nation. To be more specific, Maronites,
regard Muslims as a continuous threat not only to their political power
supremacy, but also to the independence of Lebanon. These conceptions
are greatly affected by economic and educational asymmetry as well as by
political discrepancy.
20
External Factors
f. The Palestinian Factor:
Palestinians came to Lebanon in 1948 as refugees.During their early
diaspora, the Palestinians started successively forming their own society
struggling to capture their own identity.
Wealthy Palestinians were being accepted more easily by Lebanese
society since money was a crucial factor for the Lebanese societal
acceptance but not the most determinant one. Money symbolized half of the
equation towards Lebanese full societal acceptance. The other half is
represented through strong family bonds and political affiliations that tailored
the Lebanese life for centuries.21 All together (money, political affiliations
and family bonds) are the driving forces that have activated and shaped the
close and rigid Lebanese society and its relevant perceptions, norms,
behavioral patterns, beliefs and attitudes. Therefore, this rigidness cultivated
societal polarization, sense of mistrust, lack of diversification, lack of crossborder communication and ineffective use of conflict management and
resolution tactics throughout Lebanese society and its political means.
20
Latif, Abdul-Husn.1998. “The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward”. Lynne Rieener Publishers:55
Mackey, Sandra.2009. “Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict”. New York: W.W Norton
and Company: 83-85
21
13
Apart from the societal reasons that Lebanese viewed Palestinians
suspiciously, there is a political reason, too. The Lebanese Sunni political
parties found in Palestinians a strategically promising ally towards their
conflict for political parity with Christians. The Maronites, in contrast regarded
Palestinians as a continuous threat to the confessional balance in Lebanon
and more specifically to their nebulous hold on political supremacy. Thus, a
powerful triangle comprised of Maronites, Sunnis and Palestinians always
threaten Lebanese stability.
22
g. The Syrian Factor:
Syria, like Iraq can be described as a collection of adverse communities
surrounded by borders specified by others. Strategically located on the route
from the Nile to Euphrates, Syria has always attracted invasion but was
always vulnerable in terms of natural defenses. Thus, Damascus regarded
as its protective belly the mountains of Lebanon which constitute an issue of
natural security. Syria intervened for the first time in Lebanon in 1976 in an
attempt to end the civil war and since then it became Lebanon’s shadow
and major influence affecting all its internal and external decision-making
since the complete withdrawal of the Syrian troops in 2005.
In retrospect, the era in which the interests of the West were tremendous
both in economic and strategic terms becomes more and more intense and
Lebanon offers a considerable stage on which to see an enigmatic play
performed by multiple actors (Syria, Palestine, Israel, United States, and
Iran). 23
This particular play has a still long way to go because Lebanon is regarded
not only as a crucial geographic prize but also as an attractive site for wars
specified by third parties. The true cause of the Lebanese Civil War never
came from the Lebanese people themselves. It came from the Palestinians
and the Israelis .It also came from Syria’s effort to establish its hegemony
over Lebanon, as well as from United State’s double role as Israel’s
guardian and as the protector against Soviet Union’s presence into the
region and from Iran’s desire to export the power of the Islamic Revolution.
22
Ibid
Mackey, Sandra.2009. “Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict”. New York: W.W Norton
and Company:183-211
23
14
Lebanon offers an appropriate place for all of them to go after their own
interests and ambitions, at the expense of a fragile state. These reasons
create instability in the Arab World form Beirut to Baghdad.24
h. The Israel Factor:
Throughout the civil war, the government of Israel had already showed
its intentions for Lebanon. The downfall of the Lebanese government in 1975
and the consequential termination of the Lebanese army, provided for Israel
the favorable circumstance to introduce itself as the guardian of three
Christian areas inside Lebanon. From 1975 till 1982, Israel intervened
militarily to strengthen its interests, and in 1982 Israel took the opportunity to
invade Lebanon.
All Israeli actions aimed on the one hand to destabilize even more fragile
Lebanon and to establish its hegemony. Three main pillars constituted Israeli
policy: protection of the Jewish state, occupation of the Arab territories and
gradual transformation of the Arab world.
Such great intentions hide unexpected surprises till their completion.
Hezbollah’s growing influence and power in Lebanese internal as well as
external affairs emerged even more. As a consequence, Israel for the first
time in its short history regarded Lebanon’s occupation as not so vital to its
survival. Secondly, for a country accustomed to short-term wars and
impressive achievements, fifteen years evolved until the Lebanese turmoil
came to an end were more than enough. Lebanon and the Palestinian
Indifanda in the occupied territories challenged Israelis. Israel realized that it
could longer govern neither its neighbors nor the Palestinians by the use of
force. By 2000, Israel recognized deeply that the cost of staying in Lebanon
(in economic terms along with military terms) was tremendous and decided
to voluntarily withdraw from Lebanon. 25
i. The United States Factor:
The U.S. interests in Lebanon are derived from the following reasons such as
from the Lebanese-American Community as the majority of Arab-American
24
Mackey, Sandra.2009. “Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict”. New York: W.W Norton
and Company:186
25
Ibid
15
are of Lebanese origin, the Lebanese appeals to United States for support
and Lebanon’s role as a trustworthy counselor among Arab nations.26
j. The Iranian Factor:
For Iran, Lebanon provided a main channel of communication with a
major Shia community in the Arab World. Consecutively, this channel
granted Tehran not only a focal basis from which to plan its religious
influence and proselytism into the Arab center but also a local role it had
never before obtained. Taking the advantage from conditions in Lebanon,
Tehran inspired many Shia Muslim groups in Lebanon. Therefore, Iran
financed new mosques for clerics, constructed militia bases, and recruited
Revolutionary Guards who were responsible to train armed fighters.
26
27
Clyde.R.Mark.2003. “Lebanon”. Available from http://www.opencrs.com
27
Mackey, Sandra.2009. “Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict”. New York: W.W Norton
and Company:186-211
16
3. Lebanese Intra-Political Issues and Treaties
1. The National Pact of 1943
Like any political system used to a pluralistic and multi-communal society,
the Lebanese National Pact of 1943 aimed at achieving two goals: Creating a
just society and constituting a fundamental mechanism for nation building. To
succeed on this, it had firstly to approach the two dominant fields of
altercation between Lebanon’s communal blocs: the confessional allocation of
governmental rewards and the country’s foreign policy.
28
The pact intended to convert the conflict in these domains into controllable
levels by making a first attempt to determine a balance for attaining social
justice as well as an ideological adjustment between Lebanism and Arabism.
In addition, it developed the ground for power sharing not only between the
two fundamental religious parties in Lebanon, the Christians and the Muslims
but also among many sects within each party. It also specified the framework
for Lebanon’s external and Arab policies. Even though that this agreement
remained unwritten it was recognized as fundamental for Lebanese political
life for more than thirty years, until the 1975 civil war burst.29
Furthermore, the pact was concentrated on allocating government posts,
parliament seats as well as bureaucratic, military and judicial positions among
the various distinctive communities on a proportional basis according to the
1932 census. The census computed the Christians as the preponderant
community. As a consequence, under that census the Presidency of Lebanon
was given to the Maronite sect; the Speaker of the House of Representatives
was to the Shiite Muslim; and the position of the Prime Minister was
distributed to the Sunni Muslims; as for the remaining sects, their ministerial
portfolios would be given and assigned according to their numerical
superiority. The parliamentary, civil and judiciary composition were organized
28
Latif, Abdul-Husn. 1998. “The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward”. Lynne Rienner Publishers: 7788.
29
Ibid
17
on the basis of a 6 to 5 Christian-Muslim ratio. The latter distribution emerged
a source of internal conflict as described earlier in the paper.
30
Moreover, the great dispute around Lebanon’s external policy was also a
major source of conflict between the two main distinctive communities, the
Christians and the Muslims. The Maronites were struggling for an
independent Lebanon with powerful attachments with France, while the
Muslims (particularly the Sunnis), never hid their devotion towards a union
with the Arab world. The pact provided to both communities a balanced
agreement by which they could protect their interests within an independent
and sovereign Lebanon. This was accomplished through a trade-off in which
Muslims abandoned their demand of making Lebanon a part of the extensive
Arab and Islamic state by recognizing Lebanon’s independence and
sovereignty whereas Christians alternated equally by approving the Arab
character of Lebanon.31
Even though that the pact pursued to modify a multi-communal society into
a nation-state with the use of political processes it failed to do so since the
power within the Lebanese nation was distributes between two distinctive
groups and the state. Although the state was assumed to preserve the
balance between the groups, in reality Christians were closer to the authority
than the Muslims. As a result, Christians were always the most powerful allies
of the state. On the other hand, Muslims regarded the state not as a neutral
negotiator of the conflict, but as a Christian entity and thus the major source of
conflict and division in an unstable situation.32
As a consequence, the state had become central point of efforts towards
integration because it could function as equilibrium to the dual polarization of
the Lebanese society. By integrating the various groups that exist in the
Lebanese nation within a single structure and by matching their diverse
interests under a distinct policy, it was believed that social structure would
evenly be integrated.
Although the pact failed in providing a strong integrative mechanism towards
stability, unification and openness it managed to bring arguments on national
30
Ibid
Ibid
32
Ibid
31
18
identity and power sharing at least at a controllable level. All hopes after the
end of the civil war were left to the Taif Accord, but at least a first effort
towards unification, stability and openness had already be done even though
it failed at the very end.
33
33
Ibid
19
2. The Taif Accord of 1989
All political processes no matter in which country they are used, have
their advantages, accountabilities and disadvantages. So, Lebanon seems not
to be the exception of the rule. Two decades prior to the 1975 civil war,
various Western scholars mentioned in their publications that Lebanon were
the only state with the most stable democracy among all states in the Arab
world. 34
Nevertheless, the Lebanese political system failed of being democratic,
since as a political system can be characterized as having abundant freedom
but was ailed from being democratic deficient. That is to say, that the
Lebanese democratic system even though it offered equal opportunities for all
Lebanese citizens, the political accountability and responsibility of Lebanese
officials and institutions was seriously lacking. 35
After the failure of the National Pact’s integrative mechanism towards
stability, unification and openness, the Taif Accord of 1989, was a second
attempt to determine the fundamental keystone towards the end of civil war as
well as towards the recovery to political balance. Below, some key reforms
that the Taif Accord brought to Lebanon are presented. First of all, the Taif
Accord was definite in demonstrating the Arab identity in Lebanon,
concentrating mainly on the fact that Lebanon is an Independent, Sovereign
and Free State. Secondly, the Accord ratified the unity of Lebanon. Thirdly, it
established the nation’s political system as a parliamentary democracy,
derived from the use of principles of separation, cooperation and balance
among the various Lebanese governmental mechanisms. 36
34
Salem, Paul. 1997. “Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays”. American University
of Beirut :411
35
Ibid
36
Salem, Paul. 1997. “Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays”. American University
of Beirut :412-432
20
Moreover, the Accord determined the socio-economic system of Lebanon
as a free-economy facilitating individual’s initiative and the right of property.
Last but not least, the Accord declared clearly that the abolishment of the
political sectarianism represents a core national aim that would be
accomplished only under a progressive course of action.37
Furthermore, this specific Accord represented the start-up of a new round
of negotiations concerning the Lebanese-Israeli relations and particularly
concerning the end of the civil war; as well as it also represented a step
ahead toward the distinctive Lebanese-Syrian relationship with major goal the
gradual withdrawal of Syrian intervention away from Lebanon. To conclude
with, the Accord supported the gradual reduction of the use of weapons in all
national and non-national militia. However, Hezbollah continued to use
weapons against Israel, as a resistant force and not as militia.38
The Taif Accord was signed on October 22nd, 1989 in Taif, Saudi-Arabia
and ratified on November 4th, 1989. Overall, this agreement can be
characterized by great contradiction apparent through the sectarian mentality
on the one hand; even though it declared that the abolishment of political
sectarianism represents Lebanon’s core aim, it didn’t provide a specific
deadline framework in achieving that aim. As long as sectarian allegiances
are stronger than patriotic allegiances and allegiances to a state, then the
roots of conflict will always be there and can be easily stoked. On the other
hand, the Accord provided a vision towards revolutionary, democratic, nonconfessional and stable Lebanese state. However, after the ratification of the
agreement Lebanon has experienced a long peace period till the late ‘90s as
a consequence of the national institutions re-establishment as well as of the
Lebanese national army unification.39
37
Ibid
Ibid
39
Ibid
38
21
3. The Cedar Revolution of 2005
The great impact followed the assassination of the Lebanese former Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14th 2005, was the Cedar Revolution. The
reasons of the Cedar Revolution were obvious. Lebanon is a country where
the Syrian domination was supreme for a period of fifteen years. That is to
say, in its simplest way, Cedar Revolution represented Lebanon’s break-out of
the Syrian shackles of control. When Harriri showed his clear resistance
towards Syrian control by decreasing their control, he was killed and Lebanon
was revolted.40
Even though, the reasons that led to the Cedar Revolution were obvious, the
most complicated part seems to be that of portraying out the deeper
meanings of the Cedar Revolution. Cedar Revolution spread out two principal
meanings: the meaning of the non-violence and the meaning of political and
judicial accountability. Out of the two meanings, the meaning of non-violence
seems to be more crucial. 41
Lebanon’s enhancement to non-violence is apparent. Non- violence as a
determining characteristic of the Cedar Revolution is the most important,
since all non-contemporary as well as contemporary events of the Middle East
have attenuated the basic right to personnel security from harm which has
been firstly stated as a fundamental human right by the French
revolutionaries. In contemporary history, particularly in the Middle East
massive violence which can be characterized as the inverse coin of security is
the only prevailing characteristic that isolates Middle East from the rest of the
world. For the first time in its History in 2005, Lebanon battled with non
violence, battled to guarantee the fundamental human right to be secure; that
is to say , to be free of violence. All street demonstrations that held in
40
Mallat, Chibli.2009. “March 2221”. Available from http://www.mallat.com/articles/March2221.htm
:66
41
Mallat, Chibli.2009. “March 2221”. Available from http://www.mallat.com/articles/March2221.htm
:15
22
Lebanon in 2005, had a fundamental message to pass by: Another way, the
non-violent one also exists in conducting politics and it can be achieved.42
Moreover, the second crucial meaning that Cedar Revolution attempted to
portray out the need for judicial as well as political accountability. Judicial
accountability constitutes the basis for any country that wants to stay on solid
foundations. As you will find out in the conclusion of this paper at hand, one of
the key reforms that would drive Lebanon towards stability and openness is
an independent and fully competent judicial system.
In terms of political accountability, the Cedar Revolution even though it
succeeded in the aims presented below, it fell short of renewing the political
leadership; that is to say, it fell short of holding politically accountable a
number of leaders who were supportive towards a revolutionary Lebanon.43
The Cedar Revolution succeeded first of all, by achieving the complete
withdrawal of the Syrian troops away from Lebanon as well as by achieving
the substitution of the current government at that time, which was greatly
influenced by Syrian intervention by a government characterized by more
independent leadership. Syria was always till the Cedar Revolution Lebanon’s
last world in internal as well external political issues.44
In addition, the Cedar Revolution succeeded on the creation of an
international commission responsible for a more trustworthy investigation of
Hariri’s assassination; on the complete resignation of the Lebanese security
officials of that time in order to confirm the guarantee of that plan as well as
on the settled establishment of free parliamentary elections. 45
Mallat, on his book “March 2221” argues that one of the failures of the Cedar
Revolution was the fact that it didn’t achieving on investigating deeply and on
proposing solutions over the debate on at least reducing sectarianism away
from governmental, parliamentary and public office allocations since
42
Mallat, Chibli.2009. “March 2221”. Available from http://www.mallat.com/articles/March2221.htm
:16
43
Mallat, Chibli.2009. “March 2221”. Available from http://www.mallat.com/articles/March2221.htm
:17
44
Walker, Edward Jr. “Emerging Lebanon 2006”.. Available from
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com
45
Ibid
23
sectarianism governs Lebanon and keeps it isolated from stability and
openness. 46
Overall, the Cedar revolution consisted of its vulnerabilities and its
advantages, portrays out Lebanon’s first time of change towards democracy.
Lebanese people in their majority youth ones didn’t abandoned their nation
and demonstrated their aspirations with the Lebanese national flag held in
their hands. It was the first time in Lebanon where flags representing political
and religious parties did not feature. All these young people that participated
in this revolution represented Lebanon’s future which is clearly distinctive and
away from sectarian and political mentalities that had imprisoned its identity
and its democracy all these years prior to the Revolution.47
The aftermath of Hariri’s assassination brought to Lebanon a sense of
unification, a government completely Lebanese (after the resignation of the
pro –Syrian prime minister and his cabinet ), and when the question came out
on Lebanon’s identity, all Lebanese people answered that they have
Lebanese identity since they didn’t consider anymore themselves neither of
Muslim nor of
Arab identity but they considered themselves as having an
identity exclusively Lebanese. 48
4. The Doha Agreement of 2008
The Agreement signed and ratified on May 21st 2008, in Doha, Qatar
brought another set of reforms which seemed to be a continuation of those
started with the Cedar Revolution. To be more specific, the Doha Agreement
led the way towards the constitution of a unity government where the
opposition has the power to veto in all major decisions whether internal or
external ones as well as towards the complete official prohibition of the use of
weapons. The latter decision was a response to Hezbollah’s intervention and
46
Mallat, Chibli.2009. “March 2221”. Available from http://www.mallat.com/articles/March2221.htm
:115
47
Walker, Edward Jr. “Emerging Lebanon 2006”. Available from http://
www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com
48
Ibid
24
kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers on July 2006 which led on a new short war
between Israel and Lebanon on 2006 which emerged instability once again in
Lebanon. Lebanon had the Lebanese army to intervene in military terms and
Hezbollah was considered a resistance force and not as a militia, the use of
weapons should be prohibited.
Overall, the Doha Agreement promoted stability by the reforms it
implemented and provided a way towards the successful completion of the
Lebanese transitional issue.
49
5. The Elections Results of 2009
Although elections had been held the previous June, no government has
been formed till Saturday 18th of November 2009 when Lebanon appointed
the son of the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Saad Hariri as Lebanon’s
Prime Minister. As already announced, Saad Hariri would assemble a unity
government which would include members of the oppositions which have
gained the power to veto all major decisions, either internal or external ones,
after the Doha Agreement of 2008. However, a point that has been
ambiguous till nowadays is whether Hezbollah continues to be Lebanon’s
most strengthened force in political and military terms and its minority alliance
50
would hold the power to veto as it did with the previous government.
49
Daaboul, Christofer. “ The Doha Agreement, Lebanon and the Near Future” . Available from
http://.www.iss.europa.eu
50
Slackman, Michael. “ Lebanon Chooses Saad Hariri as Premier”. Available from
http:// www.nytimes.com
25
6. Conclusion
There is still room for hope that Lebanon would successfully complete its
transitional phases. Although some essential steps as described above have
already been taken, their correct formulation, integration and implementation
still remains.
The most critical barrier that Lebanon faces and has to overcome it in order
to achieve stability and openness, is the absence of a coherent central
authority with the effective decision-making system that would strive towards
the complete abolishment of the Lebanese sectarianism as well as the
development of social and political cohesion. Sectarianism divides Lebanon
into many religious sub-groups, each of them struggling on achieving its
personal interests rather than struggling on reaching a consensus
agreement that would benefit Lebanon as a country, far and foremost and
not all different religious sub-groups.
Reform should be implemented in three main areas in order for Lebanon
to achieve stability and openness. Apart from the complete abolishment of
confessionalism in Lebanon, there is an ultimate need for a fully
independent and fully competent judicial system. The Lebanese judiciary
system is extremely vulnerable and accused of bias and sometimes
corruption. The development of a strong, independent and fully competent
judicial system is the basis for any country that wants to stay on solid
foundations.
The first area that needs reform is the security domain. Lebanon suffers
from a deficient accountability in terms of security and a powerful solution to
that would be the integration of all security forces, into one. A single
obstacle to security unification is the fact that Hezbollah is recognized as a
resistance force rather than militia, and so refuses complete disarmament.
Another important point that has to be mentioned here is that Hezbollah is a
strong political party that has the power of veto in all major internal and
external decisions according to the Doha Agreement of 2008. The final
26
decision of Hezbollah for the case of its disarmament is still ambiguous, but
as a political party gives great attention to public opinion.51
Furthermore, the two other main areas that need reform are the electoral
and the economic. In terms of the electoral area, there is an ultimate need
for judicial and political accountability as well as a more precise reexamination of the existing electoral law. Until now, all electoral
appointments were allocated based on the disputed 1932 census. A rather
effective solution would be the proportional distribution of appointments and
not the sectarian one. In the area of economic reform, privatization, if
managed and implemented correctly would provide sustainable solutions to
many problems that the Lebanese society currently faces.
All these issues should be resolved if Lebanon is to achieve stability and
openness. Since all these reforms entail fundamental structural changes all
results, successful or otherwise, will inevitably appear – and could be
assessed - in the long-run. 52
51
Choucair-Vizoso, Julia et al.2006. “Lebanon’s Uncertain Democratic Prospects”. Available from
http://www.canergieendowment.org
52
Ibid
27
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nations rise and fall “. New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks: 5-25
Choucair-Vizoso,Julia et al.2006. “Lebanon’s Uncertain Democratic
Prospects”. Available from http://www.canergieendowment.org
Clyde, R.Mark.2003. “Lebanon”. Available from http://www.opencrs.com
Daaboul, Christofer. “The Doha Agreement, Lebanon and the Near
Future”. Available from http://www.iss.europa.eu
Denney Julie, and Wenger Martha. 1990. “Lebanon’s Fifteen Year War
1975-1990”, Middle East Report 162: 23-25.
El Khazen, Farid. 1997. “Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in
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Huntington, Samuel. 1968. “ Political Order in Changing Societies”.
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Latif, Abul-Husn. 1998. “The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward”. Lynne
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29