Weapons in Space:
The Next Arms Control Challenge
Pavel Podvig
Center for Arms Control Studies
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology
PS&GS, Engineering Quadrangle
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544
Phone: (609) 258-4684
Fax: (609) 258-3661
E-mail: [email protected]
Chicago
July 2002
Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
Weapons in Space: Trends
The United States
Rumsfeld Commission Report (2001)
“[T]he U.S. must have the capabilities to defend its space assets against hostile acts and to negate the
hostile use of space against U.S. interests.”
Joint Vision 2020
Global domination
“Freedom and security of space operations, plus ability to deny its use to others”
No new arms control constraints are necessary
China, Russia, and others
“Only a legal ban on deployment of weapons in space … could prevent the raising
threat of arms race in space”
China has long insisted on opening negotiations on a ban on weapons in space
China and Russia just submitted draft language of a treaty to the Conference on
Disarmament
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Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
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Current treaties
Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963
Prohibits nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosion in space
Outer Space Treaty of 1967
“The exploration and use of outer space … shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development...”
Prohibits deployment in space of weapons of mass destruction in general and nuclear weapons in particular
ABM Treaty of 1972
Prohibited space-based missile defense systems and their components
Radars, interceptors, lasers etc. were prohibited if they were part of an ABM system; Did not ban ASAT as
long as it was not tested in ABM role.
Did not ban space-based sensors (early-warning, discrimination, cueing, adjuncts)
SALT, START treaties (1972–2009)
Bilateral U.S.-Russian. “Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party” as long as they are operating “in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law” (START Treaty, Article IX, 2 and 1).
CTBT
Multilateral. May never enter into force. The parties “shall not interfere with elements of the verification
regime of this Treaty or with national technical means of verification operating“ … “in a manner consistent
with generally recognized principles of international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of
States.” (CTBT, Article IV, 7 and 5)
Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
What kind of space weapons?
Non-weapons
Early-warning (DSP, SBIRS-High, Oko), discrimination (SBIRS-Low), imagery,
navigation, communication, meteorological etc.
May be integral part of a system that includes space weapons (i.e. missile defense)
Weapons
Missile defense
Kinetic interceptors, lasers, exotic directed-energy weapons. Allowed as long as it is not nuclear
Anti-satellite (ASAT)
Everything is allowed as long as it is not nuclear
Ground-strike weapons
No weapons have been developed yet
Capability to attack targets on the ground or in the atmosphere (planes, cruise missiles, etc.)
Everything is allowed as long as it is not nuclear
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Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
Concerns
United States: Vulnerability of space assets
Civilian systems may be vulnerable to a terrorist attack
GPS is widely used for air traffic control
Communication (cellular networks etc)
Military systems
Space systems used to support military operations
Missile defense will include space-based components
The rest of the world: Threat from space
Missile defense
May be seen as undermining retaliatory capability
Ground-strike weapons
Domination of space
U.S. may use missile defense or dedicated ASAT to deny use of space or to disable satellites during a
conflict or in peacetime
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Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
Possible incentives to deploy weapons in space
United States
Missile defense
ASAT
Will not be necessary unless other countries develop space-based infrastructure at least comparable to the
current U.S. one
In any event, it is unlikely that space-based ASAT would be more effective than ground-based one
Ground-strike weapons
Unlikely to be sufficiently more efficient than conventionally-based ones (bombers, UAVs, ballistic missiles)
to justify deployment
The rest of the world
ASAT
Terrorist or military attack on key civilian or military satellites
A coordinated attack that would disable significant portion of space force is extremely difficult
Does not have to be space-bases
Micro satellites?
Anti-ABM
Attack on key space-based components of missile defense system designed to disable it
Conventional countermeasures should give better chance of success
Ground-strike
Missiles are more effective
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Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
Arms race in space?
Arms race, maybe, but not in space
Most targets for are non-weapons
Unlike with offense vs. defense, where targets were nuclear-armed missiles, potential targets for spacebased weapons, satellites, are not weapons.
Deploying more GPS satellites is different from deploying more nuclear-armed ICBMs
No deployment of weapons in space requires symmetric response
Deploying ASAT to attack the adversary’s ASAT capabilities in order to protect your own satellites is
probably the least effective way of doing so.
“Conventional” arms race is still possible
Deployment of ICBMs is still the best way to counter missile defense
No arms race—no arms control?
The United States will be reluctant to agree on limiting weapons in space unless there
is a strong challenge
The challenge may not materialize, because weapons in space are very expensive and probably not very
effective
The United States is unlikely to deploy weapons in space (other than missile defense)
Weapons in space may become an option that that is neither ruled out nor
materialized
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Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
What arms control can do
Complete ban
No weapons in space
Military satellites are allowed
CD draft language (China, Russia)
“Do not deploy on Earth orbit any objects with any kind of weapons…”
An attempt to get a ban on missile defenses through the back door?
The “arms race” and “space sanctuary” arguments
Partial ban
No weapons in deep space (higher than ~1000 km)
Weapons are okay on low earth orbits
Legitimizes some weapons in space
Leave as it is
No explicit limits on missile defense, ASAT or other weapons
May still be better than a partial ban
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Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
Parallel track?
Defense of space assets
Rely on many smaller satellites, not a few large ones
Join capabilities across national borders
Commercial satellite imagery
Satellite tracking
NORAD + SKKP?
Global positioning
GPS + GLONASS
Early warning
DSP + Oko?
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Pavel Podvig, Weapons in Space
Conclusion
Complete ban is the best solution
Success is highly unlikely
Partial ban does not make sense
“Arms race” arguments are unlikely to work
They did not work with the ABM Treaty
Weapons in space seem to have little value
Need to separate “weapons in space” from “protecting space assets”
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