PI\HT -
SECOND
CIJAPTEH -
V
PERESTROIKA AND SOVEREIGNTY
The Communist concept of sovereignty was radically changed under
the policy of perestroika.
The milieu of the ideology manifested into
socialist internationalism and class struggle fanning East-West conflict
mercurially evanesced and national sovereignty
began to confirm to
the universal principles of international law and relations.
Emphasis
on
relations
deideologisation
followed
by
the
disintegration
communist
of
and
democratisation
East-European
the
communist
concept into a
"the
international
international
in
1989
system
and
analysis
transformed
the
theory of sovereignty doing away
Even the western scholars concede,
of
this
This part of the study is devoted
great
Perestroika
international
proved
communist
a
communist world.
bull
veritable
system.
economic and political system
It
in
the
China
basically aimed at
shop
of
restructuring
of the Soviet Union through real de-
stalinisation and democratisation process.
The new thinking revolution-
ised the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union.
curtain
to the
change in the context of historic political
upheavals in the erstwhile
and
ultimate
field is now free to return to much of the mainstream theory
in political science". ( 1)
New thinking
revolutions
general
with all its communist features.
of
The
iron
which was lifted by Khurschev in fifties was totally torn off
the
radical
changes
initiated
through
the ·policies..
of
Perestroika (Restructuring) , Glasnost (Open-ness), and Novae Misleniye
(New
Thinking)
changed
the
Soviet
interr:ta tiona!
relations
beyor;d
recognition.
1.
Will:iam E. Odom, "Soviet Politics and After - Old and New
Concepts," World Politics Vol. 45 (October 1992), p. 98. (pp.6698)
-2'22The policies initio ted by Mikhail Gorbachev
have changed the face of Europe.
By the
end of 1990 very
little remained of the
communist system under which the people of
the USSR and Eastern Europe had lived. (2}
The basic
socialist
tenets of the system as class-struggle,
internationalism
differing systems,
based
on
and
the
essential
antagonism
between
principles
convergence
of
of
international
communism
law
and
revolutionary changes that followed within and outside
and
by
peaceful
capitalism.
aptly
observed
that
The
the Soviet Union
were recognised all over the world as collapse of communism.
Ulam
the
were replaced by class-cohesion, inter-state relations
universal
cooperation
and
proletarian and
under the policy of Perestroika
Adam B.
"what had
been conceived as restructuring had the effect of a demolition." (3}
The changes were termed as reversal of communism.
The process
of Perestroika was determined as "irreversible". (4}
But the reforms
initiated by Gorbachev were almost devoured by the forces
that he had
unleashed
in
Soviet Union,
communist
sweeping
the
process.
Consequently
..
which remained as
movement
changes
could
in
the
not
communist
party
of
the
the leader and vanguard of the world
even
Soviet
the
maintain ·its
Union
and
the
existence
communist
under
world.
199J , the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev
6 September
said on the historical experience of USSR with communism:
the
On
decisively
. . . that model has failed which was brought abou~
in our country, and I believe this is a lesson
2.
Angu~
Roxburgh, The Second Russian Revolution - The Struggle
Power in the Kremlin (BBC Books, London, 1991), p.1
3.
Adam B. Ulam,
Union", Current
4.
Documents and Materials _:_ 28th Congress of Communist Party of the
Soviet Union ..:. Resolutions
( Novosti Publishers, Moscow, 1990). p. 96.
11
for
Looking at the Past : The Unravelling of the Soviet
History, Vol. 91, n9. 567, 'October 1992 p. 346
-223-
not only for our people
all peoples ( 5) .
Consequently,
the "Soviet empire in East
Europe",
European satellite states could no longer exist.
international
radical
political
shift
independence,
on
system
the
was
foreign
sovereignty,
to~ally
policy
freedom
and the international relations
or
the
East
The scenario
changed
and
but for
resulting
concepts
of social and
of
of
in
national
political
choice
communist
world
in general.
Roots of Reform
The
began
era
with
of
the
revolutionary
emergence
of
changes
in
Mikhail
the
Gorbachev
as
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on
1985.
( 6)
11
He represented
a profound break with
General
11
.Marc~:)
the Soviet
past 11 •
He translated his vision of change into structural reforms
and
functional innovations into Soviet domestic and foreign policy.
The
focus
The
of his
domestic
programme of reform
reforms,
however,
had
was
baSically
deep
domestic.
repercussions
on
the
communist international system in Eastern •Europe in particular and
on global
politics in ge:teral.
Gorbachev
had
system.
product
world.
He
of
roots
in
considered
powerful
New
interaction.
was
its
the
as
a
thinking
deeper
course initiated
Soviet
economic
both
the
socio-economic
political
Hence,
Revolutionary
currents
was
the
analysis
of
and
political
architect
in
result
this
the
of
by
and
the
communist
a
complex
interaction
of
domestic and international forces is essential to grasp the rationale
behind the radical reforms.
5.
The Times of India, New Delhi, September 7, 1991, p .1.
6.
Robert S. McNamara ,, Out of the Cold
New Thinking for
American Foreign and DefensePolicy in the 21st Century (Simon
and Schuster, New York, 1989), p. 107.
: ..
;
-224-
Domestic
ecnniJmic
·----- -crisis
Gorbachev
faced
recognized
that
the
main
was not external but internal
threat
the
; its economic
Soviet
Union
system was to
be completely restructured if it was to remain a great power . ( 7)
Economically,
high hopes about surpassing capitalism gave
domestic
economic crisis and
market.
The
discouraged
Stalinist
"a
nation
stagnation,
military
long
sinking under
and
official
buildup.
slump
"
during
"suffered from
"shifted
and
cumbersome and unmanageable"
as
intense competition in international
model
development,
with
the
its
creativity,
became
period
dogmas,
while· engaged
Soviet economy
the
and
expansion
weight of rigid
more
was
1976-85.
in
mired
The
economic
a
massive
in a
decade
Soviet
economy
such imbalances that it no longer seemed repairable
but approached a breakdown." ( 10)
such a
initiative
(8). The Soviet Union was perceived
corruption,
( 9)
way to
The Soviet economy had reached
point of stagnation and inefficiency that the infrastructure
of the Soviet Union as a superpower was seriously threatened.
Consequently,
declining
worsening
Soviet growth
West technological gap
reforms
of
(12).
the
state
of
the
Soviet
was growing, prompted Gorbachev to launch
Gorbachev
realized that, if these adverse trends
Union would be outshipped by
7.
the Soviet
newly industrialized countries
to preserve its status as a superpower in
century. f13)
economy,
rates and the realization that the East-
in both domestic and foreign policy were not reversedt
unable
( 11)
and
the 21st
He observed:
Renee De Nevers, "The Soviet Union
end of an Era", Adelphi Papers no.
. and Eastern Europe : The
March 1990, p.4
24~,
8.
Seweryn Bialel;',
"Domestic and International Factors in the
Formation of Gorbachev 1 s Reforms", Journal of International
Affairs Vol. 42, no. 2 Spring 1989, p. 285. ( pp. 283-298)
9.
Bill Bradley, Implications of Soviet New Thinking
(Institute for
East-West Security Studies, New York, 1987), p.21.
10. Anders Aslund,
Gorbachev 1 s Struggle for Economic Reforms
(Cronell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1991), p. 196.
11. Joseph L. Nogee, Soviet ?oreign Policy Since World War .!.!_ (New
York, 1988), p. 335.
12. Robert S. McNamara, Out of the Cold, Supra note no. 6, p. 130.
13. Mikhail . Armacost, "Imo!Jcations of Gorbachev
for U.S. - Soviet
·Relations"-. Journal· of "lntei:'national Affz:irs Vol. 4Z no. 2 Uipring)
1989), p.446. (pp. 445 - 456)
-225-
The political economy of socialism is stuck
with outdated concepts and is no longer in
tune with the dialetics of life. ( 14)
Deformations
Soviet socialist politico-economic system suffered from the centrain the
Soc18TI.st
lly planned economy, the self-;serving communist party, the inflexible
System.
bureaucracy and the police-state mentality.·
A tightly controlled
military state and a rigid, highly centralized economy caused stagnation
which encouraged socio-political demoralization.
by a Stalinist system proved to be the roctl:
"It
was not
Stalinism,
the ghost of Stalin that had
5.n all
its incarnations."
( 15)
The rigidities
fostered
cause of domestic crisis.
to
be
exorcised, but
living
!'he· administrative -
and
-
command system of Stalin turned social science into an obedient set·vant
of the politics elaborated by the party leader (at best by a conference
of
buret<!JJCrats),
bearers
of a
and
large
the
cult.
party
members
( 16)
The
into
silently
socialism
was
voting
rendered
swordinto an
inefficient economy and a complacent society, its state into a functioning
autocracy its legal system into an arbitrary exercise bereit of the rule
of law, its
its
party into a gigantic, arrogant,
citizens into a
marginalised,
bureaucratic apparatus and
mute conformist
mass.
( 17)
In such
circumstances, the people's role in the exercise of state sovereignty was
minimized.
remained
Nationalities
question
The
claim
of
peoples •
sovereignty
in
a
socialist
state
only a facade.
Similarly, undemocratic handling of the nationalities question
within the Soviet Union caused ethnic frictions and national arrogance
threatening stability of the Union.
Concentration of power at the centre
and apathy to local needs generated a political awareness which the
14.
Mikhail Gorbar.hev,
Perestroika .=. New Thinking for Our Country
and the World .!_-Fontana /Coollins, London, 1988) , p. 49
15.
Angus Roxburgh, The Second Russian Revolution Supra note no. 2,
p.63.
16.
Adas Burganov,
Perestroika and
the Concept of Socialism,
( Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, ··Moscow, 1990) , p. 5.
17.
Rasheeduddin Khan,
(New Delhi), Vol.
December, 1988}, p.
"Perestroika: An overview
9, No. 10-11-12, October
~-
II
World Focus
November
-226communist ideology was now unable to resist with.
problems
between the
Centre and
Republics
This caused immense
relations.
Leonid So bolev
observed
Such practice did not enhance the sense
of rational
self-awareness, independence
~nd initia ta ti ve; it led to stagnation and to
deformations in the sphere of national and
inter-republican relations. ( 16)
The discontent manifested in the workers strikes, demands for
more powers
to the Soviets.
Particulary, the non- Russian nations
were determined to throw off outdated imperial structures.
Hence,
Gorbachev
had to confront a tremendous
task of enhancing the
sovereignty of the republics while keeping them within the Union.
Huge
militarisation
On
the one hand,
the magnitude of domestic problems demanded
urgent and concentrated attention.
On the other hand,
the international
environment offered challenges to maintain Soviet military and political
power.
Military
defence costs.
competetion
with
the
Military considerations
West
had
produced
enormous
domina ted decision- making
in
both domestic and foreign policy spheres.
In the domestic area, it was
assigned
era
top
importance
economic
of military
All excess and
priority.
In
power
for achieving
undemocratic
was
the
procedures
capitalism formed the permanent context.
a
spiralling arms
were
foreign
policy,
the
political goals.
legitimized
( 19)
because anti-
Consequently, it resulted
race and an expenditure
System could no longer endure.
of
in
which the Soviet
b~rden
The huge Soviet military build ··up
·~
during the 1970S and early 1960S pUSlfed the COUntry IS :SCarce reSOUrCeS
to
the
limit.
(20)
Gorbachev observed,
"
militarisation of the economy
swallowed up huge material and intellectual resources."
dichotomy
weakness
between
of
the
the
rest
1
Soviet
of its
"internal decline coupled
Union s
economy
,
military
strength
( 21)
and
The
the
reflected
the Soviet paradox As a result,
with awesome military power".
16.
Leonid Sobolev, Anything the Law Does not Prohibit is Allowed
( Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1966), p .4
19.
Seweryn Bialer,
"Domesti.c and International Factors in
Formation of Gorbachev 's Reforms", supra note no. 6, p. 293
20.
Anuradha M. Chenoy, "Systemic Change. and Systematic Collapse",
The Soviet
Experience, Seminar
·(New Delhi), no.393, May 1992,
p. 21( pp. 16-22)
21.
Documents and Materials
note. no. 4,P.6
-
26th
Congress
of
the
CPSU,
the
Supra
-227-
the Soviet Union was "essentially incapable of sustaining effective global
dominance".
Problems
in East-
Eli r""Q""P"e
(22)
By the mid - 1980s the "image of the €1nemy" was in the process
of
dissolution,
and
a
growing
number of citizens in
East
European
countries no longer saw the West as threat to the political or national
existence
of
their
state.
( 23)
solidarity
movement
in
Poland,
improve
relations
Hungarians,
Rumania
but
problems
with
the
economic
all
for
with
of
Eastern
for
the
Bonn,
woes
the Soviet
pressures
The broad
based
evident
the
which
East
"creeping
effected
Europe,
populal'ity
German
not
merely
on
the
to
of
the
Poland
and
posed ·extraordinarily
independence
the
wishes
capitalism"
leadershj p .. ( 24) The Soviet
increased
of
difficult
Union confronted
part
of
its
East
European allies.
The events in Poland demonstrated popular resistance
to Soviet
in
system
communist
Romania
the
country
had
region.
with
asserted
an
In fact
organised
occal'>sional
Poland
became the first . non-
and non-violent
independence
in
opposition.
foreign
policy
by
denouncing Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia
in 1968 and Afghanistan
in
affairs
1979.
economic
Since
the
1960s
policies
steadily
acceptance of Soviet
the Soviet Union.
independence
decentralized
Romania
in
tested
bloc behaviour.
Since 1948,
rejecting
foreign
and
bloc
stretched
Hungary
in
limits
of
the
Albania remained
Yugoslavia,
the Soviet
and
unaligned
with
more or less maintained its
politics and
experimenting
with
economic management and free trade, with the West. ( 25)
Thus,
the
Soviet
"external
empire"
had peakea"··
and
evidence
of
22.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan - How to
onduct the US-Soviet
Contest (Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston/New . ark, 1986), p .130
23.
Yuriy
Mutual
edited
Press,
24.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,
House, New YorC1987j, p.50~ - - - - -
25.
Thomas H. Naylor, The Gorbachev Strategy .:. Opening the Closed
Security (Lexington Books, D.C. HeaA:h and Company,
Massachuacetts, 1987) pp. 15-16.
Davydov "Eastern Europe and International Instability", in
Security .:. ~ New Approach ~ Soviet American Relations
by
Richard Smoke
and Andrei Kortuhov
(St. Martin's
New York, 1991), p.129. (pp. 127'- 136)
(Random
-228decline could be found
areas. ( 26) "
in economic, military,· political and ideological
Brzezinski observed
"East European economic difficulties were
likely
to
mount, thereby. .. intensifying
political unrest." (27)
Burden of
nuring the le<-~dershi~· paralysis
East
subsequent power vacuum of the Kremlin
Eli"rape
of
Eastern
Europe slackened
giving
of
the
Brezhnev
poriod,
and
interregum, Saviet supervision
greater
leeway
tJ
the
centrifugal
tendencies of the native communist leaderships,
The economic situation
!:1 Eastern Europe deteriorated, increasing the
Soviet economic burden
and
P,~tentially
creating
destabilizing
conditions
in
t::le Soviet
empire.
The Soviet leadership was unable to devise a strategy for reconcili:lting
its dual need for economically and
Europe
and
for
the
kind
domination in the ::-egion.
of
alliance
to "ease
Soviet economy ... 11 ( 28)
Soviet
foreign
country's
Europe
Adverse
International
Environ'1985,
ment
By
policy
economic
cohesion
required
to
maintain
It was increasingly difficult even to maintain
t::1is region as the zone of Soviet
bloc was resorted
politically sta'Jle regimes in Easter11
the
influence.
~urdens
Hence, deregulation ::>f the
Eastern Europe placed on the
One of the central objectives in the shift in
since 1985
means.
( 29)
ceased to be an asset
was
By
to
the
adjust
end
foreign
of
the
to Soviet foreign policy.
The intt:irnational enviro:1ment, into which the
policy
1980s,
to
the
Eastern
( 30)
Soviet Union was in
was compelling for drastic changes in domestic and foreign policy.
the
early
1980s,
Soviet
international
position
deteriorated
26.
S. Bialer, "Socialist Stagnation and Communist Encirclement". in
The Soviet Union in the 1980's edited by Erik P. Hoffman (New
York, 1984) ~6~ ---
27.
Z. Brzezinski, The Grarrt Failure - The· Birth a!)d Death of Communisn
in the Twentj.eth -c-emui".J'i (Ma-cffiiiian, New York, ·1990), p.31
28.
Valerie Bunce,
"The Soviet Union under Gorbachev
Ending
Stalinism and Ending the Cold War", International Journal
Vol.
XLVI, Spring 1991, p. 230. ( pp. 220-241) .
29.
John Edwin Mroz "Soviet Policy and New Thinking", International
Affairs (Moscow), no.5, May 1990, p.25. (pp.23-33)
30.
S. Bialer and M. Mandelbaum Global Rivals
Contest for Supremacy
between Amet·ica and
(Alfred A. Knopf New York, 1988), p.166.
1
The Forty
the Soviet
Years
Union
-229considerably.
While detente
with the Western Europe
was still
alive,
the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979
ended it with
United States.
The declaration of material law in Poland in
the
1981, President Ronald Regan's
anti-Soviet rehetoric and downing
with the
Korean Air Lines Flight in 1983, all contributed to a
rapid worsening of U.S. Soviet relations.
The Soviet Union found
itself over-expanded internationally,
the
promise
of
non-term
straining its resources without
victories.
movements that had been in 1970's
The
national
liberation
a symbol of increased Soviet
influence became by the early 1980's an anti-Soviet force.
Socialism
gave into
Capitalism
Rise of Japan
The
Soviet
percerption of economic· devf.llopment was guided by
the comparaUvist attitude
Lenin, but especially
era,
the
in
the
last
a complex
economic
with
two
the
decades,
the industrial
technological
Soviet
Union
with
an
conceded
Soviet
and
was a driving
force
behind
the changing circumstances. On the other hand,
model.
advanced
increased
the superiority
revolution
expanded to
The global nature of market, the
interdependence
innovative economic development
behind
with
But the Stalinist model could no longer
systems of economy.
and
Starting
surpassing" economically and
capitalist system
Soviet policy formulation.
promote growth
sphere.
under Stalin and continuing in the post-Stalin
slogan of "catching up and
technologically,
during
international
of
all
countries
and
in Japan and Western Europe left
The
technological
capitalist
momentum.
countries
·Even
gap
between
was
the
widening.,
the Soviet scholars
of the capitalist development:
the United
states,
Western
Europe
and
Japan
have
intensified their ef-forts to coordinate their
activities
which
I)Ot
only
would
be
effective in an economic
crisis, but would
be stable and comprehensive. (31)
31.
A. ~ogdanov, !.~~ USA, Western Eur9~ lY~Sn ..:. ~ Triangle
of R1va1ry· {Pcogrt::ss-"Plibhsners,.,Moscow,
·):, p.101
-230-
Japan became a
powerful economic force in the world while
Soviet Union continued to lose credibility as a model for economic
..
development.
Soviet
system
resulted in its political degradation in the global politics.
China
also
11
Thus
degradation
of
the
emerged as a major and effective opponent of Soviet regional
hegemonic
aspirations. 11
its capability
this
economic
(32)
The Soviet Union,
obviously
to «;:ompete with the United States.
developing
scenario,
Gorbachev
resorted
lost
Keeping in view
to
a
policy
of
cooperation in place of confrontation:
Instead of inflating the image of the enemy
in order to justify the poor domestic
economic situation, he moved to deflate the
image, reduce tensions and defuse conflicts
in order to allow a reduction of military
spending and increased investment in the
civilian economy. (33)
Urgency for
Change.
The Soviet Union 1 s
relative decline· on the international scene
continued with its domestic crisis created a situation that required
an urgent reassessment
of the strategic direction of Soviet security
and
foreign
policy.
policy concept
of our
11
foreign
Highly
The innovation
policy,
especially
concepts
and
of the results
those. of the last decade 11 • (34)
Soviet
traditional
leadership
frozen
policies
and tacticaUy
inflexible, failed to respond to the wave
1980 s,
the
1
spiritual
foreign
new
emerged from a critical assessment
unimaginative previous
strategic
the
in .
Soviet
Union
The
crisis.
confronted
system
of time.
a
could
state
not
of
in
old
By the mid material
and
without
survive
The Brezhnev era was characterised
revolutionary transformations.
by Gorbachev at the June 1987 Plenum oL.the central committee, as
the
appearance
asserted
the
that
profound
of
radical
11
pre-crisis
reform
processes
of
11
phenomenon 11 •
is an urgent
development
Consequently,
necessity arising
in our socialist
he
from
society.
32.
z.
33.
Robert
137.
34.
Vadim Zag lad in,
To Restructure and Humanize lnterna tional
Relations
( NovostiPress Agency ·Publishing House, Moscow,
1989) • p. 62.
Brzezinski,_Game
Plan
·--)
Supra note no. 22
p. 220.
S. Me Namara, Out of the Cold Supra note no. 6, p.
------
-231-=
This society is ripe
for change". ( 35)
The obvious gravity of the
existing conditions in this respect provided
stimulant
for
revolutionary
change
in
an immensely powerful
the Soviet
system
and
its
policies.
Perestroika and Glasnost
Perestroika emerged as a panacea for all the ills of Soviet
Communist
system.
As enunciated by Gorbachev, perestroika
was
a multifaceted
programme covering several· dimensions.
complex and diverse
of
efforts
and
phenomenon,
programmes
in
incorporating an immense variety
both
domestic
and
foreign
activities of the USSR and other socialist countries."(36)
at
all-round
intensification
of
the
Soviet
political s ystem and democratisation
apparatus
and international relations.
change
in
the
realm
of
was "a
It
i.nter-state
of
economy
the
policy
It aimed
reforming
Party
and
the
state
Perestroika sought radical
and
international
relations
emphasisingclose cooperation between different political systems and
democratisation of international relations
withi.n the communist
world.
In
the
words
Revolution."
(37)
of Mikhail
The changes
that
Gorbachev,
followed
"Perestroika
by
is a
the persuance of
perestroika policies proved this beyond any doubt.
Perestroika
Perestroika
revolutionary,
transformations
means
devoured
of the
restructuring.
The
concept
being
all
social 1 legal
and
political
the
Soviet system. .·;, ' It was primarily a
"programatic domestic response to the crisis ·of the Soviet system.
( 38)
The basic na tiona! interests of the USSR urgently needed the
35.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika .=. New Thinking for our Country
and the World supra note no .14 . , p. 17.
36.
G. Lisichkin, "Marx aJld; 'Perestroika", Soviet Review Vol. XXVI,
no.6 (June 1989), p. 12. (pp.12-15)
37.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika .=. New Thinking for our country
and the World,
supra note no. 14, p. 49.
38.
Serweryn Bialer and Michael
Supra note no. 30. p. 82.
Mandelbaum,
The
Global
Rivals,
-232-
enforcement
economic
(?.)
a
USSR
of
Perestroika
These
interests
included
( 1)
modernisation to improve the Soviet standard of
reduction of the economic and
and
other developed
technological gap between the
countries;
the USSR into the world economy;
living;
( 3)
( 4)
, a
gradual integration of
the further reduction of the
threat of a nuclear or conventional
war;
in the military budget achieved
reducing military forces to the
level of reasonable
defence sufficiency;
solving global problems;
the
Eastern
by
( 5) a substantial reduction
European
( 6) active participation in
(7) a reconstruction of relationships with
countries
and
the
creation
of
normal
and
mutually beneficial relations with all neighbour - states (39)
Perestroika process aimed at renovation of the socialist system.
Vadim
Zagladin observed,
obsolete,
with
progress".
kinds
( 40)
the
"It is a struggle with the
conservative,
with
everything
phenomena
inherited
from
Indian communist theoretician Mohit ·Sen observed,
that
hampers
the
past...
( 41)
"Perestroika is a
to destroy Stalinism and the Stalinist system and to take
the Soviet Union to a democratic, humane socialism".
western scholars did not,
in the socialist system.
aimed
with the
Major thrust of perestroika was "to get rid of all
of negative
revolution
old,
at
correcting
initially
perceive any
It was considered
the
system
of
( 42)
But the
fundamental change
"a complex Of measures
socialism,
which
as
such
is
ne],/,ther called into quesUon nor in any way subject to fundamental
change".
( 43)
than politics".
perestroika
It
( 44)
virtually
had
"r(luch
more to do
with
pragmatism
rather
But the ·fast radical changes soon proved that
attacked
the
very
roots
of
the
socialist
system.
39.
Pavel T. Podlesnyi, "The Agenda of U.S. - Soviet Relations for
the 1990's", Journal of International Law ·and Politics, vol.22,
Spring 1990, no.3, p. 397.
--
40.
Vadim
zagladin,
To
Restructure
Relations, Supra note n034 , p .15.
41.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika , supra note no.11,p.263.
42.
Mohit Sen, "Will the Neo-Stalinists
India August 25, 1991, p.11.
43.
Heinrich Bechtoldt, "Gorbachev
Initiatives or Reactions",?
Aussen Politik,
Vol. 39, no.4 (1988), p. 320 (pp.319-330)
44.
Thomas
H.
Naylor,
no. 25 , p. 199.
The
and
Humanize
WakeUp
Gorbachev
?",
Strategy,
International
The Ti.mes of
Supra
note
-233Perestroika
aimed
at
structural
change
and
functional
transformation of the Soviet economy,
society and polity.
The
objective of perestroika
was defined by Gorbachev during his speech
at the 19th All Union Conference of the CPSU
on 1 July 1988. "
through
will
reach
revolutionary
perestroika,
our
society
a
qualitatively new state, and socialism will be given a new humane and
democratic image" ( 45) .
• ··
Democratisation implied a conscious effort of simplify the process
and
perfect
the methods
of work
of the entire
state apparatus.
Boris Yeltsin also stressed on the reforms to curb
bureaucracy and its
arbitrariness.
self
"Unless
we
democratize
our
life,
conceit
and
arbitrariness could again rear their ugly heads, and bureaucratism could
again
thrive".
( 46).
Consequently
economic , cultural
perestroika
"projected
and ideological fields".
to evolve
were designed
was
the Soviet
sovereignty.
affirmed
of
proletariat
On
19
and
November
state
1990
in
This aimed
sovereignty
Paris,
the revolutionary changes in the Soviet
the historic
turnaround in the
freedom and democracy;
law governed
the economy
Soviet Union
the
All political
state "as the
and administering the peoples power". ( 48)
dictatorship
(47)
into
political,
reforms
entity organizing
at transforming
into
Gorbachev,
peoples
himself,
political system." ...
from totalitarianism to
from the command and bureauctratic system to a
state and political
to equality
pluralism;
from a state monopoly in
and diversity of ownership forms and market
relations; and from unitarianism to a union of sovereign states ..• ( 49) •
Perestroika "marked
not only
a drastic turn in Soviet internal
policy away from the Stalinist model", but ~~~i~o
changes
in the system of political and economic
socialist countries ".
(50)
introduced
profound
relations among the
Domestic changes. in the Soviet Union were
45.
46.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Supra note no .14 p. 269.
Boris Yel tsin, Restructuring to be Stepped .!:!£
( Novosti Press,
Moscow, 1987).
47.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Address at the United Nations, December, 7,1988
Text
in
Perestroika
and
the
New· World
Order
( Novosti
Publishers, Moscow, 1991~ p. --s2 ( pp. 37-60)
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Supra note no. 14, p. 281
Mikhail Gorbachev, Address at the· Meeting of the Leaders of
States Participating in the E:onference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe ( Novosti Publishers, Moscow, 1990), p. 3
"A Soviet View of Eastern Europe", by the staff of the institute of
Economics of the World Socialist System (Moscow), Text in The Bloc
That Failed, Charles Gati, (Indiana University Press, Bloomingto~
1990), pp.209-210.
48.
49.
50.
-234-
intimately related to the changes in Eastern Europe.
.
(51)
Since.
\-
changes in the home policy of such a great power as the Soviet
Union
cannot
but
influence
international developments.
sense·. perestroika became an international factor.
policy
of
perestroika,
Gorbachev
(52)
commited
In
this
Under the
himself
to
restructuring
the Soviet Union and the international system aimed
to
the Soviet
integrate
(53)
Union
into
the
global
capitalist
system.
On 12 June • 1990 during his speech at the third session of
the USSR Supreme
of perestroika.
Soviet.
Gorbachev highlighted
the importance
. .. perestroika in the Soviet Union
is
a
central
point of
world
politics
today
is
the
culmination of the radical changes
in Europe. (54)
Perestroika
radical
change
international
"the
in
the
Soviet
system."
development
cooperation
established
with
(55)
of
the
"a
very
Union
high
and
correlation
radical
Consequently. _its
new
forms
East
European
of
change
emphasis
political
countries"
and
(56)
between
in
the
was
on
economic
These
new
forms of inter-socialist relations. altering. the erstwhile stereotype
systems
and
concepts,
were materialized
through
the policy of
glasnost.
Glasnost
As
a
corollary
of
perestroika.
glasnost facilitated the
process of radical change in the Soviet system.
for
glasnost
was
the
need.
to
expose
The main impetus
economic
inefficiency.
51.
Mikhael
Mandelbaum.
"Ending the Cold
War".
Foreign
Affairs. Vol. 68. Spring 1989, no.2, p.30. (pp.16-36)
52.
Y.
Rumyantsev.
"The
Policy". Soviet Review
p.7 (pp 7-8. 16-17)
53.
Valerie Bunce. "The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev : Ending
Stalinism and Ending the Cold War". International Journal
Vol. XLVI, Spring 1991. p.229.
54.
Mikhail Gorbachev. Perestroika
Supra note no. 47, p. 85.
55.
Valerie Bunce, Supra note no.. 53, p .·240
56.
Dl'l:'...IOJ.,!'lts and Ma·~erials . :. _
n01:e no. 4. p.90.
li;·.'
Mainlines of the
no .11. vol. XXV.
~8th
Soviet Foreign
November 1988.
and the New World Order
Congress of me CPSU. Supra
-235incompetence, corruption and social ills C!S part of
bureaucratic
perestroika.
Glasnost
was
recognized
(57) It denoted "greater openness
authorities and wider
the Soviet
Union."
as
"a
powerful
the policy of
perestroika
weapon".
and public accountability on the part of the
political and cultural self-expression by the people of
(58)
Gorbachev 1 s
policy of openness was "an attempt to
gain the support of intellectuals in a campaign for economic revitalization" (59)
Glasnost was the "unfolding of criticism and self-critic1sm and the assertion of
openness and truthfulness in politics. "(60)
of
public
expression,
marketization
of
Glasnost involved the liberalization
the
socialist economy
and
political
democratization ( 61} .
w~s
Menance of ignorance and intertia of thought
system
under
observed
the
that
somehow
history of Britain,
marked
"a
party,
( 63)
dominance
real
people
the
in
break
with
was on
quite simply,
the
Communist
the
France or Germany
premised ·as it
Glasnost,
of
Soviet
throughly
Union
Bolshevik
the need for
Mikhail
Party.
than about
entire
'endemic in the Soviet
knew
their own.
conception
more
Alexeyev
a bout
( 62)
of
the
Glasnost
a
vanguard
tutelage over backward masses".
"delegitimiz~ct
the party and exposed
the Soviet Union as an empire". ( 64)
The new political thinking 1 created "an ambienc.Ejl_,.conducive to debate and
to a re-examination of the fundamental premises of Soviet international relations
theory." (65)
Glasnost provided a new perspective fqr. Soviet foreign Policy.
The post - World War period sealed off the East
Eu~opean
"Socialist Community"
57.
Resolutions of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU (July 1988) Text
in M. Gorbachev, Perestroika Supra note no.11,()':"303(pp.269-310)
58.
Seweryn Bailer and M·. MandelbaumGlobal Rivals
59.
Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, , Beyond Glasnost .:. The Post· -Totalitarian Mj.nd (The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1989) , p. 185.
60.
Resolutions of the 19th All-Union Conference of. th.e C_PSU, supra note no -57·.
61.
George w. Breslauer, "Linking Gorbachev 1 s
Domestic and Foreign Policies",
Journal of International Affairs,Vol. 42/No.Z (Spring 1989),pp 269-70
62.
In, Mikhail Gorbachev, Democratization - The Essence of Perestroika, the
the Essence of Socialism-( Novosti Press -Agency Publishing House, Moscow,
1988), p.29-
63.
Gail W. Lapidus, "Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet System 1 "D~edalus
Vol. 116 (Spring 1987), p. 17
64.
Alexander J. Motyl, "Totalitarian Collapse, Imperial Disintegration and Rise
of the Soviet West: Implica!ions for the West, "In. the Rise of Nations in
the Soviet Union • edited by. MiChael Mandelbaum, (Council ;;f Foreign Relation
Press, New York, l991), p. 46
Margot L1gh t, The Soviet Theory of lnterna tiona! Relations (Wheat sheaf
Books, Sussex 1988), p. 295-296.
Supra note noaa,
p.113.
p.
65.
-236-
from
contamination by
openness to
West.
But
be the solution.
Gorbachev
considered
greater
Glasnost "meant a greater tolerance
for diversity in political opinion and less secrecy in military and
national
security
deemed
rule,
affairs"
sensational
was
not
only
in
The
(66)
comparision
the
proof
but
opening
up
with the
also
of
the system,
previous
the
cause
of
proposed
his
European
changes.
(67)
comrades;
freedom to experiment with their economigs,
Gorbachev
and
politics ... "(68)
the
East
European
offered
"freedom
to
With the policy of glasnost,
states
came
to
know
the
pattern of
management
the peoples of
reality
of
their
domestic as well as the economic prosperity or' their neighbouring
western countries.
With
the
breakthrough
in
the
news
media,
the
nations
and
nationalities
of
greater
East
Central Europe could no longer be
kept ignorant of either the richer
and freer societies to the west or
of the manifest deficiencies in the
running
of
their
own
captive
societies. ( 69)
Under the new policy,
"iron
curtains"
disappearing.
and
( 70)
involved
radical
bilateral
and
Elgiz Pozdnyakov observed
barriers
In
change
dividing
its
in
multi-lateral
the
peoples
international
realm
relations and
of
and
free
states
dimension,
inter-state
that the
were
glasnost
deplomacy,
trade and
commer.ce
transactions.
66.
Coit D. Blacker, "The Collapse of Soviet Power in Europe",
Foreign Affairs (New York), Vol. 70, no.l, 199J. p.96.
( pp. 88-102)
67.
Moshe Lewin,
"Perestroika
A New Historical Stage,"
Journal of International Affairs Vol. 42, no.2, Spring 1989)1?·:106.
68.
John Sallnow, Reform in the Soviet Union: Glasnost and the
Future (Pinter Publications, London, 1989), p. 82
69.
Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power : The pursuit
of the Nation - State in East Central Europe", Journal of International Affairs, winter 1992, val. 45, no.2, p.507
-
70.
Elgiz Pozdnyakov, "National and Interna tiunal in the Foreign
Policy "International Affairs (Moscow), Vol.6 (1989),p.11.
(pp.3-13)
-237-
Impact of
ihe
New
Think~
and
Perestroika
to
respond
domestic
responsibility
Soviet
to
domestic
Europe.
forms
its
people.
politics
of
change
emphasizing
But
(7l)
generally
"the
first
in
had
Soviet
in
Eastern
inspired and
in Eastern Europe".
people
was
innovation
resonance
Policy
(73)
the Soviet
Europe".
to
govet·nment 's
the
any
a
designed
of
in
in
the
Eastern
glasnost
had a decisive influence on the tempos,
perestroika
the
problems,
Consequently,
perestroika
primarily,
Glasnost,
and
essence and
"Gorbachev's
( '12)
then accelerated the developments
With
the new
Uni.on and
international environm!Jnt-
the Soviet. bloc
might
fight
over the meaning of democracy and could attempt to give it real
content.
(74)
spread
the
like
grandiose
A German
a
fire
facades
scholar Heinz Brahm observed,
"Glasnost
to all areas of public life and
destroyed
which
had
previously
deceived
the
populaUon ... "(75)
New political
forward
from
foreign
the
thinking
age
was
consj_dered
of negativism,
which
policy in the early 1980's (7ti)
"as
the
movement
charecterised
Soviet
Soviet initiatives around
the globe constituted "a concerted and ambitious effort to overcome
the political isolation and economic marginality
The new
j_mage of openness served
prestige,
which was eroded in
of continuing
milHary
of Moscow ... " ( 77)
to restore Soviet international
the: post detente years as a result
build-up and
the invasion of Afghanistan.
71.
David Mason, " Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe",
lnterna tional Affairs (London) Sum mer 1988, p. 436 ( pp. 431-448)
7'1..
Yuriy
Dav-ydov,
"Eastern
Europe
and
International
Stability", in Mutual Security - A New Approach to Soviet
American Relation, edited by Richard Smoke and Andrei
Kortunov,
(St. Martins Press, New York, 1991), p.1t.8.
( pp .1~7-D6)
73.
Ernest Kux, "Revolution in Eastern Europe - Revolution in
the West 11
,
Problems of Communism May-June 1991, no. 3,
Vol. XL, p.3. (pp.l-13)
74.
75.
Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, Beyond Glasnost, supra note no.g ,p.195.
Heinz Brahm, "The Disintegrating Soviet Unjon and Europe,"
Aussenpolitik . no. 1, 199L., p.44. (pp.43-53)
76.
Walter Laqueur, The Lung Road _!£ Freedom .=. Russia and Glasnost
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 19~9), p. ~19
Gali W. Lapidus, "Gm·bachev and The Soviet Heform of the Soviet
System", -Daedalus, vol.116, no.2 (Spring 1987),p.2'i
77.
-238P81
The
"new
thinking"
in
the
formulation
of
foreign
policy
"challenged allies and adversaries alike to join in the searr.:h for
naval
the
answers to old problems".
withdrawal
national
from
liberation
(79)
Afghanistan,
movements
and
New policy contributed "to
the
cooling
eventually
of
to
support
the
for
tolerance of
the anti-communist revolutions in Eastern Europe." ( 80)
thus
Perestroika
international
relations,
interdependent
organic
sought
predicted
world.
communist concepts underwent
deep
rooted
in
to
integument.
response
of
a
valid
the
With
force,
inter-state
the
the
legal
and
Soviet
reform,
"outgrown
new
perespective
system
institutional framework of domination in Eastern Europe
It
political
had
Soviet
and
assumptions of an
radical change.
forces,
"(81)
political
the
All
sociological
institutional
on
restructure
their
and
and
its
collapsed.
was aptly observed that "Gorbachev was a revolutionary, not a
reformer:
the
he went for in destroying the old system" for "this was
(82)
only
alternative
to
restoring
Perestroika
it".
reestablished full sovereign rights to the East European states.
The
last
five
years
of
perestroika
have,
in
effect,
served as a sur raga te ... favouring
resident nation-states by restoring
political
sovereignty
and
independence. (83)
78.
Natalie Gross, "Glasnost : Roots and Practice", Problems of
Communism November- December 1987, p.73 (pp.69-80)
-
79.
Coit D. Blacker, "The Collapse of Soviet Power in Europe",
(New York, Vol. 70, no.1, 1991, p. 9G.
Foreign Affairs
80.
Angus Roxburgh,
no. 2 , p.SO.
81.
Allen Lynch, "Does Gorbachev Matter Anymore?", Foreign
Affairs val. 69, no.3 (Summer 1990), p.21. (pp.19-29)
82.
William E. Odom, "Soviet Politics and After - Old and New
Concepts", supra note no .1, p. 92.
83.
Raymond Pearson, "The Geopolitics of People Power", supra
note no. 69·,
p.510.
The Second Russian Revolution,
supra note
-239-
The "New Thinking" was "the- remarkable Soviet rejection of
a
number
both
of
fundamental
domestic
and
tenets
foreign
of Marxist-Leninist
policy.
(84)
Elgiz
ideology
in
Pozdnyakov,
Chief Researcher at the USSR Academy of Sciences of World Economy
and international relations affirmed:
We are revising and rethinking
many concepts and notions that
until recently seemed unshakable:
the state,
the class struggle,
internationalism
sovereignty,
peaceful
coexistence
and
much
else. (85)
I
Perestroika,
in
the
words
into "the principles of new
deideologiza tion
countries
of
without
affairs ... "
(86)
exception
of
concepts,
freedom
relations,
and
successfully manifested
the
this
Hence,
of
choice,
equality
non-interference
All these facets revolve around
national sovereignty.
process
of Gorbachev,
thinking
interstate
•
of
in
all
internal
the concept of
I have attempted a11 analysis of the
transformation
of
the
communist
systems
and
with special reference to sovereignty, in the succeeding
sections of this study.
Decline of Class Rule and Class Struggle
The concept
of class-conflict
in society and
emergence of
dictatorship of proletariat after successful socialist revolution hnd
a
long
record
Proletarian
of
respectability
internationalism
posited
among
communist
scholars.
"the identity of interests of
84.
Robert S. McNamara 1 . Out of the Cold
Supra note no. 61
85.
E. Pozdnyakov
"Na tiona! and International
Policy," Supra note no. 701 p.ll.
86.
tvllkhail Gorbachevl Addr.ess £!:_the Meeting of the Leaders
.2.!_ States Participating in the Conference on Security and
Coopcca tion in Europe supra note no. 4.9
p. 4.
I
1
I
I
in
the
Foreign
p.toe
-240industrial
workers
ethnic origin".
based
(87)
and
sovereignty~
and
was exercised
on
class
rather
than
on nationality
or
According to the traditional concept of state
sovereign power rested with the proletariat class
by
the
Communist
party.
Focus of all state
activities was to eliminate the exploiting class and state interests
were identified
and
simple
with
class
the class interests.
rule
in
domestic
It
affairs
was,
and
in fact,
represented
continuation of the class politics of the victorious
foreign
policy.
policy on
domestic
There
(i.e.
was
an
absolute
of the notion that all states were directly
actors.
of
forej.gn
to the rejection
~omparable
as neutral
( 88)
Perestroika emphasised
confront
times.
a
proletariat in
dependency
class structure leading
pure
successfully
on social and
socio-economic
political harmony
challenges
of
the
to
modern
Gorbachev observed:
The Soviet state was born as a
tool of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and ... evolved into a
state of the whole people
The
task is now to bring the Soviet
state system into full conformity
with
this
concept,
with all
rna tters to be decided by the
people and
to be handled
under full and effective popular
control. ( 89)
87.
Charles Gati, The Bloc That Failed
Soviet -East
European Relations in TransTilon
(Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1990), p. 71.
88.
Jyrki
Livonen,
"Soviet
Transition", in Gorbachev
Harle and Jyrkilivonen
1990), p.23. (pp.22-39)
89.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika Country and the World, Supra note
Foreign
Policy
Doctrine
in
and Europe edited by Vilho
(Pinter Publishers,
London,
New
Thinking
p.281.
n~44,
For Our
-241Thus,
system
the
of
objective
socialist
socialist power by
of the new
power
in
the
thinking
interests
the people themselves.
of full democracy and people
1
was
of
to
transform a
the
people
to
a
This was a vindication
sovereignty
S
28th CPSU Congress observed that decades of domination by the
administrative
property
command
and
system
power.
ominipotency
of
rule of law.
the
(90)
alienated
The
communist
the
rigidity
party
working
of
was to
the
by
the
were to make "a
existing
system and stressed on "the need to strengthen the law, to
against
(91)
and
rule
vigorously
law state".
system
socialist
fight
of -
from
be replaced
All endeavours under perestroika
-
class
violations."
Perestroika
( 92)
exposed
Soviet
Scholar
the
Yuri
Feofanov conceded:
... we had neither a proletarian state
nor proletarian dictatorship worthy of
the name.
There was a "naked power"
dictatorship,
· party-ridden
and
ideologized throughout. (93)
was
It
courts
of
considered
law,
subordination
offensive
to
to
secure
law
against
essential
to
enhance
the
independence . .. of
Perestroika
alone.
bureaucracy
and
its
authority
judges
launched
indifference
of
and
the
their
an
effective
to
people 1 s
Rise of peoples power under the new policy resulted in the
rights.
de-legitimizing of the Communist Party 1 s authority as representative
of the class interests of the working class!•' ::
demise
of
communism
the
an~
CPSU
in
plura_l~sm
view
of
the
rapid
S~holars
envisaged the
development
of
anti-
in the East European region.
90.
Documents and Mated~afS:28th: Congress of the E:PSU
no.4, p.44-------
91.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Supra., ! 'note no. 1 4 • p. 308.
Leonid Sobolev, Anything The Law Does Not Prohibit is Allowed
(Novosti Press Agency Publishing House,.. Moscow, 1988), p.S.
92
Yuri Feofanov,
"State Ideology at Wo_rk",
(Moscow) no. 4, April 1991, p.84. (pp. 83-87)
93.
Documents and Materials : 28th Congress
4,
p. 44.
- ---
in
Sup!"a· note
Perestroika
of the CPSU
Supra note
1
-242As the experience gathered by the
countries of Eastern Europe shows; the
most
likely
result
would
be
a
disintegration of the CPSU. (94)
A
harmonious
interests
policy
was
aimed
at
society.
economic
of perestroika.
longer
PO
with
a
political . power
development.
was
above
class-
_perceived under
the
The class concept of national sovereignty
relevant
in
the new
political
thinking.
It
stopped
"identifying the state with society. class interests with the interests
of the state.
The
new
internationalist with state interests. and so on".
political
thinking
communist ideologues.
drastically
changed
the
perception
( 95)
of
Prominent theorists Yakovelev was reported to
have said during the 28th CPSU Congress:
Marx Engels · and Lenin did not create
any theory of man, of a just society.
They
created
a
theory
of
class
struggle.
The implementation of this
doctrine has been the
cause of our
tragedy • ( 96}
The
founders
struggle of social
theory
the
relied
arena
Pozdnyakov
was
of
communism
classes.
viewed
political
.... :
The dogmatic approach to the
domestic
described
or foreign
affairs
this anomaly.
of
the state and
other
civil society.
sovereignty
State.
E.
of the state
~
states-
was
afways
re~p.ect
and
leads
insoluble contradictions in theory and
state
Marxian
solely as an instrument and embodiment of ·class
",·. I •
with
the
"The descJ;"iRtion
dominance- which is one-sided-even with
relations
the
on class approach in all kiflds of politics whether
(and its interests)
between
struggle as
to internal relations
to its foreign
to
faulty
practice".
viewed
as
class
'•l
policy and
prepositions
and
Since,
the
sovereignty,
it
(97)
•
94.
·Prof. Kemeny Laszlo (Hungarian) "No More Monopoly on Power",
Perestroika (Moscow} no.9 (September 1990). p.5 (pp.3-5)
95.
E. Pozdnyakov, .'"National and International in the Foreign
International Affa'irs (Moscow), Vol. 6 (June 1989), p. 11
96.
The 28th GPSU Congress _
Commentary
on the events
Moscow, 1990). p. 43.
97.
~
of
Triumph for
July 2-13.
,.
E.
Pozdnyakov,
"National,
State
and
International Relations". Social Sciences
no.4 (1989), p. 106.
Policyn
Gorbachev ?
1990 ( Novosti.
class
Interests
(Moscow) , Vol.
in
xx.
-243-
generated
antagonism
in
inter-state
relations
and
distortion
among
communist nations in respect of the exercise of national sovereignty
in a
critical international situation.
Vadim Zagladin also conceded
that it was a distortion of the thesis which separated the sphere of
inter-state relations from
class
struggle.
relations
(98)
the sphere of class
In
were states not
fact,
the
classes.
forces
relationships, of the
acting
in
inter-state
Perestroika emphasized
that
to
view inter-state relations as arena of class struggle caused tensions
and was seriously disadvantageous to the socialist nations.
References
solidarity"
were
to
the
"community
made
to
explain
particular group of states.
that inter-state relations
foreign
often
policy
and
unity
from
"class
of any
the view
were an arena of class struggle and
their
class interests and ideology.
policy unity of the capitalist states,
the socialist countries,
were
the
These concepts stemmed
manifestations were derived from
foreign
of class interests",
in their
The
opposition to
and the centripetal trend in their relations,
attributed
by
the
Soviet Stupishiri
analysts,
to
these
states' class similarity.
In
this
contradicted
( 99)
context,
the
theory
the
declared
principles of peaceful
coexistence.
Equality, non-interference in each others internal affairs, non-
aggression,
of other
renunciation of encroachment
states,
respect
for
sovereignty
on
the territorial integrity
and
national
and good neighbourly relations could not reconcile
of class struggle in international
the
seriously
class-interests
"traditional
thinking"
and
equated international relations
politics.
affirmed
with
that
independence
with the concept
Perestroika condemned
the
doctrine
which
the class struggle could not
be
reconciled with the inevitability of peaceful coexistence.
98.
Vadim
Zagladin,
To
Restructure
and
Humanize
International
Relations ( Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1989) , p. 84.
99.
Mar,sut Light, The Soviet
supra note no.65~6B.
Theory
of
International
Relations
-244Gorbachev
"the
perceived
interdependent world,
confrontation
or
arrangements.
observed,
time
the
Now,
(1UO)
internationalism".
such
nations
constructive
"The
emerged as
threat
of
search
for
universal
in
an
tensions and
had to choose between continued
the
honoured
international class struggle", and
Marxist Leninist concepts as "the
"proletarian
:Jf
sterility
mutually
acceptable
destruction",
Gorbachev
"an objective Hmit for class confrontation in
the in tern a ti anal arena" . ( 101)
In
international
contingent
on
the
relations
sum
total
the
of
true
interests
numerous
of
states
were
factors
specific·
and
The new political thinking realized that application
circumstances.
of the notions of "socio-class similarity" and "class solidarity'' could
never help
and
to explain
processes
in
the real
the
causes behind complex phenomena
international
politics.
Hence,
peaceful
coexistence had to give way to a search for new coalition strategies.
Class-conflict
cooperation",
was
to
be
replaced
not
just
by
"a
new
level
of
but by " a common tackling of global problems, and a
com man planning of the future ... " ( 102)
Deideologisation of International Relations
Almost all
the policies
emanated from an ideology
by
their
successors.
and concepts among communist nations
envisaged
by Marx and Engels and advanced
National sovereignty was based on political,
economic and ideological principles which were internationalist in their
essence, for the
class
struggle
communist ideology
and
international
aimed at social reconstruction through
alliance
of
the
working
Power in
class
100.
Coit D. Blar.ker, "The Collapse of Soviet
supra note no. 66 , p.96.
Europe".
101.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika , supra note no.14 , p. 146.
102.
Alexei Kozhemyakov, "Soviet Foreign Policy Principle:
Dimension", New Times (Moscow), no. 31 ( 1990) p. 15
(pp.14-15).
A New
-245-
Ideological involvement of national sovereignty made it
new
social
order
and fruitful· ·'
international relations.
to
Hence the,
the
interests
socialist
adaptable to the
of
the
system
in
states sovereignty was "an
important integral part of socialist internationalism".
Projection of this ideological relation.ships among socialist nations
Deformed
perceptions justified the interference in the affairs of another state and a common
responsibility
"The
was
nxed
rightness of all
against
policies,
laws, tactfcs
'so cia list gains' .
and so on was measured
the pervasive and unchallengable official ideology ... " ( 104)
political
thinking
deformed
by
( 105)
on all the na ti.uns to defend
a
realized
monopoly
that
"when
ideology,
a
politics
civil
society
loses
its
is
inner
New
forcefully
substance."
Dominance of ideology alienated sovereign power of the state away
from
people.
which
was
( 107)
(106)
compelled
Ideology
institutions,
It undermined
to
submit
the independence of the state itself,
to ideology even its· own legal sphere.
of
the
party,
cripples
the
democratic
if
allowed
to
influence
character of its
the
functions.
state
Now,
Soviet scholars also conceded the· ne•Jtrality of the state,"... the law of
the
s tR te
ideology
should
should
institutions.
by
all
for
means
ideological neutrality. . • . .
"freeze"
on
the
threshold
its
(party's)
of
the
state
OJf this is not so, the state is not a democratic one" (108)
The policy of
sovereignty,
strive
peres~roika
the
right
of
"affirmed the recognition of national,
each
nation
to
its
socio-
Angus Roxburgh, The Second
p.64.
105;
Arkadi Lapshin, "From the Russian Point of View," International
Affairs (Moscow) , Vol. 10, October 1991, p. 79 ( pp. 79-81)
106.
Boris Rakitsky,, "Revo~.utionary Character of Perestroika," Social
Services, Vol. XX, No.4, 1989, p. 60. (pp. 60-73)
Elgiz
Pondnayako~,
"National and International in the Foreign
Policy", supra note no. gs
p.10
108.
Revolution,
of
104.
107.
Russian
independence
peoples'
Supra note no. 2
Yuri FEOFANOV, "State Ideology at Work", supra note no. 92, p.87
-246political choices. " ( 109).
Past
experience
During the post..: world War period,
super power claiming its strength
the communist
maintained
concede
ideology.
"one
that
( 111)
states
adverse
suffered
associated
(110)
was
As a core area
security
all
might.
impact
the infallibility
Soviet
always
Scholars
also
"monochannel
and
of its influence, East European
on
their
sovereign
ri.ghts
and ideological struggle were
and
of
world power of a new type" which
policy
The ideology
with
Consequently,
It was " a
foreign
monoideological".
independence.
on the basis of
dimensional"
its
the Soviet Union emerged as a
military
political
questions of East-West
confrantati.on
and
unnaturally
relations.
(112)
were interpreted
in terms of ideological conflict and any political upheaval in the East
European states as counter·revolution.
in East Europe.
East Europeans
Ideology was the cause of crisis
feel
This 1 Eastern Crisis 1 of ours was built
into the system foisted on us, and from
the outset was inherent in its ideology
and political culture. t 113)
The
hegemonistic
aspirations
of
the
Soviet
leadership
with
its
dogma tic adherence to the ideological principles resulted in deep crisis
in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1956, 1970 and
1980.
Any national-ethnic uprising or challenge to Soviet hegemony in
the
region
gains
1
was
always
and curbing
suppressed
national
in
chauvanism
the
1
•
name
But
of
saving
1
socialist
jdeology
the com mtmist
with all it~
manifestations in military and economic
international. ~
organisations
SOUld IIU• S~_CCeed in. SUppress-J.r,g, the U~8e, , !'CH' national
independence.
Sovie~ - imposed slogans
of ideological 'affirmity and
friendship among peoples did not succeed
in veiling the reality
of
109.
Konstantin Nikolayev, The End
Moscow, 1990) , p. 101.--
110.
111.
Zbigniew Brezezinksi, Game Plan supra note no.22, p.130.
Arkadi Lapshin, "From
no. 105, p.79.
the
of Ideology
( Novosti
Russian Point of View",
Publishers,
supra
note
112.
Konstantin Nikolayev, The New Political Thinking: Its Orgins,
Potential and Prospects (Novosti Publishers, Moscow, 1990),p.74.
113.
Milan Simecka, "From Class Obsessions to Dialogue: Detente and
the Changing Political Culture of F.astern Europe," in The New
Detente _
Rethinking East-West Relations edited
byMARY
KALDOR, GERARD HOLDEN AND RICHARD FALK (The United Nations
University, VERSO, Tokyo, 1989), p.352. (pp.351-368)
-247divergent interests and popular enemitles ( 114).
Eduard Shevardnadze,
the then foreign minister for the Soviet Union. conceded:
It is not the expression of p,opular will
that threatens
countries,
political
and
intolerance ..• (115)
During
Need for
C"fl""ang e:-
the
post-perestroika
period,
Soviet
but,
rather
ideological
Union
radically
revised its foreign policy renouncing its dogmatic adherence to ideology
and confrontational
a
towards
postures in international politics.
search
for
mutual understanding,
It
was "oriented
towards dialogue and
the
establishment of peaceful coexistence as the universal norm in relations
among
states"
Gorbachev
"The
(116).
stressed
During
the need
his
to
visit
to
change Soviet-East
traditional structure of our relations,
well in the past,
of our times".
Warsaw
in
July",
1988,
European relations.
which has served as fairly
needs to be changed and adapted to the requirements
( 117)
By the 1988, as Margot Light observed, Soviet relations with the
countries
been
of Eastern Europe were far less ideological now than 1hey had
before.
renounced.
( 118)
establishment
partners
Attempts,
with
of
to impose
Consequently,
more
the
organic,
Sov:'.et
a pattern from Moscow were totally
Eastern
more
Union,
Europe
natural,
based
less
more
on
than on mutual benefit and a balance of interests.
National
Interests
moved towards ... ~tl:l '::!
equal
relations
ideological
as
principles
( 119)
Concepts of national interests and independence gained prominance
in the new political thinking.
The terms
'fundamental interests of the
working class and peasan.iry ~ linking with a
'world socialist revolution'
114.
ISTVAN DEAK, "Nationalism in the Soviet Bloc- Uncovering East
Europe's Dark History", ORBIS, Winter 1990, p.51. (pp.51-55)
115.
Eduard Sheerdnadze, Foreign Policy and Perestroika
Press Publishing House, Moscow, 1989), p .16.
116.
XXVII
CPSU
CongressDocuments
and
Resolutions
Private Limited, New Delhi, 1986). p.232.
( Novosti
(Allied
~ublishers
11 7.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Bringing Out the Potential of Socialism More
Fully ( Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1988 )·II. 8
118.
MRGOT LIGHT, "Foreign Policy",
edited
by
Martin
McCauley
p .1.86. ( pp .169-188)
119.
Yuriy DavydoV
supra note no.
~3,
"Eastern
p .131.
Europe
in Gorbachev and Perestroika
(MacMillan,
London,
1990) ,
and
International
Stability",
-248were replaced by
'national interests'
in socialist diplomacy.
( 120)
process of deideologisation hampered any attempt at collective
of a
unified
policy
international
and
relations
bilateralism
among
the
communist
erstwhile Soviet dominance in East
rejection
of
definitions
identified
Soviet
of
hegemony
national
as
the
nations
Europe.
was
interest.
emerged
main
The
pursuit
pattern of
overthrowing
the
The solidarity born out of
rapidly
( 121)
giving
Mikhail
"two criteria for realistic foreign
policy
way
to
discrete
Gorbachev
clearly
: consideration for
one's own national interests and respect for other countries' interests".
( 122)
New
relations
political
so
as
level. .. "(123)
exercise
thinking
to
avoid
Hence,
of national
enabled
"regulation of intergovernmental
conflicts
at
the
class
or
ideological
new atmosphere, gave full leverage for
sovereignty
to express
the free
·disagreements in inter-
socialist relations.
The
respect
for
need
to observe strictly
national
the
principles of full
equality,
sovereignty and consideration for specific national
feature was recognized:
Today,
the
socialist
countries
have
entered a new phase -the articulation of
their national interests.
The uniformity
of the socialist camp has yjclded to a
community
of
socialist
states
whose
orientation
in
foreign
policy
is
determined
by the national interests of
each individual country.
( 124)
120.
Mikhail Kozhdkin, "Eastern Europe
Benefits of Crisis", in
Perestroika : The Crunch is now
Soviet Scene 1990,
(Progress Pubiishers, Moscow-.-1990) , . p. 412.
121.
Bennett Kovrig, "Moving Time
the emancipation of Eastern
Europe", International Journal, Vol. XLVI, Spring 1991, p. 262.
122.
Mikhail "Gorbachev, Perestroika
123.
V .S. Vereschchetin and R.A. Mullerson, "International Law in an
Interdependent
World", Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law,
val. 28, no.1 (1990}, p.295. (pp.291-300)
124.
Mikhail Kozhokin, "Eastern
note no. 120
p. 413.
supra note 'no .14 , p. 221.
Europe
Benefits
of
Crisis",
supra
-249Ideology and
Inter-state
Relations.
Earlier,
of
ideologisa tion
foreign
policy
hampered
the
development of normal inter-state relations based on the real interests
of
states.
Ideological
xenophobia",
and
the
based
the
development
on
implied
thereby
the
rela.tions."
impending
( 126)
"class chauvanism,
the rapprochement
of
the
primacy
of socio-political
of any
engendered
of various nations
of mutual understanding .. ( 125)
recognition
"freedom
affairs
stereotypes
state,
the
of
choice
need
for
New thinking
universal
precluding
which
interference
deideologisa tion
The Soviet Union aimed at "joint
values
was
in
of inter-state
efforts to Hnd
the
optional correlation between the national interests of the states and the
interests of the
that
it
was
mankind
as a
impermissable
to
whole."
( 127)
transfer
Gorbachev emphasised
ideological
differences
to
interstate relations and place them above foreign policy.
Ideological
differlilnces should not
be
transferred to the sphere of j.Q.te·r-State·~
relations, nor should foreign pc.,!icy be
subordinate to them •.• " ( 128)
New
political
thinking
refused
to
incorporate
class
antagonisms
and the principles of political and ideological confrontation into spheres
of
foreign
relations.
which
policy
G.
and
the
therefore utterly wrong
with
on
the
Shankhnazarov observed,
constitute
of states
i.nsisted
subjects
of
deideologisation
of
interstate
"It is 'sbvereign national states
international•:
relations.
It
is
to associate relations· be'tween states or groups
relationships
between
systems."
(129)
Vadim zagladin l:leld, "... ideological differences are not and
Similarly,
cannot
be
125.
Valeri Karavayev,
"Eastern Europe is .opening Itself to the
World". International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 4 (April 1990), p. 39
1~6.
Mikhail Gorbachev, On Major Directions of the USSR's Domestic
and Foreign Policy Report by the President · of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, May 30, 1989 ( Novosti Press Agency Publishing
House, Moscow, 1989), p.26.
127.
Vladlen Kuznetsov, Time for a New
Publishers, Moscow, 1987) -;-p. 252-.-
128.
129.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Supra note no.14 , p.143.
Georgi
Shakhnazarov,
"De-ideologisation
of
Inter-State
Relationships", Social Sciences,
Vol. XXI, no.1 (1990),p.40.
Way
of Thinking
(Progress
-250transferred to the sphere of inter-state
the
postulates
of
the
'new
relations".
thinking'
(130)
included
As a result,
abandoning
and
transcending so-called "class" foreign policy, in other words recognising
the higher legitimacy of the
international
system
cooperation
and
without
international
of
countries
bloc
relations
more
active
Eastern
toward
role
universal interests of
position
and
a
ideology...
Central
for
all
in advocating
( 131)
footing,
reforms in
choice
countries,
Europe.
non-ideological
free
peace, the widest
the
of internal
including
Gorbachev
the .
"moved
and
started to play a
East
European states."
( 132).
Ideology and
International
Politics.
In the arena of global politics, the deep ideological confrontation
was considered the only and root cause of the division of the world.
( 133)
the
race.
the
The ideological incompatability of the regimes,
inter-state
( 134)
eve
capitalism
Gorbachev,
relations,
generated
p_sychological
which determined
warfare
and
arms
The industrial, scientific and technological developments at
of
20th
and
century
socialism at
during
his
brought
the
address
to
the
point
the
socio.:.economic
of
United
s,vstems
of
convergence.
Mikhail
Nations on 7 December
1988 enunciated:
This new stage requires the freeing
of
interna tiona!
relations
from
ideology ... (there)
·would
be
honest
competition
between ideologies.
But it
must not spread int0 the sphere of
relations between states •.. (135)
130.
Vadim
Zagladin,
For Peaceful International
Publishers, New Delhi, 1989), p. 71.
Relations
131.
Cvijeto Job, "Can You Have Detente With Only One Bloc?.",
Review
of International Affairs, Vol. XLII, no.989, June 20,
1991, p. 29-, ( pp. 28-30)
132.
Renee De Nevers, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe : The End
of an Era", Adelphi Papers, no. 249 (March 1990), p. 4.
133.
G. Shakhnazarov, "East-West - On a Non - Ideological Approach to
Inter-State Relations", The Case for Perestroika - Articles
from
the Monthly· KOMMUNI~( Progress Publi~hers, Moscow, 1989),
p.251. (pp.251-274)
134.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Address ~ the Meeting .2.!_ the Leaders
of
Statss Participating
in Confercnr:e._ on Security
~!.ld Cooperation
in Europe, supra note no. 49, p. 4.
135.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika and the New World
note no. 47, pp. 42-43.
!_·~
•lor,
(Allied
supra
-251-
The new political thinking endeavoured
from a
struggle
to
constructive
sovereignty,
to
In
to transform ideological
destructive and alienating
factor into one that
infuse
prin<;:iple.
it
dissociated
with
with
a
creative
ideological
Hence,
reservations,
was
was
state
designed
function on a new set of principles "guided by universal values."
restoring
and
promoting
the
priority
of
uni versa!
values,
policy cleared the way for a synthesis of antagonistic concepts
in the
The
11
past was torn bet ween the rival ling ideological domains.
objective
achieve
which
11
(
136)
of deideologisation of relations among states was to
global
contradictions
new
must
cooperation.
not
lead
The
to
ideological
political
and
differences
military
or
confrontation.
28th CPSU Congress observed:
,..
New political thinking has helped us
to see a new and realistically assess
the world around us and has rid us
of
a
confrontational
approach
in
foreign policy. ( 137)
The
antagonism
policy
of
deideologisation
and mistrust
among
nations.
succeeded
in
Gorbachev
overcoming
the
acknowledged
his
success of his new thinking in international politics, during his Nobel
Lecture
on June 5, 1991.
Deideologising relations among states,
which we proclaimed as one of the
principles of the new thinking, .. has
removed
many
prejudices, baised
attitudes
and
suspicious and
has
cleared
and
improved
the
international atmosphere. (138)
136.
Konstantin Nikolayev, The New Political !_hinking ..:_ Its Origins,
Potential and Prospects--:-5upra note no. 112 p. 67.
137.
Documents and Materials
note no. 4,P. 6.
138.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Text in Perestroika
Order, Supra note no. 47, p. 110.
_
28th
Congress
of
the
and
CPSU,
the
New
Supra
World
-252-
Impact of
Tl:}e
abandonment
of
Marxist-Leninist
ideology
ultimately
De-ideologi- resulted in an important institutional change in the communist states :
sation.
the end of the leadiang role of the Communist Party in the formulation
of foreign and security polity.
Leninist
doctrine
alternative,
of
mutual
Gorbachev opened
security
the
By undermining classic
Marxist-
and by suggesting a pragmatic twentieth -
The abandonment
reflected
( 139}
and
the way
cooperation
of communist
historical
in
for a
decline
far-reaching discussion
international
ideology
in
of Soviet
century
politics.
Eastern
Political
( 140}
Europe certainly
hegemony
in
that
region and by extension on the international stage. (141)
The state sovereignty of the socialist nations and operated in a
new international environment.
to
the
were
concept
of
national
The changes in attitudes and approach
independence
and
respect
for
the very product of the new political thinking.
ideology
and
related
complexities
sovereignty
The removal of
overburden
of
from
sovereignty
simplified its political and legal perceptions.
national
Repudiation of Brezhnev Doctrine and
Democratization of International Relations.
The doctrine
and the new
The process of deideologisation drastically altered
thfnkifig - -
inviolabale
manifested
principles
into
of
"Brezhnev
socialist
Doctrine".
internationalism
The
the erstwhile
which
intra-Soviet
prominently
bloc
relations
139.
Bruce D. Porter, "A Country Instead of a Cause
Russian
Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era", The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 15, no.3 (Summer 1992), p. 43. (pp. 41-56)
140.
Robert S.
129.
141.
Allen Lynch, "Does Gorbachev Matter Anymore?"., Supra note no.
81, p. 26.
Me Namara,
Out of the Cold,
Supra note no.
6,
p.
-253during the pre-perestroika period
were determined by the application
of socialist internationalism in order to ensure
that
the exercise
of
state sovereignty
was not detrimental to the common 'socialist gains
The principle of the state sovereignty of a socialist state was originally
linked
with the interests
of the socialist
system
as
a
whole.
Socialist
internationalism II professed (Soviet) respect for (East
European)
(Soviet
sovereignty
defined)
confirmed
national
common
that
precedence
over
the
denounced
the
European),
interests".
of
sovereignty
or
severely
European states.
(East
preservation
communism
sovereignty'
and
(142)
socialist
of its
members
(143)
the
doctrine
This
sovereign
The policy of perestroika
Brezhnev
The
the
poly centrism.
marginalised
respect
and
for
the
Brezhnev
Doctrine
commonwealth
took
and any authentic
theory
rights
of
of
'limited
the
and glasnost
made
bloc's
East
virtually
sovereignty
and
independence, equal rights and non-interference as the recognized norms
of international relations.
The new political thinking evidenced
to renounce the traditional hegemonistic
the Soviet Union's attempt
influence
on Eastern Europe.
Mikhail Gorbachev unequivocally enunciated;
.. the
entire·
framework
of
between the socialist
must
be
strictly
based
on
independence.(144)
rela~ions
Gorbachev
states.
stressed
on
the
'independence'
of
politir.;:~l
countries
absolute
East
European
He refrained from supporting· "proletarian internationalism", the
142.
Charles Gati, The Bloc That Failed, Supra note no. 50
143.
Bennett Kovrig, "Moving Time
Europe", Supra note no. 121
144.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, supra note no.14 . p .165.
The
Emancipation
p. 245.
, p.71.
of
Eastern
-254foundation
Soviet line.
New con-
'S'"t"ra i ili'Son
the doctrine
to
Union
Soviet
Brezhnev Doctrine that
of the
In
invade
socialist
reserved
countries
the right
that
deviated
for
the
from
the
the
test
( 145)
fact,
the
existence
of
the
point for the Gorbachev reforms
Brezhnev
doctrine
was
and his radical pronouncements.
The
western scholars focussed their attention on the developments that led
military
coupled
burden,
political
with domestic
allegations of intervention fanning cold war
economic crisis.
decided to withdraw Soviet
independent
efforts
to
was tired of the
The USSR
gradual demise of the doctrine.
to the
Consequently,
Gorbachev soon
troops from Afghanistan and supported its
defend
sovereignty.
Gorbachev
said
on
25
February 1986:
The USSR supports that country 1 s efforts
to defend
its sovereignty.
We should
like, in the nearest future, to withdraw
the
Soviet · troo'ps
stationed
in
Afgthanistan
at
the
request
of
its
govenment. ( 146)
The
last
phrase irked
the
western scholars and
they
continued
with the notion that the Brezhnev doctrine was still a Soviet policy
reckon with.
They insisted on the removal of the so-called
Doctrine which was often used to justify
Eastern
Europe.
developing
intervention
(147)
constraints
to
crush
However,
the
Soviet
a
revolutionary
Brezhnev
Soviet military intervention in
Z.
on
to
Brezezinski
Union
to
percieved
resort
upheaval
in
to
a
the
military
Eastern
Europe
without having negative implication on the Soviet Union itself. ( 148) The
economic needs of the Soviet Union argued strongly against using troops
in Eastern Europe Gorbachev
sought
the
from
Western
detente
capital,
with
the
trade, and technology that
United ' States,
Europe
and
145.
Robert S. McNamara , Out of the Cold Supra note no.
146.
Mikhail Gorbachev,
note no.
47
147.
Valery
Giscard
d 1 Estining,
Yasuhiro
Nakasone,
Henry
A.
Kissinger, "East-West Relations", Foreign Affairs Vol. 68, no. 3
(Summer 1989), p. 12 (pp.1-:n)
148.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "East-West Relations and
Problems of Communism, May-August 1988, p. 69.
Perestroika and
,p.14
6, p.115
the New World Order, Supra
Eastern
Europe",
-255Japan
coold
be
jeopardised.
force against any
Gorbachev 1 s
( 149)
use of military
in Eastern Europe could cause
country
Western
alienation and hampered chances of making the Soviet Union part of
the common European home.
(150)
East-West security studies
from
be
Eastern Europe,
a
forceful
specific
subsequently
Afghanistan.
S.
that
implications.
the
Bialer
Institute for
international guarantees would
with sufficient
with
u.s.
the
suggested that a rapid Soviet withdrawal
demonstration
policy
However,
"new
the
And · this
( 151)
withdrawal
observed
political
that
thinking"
really
of
Soviet
to
abandon
had
followed
forces
from
communism
in
Afghanistan was to call into question the Brezhnev Doctrine. (152)
Thus the political developments reinforced the new political
thinking granting full independence
moved
from
to East European states.
the Brezhnev Doctrine,
which asserted
Moscow
the right
and
duty of interference in a country where socialism was "endangered",
to a pol·icy
the
East
Events
of keeping hands off East European affairs, to prodding
European
overtook
leaders
but
not
Moscow 1 s
carefully
dictating
constructed
resulting in "free fall" in the region.
was impelled to respond
previous
attempts
at
to
them.
plan
in Eastern Europe
by the threat of Soviet intervention,
the· Soviet
constraint absent
the danger
.in Eastern Europe
were constrained
leadership faced a
that reform would
( 155)
Under the new policy of perestroika, Gorbachev stressed on
thinning
out
of
the
Soviet
repeatedly assured
East
European
forces
that
the
While
centrifugal
autonomy
within
(154)
unleash
the
forces
Europe,
The Kremlin leadership
to events as they occurred.
reform
for
( 153)
in
the
mU1'tinational
communist
region;
and
Soviet
parties,
his
system
began
to
subordinates
the Brezhnev Doctrine of restricted
East
149.
Constantine C.
Menges,
The Future of Germany and the
Atlantic Alliance (The AEI Press, Washington, D.C. 1991), p. 84
150.
Alvin z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Client-states
From Empire to
Commonwealth?.", ORBIS, Vol.35, no.1 (Winter 1991), p. 71
(pp.69-78)
151.
Implications of Soviet New Thinking (Institute for East-WestSecurity Studies, New York, 1987), p. 89.
30
S. Bialer, Global Rivals, supra note no.
• p. 195-96.
152.
153.
Zvi Gi tel man, "The Roots of Eastern Europe 1 s
Problems of Communism, May-June 1990, p. 91.
154.
Coit D. Blacker, "The Collapse of. So~iet Power in Europe",
supra note no.
66,
p.89.
Gali W. Lapidus, "Gorbachev and the Reform of the Soviet
System", DAEDALUS, Vol.116, no.2 (Spring 1987),p.3.
155.
Revolution, "
-256East European sovereignty
"The
was "dead".
independence of each
the issues
facing
party,
its country and
are the unquestionable
( 156)
its
its
principles."
· Gorbachev enunciated'
sovereign right
responsibility
( 157)
to decide
to its nation
Oleg T.
Bogomolov,
the
director of the Institute of Economics of the World socialist system
said:
We have completely changed our relations
with
the
East
European
countries .••
"Brezhnev
Doctrine"
is
completely
unacceptable and unthinkable
we gave
too much advice
before to our partners,
and it was actually very damaging to them.
(158)
Irrelevance of
socialist
in terna tionalism.
The
Soviet
conceive
of
theorists
a
pointed
hierarchy
of
out
that
interests
it
was
a
mistake
to
in
which
common
or
international interests take precedence over specific ones or respect
for
sovereignty
Soviet
experts
forceful
for
is subordinated
on
international
law
also exposed
the
( 159)
fallacy
of
imposition of ideology on other states. "Using armed force
imposing
ideals
or
values
against
violation of international law."
in
to the principle of unity.
East
Europe,
relevance.
the
concept
( 160)
of
other
nations
is
a
gross
With the political upheavals
socialist
Alexei Kozhmyakov observed,
internationalism
"the
lost
its
recent developments
in Eastern Europe have removed
the object of practical application
of
(Socialist)
the
principle
of
This growing reality
Doctrine.
proletarian
internationalism."
( 161)
signified the virtual· demise of the Brezhnev
The Soviet Union had renounced its right,
as elaborated
156.
Charles Gati, "Eastern Europe on its own",
Vol. 68, no. 1 (1989), p. 103 (pp; 99-119)
Foreign Affairs,
157.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Supra note no. 14, p. 165.
158.
The Washington Times, July 8, 1988.
159.
Margot Light, The Soviet
Supra note no. --65
160.
V. S. Vereshchetin and R. A. Mullerson, "International Law in
an Interdependent World", Columbia journal of Transnational
Law, Vol. 28, no. I ( 1990), p. 295 ( PP. 291-300)
161.
Alexei Kozhemyakov, "Soviet Foreign Policy Principle : A New
Dimension", New Times (Moscow), no.31 (1990),
p. 14.
Theory
of International
p. 306-307.
Relations
-257in
the
concept
of
'socialist
internationalism' ,
to
intervene
the
internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies. ( 162}
Perestroika derecognized
as
modAl
for
Ea~t
the
·:i,e Sr";:et Union as
the Soviet Union's political
~nd
European f.tates
JtA
vanguerd ::ff wnrld
system
·•he curnmunist pat·ty of
comnun~~-~
mo'femont~
The most visible impact of Gorbachev 's new political thinking
growing autonomy of the East European parties
the old theory
was
and the revival of
of "separate roads to socialism."
We have become convinced that unity does
not Jl!ean identity and uniformity.
We have
also become convinc.ed that there is no
"model"
of socialism to be emulated by
everyone, nor can there be any. (163)
According to the
the
of
interests
'old'
socialist
poltical thinking in the Soviet Union,
countries
were
subordinated
to
the
fact, the principles of
interests of socialist internationalism. In
as a supra-national
authority.
socialist internationalism appeared
Such
nations
as
cooperation",
"international
relations
of
a
new
type",
"mutual
"fraternal assistance", and "defence of socialist gains"
were complex phenomena which hampered the assessment of the real
nature of state
political
sovereignty
thinking
articulation
of
interests
Freedom of
Choice.
in
nations.
the socialist countries entered a
their
With
new
the new
phase
interests.
The
to a
community
of socialist states whose
foreign
politics
was
uniformity
determined
by
the
of
of
national
socialist camp yielded
orientation
of socialist
the
national
of each individual country. (164)
A key factor of the new thinking was the concept of freedom
of choice,
obsolete.
observed
attempts
which rendered
Deputy
U.S.
the
policy
Secretary
of
of force and
State
John
C.
interference
Whitehead
in 1987 that "Soviet new thinking means the end of Soviet
to impose either reform or reaction on its East European
162.
RENEE DE NEVERS, "The Soviet Union ·and Eastern Europe :
The End of an Era", Adephi Papers, no. 249 (March 1990},p.22.
163.
Mikhail Gorbachev, October and Perestroika : The Revolution
Continues ( Novosti Publisher~Moscow,. 1987 )--; p. 75.
164.
Mikhail Kozhokin, "Eastern Europe : Benefits of Crisis", Perestroika
The Crunch is Now . . . (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1990},
p.413.
-
--
~··
-258neighbours,
leaving them free to determine their own future and select
their own road
direction
of
to get
the
there.
USSR's
( 165)
foreign
On 30 May 1989,
policy,
Gorbachev
as a
major
asserted
the
principle of non-interference and respect for sovereignty.
- the use of -force or threat of force to
attain any political, economic or other
ends
is
inadmissable;
a
respect
for
sovereignty, ipdepenqence and territorial
integrity in relations with other countries
is indispensable. (166)
During his visit in Finland in October 1989, Gorbachev clearly
declined to interference even in the East European
anti-Soviet
right,
to
uprising.
anti-communist and
He said, "We have no right, moral or political
interfere
in
events
happening
there."
( 167)
Such
statements were given credence by the general posture of Soviet foreign
policy,
which ·uil"ima.tl'llY
of
chances
reduced
both commitments abroad and the
Igor Orlik
confrontation with the West.
military
observed. "it relieves our country of the heavy burden of "maintaining
,
order"
in
every
sphere of
in
countries
that
used
On July 2, 1990, in the Political Report
allies." ( 166)
Central
life
to
be
our
of the CPSU
committee to the 26th CPSU Congress .• Gor:bachev enunciated:
The recognition of every people's freedom
of choice
is. a fundamental precondition
for the building up a new type of world
order. (169)
The foreign policy based on the principles and attitudes of new
thinking
affirmed
overridden
by
threatening
the use
sanctions".
that
force
(170)
and
of
The
"nations
that
choice
stability
force or by
principle
cannot
cannot
intervention,
of
freedom
of
and
be
must
not
be
achieved
by
blockade and
choice
other
created
a
165.
Implications of the Soviet New Thinking Supra note no.
p.64.
9
166.
Mikhail Gorbachev, On Major Directions of the USSR's Domestic
and Foreign Policy, Supra note no. 126 -, p. 28
167.
The New York Times, October 26, 1989.
168.
"International Affairs" Guest Club, "From Eastern Europe into a
United
Europe,"
Interna tiohal
Affairs
(Moscow) ,
no.
10
(October, 1991), p. 136 (pp. 132-141)
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika
and the New World Order,
supra note no.
47
, p .102.
Eduard Sheverdnadze, Foreign Policy and Perestroika ( Novosti
Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow ,----r-989), p .16.
'I
169.
170.
-259conducive environment
Yuriy
for
harmoneous
Soviet -:East European relations.
Davydov observed:
" ... internal
crisis
in
events
their
transition
to
in countries
relations
reforms
accomplished
in a
without
The theory
with
of
the
the
region
Soviet
number of
pressure,
as a
are not
Union.
As
leading
a
result,
cooperation and
the
East
European states has
been
normal
political process."
( 171)
of freedom of choice had wider implications.
treaties of friendship,
to a
The earlier
mutual assistance were no longer
acceptable to East Europeans due to their over- ideologised emphasis on
confrontation
retain
an
military
in
article
political
military bases
Such
Europe and
demand
for
bidding
alliances
and troops
was
the
world.
Now
contracting
or
make
considered
"as
the Soviet Union expressed
New
political
ideological
and
But
( 172)
sovereignty
such controversy
developments in the region.
opposed
objectively
the
Even
system
was on the . respect
Its emphasis
for
of
the
of the ways and forms
conflicts
guarantees
with
against
frontiers.
political
outside
means;
aggression,
Democratization
of
the elaboration
and
international
inviolability
relations
class
struggle;
renunciation
of
attempts to impose anyone's values
(174)
It envisaged,
negotiations,
with
sovereignty
of all
strict
the
confrontational
of
of
involved
"rem,mciation of the principle of looking at it ·.from the stand
world".
and
development; just and democratic settlement of international crises
effective
the
for
the desire to join erstwhile hostile military
thinking
dominance.
regional
national
hostile
available
their
right of every nation to make a sovereign choiee
of its
in
(173)
Organization i.e. NATO.
Democratization.
join
territory
disregarding
the dramatic
to
to
by the East European states.
aimed at updating the "Brezhnev Doctrine" .
was soon overcome by
parties
their
was rejected
the Soviet demand
point of
ideology;
of
or way of thinking and life on the
the settlement of existing conflicts through
respect
countries,
and
for
for
th.e
the
rights,
right
of
interests
every
people
and
to
"Eastern Europe and International Instability'1 ,"Supra
, p. 135.
171.
Yuriy Davydov,
note no.
23
172.
"International Affairs" Guest Club, "From Eastern
• p. ~.38.
United Europe", Supra note no. 168
173.
Boris Yeltsin
174.
Elgiz Pozdnyakov,
"National
Policy", Supra note no.
70
Reported in
Europe
into A
, Times ·o'r Indiq 27 December 1991.
and
International
• p.13.
in
the
Foreign
-260-
decide
its future . independently."
( 175)
The only
way
to
national sovereignty
ensure
was to recognize all peoples and states as equal
and
rights
enjoying
international
equal
affairs.
to
Soviet
pursue
their
Foreign
legitimate
Minister
Eduard
interests
in
Sheverdnadze
observed:
Truely, his·toric, equalitative changes
have taken place ·in ""these relations.
We are bas.ing
them on sovereign
equality, the inadmissability
of any
interference
and the recognition of
every country 1 s
right to absolute
freedom of choice. ( 176)
During his address at the United Nations on
Gorbachev
recognized
among
the nations.
order
has
grown
the
striving
own
( 178)
independence
"The Idea of democratising
into
a
powerful
Western authorities observed
Eastern Europe
for
7 December
social
and
and
democracy
the entire
political
world
force."
that under Gorbachev, Moscow s allies in
were provided
with greater latitude to pursue their
Consequently, they were "to enjoy 'greater
of socialism.
freedom of action in
the light of the USSR 1 s accent on equality of rights, sovereignty
( 179)
( 177)
1
national interests and to develop their· own variety
independence".
1988,
and
East European "nations were free to follow their
own paths of development, even to leave the socialist camp. (180)
Soviet
scholars
highlighted
determination in real terms.
rights for every nation.
the
importance
undemocratic and anti-human
national
self-
Vladimir stupishin advocated for equal
"It is therefore,
'
of
high time we renounced the
principle of granting
unegual rights, of
175.
Vadim
Zagladin,
To
Restructure and Humanize
Relations, Supra note no.
98
, p.-148.
176.
Eduard Shevardnadze, foreign
note no. 170
, P47
177.
Mikhail Gorbachev,
Supra note no.
47
Policy
Peres~~oika
and
and
International
Perestroika,
the 'New
World
Supra
Order
• p. 37
178.
Institute for East-West Security Studies, Implications of Soviet
New ThiJ!king, Supra note no. 151
, p .12
179.
William E. Butler, "International Law, Foreign Policy and the
Gorbachev Sty}9, 11
Journal· of International Affairs, Vol. 42
no .. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 366.
Angus Rt•Xb1lrfh, The SecC'nd Ktlr-<":.:.,.n Revn:.u::.'.on Suprz. nc ... e no. 2
P. ~.. s~ . .~
180.
.
-261grading
peoples
Sheverdnadze
by
applying
opined,"...
different
what
is
peoples and states can be stable
level~
based
on
••. "
the
(181)
free
and viable." (182)
Eduard
will
of
the
China the main
rival of the Soviet Union in the communist world and a great critic
of
Brezhnev
Doctrine
also
conceded,
these relations -mainly characterized
its
demand
that
sovereignty
Demise
others
has
of
the
obey
become
Brezhnev
its
"The
old
stereotype
view
of
by Moscow s self-centredness and
1
'
dictates at
more
and
more
Doctrine
was
clear
the expense of
their
unfashionable".
( 183)
from
the
Gorbachev 1 s
statement.
We are resolutely opposed to any
theories and doctrines that attempt
to justify .the export of revolution or
counter-revolution and all forms of
foreign interference
in the affairs
of sovereign states. ( 184)
The aforementioned analysis serves
concerning
in
the
to show
that the theories
relations among socialist nations underwent
form
of renunciation of Brezhnev
of international
relations.
ideological SUP.eriority
structure in international
sovereign equality.
Doctrine and
radical
democratisation
The Soviet Union disclaimed
over other socialist
antagonistic social - political systems
political and
nations and hierarchical
relations was replaced
This facilitated
changes
by the principle
the harmonizing
of
process between
in international politics.
Cooperation Between Different Systems
New Wave
emphasized
the
transformation of
thinking
New
political
of Co~ation
systems antagonism into peaceful competition·, •· comparision and all
181.
Vladimir STUPISHIN, "Freedom of Choice and the Right of
Nations to self-determination," Internadonal Affairs,
no.
3
(March 1991), p. 12 (pp.9-13)
182.
Eduard Shevardnadze, "Eduard Shevardnadze on Foreign Policy",
New Times (Moscow), Vol. 27 ( 1990) , p. 13.
183.
Beijing Review, August 15-21, 1988, p.20.
184.
Documents and Materials - Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev, to CUBA,
April
2-5-,-1989
( Novosti Press ·Agency Publishing House,
Moscow, 1989), p. 18.
-262-
round
in
cooperation.
search
of
intensify
The Soviet Union and its allies in East Europe,
solutions
dialogue
a
growing
their
with
beyond the spectrum
was
to
own
political
realization
development
realities
forced
forces
problems,
of
the
that
the
no
the
concept
systems
longer reflected
erstwhile
sought
West
of the international communist
struggle between the two opposing
world
reform
that
system.
which said
constituted
the reality.
super-powers
to
went
There
that
the
the core of
(185)
The new
"to choose
between a
more immediate military security and a long term economic security."
( 186)
Soviet
politics
in
the
Perestroika
systems
reformers advocated for the openness
sense
of
emphasized
and
the
on
"an
unavoidable
the
possibility
evqlution
interdependence
of
of history and
of
of
their convergence.
the
world".
the
different
New
political
thinking,
based on recognition of the unity of the world and on "the
broadest
possible
Sought
to
examine
interaction and
a
new
cooperation among
whole
states",
range of concepts
(187)
relating
to
politics and law in the international sphere.
New political thinking aimed
at harmonizing inter-relationships
between the states of two main social systems-socialism and capitalism
-
with
world
the objective reality of the
unity.
resolutions
mentality
of
very
antagonism
exerted
international
sovereign
The
a
relations.
equality
survival
between
present
of
times and
mankind
East
and
powerful influence
Extensive
transcending
bloc
depended
West.
New
the
interaction
politics
the idea of
in
the
the
the
political
reorganization
on
community could only create a situation coA"ducive
on
basis
of
of
international
to cooperation and
strengthen mutual trust and understanding.
185.
Georgi
Shakhnazarov,
"De-Ideologisation
of
Inter-State
Relationships", Social Sciences, Vol. XXI, no. 1 (1990), p.55.
186.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Random
House, New Yor~1987), -p:- 540. - - -
187.
Vadim Zagladin, To Restructure
and
Relations, Supra note no. 34 , p. 82-.-
Humanize
International
-263The contraditions and conflict in relations between countries of
the two systems emanated with the rise of the Soviet Union and East
European
countries
assigned
the role of defending
used
as,
as
weapon
communist
for
its
establishment of a
world
period,
polarisation
of
systems
was
The
peaceful
political
co-existence
forces
bloc
was
(188)
on
the
politics and
frequently
the
two
systems
were
regarded
as
aiming
at
the
In the post-war
basis
of conflicting
military
converted
and occassional international crisis situations.
was
system and it was
consolidation
socialist state.
into
sovereignty
State
the communist
political
transformed
states.
alliances.
into cold
war
The rela dons bet ween
utterly· antagonistic
for
many
decades.
the contradiction between socialism
and
capitalism as social systems was
embodied in, and . . . materialised
as, a
confrontation between the Soviet state and
later on all socialist states, and the
states of the capitalist world. ( 189)
The
world
monolithic
and
the
camps
ideology.
into
two
and
international
irreconcilably
hostile
both in politics
Issue of national sovereignty was relegated to
intensified
antagonisms
and
at the level of inter-bloc issues.
international
capitalism
divided
aggravating confrontational trends
(190)
background,
manifested
the
was
system
as
socialism.
events
consisting
Their
mutual
and phenomena.
a r.dsis situation was interpreted
of
( 192)
confrontation
( 191)
two
Old theory saw
economic
antagonism
were
systems,
explained
all
National sovereignty in
differently to suit their respective
ideological and political interests.
188.
See Elliot R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for a
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1960).
189.
G. Shakhnazorov, "East-West - On a Non- Ideological Approach
to International Relations", The Case for Perestroika (Progress
Publishers, Moscow, 1989), p.253-.-- - -
190.
Konstantin Nikolayev, The End of Ideology, Supra note no. 109,
P.77.
191.
Dan Sinith, "The Arms Race and the Cold War", in The World
Order : Socialist
,:tives edited by Ray Bus~Gordon
- and
..
Johnston
Davh.. L.u ... tus (Polity
Press, Cambridge, 1987).
p. 149, (pp. 141-168).
T•
•
-
., ..
~-
192.
World
State
-·
Jyrki Livonen, "Soviet Foreign Policy Doctrine in Transition",
Supra note no. 88, p. 31.
-264-
Impact of
De-ideologisation.
Mikhail Gorbachev envisaged "ridding the flow
of
"enemy
image"
stereotypes,
concoctions,
of dele berate
the
( 193)
New
the
dogmatic
truth."
policy
from
~uperiority
of
bias,
of information
prejudices
and
distortion and unscrupulous
political
thinking
adherence
to
freed
violation of
the Soviet
foreign
ideology.
.c~mmunist
and infalUbili ty of ideology was
absurd
Its
disclaimed.
We have rejected the stupid dogma of our
infallibility.
We
are
beginning
to
understand
others
and
want
to . be
understood ourselves
in the new epoch
of perestroika ..• (194)
Growing
Interdependance.
Mikhail Gorbachev recognized a world· of converging interests,
a world both "interdependent" and "integral". (195)
The Soviet Union
sought "to be its part and parcel, not its ruler as a result of some
sort
1
of
revolution 1
world
iron curtains
1
• (
196)
Communist
and other barriers dividing.
The
disappea~ing
world,
once
seen
..
ideologues
peoples
as
regaining under our eyes Hs colourful variety,
social
institutions,
division
and
against
the
system
achievements".
the
of
(198)
norm
view
blocs
background
classical Marxism considered
opinions,
in
of
new
1
Gorbachev s
Leninism
in
Europe
as a
I?olitical
and
white
is
conglomerate of
(197)
became
"the
and states are
black
relations."
felt,
The
"an
very·
anachronism
thinking
and
its
New thinking had broken with the
by declaring that conflict need not be
international
relations.
(199)
Gorbachev 1 s
0
foreign policy was the complete
of
an
inevitable,
final,
repudiation of the Leninist
physical
battle
between
doctrine
capitalism
and
communism. (200)
193.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Realities and G'Uarantees For a Secure World
(Novosti Press Agency Publishing H6us·e~ 'rY'Ioscow, -1987) ,p.13.
194.
Stanislav
Kondrashov , in New Political Thinking
Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, .~989) , p. 25.
195.
Documents and Material, 27th
116, p. 26.Vladlen Kuznetsov,
Time for
note no. 11.1, p. ::,.,. •
196.
CPSU
~
New
Congress,Supra
( Novosti
note
Way of Thinking,
no.
Supra
197.
E.
198.
O:leg Bogomolov, in "International Affairs" Guest Club, "From
Eastern Europe Into A United Europe", Supra note no168, p.133
Robert S. McNamara,
Out of the Cold,
Supra .note no. 6,p.128.
Thomas H. Naylo, The Gorbachev Strategy, Supra note no. 25, p.38
199.
-10.
Poznyakov,
"National and International
Policy",
Supra note no. 70 p.11·.
in
the
Foreign
-265Compatability between capitalism and communism
the
"realities
of
nuclear
technological
revolution
interdependent
world.
"behind
if it
weapons,
and
( 201)
the rest of the
long
world
economy.
economic
and
Soviet
Union
self-impose~
the
technological
bloc
growth.
was
likely
( 203).
the
to
fall
socially and politically
into
it
to
and
of
exile." (202)
carried
failed
scientific
systems",
world economically,
pursuit of antoarky
Yet
the
information
The
continued to remain in a
bloc's
ecology,
arose out of
isolation from
keep
pace
was
It
The Soviet
with
the
world
realized
in
the
Soviet Union,
Our self- imposed isolation of many years
has not led to anything good.
We have
driven ourselves into an impasse. (204)
End of
Cold War.
During
highlighted
Summit
USSR-USA
The
satisfy
Moscow
in
1988,
Gorbachev
"a need for restructuring international relations.
found essential to promote
(205)
in
summit
was
"It was
"positive contacts between East and West."
to
one's rights and
overcome
interests
"the
old
habit
of seeking
at other people's expense, and a
shortage of fairness and humaneness in international relations."
As
a
reminder of reality
major
stumbling
beginning
with
bloc
the
for
West.
to
of the cold
war,
Gorbachev
in
Eastern Europe was a
his
To ending
( 207)
( 206)
search
for
the
war
cold
a
new
and
promotion of integration between the two superpowers required "ending
Soviet
subjugation
people of that
of
Eastern
part of the
Europe,·
world
which
to decide
means
freely
allowing
how
the
to govern
201.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, supra note no .14 , p .138
202.
Coit D. Blacker, "The Collapse of Soviet Power in Europe",
Supra note no. 66, p. 96-97.
203.
Ronald A. Francisco, "The Foreign Economic Policy of the GDR and
the USSR : the End of Autarky, in East Germany in Comparative
Perspective edited by David Childs (Routledge,
London, 1989),
p. 206 (pp.189-208).
204.
Anatoly Karpchev, "The Art of Living Together", Socialism_
Theory and Practice (Moscow) , May . 1990, p. 88.
205.
USSR USA Summit, Moscow, May 29-June2, 1988 - Documents and
Materials ( Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1988). p.
206.
Josheph G. Whelan, The Moscow Summit, 1988- Reagan and Gorbache'
in Negotiation (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990), p. 16.
207.
Charles Ga ti, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe", Foreign Affairs, Vol.
65, no. 5 (1987), p. 947. (pp.954-975).
-266themselves."
( 208)
offer Eastern
the West,
Gorbachev believed
that he could afford
to
Europe an increased autonomy and improved ties with
for the
easing of tension between the superpowers
pre-requisite
for
transcend en tal.
( 210)
increased
East
European
autonomy.
was a
( 209)
Now,
Soviet objectives were real and concrete rather than ideological and
New political thinking transformed the perception of the world
"divided into
economic, political, national-state and ethnic-regions
entities which were relatively closed and hostile to one another" into
a world "of increasingly widening interaclion
and interconnection and
of growing integration and interdependence." ( 211)
During his address
at UN, Gorbachev said,"... if we are aware of lhe interdependence of
the
modern
itself
both
world,
in
this
policies
international relations".
and
communism
growing
was
dependence
understanding
and
( 212)
in
states
practical
Dynamic
considered
of
should
ensure
efforts
in
the
"constantly
with such
and
correlated
in
the
values as independence,
security."
( 213)
. Thus,
minds
harmonise
conditions Of
international
relations among nations acquired a political form,
was
to
manifest
interaction between socialism
essential
to
increasingly
of
the
peace.
peace as
rulers
the
Since
an asset
and
people
territorial integrity, sovereignty
international
cooperation
was
to
be
"based on completely equal rights and a respect for the sovereignty
of the each state".
(214)
208.
l'vlikhael Mandelbaum, "Ending the Cold War",
Vol. 68, no. 2 (1989), p. 21.
Foreign Affairs,
209.
Hobert 5". McNAMARA, Out of the Cold, Supra note no.6, p.116.
210.
Richard H. Ullman, '!Ending the Cold War", Foreign Policy, Vol. 72
p.1411-45.
211.
Konstantin Nekolayev, The End of Ideology, Supra note no.109, p.13-14.
212.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika and the New World Order
note no. 47, p. 45.
213.
Alexander Niki tin,, "Security in the Age of Interdependence",
Problems of the Contemporary World, Series no. 126 (Moscow,
1988) • p. 69.
214.
Documents and Materials ..:_ 27th CPSU Congress, Supra note no.116,p.23.
Supra
-267Sta bllity and security was to be guaranteed not by artificially
freezing the socio-political
status quo in the world but by adapting
the structure and content of international
relations
level
development.
of
social,
economic
and
political
to the achieved
Gorbachev
en uncia ted :
A nation may choose either capitalism or
socialism.
Thus is its sovereign
right.
Nations cannui and should not pattern
their life either after the United States
or the Soviet Union. (215)
The
root
cause
of
international
crises
and
many
regional conflicts originated from the imperialist policy
interference
largely
in
the
affairs
depended
on
communist or capitalist,
every natio.n
of
sovereign
whether
could
the
states.
the
of diktat and
Their
imperialist
be made
of
settlement
forces,
either
to respect
the right of
to independently determine its destiny.
In impact of
new thinking was observed as follows:
Today, it is quite clear that central and
Eastern Europe, and Europe as a whole,
is not the place for experimenting with
maintaining a state of tension, especially
when this invol·ves countries belonging to
different systems and military-political
groupings. ( 216)
In the emerging
interdependence,
be
no
region,
the arena of inter-state
great
powersrivarly
freedom
of
and
especially not
1988, Gorbachev suggested,
and
Europe could
During his address to
( 217)
into sensible competition on
choice
Eastern
rivalry of the two systems, of the two
the USA and the USSR.
UN, on 7 December
this
political situation and in the era of growing
balance
of
interests
... we must transform
the
11
•
basis of respect for
(
218)
Soviet
policy
215.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Supra note no. 14 . p. 143.
216.
Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, 11 A Soviet
View of Eastern Europe 11 , Appendix to Charles Gati, The Bloc
That
Failed Supra note no. 50, p. 219.
217.
Ibir!,
218.
Mikhail Gorba•:.: 1nv, Perestroj ka
Supra note no. l"i, p. GO.
p. 217.
and
the
New
Wonder
Order,
-268makers observed,
been
closed.
"the
confrontational period in European his tory has
The old
two
block security system
is
being eroded
day by day ..• " ( 219)
New System
~ Interna-
tional
security.
In the new perspective a comprehensive system of international
security
was inconceivable without creating a climate of confidence in
relations
among all
social
systems.
among
them
interstate
countries,
(220)
By
especially among states
democratising
societies
deideologisa tion facilitated gradual
relations.
materialised
in
the
The
thesis
wasteful
of
arms
and
relations
dem ilitarisa tion
inevitability
race.
with different
(221)
of
of
confrontation
Gorbachev asserted
that even the strongest state could no longer protect itself solely by
military-technical
that
could
be
means;
security
solved only
thinking
emphasized
disputes
through
political
of
nations
involved.
the
by
increasingly
political
means.
disarmament and
means
end
the
of
in te rna tiona 1
was
replaced
interaction.
by
political
(223)
Gorbachev
principle of "reasonable defence sufficiency"
all members
a
task
political
peaceful settlement of
the sovereign rights
cold
confrontation on geopolitical and geostrategic grounds
antagonism
New
( 222)
by upholding
The
became
war
discouraged
and ideological
dialogue
propagated
stimulating
the
and equal security for
of international community denouncing the power politics
based on military strength.
He said:
We countered the militarist
doctrine on
which power politics are based with the
concept of the 1 balance of interests 1 and
reciprocal equal security. ( 224)
219.
Alexei A. Arbtov, Sergei A. Karagonov, Vladimir N. Lobov,
The Soviet Union and European Security (Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, 1990), p. 15.
220.
Nikolai Kapchenko,
"Political Aspects
The Soviet Concept
of
Universal Security", Problems of the Contemporary World
Series no. 126, p. 112. (pp. 1Ul-115T
221.
From Confrontation to
Andrei Kozyrev,
"East and West
Cooperation and Development," International Affairs (Moscow),
no. 10, (October 1989), p. 10.
222.
Bruce Parrott, "Soviet National Security Under Gorbachev", Problems
of Communism, November-December 1988, XXXVII, no.6,p. 9-10.
223.
Francisco Rezek, "A New International Order," Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), Vol. XLII, no. 903, March 20,1991,p. 2.
224.
Mikhail Gorbachev, The Ideology of Renewal for Revolutionary
Restructuring
(Moscow, 1988), p. 53.
-269The
renunciation
of
inadmissability
another,
peaceful
full equality,
as
major
of
the
interference
use
by
or
one
threat
state
settlement of all disputes,
friendly
highlights
of
in
force,
the
the
affairs
advantageous
the
thinking
in
cooperation emerged
international
politics.
Gorbachev emphasized on the pooling of efforts and cooperation
full
respect
for
of
respect for sovereignty
mutually
new
of
with
the right of each nation to live as it chooses and
resolves its problems on its own in conditions of peace. " (225)
In terna tionalization of
Economy.-
In fact,
West
the most prominent
conflict,
factor,
which reduced
communist world and
was the economic crisis in the
its earnest desire to join the world economy·.
considerations,
to
yield
(226)
Economic
of the world signified the efforts
to overcome
economic
internationalisation
contradictions in
neutral and
The military-strategic
which were dominant over the pact past 45 years were
to
into account
the East-
the
considera lions.
form of mutually acceptable agreements tal<ing
The market forces · being
the interests of all partners.
independent of systems,
reduced
the political antagonism
and upheld national independence and state sovereignty .
. . • they emphasize the interdependence of
the different
systems and the possibility
of reforming them; they point out how
necessary it is to transform
antagonism
into peaceful
competition, comparision
and all-round cooperation. (227)
New
political
order guaranteeing
thinking visualized"
a
equal economic security
new
world
economic
to all countries."
( 228)
Comprehensive system of international economic security was to defend
each
state
manifestations
equally
from
of neo-colonial
discrimination,
sanctions
policy and· imperialist
and
other
interference.
225.
Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok, July 28, 1986
(Moscow, 1986) , p. 26.
226.
Ernst Kux, "Revolution in Eastern Europe -Revolution in the
West?." Supra note no. 73, p. 13.
227.
Heinz Timmermann, "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union's
Reassessment of International Social Democracy :
Dimensions and
Trends", Tho Journal of Communist Studies (London), Vol. 5,
no. 2 (June, 1989), p-.-182.
228.
Documents and Materials _ 27th CPSU Congress, supra note
no. 116, p. 97.
-270This
process ultimately
systems.
economic
of
i.e.
and
convergence
to
the
merger to
socialism
Shakhnazarov,
scholar
Soviet
led
the theory
who vehemently opposed
of
theory
and
two conflicting socioThe prominent
capitalism.
the
fusion
of
two
sys terns.
( 229)
now realized
... the East and West, as well as the
North and South, are faced with the task
not only of throwing bridges across the
gulfs that now separate them, but also of
trying
to eliminate these gulfs. (230)
The East European
leaders
were
coopera lion between conflicting
Deputy
Minister
process,
of
Foreign
Affairs,
both systems-irrespective
political,
and
ideological
equally
G.D.R.
decisive
lessening
impact
of
analogous
systems".
the
new
adaptation
to
the
Peres troika
to live with
In fact,
( 231)
thinking
was
changing
environmental
perestroika
disarmament and
process
involving USSn, East Europe and the West.
emergence
"In
contradictions-must learn how
( 232)
enhancing
Harry Ott,
observed
incentive for ceasing tensions,
confrontation."
in
systems.
of their fundamental socio -eonanic,
each ot1v=1r and get along well together".
"provided a
responsive
socio-economic
had
a
gl() bal
The simultaneous
"perceived
in
terms
factors
in
of
the
an
two
(233)
1.·
Thus
the
perestroika
two
world
new
promoted
the
socio-economic
principle of
co-existence
spheres of economics,
perestroika
realities
forged
stemming
harmony
systemswas
the
the
process
between the erstwhile
capitalism
transformed
science and
ahead
through
and
into
technology.
relations
The
cooperation in the
the process of
the
different
G.
Shakhnazarov,
Futurology
Moscow, 1982), p. 40.
230.
G. Shakhnazarov, "East -west
On a Non
Ideological
Approach to Inter State Relations", Supra note no. 133, p.274.
Implications of Soviet New Thinking, Supra note no.
9
,p.56.
1\Hguel A. Escotcl, , Former Secretary - General of the Organization
of Ibero-American States", Global Implications of Perestroika",
Review of International Affairs, Vol. XLI, no. 9G2, May 5, 1990.p.12
233.
(Progress
two
229.
231.
232.
Fiasco
opposing
communism.
Dut
between
of
Publishers,
Ole Norgaard,, "New Political Thinking East. and West : A Comparative ~e~espective~" J.n Gorbar.hov an_!! Europe edited IJy 1-lilo
.Ilnrle ,P1ntcr PulJllshers, Lolll.lun, 1~90), 52. (pp. 51-83)
-271systems
up
to
the
international
relations
concept
state
of
traditional
with
the
new
sovereignty
constraints
exercise
of convergence
brink
on
perspective
in
the
sovereignty
of sovereignty
were
The
sea
altered
the
world.
The
motives
behind
considerably.
"export"
of
revolution
national independence
or
counterrevolution.
and state sovereignty
the
A crisis
situation in Eastern Europe did not need to be interpreted
of
in
influenced
communist
and
change
in terms
The assessment
of
was to be made on the
basis of general principles of international relations and law.
Reliance on United Nations and International Law
In
and
the
the new
own
thinking,
primacy of international
prom inance.
global
political
The priority
interdependence
paths
to
national
reliance on the United
law in international politics gained
of universal human values and interests,
and
the freedom
development
of nations
became
to choose their
accepted
principles
In order to co-ordinate the diverse
international relations.
Nations
of
interests
of several states and to find organisational forms for the international
problems,
the
United
Nations
was
considered
"the
best
forum".
Mikhail Gorbachev said:
... the role of the United Nations with its
experience of streamlining international
co-operation is more important than ever
before . ( 234)
Perestroika
emphasised the
unconditio.nar-· observance
of
the
United Nations ·Charter and the right of peoples to choose themselves
1
the roads and forms ·of their developmen t as an imperative condition
for
universal
security.
productive contacts
Improvement
with non-aligned
in
Soviet-American
nations· and need
relations,
for
peaceful
settlements of disputes required strengthening of the United Nations.
The Resolutions
approved,
234.
of
the
19th
All
Union · Conference
of
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Supra note no. 14
the
CPSU
p. 140.
-272-
of the effnrts to build-up the prestige
of tho United Nations and achieve
the
settlement of regional conflicts on the
basis
of
the
principles
of
national
reconciliation and free self-determination.
( 235) •
This was a significant departure from the traditional communist
view
of
United
considered
were
Nations
and
international
"capitalist institutions".
Nikita
great
(
The assumption prevailed. that neither
236)
contemporary
Power
powers
Nations
was
Khruchev himself observed in
Nations nor its Charter affected in any
slates.
it
the U.N. , in point of fact, is a branch of the U.S. State
11
Department 11 •
the
Earlier,
that U.N. and related international political organisations
1962 that
of
law.
international
politics
reigned
was
found
incapable
in
a
( 237)
lower
situation or
struggle
supreme
democratic principles.
considered
and
basic fashion,
in
to
for
the
prevent
of
relations
the
significance
between
between the
relations.
United
violations
In Soviet analysis,
order
the character
supremacy
interna tiona!
the United
of
the
United Nations was
in
the
international
system.
The theoretical elaboration of such ideas as "functionalism 11 or
11
welfu re
internationalism 11
in
the
form
of
world
government
were
denounced as an effort by reactionary forces to subvert the communist
system and
to eliminate
government
was
independence;
considered
however
were not ruled out.
inherent
in
posed to be
a
national
State
very
against
collective
( 238)
or
sovereignty~
United
The slogan of world
sovere~gnty
efforts
to
sl,ove
and
national
global
problems
Nations could not enjoy the traits
supra-state
organisation.
Soviet
theorists
cautious to protect the interests of the socialist
states.
support
lienee, United Nations could not enlist their unconditional
in dealing
with international relations, "The principles of
respect
of
sovereignty
and
the
equality
of
States
require
strict
235.
Ibid., P. 279.
236.
Quoted by Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations, (Cambridge University Pt·ess, Cambridge, 1907), p. ~
237.
G. Shakhnazarov, The Corning World Order,
Moscow, 1~n4), p.~
238.
G. ShaJ-lqwzarov, Thirl., P. 204.
(Progress Publishers
-273observance in the United
Nations of the
and
groups
of
the
determine,
basic
among
social
other
of
things,
the
of all countries
interests
states,
and
composition
that
of
should
pre-
the. main
U.N.
agencies." ( 239)
Hence,
issues
state sovereignty
was put in the forefront
on all the
before ·.United· Nations and in its composition itself,
this organis::ttion might not
socialist
system.
non-governmental
sub-system
be detrimental
to the interests of world
International organisations,
kinds
were
understood
of international
so that
as
both governmental and
"a distinctively
relations in comparision
inferior
to other sub-
systems composed of sovereign states of like· socio-political orders."
(240)
as
Similarly, 'the international
"inter-class
compromise"
or
law was more or less considered
"inter-class
law"
between
two
antagonistic class systems.
With
Nations
the
and
new
political
thinking
Soviet
law
underwent
sea
the
Soviet
international
perestroika
evidenced
traditional nationalist dogma and
it
shared
Priority
with
was
other
allocated
members
to
Union's
universal
the
change.
on Uniied
Process
attempt
to
international
values
and
of
renounce
the .interests
to cultivate
of
positions
which
community.
interests,
global
interdependence above class considerations.
we are all dependent on each. other .
No country
or nation should be regarded
in total separation' r·rom another. . . that is
what our communist vocabulary
calls
internationalism and it means promoting
universal human values. ( 241)
Now
the
socialist
internationalism
based
on
class-alliance
confronting the capitalist imperialism was replaced by an international
the
U.N.",
in
Tunkin, (Progress
239.
G. I.
Morozov,
"International
Law.
and
Contemporary International Law,
ed. by G.
Publishers, Moscow, 1969), --p-:--124-125.
240.
Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations,
note no. 236, -p:-128.
-
241.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, Supra note no. 14 p. 188-189.
~~r<>
-274understanding
defend
strive
to
universal
International
for
values
human
law,
solutions
erstwhile
a
as
used
as
emerged as a dominant factor in state
problems
global
of
matter
an
of
instrument
policies.
and
state
of
Prof.
to
policy.
policy,
now
W. E. Butler
observed:
The very suggestion of the primacy of law
over policy is a change of the utmost
consequence,
quite
without
precedent
during the past seven decades. ( 242)
A
state-centric,
politically
oriented
model
of international
relations has been liberalised to recognise the rights and dignity
of
the
center
of
Republic
of
individual
interna tiona!
Germany
and
the
law
Soviet
emanated
Treaty
Union
of
1990 asserted
international
(243)
survival
politics.
and
September,
the
in
"
from
the
Soviet Union,
radical
mankind
between
Soviet
as
the
Federal
the
Socialist
Republics
on
13th
the precedence of the uni versa! rules of
their
recognition
of
domestic
of
the
changes
and
international
relations ... "
primacy ... :of international
law
in
the
the
dorpestic
system
of
"Recognition of the growing. importance of international
law is closely connected with the building of a socialist state based
on the rule of law in the Soviet Union.
international
The
It
increased
peaceful
legalities are two sides of the same coin"(244)
new
the generally
Ensuring both domestic and
political
recognised
faith
in
settlement
state
principles and norms
United
of
initiated a
Nations
disputes,
the
for
effe"ctive
enforcement
in
states.
It
considered necessary to enhance the authority
role
the
United
which
was
territorial
capable
on
of
of
international
respect
Nations
and
based
of international law.
non-interference
sovereignty
policy
affairs,
of
for
thinking
integrity
of
and the
fulfilling
the
assigned role.
242.
William E. Butler, "International Law, Foreign Policy and the
Gorbachev Style," Journal of Internatio.nal Affairs(New York),
Vol. 42, No. 2, Spring 1989-,-p. 371.
243.
Germany and Europe in Tansihon, edited by Adam
Rotfeld and Walther Stutgle, (Oxford University Press,
p. 190.
244.
Daniel
HJDl),
V. S. Vereshchetin and R ./\. Mullarson, "Interna tiona! Law in an
Interdependent World, "Columbia Journal of Transnational Law,
Vol. 28 (1990), no. 1 P. 296.
-275Comprehensive system of international security as proposed by
the
27th
CPSU
Congress
was
to
constructive co-operation on a
action, not
be
materialised
through
world-wide scale.
by a group of states, but by
a
close,
It required a
joint
a majority of States.
This
co-operation
must
be
based
on
completely equal rights and a respect
for the sovereignty of each state.
It
must
be
based
on
conscientious
compliance
with accepted commitments
and with the standards of international
law. (245)
To ensure the process of disarmament and the establishment of
a system of international
peace and security, Soviet Union expressed
full faith in United Nations.
of the U.N.
( 246)
"The system could function on the basis
Charter and within the framework of the United Nations."
Formerly,
positivist
approach
to
international
law
hampered
the Soviet Union's appreciation of general principles and creation of
norms
general
international
law.
(247)
New
political
the Soviet perception of general principles
softened
law.
in
Gorbachev
adherence
advocated
for
reliance
on
thinking
of international
United
Nations
and
to the universal values:
Unconditional observance of the United
Nations charter and the right of peoples
to choose themselves the roads and forms
of their development,
revolutionary or
evolutionary, is an imRerative
condition
for uni versa! security. ( 248)
··I
I
In
his
article
on
further stated:
organisation
for
United
a
extensive
Nations
in 1987,
Mikhail
mechanism . could
be set
'
international varification of
~
~
Gorbachev
up
under
compliance
245.
XXVII CPSU CONGRESS,
Documents and
Publishers, New Delhi, 1986) , p. 23.
Resolutions,
246.
M. Gorbachev, Realities and Guarantees
(Novosti, Moscow, 1987), p---:---6.
for
247.
John Quigley, "The New Soviet Approach to International Law"
7, Haward International Law Journal.!. (1965), p. 15-16.
248.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Supra Note. 246, p. 9.
a
Secure
(Allied
World
-276with
agreements
armaments
and
on
of
lessening
the
international
military
situation in
tension
conflict
and
limiting
areas.
(249)
Gorbachev also proposed strengthening the international Atomic Energy
Agency,
creating a
world space organisation ancl making more use of
the International Court of Justice - making its jurisdiction compulsory
for
all
states.
measures
of
Earlier
interference
these
in
suggestions
internal
could
affairs
be
and
considered
violation
of
sovereignty according to traditional theories in Soviet Union.
other
hand
United
the
new
political
thinking
was
inclined
Nations, more or less, a role akin to
Mikhail Gorbachev in his "The United
states.
Nations embodies as it
It is
bilateral,
asserted,
and
(250)
we
II
Nations and
comprehensive
Soviet
have
a supranaUonal
the
ClUthority.
observed:
the interests of different
in
one
Foreign
article
in
all
as
the leading
role
the
same
Shevardnadze
to
the
United
He recognised "the
in politics- pol.itical ecology." ( 251)
Minister
termed
Vladimir Petrovski
declaration
their
and
Eduard
Minister
other international organisati<;ms".
Deputy
relatlons
Foreign
assigned
emergence of a new sphere
Gorbachev
On the
assign
UN· 7 Dec·._ 1988,
were,
state
the only organization which can channel their efforts -
regional
direction".
~
Address
to
as
for
"restruc-turing
military,
aspects
of
the
international
political,
economic,
d~
humanitarian and ecological and
law
and
order"
( 252)
the narrow
transcending
along the principles of democratisation
The
emphasis
,.,;,·- .
interests of states,
on
rule of law
values
classes and ideologies
,.
suggested a
universal
in international relations.
Soviet theorists
now reiterated:
the ensuring of durable and secure
peace pre-suppose19 strengthening of the
legal
and
moral
basis
of
modern
international relations. (253)
249.
250.
Ibid.
M. Gorbachev, Perestroika and the New World Order,
Publishers, Moscow, 1991), P. 4~ - -
251.
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Policy and Perestroika,
Moscow, 1989), p. 50.
"252.
Moscow TASS in English, September 18, · 1989
September 18, 1987, pp. 5-6.
253.
Vadim Zagladin, For Peaceful Inte.rnaticinal
Publishers, New Delhi, 1989) , p. 87.
~54~ M· Gorbachev, Supra note No. 246, p .· 14.
( Novosti
( Novosti
in FBIS - SOV.
Relations
(Allied
-277-
Hence, it was found essential to create "a system of universal
law and ' order which ensures the primacy of
international law in
politics". ( 254)
Principles of
international law emerged as the
basis
political
advocated
footing
policy
for
of
" ... putting
guaranteeing
sovereignty,
the
the
independence,
state.
28th
Congress
of the CPSU
relations between states on a legal
the
freedom
of
and
development
the
social
and
political
choice,
of co-operation and
partnership with countries of the world. " ( 255)
The
made
general
universally
democratic
of international
These
must
applicable.
between relations among
countries.
system is
principles
norms
socialist states as
apply
law
were
uniformly
well as among capitalist
Any discrimination on the basis of class or
tantamount to
negation of international law.
political
nations see in these universal human
values only their class understanding of
sovereignty
or
intereference,
then
international law is void of any true
meaning. ( 256)
If
New
political
-international
principles.
economics
law
thinking now
different
denied
from
:my existence of socialist
universal
international
legal
"Interstate relations in the arena of world politics and
must
international
be
law,
founded
on
strict
which presupposes
observance
of
the
rules
Of
the· equality of all countries,
mutual respect, non-interference in each other's internal affairs etc. "
(257)
I
Growing
tendency
now well recognised.
to
a
struggle
The prevailing
for
.
'
towards interdependence of the states was
The world has moved from colonial dependence
independence
and
into
universal
interdependence.
dialectics of the present day is considered a stage of
255.
Documents and Materials,
Party of the Soviet Union,
28th Congress of the Communist
(Novosti, Moscow, 1990), p. 90.
256.
V.S. Vereshchetin and R.A.
295.
257.
Vadim Zagladin, To Restructure anc;l Humanize International
Relations ( Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1989), p. 84-85.
Mullerson, Supra note no.
244,
p.
-278reconciliation
between the two opposing socio-economic systems.
In
this interdependent world national states were to respect the interests
of other nations or of the international community as a whole.
interview,
Alexandar
Yakovlev
analysed
the
In an
impact
of
on state sovereignty.
interdependence
I don't think that interdependence of
states leads to the loss or surrender of a
part of a country.- s sovereignty .
I think
the question is rather about taking into
account the interests of others.
It is not
a concession of sovereignty,
this is only
a desire, a striving, a readiness to live
together, to search for a solution to a
problem. ( 258)
Hence,
interdependence
of
states
behaviour of a state in inter-relations.
required
This
a
responsible
responsibility
could
be ensured by strengthening United Nations and enforcing international
law.
"Interdependence is normally expressed in the voluntary self-
limitation of State sovereignty on the basis of reciprocity, or in the
partial
devolution
of
sovereign
powers
to
international
organisations". ( 259)
The
principle
of
co-existence
implied
respect
the
for
the
sovereign equality of all nations, prohibitiOD against the use of force
and interference in the internal affairs of other nations.
But earlier
peaceful co-existence was characterised as "a specific form
struggle" between
the two antagonistic systems !
the
socialist.
political
( 260)
The 27th Congress of the CPSU considered
and
and
thinking aimed at
of
sovereignty
struggle
stressing
territorial
the
intergrity
inviolability of their borders •.. " ( 261)
the capitalist
and
"minimising
the
.•
aspect
the
class
New
of class-
-
aspect
of
of
co-operation"
"strict respect for
states
and
the
as the essential ingredients
of peaceful co-existence.
258.
Interview " Alexander Yal<ovlev, by Serwer~n
Bialer, "Redefining
So::ialism at Home and Abroad:" Journal of International Affairs,
Vol. 42, No.2, (Spring, 1989), p. 346.
259.
William E. Butler, Supra note no. 242, p. 372-73.
260.
John Quigley, "Perestroika and International Law", The American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 82 (1988), p. 790.
261.
XXVII CPSU Congress, Documents and Resolutions,
shers, New Delhi, 1986), p. 311-.-
(Allied Publi-
-279But
it
is
adhered
the
noteworthy
that
neither
capitalist
to this principle in the past.
"doctrine of limited
nor
socialist
countries
The "Brezhnev Doctrine" or
sovereignty" in the communist
world
and
the use of armed forces for "propagating de7llocracy" by U.S.A.
(262)
caused serious viola Uons of the principle of nqn-intervention.
theorists
conceded
that",
the
introduction
of
Soviet
Soviet
troops
to
Afghanistan was also inconsistent with norms of international conduct."
(263)
Similarly,
the sovereign
the
protection of human rights could not
rights of the State.
International law
transcend
did not have
any direct relation to the individual in regard to the observance of
human rights and freedoms.
envisage
any
external
consideration
other safeguard
sovereignty.
could
Communists
violations of human rights,
in
their
thinking,
The protection of human rights did "not
so-called
the
other
than ·the State",
amount
always
to
accused
an
the
( 264)
for
infringement
of
capitalist
system
any
state
for
without examining the prevailing practice
progressive
system.
With
the
new
political
realisation of the deformations in the socialist system
came in open.
It is shameful
that until recently we used
to say "so ·called' human rights", claiming
that we had no problems with them at
home. (265)
The status of individual in international law emerged
awareness of the importance of mankind.
with the
Protection of human rights
now did not confine within the state boundraries. "Strict observance of
262.
Louis Henkin, "International Law and the National Interest",
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 25 (1986),p.31.
263.
v.s.
264.
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. International Law - A Text
book, (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow---:n-:-d.) ,p.140.
265.
Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Policy and Perestroika,
Moscow, 1989), p. 51.
Vereshchetin and R.A.
Mulle~son,
Supra note no. 244, p.297
( Novosti,
-280international human rights agreements and their priority over domestic
norms and rules is a necessary attribute of a state based on the rule
of law" (266)
Vladimir Terebilov,
the chairman of the Supreme Court of the
USSR expressed the Soviet commitment to protect human rights and its
allegience to the UN Charter: "The Soviet Union champions consistently
and
vigorously
human rights
the
UN
international
cooperation
in
the
field
of
in full confirmity with the objectives and principles of
Charter".
recognised
State
all-round
as
( 267)
an
Hence
effective
sovereignty
could
international
measure for
not
claim
legal
obligations
were
potection of human rights.
its
inviolability
in
case
of
infringement of human rights.
must retain priority
human
rights
over the interests of national sovereignty
and autonomy. (268)
Thus,
Soviet
new
political thinking
perceptions
international
considered
essential
of
the
organisations.
merely
means
an
to
resulted in a drastic change in
principle
resolve
of
international
international
The
attribute
of
foreign
international
policy,
disputes
law
law
which
now
became
and
the
and
was
an
United
Nations and other international organisations a medium to enforce new
principles
and
norms
of
international
conduct
to
foster
universal
values and welfare of mankind.
266.
V. S. Vereshchetin and R. A.
299.
Mullerson, Supra note no.
267.
Vladimir
Terebilov,
Perestroika
Demands
Judicial
Reform
( Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1988), p. 32.
268.
28th Congress of the Communist Party
Supra note no. 255, p.26.
of
the Soviet
244,
p ..
Union,