Democratic Transition In Egypt: Between Success and Failure
As
%
X0\S
A Thesis submitted to the faculty of
San Francisco State University
In partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree
18
Master of Arts
In
International Relations
by
Khaled Amin Ezzat
San Francisco, California
August 2015
Copyright by
Khaled Amin Ezzat
2015
CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL
I certify that I have read Democratic Transition in Egypt Between Success and Failure
by Khaled Amin Ezzat, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving
a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment o f the requirement for the degree Master o f
Science in Arts: International Relations at San Francisco State University.
Mahmood Monshipouri
Ph.D.
Associate Professor o f International Relations
Associate Professor o f International Relations
Democratic Transition in Egypt Between Success and Failure
Khaled Amin Ezzat
San Francisco, California
2015
The uprising o f 2011 that toppled President Hosni Mubarak was an incredible
achievement for the Egyptians. Under Mubarak, Egypt was a key regional ally o f
Washington, a reliable peace partner for Israel, and an island of stability in a turbulent
Middle East. But Mubarak was also an authoritarian, whose ruling party presided over an
increasingly repressive state apparatus at home. With Mubarak gone, Egyptian people
have a chance to chart their own course. However, almost 4 years has passed and it’s not
clear that Egypt is headed for democracy. This paper seeks to demonstrate that
democratic transition failed because Egyptians preferred political stability and the hope
o f economic growth under a strong ruler rather than fight for democracy. This paper will
also at the differences between an “effective” government under A1 Sisi versus more
“legitimate” government under Morsi in fulfilling the basic needs for Egyptians. This
research paper will also look at structural factors in Egypt that create an environment
adaptable to one government over the other.
I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation o f the content
th^oio
LIST OF FIGURES
Figures
Page
1.
Development Rate......................................................................................................27
2.
Economic Performance ...................................................................................
3.
Pew Study
4.
Pew Survey .............................................................................................................. 46
5.
Pew Survey
6.
Currency Reserve.......................................................................................................49
7.
Approval Rate.............................................................................................................50
8.
Approval Rate.............................................................................................................51
........................................................................
............................................................................................................. 47
28
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List o f Figures............................................................................................................................... vi
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 1
Literature Review...........................................................................................................................3
During Revolutions........................................................................
M ethod................................................................
7
12
M odernazition................................................................................................................. 13
Transitional......................................................................................................................17
Structural..........................................................................................................................20
C auses...............................................................................................................................................
Conditions During Mubarak Era.................................................................................. 27
The A rm y.........................................................................................................................24
The Muslim Brotherhood...............................................................................................35
D iscussion.........................................................................................................................................
Reveolution or C oup...................................................................................................... 40
Why The Army Back A gain......................................................................................... 43
Comparison..................................................................................................................... 48
Weak civil Socity............................................................................................................53
Regional A cto rs..............................................................................................................55
C onclusion.......................................................................................................................57
R eference...................................................................................................................................... 59
1
Introduction
Revolutions have become a phenomenon of interest to researchers in the fields
o f international relation, political science and humanities. People have studied the
revolutionary experiences, from the French Revolution in 1789 as a classic model of
revolutions moving forward through the Russian revolution in 1917, then the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 and the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in the late Eighties
and early nineties o f the twentieth century. In 2010 protests and uprising movements in
the Middle East have swept the region. It began in Tunisia going to Egypt and then
spreading to other states. These uprisings lead to the fall of many leaders like Ben Ali
(Tunisia), Mubarak (Egypt), Selah (Yemen) and Qadafi (Libya). The Arab Spring has
developed a focused thought in international research frameworks and new concepts of
international politics, given the developments in the Middle East region. We find that it
summons a set of theory concepts such as the concept of revolution, which needs to be
reviewed and assessed for their significance and value.
The process of revolution in these countries primarily aimed at the collapse of
political systems and rebuild new systems based on fundamental basic human rights like
liberty, social justice and economic security. The aim of these uprisings was to effect
change in the political systems and not to accept any oppressive regimes, and in this part
is trying to frame the concept of addressing the Revolution as one of the tools that might
lead to the collapse of political systems.
2
Three or more years after the Arab Spring, Tunisia seems the only clear model of
applying democratic transition. Tunisia passed through many obstacles and dilemmas for
nearly four years. But they managed to get out each and every one of them safely. Tunisia
succeeded in drafting a new constitution, which was agreed upon by all the different
social and party affiliations representing all ideology (The Economist, 2014).
Furthermore, they succeeded in the first parliamentary elections on the basis of the new
constitution and finally a new president was elected.
This raises an important question: Why Egypt hasn’t fully transitioned toward
democracy? Egypt is the largest Arab country, and it has one the oldest legacy of
statehood in the region and they are considered the Renaissance o f the Arab world.
Therefore, despite the fact that Arab Spring started from Tunisia, but “Tahrir Square” in
Cairo was the one that captured the scene in the region and turned into a political icon for
the Arab Spring. The result o f the revolution led to the first democratically elected
President of Egypt, Mohammed Morsi, who was toppled only one year after he was
elected by the Military after the people went on the streets to voice their discontent of his
rule. Meanwhile, in countries like Tunisia, the development has been quite different
where the military did not intervene. Though there have been security and legitimate
questions, and outright protests against the interim government, it never descended into
strong tensions like in Egypt. Although there were the same political split in Tunisia as in
Egypt, but the Tunisians managed to negotiate a compromised solution, and draft a
constitution taking into consideration many different aspects of the country and the
3
people living in it (Stepan, 2012). So it’s necessary to explore the internal factors that
affected Egypt path towards democracy, especially the roles of the army, Muslim
Brotherhood and regional actors.
Literature Review
Marc Lynch a professor o f political science and international relations at George
Washington University believes one of the important changes that paved the way for the
Arab Spring was the structural change in Arab public awareness where technology played
a role in weakening the ability of regimes to control the movement of information
(Lynch, 2012).
Robert Kaplan an American journalist has pointed out in an article entitled “The
New Arab World Order” that Arabs did not rise up because o f the Palestinian struggle or
because o f their anger toward the United States or the West (Kaplan, 2011). However, the
uprisings were against unemployment, tyranny and indignities in the interior of their
societies, and this is what constitutes a big wave o f change in the history o f the Middle
East (Kaplan, 2011)
These uprisings highlighted that foreign issues were not the main concern rather it
was domestic concerns that moved these masses. Also the uprisings broke the former
perspective that for any change to happen the involvement of the West, especially the
U.S. was needed. The scene this time was special and different because there were not
4
any traditional players like army generals, party leaders or Unions, but the actors in these
revolutions were young youth that was not driven by any political motive (Kaplan, 2011).
After the cold war, it was a common theme for many developing states to
transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes. Military dictatorships,
bureaucratic oligarchies, and other authoritarian regimes have found themselves subject
to the irresistible forces of globalization, which compel them in the direction o f a degree
o f progressive democratic reform (Bhagwati, 2007). Due to globalization citizens
became more aware of their extension o f political rights, establishment of limited
electoral processes, the ability to organize independent parties and freedom of the press
(Bhagwati, 2007). There has been an extended debate about democracy and development,
and the relation between democratization and economic growth.
Samuel Huntington characterizes the debate in terms of “conflict” and
“compatibility” that some democratic regimes are in general less capable of managing
effective economic development than authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 1968). The
central premise of his reasoning stems from the observation that development requires
change, and that change affects some voters adversely (Huntington, 1968). So
governments dependent on electoral support in elections will typically tend to avoid
choices that impose hardship on significant numbers o f voters (Huntington, 1968). Adam
Przeworski’s present a thoughtful argument to this effect in his article “Democracy and
the Market” (Przeworski,1991). He believes that development requires a decisive policy
choices and an effective policies implementation; authoritarian regimes are more
5
decidedly and more effective in implementing policies (Przeworski,1993). He highlights
the point that ethnic and sub-national conflicts interfere with economic development, and
are most effectively suppressed by strong authoritarian government (Przeworski,1991).
Also authoritarian governments are more capable to effectively defer consumption in
favor of savings (Przeworski,1991). Democratic regimes usually are under a political
imperative to increase social welfare spending, which reduces the rate o f accumulation.
Democracy undermines investments (Huntington and Dominguez 1975).
For example, the above factors could also explain why democracy is very hard to
occur in a country like China because the political culture and the unique relationship
between the state and society. The absence of civil culture and civil society, and a weak
society dominated by a strong state provides a structural explanation of why strategic
coordination by opposition cannot conquer autocrats. Additionally, if we put China’s
economic development and democratization in a bigger picture, perhaps China’s political
transition has been just in the early phase o f modernization; its democracy is inevitable
but just delaying (Pei 2006). As in the case of Egypt, where the regime under the army
controls a large portion of the economy, hence convincing people that they are the key for
development. Sooner or later on autocracies will democratize under the stimulation of
economic development. As mentioned above democracy might not be successful without
development in that might explain the case in Egypt.
6
However, autocracies might not be the best option for Egypt as well due to
corruption. Corruption tends to be more prevalent in autocratic systems (where one
person rules with unlimited authority), or by a small group o f elites. As Minxin Pei of the
Carnegie Endowment points o u t , corruption does exist in democracies, but it is
absolutely different from the massive looting that exits in autocrats in dictatorships (Pei,
2006). That is why the least corrupt countries, with a few exceptions, all happen to be
democracies, and the most corrupt countries are overwhelmingly autocracies. It's not
coincidental that the connection between corruption and autocracies ruling. Democracies
derive their legitimacy and popular support through competitive elections and the rule of
law. While autocracies might depend on the support of a small group of political and
social elites, the military, the bureaucracy and the secret police. These facts make us
doubt the claims that autocracies manage to provide a better economic model because it
might not be reflected in reality.
Also, there are no guarantees the democratic process will take place in
autocracies through time. In the last two decades, there has been at least dozens of
democratic transitions. Although it is especially true that the current political situations of
the “transitional countries” are not set in stone, but enough time has passed to shed
significant light on how the transition process is holding up (Diamond, 2006). Out of
nearly 100 countries considered as “transitional” from autocracies to democracies in past
years, only a relatively small number of states probably fewer than 20 states are clearly
en route to becoming successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made
7
some democratic progress and still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization
(Diamond, 2006). Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs found that even if
autocracies have a successful result of economic development this would not lead to
democracy because authoritarian regimes and autocracies around the world show people
that they can enjoy the benefits of economic development on the one hand and avoid
political liberalization on the other (Mesquita and Downs, 2005).
During Revolutions
Autocracy and democracy represent two very distinct political systems, and the
differences between them explain the complexity. This difference in turn affects their
robustness when established during a revolution. According to Carles Boix and Milan
Svolik authors of “The foundations of limited authoritarian government”, an autocratic
government is by its nature less complex than a democratic one (Boix, 2013).
Autocracies do not require the extensive decision-making structures that are necessary to
gather public support or negotiate with other branches of the government (Boix, 2013).
While true democracy requires the incorporation o f many independently acting and
interacting interests that requires special institutions and procedures like legislators and
representatives, competitive elections and debates. An autocratic government may choose
to take these actions; however, they are not required (Boix, 2013). Many authoritarian
governments do not conform to the pure autocratic type of one man rule; rather they may
share power with a group like a family, party, or a military (Boix, 2013). Arrangements
8
like these should entail more political complexity than pure autocracy, although it’s not at
the same level o f complexity necessary for a democracy.
Modern democracies also involve a multitude of non-governmental institutions
such as civic associations and independent media. Whatever form these institutions take,
the need to distribute the political authority among many individuals and the diverse
groups o f which they are of part constituted an extra layer o f complexity within
democracies (Michels, 2001). In applying this analysis o f revolutions that aim to create a
democratic government we immediately identify the associated difficulties. After gaining
power, the provisional government must address many questions in order to build its own
institutions. Since there no single democratic template to follow. The many kinds of
democracies, whether direct and representative, federal and centralized, presidential and
parliamentary reflect its complexity. While autocracies may choose their own
establishments, democracies must determine which of a large number o f alternatives to
implement (Michels, 2001). This is where every constitutional choice can become a
subject to denial or refusal, since each decision might benefit one segment o f the
population over another.
Autocratic regimes brought down by a revolution are usually preceded by
democratic government, however the new democratic government struggle to meet the
demands before they are given enough time (Boix, 2013). Faction’s starts emerging in
reaction to the weakness of the new institutions and old institutions try to impose
themselves back to the scene. Conflicts will erupt, either between the government and the
9
populace or between factions, as the new institutions fail to contain it (Boix, 2013).
Within a few years or even less the new democratic government will be replaced by a
more capable regime generally just as autocratic as the ones recently overthrown (Becker,
2005). This process can be translated into the level o f complexity: when a revolution
brings a rapid change by displacing or destroying accumulated system. Subsequently,
governments that try to create democracy, find a gap between their present and their
intended goals are too great (Becker, 2005). The problem is not that democracy is
incapable; but on the contrary the stability and prosperity o f mature democratic states
testify to that. However, democracy needs time to mature, but when time is short and the
foundations for a complex structures have been eroded or did not exist in the first place.
Especially in the last several decades, several revolutions in the Philippines in
1986, in South Korea in 1987, and across Eastern Europe in 1989 have managed to oust
autocratic regimes and replace them with more or less stable democracies (Boix, 2013).
These are not counter examples, but rather demonstrations of the constructive side o f this
conclusion. In all of these nations, the revolutions were largely non-violent and forced
out autocrats without overturning the apparatus of government. These revolutions also
managed to take advantage o f the existing complexity represented by previously
powerless democratic elements, such as parliaments with only symbolic roles and tightly
managed elections. Foundation already in place by autocratic regimes to offer the
semblance of representational government, these powerless institutions later provided a
10
foundation for a democratic government without significant modifications to their social
system. Furthermore, these regimes all received external support during their critical
early years. However, In the case of Egypt it was vice verse the structure helped the
survival of the autocratic government and external support was anti-democratic
transition.
Many concepts of democracy have been identified in the literature. This is part of
the trend best described as ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier and Levitsky 1997).
Collier believes the situation could be chaotic due to the many forms being presented.
This phenomenon became problematic by the rise of democracy outside of Western
Europe in the last few decades. All these new democracies, with their own unique
different histories and cultures, could present a new definition for democracy (Levitsky
and Way 2002, 52). Thus, scholars are able now to describe accurately these new forms
o f democracy, while ensuring this level o f democracy is applied correctly to avoid calling
non-democratic systems democracy. This raises a question as to whether there are many
different forms o f democracy or a single concept.
This thesis will showcase the existence o f different types of democracy. It is more
analytical and empirically useful for it enables the identification and description of the
current form of democracy in Egypt. Instead of focusing ethnocentric bias which assumes
that a Western European model of democracy is the definitive conception o f democracy,
the paper will look at the different culture and influential actors of democracy.
11
Accepting the idea of having different types of democracy has significant
advantages over a single conception o f democracy. First, there is no agreement over what
a single conception of democracy would include, nor would such an agreement be able to
include the wide variety of democracies exists in many different countries. This is
especially true with the new developed democracy, by which ‘vary profoundly both from
each other and from the democracies in western countries (Collier and Levitsky 1997,
430). For example, both El Salvador and Ukraine had the same democratic rating of
‘party-free’ from Freedom House, yet in El Salvador there were ‘substantial human rights
violations and the absence of civilian control over the military’ and in Ukraine
democratic processes were ‘routinely abused or manipulated’ by incumbents (Levitsky
and Way 2002, 52); both countries were democratic in a sense, but were significantly
different from each other. If we look closely in Egypt in last 3 years and we start
comparing between two regimes we will see these differences between two
democratically elected governments. Where one regime seemed to be more legitimate in
terms of democratic principles and human rights codes, however were less effective for
meeting economic demands. While another regime that seems more capable of providing
some form of governance, stability with violation o f democratic principles.
Given these theoretical constraints, we can hypothesize that disruptive
revolutionary events will favor the development o f autocracies over democracies, even
when the impetus of the revolution itself is to create democracy. The degree to which
autocracies are favored should increase when there is a greater disruption o f the pre-
12
existing governmental form. The structural aspect o f the society and the needs of people
should be taken into consideration as a determine factor. The historical record of
revolutionary outcomes supports the hypotheses presented above that the people of
Egypt chose a capable defined in terms o f stability government rather than unstable
democratic one.
Methodology: Historical
In this thesis, I chose historical methodology because it provides the best
explanation for a complex phenomenon like democratization in Egypt. I believe that the
unique capacity of historical methodology does not only come from its disciplinary
origins rather than philosophical and epistemological roots. Historical methodology has
an inductive and flexible style o f theory building, but it enables the researcher to see the
multiple faces of reality through the subjects' eyes.
Through in-depth data and observation one can share the interpretative lens of
subjects/actors and their influence over social, political and cultural environment. By
shifting from one subject/actor to another the researcher can understand and therefore
identify the dominant powers and institutions that frame their views and tint their lenses.
Contrary to quantitative methodology where researchers are distant outsider observers
who treat people as silent objects, historical methodology avoids the distance through
observation and greater interaction between researchers and their topics. In addition, this
13
method acknowledges the central role of the researcher and legitimizes his subjective
interpretation rather than pretending objectivity and the ability of reaching scientific truth
as positivsts might claim.
Whether democratic culture is needed to pave the way for the democratic
process or change comes as a result o f it, is still an unanswered question. What looks
more conflicting though, is the use o f culture to explain the absence of democracy in the
Middle Eastern context and the Arab world in particular. The importance of engaging
with the historical-political culture approach stems primarily from the fact that, whenever
democratization in the Middle East is invoked, the cultural argument always comes to the
fore. A close examination of the historical-political culture and the dangers of reading the
deficiency o f democracy in the Arab settings through the prism of culture will follow in
the next section discussing three main approaches.
Modernization Approach
Seymour Lipset believed that democratizing is primarily connected to
socioeconomic development or the level of modernization inside a state. His work
focused on a comparison between European nations and Latin American nations to
demonstrate that in the first region has stable democracies or unstable democracies and
unstable dictatorships while in Latin America we find democracies, unstable dictatorships
and stable dictatorships (Lipset, 1959). After comparing these countries, his findings
were that the average wealth, degree o f industrialization and urbanization, and level of
14
education and economic development were higher in democratic countries (Lipset, 1959).
Thus, he concluded that democracy is related to the economic development of the state.
This precisely means that the more developed the nation is the greater the chances that it
will sustain democracy. To prove this point in this thesis we need to look at the demands
o f Egyptians for political change and see if it was primary economical.
In other terms, most countries that fail in maintaining political democracy are due
to their poor development. However, Lipset’s theories about the interdependence between
capitalism and democracy has been criticized even from within the modernization realm.
Larry Diamond has a different view o f this relationship: "the more well-to-do the people
of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, achieve, and maintain a
democratic system for their country" (Diamond, 1992). On this part, Walter Rostow
identified four stages leading societies from traditionalism to modernity where
democracy can prevail. These four stages are "traditional societies", "pre-take-off
societies" "take-off and finally "mass consumption societies (Rustow, 1970). In that case
economic data o f Egypt current conditions will help us predict Egypt future transition.
According to modernization theory, economic development is the key for
democratization because it brings a higher level of income within the society, which in
turn leads to less struggle and conflict between classes (Diamond, 1992). It has been well
documented higher economic levels goes parallel with education levels. Citizens with
higher educational levels come to value democracy by becoming more tolerant, less
15
radical, moderate and rationally with regard to different views and other social groups.
Although these socioeconomic factors could not be disregarded when explaining
democratic transitions, nonetheless in certain parts of the world they become problematic
when used to analyze the situation like in the Middle East region.
Tim Niblock compares a number of Middle Eastern countries with more
developed countries, his finding was, on the contrary, to the classic modernization theory
(Niblock, 1998). He argues that a number o f Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt
relatively score highly on sectors like education, industrialization, social mobility,
urbanization and standard of living, yet they have been surpassed on the road to
democratization by countries with lower scores (Niblock, 1998). The importance of
education has been highlighted as factor o f creating a culture that favors democracy over
other forms of government, also known as the “political culture approach” within
modernization theory (Niblock, 1998). To prove that point, I will need to look at
educational levels in Egypt to see if there is enough believers in democracy.
Modernization theory has been criticized due to the very limited solid empirical
evidence that supports any claim to universal applicability. There is certainly a positive
correlation between economic development and democracy, but it’s not the only deciding
factor. Other variables like political institutions, social norms, ethnic diversity should also
be considered. Its ethnocentrism and culture specificity caused it to ignore a range of
other forms of socioeconomic development including that of Egypt.
16
The problem with modernization theory is the principles and rules are drawn from
Western experiences, which cannot always apply to non-Western societies. In addition,
modernization theory is seen as a historical in that it does not recognize the fundamental
differences between societies and their historical context. It assumes that all societies can
replicate a transition, which actually occurred at a particular moment under different
circumstances (Grugel, 2002). A transitional theorist like Dankwart Rustow criticizes
modernization theorists describing “their key propositions” as “couched in the present
tense” and only concerned with preserving and enhancing the stability and health of
existing democracies (Rustow, 1970). In one o f his studies, he compares the histories of
Turkey and Sweden and concludes that the road to democratization is marked by social
conflict rather than the timeless social requisites. According to Rustow, societies in
general tend to establish somewhat national unification process, then they enter into a
long phase o f “political struggle” before they reach an agreement “historical decision”
(Rustow, 1970). Rustow theory could be proven by looking at the persisting conflicts that
Egyptian society keeps facing currently.
The majority o f critics seems to view the modernization approach as simple and
lacking Relying on economic structures (capitalism) to explain complex situations like a
shift of political change down, modernization ignores the role o f other factors including
the human factor, the role of groups, classes. As for the political culture approach,
criticism comes from two different schools like transitional and structural.
17
Transitional
Transitional approach, focus on the sociopolitical factors, thus waiting for
economic conditions to mature and become favorable to democracy, transitional scholars
emphasize the role of committed actors in bringing democratic change independently
from the structural context. One of these scholars was Dankwart Rustow his focus on
“How a democracy comes into being" in the first place, and “What conditions make it
thrive” (Rustow, 1970). Rustow's work revolves around certain phases of democracy like
the “decision” phase, which according to him is characterized by a deliberate
“compromise” on the part of “political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity
and, to that end, to institutionalize some crucial aspect of democratic procedure”
(Rustow, 1970). At the final phase (habituation) "the population at large will become
firmly fitted into the new structure by the forging of effective links o f party organization
that connect the politicians in the capital with the mass electorate throughout the country”
(Rustow, 1970).
Transitional approach was later elaborated by Guillermo O ’Donnell and his work
“Transitions from Authoritarian Rule”, which became a key reference for transition
studies (O ’donnell, 2013). Democratization according to Guillermo is a process of
interaction between the democratic elites and authoritarian leaders. It is a combination of
“overlapping moments” of conflict and political negotiations undertaken separately from
economic conditions (O’donnell, 2013). Adam Przeworski argues that democracy in
political reality has always coexisted with oppression and exploitation within the society
18
(Przeworski, 1993). For a transitional approach to work, it’s very crucial to look at the
division within the authoritarian regimes, which creates a space for other political actors
to become more active. Przeworski believes that there is no transition whose beginning is
not the consequence direct or indirect divisions within the authoritarian regime itself
(Przeworski, 1993). In that case, we will need to look at Egypt during Mubarka Era and
explain what went wrong!
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan developed the next major theoretic contribution to
the transitional approach in their collective work “path dependence”. The key o f their
work lies in contextualizing the strategic choices made by the elites within the structural
constraints of the legacy o f the past (Linz, 1996). The type o f authoritarian regime that
was in place at the time of transition is crucial structural elements and components o f this
legacy that political elites have to deal with in the future. As Richard Snyder in his
explanation of non-revolutionary transition, the form and the shape o f the non-democratic
regime affects both the process of transition and also the future of the transition (Snyder,
1992). If we go back to Linz and Stepan, they expanded the debate on democratization
beyond the doubt o f the transition phase. They make a clear distinction between
"transition" which does not always lead to a democratic outcome, and "consolidation"
(Linz, 1996). Consolidation is what makes a democratic transition come to a successful
phase by becoming the only political regime type (Linz, 1996). Using Linz theory, it’s
going to useful looking at data from the fall of Mubarak passing by the transitional period
of the SCAF and the decision were taken until now.
19
In my opinion, the transition approach is too simple as it reduces a complex
process such as democratization to the contingent choice and tentative arrangements of
political elites. The dynamics o f elite interaction are necessary but insufficient to create
democracy. From past experiences shows that in some transitions, the popular struggles
played a determining role in democratization. Jean Grugel for example, describes the
transition approach as being excessively elitist to the extent that it stripes the democratic
process from its popular base and contradicts the spirit o f democracy when it ignore the
role of the masses and also downplays the role of non-political elites (Grugel,2002).
Another flaw o f the transitional approach is its overwhelming focus on immediacy
and short-term changes. This flaw or weakness, unable researcher to explain the deeprooted obstacles to the process of democratization by not paying attention to the long­
term course o f sociohistorical development of the concerned society. Transitional
approach fails to adequately explain why the outcomes of transitions are different from
one place to another. Graeme Gill noted that the short-term perspective tends to obscure
the operation of long-term trends and therefore only brings into focus “the tactical
maneuvering which fills the canvas, the sound and fury o f elite conflict and compromise,
and the political posturing of the main actors” (Gill, 2000). Also the majority o f the
literature on transition was produced to account for, and explains the successful
experiences of transition to democracy in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, and
Latin America. It makes the transitional apporach insufficient to understand the cases of
20
unsuccessful or reverse transition. This will require understanding the long term causes or
the structural effect that played a role.
Structural Approach
Different from the transitional and modernization approaches, which focuses on
contingency and economic aspects, the explanatory focus of structuralism is on long-term
processes o f socio-historical change. In structuralism democratization is not explained in
the structuralist literature by the agency o f political elites, but rather by the changing
structure of power (state/social classes). Another dimension o f structuralism is its statecentric view, which sees democratization as a process of state transformation. Barrington
Moor's work is considered a reference point in the literature on democratization from a
structural perspective. He did a comparative study o f eight countries including the United
States, Japan, China and India, Germany, Russia Britain and France (Moore, 1993). After
analyzing the historical trajectories o f these countries, Moor came to the conclusion that
different patterns of structural interrelationships in different countries produced different
political outcomes. His comparative analysis described that, among the eight selected
countries, only Britain, France and the US moved towards democracy (Moore, 1993).
The changing structure o f power in the other five countries led to different results like
fascism or communism. Moore method could be very useful in explaining why
21
democracy might fail in Egypt by looking at the “structural interrelationships” of the
state.
Structuralism emphasis on long-term historical context, which help us in
understanding cases like Egypt. Structural approache assume that economic
development, political culture, class conflict, social structures, and other social conditions
can explain particular outcomes o f the transition (Moore, 1993). The Majority of
structuralism scholars were preoccupied with macro-level social conditions, or
socioeconomic and cultural prerequisites o f democracy, and sought to explain the causes
and effects of democracy and clarify the nature of their relationships. Thus, it’s necessary to
look at Egypt conflicting classes or actors struggle to prove this method.
Scholars like Lipset focused on the long-run causal influence of the level of wealth,
industrialization, urbanization, and education on democratization. In the other hand some
writers emphasized the role of civic culture, class conflicts, interest groups, religions, etc.
Their empirical studies generated debates over not only the prerequisites for but also the
level and stability of democracy. The work of O'Donnell and Schmitter's explains the
collapse of democracy by assuming an important connection between socioeconomic and
political structures, and, especially when focusing on economic development and class
conflict as principal explanatory variables (O ’Donnell, 2013). The common feature o f
these studies by this group o f scholars was the assumption that certain social and political
structures must be in place before democracy can be inaugurated. For that theory to
22
work, it will be essential to look at the long history army presence and their influence on
the society.
In certain cases the economic dependence o f one country on another like receiving
foreign aid can affect the growth o f the urban working class and therefore contributes to
the delay o f democratization. In other cases, economic and military aid can strengthen the
state apparatus unduly and therefore hinders the class struggle for democracy. History
shows us that in the Middle East, transnational powers have in many cases supported
established dictatorships at the expense of democratic change. This exactly will help
explain the foreign aid Egypt receives from the G ulf States and its effect.
Larbi
Sadiki’s
“Rethinking
Arab
Democratization”
he
addresses
the
democratization in the Arab setting from a different perspective. It critically engages with
the dominating ethnocentric, Euro-American narrative on democratization and the
applicability of its ‘transitolgy’ approach to the Arab world (Sadiki, 2009). Sadiki
presents his own understanding and analysis o f the problems o f transitioning towards
democracy in the Arab Middle East. Familiar with the long-standing struggle for
democracy in a region where experiments of written constitutions, elections and
parliaments date back to the mid-nineteenth century, the author offers what he calls an
indigenous perspective on Arab democratization that is “historically situated, flexible,
contingent, fragmented, nuanced, nonlinear, and variable” (Sadiki, 2009). Along these
lines, he analyses the Arab electoralism phenomenon or “the election fetishism” to use
23
his own terms, noting that electoral activities in much o f the Arab world seem to coexist
with authoritarianism rather than reversing political singularity and loosening the tightly
excessive executive power of the regimes in place. To prove Sadiki point, we need to
compare 2012 and 2013 presidential election, especially on the percentage o f support.
The significance o f Sadiki’s work consists not only o f the indigenous and the
contextualized account of Arab democratization, but also and more importantly opening
the path to new and different narratives contesting and challenging the Euro-American
paradigmatic authoritative approaches to democratization. It is this spirit of plurality of
understandings and interpretations that stands in the face o f the imposition o f any
singular approach to democratization that informs my thesi and gives it more relevance.
Thus, I believe that we need to look at all three approaches Modernization, Structural and
Transitional to help explain the factors that made autocratic regime more effective in
delivering demands rather than democratic ones and made Egyptians chose to revert back
to similar regime to the one they revolt against. There were some central factors that led
to Egypt failure in transitioning towards democracy like the strong presence o f the army,
the failure of The Muslim Brotherhood to coexist with the army and third, the influence
of regional neighboring countries.
24
Conditions in Egypt During Mubarak Era
Political conditions in Egypt were acidly cynical, and full o f corruption. During the
era of Hosni Mubarak, who stayed in power for 30 years, the political sphere was fueled
by the contrast between rising aspirations and enduring hardships. There was a high sense
of alienation among youth, to the extent that the youth wanted to leave the country. The
constitution changes made in 2005 were designed to disguise one-man rule, with
centralized administration. Human rights abuses by the security sector was very visible;
and the fraud in the 2005 legislative elections was followed by more severe fraud in 2010
elections (Green, 2011). The same was expected the same to be manifested in the
presidential elections of September 2011.
On the regional level, Egypt prior to the 25th January revolution has begun to lose
its regional power to other competitors in the region like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. It was
clear that there has been a shift of powers in the region and Egypt affect using soft power
tools like Egyptian media, art, or expertise to lead development in the Arab world is no
longer the case. Other powers such as the power o f oil money, and religious movements
have taken over the role of Egypt in the region. On the African level, Egypt had distended
itself from the continent, as African countries perceived Egyptian leadership as arrogant.
This has resulted in the Nile crisis and African Nile countries signing the “Antibi” Treaty
to divide Nile water quotas, and rejecting that Egypt gets a permanent seat in the Security
Council in the case of its enlargement (Green, 2011).
25
On the global level, Egypt kept a strong relationship with the U.S. and
maintained peace with Israel. In return Egypt was receiving $2 billion in assistance since
the signing Camp David, which was divided between $1.3 billion in military assistance
and the remaining amount in economic assistance (Barany, 2011). This figure declined to
$1.55 billion in 2010 with spending on military assistance being maintained, while less
was spent on economic assistance. The United States for instance, poured in some $60
billion of economic and military aid over the years to maintain Egypt as an ally (Barany,
2011).
There were several political reasons that led to the revolution o f January 25th.
First, the human rights abuse that was highly manifested in confronting demonstrations,
with the emergency law support like in the city of “Mahalla” in April 2008 and other
individual incidents such as
of Khaled Said death. Khaled Said was believed to be
tortured by the police, which prompted several Egyptian youth to show support on the
Internet.
Secondly, the lack of tolerance with minorities in Egyp that promoted discontent.
For example, in 2011, the Church of Two Saints in Alexandria was the subject o f a
terrorist act which burned parts of the church and twenty-three people died as a result of
the attack. All of the victims were Coptic Christians. Coptic Egyptians were generally
supportive of the Mubarak regime that acted as a barrier against Islamic fundamentalism
in the country. However, in the last few years the country witnessed a number of violent
26
events against Copts including the failure o f the regime not only to protect them, but also
to address their grievances related to building churches and appointing public offices.
The restoration of the churches was authorized with difficulty that required presidential
executive approval (Green, 2011). Also discontent rose among other ethnic minorities,
such as the Nubians and the Bedouins o f Sinai (Green, 2011).
On the social level there were several factors that led to the revolution. First, the
demographic explosion in population growth reaching 84 million people living in a
congested 6% of geographic space in Egypt. The majority of the population are youth,
unemployment rates rose substantially with rapid expansion o f university education that
has produced graduates with an inadequate level of quality education, with no potential
future. In fact, two-thirds o f Egyptians are under 30, and each year 700,000 new
graduates compete for 200,000 new jobs (Shuhiab, 2011). Another social element is the
discontent among racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. For example, Nubians and
Bedouins felt alienated and not integrated in development and further neglected in their
demands. As for the Christians, they suffered the lack o f responsiveness to their religious
demands to build and restore churches, as well as setting the rules for Christians
converting to Islam and vice versa. The economic, political, and social reasons behind the
revolution were expressed by serious signs o f discontent prior to the revolution taking
place. In 2004 there were about 266 protests and it reached 630 by 2008 (Shuhib, 2011).
On one account, the daily protests in 2010 averaged 5 a day (Shuhib, 201 l).However, the
27
government reacted arrogantly by using excessive force, and indulging in human rights
abuse.
B e t t e r liv e s
E g y p t , s o c ia l i n d ic a t o r s
P o p u la tio n ( m )
L a b o u r fo rc e ( m )
f e r t ilit y ra te { b ir t h s p e r w o m a n )
I n f a n t m o r t a lit y (p e r 1 ,0 0 0 b ir t h s )
L ite ra c y ( % )
E le c tr ic ity c o n s u m p t io n
(k w h p e r p e r s o n )
Fix e d t e le p h o n e lin e s a n d m o b ile p h o n e c o n t ra c t s p e r lO O p o p
P a s s e n g e r c a rs p e r 1 .0 0 0 p o p
1990
5 7 .a
2009
1 4 .3
5 .2 *
25.-4
8 3 7l
7 8 -5 *
5 7 .0 *
644
2.91
3 4 .8 «
72.0%
1 .4 6 0
2 .8
7 9 .1
1 8 .7
3 3 .3 * *
*
*2005-10 *19#* *2008 **2006
Sources; econom ist Inte lligen ce U n it; IT U : U*#£SCOr
UN Population Division; I n t e r R o a d federation
Figure 4.2: Indicators of Developments in Egypt.
Source: Holding its Breath: A Special Report on Egypt, The Economist (17 July 2010): 4
Economic Conditions
The economy in Egypt prior to the January 25th in terms o f numbers was
performing better than ever. GDP growth had shifted into a much higher gear, increasing
from just below 5% in the mid-1990s to 7% in 2006-07 (Sufayan, 2007). Egypt’s share o f
world trade had been falling continuously for the past 40 years, but from 2004 to 2009 it
started expanding as exports tripled in value. Foreign investment gushed in at record
levels, notching up a cumulative total o f $46 billion between 2004 and 2009 (A1 Ahram,
2011). Even the gross public debt in that period fell by nearly to third. The size of the
country’s foreign debt dropped below the value o f its foreign reserves for the first time in
28
decades, and debt servicing, a crushing burden in 1990, dwindled to a small fraction of
the value o f annual exports (A1 Ahram, 2011).
r
A solid performance
Egypt's:
Egypt's economy, 2009, % of GOP
%inert#**on
y«*r
Manufacturing
16.2 —
Mining and petroleum
— ----- 14,1
-
Other
17.6 —
r~ —
\
i
cm
jr,5 — —
1
Sue/
canal
.
2000 Ot
02
3 J — ——
GDP per person
03
04
Sowf<«: IMF: M fihtryof
OS 06
07
08 04* 10*
Dfveiapm^ri?
Construction
4,6 — — —
Agriculture
—
13.6
Wholesale
and retail
r—
10.«
Tourism &
transport
r—
---- 1
•estim ates
«-
! Forecasts
Financial services
7.6
^ o ^ ^ u ^ k a ti o m in d IT
Figure 4.1: Performance of the Egyptian Economy Prior to the 25th of January Revolution.
Source: “Holding its Breath: A Special Report on Egypt”, The Economist (17 July 2010): 8.
The Army
The Tunisian army refused to fire upon its citizens same as the Egyptian army,
but unlike the Egyptian military, they were not expected to take over the transitional
process (Barany, 2011). There are many reasons for this, including political society and
the international context. In Tunisia, the founding dictator Habib Bourguiba, and his
successor, Zine El Abedine Ben Ali, both kept the military small. They also took heavy
measures to separate the military from politics and the economy (Barany, 2011). Instead,
the military was modestly funded and had no incentive to preserve any status o f affluence
29
and political influence as it had none to begin with (Barany, 2011). The military sided
with the people and secured the installation of the country’s civilian transitional entity,
enforcing the ban on former regime loyalists and members o f Ben Ali, or any other party
under his dictatorship from participating in politics (Gelvin, 2012). Another important
factor in the military’s weakness in Tunisia was the lack of an international importance in
comparison with the Egyptian military (Gelvin, 2012). If we look closely in the case o f
Egypt, we will find that the first note imposes itself was the overwhelming presence of
the army in the political scene for decades and until this moment.
The involvement of the military in the Egyptian state and the economy began in
1952, when a military coup led by a group of young officers brought down King Farouk.
This coup brought the charismatic and popular colonel Gamal Abdal-Nasser to power
from 1954-1970 (Abdel-Malek, 1968). He formed an Arab socialist regime in which
military officers occupied the most important administrative and economic positions.
Succeeded Nasser other military officers Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak
(1981-2011). Although Sadat tried to decrease the influence of the military in the state by
significantly reducing the number of army officers in government positions, making the
army focuses more on affairs o f war (Cooper, 1982). However, when Mubarak was in
power the military influence has begun to increase again in the Egyptian society allowing
its leaders to create economic enterprises and occupy high-level administrative positions
in the government (Hashim, 2011)
30
A couple of military structures engaged in profitable non-military manufacturing
and services: the National Service Products Organization (NSPO), the Ministry of
Military Production (MOMP), and the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI).
NSPO specializes in civilian manufacturing, forming and other services. MOMP owns
eight manufacturing plants 40% of their production is geared to civilian markets (AbulMagd, 2013). AOI owns eleven factories and companies 70% o f their production goes to
civilian markets (Abul-Magd, 2013). All these structures produces a wide variety of
goods: chemicals, infant incubators, mineral water, butane gas cylinders, kitchen stoves,
steel, cement, home appliances, gas pipelines, pasta, olive oil and other foodstuffs. The
army owns a large number o f gas stations, hotels, wedding halls, supermarkets, parking
lots, domestic cleaning offices, transportation and shipping companies across the country
(Abul-Magd, 2013).
It became norm in Egyptian government to have a large number of retired officers
appointed to high-ranking positions in many places in the state bureaucracy, as a way to
financially reward and politically appease them. Retired army officers were hired in
numerous positions in the state. For example, the majority of provincial governors were
retired army generals especially provinces near of the Suez Canal, the two Sinai
provinces, sometimes Alexandria, and also major Delta areas (Abul-Magd, 2013). The
military also controlled oil sector, as retired generals ran many natural gas and oil
companies. They also controlled parts of the commercial transportation system. The
position of the head of the Suez Canal was always reserved for the retired military chief
31
of staff. The heads o f the Red Sea ports were retired generals, as were the managers of
the maritime and land transport public sector companies (Abul-Magd, 2013). A class of
military administrators and managers grew in the bureaucracy, the public sector, and the
military enterprises, and they received their pensions from military sources in addition to
high salaries from the government. Thus, that explains extended influence of the military
establishment to private sector companies, especially after the open era o f President
Anwar Sadat known as “A1 Infataha” (Sufyan, 2007). The Army in Egypt has
transformed itself from a professional military institution in the state and became an
institution that has interests o f large and complex political and economic interests, which
needs to constipate governance in order to preserve the interests o f their class (Tadros,
2012). However, we cannot forgot the army was able to build many infrastructure
projects that was a key in Egypt development
Despite M ubarak’s attempts to maintain military on his side through privileges to
retired officers, they still did not approve of Gamal Mubarak’s candidacy for presidency.
They silently resented his privatization plans. Reports came out that indicated Field
Marshal Tantawi, the former Minister of Defense, and the Egyptian military were largely
critical of the economic liberalization because it undermined state control (Byman, 2012).
Margaret Scobey, a former US ambassador to Egypt stated, “The military views the
G.O.E.’s privatization efforts as a threat to its economic position, and therefore generally
opposes economic reforms (Byman, 2012). We see the military’s role in the economy as
a force that generally stifles free market reform by increasing direct government
32
involvement in the markets.” Tantawi’s skepticism regarding the neoliberal reforms is
probably due to the potential privatization o f the military’s vast economic empire.
The military institution has been a key player in all of the events that followed
the explosion of the revolution. The army was the one that forced the resignation of
President Hosni Mubarak, and then they took absolute control and management o f the
transitional period (Abul-Magd, 2013). The army handed the state to the Brotherhood
after they won in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012, when former
President Mohamed Morsi, a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood became that
nation’s first democratically elected president. Though its leadership positions were
reshuffled under Morsi, the army remains one o f the most important political players
throughout Egypt’s so-far failed transition from authoritarianism (Brown, 2013). There
were many tedious details of those big events; the army couldn’t hand over the power to
the Muslim Brotherhood without striking a deal about the role o f the political
atmosphere. The Muslim Brotherhood realized from very early on that they would be
forced to work with, rather than against, the military if they hoped to gain any kind of
political victory (Barany, 2011).
The 2011 revolution took place in the heart of the country built by the army and
dominated since 1952. In this context, the Egyptian army will need to consent on every
major descision (Hashim, 2011). The first indication of this influence was the fact
military officers were in charge o f governance in the state along with the President, for
example the ministers of defense; interior and intelligence and high level position in the
33
government are usually from the military establishment (Hashim, 2011). The second
indicator that the country's political decisions are affected by the army is the fact that
senior positions in the military are subject to the approval of the institution before
appointing (Hashim, 2011). The third index and the most important is the strong
influence of the military institution on the economic sphere o f the country. The army is
believed to control between 30 and 40 percent of the Egyptian economy (Tadros, 2012).
So in February 10, 2011 Mubarak relinquished his post after Egypt’s Security
Counsel of Armed Forces urged him to step down. The former appointed Vice President
Omar Suleiman announced that Mubarak had resigned and the SCAF would take over
control of the country until further notice. This direct political role was considered
something new for SCAF which had had been usually assembled previously by
Presidents for military advice and on issues regarding national security only. It is also an
interesting observation that among countries that experienced uprisings and governmental
transitions, Egypt was the only one where the military took full control of the transitional
government. For example, in Libya it was the National Transitional Council (NTC), in
Tunisia it was the National Unity government and in Yemen it was the Vice President
Hadi led by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). SCAF was clearly in no hurry to take
steps towards quick transition because It was obvious that a truly democratic system
could undermine the powers enjoyed by the military for the last 5 decades (Tadros,
2012 ).
34
Also the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood the number one rival for the army in
Egypt was the main runner in the race to power deterred SCAF to not only consolidate
power but also delay the electoral process as much as possible. The first step taken by the
SCAF was to hold a referendum on constitutional amendments on March 19, 2011, after
the suspension of the existing constitution o f 1971 (Broken, 2011). Nathan J Brown in his
paper “Egypt’s Failed Transition”, believes the SCAF insisted to write a new, temporary
constitutional declaration that inserted the special clauses on how the state would be run
during the transition (Brown, 2011). The timetable for parliamentary and presidential
elections was unclear and there was a delay after another. These delays o f the elections
heightened doubts over the SCAF intentions to return to the barracks and leave politics.
Then the so-called drafted ‘Selmy Document’ released in November 2011 was the cause
of massive outrage and protests across all sections of society (Broken, 2011). It outlined
supra-constitutional principles that gave the SCAF the right to oversee its own military
budget and an increasingly strong hand in the country’s future politics and the writing of
the next constitution (Brown, 2011). It led to the “million man march” on November 18
led by the Muslim Brotherhood and thereafter the protests on November 25 which also
included major youth movements such as ‘April
Coalition’ (Broken, 2011).
6 th ’
and the ‘Revolutionary Youth
35
The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in Egypt in 1928 to turn Egypt away
from secularism and toward an Islamic government based on Sharia (religious) law and
Muslim principles (Leiken, 2007). The Muslim Brotherhood operates as a religious
charitable and educational institution, having been banned as a political party in 1954
(Leiken, 2007). Over the years, the Egyptian government has alternated between
tolerating and suppressing the Muslim Brotherhood, sometimes arresting and jailing its
members, and other times allowing its members to operate almost without hindrance.
Many foreign observers agree that the organization has renounced the use of violence as a
political tactic, while many Egyptian officials continue to perceive the Brotherhood as a
threat and are unwilling to legalize the movement (Leiken, 2007).
Most analysts believe that, from an organizational standpoint, the Brotherhood was
the only movement capable of mobilizing significant opposition to the government,
though opinions vary on how much mass support the Brotherhood commands (Walesh,
2003). As is typical for Islamist groups across the region, the Muslim Brotherhood is
strongest among the professional middle class, controlling many o f the professional
syndicates (associations), including those representing engineers, doctors, lawyers and
academics (Walesh, 2003)
However, I feel the Brotherhood”after their arrival to power in June 2012 failed to
realize how the state structures should be operated especially understanding the military
36
crucial role Egypt. This was the first early signs of failure for the Brotherhood. The
Muslim Brotherhood forgot the first rule of politics “If you can’t beat them, join them”.
Dealing with the army for more than 60 years in power of the country, the Brotherhood
should have accumulated enough experience to coexist with the army. Yet, the
Brotherhood committed political suicide since the early days o f ruling by trying to push
the army to the side; they failed to accept the reality that the army is entrenched deeply in
the Egyptian society (Barney, 2011).
Once in power, Morsi did his best to reverse these changes, in a move that ended
in total chaos. First, Morsi challenged the SCAF ruling attempting to reinstate his muchneeded parliament, which the Supreme Court refused to allow him. However, the next
measures he took were more successful. He made some changes in the leadership within
the military, dismissing among others Field Marshall Tantawi and replacing him with
General A1 Sisi (BBC, 2013), who is the current president o f Egypt now. As the deadline
for the completion of the draft constitution approached, Morsi and his allies grew
nervous. In one of the most destructive moves in Egypt’s modem political history. Morsi
gave him self the right to make constitutional changes without military or judicial
oversight. He now had more power than Mubarak ever had, according to the constitution
his constituent assembly written (BBC, 2013).
The second sign of the failure to the “Brotherhood” was the delinquency o f the
ability to unify the society rather than to fuel conflicting political and religious
37
ideologies, which was always present weapon in the army political arsenal. Simply The
Brotherhood didn’t work with other political forces that were originally against the army,
which in return gave the army the chance to settle some of the differences with these
groups (Amin, 2013). They also failed to comprehend the popular mood change toward
them after the disastrous Constitutional Declaration in November 2012 (Amin, 2013). As
a result, it isolated the “Brotherhood” and they had to face almost everyone, including the
Salfies who sold them out in favor of the army.
The most important factor contributing to this was the lack of building pacts
between Islamists and secular opposition movements prior to the uprising. Whereas
Ennahda in Tunisia were in negotiations with secular parties as early as 2003, the Muslim
Brotherhood was a secretive organization at the time that was arguably less moderate
than Ennahda (Stepan, 2012). Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was not
strictly a non-regime political party like Ennahda, but were more incorporated in the
political system during Mubarak (Stepan,2012).
The primary reasons for M orsi’s downfall was the high expectations of the people
following the 2011 revolution. Morsi himself made great promises that he couldn’t
achieve, in addition the weak performance by the Morsi government including himself.
Usually any uprising that results in the overthrow of a ruler, the population tends to have
high demands and often unrealistic expectations that the next person in power will need
quickly solve. When these expectations are not met, citizens may become unsatisfied
with the new government very quickly, as can be observed was the case o f Egypt. During
38
M orsi’s election campaign, he promised to solve the security vacuum, traffic congestion,
bread scarcities, food shortages, and problems with public transportation all within his
first 100 days in power (AhramOnline 2012). These promises, which were addressed in
the Muslim Brotherhood’s Renaissance Project “Alnahada” (Halime 2013), set very high
hopes for a rapid transformation of the economy and success in solving problems that had
been going on for decades. Thus, M orsi’s promises for the first 100 days reinforced the
population’s views that the country would rise quickly.
Rather than being pragmatic in regards o f expectations, M orsi’s speech in
Tahrir Square on June 29, 2012 only served to raise them. In his speech he vowed to
advance the tourism sector, achieve justice for the martyrs and wounded of the
Revolution, rejuvenate the economy and “alleviate the suffering o f millions of Egyptians
seeking a decent dignified life,” respect the constitution and law, advance democracy,
and establish the principles of freedom and social justice while removing all forms of
injustice, corruption and discrimination (IkhwanWeb 2012). Morsi promised everything
from a government that represented all Egyptians to justice for the martyrs o f the
Revolution; which many of those who hesitantly supported him during the elections in
hopes that he will fulfill the Revolution’s aims and promises. M orsi’s first 100 days in
power when there was still no security, no garbage pickup in the streets, traffic
congestion was still high, the economy and tourism continued to decline, and gas
shortages and power outages ran rampant during the hot summer months the population
39
began to voice their disapproval. Even Morsi admitted that he had failed to meet all his
targets, though he did claim some successes (Ahramonline 2012).
Autocratic regimes brought down by a revolution are usually preceded by a
democratic government attempt, but the new democratic government struggle to meet the
demands before they are given enough time (Boix, 2013). Faction’s starts emerging in
reaction to the weakness of the new institutions and old institutions try to impose
themselves back to the scene. Conflicts will erupt, either between the government and the
populace or between factions, as the new institutions fail to contain it (Boix, 2013).
Within a few years or even less the new democracies are replaced by the more capable
regime generally just as autocratic as the ones recently overthrown, if not more so
(Becker, 2005). This process can be translated into the language o f complexity: a
revolution brings rapid change, displacing or destroying accumulated complexity.
Subsequently, governments try to create democracy, but find the gap between their
present and intended complexity is too great and are replaced by autocracy (Becker,
2005). The problem is not that democracy is incapable; but on the contrary the stability
and prosperity of mature democratic states testifie to that. However, democracy needs
time to mature, but when time is short and the foundations for more complex structures
have been eroded or did not exist in the first place.
After The January 25th Revolution and the political unrest that followed led to a
fall in the value of the Egyptian pound. Reserves that stood at $36 billion at the time of
40
M ubarak’s ouster had fallen to $15 billion by November 2012 (Reuters 2013). By the end
o f 2012 this currency policy was no longer sustainable, as Egypt’s foreign reserves fell to
record low level (Reuters 2013). Because Egypt relies heavily on foreign imports, low
reserve levels caused problems on a number of levels. First, Egypt is the largest importer
o f wheat in the world (McFarlane 2013) and importer of a number of other food products
faced the problem of a dollar shortage for importing food staples (Badawi 2013). Second,
international business and transactions were disrupted because U.S. dollars became hard
to come by. The Egyptian Central Bank initiated U.S. dollar auctions to prevent a run on
the pound and banks began to put restrictions on the amount of dollars that could be
withdrawn per day (Badawi 2013). They also charged large fees for transferring money
outside o f the country. The black market for dollars became very alive with independent
money exchanges, giving much higher rates to individuals exchanging dollars and
charging even higher rates for those attempting to obtain them (Badawi 2013).
Revolution or Coup (JUNE 2013)
While most political scholar and analysts perceived the events of June 30 2013 as
a “military coup,” most Egyptians think o f it as second wave o f the revolution (Pillay,
2014). After massive protests across the country on 30 June, which tens o f millions
participated, most Egyptians expected the army would take actions to try save the country
from chaos. The military responded to the people’s demands on Tahrir square, and
41
formed a collation with several political parties and public figures to depose Morsi on
July 2013.
Despite M orsi’s and the Muslim Brotherhood attempts to grant the military
exceptional political and economic privileges and even included them in the constitution.
General al-Sisi was who was appointed by Morsi himself, Al-Sisi asserted on several
occasions that the army would not interfere in politics and invests its efforts into
protecting the country internally and externally (Abul-Magd, 2013). Therefore, it was
risky and could have resulted in significant future losses for the military to side with
youth and opposition groups that had long confrontations with SCAF while in power. The
military also risked losing international support especially of the US, which did happen
for short while when the Obama administration has suspended for almost a year to punish
the Egyptian military for ousting Morsi (Abul-Magd, 2013). However, the Egyptian
military decided to take these risks because their long rivalry with the Muslim
Brotherhood whose participation in the power structure threatened national security from
their point of view.
The army had reasons to believe that the Muslim Brotherhood was an imminent
threat to the country. Two month before Morsi removal an armed cells on the Sinai
Peninsula kidnapped seven Egyptian soldiers. Morsi interfered to stop a planned military
operation against the kidnappers. The kidnappers eventually released the soldiers and
escaped without being arrested or identified (Yousef, 2013). After this crisis, many
42
former military generals began to assert in the media that the Muslim Brotherhood
sponsors the Sinai Jihadists and that they assisted the criminals’ to escape from security
forces. For example, the former founder of the military counter-terrorism unit, Team777,
claimed that the Brotherhood and Hamas were responsible for many other incidents of
kidnapping soldiers on the peninsula (Araef, 2013). A few weeks later after this incident
Morsi gathered tens o f thousands of his supports from different factions in Cairo Stadium
in order to declare international Jihad in Syria. Morsi announced that the “Egyptian
people and army” were going to help free Syria from Assad regime without discussing
the matter with the army (Ahramonline, 2013). Many Sunni extremist clerics were in the
Cairo stadium with M orsi’s and this gave an impression o f the support he had
(Ahramonline, 2013). General al-Sisi in his meeting with US Secretary o f Defense
Chuck Hagel in Cairo, expressed deep concern that the severity o f the security situation
in the region (Schenker, 2013).
In the process of ousting Morsi, al-Sisi made careful calculations to make sure
he would not lose support on the internal, regional or international fronts. On the internal
front, he received the overwhelming support of the masses, who had feared the return of
terrorism. He also received support from various political parties that are not concerned
by the military’s businesses and their elevated status. At the regional level, al-Sisi
received extensive support and billions o f dollars from Arabian G ulf regimes that
resented the Muslim Brotherhoods’ regional schemes, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and
Qatar. Internationally, although the US suspended part o f its military aid to Egypt, it did
43
not use the term “military coup” to describe the military intervention. President Obama
does not seem to have plans to cut aid to Egypt altogether.
Why the Army Back Again
Since the ousting o f Morsi, the Egyptian military has partially withdrawn from
politics in comparison with the full administrative role it played after January 2011 and
has mainly focused on security matters, especially in Sinai. Democratic transition in
Egypt was taking place according to a road map that General Al-Sisi, civilian political
parties, youth groups, and Muslim and Christian religious leaders drew up in early July
(Tawefeeq, 2015). The road map included the drafting o f a new constitution, to be
followed by presidential and parliamentary elections within a few months. However, the
democratic transition is taking place under heavy security measures in the face o f the
Brotherhood’s retaliations in response to the ousting Morsi. When rumors started to
spread about Al-Sisi running for president, he made a declaration that he has no such
plans and that his focus is only the security of the country (Tawefeeq, 2015). It seems that
A1 Sisi became a popular figure and has huge support. This gave a clear evident
indication that Egyptians views democracy as priority has changed.
According Pew research studies majorities in Egypt say that values commonly
associated with democracy are important for Egypt’s future. However, strong support for
these values ranges from 79% who say that a fair judiciary is very important for Egypt’s
44
According Pew research studies majorities in Egypt say that values commonly
associated with democracy are important for Egypt’s future. However, strong support for
these values ranges from 79% who say that a fair judiciary is very important for Egypt’s
future to just 26% who say that a civilian controlled military is very important (Pew,
2014). Overall, 82% say that improved economic conditions are very important for
Egypt’s future. And nearly eight-in-ten (79%) say that a judicial system that treats
everyone in the same way is very important. Similarly, 63% of Egyptians say law and
order is critically important to their country’s future (Pew, 2014). From this survey, we
could understand that the Egyptians might positively respect democratic values, but their
priority is improving the economic status. Thus, answering the question that democracy
isn’t the primary target for the Egyptian currently.
Law and Order, Fair Judiciary and Improved Economy
High on the List for Egypt’s Future
M o il?
im p o r t a n t i s
f o r JEgypt's f u t u r e ?
Very
important
Law and order
Fair judiciary
Som ew h at
important
Net
96 %
95
Improved econom ic
conditions
94
Uncensored media
80
Hones-t elections
79
Freedom of religion
for minorities
79
Sam e rights for
women as men
76
Freedom to openly
criticize the gov't
72
Religious parties
can t>e part of gov't
69
Freedom to protest
peacefu Ily
66
Civi Iian-control led
military
62
Source: S p rin g 2014 Global Attitudes survey. Q104a-k.
P E W RESEARCH CENTER
45
Also in the same study, about half of Egyptians (52%) now say that to solve their
country’s problems they should rely on a democratic form of government, while 43%
think that a leader with a strong hand is the best way to deal with Egypt’s challenges
(Pew, 2014). In the aftermath of the 2011 overthrow of President Mubarak, nearly two
thirds (64%) thought a democratic form of government was the proper solution for
Egypt’s woes, with only around a third (34%) favoring a strong leader (Pew, 2014). This
decrease preference for a democratic government versus a strong leader relates to views
of the 2013 military removal of President Morsi, as well as attitudes towards Abdel
Fattah Al-Sisi.
Beyond these political measures, poorer Egyptians show a greater inclination
towards a strong leader. A majority (55%) of low-income Egyptians think a leader with a
strong hand is the best way to solve problems, while only 39% o f high-income Egyptians
agree. President A1 Sisi’s winning the 2014 election with 94% of the votes was an
evident result o f his popularity. Especially participation percentage was close as the 2012
election. Thus, it proves that the Egyptians are looking for a hero figure to trust in these
difficult conditions.
Egyptians Support Democracy over
Strong Leader, but Gap Is Narrowing
V\~eslzould rely o n ____ to solve our country 's problems
so %
8 - .
40
20
Jk
O
BeaM
A
er with c* strong. tv«incJ
.---------------------,-------------------- .---------------------,-------------------- ,
2007
2011
2012
2013
2014
Source: S p rin g 2014 Global Attitudessurvey. QET1.
P E W RESEARCH CENTER
D e m o cra cy vs. S ta b le Governm ent
W 7 iicFi is m o re imjyorta.nt to yoi±?
80%
S t a i l>f*e g o v e r n m e i i l ^
m w it h o u t
futi denra-cry
54
40
44
32
D e m o c v a c y , cswsn wirtt* s o m e rislc
20
2011
of political igicstarliaBify
2012
2013
S o u rce : Spri ng 2 0 1 4 Gl o ba I Attitudes survey. Q106.
REW RESEARCH CENTER
2014
47
C o n fid e n c e in D e m o c r a c y E b b s
2013
2014
V ie w s o f d e m o c ra c y
%
%
D e m o c r a c y is p re fe ra b le
N o n -d e m o c r a t ic g o v ’t c a n
be p re fe ra b le
66
59
21
25
D o e s n o t m a tte r
11
14
■*■3
D e m o c r a c y is p rio rity
51
44
-7
S ta b ility is p rio rity
43
54
C / ia n |
-7
D e m o c ra c y vs. sta b ility
+11
S ou rce : S p rin g 2 0 1 4 G lobal Attitudes survey. Q 1 9 & Q 106.
P E W
R E SE A R C H
C EN T ER
If we look a t Pew study, w hich is more important, having a democratic
government that comes with the risk o f instability, or having a stable government? The
result came to support the theory, if there is a risk o f instability that comes with
democracy, people will tend to favor a strong stable government that could provide the
needs. The study shows a narrow majority (54%) chooses stability. Forty-four percent
take the other view, saying the priority should be democracy. In contrast to last year 51%
o f Egyptians prioritized democracy, while just 43% said a stable government is more
important (Pew, 2014). Also, it seems visible according to the data that Egyptians began
to lose confidence in democracy, as the confidence level dropped 7 percent, while
stability increased by 11 percent (Pew, 2014). The problem is democracy needs time to
mature, but when time is short and the foundations for more complex structures have
48
been eroded or did not exist in the first place. People will choose the system that
provides stability and in the case o f Egypt going back to the semi-autocratic regime.
Comparison
The government’s restoration o f political stability and reforms to the economy
during El Sisi short era has inspired international businesses to proceed forward with a
number of large-scale investments in Egypt: BP plans to invest $1.5 billion in 2014 to
increase its production of natural gas in Egypt (100 days, 2014). International companies
have completed 29 new agreements for oil and gas exploration, with a baseline worth
over $2 billion that will create over 100 new wells to be drilled. Dubai-based retail giant
Majid Al-Futtaim is set to increase investment in Egypt by $2.5 billion, building four new
malls in Cairo and 32 new hypermarkets nationwide (100 days, 2014). The investment is
estimated to create over 40,000 new jobs (100 days, 2014). Egypt also recently been
approved for $500 million loan from the World Bank to fund a comprehensive project to
provide natural gas to residential communities (100 days, 2014).
Under President El Sisi, Egypt foreign direct investment in Egypt increased over
the first three quarters of fiscal year 2013/14 to reach $4.7 billion, up more than 20
percent from the corresponding period in the preceding fiscal year (100 days, 2014).
Egypt ranks second after Brazil in terms of the highest rates of return on investment
globally. Egypt aims to reach an economic growth rate of 6 percent in the next five years.
In August, Egypt’s stock market closed above 9,000 points for the first time since 2008.
49
HSBC’s Egypt Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) reported Egypt’s economy grew in
August as “rates o f expansion were sharp and the most marked in eight months” and that
“purchasing activity increased at the fastest pace since data collection began in April
2011 (100 days, 2014). All these projects have led the currency reserve to rise by $3
billion as the date below shows.
Sources: Central Bank of Egypt, TradingEconomics.com
During 2014 President Sisi approved a new budget for 2014/15 that
implemented long awaited subsidy reforms. For example, he cut spending on energy
subsidies by almost a third o f what it used to be and saving $6 billion (100 days, 2014).
He also managed to increase tax revenue by implementing a new 10 percent capital gains
50
tax, a 5 percent levy on high incomes for three years and an extension o f the value added
tax to a range o f goods and services (100 days, 2014). These Tax revenues will allow the
government to increase its spending on health and education. President El Sisi new
budget will allow the government to reduce the deficit to 10 percent o f gross domestic
product in the next fiscal year, a reduction from the 12 percent deficit in comparison with
M orsi’s 14 percent (100 days, 2014). This data proves El Sisi efficiency on applying
harsh economic measures due to his ability o f not making promises while Morsi failed to
apply these measures because he told he made the opposite.
I
bqseenojjAj
Do you approve or disapprove Abdel Fatah
Al-Sisi's performance as a president?
Highly
Can't decide, 7
Disapprove, 3
Disapprove, 2
www.baseera.com.egwww.facebook.com/baseeraegypt
AL- SISI APPROVAL RATE
51
MORSI APPROVAL RATE
If we directly compare Morsi and A1 Sisi performances, will see a significant
difference in people opinion. The Bassera Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research
has conducted their periodical survey about Egyptians' opinion regarding the
performance o f President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi after 6 months in office. The poll included
questions about the president's performance, re-electing him if the elections were to be
held tomorrow and evaluating the Prime Minister's performance. The results o f the
survey show that the percentage o f those who approve the president's performance has
52
increased to 88% at the end o f his 5th month in the office, compared to 82% at the end o f
the first 100 days. Those who disapproved his performance reached the same level that
has been witnessed at the end o f the first 100 days (5%). The percentage o f those who
can't decide decreased to 7% at the end o f the 5th month from 13% at the end o f the first
100 days (Bassera, 2014). The percentage o f those who highly approve the president's
performance increased to 66% at the end o f the 5th month, compared to 58% at the end of
the first 100 days. Those who approve reached 22% at the end o f the 5th month,
compared to 24% at the end o f the first 100 days (Bassera, 2014).
The percentage o f those who highly approve the performance o f the president,
which reaches 66% o f the national average decreased to 57% among youth less than 30
years and to 51% among those with a university degree or higher education. A1 Sisi’s 6
month ratings have an increase in his approval rate, while Mohamed Morsi's 6th month
witnessed a major inversion in the Egyptians' evaluation o f his performance. The
percentage o f those who approved Morsi's performance at the end o f the 5th month
decreased by 21 percentage points if compared to the percentage witnessed in his first
100 days (Bassera, 2014). From comparing approval rate, we will see that the semi
autocratic system in Egypt was more successful in stabilizing conditions, therefore there
was the highest rate o f approval. While the semi democratic government under Morsi
failure o f stabilizing the county lead in their lower rate o f approval and dissatisfaction.
53
Weak Civil Society
Another factor that affected political environment in Egypt was the weak civil
society that was shackled down under Mubarak regime. In Egypt, NGOs are required to
apply for legal status and, according to Association Law 84-2003, NGOs must be
registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs (Human Rights, 2005). In some cases, it
may take years before the ministry approves on an application, and many groups are
routinely rejected. If an NGOs application is rejected, it has few legal rights and can be
shut down. However, even registered NGOs must tread carefully when engaging in
sensitive political issues, as some groups have been periodically closed or have had their
legal status revoked (Human Rights, 2005). NGOs also must report all foreign donations
to the Ministry o f Social Affairs. Overall, tolerance for the activities o f non-registered
groups vary, and many NGOs operate without any legal protection (Human Rights,
2005). The revolution managed to give freedoms to these NG O ’s to operate. But these
groups and NGOs lacked the grassroots inside the community to compete with the army
or the Brotherhood, neither politically nor intellectually.
This was evident through the panic that hit these groups after the arrival of the
Brotherhood to power. These groups felt dominated by the other two powers. However
the, Brotherhood and their exclusionary policies contributed to their feeling of weakness.
Thus, this was the reason that civil forces rushed to take refuge in the army and support
the move to dislodge the Brotherhood. Perhaps it is clear that the use of this option is an
54
indicator o f the extent o f the weakness of this third party in the process that justified the
choice scrawny speech marked the deployment of hatred toward the Brotherhood and the
glorification of the military.
For example, Tunisia was a police state, but not a military state (Barany, 2011).
When Ben Ali was ousted and exiled in early 2011, there were no incentives for any
political institution or entity to preserve the status quo, everyone wanted change. This
paved the way for Tunisia’s diverse and pluralistic political society and culture.
Micheline Ishay a Professor o f International Studies at the Josef Korbel School of
International Studies at the University of Denver, Colorado believed Tunisia, human
capital is more developed than in Egypt (Ishay, 2013). Thus, offering greater
opportunities for post-revolutionary economic growth and, a better prospect for
consolidating the revolution.
In the power vacuum since the 2011 uprisings and after that the deposition of the
Muslim Brotherhood Egypt’s military regime, has been able to regain absolute political
control of the country. This is could be the fault of liberal and leftist politicians, whose
criticism o f both military and Brotherhood was all too short-lived. For example, figures
like Mohamed El Baradei were not active enough in fighting for a democratic alternative
instead they always abandon the battlefield. The Egyptian political scientist and human
rights activist Amr Hamzawy have repeatedly demanded that the army and security
apparatus come under civil control in order to foster democracy in Egypt. He also
55
believes as long as the military involved in policy making, Egypt’s civil and elected
institutions remain weak and unable to control the state ( Hamzawy, 2013). However,
figures like Hamzawy and El Baradei could be known in the international sphere and in
the media, but they lack any solid presence among the average Egyptians.
Regional Actors
After the Arab Spring the G ulf States align their growing capabilities (in the
political, economic, and security arenas) with a far more expansive policy intent. This
was very visible when GCC led by Saudi Arabia to send forces into Bahrain to restore
order following M anama’s Pearl Roundabout uprising. It was also evident when the GCC
intervened in escalating the violence in Syria and the uncertain aftermath of regime
changes across North Africa. From the start o f the uprising that resulted the toppling of
President Hosni Mubarak on February 11, 2011, the Gulf States officials viewed events
in Egypt as fever sweeping through the Middle East and North Africa. GCC monarchies
were concerned as the Obama administration not only withdrew support from its
longstanding regional ally in Cairo, but also appeared to welcome a rival Islamists group
like the Brotherhood through the ballot box (Henderson, 2013). . As concerns mounted in
the GCC at the apparent indecision in Western capitals to abandon former allies like
Mubarak and Ben Ali, the G ulf officials were prepared to act unilaterally or, at best, as a
loose regional bloc to secure their interests in transition states (Henderson, 2013).
56
Policies were different towards Yemen as well as Bahrain were generally
coordinated and more multilateral in nature. The uprisings in Egypt did not present a
material or ideological threat; however the threat came from the idea of removing
regimes. That’s why the GCC states moved quickly to back its interests and maintain
order Egyptian politics. As a result, after Mubarak’s fall, the GCC countries supported
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) with diplomatic recognition financial
support (Henderson, 2013). The G ulf countries like Saudi Arabia were trying to limit the
impact and contain the overspill o f such rapid and unexpected change to their countries
through aid and diplomacy.
The regional balance of the Middle East has evolved significantly after the
removal of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government was ousted from power.
Strong countries in the GCC like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
offered immediate political and financial assistance to General Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi’s
interim regime in Cairo While Qatar, which had become a cause o f considerable tension
both in Egypt and the GCC because their close ties between the Mohammed Morsi
administration (Henderson, 2013). This also illustrates G ulf States were assertive in
supporting a specific actor in the political field, which is the army.
The Middle East region has changed significantly in recent months, with the rise
and growth of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its takeover of large
territories in Syria and northwestern Iraq. However, the dramatic fall in oil prices will test
57
the resilience o f G ulf pledges to Egypt to support the current regime. These developments
arguably pose a greater and more imminent security threat to GCC states than
maintaining stability in Egypt. In addition, the continued decline in oil revenues will have
a great effect on Egypt that is heavily dependent on Gulf assistance currently for
economic support.
Conclusion
There are a number o f factors that help A1 Sisi regime present itself as a stable
and effective government and gain further military and economic aid in comparison with
Morsi regime. First the military support, which was discussed as the most influential
actor in the Egyptian political, economical and social sphere. A1 Sisi strives to emulate
his predecessor Nasser with the ambitious project of the Suez Canal extension, which
started in August 2014. This gigantic enterprise is intended not only to gain economic
profit in the future, but apparently also to unite the country through a big national project
and through the president himself. Also the significant support he receives from the Gulf
countries with the exception of Qatar. This Aid stimulates the Egyptian economy to some
extent, thus providing some form of stability to the country. The disastrous situations
happening across the Middle East stretching from the Syrian civil war, the territorial
gains being made by DAESH Islamists (Islamic State, IS) both in Syria and Iraq, the
looming collapse of the Iraqi state itself, and the rekindling o f military hostilities between
Hamas and Israel as o f summer 2014 all fall into this category
58
The prospects for a transition to democracy in Egypt are promising, despite
security struggles against violent clashes. The continuing support for the military despite
the arrest of the Muslim Brotherhood members and jailing of liberal revolutionary figures
and the imprisonment of journalists’ points to the idea that it is not democratic freedoms,
but stability and economic prosperity that is the primary concerns o f everyday Egyptians
at this point in time. However, that does not mean that all hope for democratization has
been lost in the case o f Egypt. For example, if the current regime cannot improve the
economy, it is possible that people’s patience of extreme measures will run out. We must
also look at democratization as a long-term process rather than a short-term event. From
the time of the French Revolution it took decades for France to develop into an actual
democracy. The same thing could be said about the United States that it took almost 200
years to reach this democratic model. Only time will tell what path Egypt will progress.
59
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