The Myth of Defeat: The Memory of the Yom
Kippur War in Israeli Society
CHARLES S. LIEBMAN
The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 arouses an uncomfortable feeling
among Israeli Jews. Many think of it as a disaster or a calamity. This is
evident in references to the War in Israeli literature, or the way in which
the War is recalled in the media, on the anniversary of its outbreak. 1
Whereas evidence of the gloom is easy to document, the reasons are more
difficult to fathom. The Yom Kippur War can be described as failure or
defeat by amassing one set of arguments but it can also be assessed as a
great achievement by marshalling other sets of arguments. This article
will first show why the arguments that have been offered in arriving at a
negative assessment of the War are not conclusive and will demonstrate
how the memory of the Yom Kippur War might have been transformed
into an event to be recalled with satisfaction and pride. 2 This leads to the
critical question: why has this not happened?
The background to the Yom Kippur War, the battles and the outcome
of the war, lend themselves to a variety of interpretations. 3 Since these are
part of the problem which this article addresses, the author offers only the
barest outline of events, avoiding insofar as it is possible, the adoption of
one interpretive scheme or another.
In 1973, Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, fell on
Saturday, 6 October. On that day the Egyptians in the south and the
Syrians in the north attacked Israel. The attack came as a surprise. The
question of why Israel was surprised, should it have been surprised, and
who was to blame for the surprise is a matter of debate, but it is beyond
dispute that war found the Israeli public as well as the army unprepared.
In the first few days the Israeli army suffered 'heavy' losses and was
forced to retreat along both fronts. On the third day, Israel launched a
counter attack on the southern front which failed. However, the tide of
the war turned in the early days of the second week. Within two weeks the
Israeli army had advanced into enemy territory inflicting heavy casualties
on the Egyptians, encircling one of its armies, although it never dislodged
the Egyptian army from the Sinai desert, and advancing in the north to
within artillery range of Damascus. A cease fire was declared on 22
Middle Eastern Studies, Vo1.29, No.3, July 1993, pp. 399-418
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
400
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
October 22 at the insistence of both the United States and the Soviet
Union and a separation of forces agreement was eventually signed with
the active intervention of then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR A FAILURE: THE RATIONAL ARGUMENT
The mention of the war in the press and in popular books and articles
suggest the following reasons, not necessarily in order of importance, for
recalling it as a calamity.4
1. The great number of casualties.
2. The loss of territory which followed the conclusion of the war.
3. The surprise nature of the attack, contrary to the expectations of the
military and political elite. This, it might be argued has two conse­
quences. First, it destroyed public confidence in the leadership and
undermined the public's sense of security. Secondly, it minimized a
sense of victory that might have followed the conclusion of the war.
The fear and trepidation that preceded the Six Day War (the June,
1967 war), enhanced the sense of victory. In the case of the Yom
Kippur War, the country felt secure before its outbreak so there was
less cause to be grateful at its successful completion.
4. The inability of Israel to achieve a crushing military victory stemmed
from the intervention of the superpowers. This demonstrated Israeli
dependence (impotence) and points to the conclusion that Israel can
never defeat its enemies decisively; hence it will always be subject to
security threats.
Analyzed, one by one, the arguments are not overwhelming. However,
each of them has at least a surface credibility. When added together, it
might be argued, they explain why the war is recalled as less than a
victory. But they don't account for the feeling of despair, or disaster that
Israeli society associates with the Yom Kippur War.
With regard to the casualties argument - whether there were or were
not a great number of casualties depends on a number of factors including
expectations with regard to casualties, the period of time in which the
casualties took place, and other, even more subjective judgements. In a
newspaper column written less than a month following the war, an astute
Israeli observer noted that the number of casualties is not sufficient to
account for the prevailing 'atmosphere of dejection'.5 Less than 3,000
soldiers died in the Yom Kippur War. Slightly over 600 soldiers died in
the Six Day War which Israelis considered the most glorious victory in
their history. Over 6,000 Israelis are presumed to have died in the 1948
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
War of Independence at a time w~en the~)llnt~
fifth its size during the Yom KIppur
ar.
·
ry Furthermore, U
1"
thl
celebrated in Israe11 memo.
dence there were no civilian casua tIes m
p~n
' d that the loss of life is measured ag
mIght respon .
ted to the War of Independell
The outcome Impu
. D '
the
outcome of the SIX ay
d
.h.
the State an
ny h
.
.
f the West Bank WIt Its rna
(hberatlOn) 0
1
hich contains the
eastern part of Jerusa edm w
Yom Kippur
.
.
t is impute t0 the
society
having brought p~ace. WIth gyp. uestion al
make this connectIon IS part of the q
ne ative associations, not the answer..
~ith re ard to the surrender of terntory ar;
War it is t~ue, resulted in the surrendfeSr.of~h;~
.'
W r But the surrender 0 mal <:
~~~~~~;:eli
co~ld ~ve, ;e~~:p;~l~:~
~~~~ E:y~t and Isra:l, a tr:a%:~~~~~::
Israelis acclaimefd. ~rt~:r~~~ed States, ced
under pressure ro
. .h <
Yet that war is not overlaId WIt a"
d
capture .
.
ent the
With respect to the surpnse argum. '
factor in weakening public confid~nce 10 the ~
data on Israeli public opinion pnor to ~d I~
Public confidence in the gov~rnmen~i:;:g
steadily deteriorating f~ll~wmr ~e blic di
Yom Kippur War a maJo.n~~ 0 "t e pu
sh
of Israel's military invincIbIhty ?ad b~e;
Yom Kippur War did lower publIc con ene
confidence had been declining any~ay. On
.
t on the public's confidence 10 the n
:t~~ the Six Day War, the pUb.l~c ~~n~~~~
war and therefore, had no trepl a 1 . .
Octobe:, the same was true of the Sl:a~
although Israelis only learned later ho b
. t h e coun,
try there was
. a pu
II
overrunmng
few days that the War was not gOl~g we .
eral sense of relief as Israel s ,army
gen h I
the mood of the Israehs can.
Nevert e ess,
.
d'
7
f the first week and reached Its na lr on _
o
. for those who died in the war, t
mourmng
been declared."
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
lce of both the United States and the Soviet
forces agreement was eventually signed with
~hen US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.
r
FAILURE: THE RATIONAL ARGUMENT
. the press and in popular books and articles
os, not necessarily in order of importance, for
iualties.
<:h followed the conclusion of the war.
e attack, contrary to the expectations of the
:e.. This, it might be argued has two conse­
oed public confidence in the leadership and
:sense of security. Secondly, it minimized a
1t have followed the conclusion of the war.
that preceded the Six Day War (the June,
= sense of victory. In the case of the Yom
felt secure before its outbreak so there was
.t its successful completion.
chieve a crushing military victory stemmed
~e superpowers. This demonstrated Israeli
.nd points to the conclusion that Israel can
~cisively; hence it will always be subject to
~uments are not overwhelming. However,
rface credibility. When added together, it
It why the war is recalled as less than a
I for the feeling of despair, or disaster that
Ihe Yom Kippur War.
!i argument - whether there were or were
depends on a number of factors including
§ualties, the period of time in which the
=-, even more subjective jUdgements. In a
:han a month following the war, an astute
-number of casualties is not sufficient to
osphere of dejection'.5 Less than 3,000
.. War. Slightly over 600 soldiers died in
considered the most glorious victory in
!i are presumed to have died in the 1948
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
401
War of Independence at a time when the country's population was one­
fifth its size during the Yom Kippur War. But that war is widely
celebrated in Israeli memory. Furthermore, unlike the War of Inde­
pendence, there were no civilian casualties in the Yom Kippur War. One
might respond that the loss of life is measured against the fruits of victory.
The outcome imputed to the War of Independence is the establishment of
the State and the outcome of the Six Day War was the occupation
(liberation) of the West Bank with its many holy places, especially the
eastern part of Jerusalem which contains the Western Wall. No great
achievement is imputed to the Yom Kippur War. But, we will argue
below, Israeli society could have, retrospectively, credited the War with
having brought peace with Egypt. The reluctance of Israeli society to
make this connection is part of the question about why the War arouses
negative associations, not the answer.
With regard to the surrender of territory argument - the Yom Kippur
War, it is true, resulted in the surrender of the Sinai desert captured in the
Six Day War. But the surrender of Sinai was part of the peace treaty
between Egypt and Israel, a treaty which the overwhelming majority of
Israelis acclaimed. Furthermore, the 1956 war in Sinai ended with Israel,
under pressure from the United States, ceding all the territory it had
captured. Yet that war is not overlaid with a sense of tragedy or despair.
With respect to the surprise argument, the importance of the surprise
factor in weakening public confidence in the state's elite is undermined by
data on Israeli public opinion prior to and in the aftermath of the War.
Public confidence in the government, though not the military, had been
steadily deteriorating following the Six Day War" whereas even after the
Yom Kippur War a majority of the public did 'not believe that the "myth
of Israel's military invincibility" had been shattered'. 7 In other words, the
Yom Kippur War did lower public confidence in the political elite but that
confidence had been declining anyway. On the other hand, it had little
impact on the public's confidence in the military. While it is true that
unlike the Six Day War, the public did not anticipate the outbreak ofthe
war and, therefore, had no trepidations about its consequences before 6
October, the same was true of the Sinai War in 1956. Furthermore,
although Israelis only learned later how close the enemy had come to
overrunning the country, there wa~ a public perception during the first
few days that the War was not going well. This should have resulted in a
general sense of relief as Israel's army reversed the tide of battle.
Nevertheless, the mood of the Israelis continued to decline from the end
of the first week and reached its nadir on 7 November, the national day of
mourning for those who died in the war, two weeks after a cease fire had
been declared. x
J~
402
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
Finally, with respect to the argument that the War demonstrated Israeli
impotence, this was not the first war whose outcome suggested that Israel
could never inflict a blow of such magnitude on its enemies that they
could no longer threaten its security. It was no secret that even in the Six
Day War the army's northern command was alloted a minimal amount of
time to capture the Golan Heights before the Security Council imposed a
cease-fire on Israel. Furthermore, the Six Day War remained the excep­
tion to all Israeli wars. That victory alone generated a belief that Israel
had achieved some permanent security. The Sinai War was surely a prime
example of how the results of a brilliant military victory could be erased
through superpower pressure.
Other reasons might be offered to explain the sense of gloom as­
sociated with the Yom Kippur War. It has been suggested that the
problem is not the outcome of the War, but the great failure of the protest
movement following the war. Yaacov Hasdai has written that the
humiliating failure of the protest movement, its inability to formulate a
positive program or to produce a leadership was more troubling than
other aspects of the war. 9 Eva Etzioni-Halevy has described this protest
movement which arose as soon as large numbers of soldiers had been
released from active service following the conclusion of the Yom Kippur
War. lO The protest movement, she observes, was related to general
grievances, but it was precipitated:
by the alleged failures of the government in handling the war ...
What was especially resented was that no cabinet members or
senior officials were willing to assume responsibility for the failures
and to resign their posts. 11
But there is no evidence that the general Israeli public, outside certain
marginal political and academic circles, shared Hasdai's concern about
the failure of the protest movements. If so, the outcome of the Yom
Kippur War or at least the failure of the protest movements should have
left a long-term impact on Israeli morale, but Etzioni-Halevy, relying on
public opinion data reports that this is not the case. 12
It might be argued that the reason why the War is recalled with such
unhappiness is a combination of some or all of the factors already
suggested. That may be true but the combination, by itself, does not
render the arguments any more convincing. The claim of this essay is not
that the public does not accept one or more or even all these arguments,
or even that, as indicated above, they do not have at least surface
credibility. The claim here is that there is no convincing case for any of
them. But even if the arguments were persuasive we must still explain
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
.
r War was not mythologized,
why the Yom dKelfPePa~s and thereby transformed in.
in the case 0 f
,
Israelis.
Contemporary Political Myth
th once used exclusively to refer t()
d increa~
The term my ,
. d'
originated in the cl~ssical peno '~s ~~:'s discu.
ry socIety. Henry u
.
conte~pora
13
th is a dramatic narratiVe a
especIally usefh~\. ~y 1 which functions to assist
calor pseudo- Istonca ,
.
M th im (;
.0rderingdtheirthPr::::~~x::~~~:~iy i~comp~~
in
HIstory an my
., h' t r'­
· the very process of wntmg IS 0 J'
create myth m
b pseudc
h' h the myth recounts may e
~vents.w ICe case of contemporary myth, the nal
h' ch did occur - selects, •
hkely, m th
to a series of events WI.
.
d' t' ctIVe manner.
' d . '131
these events m a IS m
A reservation with respect to thIS an sl~m .
the term 'dramatic narrati.ve'. Tdhe eXt~:st~~nc;
th But thIS nee no
f ents A dramatic I
form to t he my·
overarching structur.e 0 evor ~ore forms, b1.
from this stru~ture m one th Lincoln did nc
canonical verSIOn of the my .
H
Civil War in his second inaugural.a~dress. te;
investing it with mea~ing, by exPlam:~;~~~rda;
which American socIety had. to pa~,
h Am
sin of slavery. Following thl~ oU thmne~~i~h w()
t d in dramatIc for
now be recoun e
with the Emancip
may be no narrati'­
y
Vlctt.or but rather different stories connecte
f h myth as Ion
en ue ty ,
ture. These stor~es are part o. t ~ses. The H.
the meaning WhICh the myth l~~rom the mal
Israeli version, can be dedu~e Holocaust. 14 ":
about and commemorate t ~
f
s wi"
within Israeli society i~ a va:I~ty ~~li~:;ews
the myth - the destructIOn 0 SIX ~l
ve th
while the world did nothmg to sa
E urope
' p t as a S'
tion that Jews have n,o secunty exce
land. One could recIte the myth as a d~a~
d' this form in school texts. The pom ,
foun m . '
. b t whether there
narrative eXIsts m reahty, u
~egro e~:~~:e;oe~~~~~:;:
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
• the argument that the War demonstrated Israeli
.he first war whose outcome suggested that Israel
w of such magnitude on its enemies that they
its security. It was no secret that even in the Six
~ern command was alloted a minimal amount of
I Heights before the SecUrity Council imposed a
lermore, the Six Day War remained the excep­
hat victory alone generated a belief that Israel
Ilent security. The Sinai War was surely a prime
:s of a brilliant military victory could be erased
iure.
e offered to explain the sense of gloom as­
~ppur
War. It has been suggested that the
~ of the War, but the great failure of the protest
~,War. Yaacov Hasdai has written that the
trotest movement, its inability to formulate a
'duce a leadership was more troubling than
~a Etzioni-Halevy has described this protest
~n as large numbers of soldiers had been
tfollowing the conclusion of the Yom Kippur
lent,
she
!
.
d: observes, was related to general
IpItate
::'
Ifof the government in handling the war ...
h:sented was that no cabinet members or
lting to assume responsibility for the failures
• • 11
~T"
.at the general Israeli public, outside certain
rRic circles, shared Hasdai's concern about
nrements. If so, the outcome of the Yom
Jure of the protest movements should have
ilOIi morale, but Etzioni-Halevy, relying on
!tat this is not the case.12
reason why the War is recalled with such
o of some or all of the factors already
but the combination, by itself, does not
: convincing. The claim of this essay is not
one or more or even all these arguments,
nve, they do not have at least surface
lat there is no convincing case for any of
Its were persuasive we must stilI explain
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
403
why the Yom Kippur War was not mythologized, as frequently happens
in the case of defeats, and thereby transformed into a source of pride for
Israelis.
Contemporary Political Myth
The term myth, once used exclusively to refer to a class of stories which
originated in the classical period, is used increasingly with reference to
contemporary society. Henry Tudor's discussion of myth seems
especially useful. 13 Myth is a dramatic narrative of critical events, histori­
calor pseudo-historical, which functions to assist the individual or society
in ordering their present experience. Myth imposes meaning on events.
History and myth are not necessarily incompatible. The historian may
create myth in the very process of writing history. On the other hand, the
events which the myth recounts may be pseudo-history. But more than
likely, in the case of contemporary myth, the narrative - though referring
to a series of events which did occur - selects, organizes, and interprets
these events in a distinctive manner.
A reservation with respect to this and similar definitions is the use of
the term 'dramatic narrative'. The expression suggests a fixed narrative
form to the myth. But this need not be the case. Myth refers to some
overarching structure of events. A dramatic narrative can be inferred
from this structure in one or more forms, but there need not be any
canonical version of the myth. Lincoln did not recite the events of the
Civil War in his second inaugural address. He mythologized the war by
investing it with meaning, by explaining the terrible loss of life as the price
which American society had to pay, in accordance with God's will, for the
sin of slavery. Following this outline, the American Civil War myth can
now be recounted in dramatic form which would begin with the story of
Negro enslavement and end with the Emancipation Proclamation and the
victory of the North. There may be no narrative version of the myth, in its
entirety, but rather different stories connected to the overarching struc­
ture. These stories are part of the myth as long as they serve to reinforce
the meaning which the myth imposes. The Holocaust myth, at least in its
Israeli version, can be deduced from the manner in which Israelis speak
about and commemorate the Holocaust. 14 The Holocaust is projected
within Israeli society in a variety of forms which point to the meaning of
the myth - the destruction of six million Jews and of Jewish life in Eastern
Europe while the world did nothing to save them is conclusive demonstra­
tion that Jews have no security except as a sovereign nation in their own
land. One could recite the myth as a dramatic narrative and it can be
found in this form in school texts. The point, however, is not whether the
narrative exists in reality, but whether there is a narrative structure to the
.1
404
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
Holocaust in the minds of those who speak about the events or act on the
basis of their understanding of these events.
In studying myth, therefore, the scholar may have to provide the flesh
and bones of the very narrative which he seeks to explore. Such an
enterprise is not without its problems but this merits a separate essay.
A political myth is a myth whose referent (subject matter) is political
and/or whose consequences are political (it reorders contemporary politi­
cal experiences). Myth is of special importance in the case of defeat or
some other national catastrophe. Victory or success requires little
explanation. It affirms a society's belief in itself, it generates self confi­
dence, confidence in the society's leaders and in its norms and values.
Those who might have suffered in the achievement of the success are
comforted by the fact that their suffering and sacrifice contributed to the
achievement. But defeat, tragedy and national catastrophe challenge a
society's self-confidence, its belief in itself, its leaders and its values. It
threatens everyone with loss of ultimate meaning, especially those who
'sacrificed' the most. It seems to pose one of two alternatives. Either
destiny and fortune, if not justice itself, is on the side of the 'other', the
'enemy', the forces that were victorious, or there is no pattern or meaning
to events and reality is built on sands of accident and chaos. Both
explanations are destructive of social and personal order. Hence, it is no
surprise that some of our most important myths and mythological for­
mulations refer to events that appear to be defeats or might be inter­
preted as defeat but are affirmed, through the myth, as actually being a
victory of some sort. Martin Jaffee, in an article that discusses the
mythologization of the Holocaust, describes this pattern in more general
terms.
Victimization ... is easily thematized in memory and story as a
moment of victory. That is, when transformed by the religious
imagination into myth, the experience of victimization can confer a
kind of holiness and power upon the victim. In stories constructed
around the murder of the innocent victim, for example, each
retelling reconstructs the original moment of the victim's destruc­
tion and transformation. In such stories the victim is always both
victim and victor, always destroyed but always reborn in a form that
overcomes the victimizer ... Not incidentally, the chief beneficiary
of that empowerment is the community, which views itself as the
historical witness to the victim's degradation and transcendence,
the historical body that, in its own life, preserves the memory of and
relives the moment of degradation and transfiguration. By telling
and retelling the story of the victim, the community of victimization
not only memorializes the victim and stands in solidarity with the
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
. the victim'S tJ
victim's.fat~; it. also i~~~:~~;y the power 0:
tion, bnng10g 1Otl~' 1 and social reality t
't wn po It!ca
If_understanding as a Cl
onto I.S 0
which It comes to se
.
h as already noted, is 1
Thp- central Israeh myt, 'ng in the death 0
ff t to find meam
reflects the e or . h l'f
1 in Eastern and Cel
destruction of J~WIS 0 :ccasion mythological ~
defeats or tragedIes:IS f r the Zionist settlers
most impor~a~\of ~o~~eth~se cases, ostensible
and Tel~Ha1. n
s a source of inspiration, c
been re10terpreted a. ortant of all, as purpc
legitimacy, and mo~t ~mp n true of the Holoe
·'
in ThIS IS eve
1
d of that event. On t
not d Ie 10 va .
deny the en~rmoustrageat~east in part, by asS
the victims IS honoredd'
nl'tude But there
allele mag
.
tragedy 0 f unpar
. denied ultimate s
involved. The enemy 11S their dignity or pr
.
have never 0 st
reporte d t 0
d _ 'I believe wIth coml
ness would be restore
. s'the victim
h
h he tarne ,
will come even t oug
hambers _ and mo
on their way to the ga~ ~ om their death - tt
great good has e~e~~:tio~ of Zionism, that
Israel and the v1O~1I el Furthermore, soc
outside the l~nd ~ r~r\o' the values shared
heroism and 10 fi elY
those who li~e.
t of each myth and th
The narratIve conten t deal about the sc
myths relate tells us a grea
. hardly S\l
dd d But one IS
become embe ~. s Henry Rosenberg
mythic constructIOn. ~h death of Saul al
the biblical story of f ~ nidas and the b:
Herodotus' account 0 I eo Rosenberg pc<
Persians at Th~rm?py ~~lsh modern Gr
English, Scand1O.avlan, to help illumio:
and American ,hteratu:: against the Si,
nd
George Custer ~ last s
I then about 1
ua
There is noth1Og unus t' Wh~t is surp
the Holocaus .
or Masad a or
h' ch lend themselve
or a series of ~vents Wn~ calamity. This se
in terms of dIsa~te~ a embered in Ism
Kippur War as It IS rem
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
of those who speak about the events or act on the
lding of these events.
:refore, the scholar may have to provide the flesh
narrative which he seeks to explore. Such an
It its problems but this merits a separate essay.
llyth Whose referent (subject matter) is political
,ces are political (it reorders contemporary politi­
is of special importance in the case of defeat or
:ttastrophe. Victory or success requires little
society's belief in itself, it generates self confi­
:. society's leaders and in its norms and values.
;uffered in the achievement of the success are
1 their SUffering and sacrifice contributed to the
• tragedy and national catastrophe challenge a
j~ belief in itself, its leaders and its values. It
-oss of ultimate meaning, especially those Who
eems to pose one of two alternatives. Either
l,justice itself, is on the side of the 'other', the
:i:e victorious, Or there is no pattern or meaning
!>oilt on sands of accident and chaos. Both
~c; of social and personal order. Hence, it is no
fJPost important myths and mythological for­
ijIat appear to be defeats or might be inter­
fP;med, through the myth, as actuaUy being a
ffin Jaffee, in an article that discusses the
(.;
describes this pattern in more general
~ust,
asily thematized in memory and story as a
bat is, When transformed by the religious
~ the experience of Victimization can confer a
»vee upon the Victim. In stories constructed
f the innocent victim, for example, each
le original moment of the victim's destruc­
1. In such stories the victim is always both
s destroyed but always reborn in a form that
:r ... Not incidentaUy, the chief beneficiary
; the community, which views itself as the
victim's degradation and transcendence,
n its own life, preserves the memory of and
egradation and transfiguration. By telling
the victim, the community of victimization
e victim and stands in solidarity with the
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
405
victim's fate; it also shares in the victim's triumph and transforma­
tion, bringing into its history the power of its myth and mapping
onto its own political and social reality the mythic plot through
which it comes to self-understanding as a community of suffering. IS
ThP- central Israeli myth, as already noted, is the Holocaust. The myth
reflects the effort to find meaning in the death of six million Jews and the
destruction of Jewish life in Eastern and Central Europe. But lesser
defeats or tragedies also occasion mythological formulations - among the
most important of these for the Zionist settlers in Palestine were Masada
and Tel-Hai. 16 In both these cases, ostensible defeats and failures have
been reinterpreted as a source of inspiration, as a bestowal of territorial
legitimacy, and most important of all, as purposeful. Those who died did
not die in vain. This is even true of the Holocaust. No effort is made to
deny the enormous tragedy of that event. On the contrary, the memory of
the victims is honored, at least in part, by associating their death with a
tragedy of unparalleled magnitude. But there is more than tragedy that is
involved. The enemy is denied ultimate satisfaction, the fallen are
reported to have never lost their dignity or pride or belief that righteous­
ness would be restored - 'I believe with complete faith that the Messiah
will come even though he tarries', the victims are reported to have sung
on their way to the gas chambers - and most significantly of all, some
great good has emerged from their death - the emergence of the State of
Israel and the vindication of Zionism, that is, the futility of Jewish life
outside the land of Israel. Furthermore, society has learned a lesson in
heroism and in fidelity to the values shared by those who fell as well as
those who live.
The narrative content of each myth and the particular lessons which the
myths relate tells us a great deal about the society in which the myths have
become embedded. But one is hardly surprised at the enterprise of
mythic construction. As Henry Rosenberg notes,11 it is at least as old as
the biblical story of the death of Saul and Jonathan. ls It is found in
Herodotus' account of Leonidas and the battle of the Greeks against the
Persians at Thermopylae. Rosenberg provides similar examples from
English, Scandinavian, Welsh, modern Greek, Serbian, French, Scottish
and American literature to help illuminate his case study of General
George Custer's last stand against the Sioux Indians.
There is nothing unusual, then, about the mythologization of Tel-Hai
or Masada or the Holocaust. What is surprising is when a seeming victory
or a series of events which lend themselves to mythologization is recalled
in terms of disaster and calamity. This seems to be the case of the Yom
Kippur War as it is remembered in Israeli society.
.
406
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
THE MYTHOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
There are at least three related paradigms that are available in mytholo­
gizing the Yom Kippur War: the Purim paradigm, the bravery paradigm,
and the consequences paradigm.
The Purim Paradigm
The holiday of Purim celebrates the salvation of Persian Jews recorded in
the biblical book of Esther. The story is of an imminent threat to Jewish
life and the nullification of that threat through what might appear to be
natural but the believer knows to be miraculous means. The ultimate
victory of the Jews, therefore, signals both Jewish power of sorts as well
as the help of God who is the source of that power. The paradigm's
emphasis on the immediate threat to Jewish existence and miraculous
salvation from the threat, sometimes but not always accompanied by the
humiliation of the Jews' enemies, recurs throughout the Middle Ages.
Collective memory manipulates sacred history, as Lucette Valensi notes,
by appropriating 'the great tradition and ground [ing] it in local context' .19
Local Jewish communities, relived the Purim paradigm in their own
experiences and commemorated the anniversary of the event with local
variations of the Purim celebration. The Encyclopaedia Judaica lists 100
such 'special Purims' the earliest of which dates from 1191 in Champagne,
France and the latest in 1878 from Vidin, Bulgaria. 20
The Yom Kippur War contains all of the elements of the Purim
paradigm. It might be argued that secular Israeli society's historical
memory is so dim and its distance from the tradition so great that it has a
limited capacity to formulate contemporary events in classical Jewish
molds. 21 But why did the religious public fail to mythologize the War in
terms of the Purim paradigm? Interestingly, even the haredim (sing:
haredi) , the ultra-Orthodox and ostensibly anti-Zionist community which
constitute roughly one-third of the religious public, did do so with respect
to the Six Day War,22 Furthermore, they acknowledged that miracles had
taken place in the Yom Kippur War. 23 Yet they refused to portray the
Yom Kippur War in accordance with the Purim paradigm - a step which
would have turned the event into one with very positive rather than
negative associations.
The Bravery Paradigm
This is the most self-evident of the paradigms. Loss of human life,
particularly of young people, is deemed unnatural and it begs for inter­
pretation. The imposition of meaning upon the loss of many lives,
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
.
. . e of war, becomes a central .
especially m t~~ which the intellectuals who
leaders, a tas m h
'bes of society's high Cl
roducers as well as t e scn
.
h b
~ole If the loss of life has no mealllng~ then t eth
'f t nd all members of the Soclety ar~
com or a
.
b the attnbut
chaos. This is overcome , m pallrt t~e 'myth of t1':
h t George Mosse h as ca e
~~~h aof the fallen soldiers leads ~~ some o~~~
. been achieved. In addltlOn, we
.
~~~~~~; particular soldiers by retelling t~~he;~:
.
and bravery. The bravery 0
of herOlsm
.
.
ts it honors the society wh­
then achlevemen ,
.
for which tb
sanctifies the values of the s~clety.
d
de~~ea~r~~~;y:~i~~r~~~\::~i~~:~nu::::o~~ttl~
d celebrated before the war
:~~;o~st~~~a:are re::~~~t:~~~::~;,e~~~~~'
innovatlon, but .the w
bered in that ligl
Independence, lS not remem
The Consequences Paradigm
.
b 1977 Egyptian presldent PI
On 19 Novem er
David talks a few me
The visit led to the Cam~
d
26 March 1
treaty with Egypt was Slgn~e ~;eaty as ope
Israelis we~co~ed the ~e~bors. Short of tha
relations wlth lts.A~ab ~elgthe most formidabl
.
t d as chmmatmg
m~erpre e
1 ce for Middle East observers
It lS commonp a
t in the events t1
as an import~~~o~p~~;~ar, in other wor
acc~rds. T:: ar whic: resulted in a peace tr'
f ' dable threat to ISfi
zatlOn as
provided the most orml
.d' h
whatever cost Israel might have pal m
deemed worthwhile.
,
K
The potential for interpretmg th~ Yom
in order to obtam peace
Israel had to pay
I
l's current pre~
conclusion of the war. srae
ce treaty
books written before the pea
I d
'b d the war as the possible pre u e
descn e
' n l y beca
Moshe Dayanargued that It was 0 'U' g 1
Yom Kippur War that he was WI;; .
' to the terms of the Camp aVI
accor d mg
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
POTENTIAL OF THE YOM KlPPUR WAR
;related paradigms that are available in mytholo­
:Var: the Purim paradigm, the bravery paradigm,
aradigm.
~brates the salvation of Persian Jews recorded in
er. The story is of an imminent threat to jewish
)f that threat through what might appear to be
:knows to be miraculous means. The ultimate
fore, signals both Jewish power of sorts as well
is the Source of that pOwer. The paradigm's
lte threat to jewish existence and miraculous
sometimes but not always accompanied by the
:nemies, recurs throughout the Middle Ages.
dates sacred history, as Lucette Valensi notes,
tradition and ground[ing] it in local context'. 19
-, relived the Purim paradigm in their own
Irated the anniversary of the event with local
~bration. The Encyclopaedia Judaica lists 100
-/iestofwhich dates from 1191 in Champagne,
78 from Vidin, BUlgaria. 20
contains all of the elements of the Purim
lIed that secular Israeli society's historical
tance from the tradition so great that it has a
te contemporary events in classical Jewish
igious public fail to mythologize the War in
:m? Interestingly, even the haredim (sing:
,nd ostensibly anti-Zionist community which
)fthe religious public, did do so with respect
more, they
acknowledged that miracles had
23
)ur War. Yet they refused to portray the
Ice with the Purim paradigm _ a step which
t into one with very positive rather than
of the paradigms. Loss of human life.
s deemed unnatural and it begs for inter­
meaning upon the loss of many Jives,
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
407
especially in time of war, becomes a central task of every society's
leaders, a task in which the intellectuals who are among the major
producers as well as the scribes of society's high culture, playa prominent
role. If the loss of life has no meaning, then the bereaved remain without
comfort and all members of the society are threatened by conceptual
chaos. This is overcome, in part, by the attribution of purpose to death,
by what George Mosse has called the 'myth of the war experience'. 24 The
death of the fallen soldiers leads to some outcome that would not have
otherwise been achieved. In addition, we console ourselves about the
deaths of particular soldiers by retelling the event of their death as a saga
of heroism and bravery. The bravery of the fallen not only celebrates
their achievements, it honors the society which produced them and
sanctifies the values of the society for which they were prepared to face
death and for which they did their utmost.
The bravery of Israeli soldiers on the battlefields of the Yom Kippur
War was already celebrated before the war had ended. Particular epi­
sodes of the war are recalled as instances of great courage, fortitude and
innovation, but the war in its entirety, unlike, for example, the War of
Independence, is not remembered in that light.
The Consequences Paradigm
On 19 November 1977 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat visited Israel.
The visit led to the Camp David talks a few months later. A formal peace
treaty with Egypt was signed on 26 March 1979. The vast majority of
Israelis welcomed the peace treaty as opening a new era in Israeli
relations with its Arab neighbors. Short of that, the peace with Egypt was
interpreted as eliminating the most formidable threat to Israel's security.
It is commonplace for Middle East observers to see the Yom Kippur War
as an important component in the events that led to the Camp David
accords. The Yom Kippur War, in other words, lends itself to mythologi­
zation as a war which resulted in a peace treaty with the country which
provided the most formidable threat to Israel's existence. In that case,
whatever cost Israel might have paid in human life could have been
deemed worthwhile.
The potential for interpreting the Yom Kippur War as the price which
Israel had to pay in order to obtain peace has been available since the
conclusion of the war. Israel's current president Chaim Herzog, in two
books written before the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt,
described the war as the possible prelude to peace. 25 In a 1980 article,
Moshe Dayanargued that it was only because of Sadat's setback in the
Yom Kippur War that he was willing to discuss peace with Israel
according to the terms of the Camp David agreement. 26 In November,
408
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
1990, five Israelis were killed and 25 wounded by an Egyptian military
policeman near the Egypt-Israel border. Describing the incident on
Israeli television, Israel's foreign minister David Levy commented on the
fact that Israel had fought a bloody war in order to secure a peace treaty
with Egypt. This presumably made the absence of proper security
arrangements by the Egyptians all the more reprehensible. 27 But state­
ments of this sort are unusual. The question is why are they so unusual?
Why does Israeli society not remember the war as a case of 'miraculous'
salvation, by human if not by divine hand, in which the courageous
Israelis achieved, against great odds and by dint of self-sacrifice, a
military victory which resulted, a few years later, in a peace treaty with
Egypt?
THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AS FAILURE: THREE EXPLANATIONS
My argument is that the Yom Kippur War has been mythologized but not
in a manner that students of myth would have anticipated. It has been
mythologized into a myth of defeat. I suggest three explanations for this.
They are not mutually exclusive and are offered as hypotheses which
merit study rather than conclusions based upon extensive research. All
are based on the assumption that if Israeli society insists on viewing the
Yom Kippur War in negative terms then we ought to ask about the
function which that view serves.
The Shattered Promise of the Six Day War
Three weeks of growing tension and acute concern for Israel's security
preceded the June 1967 war. The lightning victory of the Israeli forces,
the total destruction of the Egyptian air force and the rout of its land
forces, the capture of Ramat HaGolan from the Syrians, but especially
the acquisition of territory with deep historical associations, the old city
of Jerusalem in particular, generated a sense of euphoria ar,nong Israeli
Jews and a new set of perceptions and expectations about Israel. Socio­
logist Zvi Sobel has suggested that these perceptions and expectations
involved three major realms of life - Israeli security (Israel no longer had
to fear military threats from its neighbors), aliya (the expectation that
masses of diaspora Jews would flock to Israel), and economic prosperity
resulting from large scale economic investment from abroad. But beyond
the specific realms in which Israelis anticipated change, a new self-image
emerged - that of a self-sufficient Israel, capable of any achievement. 2' If
not an entirely new Israel, it was an Israel which had reached a new stage
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
f life. 29 As Eliezer Schweid put it, .'the great
~onger hoped became reali~i~s' and, 10 the word
like unto them that dream .
Within a few years the dream had shatt~red.
and the new self-image generated b~ the SIX D~
. t . Israel was left with a reahtytotally dl.
SOCle y 10
I
. p'
Israeli society. Israelis felt themse ves mc~ c
romise which the Six Day War had engen e
p
. t d wl'th the Yom Kippur War, therefore
assoCIa e
d ft'
narrate the Yom Kippur War as a e ea IS
distortion of reality because the successfu~.conc
subsequent outcome were significant aC leveI
romise of the Six Day War ge~erated the nel
~lose the circle which begins With .the June. V
defeat excuses Israeli societ~ its fallure to l~::
June war by suggesting that It. was ~he prom
false. Only further study can lllu~lllnate t~~:f
when this came about, a~Ong.whlchsegm
..
how deep into Israeli society It reached, an:.
whom it never affected or may have affec~e II
this is very much related to the next pomt.
Completing the Reintegration into Jewis~ H~i
The Six Day War strengthened ~he JeWIsh lC
secular Zionist vision which dommated Isr~el
through the first two decades of statehoo l~
.
J w The Israe 1
different than the dlaspora e .
referred to the term Jew, a further m~asu
~onal conceptions), understood thebJel.wlshd~
. .
d e leve
than a religious collectiVIty, an
. f
Jewish state had transformed themsel~es _
normal nation. This image b~gan t~ dechne I
War marks a dramatic turmng P?mt. IS~~~
as linked to dIas~ora .
th1'nk of themselves .
.' h J
sh reh·
reaffirm their aSSOCiatiOnS Wit eWI.
But there is a paradox about the.SIX ~ay
reintegration of Israeli Je~ish SOCl~ty mto
There is no historical JeWish paradigm, cer
tion of the second Temple 2,~OO year~
o timism generated by the SIX Day
p.
the Purim paradigm iIIustrat
enemies, as
.
be d
ate of the Jew IS to
e
temporary. The f
i
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
killed and 25 wounded by an Egyptian military
ypt-Israel border. Describing the incident on
; foreign minister David Levy commented on the
It a bloody war in order to secure a peace treaty
Imably made the absence of proper security
yptians all the more reprehensible. 27 But state­
Jsual. The question is why are they so unusual?
not remember the war as a case of 'miraculous'
lot by divine hand, in which the courageous
t great odds and by dint of self-sacrifice, a
ulted, a few years later, in a peace treaty with
.S FAILURE: THREE EXPLANATIONS
1m Kippur War has been mythologized but not
of myth would have anticipated. It has been
If defeat. I suggest three explanations for this.
;lusive and are offered as hypotheses which
lclusions based upon extensive research. All
In that if Israeli society insists on vieWing the
tive terms then we ought to ask about the
:rves.
eSix Day War
lsion and acute concern for Israel's security
. The lightning victory of the Israeli forces,
Egyptian air force and the rout of its land
l HaGolan from the Syrians, but especially
ith deep historical associations, the old city
~nerated a sense of euphoria aJ.llong Israeli
tions and expectations about Israel. Socio­
:d that these perceptions and expectations
If life - Israeli security (Israel no longer had
its neighbors), aliya (the expectation that
:l flock to Israel), and economic prosperity
omic investment from abroad. But beyond
'aelis anticipated change, a new self-image
~nt Israel, capable of any achievement. 2" If
:is an Israel which had reached a new stage
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
409
of life. 29 As Eliezer Schweid put it, 'the great things for which we no
longer hoped became realities' and, in the words of the Bible, 'we were
like unto them that dream'.JQ
Within a few years the dream had shattered. The hopes, expectations
and the new self-image generated by the Six Day War dissipated. Jewish
society in Israel was left with a realitytotally dissonant with the myth of
Israeli society. Israelis felt themselves incapable of living up to the
promise which the Six Day War had engendered. The sense of defeat
associated with the Yom Kippur War, therefore, resolved the tension. To
narrate the Yom Kippur War as a defeat is not only a myth but a
distortion of reality because the successful conclusion of the War and the
subsequent outcome were significant achievements. But the frustrated
promise of the Six Day War generated the need for a myth of defeat to
close the circle which begins with the June War of 1967. The myth of
defeat excuses Israeli society its failure to live up to the promise of the
June war by suggesting that it was the promise of that victory which was
false. Only further study can illuminate the details of whether, how and
when this came about, among which segments of the population it began,
how deep into Israeli society it reached, and whether there were groups
whom it never affected or may have affected in a different manner. All of
this is very much related to the next point.
Completing the Reintegration into Jewish History
The Six Day War strengthened the Jewish identity of Israeli Jews. The
secular Zionist vision which dominated Israeli Jewish society prior to and
through the first two decades of statehood was of an Israeli Jew totally
different than the diaspora Jew. The Israeli Jew (the term Hebrew was
preferred to the term Jew, a further measure of alienation from tradi­
tional conceptions), understood the Jewish people to be a national rather
than a religious collectivity, and believed that those who lived in the
Jewish state had transformed themselves from a pariah people into a
normal nation. This image began to decline in the late 1950s, but the 1967
War marks a dramatic turning point. Israeli Jews once more began to
think of themselves as linked to diaspora Jews and Jewish history, and to
reaffirm their associations with Jewish religious symbols. 3 \
But there is a paradox about the Six Day War as a turning point in the
reintegration of Israeli Jewish society into Judaism and Jewish history.
There is no historical Jewish paradigm, certainly none since the destruc­
tion of the second Temple 2,000 years ago, to describe the kind of
optimism generated by the Six Day War. Jews might defeat their
enemies, as the Purim paradigm illustrates, but the victory is always
temporary. The fate of the Jew is to be despised by the non-Jew and to
.
410
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
suffer thereby, because the non-Jew is more powerful than the Jew. The
metaphor most frequently invoked within the tradition to describe the
condition of the Jewish people in the world is 'the lamb among seventy
wolves'. Jews have no recourse other than the help of God. The only
appropriate strategy for Jews to adopt, besides fulfilling God's will and
beseeching Him for mercy, is to behave with great caution in worldly
matters. There is no room for pride and least of all for confidence. There
is no way in which the victory of the Six Day War, the display of Israeli
might, the conquest of territory, the subjugation of the Palestinians, and
the supreme confidence in the future could be squared with historical
Jewish paradigms.
Two segments of the Israeli-Jewish public were untroubled by this
paradox - the unregenerate Jewish secularists who continued to feel total
alienation from the Jewish tradition and had no need to fit contemporary
developments into some historical Jewish paradigm, and the ultra­
nationalist religious messianists who believed that the victory in the Six
Day War signaled the imminence of Divine redemption, as a conse­
quence of which traditional historical paradigms were no longer ap­
plicable. 32 But one might have expected that the largest segment of the
public would be troubled, if only at the unconscious level, by the
contradiction between the reintegration of Israel into the stream of
Jewish history and the seeming transformation of history wrought by the
Six Day War. The Yom Kippur War, viewed as a defeat, represents the
final step in the reintegration of Israel into traditional Jewish historical
paradigms. This explanation is especially applicable to the religious
sector.
The Yom Kippur War as the integration of Israel into Jewish history is
illuminated by comparisons between the Yom Kippur War and the
Holocaust. The Holocaust, within many segments of Israeli society, is
understood as the inevitable outcome of life in 'exile' , a fulfillment of the
Zionist conception of Jewish life in the absence of a Jewish state. Hence,
any analogy between the Holocaust and events within Israel challenges a
basic Zionist tenet but does affirm the Jewish normalcy of Israel. Com­
parisons between the Holocaust and the Yom Kippur War were common
in the period immediately following the war. They are almost unheard of
today for reasons which will become clear in the following section. The
continuing appropriation of the Yom Kippur War as a mode for integrat­
ing Israeli society into the stream of 'normal' Jewish history is most
evident among haredi elements.
Although the ultra-Orthodox segment of the Israeli Jewish population,
the haredim, are charged with antagonism to the state, their political
leaders have adopted an increasingly pragmatic attitude" and the con-
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
lk of their followers with the gen(
f the
· bu
.
f
th se 0'
cerns o
are increasingly indistingUishable rO~e 1~77 I
development was accelerated by t
h.
nationalist government especially s~mp~ et~
ower But the tendencies are to be oun ~u
~ecog~ition by haredi writers of the gr~at VlctO~
the Six Day War.}4 Amongst haredlm, ~ew,
.
'ty , the object of..Genttle
mmon
.
Persecuted
. d I b the miracles of Dlvme mter
..
sustame on Y y
Yom Kippur War facilitated the mtegratlo~ 0
tion of Jewish history a~d reinforced hare~l C(
The single most influential leader .of haredl Jev
. d that the suffering which resulted f
emphaSlze
f h .
.
.
J
that they must repent 0 t elf S
IS a sign to ews
h· . tb
t Those who argue that t hIS IS
observan.
Redemption, according to Rav Schacb' w;rt~:
of the War and misleading Jews a .o~
Another haredi writer was mor~ exphclt ab~
the Six Day War and the Yom Klppur.War.
he claims, Jews deceived themselve~ mt~ be~
theirs rather than the result of God s he.p.
.
bl'10
ded by dangerous pretensIons
pubhcwere
forced Jews to ask:
Why all this suffering? Why ?oes the!~
e suffering? Little by htt
purpose 0 f th
(1
the search for the right pat~, an~ ~rae
to return to Judaism until ~ntlre mSI
number of Israeli penitents mcreased
In other words, it is the suffering wh.ich r(
War, rather than the exultation followmg t1:
which reminds Jews about the.true nature ~
fortunes of the state of Israel mto the regnc
Jewish history.
THE MEHDAL AS A MYTH OF REASSUR.
There is no question that the Israeli.arm y •
War victorious. But equally clear ~ th:t
some leaders, Minister of Defense os e
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
the non-Jew is more powerful than the Jew. The
Itly invoked within the tradition to describe the
people in the world is 'the lamb among seventy
recourse other than the help of God. The only
Jews to adopt, besides fUlfilling God's will and
rey, is to behave with great caution in worldly
n for pride and least of all for confidence. There
ctory of the Six Day War, the display of Israeli
rritory, the subjugation of the Palestinians, and
in the future could be squared with historical
Israeli-Jewish public were untroubled by this
te Jewish secularists who continued to feel total
1 tradition and had no need to fit contemporary
historical Jewish paradigm, and the ultra­
anists who believed that the victory in the Six
lminence of Divine redemption, as a conse­
Ilal historical paradigms were no longer ap­
lave expected that the largest segment of the
I, if only at the unconscious level, by the
~ reintegration of Israel into the stream of
Iling transformation of history wrought by the
ppur War, viewed as a defeat, represents the
on of Israel into traditional jewish historical
on is especially applicable to the religious
the integration of Israel into Jewish history is
s between the Yom Kippur War and the
within many segments of Israeli society, is
outcome of life in 'exile', a fulfillment of the
I life in the absence of a jewish state. Hence,
locaust and events within Israel challenges a
affirm the Jewish normalcy of Israel. Com­
ust and the Yom Kippur War were common
lowing the war. They are almost unheard of
become clear in the following section. The
~e Yom Kippur War as a mode for integrat­
,tream of 'normal' jewish history is most
ItS.
)x segment of the Israeli Jewish population,
:h antagonism to the state, their political
~asingly pragmatic attitude 33 and the con-
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
411
cerns of the bulk of their followers with the general welfare of the society
are increasingly indistinguishable from those of other Israeli Jews. This
development was accelerated by the 1977 election that brought a
nationalist government especially sympathetic to religious concerns to
power. But the tendencies are to be found much earlier as was evident in
recognition by haredi writers of the great victory which Israel enjoyed in
the Six Day War. 34 Amongst haredim, Jews are perceived to be a
persecuted minority, the object of Gentile hatred, physically weak,
sustained only by the miracles of Divine intervention. The myth of the
Yom Kippur War facilitated the integration of Israel into their concep­
tion of Jewish history and reinforced haredi conceptions of that history.
The single most influential leader of haredi Jewry, Rabbi Eliezer Schach,
emphasized that the suffering which resulted from the Yom Kippur War
is a sign to Jews that they must repent of their sins and become religiously
observant. Those who argue that this is the suffering that precedes
Redemption, according to Rav Schach, were distorting the true message
of the War and misleading Jews about their obligation to repent. 35
Another haredi writer was more explicit about the connection between
the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War. Following the Six Day War,
he claims, Jews deceived themselves into believing that the victory was
theirs rather than the result of God's help. 'The leaders and the broad
public were blinded by dangerous pretensions ... '36 The Yom Kippur War
forced Jews to ask:
Why all this suffering? Why does the Jew always suffer? What is the
purpose of the suffering? Little by little these thoughts awakened
the search for the right path, and [Israeli Jews] began, little by little
to return to Judaism until entire institutions were built and the
number of Israeli penitents increased. 37
In other words, it is the suffering which resulted from the Yom Kippur
War, rather than the exultation following the victory of the Six Day War,
which reminds Jews about the true nature of reality and which merges the
fortunes of the state of Israel into the regnant paradigms of the nature of
Jewish history.
THE MEHDAL AS A MYTH OF REASSURANCE
There is no question that the Israeli army emerged from the Yom Kippur
War victorious. But equally clear is that, in the early days of the War
some leaders, Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan foremost alpong them,
412
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
believed that the destruction of the state was a real possibility. 38 It would
also appear that, were it not for the American arms that were rushed to
Israel, the Arab armies might have prevailed. 39 Although these arms, in
effect, offset the Soviet arms with which the Egyptians and Syrians had
been liberally supplied both before and during the war, the fact remains
that the Yom Kippur War demonstrated that the state of Israel is not a
secure haven for Jews. Its security is precarious, its survival dependent
u~on.the support of a g~eat power. This contradicts the central message of
Zlomsm, a message reInforced by the Holocaust myth, that there is no
secure place for J~ws except in their own land where, unlike everywhere
else, they are an Independent self-sufficient people. In other words, the
Yo~ Kippur War threatened this central message and myth of Israeli
socIety.
The work of Claude Levi-Strauss has sensitized students of society to
the. role of myth in 'mediat[ing] contradictions or opposition as ex­
penenced by men'40 by posing significant contradictions and then resolv­
ing them. 4! The question is, why are these contradictions posed and
resolved through myth, that is, in analogical terms, rather than in logical
or causal terms. The answer may be that the contradictions or dilemmas
are too frightening or challenging for society to confront directly. The
conscious confrontation would require the surrender of some other
societal norm or value. Therefore, like dreams, the contradictions are
cloaked in symbol. Myths present reality in symbolic form. The act of
representation is a form of catharsis and representation in symbolic form
conceals from our consciousness the full horror of the contradiction.
Hence, the resolution of the contradiction is also symbolic. Myth does not
~rovide a rational resolution to the contradiction but this is no problem
s~nce. the contradiction is only projected symbolically. Indeed, the resolu­
tIOn IS of only secondary importance to the more important function of
the myth - the unconscious relief offered by the symbolic representation
of the dilemma.
Israelis refuse to accept the obvious implications of the Yom Kippur
War at the conscious level. A 1975 survey reported that only 17 per cent
of Israeli Jews harbored a fear that the state would be destroyed. 42 Only
weeks after the war ended, a random sample of adult Israeli Jews found
the vast majority denying that 'the myth of Israel's military invincibility
had been shattered'. They affirmed that the Israeli army could, if
ne~essary, .repel .an ~ggressor. singlehandedly.43 Most interesting of all,
ZVI Sobel, IntervIewIng IsraelIs on the verge of emigrating from Israel in
1980 .reported th~t 'notwithstanding the shock and upset of the 1973 war,
rare IS the IsraelI who would suggest the possibility of serious defeat in
future wars, at least aloud'.44 But,-whereas Sobel reports that his respon-
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
dents skirted the issue and refused to admit tb
they made it clear that war and insecurity wen
decision to emigrate. He observes that:
The 1973 war led to the rise of feeling of
long-term survivability of the ent~rpris
certain morbidity, a kind of socIetal I
mortality.45
This suggests that the contradiction betweel
experience of the Yom Kippur War is suppre~sl
denying concern over the threat of destructlo
unconscious level and is resolved by mytholog
as a mehdal.
Mehdal is the term most often associated wi1
association that dates to November 1973, if I
translatable. Some Israeli authors, writing in 1
original Hebrew. The Alkalai Hebr~w Englis.
'omission' or 'oversight'. A mehdalls somett
bad but not, in and of itself, a major catastl
might be 'shortcoming'. The sentence 'the
rendered as 'something went wrong'. But, as
Dictionary suggests, what went wrong was. m
not having done something, an error o~ o~mss
something wrong, an error of commls~lon.
The association of the term mehdal WIth th
great deal about how the War is rememben
recalled as something which went wrong, yel
alludes to the possibility that under diff'
different circumstances, things might have c
the heart of the Yom Kippur War myth.
mehdal can reconcile the threat which the­
basic premises of Zionism with continuing a·
This is especially evident if we recall tt
associated with the Yom Kippur War in the
of 'earthquake' .47 Unlike a mehdal, an earth
event of frightening dimensions, one that
one that man can do nothing to prevent a
knows about in advance, he ought to flee
The term mehdal suggests that somethir
wrong is rectifiable. It might have been tt!
time or over-confidence or some other '!'
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
!on ofthe state was a real possibility.38 It would
lot for the American arms that were rushed to
:ight have prevailed. 39 Although these arms, in
oms with which the Egyptians and Syrians had
lh before and dUring the war, the fact remains
-demonstrated that the state of Israel is not a
security is precarious, its survival dependent
power. This contradicts the central message of
Iced by the Holocaust myth, that there is no
,t in their own land where, unlike everywhere
~nt self-sufficient people. In other words, the
led this central message and myth of Israeli
i-Strauss has sensitized students of society to
at[ing] contradictions or opposition as ex­
ng significant contradictions and then resolv­
S, why are these contradictions posed and
is, in analogical terms, rather than in logical
. may be that the contradictions or dilemmas
~nging for society to confront directly. The
luld require the surrender of some other
:refore, like dreams, the contradictions are
resent reality in symbolic form. The act of
Itharsis and representation in symbolic form
~mess the full horror of the contradiction.
:ontradiction is also symbolic. Myth does not
to the contradiction but this is no problem
-projected symbolically. Indeed, the resolu­
I(>rtance to the more important function of
~lief offered by the symbolic representation
~ obvious implications of the Yom Kippur
1975 survey reported that only 17 per cent
r that the state would be destroyed. 42 Only
random sample of adult Israeli Jews found
l 'the myth of Israel's military invincibility
3ffirmed that the Israeli army could, if
singlehandedly.43 Most interesting of all,
:s on the verge of emigrating from Israel in
nding the shock and upset of the 1973 war,
mggest the possibility of serious defeat in
ut,.whereas Sobel reports that his respon-
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
413
dents skirted the issue and refused to admit their deep feelings of fear,
they made it clear that war and insecurity were potent elements in their
decision to emigrate. He observes that:
The 1973 war led to the rise of feeling of doubt with respect to the
long-term survivability of the enterprise, the development of a
certain morbidity, a kind of societal growth of intimations of
mortality. 45
This suggests that the contradiction between Zionist ideology and the
experience of the Yom Kippur War is suppressed at the conscious level by
denying concern over the threat of destruction. But it resurfaces at the
unconscious level and is resolved by mythologizing the Yom Kippur War
as a mehdal.
Mehdal is the term most often associated with the Yom Kippur War, an
association that dates to November 1973, if not earlier. 46 It is not easily
translatable. Some Israeli authors, writing in English, use the word in the
original Hebrew. The Alkalai Hebrew English Dictionary translates it as
'omission' or 'oversight'. A mehdal is something that happened which is
bad but not, in and of itself, a major catastrophe. The best translation
might be 'shortcoming'. The sentence 'there was a mehdal' is best
rendered as 'something went wrong'. But, as the Alkalai Hebrew English
Dictionary suggests, what went wrong was more likely the result of one's
not having done something, an error of omission, rather than having done
something wrong, an error of commission.
The association of the term mehdal with the Yom Kippur War tells us a
great deal about how the War is remembered. It tells us that the War is
recalled as something which went wrong, yet did not have to go wrong. It
alludes to the possibility that under different perhaps even slightly
different circumstances, things might have come out much better. This is
the heart of the Yom Kippur War myth. Because only the myth of a
mehdal can reconcile the threat which the Yom Kippur War raised to
basic premises of Zionism with continuing adherence to Zionist ideology.
This is especially evident if we recall that a second metaphor was
associated with the Yom Kippur War in the first few years, the metaphor
of 'earthquake'.47 Unlike a mehdal, an earthquake is by definition a major
event of frightening dimensions, one that is embedded in nature itself,
one that man can do nothing to prevent and in the face of which, if he
knows about in advance, he ought to flee.
The term mehdal suggests that something went wrong, but what went
wrong is rectifiable. It might have been the wrong leaders at the wrong
time or over-confidence or some other 'shortcoming', or o.mission, or
...
414
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
oversight but it is not inherent in Zionist ideology or the nature of the
Jewish state. The term mehdallocates the key to the interpretation of the
War in the surprise attack and the story of how the Israeli army eventually
overcame the surprise. In fact, the use of the term mehdal reinforces
Zionist ideology which emphasizes activity rather than passivity, doing
rather than responding. The error of the Yom Kippur War, therefore,
becomes the fact that Israel did not do enough, in this case properly
evaluating and assessing intelligence information about the enemy and
then acting on the basis of that information.
The term mehdal suggests the narrative structure of the Yom Kippur
War myth. This structure, at least in quasi-narrative form, is implicit in
Chaim Herzog's radio broadcasts during the first month of the war, and
subsequently published as a book. 48 Herzog notes in his introduction that
the Yom Kippur War was:
A glorious war of the IDF [Israel Defense Force] and the Israeli
soldier who, despite the mistakes, the faulty assessments and the
shortcomings [mehdalim] had the spiritual strength, the courage,
the capacity for innovation and the spirit of sacrifice to overcome a
beginning which is the worst Israel has ever known. The moment of
surprise and despair, the bravery, the resourcefulness, the suffering
and the pain and the death joined together in a mighty effort that
turned a dangerous situation into a glorious military victory that, if
not for the intervention of the great powers, would have been
decisive.
He concludes the introduction with an observation that does not seem to
make any sense. He notes that the maturity, the intelligence and the
fortitude which the nation as a whole as well as the army displayed under
conditions which would have perplexed other nations 'are the legiti­
mation of Zionism and of all the efforts invested in the state of Israel ... '49
The only way I can understand this remark is Herzog's unconscious
response to his own sense that the War has undermined the basic Zionist
thesis. Herzog's narrative also responds to the problem of Israeli depen­
dence on the United States. Massive American aid to Israel is interpreted
as an effort to foil the Soviet Union. The initial Egyptian success is not
only attributable to a mehdal but to the active role of the Soviets, partners
in Egypt's 'machiavellian plan whose purpose was not only to deceive us
but the entire western world'. 50 American intervention, therefore, be­
came necessary for the sake of the West, not for the sake of Israel. It is,
according to Herzog, a turning point in halting Soviet imperialism. 51
Finally, although Herzog acknowledges that the superpowers would not
have allowed Israel to win a decisive victory anyway, Israel accepted the
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
Security Council call for a cease fire because, '\1
was of primary importance'.52
.
Herzog's narrative cloaks the threat Whlcl
premises of Zionism. But the residue offears
fear for the viability of the Jewish state, the rea
places in the world for the Jew than in I~rae
Israeli sovereignty depends on the goodWill 0
remains present in the minds of Israeli Jews. T
War cannot be recalled as an achievement ()
What the myth of the mehdal does is to pern
object of these fears and of the real cause for
the War.
NOTES
I am grateful to Robert Paine, Bernard Susser and Stuar
earlier version of this paper.
1. Note, for example, the recollection of the Yom Kip~­
newspaper in 1990. The country's most popular lyn
column of verse in the paper. On the seventeen~~ a~n
he devoted his column to 'the shock, the humiliatia
death' wrought by the war. 'The house was saved,' ~f
the fire.' Two other articles deal with the war and Its
war widow since her husband's death in 1973 and I
large number of soldiers who suffered from battle.-s
were minimized and casualties who were treated In
Sept. 1990, 'Yom Kippur S~cti(.m'~. A year late~
(eighteen is a number of speCial slgmficance to Jew_
stories of the War and its aftermath along the sam
2. Such efforts have been made including, most recentl
on the fifteenth anniversary of the death of David El:
the Yom Kippur War. Elazar resigned in the wake c
which held him responsible for Israel's lack of 1=
program was devoted to Elazar's success in the YOI
war as a great victory. The battery of for.~er gener!:
public who appeared on the program pralsmg Elazal
at least among the former militar~ elite there a~e m;
as a success. Their failure to convmce the Israeli put
a worthy topic of study.
3. In the preface to one of his t~.o bo~ks on the war, (
former commander of Israeli mteiligence (now Pre'
the most impressive military victory in Israeli his
Atonement (Jerusalem: Edanim, Yediot Aharonot
army colonel Yaacov Hasdai, who se:~ed in the wa­
admits is shared by political and military leaders
argues that Egypt won the war and the Israelis who
defend the establishment against the mass protest
changes in Israeli society. Yaacov Hasdai, The Ir
1983), pp.25-35, 40.
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
erent in Zionist ideology or the nature of the
"dallocates the key to the interpretation of the
'lOd the story of how the Israeli army eventually
I fact, the use of the term mehdal reinforces
,phasizes activity rather than passivity, doing
"he error of the Yom Kippur War, therefore,
:leI did not do enough, in this case properly
,telligence information about the enemy and
f that information.
.ts the narrative structure of the Yom Kippur
at least in quasi-narrative form, is implicit in
Idcasts during the first month of the war, and
I book. 48 Herzog notes in his introduction that
~ IDF [Israel Defense Force] and the Israeli
:he mistakes, the faulty assessments and the
lim] had the spiritual strength, the courage,
ation and the spirit of sacrifice to overcome a
worst Israel has ever known. The moment of
he bravery, the resourcefulness, the suffering
jeath joined together in a mighty effort that
uation into a glorious military victory that, if
on of the great powers, would have been
)n with an observation that does not seem to
that the maturity, the intelligence and the
. a whole as well as the army displayed under
tie perplexed other nations 'are the legiti­
the efforts invested in the state of Israel ... '49
:tand this remark is Herzog's unconscious
it the War has undermined the basic Zionist
:0 responds to the problem of Israeli depen­
.1assive American aid to Israel is interpreted
: Union. The initial Egyptian success is not
but to the active role of the Soviets, partners
n whose pUrpose was not only to deceive us
i'.50 American intervention, therefore, be­
)f the West, not for the sake of Israel. It is,
ling point in halting Soviet imperialism. 1/
nowledges that the superpowers would not
lecisive victory anyway, Israel accepted the
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
415
Security Council call for a cease fire because, 'weighing the price, in sons,
was of primary importance'. 52
Herzog's narrative cloaks the threat which the War raises to basic
premises of Zionism. But the residue of fears which the War raised, the
fear for the viability of the Jewish state, the realization that there are safer
places in the world for the Jew than in Israel, and the knowledge that
Israeli sovereignty depends on the goodwill of at least one superpower,
remains present in the minds of Israeli Jews. That is why the Yom Kippur
War cannot be recalled as an achievement or remembered with pride .
What the myth of the mehdal does is to permit the masking of the real
object of these fears and of the real cause for the gloom associated with
the War.
NOTES
I am grateful to Robert Paine, Bernard Susser and Stuart Cohen for their comments on an
earlier version of this paper.
1. Note, for example, the recollection of the Yom Kippur War in Israel's most widely read
newspaper in 1990. The country's most popular lyricist, Haim Hefer, writes a regular
column of verse in the paper. On the seventeenth anniversary of the outbreak of the war
he devoted his column to 'the shock, the humiliation, the disappointment as fierce as
death' wrought by the war. 'The house was saved,' he writes, 'but we still see the signs of
the fire.' Two other articles deal with the war and its outcome. One relates the life of a
war widow since her husband's death in 1973 and the second reminds readers of the
large number of soldiers who suffered from battle-shock, numbers whose dimensions
were minimized and casualties who were treated inadequately. (Yediot Aharonot, 28
Sept. 1990, 'Yom Kippur Section'). A year later, on the eighteenth anniversary
(eighteen is a number of special significance to Jews), the daily papers were filled with
stories of the War and its aftermath along the same lines.
2. Such efforts have been made including, most recently, a television documentary shown
on the fifteenth anniversary of the death of David Elazar, the Israeli chief of staff during
the Yom Kippur War. Elazar resigned in the wake of a government commission report
which held him responsible for Israel's lack of preparedness. A good part of the
program was devoted to Elazar's success in the Yom Kippur War and it portrayed the
war as a great victory. The battery of former generals, names well known to the Israeli
public who appeared on the program praising Elazar and his achievements, suggest that
at least among the former military elite there are many with a stake in recalling the war
as a success. Their failure to convince the Israeli public of their case remains, therefore,
a worthy topic of study.
3. In the preface to one of his two books on the war, Chaim Herzog, military analyst and
former commander of Israeli intelligenci: (now President of Israel), labeled the war as
the most impressive military victory in Israeli history (Chaim Herzog, The War of
Atonement (Jerusalem: Edanim, Yediot Aharonot edition, in Hebrew, 1975). Retired
army colonel Yaacov Hasdai, who served in the war, dismisses this argument which he
admits is shared by political and military leaders across t~e political spectrum. He
argues that Egypt won the war and the Israelis who claimed otherwise only sought to
defend the establishment against the mass protest movements which demanded basic
changes in Israeli society. Yaacov Hasdai, The Iron Pen (Jerusalem: Kvutzat Laor,
1983), pp.25-35, 40.
416
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
4. I am presently engaged in a study to determine how widely each of these arguments or
others have indeed been evoked, by which segments of the population and in which
period since 1973.
5. TJ.1e ~olumn was .~ritten by Shlomo Avineri and is reprinted in his book Essays on
ZIOnism and Politics (Jerusalem: Keter, in Hebrew, 1977), p.83.
6. Louis Guttman and Shulamit Levy, 'The Home Front', Encyclopaedia Judaica Year
Book 1974, pp.88-91.
7. Ibid., p.91.
8. Ibid., p.88.
9. Hasdai, op. cit., p.50.
10. Eva Etzioni-Halevy with Rina Shapiro, Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and
Integration Among Israeli Jews (New York: Praeger, 1977).
11. Ibid., p.1l7.
12. Etzioni-Halevy, op. cit., p.188.
13. Henry Tudor, Political Myth (London: Macmillan, 1972).
14. TJ.1e. poin~ i.s di~ussed in som~ ~etail in C~arles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya,
CIvil ReligIOn In Israel: TraditIOnal JudaISm and Political Culture in the Jewish State
(Ber~el~y: University of California Press, 1983). The most recent and complete
descnptlon of the memory of the Holocaust in Israeli society is Eliezer Don-Yehiya,
'Memory ~nd. Political Culture: Israeli Society and the Holocaust', Peter Medding
(ed. ), Studies In Contemporary Jewry: An Annual, VIII (New York: Oxford University
Press, forthcoming).
15. Marti'.l S. Jaffee, '~he Victim-Community in Myth and History: Holocaust Ritual, the
QuestIOn of Palestme, and the Rhetoric of Christian Witness', Journal of Ecumenical
Studies, Vol.28 (Spring, 1991), pp.23D-I.
16. The mythical nature of these two events are treated in Yael Zerubavel, The Last Stand:
On the Transformation of Symbols in Israeli Culture (Philadelphia: Dissertation
submitted to the University of Pennsylvania, 1980).
17. Henry Rosenberg, Custer and the Epic of Defeat (University Park PA: The Pennsyl­
vania State University Press, 1974).
'
18. Rosenberg might have observed that the events of Saul and Jonathan's death are
related somewhat lac~)fii~ally at the end of First Samuel and retold, in mythic form, a
page later at the begmnmg of Second Samuel, especially in David's eulogy.
19. Lucette Valensi, 'From Sacred History to Historical Memory and Back', History and
Anthropology, -Vo1.2 (1986), p.287.
20. The list is not complete. Jews of Baghdad declared a second Purim to celebrate the
miracles associated with the British capture of the city in 1916. Nissim Kazzaz The Jews
in Iralj in the Twentieth Century (Jerusalem: The Ben-Zvi Institute, in Hebr;w, 1991).
21. That IS probably true of the Purim paradigm though it is not true of the exodus from
Egypt paradigm.
22. Menachem Friedman cites two prominent haredi writers who describe that War as a
miraculous experience which 'serves as their point of departure for a new look at
reality'. Menachem Friedman, 'Israel as a Theological Dilemma', Baruch Kimmerling
(ed.), The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers (Albaby: SUNY Press,
1~89), pp.2?:4-5. See also Eliyahu Kitov, Kivsei d'Rakhmana: Al Hayamim Hey B'iyar
V kat-he~ B Iyar [~he Se~rets of God: On the Days of Fifth of1yar and Twenty-eighth of
Iyar] (pnvately pnnted, m Hebrew, 1987). The importance of this pamphlet should not
be underestimated since Kitov's commentary upon and interpretation of the Jewish
holidays and of sacred texts is widely accepted in haredi circles and among many within
the religious Zionist camp as well.
23. See, for example, Yoel Schwartz, Yemot Olam [The Days of the World] (Jerusalem:
D'var YerushaJyim, \n Hebrew, 1980), pp.123--6.
24. George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory ofthe World Wars (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990).
25. He~zog, op.cit. an~ Days ofAwe: Commentaries on the Yom-Kippur War (Jerusalem:
Weldenfeld and Nicolson, The Ma'ariv Book Guild, in Hebrew, 1973).
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
26. Moshe Dayan, 'Footnotes in the Wake of the Yom KiJ=
Sept. 1980, 'Erev Succot Supplement', in Hebrew).
27. This televised appearance by Levy is cited from memor:
was the original trigger for this research project.
28. Zvi Sobel, Migrants From the Promised Land (New I
1986), pp.24-38.
29. Jay Gonen, 'The Israeli Illusion of Omnipotence F~llC
of Psychohistory, Vol.6 (Fall, 1978), pp.241-71, CIte!
Jerusalem Post Week-End Magazine (16June, 1967) b~
the title 'A New State Has Emerged'. According to
It may be said that the Jewish St~te und~rwent it~
and its bar-mitzva [rituals associated With reach.
Today it has achieved its majority. Israel is no "
powers of the UN which acted as mediators be
around. From now on, any talking about Midelll
done with Israel. Her power is unquestioned in
30. Eliezer Schweid, Israel At The Crossroads (Philadelr:
1973), p.159. Schweid cites the biblical phrase.
31. The evidence for this change is presented, in some del
op. cit.
32. For a survey of the political implicati~ms of the ~~
'Totalitarian Democratic Hermeneutics and Pohcl­
Nationalism', The Israel Academy of Sciences and
cracy and After (Jerusalem: The Magnus Press, 19B;
33. Yosef Fund, Agudat Israel Confronting Zionism anti
Policy (Ramat Gan: Doctoral dissertation submitted I
also Efraim Inbar, Gad BarziJai and Giora Goldbc
Orthodox Parties in Israel on National Security', fo
34. See note 21. (Friedman, whose study is cited it!
conclusions than I about the integration of the state
history). HaModia, the daily newspaper of Agudat Y
the haredim in this period, is filled with stories of th
immediately following the Six Day War.
35. Rav Schach's message, delivered shortly after th
Ne'eman the Hebrew language newspaper which ac
See the }rated supplement, 'The Weekly Yated' (3
36. Schwartz, op. cit., p.9O.
37. Ibid.
38. The war aims of the Egyptians and the Syrians are a,..
that the Arabs harbored 'limited objectives vis-a-vi.
the state of Israel' (Frank Aker, October 1973: Th.
Archon Books, 1985. p.19) finds support in the Eg:
other hand even Aker suspects that Syria might ha"
However, the Israeli public, with whom this paper is
Arabs sought the total destruction of Israel. ThL
November, 1973, political scientist Shlomo Avmt
general of the Foreign Office within a couple of yea
threat to its [Israel's] existence since 1948', Ma'ariv,.
cit.
39. According to Aker, 'when convinced that Israel's su.•
responded so massively that the results turned the tl­
40. Percy Cohen, 'Theories of Myth', Man, VolA .(Seo
41. See also Hide Ishiguro, 'Myths and False Dlchc
(Summer, 1985), p.368.
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
ludy to determine how widely each of these arguments or
.ked, by which segments of the population and in which
Shlomo Avineri and is reprinted in his book Essays on
lem: Keter, in Hebrew, 1977), p.83.
I Levy, 'The Horne Front', Encyclopaedia Judaica Year
na Shapiro, Political Culture in Israel: Cleavage and
(New York: Praeger, 1977).
liS
:8.
(London: Macmillan, 1972).
: detail in Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya,
.tional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State
lifomia Press, 1983). The most recent and complete
the Holocaust in Israeli society is Eliezer Don-Yehiya,
~e: Israeli Society and the Holocaust', Peter Medding
•Jewry: An Annual, VIII (New York: Oxford University
Community in Myth and History: Holocaust Ritual, the
,Rhetoric of Christian Witness', Journal of Ecumenical
" pp.230-1.
~o events are treated in Yael Zerubavel, The Last Stand:
vmbols in Israeli Culture (Philadelphia: Dissertation
: Pennsylvania, 1980).
the Epic of Defeat (University Park, PA: The Pennsyl­
L974).
'ed that the events of Saul and Jonathan's death are
t the end of First Samuel and retold, in mythic form, a
Second Samuel, especially in David's eulogy.
History to Historical Memory and Back', History and
,.287.
of Baghdad declared a second Purim to celebrate the
tish capture ofthe city in 1916. Nissim Kazzaz, The Jews
(Jerusalem: The Ben-Zvi Institute, in Hebrew, 1991).
.rim paradigm though it is not true of the exodus from
prominent haredi writers who describe that War as a
serves as their point of departure for a new look at
Israel as a Theological Dilemma', Baruch Kimmerling
iely: Boundaries and Frontiers (Albaby: SUNY Press,
IU Kitov, Kivsei d'Rakhmana: Al Hayamim Hey B'iyar
God: On the Days ofFifth ofIyar and Twenty-eighth of
ew, 1987). The importance of this pamphlet should not
s commentary upon and interpretation of the Jewish
dely accepted in haredi circles and among many within
ell.
tz, Yemot Olam [The Days of the World] (Jerusalem:
, 1980), pp.123-6.
Reshaping the Memory ofthe World Wars (New York:
~: Commentaries on the Yom-Kippur War (Jerusalem:
Ma'ariv Book Guild, in Hebrew, 1973).
THE MEMORY OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
417
26. Moshe Dayan, 'Footnotes in the Wake of the Yom Kippur War', Yediot Aharonot (24
Sept. 1980, 'Erev Succot Supplement', in Hebrew).
27. This televised appearance by Levy is cited from memory. It was Levy's statement which
was the original trigger for this research project.
28. Zvi SobeL, Migrants From the Promised Land (New Brunswick: Transaction Books,
1986), pp.24-38.
29. Jay Gonen, 'The Israeli Illusion of Omnipotence Following the Six Day War', Journal
of Psychohistory, Vol.6 (Fall, 1978), pp.241-71, cites, for example, an article in the
Jerusalem Post Week-End Magazine (16 June, 1%7) by columnist David Krivine under
the title 'A New State Has Emerged'. According to Krivine:
It may be said that the Jewish State underwent its Brit Mila [circumcision) in 1948
and its bar-mitzva [rituals associated with reaching the age of thirteen1in 1956.
Today it has achieved its majority. Israel is no longer a ward of the benevolent
powers of the UN which acted as mediators between herself and the countries
around. From now on, any talking about Mideast problems concerning Israel is
done with Israel. Her power is unquestioned in the zone. (p.249 in Gonen).
30. Eliezer Schweid, Israel At The Crossroads (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society,
1973), p.159. Schweid cites the biblical phrase .
31. The evidence for this change is presented, in some detail, in Liebman and Don-Yehiya,
op. cit.
32. For a survey of the political implications of the messianist theology, see Uriel Tal,
'Totalitarian Democratic Hermeneutics and Policies in Modern Jewish Religious
Nationalism', The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Totalitarian Demo­
cracy and After (Jerusalem: The Magnus Press, 1984), pp.137-57.
33. Yosef Fund, Agudat Israel Confronting Zionism and the State of Israel- Ideology and
Policy (Ramat Gan: Doctoral dissertation submitted to Bar-Ilan University, 1989). See
also Efraim Inbar, Gad Barzilai and Giora Goldberg, 'The Positions of the Ultra­
Orthodox Parties in Israel on National Security', forthcoming.
34. See note 21. (Friedman, whose study is cited in note 21, draws very different
conclusions than I about the integration of the state into haredi conceptions of Jewish
history). HaModia, the daily newspaper of Agudat Yisrael, the major political party of
the haredim in this period, is filled with stories of the great IsraeLi victory during and
immediately following the Six Day War.
.
35. Rav Schach's message, deLivered shortly after the War, was reprinted in Yated
Ne'eman, the Hebrew language newspaper which accepts his unquestioned authority.
See the Yated supplement, 'The Weekly Yated' (3 Oct. 1990), p.16.
36. Schwartz, op. cit., p.90.
37. Ibid.
38. The war aims of the Egyptians and the Syrians are a matter of some dispute. The notion
that the Arabs harbored 'limited objectives vis-a-vis the idea of totally exterminating
the state of Israel' (Frank Aker, October 1973: The Arab-Israeli War, Harnden, CT:
Archon Books, 1985, p.19) finds support in the Egyptian conduct of the war. On the
other hand, even Aker suspects that Syria might have wanted to achieve total victory.
However, the Israeli public, with whom this paper is concerned, never doubted that the
Arabs sought the total destruction of Israel. Thus, in a newspaper column of 16
November, 1973, political scientist Shlomo Avineri, destined to serve as director
general of the Foreign Office within a couple of years, called the war 'the most serious
threat to its [Israel's) existence since 1948', Ma'ariv, (16 Nov. 1973) cited in Avineri, op.
cit.
39. According to Aker, 'when convinced that Israel's survival hu~g in the balance, America
responded so massively that the results turned the tide of the war'. Aker, op.. cit., p.57.
40. Percy Cohen, Theories of Myth', Man, VolA (Sept. 1969), p.346.
41. See also Hide Ishiguro, 'Myths and False Dichotomies', Social Research, Vol.52
(Summer, 1985), p.368.
418
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
42. Rachel Katz, 'Concerns of the Israeli: Change and Stability from 1962 to 1975', Human
Relations, Vol.35 (1982), pp.83-99. In all fairness, the figure was none in a comparable
1%2 survey.
43. Guttman and Levy, op. cit., p.91.
44. Sobel, op. cit., p.109.
45. Ibid., p.1l3.
46. I found the term used in the press as early as November, 1973, with indications that it
was already in public use. It may have been used earlier. The extended research, to
which this paper is only a prelude, will determine when it was first invoked.
47. A bibliography of serious works concerned with the Yom Kippur War lists 25 books in
Hebrew, Shmuel Zabag, Israel's Foreign Policy: A Selected Bibliography (Tel Aviv:
The Open University, 1990). Two of the books include the term mehdal in the title, one
uses the term earthquake. My own survey of colleagues, scholars whom one might
suppose have better memories of national events found that whereas everyone as­
sociated mehdal with the Yom Kippur War, only one associated the term earthquake
with that war.
48. Herzog, Days of Awe, op. cit.
49. Ibid., p.2.
50. Ibid., p.39.
51. Ibid., pAO.
52. Ibid., p.57. Herzog's broadcasts were not simply narratives or quasi-narratives in which
the story he tells lends itself to mythic interpretation. Herzog, on occasion, especially
toward the end of the book, addresses at least one of the value contradictions which the
War raises. He feels called upon to explain why Israelis ought not to feel depressed
because the War demonstrated their dependence on the United States. He suggests that
dependence is a two-way street and if a superpower supports a small country in the
manner in which the United States has supported Israel it is a sign that this is important
for its own national interest. Under such circumstances the superpower will not dictate
policies to the smaller country (p.91). But this argument is quite secondary to the
narrative of the war which unfolds in the volume.