Chapter 2: Geographical/environmental systems:
possibilities and limits of knowledge
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1. Introduction
Complexity of the subject mater of geography is in comparison with other empirical
disciplines exceptional. This exceptionality corresponds to two basic forms of real
systems, i.e. the highest levels of (i) developmental complexity and (ii) structural
complexity. The first complexity form involves the incorporation of societal structures and processes in geographical systems, thus inclusion of components with clear
subjectivity and activity, with exceptionally dynamic and alternatively orientated
development. The second complexity form is involving qualitative heterogeneity of
parts of geographical systems, with mutual interactions between inorganic, biological
and societal phenomena. Obviously, this complexity of geographical reality suggests,
respectively constraints possibilities of its cognition in a number of respects. There is
high level of the complexity of the subject matter and lower levels of sophistication
of epistemological and methodological approaches. Aa a consequence of this tension there are different levels of mathematical formalisation of particular disciplines,
development levels of inductive and deductive approaches, etc. Similarly, there are
differences in applications of reductionist or – in contrast – holistic approaches in
studies of reality changing scopes for speculative assessments, emphasising or refusing a search for regularities and scientific laws.
These differences cannot only result in epistemological problems as such, but also
in basic dualistic conceptions which in a number of respects tend to contest a unity
of science. One can point out to the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic
sciences made by the neo-kantians, and in particular to the long-lasting polarity between natural and social sciences. This polarity is also reflected in the development
of geography, in monistic or dualistic conceptions of the discipline. There is also of
particular importance for the geographical discipline the emergence of a new duality
in science departing from the different orientation of the subject matter of (i) “traditional” empirical sciences that are studying individual fundamental qualitative forms
of real phenomena and (ii) relatively “new” environmental en ecological sciences that
study qualitatively hybrid systems. Also geography belongs in this category of environmental sciences.
The different level of “complexity” of real systems conditions obviously not only
possibilities of relevant approaches and the level of their cognition. But, it also “forms”
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the understanding, perfection of useful methods, exact character of applicable models of study and established regularities and reliability of associated explanations.
Also in this case, it is possible to formulate an important epistemological principle,
respectively regularity: increasing complexity of real systems implies decreasing association between the formal perfection of their understanding and the adequate (true)
character of the understanding. Basically, this concerns increasing incalculability and
developmental variability of real systems, and not only a lacking perfection of their
understanding. Exact description, establishment of functional regularities, axiomatic
theory building, etc. are rightly seen from formal methodological viewpoints as main
aims of scientific inquiry. The aims can be met only with regard to partial questions,
because the reality is seemingly not “a clearly determined machine”. Acceptance of
such a conceptualisation is at least necessary given considerable uncertainty about our
cognition, because a full understanding of the essence of reality is for science a limit
impossible to reach. The uncertainty obviously varies in accordance with different
complexity of the real subject matter of the study. Yet, this problem always besets any
investigation. This is illustrated by a well-known claim of A. Einstein concerning uncertainty of mathematical statements about reality (Einstein, 1954, p. 232). It has been
already emphasised that the degree of the uncertainties at various levels of the order
of reality is different. This is reflected in the methodological character and methods of
the sciences concerned. There is a characteristic expression of these differences and
simultaneously also “a habit to interchange causes with effects” in the claim that natural sciences are more exact disciplines. A logical consequence of the claim would be
to characterise social sciences (and to a lesser extent- and perhaps temporally – also
ecological and some of biological disciplines) as inaccurate sciences. Can one assert
that the less-exact character of social sciences is a consequence of some lagging behind natural sciences, or is it an outcome resulting from “less accurate” character of
social reality with its various variants? Is it the issue of inaccurate social sciences or of
inaccurate character of a certain level of organisation of the reality itself?
2. Metageographical questions
Preceding discussion of the principal problems of scientific inquiry leads necessarily
to metascientific issues, and – given the specific orientation of our considerations –
into metageographical issues. This is understandable, because the subject matter of
sciences evokes in various aspects also ways and tools of their studies. A primary
systematisation and generalisation of pieces of knowledge about studies of reality is a
point of departure of a specification of the aims of the cognition process: what types
of knowledge have to be sought and what is the order of the part of reality studied. The
aims give a fundamental orientation to studies and, consequently, to explanations of
established regularities. In a simplified way, therefore, one can speak about the reflection of the subject matter of science in the methodological character and methods of
the science concerned. Hence, the theory of subject matter of a science is to a certain
extent also a framework of associated methodology, methodical procedures, and thus
geographical/environmental systems: possibilities and limits of knowledge
modelling, that is considered specifically in this book. Obviously, there is in the process of cognition, a mutual interaction between the subject matter and methodological
approaches, and such an interaction is also a condition of advance of the cognition
process. Increasing knowledge of the subject matter improves our insights in reality,
and methodological approaches primarily provide formal quality of scientific results
and their system (logical consistency, exact definition, documentation of regularities,
etc.). It seems that in the development of modern science associated in particular with
the start of new empirism (F. Bacon, T. Hobbes, J. Locke) there were in the beginning important impulses from studies of the subject matter (see the emphasis given
to empirical and inductive approaches). Changes of a speculative scientific approach
to the cognition of the world were mostly based on deductive approaches, empirically unfounded ones. In this sense, one can speak of a change of a protoscience (and
perhaps also pseudoscience) in a modern proper science.
Of course, there is the unpleasant circumstance that this change took place only
in part in sciences studying complex real systems, the social sciences. The complexity of the subject matter hinders a rapid and sufficiently convincing progress in the
cognition process, and the process brings rather alternative and not cumulative orientations. There still survive speculative approaches. The cognition process is even
more difficult at the field of geographical inquiry studying “societal”, but also “natural”
phenomena, and in particular their interactions. Such a wide delineation of the subject matter of the geographical science evokes many variant approaches, and thus
“different” geographies. This is clearly illustrated by frequent changes in geographical
paradigms. Only in the second half of the twentieth century, there were introduced
three principally different paradigms. Idiographic conception associated with the
emphasis given to regional synthesis (Hartshorne, 1959) was refused by nomothetic
orientation of positivist geography (Bunge, 1962; Haggett, 1965; 1972; Chorley and
Haggett, 1967; Harvey, 1969). This orientation reduced qualitative contents of geographical systems gradually to spatial structures (see so-called “spatial science”). This
orientation “corrected” the subject matter of geography for necessary modelling and
overcome the duality between the natural and the societal in geography. However,
this orientation obviously destroyed the qualitative specific knowledge function of
geography: past environmental determinism made human geography obsolete, but
the geometric determinism made obsolete all geography. There came reaction with
passionate critique and the science of geography moved at another position. Human
geography was seen as pure social science and the dualistic conception of geography
accepted (Johnston et al., 1994, page 260). Post-positivist paradigm is obviously a disintegrating one and in both major parts of geographical studies. In particular, human
geography accepted the social science plurality that has been resulting in alternative
schools such as neomarxist (Harvey, 1982), realistic (Sayer, 1994), post-modern (Dear,
1986) or behavioural ones (Golledge and Stimson, 1997).
Although the complexity and heterogeneity of the subject matter of geography
evoke diversification of research orientations, the contrasting transformations are
startling. Among other things, the transformations make doubtful any possibility to
realise “all including” inquiries of reality. There is also a certain analogy with the func-
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tion of philosophy in its (older) conception of a general synthesis of scientific cognition
of reality. In the modern era, philosophy never has been able to fulfil such a function,
and this was leading to its specialisation concerned with methodological questions, or
to a partial shift “outside science” and formation of its new function of critique of science (in particular natural science), of course providing often little informed critique.
The philosophical pluralism reflected in social sciences is also a result of different
approaches to scientific inquiry, their partial character. It is important to note that
various ambitions to form some universal foundations for science in philosophy or
for an integral approach to environmental issues in geography were failures. It is clear
that the cognition of reality must be a gradual process proceeding from the partial
towards the understanding of the whole, and from the phenomena understanding
towards the fundamental understanding. This is particularly important in studies of
very complex real systems. Current mutual exclusions of various partial conceptions
and approaches have to be replaced by views emphasising their necessary combined
contribution to the search for an integrating system. The following assessment in this
chapter is organised in that way. Primary attention is turned to the subject matter
specification of geography and to resulting consequences with regard to used tools
and including issues of modelling geographical structures and processes. The main
aim is to harmonise various approaches in geography; first of all, to indicate general
type of geographical regularities and corresponding principles of conditioning. Such
an assessment gives a primary orientation to the cognition process, to formulations
of “correct” questions that have to be answered. However, it is also indicating specific
ways of application of general approaches to geographic reality. From this perspective,
there are discussed major barriers of studies of geographical systems and possibilities
of their methodological accommodation or crossing (see also the discussion in chapter three of this book). There are also considered issues of specification of regularities
and explanations at different levels of studies. The geographical inquires must necessarily be orientated on the search for geographical regularities (see the long-lasting
debates on the idiographic or nomothetic nature of geography).
2.1 Specific character of the subject matter of geography and methodological
consequences
The importance of the subject matter specification is for each empirical science extraordinary, because it provides orientation for respective cognitive processes. The
consequential character of this problem increases with higher level of the complexity
of the studied subject matter. In particular in the case of ecological or environmental
sciences, and more clearly in the case of geography, there are very different conceptions of study due to its qualitative heterogeneity. This has been illustrated in the
changes of paradigms in the geography. The issue of the specification of subject matter is obviously primarily depending on substantial insight into studied real systems,
yet methodology and basic types of scientific methods allow for a higher degree of
universality. The finding of an order in the reality enables not only meaningful orientation of the cognitive process, but it also evokes specific forms of applications of
geographical/environmental systems: possibilities and limits of knowledge
universal methods. During stages of insufficient development of a science and unclear
delineation of its subject matter, it is necessary to follow both repeated systematic
approaches and heuristic approaches. From the comparison of the above-indicated
conceptions of geography one can derive a key role of three problems in the specification of geographical systems, three problems that also indicate three different levels of
the specification. The first level is the subject matter specification, in a narrow sense
the delineation of the set of phenomena, relationships and processes that geography
is concerned with in its studies of the reality. In spite of a stable specification of the
subject matter of geography – the environmental sphere of Earth – the specification
of contents and ways of study of such a subject matter is debated considerably. There
are extreme position such as “all including” regional syntheses, on the one hand, and
the positivist reduction focused on spatial structures (of anything), on the other. Most
definitions of geography obviously result in the emphasis given to areal differentiation
and studies of mutual relationships, respectively conditioning among qualitatively
heterogeneous phenomena, and thus to ecological aspects in a wider meaning. In sum,
one can speak of three basic approaches in geographical studies that are called for
example by P. Haggett (i) spatial, (ii) ecological, and (iii) regional complex approaches
(see Haggett, 2001). However, when specifying the subject matter of geography, the
three approaches have to be combined and integrated. It is necessary to suppress the
spatial aspects, because territorial patterns are only phenomena aspects of geographical organisation. Ecological or environmental approaches are therefore concerned
with external relationships of individual elements, or their relatively homogeneous
systems. Such a conceptualisation excludes studies of internal nature of individual
elementary qualitative types of phenomena (inorganic, biological or societal phenomena) from the research interest of geography. Obviously, in geographical reality there
evolves the coexistence of all these types of phenomena resulting in the significance
of the principle of regional complexity. The abstraction from internal conditioning of
elements enables to define geography as a special science (respectively environmental
or ecological disciplines as a specific group of empirical sciences). This is shown in a
simplified schematic way in Figures 1 and 2.
A second and more important level of the problems of subject matter specification of geography is concerned with the existence of geographical regularities.
Considering these problems necessarily leads again to wider discussions of relations
between idiographic and nomothetic approaches, on the one hand, and holistic and
reductionistic approaches, on the other. The complexity and qualitative heterogeneity of geographical environment shown in territorial differentiation in localisation of
phenomena led to the conceptions of unique character of geographical systems (se
in particular Hettner, 1927; Hartshorne, 1939; 1959). On the other hand, however,
it is necessary to emphasise that all significant generalisations in geography were
orientated towards specifications of certain regularities in differentiation: in physical-geographical sphere one can point out first of all to the horizontal and vertical
zonality, in the human geographical sphere to the distance decay in interactions (see
already Ravenstein, 1885), or to the asymmetric frequency distribution of settlement
size (for example size distribution of towns, Auerbach, 1913).
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Fig. 1 Reality, elements and environmental systems (source: Hampl, 2000, page 28).
At a higher level of generalisation, these regularities were documented by Korčák
(1941) who emphasised the duality of structuration of sets of geographical phenomena: besides traditionally recognised homogeneity of kinds (see Qetelet, 1948) he
specified the second basic type of structuration of real systems, it is “geographical”
geographical/environmental systems: possibilities and limits of knowledge
Fig. 2 Primary classification of real systems (source: Hampl, 2000, page 31). Note: Organisation
of final environmental systems expresses a simultaneous increase in their structural and evolutionary complexity.
type characterised by asymmetric differentiation. It was shown in subsequent empirical studies by numerous examples that (i) there is a relationship between the degree
of homogeneity respectively heterogeneity of kinds of sets at the level of structural
complexity of real systems, and (ii) there is association of this differentiation with
the degree and character of conditioning of integrity of real systems. A systematic
elaboration on these assessments at a general scientific level and also at the level of
specific geographical considerations is given in other studies (see for example Hampl,
2000). Obviously, methodological consequences of these assessments require a deeper
elaboration.
2.2 Geographical regularities in differentiation
A wider conceptualisation of the inductive approach and especially the meaning of
repetition must further be clarified in order to specify criteria of the general, the
substantive and the regular. The habit of the scientists to understand the repetition
only in terms of similarity of phenomena is one-sided, and thus reductionistic. Geographical studies show that it is possible to understand the repetition also in terms of
regularity in differentiation of phenomena: phenomena are thus regularly differentiated in the framework of systems of a certain type and simultaneously the internal
differentiation is similar, i.e. repeated. There are examples of the repetition of asymmetric differentiation in size of cities and towns or lakes in Canada, France, Brazil
or Poland, etc., or in all regional systems, and there is always differentiation of one
(single) type of asymmetry. With increasing size (or with qualitative significance) of
phenomena – cities, towns, lakes, banks, mountains, etc. there are gradually decreas-
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ing frequencies. Similarly, there is the asymmetric territorial differentiation in territorial intensity of various phenomena: in statistical distributions in the set of regions
characterised in terms of population number, GDP or rainfall volume per territorial
unit. It is necessary to note that asymmetry measures in the various distributions
are obviously not identical. However, there is the significant fact that the level of the
asymmetry is differentiated in a regular and law-like way according to the degree
of structural complexity, rank/scale and development complexity of environmental
systems studied.
A clear empirical illustration of these regularities is the measurement of the level
and form of the differentiation/variability of differently conditioned features of the
same human population. If the features are internally conditioned, such as biological features (weight or height of human beings), demographical features (fertility or
mortality) or features that indicate potentials for social or economic engagement (IQ
in early age groups) than the statistical population will show a lower level of differentiation, similar to so-called normal frequency distribution of Gauss. If the features
are conditioned by external conditions in positions of human beings in differentiated
society (such as income or wealth of individuals) than the statistical population will
be significantly differentiated and the form of such distribution will be of a transitory
type towards an asymmetric distribution. Finally, the features that are conditioned by
complex/geographical circumstances such as territorial distribution or concentration
of populations in settlements will show extremely asymmetric distributions. Thus, it is
clear that in the reality there are two basic types of regularities and organisations and
their combined results – “compromise-based” forms of differentiation are characteristic in social and economic structurations. These regularities primarily indicate the orientation of the cognition process and suggest what has to be sought and subsequently
modelled, and where regularities can be specified. In consequence, it is crucial for the
geographical inquiry to search for regularities in differentiation in the framework of a
multi-level system organised according to three dimensions: (i) structural complexity,
(ii) rank-scale levels, and (iii) development complexity. Already on the basis of the general orientation of the study, it is possible to identify “wrong” formulation of research
questions. The long-lasting discussions on “optimal” size of cities are well-known
examples of wrong debates in geography. The hierarchical (asymmetric) differentiation of settlement systems indicates inequalities among settlements, necessities of a
hierarchical division of their functions, and thus the impossibility to create a network
of one settlement size category. An “optimisation” can only be concerned with whole
hierarchical differentiation of settlement systems and accompanying division of functions in the whole system, because an “optimal” settlement or similarly an “average”
settlement can be in reality an inadequate and non-representative construction.
This example already suggests methodological consequences of the subject matter
specification of geography if one applies very simple tools or characteristic supplied
by statistical analyses. Statistical methods are used in geography very often due to the
stochastic character of complex conditioned structures and processes, but also due
to the extent of studied empirical populations. Applied statistics has been developed
for analyses of homogeneous kind populations (biological, demographical, etc.), and,
geographical/environmental systems: possibilities and limits of knowledge
in consequence, there emerged the tendency to consider unimodal and symmetric
statistical distribution of phenomena as “normal” distribution. As a result, there
was the emphasis given to synthetic role of average values, ways of measuring variability, correlations, etc. In analyses of asymmetrically differentiated distributions of
geographical phenomena any mean values are obviously loosing their representative
character – see average size of settlements or lakes. There is however another meaning of these indicators. Considering social characteristics there is often used median
size for indication of a “usual” (middle) income situation of households given typical
transitory distributions of this characteristic. Considering geographical phenomena,
it is frequently useful to choose modus, not as a “central” value, but in order to indicate a critical size, i.e. size of settlements, centres, regions and similar units that never
have zero values. In general, it is appropriate to use ratios of all mean measures that
can show degrees of asymmetry in the differentiation concerned. Dealing with various
measures of variability, it is necessary to emphasise their unrepresentative character
with regard to ontologising assessments of “law-like tendencies or contingences”. In
such assessments it is always needed to measure differences between empirical and
theoretical (asymmetrical) distribution of frequencies.
From the perspective of establishing and formulating of geographical regularities in general, and in view of a subsequent modelling in particular, it is necessary
to discuss two interconnected problems. First, there is the question whether it is
appropriate to search for a geographical order in spatial forms. Second, there is the
question to what extent regularities or models of geographical differentiation can be
“exact”. The research interest focused on territorial patterns was and still is a central
interest in geographical studies. It is understandable, because information on localisation of phenomena has always had considerable practical importance and analyses of
spread of phenomena have suggested primary hypotheses on their mutual relationships. In spite of this, it is justifiable to consider territorial distribution only as an
external (phenomenon level) indication of deeper relationships and conditioning. In
this sense, analyses of geographical localisation can only be used in indications of
regularities than in their explanations. Generalisations of characteristics of geographical distributions can therefore be seen as first stages in the scientific cognition, and
the search for conditioning principles and development mechanisms is a subsequent
and deeper stage of geographical inquiries. Conditioning principles and development
mechanisms must necessarily be founded upon our understanding of interaction
among qualitatively different structures and processes (see also conceptions of critical
realism in Bhaskar, 1979; Sayer, 1984). This issue is associated with the distinction
between so-called extensive and intensive approaches that is stressed in the general
conception of critical realism (see further discussion in chapter three of this book).
The mentioned deeper qualitative conditioning is manifest in the relative character
of the importance of the distance factor. Moreover, it seems that in the geographical
organisation of society the importance of distance factor tends to decrease. There
is associated deepening of two basic forms of hierarchical differentiation of sociogeographical systems: (i) territorial differentiation (for example in population density
in a set of regions, functional zones, etc.) and (ii) differentiations according to size
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of cities, towns, etc. According to these tendencies there are considered vertical and
horizontal forms of differentiation. However, such considerations are not accurate,
because so-called horizontal differentiation also includes the vertical one (see the
central place theory).
There has been given exaggerated emphasis to spatial forms that usually has been
leading to abstraction of the “geometric” from the “qualitative” and in an analogy
the structural from the developmental. This has had clear effect in location theories
and in studies in the positivist stage. One can make empirical research concerned,
for example, with three features of “ideal” spatial form of a nodal region (Christaller,
1933), i.e. nodality, centrality and regular hexagonal form. One can easily show that
the three aspects are at different level of generality. The nodal form can be documented in almost all socio-geographical regions at lower scale levels, but a central
location of the node only in one of subtypes of the regions. Regular hexagonal forms
in the delineation of regions can be documented exceptionally. However, the primary
important characteristic of settlement systems, i.e. the hierarchical differentiation of
centres can be shown in all systems, but also when one studies sets of firms, banks,
and also considering lakes and mountains. In sum, the hierarchical organisation is
thus a more general regularity that stretches further than the scope of the settlement
organisation considered in the central place theory or rank-size rule.
3. Conclusions
The examples considered above suggest the following conclusion: regularities of organisation in complex systems are of stochastic type and have a “framework” character.
The basic regularities are thus a certain skeleton of organisation that is “surrounded”
by a zone of variability in secondary (more precise) features or forms of studied characteristics. In this sense it is necessary to search for new or better formulations of these
regularities – for example generally characterised regularity further specified through
indications of degrees of variability of possible (probable) more exact forms. Such an
approach takes in part into account the relative nature of inquiries and also mutual
linkages between nomothetic and idiographic studies in the geographical science, but
in particular in the reality studied. Established differentiations in secondary features,
their variability, are not the result of the lack of perfection in our approaches, but their
understanding contributes to the cognition process of the reality. For example, frequent problems with delineations of geographical regions cannot lead to conclusions
about non-existence of natural/real geographical wholes or their fuzzy boundaries. In
contrary, the conclusion to be drawn is that geographical regions are characterised by
a relatively low level of integrity (autonomy), shifting boundaries, and discontinuity
counterbalancing continuity in organisation of environment. In view of these conclusions, it seems that one can classify geography paradoxically as a nomothetic science
(see the general validity of asymmetrical/hierarchical organisations) and secondarily
as an idiographic science (see extraordinary variability in “exact” forms of hierarchical
differentiation). It must be emphasised again that these characteristics concern the
geographical/environmental systems: possibilities and limits of knowledge
reality, however communicated by knowledgeable subjects. The inadequate character
of spatial order based on location theories and associated positivist schemes vis-a-vis
the reality is clear when one is assessing the development: each change necessarily
disturbs structural “completeness” of such models. The absence of a development approach is also evident in well-known sequencing of spatial analysis of the system of
nodal regions (Haggett et al., 1977: interaction – networks – nodes – hierarchy – surfaces – diffusion. From a development perspective, however, these stages would have
to be re-ordered according to the orientation on more differentiated and dynamic
forms: surface – networks – nodes – hierarchy – interaction – diffusion. Moreover,
the conception of diffusion as a development process can be debated. Because, it is
necessary to distinguish geographical spread of non-geographical changes (for example technological innovations) from changes in geographical organisation itself (for
example the urbanisation process and associated process of hierarchisation of settlement centres). The former case involves geographical differentiation that is more
or less static. The latter case indicates the changing geographical organisation. Its
assessment would have to be considered as a higher (i.e. seventh) stage in the analysis
sequence concerned.
The elaboration on the character of geographical regularities and tools of their studies must also deal with another circumstance. The emphasis given to the extraordinary
differentiation of hierarchical type in geographical systems can only be established
in analyses of geographical systems according to their size, respectively according to
significant qualitative features. If one considers structural features (for example the
nodal form of territorial order, relation between size of centres and their hinterlands,
etc.) the variability of geographical units is relatively limited and associated differentiation in the set is similar to the symmetric Gauss distribution. Therefore, one
can speak of a certain kind of geographical (complex or environmental) wholes. For
example, a set of nodal regions “must” be according to structural features relatively
homogeneous, because the features define the set of these units. The fact that nodal
regions are extremely differentiated according to their size means that structurally
similar units can be in terms of size and qualitative importance equivalent (elements)
and successful in wider competitive environment, but it is not necessarily the case
(complexes). The dual character of the differentiation in the sets of geographical
units often leads to different assessments. This is especially involved in analyses of
development in which in geo-societal systems simultaneously are taking place homogenising processes (structural features) and heterogenising processes (features of
size and qualitative importance). There is the example of the urbanisation process
that can be understood as a process of social re-homogenisation (transformation shift
of rural society to urban society) and also as a process of heterogenisation leading to
differentiated growth of settlements and deepening of their hierarchy. A similar example can be the globalisation process: homogenisation of consumption in the world
population is simultaneously accompanied by geographical and social deepening of
the asymmetry in division of wealth in the world. A general expression of this duality
is reflected in seemingly incompatibility between the theories of development stages
(see Rostow, 1960) assessed by their critics as non-realistic and optimistic views of
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societal development, and the theory of world polarity core-periphery (Wallerstein,
1979; 1984; see also Taylor, 1989). It is clear that the transformation from a lower
stage to a higher stage of the societal development cannot be identified with a change
of the poor into the rich or with a shift of the lower hierarchical position to a higher
hierarchical position. In the reality of the societal and geo-societal development there
is taking place increasing qualitative level of “all elements” as well as reproduction of
their inequalities, their hierarchisation. The higher form of hierarchisation is conditioned by a higher qualitative level of all or a majority of units (see for example the
spread of literacy or specialisation of economic activities). In the perspective of the
majority of units that still are below an average level, however, the transformation
implies increasing level, because they remain members of the whole and are not loosing possibilities to be active participants in division of labour and in economic and
political competition. They are still in the game and not excluded from the development process.
A third level of elaboration on the subject matter of geographical cognition is
concerned with issues of explanation of geographical regularities, geographical organisation and geographical order. Undoubtedly, this consideration is dealing with
deeper ways of geographical studies. The preceding discussion made clear that we
are in the beginning stage of the specification of geographical regularities. However,
it seems that the knowledge of geographical regularities opens the door for their
explanation. It is also possible to see the regularities and their specific character as
an initial justification of autonomous organisation of geographical and societal systems and usefulness of holistic approaches. The holistic approaches do not oppose
reductionist approaches, but they are complementary in a combination. There are
various reasons to assume that integral understanding of an order in the reality can
depart from studies of interactions of whole and partial structures. Yet, in what rests
the character of hierarchical organisation of environmental and societal systems? A
general feature of all these organisations is the polarisation of the type strong – weak,
big – small, rich – poor, etc., and a relatively continuous asymmetric differentiation
of parts in view of this polarity; there are many minimums and a few maximums.
Another important feature of these systems is relative autonomy, but also qualitative
heterogeneity and inequality in importance of their parts associated with mutual need
to participate in various forms of division of labour (societal and territorial division
of labour). It is thus necessary to emphasise that in the organisation of these systems
there are co-operative, but also competitive and determining mechanisms. The key
importance of the hierarchical principles rests in their integrative and organising
functions: there must be a power unifying the plurality of heterogeneous parts and simultaneously creating conditions for their functional specialisation in the framework
of co-operating whole.
This discussion allows drawing the conclusion that the problem of explanation is
linked up with the search for dominating conditions of hierarchisation, associated
mechanisms and formation of co-operating complexes of phenomena. There is an
analogy with the critical realism (see especially Sayer, 1984), non-linear causality in
the sequence “structures (understood as dominating conditions) – mechanisms – phe-
geographical/environmental systems: possibilities and limits of knowledge
nomena”. Of decisive importance is obviously the identification of dominating conditions (hierarchical principles) and ways in which hierarchical mechanisms function.
Given the extraordinary complexity of environmental systems there “must” be corresponding qualitative heterogeneity of hierarchical principles and mechanisms and in
the case of societal and geo-societal systems also corresponding changeability in their
sphere of influence. An attempt has been made at systematisation and indication of
development sequences using a typology of hierarchies and classification of real hierarchical systems in another publication (Hampl, 2000). The typology specifies the following key conditioning of hierarchies: (i) external determination (see the conception
of geographical/environmental determinism), (ii) internal determination (illustrated
by totalitarian political regimes), (iii) internal competition (market economy), and
(iv) internal co-operation (idealised democratic system with dominating principles of
solidarity). Obviously, one cannot find these ideal types in the reality, because there
always are combined influences of more or less of all of the types. Progressive development is obviously carried on a gradually increasing importance of more complex
and for the development more advantageous principles and mechanisms.
The primary typology of hierarchies and their development classification represents understandably only a beginning of the explanatory process. Its significance
rests in an indication of the orientation of the process. In the beginning stage there
are corresponding simple forms of inquiry – classifications, schemes, etc. A more
exact and complex modelling of hierarchical organisations is currently not a realistic
affair. A whole array of causes can be mentioned: difficult quantification of relationships, hybrid character of processes, combining effects and influences, etc. There is
also the limiting impact of the lack of empirical analyses and often indispensable data.
Practical experience with unsuccessful planning of societal development and regional
differentiation of the development make it clear that necessary modelling of geographical systems would have to be orientated on the search for mechanisms and ways
of their functioning (i.e. on associated rules of the game) and not on some prognoses
of the future, respectively on some end pictures of desirable states of societal and
environmental affairs. The plurality of articulation of interests in the current society
and the activity of subjects of societal development and corresponding autoregulative
basis of the development enables to draw this modest conclusion.
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References
AUERBACH, F. (1913): Das Gesetz der Bevölkerungskonzentration. In: Petterman’s Mitteilungen 59,
287–315.
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