Modern Europe into the past. Throughout, he takes an uncritical stance toward nationalist historians and politicians who share such conceptions. That the nation-creating process was complete among Slovaks by the ninth century, that the Slovaks in the sixteenth century were "the only nation in Central Europe which had higher social classes than just the peasantry" (p. 65), or that, by 1820, the Slovak language had "produced a [body of] work that would have also honored the great literatures [of the world]" (p. 93) are dubious assertions that warrant critical examination. The book at times reads like an effort to build Slovak self-esteem. While one can perhaps forgive Kirschbaum, a specialist on twentieth-century Slovak politics, for errors such as the statements that Matyas Corvinus never challenged the Hungarian barons or that the War of Austrian Succession did not have serious consequences for the Habsburg Empire, more problematic are some omissions and questionable interpretations connected with recent Slovak history. Frantisek Jehlicka, a Hungarian agent whose ties with Slovaks helped make Czechs suspicious of Slovak nationalism, is never mentioned; Vojtech Tuka's public assertion that Czechoslovakia's laws would cease to be valid in Slovakia in 1928 is deemed a "minor issue," and Tuka is incorrectly portrayed as becoming "bitterly antiCzech" only after his arrest in 1929. The Nitra demonstrations of 1933 are depicted as spontaneous, when in fact they were orchestrated by Slovak nationalists. Important developments during the period of the Slovak Republic are left unexplained. The reader never learns why Slovakia came up with its own anti-Jewish policies apart from Nazi dictates, why prominent Slovak leader Karol Sidor resigned from the government in the spring of 1939, or why Berlin foiled a coup attempt against Slovakia's President Tiso in early 1941. Kirschbaum's attempt to finesse the touchy issue of Jewish deportations under the Tiso regime is unsatisfying, given the author's failure to explore alternative reasons for the halting of the deportations and exemptions given to Jews aside from Tiso's alleged "political courage." The chapter on the Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is one-sided and polemical. Regarding the Hungarian question, that minority's grievances against Slovak rule are mentioned only in the book's penultimate paragraph, and no mention is made of the anti-Hungarian character of Slovak demonstrations after 1989. As the only sweeping survey of Slovakia's history available in English, this book is worth reading. But the reader will discover that this is history seen through a nationalist lens. The book's contribution to a scholarly understanding of Slovakia is thereby limited. J AMES RAMON FELAK University of Washington ROBERT E. BLOBAUM. Rewolucja: Russian Poland, 1904-1907. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 1995. Pp. xx, 300. $35.00. AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 1579 Popular historiography about the Revolution of 1905 consigns Polish developments to the periphery of Russian imperial history. Yet the political turmoil in the Polish lands contributed fundamentally to the destabilization of imperial authority in these provinces in the period preceding 1914. Robert E. Blobaum's objective is "to examine upheavals in the Kingdom of Poland in their own light, 'emancipated' as it were from dubious Russian revolutionary 'parentage,' and to study far more carefully the Polish revolution's social actors" (p. xi). This outstanding study, the first in English, presents 1905 as a defining moment in the emergence of modern Polish political culture. The political and social conditions of modern statehood came into place, making the continuation of the imperial occupation ever more untenable. Previously, the Marxist historians Stanislaw Kalabinski and Feliks Tych had asked whether developments in the Polish lands between 1905 and 1907 were "The Fourth Insurrection or the First Revolution" (Czwarte powstanie czy pierwsza rewolucja). The question linked the gentry-led Polish struggle for national liberation with the Marxist preference for proletarian social and economic justice. Their work, despite its ideological predisposition, reflected a Polish preoccupation with political history. Nevertheless, the debut of workers and peasants as independent political actors was revolutionary, and Blobaum's account successfully integrates social and political developments. The opening chapter, an excellent introduction to the relationship between the Russian state and the Polish nation from the insurrection of 1863 to the eve of 1905, finds that political "parties" were more conspiratorial sects than mass organizations but that opposition to Russification united all social groups. In 1904, economic dislocation and opposition to mobilization for the Russo-Japanese war emboldened social and political discontent among workers, peasants, and students. It was the Polish workers, however, whose tenacity and numerical participation in the strike movement through 1907 dwarfed that of their Russian counterparts and made the "Polish revolution" worthy of its name. Following upon worker activities, the socialist parties in 1905 began penetrating and politicizing the labor movement in competition with the National Democrats. Blobaum details the political subtleties and organizational growth of the major political movement but de-emphasizes the role of political parties, ideologies, and personalities, emphasizing the "totality of social experience of the revolutionary years" (p. 189). The growth of organizations representing mass constituencies and the resulting democratization of Polish political culture reflects the revolutionary uniqueness of 1905 and distinguishes 1905 from earlier gentry-led conspiracies and insurrections. Whereas previously the question was whether peasants and workers could participate in public life, after 1905 the issue was to DECEMBER 1996 Reviews of Books 1580 what extent and how. Polish politics were no longer the preserve of a social elite. Revolution also came to the countryside. Agrarian workers struck in 1905; the popular gmina movement agitated to polonize and democratize local government; disputes over servitudes increased; and rural vigilantism was rampant. Russian authority was not permanently displaced, but the peasantry of Russian Poland for the first time actively engaged in political life. There were also school strikes and a partially successful struggle to polonize private education, in which the National Democrats and Polska Maderz Szkolna (Polish Motherland Schools) were prominent. The one national institution that only partially accommodated itself to burgeoning national aspirations was the Catholic Church. Ultimately, it backed away from the opportunity to embrace Western-style Catholic social action and to expand its mission. By November, 1905, the Russian imperial government could make concessions like those granted to the Finns and restore political autonomy to the Kingdom or restore order by martial law. Opting for the latter, a peaceful Russian solution to the Polish question was impossible, and Russian rule in the Kingdom "thereafter rested irrevocably on military occupation" (p. 261). Blobaum draws extensively on national and provincial archives and on the fresh, insightful works of a new generation of Polish social historians. If 1905 is the dawn of modern Polish mass movements, however, more discussion of the failure of liberalism to attract popular support might provide insights about the character of Polish nationalism. Also, 1905 roiled the political leadership of the Polish immigrant community in America. This aside, the study is a major contribution and marks Blobaum as an important scholar. STANISLAUS A. BLEJWAS Central Connecticut State University CHRISTOPHER BENNETT. Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences. New York: New York University Press. 1995. Pp. xv, 272. $24.95. Christopher Bennett's book falls roughly into three parts: first, historical background up to the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia'S Communist regime in the mid-1980s; second, a political analysis of the events that marked the breakup of the country and the descent into warfare; and third, a critique of the recent policies of all concerned, especially of outside powers. The historical part tells the general reader who the Yugoslavs are, how they happened to come together in one state after World War I and again after the dissolution and partition of the state in World War II, and what held them together during the following half-century of Communist rule. The account, though brief, is more than adequate, for Bennett displays a remarkable ability to explain complex subject matter in clear and simple terms. On some points the explana- AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW tions may appear to others acquainted with the record to be too brief or too simple-for example, on the role of the Partisans in World War II or on the circumstances of the Tito-Stalin break in 1948-but not substantially so. One reason that the Communists' power lasted as long as it did under Tito, Bennett rightly notes, was his government's insistence that no nationality would be under the domination of another. As a war correspondent covering recent events, Bennett had a distinct advantage over his journalistic rivals. He was in the country as a student in the 1980s and knew its major languages and something of its politics before reporting on the war, and his account shows it. He makes a bit too much, however, of the naivete of Western journalists and officials in attributing the outbreak of hostilities and the cruelty with which they have been conducted to ancient hatreds and traditional Balkan bestiality instead of to the ambitions, strengths, and weaknesses of current political leaders. Bennett points the finger at one man in particular, Serbia's Slobodan Milosevi6, who found a chance for greater power and glory in the cause of building Greater Serbia on the ruins of Yugoslavia. Others also took the measure of Milosevi6, or thought they did, for at no time did he show all his cards. Once the fighting started, with the Serbs as the primary aggressors, old stereotypes and extreme visions reappeared on all sides, and atrocities bred atrocities. Croats saw Serbs as trying to deny them their right to independence and to annex large slices of their territory. Serbs feared a revival of Croat Ustasi extremism and the mass murders of World War II. Both were drawn to intervene in Bosnia, while Muslims there were driven to assert a new and stronger nationalism of their own. With incisive criticism, Bennett shows how the Western powers were played for fools by Milosevi6 and the Bosnian Serbs. The only favorable thing he has to say about British and French policies is that, while morally indefensible, they were understandable. Why should those powers intervene in a bloody civil war in the Balkans when their own vital interests were not seen to be at stake? Better to stick to humanitarian aid and the diplomatic effort for peaceful settlement (although it was going nowhere). When Bennett was writing about "prospects," he expected-not without reason-that general situation to continue. But the more it remained the same, the more it began to change. France, under Jacques Chirac, opted for a stronger policy. Croatia recaptured most of the territory lost to the Serbs in 1991, helping to create a map based on more ethnic cleansing than ever but nevertheless with a more favorable balance for a political settlement. And the United States emerged from its dithering to push all the parties into the agreement reached at Dayton, Ohio, in late 1995. Whatever else these developments meant, they seemed to mark the end of the dream of Greater Serbia. Milosevi6 calmly took over negotiating authority from the Serbs of Bosnia and sold them and their confreres DECEMBER 1996
© Copyright 2026 Paperzz