African Security
ISSN: 1939-2206 (Print) 1939-2214 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uafs20
South Africa’s Emerging “Soft Power” Influence
in Africa and Its Impending Limitations: Will the
Giant Be Able to Weather the Storm?
Olusola Ogunnubi & Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao
To cite this article: Olusola Ogunnubi & Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao (2016) South Africa’s
Emerging “Soft Power” Influence in Africa and Its Impending Limitations: Will the Giant Be Able
to Weather the Storm?, African Security, 9:4, 299-319, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2016.1242978
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2016.1242978
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Sep 2016.
Published online: 29 Sep 2016.
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Date: 07 November 2016, At: 03:59
AFRICAN SECURITY
2016, VOL. 9, NO. 4, 299–319
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2016.1242978
South Africa’s Emerging “Soft Power” Influence in Africa
and Its Impending Limitations: Will the Giant Be Able to
Weather the Storm?
Olusola Ogunnubi
a
and Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao
b
a
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa;
Department of Political Science, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
b
ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS
South Africa benefits from a symbolic hegemonic identity drawn
from its enormous soft power resources. Whereas South Africa
has been widely referenced as a regional hegemonic power
capable of using its soft power influence to deepen its global
status, there are contradictions to Pretoria’s increasing soft
power claim. In this article we undertake a discursive analysis
of some of these soft power limitations. The main argument
raised is that despite the optimism, South Africa’s capacity to
translate soft power into influence has been largely undercut by
several factors, including its recurring xenophobic incidences
and leadership inconsistencies toward Africa. We conclude by
asserting that South Africa can indeed continue to punch above
its weight if it begins to address the ambivalence that confronts
the expression of its soft power resources.
foreign policy; hegemony;
regional power; soft power;
South Africa; xenophobia
Introduction
There is little debate that in the over two decades since its reacceptance into
the international community South Africa’s global presence has grown
remarkably, to the extent that it has altered the geopolitical and economic
calculus of the African continent.1 Scholars argue that South Africa’s material
capabilities guarantee its status as Africa’s regional hegemon.2 With its
inclusion in important global multinational organizations, such as the G20,
the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), and the BRICS, South
Africa is widely perceived as Africa’s giant, wielding significant influence
within Africa and beyond. On the basis of its membership in these global
economic forums, South Africa has often canvassed its ambition to represent
Africa’s development agenda in international platforms.3
For instance, Obi suggests that South Africa’s hegemonic influence in the
region is grounded by its claim to be “projecting Africa’s voice and interests
at these global economic forums and groups, and in its effectiveness as
Africa’s sole player in the BRICS and G20.”4 Qobo and Dube share similar
CONTACT Olusola Ogunnubi
[email protected]
Department of Politics and International Studies,
University of Zululand, Private Bag X1001, KwaDlangezwa 3886, South Africa.
© 2016 Taylor & Francis
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sentiments, arguing that “South Africa is often regarded as a lever of progress
that could lift the continent and also serve as an enlightened and crucial voice
speaking on behalf of the developing world.”5 In essence, much of South
Africa’s regional influence has been centered on its largely superior material
capability, which has enabled the country to advance a strong Afrocentric
foreign policy and granted it the role a as a “big” regional power.6
Soft power, however, is increasingly a necessary complement to hard power
for reginal hegemony.7 Soft power describes the increasing importance of
intangible instruments of power evidenced through persuasion, attraction, and
agenda-setting.8 Although the idea of soft power has featured in the work of
scholars such as Morgenthau and Knorr, the concept was first fully developed by
American political scientist Joseph Nye in his book Bound to Lead.9
In Africa, South Africa is widely believed to possess an extraordinary reservoir
of soft power.10 Analysts contend that largely because of its soft power influence,
South Africa’s regional and global reputation has increased tremendously,
particularly since the end of apartheid rule in 1994. South Africa, therefore,
seems to enjoy what Alden and Schoeman termed a “symbolic representivity” on
which its putative hegemonic credential in Africa is based.11 The South African
example of symbiolic hegemony perhaps confirms that soft power is increasingly
gaining prominence as a significant component in the estimation of global
power. As Hayden points out, within the realm of international politics, soft
power is increasingly becoming a necessary component of statecraft.12
The combination of its post-apartheid surge in soft power and its established
hard power, however, is not necessarily welcomed by all. Some commentators
have built a strong (and at times bitter) narrative of a South African regional
hegemony that rests on the complementary strength of its preponderant
material and ideational (soft power) resources.13 South Africa’s post-apartheid
economic challenges enhances the relevant role of its soft power.14 Not least, is
its continuing high unemployment rate. In 2012, it increased from 24.9 percent
to 25.5 percent, and approximately one-third of youth between the ages of fifteen
to twenty-four were not in employment, education, or training.15 South Africa’s
income inequality remains one of the highest in the world.
The main questions, nonetheless, are how much of its soft power resources
has South Africa been able to develop and weave into its foreign policy
strategies and what might erode the efficacy of South Africa’s soft power
influence. Understanding these issues will help provide more nuanced assessments of South Africa’s soft power diplomatic strategy—one that uniquely
integrates soft power resources and instruments into mainstream diplomatic
practice and promotes South Africa’s regional and global influence.
The central purpose of this article is to examine the limitations to South
Africa’s apparent soft power influence in Africa and how the country has
been able to confront these challenges. The rest of the article is structured
into five parts. In the first, we offer an overview of the concept of soft power
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based on the propositions by Nye and other scholars. The second section
explores some of the literature on South Africa’s soft power by delineating
the various academic claims that South Africa possesses some quantity of soft
power over and above other African countries. This is followed by a critical
examination of the debilitating factors that impinge on the usefulness of
South Africa’s soft power. In the fourth part we examine the emerging
paradoxes of South Africa’s soft power claim. The article concludes by
advancing suggestions of how South Africa can reduce the negative perceptions and implications of its perceived soft power status within Africa in a
way that does not jeopardize its global and continental ambitions.
Reviewing soft power and its interpretations
The 21st century has witnessed new ways of conducing international
diplomacy. While power has remained the central focus of state interactions,
notions of power have changed remarkably.16 Traditionally, a state’s capacity
to gain influence in international relations has been conceived and measured
purely in terms of hard power competences (economy and military).
However, as highlighted, Nye drew our attention to the point that current
trends in international relations suggest that states are developing other noncoercive and ideational methods of influence beyond the traditional realms of
military and economic power.17
While it is useful for this study to provide a brief overview of the notion of
soft power, especially as propounded by Nye, it is equally pertinent to delve
into the diverse conceptual prescriptions on soft power, especially from a
non-Western perspective. By doing this we can conceptualize soft power so
as to fit the analytical lens of this study. Nye submits the argument that
although the wielding of hard power competencies might often get others to
change their position through inducement or threat, evidence shows that it is
equally possible to get the outcomes one wants through indirect means.
Describing this as “the second face of power,” Nye argues that it is possible
to “set the agenda and attract others in world politics” armed by the ability to
shape the preferences of others. This fluidity of power relations is what Nye
along with others refer to as “soft power,” which is the power of attraction.
This demonstrates that in the post–Cold War era the domain of foreign
policy has moved beyond traditional and official instruments of diplomacy,
with non-state actors playing more prominent diplomatic roles.18
Since then, the notion of soft power has gained wide popularity among
scholars of international politics, practitioners, media, the corporate world,
and even music bands.19 Li, for instance, notes that hardly any international
conference concludes without a reference to the term “soft power.”20 With
United States as his main example, Nye summarized soft power in a variety
of definitions: “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather
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than coercion or payment; the ability of a country to attract other countries
by ideas, values and ideology; the ability of a country to let another country
think what it thinks.”21 Nye’s idea of soft power draws from the ability of a
state to derive acquiescence through its power of attraction. According to
him, soft power is the “ability to affect the behaviour of others by influencing
their preferences” and “the ability to entice and attract” others without
having to deploy hard power threats.22 As he argues, “If I can get you to
want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do
not want to do.”23
Fundamentally, as Nye and other soft power proponents argue, the power
assessment of a state must be one that includes both hard power and soft power
for what Nye termed as “smart power.” He explained further that there are a
number of ingredients (soft power resources) that produce soft power outcomes
and points to three components of soft power: political values (when it lives up to
them at home and abroad), foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and
having moral authority), and culture (in places where it is attractive to others).
These three components are the primary currencies through which a state’s soft
power can be projected.24 Beyond being an antonym for hard power, soft power
therefore requires the ability to determine and shape the agenda and preferences
of actors with the ultimate objective to make others see the sensibility in
cooperation rather than confrontation. In many ways this reduces the
requirement and necessity for the mobilization of hard power.
It is hardly surprising, then, that in the current globalized system the premium
states place on the subtle effect of soft power instruments and resources is gaining
prominence.25 Given poor economic growth and a reduced financial means to
pursue a rigorous foreign policy, states can address much of their foreign policy
priorities by relying on their soft power base. As a consequence, states with a
reasonable degree of soft power capability can rely more on their soft power
resources to leverage international diplomatic interaction.26 Soft power has also
become a necessary prerequisite for regional and middle power status and can be
regarded as critical to the local acceptance of regional hegemony.27
Since Nye’s exposition of soft power, our understanding of soft power has been
subjected to multiple interpretations. Scholars have offered their own analysis on
the concept, including how it can be measured, the resources (state and nonstate)
that can be mobilized to enhance soft power, the contradictions and limitations of
soft power, and the use of soft power by developing and authoritarian states.
Haynes argues that soft power resources include attributes such as culture, values,
and ideas which collectively reflect different forms of influence deemed to be
antonymous to hard power. His definition draws the inference that soft power can
be wielded not only by states but also by non-state actors, or what he called secular
sources of soft power. His view aligns with Sidiropoulos’ assertion that soft power
is “the ability of a nation (or a multinational organization) to achieve desired
outcomes without the use of hard force.”28
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However, others have critiqued the usefulness of soft power as a tool of state
power. They ask: how useful is soft power in dealing with the challenges of state
interaction, and in what specific ways does soft power allow states to alter the
behavior of their contemporaries? Critics contest that Nye’s three soft power
instruments appear to be vaguely described and sometimes overlap with one
another. They argue that Nye failed to create a distinct analytical depiction of
the point where foreign policies, political values, and culture influence behavior. This is why Li explains that despite its popularity, the concept of soft
power has remained notoriously undertheorized, leading to confusion in
current literature and even practical discussions on international relations.29
He suggests that although the literature points to ideational elements as
sources of a state’s soft power, there is still far less clarity about how
these soft power currencies actually produce attraction. Explaining China’s
diplomatic posture, Li, however, agrees with Nye, that economic and military
sources of powers can also be transposed into soft power to exude admiration
and attraction. Li’s overall argument is that the nature of power is neither soft
nor hard since the form power takes is largely contingent on how an actor
chooses to exercise its capability.
While the debate on soft power will continue, the idea remains a significant
element of state power given the changing terrain of international relations
discourse and praxis. For example, insecurity from nontraditional sources
(human security) is becoming more prominent in global and especially in
the developing world. The meta-geography of terrorism has redefined geopolitics globally as the struggle is no longer over territories or on territories but a
clash of beliefs that crisscross territories through social and technological
networks.30 Therefore, intelligence gathering, technological prowess, and the
ability to build consensus and coalitions through attractive ideas (all elements
of soft power) will be vital to exercising power and influence in the twenty-first
century. Despite its contentious meaning, soft power plays an important role
in the practice of international diplomacy and politics. Moreover, it has come
to inform “the logic behind particular strategic choices in public diplomacy
and strategic communication.”31
There is little wonder, given South Africa’s reference to the idea of soft
power in its National Development Plan 2030, that the country has gained
significant global reputation and attention as a result of its apparent soft
power capabilities.32
South Africa’s rising soft power: Perspectives and perceptions
When South Africa emerged from apartheid isolation in 1994 amid great
expectations, its government was confronted with two major dilemmas. The
first was that of presenting itself as a radical departure from the erstwhile
notorious apartheid government, which had as an article of faith the
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preservation of minority white rule.33 Indeed, the fundamental way in which
the African National Congress (ANC)–led government could show itself as
different from its predecessor was not only by its domestic priorities but also
by building new relationships both with Africa and the entire world.34 South
Africa’s second major challenge was to create a unique national (and African)
identity for itself that would mark a clear path for the “Rainbow nation.”
Because the country had long been associated with racist apartheid rule, it made
strategic sense to confront its past. And in a bid to transform its image from that of
a pariah, Nelson Mandela as president made numerous foreign trips abroad to
garner international support for the new South Africa.35 As Geldenhuys puts it,
“These exemplary features and the saintly presidential presence of Nelson
Mandela provided a solid domestic base and the self-confidence to pursue an
ambitious, moralistic foreign policy.” According to him, “South Africa’s virtuous
global citizenship since 1994 can be regarded as the external corollary of its
commitment to democracy and good governance at home.”36
South Africa’s increasing prominence in Africa has been due largely to its
assortment of hard and soft power over and above other regional contenders.37
As Alden and Schoeman contend, post-apartheid South Africa has seemingly
recognized the utility of its material and ideational assets in representing its
national interest but also for promoting its global reputation relevant to other
African countries held capture to poverty, unemployment, conflict, and
corruption.38 Thus, despite its relatively new status in the international system,
post-apartheid South Africa’s emergence to the fore of regional politics in
Africa brought about significant changes in the geopolitical calculus of the
region.39 Even before the ANC gained power, South Africa was invited to join
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). This meant that
countries such as Nigeria and Egypt had to contend with the increasing
presence of South Africa not only by accepting Pretoria as an important
regional actor but also by embracing its prominent role in Africa.
South Africa was beginning to play the role of an African hegemon capable
of imposing its will and dominating the discourse of African politics. It was
displaying the capacity to present itself as a leader on continental and global
matters.40 South Africa, particularly under Mandales’s successor Thabo
Mbeki, assumed a leadership role in Africa. South Africa stood firm in the
promotion of peace, democracy, and the reconstruction and development of
the continent.41 It positioned itself to occupy the leadership vacuum created
in Africa partly as a result of Nigeria’s internal and external dilemmas as well
as Egypt’s sustained lack of interest in Africa.
The international goodwill afforded South Africa’s leaders also helped push
through their foreign policy. It allowed other stakeholders to adopt the “ideas
and norms the country purports to defend and put forward, including its
substantive contributions.”42 To this extent, it became increasingly difficult
to separate the values that these leaders represented from the sensibilities of the
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policies they proposed to the international community and especially to their
African counterparts. This was not always successful, as evidenced, for
instance, in the case of Mandela’s unsuccessful bid to have Nigeria suspended
from the Commonwealth in 1995 following the execution of the nine Ogoni
activists by President Abacha. Nonetheless, the afterglow of apartheid’s demise
had a halo effect on South Africa’s new leaders.
The main point here is that in the past two decades South Africa has been able
to embark on a remarkable transformation wherein it gained significant international credibility, acceptance, and moral identity as a major African leader.
Following its successful bid and subsequent hosting of the FIFA World Cup in
2010 as well as its membership of the BRICS in the same year, international
reviews of South Africa improved significantly. A survey of sixteen major
countries by the BBC 2011 World Service Rating Poll indicated South Africa’s
global influence increased from 35 percent in the preceding year to 42 percent in
2011, accounting for the second highest rise among the countries surveyed and
ninth in the overall standing of positive international perception.43
In many ways, as major soft power indexes show, South Africa’s soft power
profile dwarfs that of regional contenders such as Nigeria and perhaps Egypt.44
South Africa has, therefore, been able to benefit from its efforts to promote its
international prestige among the comity of nations. Its international status
greatly improved with the end of apartheid. The legacy of apartheid, however,
casts a shadow over its emerging regional role.
South Africa’s apartheid history has left a mixed identity.45 According to
Adebajo, “The apartheid era army’s destabilization of neighbors has left a
profound distrust of South African military interventionism which remains
strong today.”46 The decades prior to South Africa’s democratic transition at
the cusp of the end of the Cold War was post-independent southern Africa’s
most volatile. South Africa’s rearguard action against the “Winds of Change”
animated by anti-apartheid forces camped in its near-abroad cost the region
an estimated 1.5 million lives between 1980 and 1988 with a cumulative cost
to the region of approximately $60.5 billion.47 South Africa’s “destabilization” campaign was part of President P.W. Botha’s “total national strategy,”
which was meant to protect the encircled South Africa from its near abroad.
It at one time or another directly or indirectly intervened in the civil wars in
Rhodesia (which became Zimbabwe in 1980), Angola, and Mozambique. It
also applied economic pressure throughout the region. As Hanlon stated,
“The military attacks catch press headlines, but outside Angola and
Mozambique, South Africa’s economic power in the region is in some ways
more critical.” 48 Southern Africa was wary of the “new” South Africa.
South Africa’s neighbors responded by forming the Front Line States
(1970), which led to the formation of SADC’s precursor, the Southern
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980. SADCC
was a self-conscious effort to balance the regional dominance of South Africa,
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by at least loosely tying the states of the southern African subcontinent
together is a form of regional economic integration.
The legacy of South Africa’s hard power, both military and economic, in
southern Africa limits its ability to leverage that power to promote its regional
foreign policy. Soft power, therefore, is not only a complement to hard power
but takes precedence in South Africa’s projection of power in the region. South
Africa’s soft power profile includes its cultural and media exports, political
ideals, constitutionally enshrined values of the rule of law, the Bill of Rights, its
vast array of iconic personalities and political goodwill, the presence of multinational companies in Africa, highly ranked universities, the successful hosting
of mega-sporting events, and tourism and hospitality.
Leaving no turn “un-stoned”
The importance of soft power in South Africa’s toolkit is enhanced when juxtaposed to its use of hard power during apartheid. After its international isolation,
South Africa underwent an incredible transformation from a hitherto pariah state
to one that is today globally accepted and recognized as a middle/regional power.
Qobo and Dube argue that “integrating into the global system was one of the
major priorities of the South African government in the early 1990s, especially
because the country was keen on reflecting the pariah image associated with the
period of apartheid rule.”49 Emerging from the apartheid isolation in 1994, South
Africa positively positioned itself as a promising regional actor in Africa and in the
past two decades focused on expanding its political, economic, and ideational
influence while at the same time increasing its diplomatic niche in the continent
and beyond. A number of scholars have argued that since the post-apartheid era
soft power has been the constant of South Africa’s foreign policy.50
Much more than other contending regional powers in Africa, South Africa
conceivably places greater premium on its soft power resources. Inspired by its
willingness to conform to international law and adhere to its legal obligations
in the international community, South Africa’s commitment to collaborative
efforts toward tackling global issues like climate change, poverty, underdevelopment, and promoting human rights reflect this priority. Qobo and Dube
rightly assert that South Africa’s involvement in multilateral forums like the
G20 has “clearly helped to sustain the country’s international profile as a global
actor and a voice to be reckoned with in the developing world.”51
The wielding of soft power assets has often yielded benefits such as
international recognition, reputation, and the acceptance of South Africa as
a legitimate regional power.52 It has also advanced Pretoria’s regional hegemonic status and underscored its moral authority, especially within Africa.53
An assessment of post-apartheid South Africa’s engagement in Africa since
1994 reveals that much of its rising status within Africa has been promoted
by the official and unofficial rhetoric and subtle wielding of its soft power,
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which has evinced dividends that qualify Pretoria as Africa’s hegemonic
power.54 There is, however, tension between South Africa’s de facto regional
hegemony and southern Africa acceptance of it hegemonic status.
Soft power and its discontents
There are a number of issues that have limited and continue to limit South
Africa’s ability to project its soft power. More than anything else, these issues
have continued to define South Africa’s relationship with its neighbors and the
rest of the world. The shifting trend of South Africa’s foreign policy toward soft
power has equally portrayed ambivalence that challenges its status as a regional
soft power state in Africa. Its leadership is often suspect. For South Africa to
command the full strength of its hegemonic potential it needs to resolve the
multiple domestic contradictions and external challenges that confronts its
global reputation.55 Alden and Schoeman point out that South Africa’s ability
to conduct a successful foreign policy that aligns with its continental and
global ambitions hinges on how it deals with the ambivalences of its domestic
weaknesses and “a divided continental reaction to South African leadership.”56
In this regard it is important, therefore, to focus on some of the domestic
challenges that limit South Africa’s use of soft power.
As Ogunnubi and Uzodike contend, a regional hegemonic power, particularly within the discourse on emerging middle powers, refers to a state that
enjoys superior power advantages, possesses political and economic capabilities, boasts of a combined capacity for considerable influence on its neighbors,
and enjoys a considerable level of acceptance of its regional leadership.57 In
many respects, South Africa is considered a regional superpower. It has disproportionate socioeconomic and political resources in the region. The country has the capacity to drive Africa out of what Kagwanja argues is the
continent’s “mire of poverty and desperation.”58 South Africa is (arguably)
Africa’s most technologically and industrialized country, with a gross domestic
product (GDP) of over $350b (2013 estimate). Its economy is two times that of
the entire Southern African subregion, which gives it immense comparative,
economic, and soft power advantages within its subregion and on the African
continent. With a population of over fifty million people, second only to the
Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) in the SADC region, South Africa possesses the greatest human and material resources within its subregion. More
than anything else, these advantages confirm South Africa’s status as a regional
hegemon and to a considerable extent a hegemon in Africa.
South Africa’s hegemonic aspirations and “soft power”
South Africa has attempted to leverage its inherent advantages. For example,
in the area of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, South Africa has
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employed the use of what Neethling argues its diplomacy-based approach to
encourage parties to cease hostilities and negotiate a peaceful settlement of
their disputes while holding back from engaging in peace enforcement and
peace building.59 Over the years, South Africa has adopted a regional
approach to conflict resolution in Africa, or what van Nieuwkerk identifies
as the “art of transforming war into peace through the lens of regionalism.”60
It bears mentioning that the model has been put to test over the years in the
course of its mediation in a number of conflicts in Africa, particularly those
in Burundi, the DRC, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Côte d’Ivoire.
As a middle power, scholars have also contended that South Africa
possesses the human, financial, and military resources to function as a bridge
between the West and Africa.61 It is instructive to note that this argument has
been largely echoed by a number of its leaders, particularly former president
Thabo Mbeki, who once noted that the country desires to be a champion of
the invisible people of the world, where there would be a democratization of
the system of international relations and the space for the poor and the
powerless within an unstoppable globalization process.62
Southern Africa was the place to start. South Africa’s Department of
Foreign Affairs argued that “the future of our country is inextricably linked
to the future of the African continent and that Africa remains the central area
of focus in the conduct of South Africa’s foreign policy.”63 This perhaps
explains Khadiagala and Nganje’s argument that emerging powers such as
South Africa are leaders in their regional neighborhoods and are thus in the
ambiguous position of reconciling regional sensitivities associated with their
leadership with the global demands of promoting democracy.64
South Africa, however, has increasingly faced stiff opposition from other
African countries, who view its quest for dominance as an affront to their
own role. As Khadiagala and Nganje argue, “South Africa’s bid to transform
the political landscape in Africa has faced numerous difficulties, particularly
resistance from authoritarian and antidemocratic regimes.”65 Many African
states, particularly Nigeria, Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe do not like being
lectured by South Africa. They regard it as a relatively new entrant on the
African stage.66 This is perhaps informed by the scepticism and apprehension
with which Pretoria’s leadership role in Africa is often viewed, particularly in
the light of its ability to undermine their own aspirations for regional or
continental leadership.67 As a consequence, South Africa’s perceived selfappointed hegemonic role and its regional power and influence in Southern
Africa and across Africa has limited its ability to openly articulate its foreign
policy ideals of democracy and human rights.”68
South Africa’s ability to transform its immense soft power advantages
depends on its ability to downplay the apparent pugnacity attached to the
advancement of its hegemonic aspiration. Being a hegemon in itself is not
necessarily a bad thing; however, how the role is pursued and perceived
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matters. For South Africa, therefore, one way of downplaying this perceived
arrogant hegemonic posture could be by taking a cue from Nigeria, which in
the course of its engagement in peace and security related discourses in
Africa and in its relationship with its contiguous states (Benin, Chad,
Niger, and Cameroon) does not impose its authority on any of them.69
Xenophobia/Afrophobia
If southern Africa is the natural stage for South Africa to build a hegemonic
role, how its neighbors’ citizens are treated is of importance. One other issue
that often impedes South Africa’s capacity to fully leverage its soft power is
its xenophobia. For Evans and Newnham, the notion refers to a crime against
humanity involving aspects such as dislike, fear, distrust, or intolerance of
foreigners, often expressed in terms of hostilities toward nationals from other
countries.70 Others see it as a hate crime, defined as the extreme expression
of prejudice through violent criminal acts committed against people, property, or even organizations, either because of the group to which they belong
or with which they identify.71 It has been argued that xenophobic intolerance
often stems from three factors: (a) interactive factors related to the amount of
exposure inhabitants have to strangers, (b) cultural factors that include
identity and nationalism, and (c) material or economic factors related to
employment opportunities, available resources, etc.72
According to the South African Migration Project, South Africa currently
has one of the highest levels of xenophobic occurrences in the world, with
attacks mostly directed toward African immigrants.73 As argued by Solomon,
xenophobic attacks in South Africa follow a pattern of racism, orchestrated by
locals, against African migrants, and it emanates from factors such as the fear
of losing their social status and identity, the conviction of intimidation that
foreigners pose to citizens’ economic success, and feelings of superiority.74
The first major incident of xenophobic attacks in South Africa occurred in
May 2008, and it left an estimated sixty-two people dead, six hundred and
seventy injured, and displaced another thirty thousand, mostly foreign
nationals.75 Similarly, during the 2015 incident, at least seven people were
reported to have lost their lives.76 It should be noted that this trend has remained
a constant, despite South Africa’s political, economic, and social transformation
and its endorsement of a constitutional framework based on the principles of
human rights, equality, social justice, and tolerance and nondiscrimination.77
Indeed, the consequences of these attacks on South Africa’s ability to maximize
its soft power are enormous, particularly when situated within the purview of the
dictates of Articles 5 and 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article 5, for example, states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” while Article 9
forbids “the arbitrary arrest detention or exile” of foreigners or migrants.
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More than anything else, the recurrence of these attacks and the apparent
inability of the South African government to forestall them cast doubts on
South Africa’s capacity to defend international conventions. And at the same
time, as an international norm entrepreneur it claims to be, recurring
xenophobia also portends serious implication for South Africa’s ability to
command respect within the international community.
Leadership Inconsistencies and Africa: The global versus regional role
South Africa’s voyage into carving a front-runner role for itself began shortly
after the demise of apartheid in 1994, when the ANC unequivocally spoke of its
determination to return South Africa to where it thought it belonged. It noted:
The ending of apartheid was a joyous moment in the history of our continent.
Africa sacrificed much during the course of our struggle. Our people—refugees
and the liberation movement were offered food, shelter and facilities to enhance
the common endeavour to put an end to racist tyranny and oppression. With
fellow Africans we share a vision to transform our continent into an entity that is
free, peaceful and vibrant.78
South Africa has demonstrated its resolve to play a lead role in the
resolution of conflicts in Africa and in providing logistics and financial
support to a number of regional organizations. It supports the African
Union (AU), particularly its Peace and Security Council (PSC),79 which
seeks to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the encouragement
of peacebuilding in Africa and the Common African Defense and Security
policy.80 South Africa, under former President Mbeki, emerged as the first
chairperson of the AU and later the PSC during which the New Partnership
for African Development (NEPAD) initiative was launched. Similarly, South
Africa, through tactful diplomacy, particularly in the use of its special envoys
and ambassadors, has mediated in the crises in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone. Using this platform, South Africa has provided financial and
diplomatic support indirectly through the AU to mediators in a number
West African countries, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.81
In terms of its interventionist role in Africa, South Africa, between 1994
and 2000,82 attempted to make its presence felt on the international scene
through its contribution to UN and AU peace missions, committing a total of
2,020 troops in fourteen peace missions.83 South Africa also went into
Lesotho in 1998 to reverse a coup attempt and played a mediatory role in
Burundi, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire. These attempts, as Alden and Schoeman
argue, remain a clear demonstration of South Africa’s desire to play a central
role in the regional management of conflict.84
South Africa gives the impression of being more comfortable acting as a
third party mediator under the auspices of supranational institutions like the
SADC, the AU, or the UN. Regardless of these initiatives, however, some critics
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have also noted that a number of South Africa’s interventions, particularly the
Mbeki government’s “quiet diplomacy” approach to the Zimbabwean crisis
and its attempted brokerage of peace in Côte d’Ivoire are a failure.85 South
Africa’s attempt to exert its authority in Africa is not without blemish.
Commenting on what has been argued as South Africa’s leadership and
policy inconsistencies in Africa, some critics have pointed to the role played by
South Africa in the passage of the United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1973 on Libya. Khadiagala and Nganje argue for example that South
Africa, alongside Gabon and Nigeria, had initially voted it in favor of the
enforcement of a “no fly zone” on Libya in 2012. It repudiated it after the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s military intervention on the grounds
that NATO overstepped the bounds of the resolution.86 Zuma’s back-pedaling
on Libya called into question Pretoria’s policy consistency, particularly with
regard to South Africa’s commitment to democratization on the continent.”87
South Africa has refused to draw concrete lessons from its checkered apartheid history in the course of its interaction within the community of nations. A
case in point is what Khadiagala and Nganje call the “the opportunity provided
by the Arab Spring,”88 which should have been used by South Africa to
“reassert its leadership on democracy promotion, particularly since Libya
and most of North Africa had for a long time remained strongholds of
authoritarianism in Africa.”89 Instead, South Africa’s policy discourse was
dominated by claims concerning NATO’s “regime change” in Libya. Zuma
maintained that NATO and the UN had undermined African efforts and
argued that “the AU was not given space to implement its roadmap to ensure
an African solution to the Libyan question.”90
One other issue that evinces South Africa’s policy inconsistency in Africa is the
manner in which its leadership chooses what international treaty, convention, or
accord to respect and which ones to disregard. Since the end of apartheid in 1994
and more recently under the Zuma administration, South Africa has been caught
“double speaking” and also acting at variance with some of the conventions to
which it voluntarily subscribed. In this regard, critiques argue that there can be no
better example than in the stance taken by South Africa over the arrest warrant
issued to the Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir for crimes allegedly committed
against his own people during the Darfur crisis.91 South Africa’s adoption of this
position is despite the fact that it is a founding member of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) at the Hague. It was also one of the first countries in Africa
to domesticate the Rome Statute, which created the ICC. Yet the Zuma administration chose to remain silent in the face of the onslaught of opposition to the
ICC.92 South Africa under Zuma was to later take its anti-ICC campaigns to a new
height and what some analysts described as “reversing the fight against
impunity”93 when it teamed up to condemn the ICC over its indictment of
Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and his vice president, William Ruto, over
the crisis that erupted in the aftermath of the 2010 presidential election in Kenya.94
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South Africa’s May 2013 decision to vote in favor of the motion calling for
sitting African heads of state to be exempted from facing trials at the Hague
until the expiration of their term(s) in office and the support it gave to the AU’s
October 2013 decision requesting deferral the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto stand
diametrically opposed to what should be the ideals of a country intending to
command respect within the international community. This development has
in fact been described as “an abdication of South Africa’s leadership (responsibility) in Africa, because it amounted to appeasing the anti-ICC block at the
AU at the expense of its commitment to international norms.”95
More than anything else, as we argue, it represents a major dent in South
Africa’s international image and perception within Africa and its presumed
capacity to effectively lead the rest of Africa.
The paradox of South Africa’s soft power
The previous sections point to an interesting paradox. South Africa’s international status and middle power status give it a privileged international place
between the weak and the strong in the international system. It is, however, the
relatively strong—the major international powers—that supports that role.
The relative weak—South Africa’s neighbors—are less supportive. South
Africa continues to make vital contributions toward peacebuilding in Africa
as evident in its interventions in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and
Lesotho. However, South Africa has on a number of occasions defaulted on its
commitment to a human-rights-driven foreign policy in favor of defending
state security. This was evident, for example, in South Africa’s staunch defence
of the Mugabe-led government in Zimbabwe, even in the face of gross human
rights violations. It is also evident in its refusal to implement ICC’s arrest
warrants against Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan. Acts like these risk portraying
South Africa as an obstacle to peace and security on the African continent.
Another factor inhibiting South Africa’s full potential in Africa is the
potential effect of xenophobia, which is believed to be motivated by South
Africa’s internal socioeconomic challenges. While it is true that the South
African government maintains a zero-tolerance for the act, many observers,
particularly South Africa’s neighbors, believe that not enough is being done
to forestall its reoccurrence. Sporadic xenophobic backlashes still occur in
South Africa, which often escape the popular news media. Clearly, this stands
in contrast to the United Nations Convention of 1951 and the 1967 Protocol,
both of which relate to the status of refugees, defines who they are, and
delineates the legal obligations of states toward them.
The inability of South Africa to act boldly in this regard arguably limits its
influence as a successful interventionist/mediator, especially within its subregion, and its capacity to be trusted as an unbiased conflict negotiator in
Africa. Similarly, while South Africa’s involvement in the DRC may be a
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testament to Mbeki’s wider African renaissance agenda and the need to find
African solutions to African problems, some observers maintain the view that
the underlying motive for the “invasion” was to prepare the way for “a deeper
penetration of the DRC’S resource-rich country by mining companies and
other South African corporations with ties to the South Africa’s political elite.96
So strong was this perception that some analysts have argued that South Africa
appears to be the only country with influence on the regime in Kinshasa.
Nothing better sums up the motivation behind South Africa’s intervention
in the Great Lakes region than the speech credited to Minister Maite
Nkoana-Mashabane, who in a recent interview stressed the importance of
the DRC and the Great Lakes region to South Africa’s foreign policy and
economic development prospects. She noted that if “Africa were a body, the
real heartbeat at the centre of that body would be the Great Lakes. The region
is endowed with minerals, has fertile land for agricultural purposes and holds
immense potential to set Africa on a higher trajectory.”97 It perhaps bears
noting that while the adoption of economic diplomacy as a tool for foreign
policy is not necessarily bad, it is bad when the approach is seen as overriding
the singular objective of peacebuilding, as evidenced in the DRC case.
South Africa, since the advent of the Jacob Zuma led presidency in 2009,
appears unwilling to intervene in a conflict, particularly within Africa, when it
stands to gain nothing in return. More importantly, the continuing decision by
South Africa to aggressively pursue its own economic interest in the course of
its conflict intervention in Africa erodes the foundation of its soft power.
South Africa, nonetheless, has attempted to dispel the negative connotations
of its hegemonic position in Africa. It has not succeeded in eradicating all fears
and suspicions among fellow African member states about its true intentions. It
has in fact been argued that a number of African states, particularly within the
Southern African subregion, have repeatedly expressed their resentment of
Pretoria’s presumptuous foreign policy posture.98
Further limiting South Africa’s capacity to fully exert its inherent advantages
embedded in its soft power potential is the country’s unabating internal socioeconomic problems, which have fueled violent reactions and exposed the troubled
state of its economy. For example, and according to Municipal IQ (a specialized
local government data and intelligence organization that collects data on service
delivery protests), South Africa between 2014 and April 2016 has recorded at least
425 major service delivery protests, with 70 of those protests already recorded as of
April 2016.99 Indeed, if this development continues, the capacity to affect South
Africa’s perceived and actual capability to be seen as a major force and leader by its
neighbors and on the African continent will be affected.
Public support for South Africa’s peace missions, particularly with regard
to the genuineness of its intentions in Africa have continued to be questioned. While the leadership of South Africa’s ANC may genuinely have a
sense of solidarity with other African countries, as evidenced in President
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O. OGUNNUBI AND O. B. AMAO
Zuma’s speech to the Congolese parliament in 2013, average South Africans
find themselves more detached from the rest of the continent, ostensibly
because of the country’s perceived “differentness” and isolation during the
apartheid regime.100
Finally, South Africa is also often accused of being unnecessarily arrogant
in its interactions with the rest of Africa. For example, Daniel and colleagues, while commenting on South Africa’s foreign policy toward Africa,
term it as a South African “invasion” of the continent.101 A case in point is
South Africa’s bilateral decision to deploy soldiers to the Central African
Republic (CAR) without taking into consideration regional mechanisms and
international norms.
Conclusion: Will the giant be able to weather the storm?
This article looks at factors that impinge on South Africa’s ability to use soft
power to advance its interests. It notes that notwithstanding the seeming
optimism of its soft power, South Africa’s capacity to translate this into
influence is largely undercut by several factors, including its misinterpreted
continental hegemonic aspiration, recurring xenophobic incidences, and its
leadership inconsistencies toward Africa. South Africa faces the paradox of
effectively playing the role expected of it as an international norm entrepreneur while at the same time being conscious of the expectation of its African
constituency. The extent to which Pretoria is able to effectively navigate the
international turbulence that confronts the expression of its soft power
diplomacy within the murky waters of its national interest will be contingent
on how its leadership meets the challenges confronted both in the domestic
and international arena.
South Africa is a regional hegemonic power (although with serious limits).
For all intents and purposes, South Africa can project a hegemonic role in
Africa as long as it addresses the polemic ambivalences that confront the
expression of its soft power resources. To maximize the benefits of its
inarguable soft power advantages, South Africa needs to do more to convince
its neighbors, particularly Zambia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, who have at
various times resented Pretoria’s audacious foreign policy posture, that its
presence as a subregional power will not in any way undermine their
sovereignty. It will also have to lead by example, and that will mean addressing its own domestic challenges and the gaps between its rhetoric and its
actions on the continental and global stage.
ORCID
Olusola Ogunnubi
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5005-9519
Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5246-4646
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Notes
1. Cyril Obi, “Repositioning South Africa in Global Economic Governance: A Perspective
from Nigeria,” South African Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 2 (2015): 165–184;
Olusola Ogunnubi, “Recalibrating Africa’s Geo-Political Calculus: A Critique of South
Africa’s Hegemonic Status,” Politikon 42, no. 3 (2015): 1–20.
2. Adam Habib, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Hegemonic Aspirations, Neoliberal
Orientations and Global Transformation,” South African Journal of International
Affairs 16, no. 2 (2009): 143–159; Daniel Flemes, “Regional Power South Africa: Cooperative Hegemony Constrained by Historical Legacy,” Journal of Contemporary
African Studies 27, no. 2 (2009): 135–157.
3. Maxi Schoeman, “Introduction to the SPECIAL ISSUE: Alliances beyond BRICS—South
Africa’s Role in Global Economic Governance,” South African Journal of International
Affairs 22, no. 2 (2015): 143–144.
4. Obi, “Repositioning South Africa in Global Economic Governance,” 165.
5. Mzukisi Qobo and Memory Dube, “South Africa’s Foreign Economic Strategies in a
Changing Global System,” South African Journal of International Affairs 22, no. 2
(2015): 145–164.
6. Timothy Shaw, “African Agency? Africa, South Africa and the BRICS,” International
Politics 52 (2015): 255–268.
7. See Flemes, “Regional Power South Africa”; Olusola Ogunnubi and Christopher Isike,
“Regional Hegemonic Contention and the Asymmetry of Soft Power: A Comparative
Analysis of South Africa and Nigeria,” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 37, no. 1
(2015): 152–177.
8. Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012).
9. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, NY:
Basic Books, 1990).
10. Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, “South Africa’s Emerging Soft Power,” Current History 113,
no. 763 (2014): 197–202; Karen Smith, “Soft Power: The Essence of South Africa’s
Foreign Policy,” in South African Foreign Policy Review, Volume 1, eds. Chris
Landsberg and Jo-Ansie van Wyk (Pretoria, South Africa: Africa Institute of South
Africa and the Institute for Global Dialogue, 2012), 68–83.
11. Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony in Africa,”
International Politics 52 (2015).
12. Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power.
13. Alden and Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony;” Ogunnubi and Isike,
“Regional Hegemonic Contention;” Deon Geldenhuys, “South Africa: The Idea Driven
Foreign Policy of a Regional Power,” in Regional Leadership in the Global System, ed.
Daniel Flemes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), 151–167.
14. National Planning Commission, National Development Plan 2030 (Pretoria, South
Africa: Government Print, 2012).
15. “South Africa: Unempoyment Rate Rises,” 2012, http://allafrica.com/stories/
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16. Giulio Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Politics: A Synthesis of Realism,
Neoliberalism and Constructivism (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
17. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success In World Politics (New York, NY: Public
Affairs, 2004).
18. Gallarotti, Cosmopolitan Power in International Politics.
19. “Soft Power” is the title of a song by British music band Ladytron released in 2005.
316
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20. Mingjiang Li, “China: Domestic Sources of Its Soft Power Strategy in East Asia,” in
Regional Leadership in the Global System, ed. Daniel Flemes (Farnham, UK: Ashgate
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21. Nye, Soft Power.
22. Ibid.
23. Joseph Nye, The Paradoxes of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t
Go It Alone (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002).
24. Ogunnubi and Isike, “Regional Hegemonic Contention.”
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27. Sidiropoulos, “South Africa’s Emerging Soft Power”; Daniel Flemes, Conceptualising
Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case
(Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Working Papers
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28. Sidiropoulos, “South Africa’s Emerging Soft Power.”
29. Li, “China: Domestic Sources,” 37.
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31. Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power, 28.
32. National Planning Commission, National Development Plan 2030.
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Mbeki’s ‘Progressive African Agenda,’” in South Africa in Africa: Post-apartheid Era,
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Qobo and Dube, “South Africa’s Foreign Economic Strategies,” 148.
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Qobo and Dube, “South Africa’s Foreign Economic Strategies,” 159.
Ogunnubi and Isike, “Regional Hegemonic Contention.”
Alden and Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony”; Ogunnubi and Uzodike,
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Alden and Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony.”
Obi, “Repositioning South Africa in Global Economic Governance”; Chris Alden and
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Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa in the Company of Giants: The Search
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Alden and Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony.”
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Khadiagala and Nganje, “The Evolution of South Africa’s Democracy,” 5.
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Alden and le Pere, “South Africa in Africa,” 145–169.
Kagwanja, “An Encumbered State?” 28–29.
Olumuyiwa Amao and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, “Nigeria, Afro-centrism and Conflict
Resolution: After Five Decades, How Far, How Well?” African Studies Quarterly 15,
no. 4 (2015): 1–24; Olusola Ogunnubi, “Effective Hegemonic Influence in Africa: An
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72. Ian Nell, “The Tears of Xenophobia: Preaching and Violence from a South African
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75. “Toll from Xenophobic Attacks Rises,” Mail & Guardian, May 31, 2008.
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79. The Peace and Security Council is Africa’s consensual security council with no veto
power by any country, and all the continent’s 54 member countries wield the same level
of authority.
80. Williams Ishola, “South Africa in Peacemaking in West Africa,” in South Africa’s Role in
Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa, ed. Roger Southall Conference
Proceedings (Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2006) 173–190, 180.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Alden and Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony.”
84. Ibid.
85. Giulia Piccolino, Mediation, Local Response and the Limits of International Engagement
in Cote d’Ivoire (paper presented at the ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin, Ireland,
August 30–September 1, 2010).
86. Khadiagala and Nganje, “The Evolution of South Africa’s Democracy.”
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., 12.
90. South Africa Government News Agency, cited in Khadiagala and Nganje, “The
Evolution of South Africa’s Democracy,” 12.
91. It bears noting that the tensions between the AU and ICC started in July 2009 at an AU
summit in Libya when the AU opted not to cooperate with the ICC in the arrest of
indicted Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir (AU 2011). African Union, Decisions,
Declaration and Resolution of the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the
Union (Addis Ababa: AU Commission, Addis Ababa, January 30–31, 2011); Tseliso
Thipanyane, South Africa’s Foreign Policy under the Zuma Government (Pretoria, South
Africa: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2011).
92. Khadiagala and Nganje, “The Evolution of South Africa’s Democracy.”
93. Ibid., 15.
94. “South Africa Backs AU Decision on ICC: Zuma,” Xinhua News, http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/africa/2013-10/14/c_132798157.htm, October 14, 2013, accessed Janaury 2,
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95. Khadiagala and Nganje The evolution of South Africa’s democracy, 15.
96. Claude Kebemba, “South Africa and the DRC: Is a Stable and Developmental State
Possible in the Congo?” in South Africa’s Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in
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Trade,” Mail & Guardian, November 15–21, 2013.
Milfrid Tonheim and Gerrie Swart, “Africa’s Pre-eminent Peacemaker? An Appraisal of
South Africa’s Peacemaking Role in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” NOREF
Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, (Oslo, Norway, February, 2015), 12.
See for example, “Service Delivery Protests on Track for New Peak Level in 2016,” TMG
Digital, http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2016/05/11/%E2%80%98Service-deliveryprotests-on-track-for-new-peak-level-in-2016%E2%80%99, accessed June 10, 2016.
Tonheim and Swart, “Africa’s Pre-eminent Peacemaker?” 12.
John Daniel, Roger Southall, and Sanusha Naidu, “The South Africans Are Coming!” in
The State of the Nation, eds. John Daniels and Robert Southall (Pretoria, South Africa:
HSRC, 2008), 1–23.