Emotion
2001, Vol. 1, No. 3, 249–257
Copyright 2001 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
1528-3542/01/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//1528-3542.1.3.249
Emotional Intelligence or Adaptive Emotions?
Carroll E. Izard
University of Delaware
R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Matthews (2001) challenged the adequacy of the
psychometric properties of the principal performance measure of emotional intelligence (EI). They raised doubt about the existence of emotion-related abilities that
influence behavioral outcomes and social competence after controlling for general
intelligence and personality. I agree with Roberts et al. that demonstrating the
discriminant and predictive validity of a measure of EI in the context of rival
predictors will require more research. I agree with the proponents of EI that emotion-related abilities do exist and show that such abilities in children account for
unique variance in measures of adaptive behavior and social competence. However,
evidence from developmental and clinical research suggest that these emotionrelated abilities and their influence on socioemotional competence stem more from
the direct effects of emotions than from a special form of intelligence.
mance measure of EI (Multi-Factor Emotional Intelligence Scale; MEIS; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey,
1999) yield disparate and conflicting results. For example, Roberts et al. found that the consensus-based
scoring procedure currently recommended by the developers of EI shows that people who score high on
emotion perception (the first branch of the conceptual
model of EI), are “somewhat unintelligent” though
agreeable and extraverted (Roberts et al., 2001,
p. 226). Whereas Roberts et al. reported a number of
predicted and meaningful correlates of the various
components of EI, they noted that its proponents have
not yet clearly demonstrated predictive validity after
statistically controlling for intellectual ability and personality.
Roberts et al. (2001) remarked that the psychometric problems that beset the current performance scales
for measuring EI might prove amenable to further
research. This will prove true, however, only to the
extent that the conceptualization of EI separates it
sufficiently from other broad constructs (intelligence,
personality) that relate to adaptation. To solve the
psychometric problems, EI proponents will need to
show that measures of the construct account for significant variance in adaptive behavior in the context
of rival predictors. So the questions concerning the
measurement of EI seem highly linked to questions
concerning the conceptual status of EI and its relation
to other broad constructs, including emotion-related
constructs (Roberts et al., 2001).
The idea of EK, which emerged in research on
emotional development in the early 1970s (Izard,
The developers of the construct of emotional intelligence (EI; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) have made
broad claims for it, declaring it the basis of emotional
skills, emotional achievements, and emotional competencies and “a good goal for a democratic culture”
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p. 16). Mayer and Salovey
thought it likely that EI includes teachable skills, but
they added the caveat that “the potential gains from
teaching emotional intelligence will need to be considered with caution” (p. 18). Apparently, many have
thrown this caution to the wind (undoubtedly to the
dismay of the developers of the construct), and their
efforts to teach and apply the construct in the workforce have resulted in a growing EI industry (Roberts,
Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). Moreover, somewhat
independent of these adult-oriented activities, techniques related to the EI construct, particularly to the
emotion perception or emotion knowledge (EK) component, have become part of school-based preventive
interventions. Such interventions affect the lives of
tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of children and
their families every year.
Roberts et al. (2001) presented rather robust data
that raised serious questions about the current measurement of EI. They showed that the consensus- and
expert-based methods of scoring the principal perfor-
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carroll E. Izard, Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716-2577. Electronic mail may be addressed to [email protected].
249
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1971) and became a hot topic in the 1980s and 1990s
(Denham, 1998), represents one such construct.
Roberts et al. (2001) focused on EI and its measurement and thus did not discuss the developmental research on the related construct of EK. Yet EK overlaps conceptually and operationally with the emotion
perception branch of EI (Mayer, DiPaulo, & Salovey,
1990). A considerable body of developmental research bearing on EK (for a review, see Denham,
1998) appears to give it a stronger empirical base than
that reported for the MEIS by Roberts et al. One could
interpret evidence of the validity of EK as having
positive implications for EI. Most of the evidence
relating to the validity of EK comes from developmental research on the perception and labeling of
emotion signals or cues in expressive behavior or provocative situations. One could also interpret emotion
perception, which forms the basis for emotion labeling and several other aspects of EK, as something
other than an intelligence.
I agree with the developers of the EI construct that
conventionally defined intelligence and personality do
not represent all the human abilities or characteristics
involved in social competence and adaptive behavior.
I also agree that humans have a domain of abilities
that relate to the emotions.
In the following sections, I define the broad construct of EK (studied mainly in developmental research with children) and note some relations to the
construct of EI (studied mainly in adults). Then I focus on its core components, emotion perception and
emotion labeling (EPL), which one can also interpret
as the core components of EI. Then I present evidence
supporting a more optimistic view of the efficacy of
EPL, than EI Roberts et al. (2001) did for EI in predicting behavioral outcomes for EI. Finally, I review
evidence showing that emotions do not always depend
on knowledge or cognitive mediation, that emotions
make independent contributions to individual and social functioning, and that the emotion-related abilities
and processes involved in these independent contributions may best be represented by the construct of
emotional adaptiveness (EA).
Emotional Intelligence, Emotional
Adaptiveness, and Emotion Knowledge
Mayer and Salovey (1997) defined EI in terms of a
four-branch model. The lowest branch consists of the
ability to accurately perceive the emotions or emotion
signals in self, others, objects, and situations. This
branch of EI also involves the ability to express emotions and emotion-related needs. One could argue that
EPL, the first and presumably major aspect of the
lowest branch, forms the foundation for the rest of EI.
Although its relation to the second branch (emotional
facilitation of thinking) may be arguable, emotion
perception or accurate emotion-signal detection and
emotion labeling appears essential to the third branch
of EI—understanding and analyzing emotions and using emotion understanding effectively. EPL also appears necessary for realization of the fourth branch—
reflective regulation of emotions to promote
emotional and intellectual growth.
EA stems from the core characteristics and functioning of the emotion systems and affects all other
systems. Developmental researchers have operationalized it, or its influence on perception and cognition,
through measures of EK. EK derives from certain
emotion-related skills and abilities, some of which
emerge primarily as a result of the functioning of the
emotion systems and some as a joint product of the
emotions and cognitive systems. All these abilities are
influenced by person–environment interactions
(Izard, 1971; Izard et al., 2001). EK, knowledge of the
expressions, labels, and functions of emotions, increases the probability that an individual can and will
utilize the inherent adaptiveness in emotion arousal
and emotion motivation. EK consists of many facets,
including the ability to (a) accurately perceive emotion signals in facial and vocal expressions, behaviors,
and various contexts (the most fundamental facet), (b)
label emotion signals, (c) identify causes or activators
of emotions in oneself and others, and (d) anticipate
one’s own emotions in expected or imagined situations. Other facets include the ability to recognize and
label one’s own emotions in varying circumstances,
and to understand (a) relations between emotion, motivation, and behavior, (b) family and cultural norms
for verbal and nonverbal emotion expressions, (c)
norms for emotion feelings, (d) dissimulation, and (e)
co-occurring emotions and ambivalence. These facets
probably vary in the extent to which they derive from
direct effects of the emotions on intelligence and personality on the one hand, or depend on cognitive development, individual experience, and social learning
on the other hand. Empirical research has not yet determined whether these 10 facets constitute a homogeneous and interrelated set. The 2 most frequently
studied facets of EK, defined together as EPL, do
correlate moderately, and investigators have examined them both singly and as an aggregated index of
EK.
The abilities to perceive and label emotions represent the core processes in EA and facilitate the devel-
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opment of its other components. The considerable
ability of young infants to perceive emotion signals,
discriminate among them, and respond to them in
meaningful ways suggest that EPL has heritability and
some independence of cognitive development (Caron
& Caron, 1988; Tronick, 1989). The ability to symbolize or label emotions involves inferential or interpretive processes that obviously depend on cognitive
development, but accurate emotion labeling also depends on accurate emotion perception. EPL abilities
are fundamental to emotion communication and normal social relationships (Bandura, 1986; Hobson,
1993). What also follows is that deficits in these abilities will contribute to deficiencies in other facets of
EA and impede the development of social competence.
EPL has content quite similar to that of the Emotion
Perception factor of the MEIS, an index of the foundational branch of EI. In a factor analysis of MEIS
(Roberts et al., 2001), the Emotion Perception factor
accounted for 28% of the total variance, almost twice
as much as the other two factors combined, but it had
unexpected correlates (e.g., low intelligence) that researchers have not found with indexes of EPL in developmental and clinical research (e.g., Denham,
1998; Izard et al., 2001). Actually, normative studies
of various components of EK show that the emergence of some its facets, such as the ability to predict
others’ emotions on the basis of their beliefs or desires
and understanding ambivalence, depend on age and
cognitive development (Harris, 1994; Harter, 1986).
Moreover, research shows that indexes of EPL relate
to a number of the qualities similar to those attributed
to EI. These qualities include sociability and positive
emotionality as well as peer acceptance and other aspects of socioemotional competence (Denham, 1998).
Identifying Effects Specific to EPL
Researchers have repeatedly found correlations between EPL and verbal ability ranging from .16 to .63.
Because of the assessment of both cognitive ability
and EPL through language, some of their common
variance may result from the common means of measurement or method variance. In any case, verbal ability is necessarily a determinant of current measures of
EPL and probably of other facets of EK as well. At
the very least, a child, for example, has to have the
requisite receptive vocabulary (a component of intelligence) to understand and respond to EPL tasks.
Thus, investigators evaluating the significance of EPL
for social behavior clearly need to control for the effects of the verbal component of intelligence and
probably other components as well. Theorists define
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intelligence as the ability for adaptation in, as well as
selection and shaping of, environments and as a construct that may include abilities for social and emotional functioning (Gardner, 1993; Sternberg, 1997).
Intelligence not only correlates positively with EPL
and adaptive behavior, it tends to correlate negatively
with maladaptive behavior. Although numerous risk
factors influence negative behavioral outcomes, intelligence accounts for unique variance after controlling
for other variables (Werner & Smith, 1992). Thus,
Roberts et al. (2001) correctly noted the need to control for cognitive ability in evaluating EI (and similar
constructs). Validity studies that fail to do this may
have little meaning.
Evaluating the predictive efficacy of EPL or any
other emotion-related ability also requires controlling
for temperament or personality. Several studies have
shown relations between the emotion systems and
personality. Studies have found that even in infancy,
emotion expression styles have considerable stability
over time, and that toddler’s expression styles predict
behavioral outcomes in later years. A number of studies have shown that personality indexed as emotionality or temperament predicts behavioral outcomes
(Lengua, West, & Sandler, 1998).
Emotions, temperament, and personality are interrelated (cf. Goldsmith & Campos, 1982), and adaptation often appears as the key construct or criterion for
evaluating and defining each of them. Theorists define emotions as inherently adaptive (Izard, 1971,
1989), as responses for adaptational encounters (Lazarus, 1991), and as the organizers and the motivational components of traits of personality (Malatesta,
1990). Theorists define traits of personality as influencing the choice of coping mechanisms and as determinants of well-being (Costa & McCrae, 1980).
Theorists define well-being in terms of happiness or
positive emotionality (Diener & Larsen, 1993). Research has shown that emotionality predicts children’s
personality and social functioning (Abe & Izard,
1999b; Eisenberg et al., 1997). Such evidence of the
interrelatedness of the constructs of emotionality and
temperament–personality supports the Roberts et al.
(2001) position that meaningful evaluations of emotion-related abilities require controlling for causal
processes specific to temperament–personality.
The Predictive Efficacy of EPL After
Controlling for Aspects of Intelligence
and Temperament
Early studies showed that children’s EPL predicted
positive behavioral outcomes (e.g., peer status and
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academic performance) after controlling for verbal
and performance components of general intelligence
(Garner, Jones, & Miner, 1994; Izard, 1971, ch. 14;
see Denham, 1998, for a review). Several recent studies found that EPL predicted aspects of social competence after controlling for indexes of both intelligence and temperament. One study demonstrated that
EPL had long-term predictive validity. Preschoolers’
EPL predicted adaptive social behavior and academic
competence 4 years later, when the children were in
third grade (Izard et al., 2001).
Although the foregoing developmental studies of
EPL have limitations, they stand in contrast to the
assessment of EI by Roberts et al. (2001). The number
of these developmental studies and the consistency of
the findings suggest that we can measure EPL and that
it plays a significant role in the development of socioemotional adaptiveness. High scores on EPL predict positive social behavior, and low scores on EPL
predict behavior problems.
How EPL Influences Social Behavior
The developmental data do not identify precisely
the processes through which EPL influences social
behavior. However, EPL relates conceptually and
logically to emotion communication—the decoding
and encoding of emotion signals. Breakdowns in
emotion communication affect social relationships adversely and may elicit negative emotions and withdrawal behavior in infants and children. Some of the
problems in the social relations of autistic children
may be due not to a deficiency in emotion expressions
but to their timing and apparent lack of relation to
context. Many studies also demonstrate that one’s
emotion expressions motivate responses in the observer. If the expression is contextually inappropriate,
it is more likely to motivate socially dysfunctional
behavior.
I propose that like deficient emotion-expressive behavior, deficient EPL leads to contextually inappropriate or insufficient emotion communication and,
hence, to behavior problems and delayed social competence. EPL and emotion communication are fundamental to empathy and sympathy, and these phenomena relate positively to prosocial behavior and
negatively to antisocial behavior and aggression (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). If children lack sufficient
EPL to interpret the expressive behavior of others and
understand its causes, they are more likely to encode
expressions that are socially discordant. More important, they will lack the information and motivation
essential for the social communication and empathic
responses that facilitate good peer relations and socially competent behavior (cf. Salovey & Mayer,
1990).
Emotional Adaptiveness
Although measures of the EPL component of EA in
children and the performance measures of the Emotion Perception factor of EI have similar content, the
conceptual representations of these two underlying
constructs differ widely. EI is conceived as a form of
intelligence; EA is conceived in terms of the functioning of the emotion systems and their distinct motivational properties. The subordinate construct of
EPL is conceived as a joint product of the emotions
and cognitive systems. Recent evidence suggests that
temperament–personality and social environment
contribute to the development of EPL. However, research on early emotional development suggests that
the decoding component of EPL and infants’ expressive responses to the detection of emotion signals
have innate determinants and are mainly a function of
the emotion systems. The emotion perception and
emotion expression systems in infants are highly preadapted to facilitate infant–other communication (Magai & McFadden, 1995; Tronick, 1989).
The questions created by popular appeal of the EI
construct, the increasing efforts to teach EI or apply it
in industry and education, the Roberts et al. (2001)
critique of the principal measurement model of EI,
and the contrasting positive results of developmental
research on EPL should attract more attention to a
central issue in psychological science: the nature of
emotions and their roles in the development of social
competence and in adaptative behavior across the life
span. Consideration of this multifaceted issue may
have profound implications for the construct of EI and
for emotion science. The question as to what drives
the perception, cognition, and action that give EI the
adaptive advantages claimed by its proponents represents a fundamental aspect of this broad issue. Are the
causal processes basically intellectual in nature or are
they basically emotional? The proponents of EI have
opted for an explanation in terms of intellectual processes, or an intelligence. Does this, in fact, amount to
an underestimation of the role of emotions? My answer, “Yes,” comes in part from my interpretation of
developmental data and in part from my intuition. I
am aware that my intuition may be largely a direct
effect of my emotion systems. In any case, a more
definitive answer to the question awaits more experimental investigations of individual differences in the
ADAPTIVE EMOTIONS
functioning of emotions and their effects on both
adaptive and maladaptive behavior.
To consider the merits of EA as a construct, researchers need to show that emotion systems have the
capacity to operate independently. Researchers also
need to demonstrate direct effects of emotions on perception, cognition, behavior, and developmental processes and show the implications of these emotion
effects for personal well-being and social adaptation.
The Relative Independence of the
Emotion Systems
I emphasize the notion of relative independence
among the emotion, cognitive, and action systems.
Relatively greater independence among systems characterizes infancy and early development because of
the immaturity of some underlying brain mechanisms
and pathways, but some independence continues
through the life span (cf. Damasio, 1994; LeDoux,
1996; Zajonc, 1980). Nevertheless, system interrelatedness and interdependence probably characterize
most of the coping strategies of daily life. Indeed, I
propose that the quality of overall adaptation to the
social and physical environment depends on the effectiveness of the connections and communications
among the major systems. For example, a connection
between the feeling of anger caused by unjustified
constraints and verbal self-assertion favors adaptation
more than a connection between such anger arousal
and violence.
Intersystem connections constitute the crux of emotional development and enable the remarkable effects
of the emotion systems on adaptation (Ackerman,
Abe, & Izard, 1998). A prime example is the infant
and toddler forming connections between emotion
feelings and verbal labels that enable the symbolization of emotions in awareness and their linguistic expression. Such connections between the emotion and
linguistic system eventually enable some cognitive
control over the emotions.
Although researchers agree that the emotion systems frequently interact with the cognitive systems,
only a few have identified the independent operations
of emotion as a significant problem for research
(Izard, 1993; LeDoux, 1996; Loewenstein, Weber,
Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Zajonc, 1980). There is some
evidence supporting the idea that the emotions make
independent contributions to perception, cognition,
behavior, temperament–personality, and developmental processes. Although, as many theorists agree, emotion systems have adaptive functions, specific emotion experiences may prove adaptive or maladaptive.
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The adaptiveness of a particular instance of emotion
arousal depends on a number of factors, including
cognitive antecedents (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Scherer,
1993), cognitive accompaniments (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), behavioral reactions, and contextual
factors.
Defining EA
In the framework of differential emotions theory,
the motivation for the processes involved in EA derive directly from the core characteristics of the emotions. In the past 3 decades, many theorists have
agreed with Darwin, James, Plutchik, and Tomkins
that emotions have motivational functions that give
them critical adaptive qualities; for example, interest
gives focus and selectivity to perception; fear and
anticipatory shame protect from physical and psychological harm; guilt motivates moral reasoning, empathy, and reparation of damaged relationships; and joy
works as an antidote for stress and a stimulus to social
interaction and creative thinking. In contrast, the developers of the construct of EI have not explicitly
ascribed motivational roles to the emotions and have
indicated that EI does not depend on motivation as
traditionally defined in nonemotional terms (Mayer &
Salovey, 1997).
A serious look at EA would mean directing more
effort toward understanding the core characteristics
and functions of the emotion systems and their relatively independent or distinct contributions to adaptation. This shift in conceptualizing causal processes in
adaptation would require acceptance of the relative
independence of the emotion systems. This shift also
requires acknowledging the capacity of emotions to
exert direct effects on behavior without cognitive mediation or the participation of an intelligence. The
construct of EA implies that cognitively or noncognitively generated emotions may, for example, mediate the solution to a problem in choosing among behavioral alternatives (Izard, 1993) and that the
emotion-determined choice may run counter to rational processes that point to a cognitively correct solution (cf. Loewenstein et al., 2001). Many scientists
reject such emotional propositions for use in mainstream psychology or cognitive science, continuing to
exclude emotion variables in studies of mental processes despite considerable evidence for direct effects
of emotions on systems ranging from perception to
personality.
Emotions Affect Perception
Anger induced through role-play tends to cause
participants to perceive expressions of anger when
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exposed stereoscopically with expressions of joy
(Izard, Wehmer, Livsey, & Jennings, 1965). Joy and
sadness induced through music make the perception
of emotion-congruent words faster and require less
sensory data than emotion-incongruent words. Similarly, participants make judgments about faces more
quickly when the expression on the faces match the
participants’ emotion state (Niedenthal, Setterlund, &
Jones, 1994). Aggressive children tend to attribute
hostility to the actions of others (Crick & Dodge,
1996), and anger-prone children tend to perceive anger signals in facial expressions where none exist
(Schultz, Izard, & Ackerman, 2000). Fear restricts the
visual field and creates severe perceptual biases that
limit the range and flexibility of cognitive processes
(McNally, 1996).
Emotions Affect Cognition
Research on the functions of emotions has demonstrated their substantial effects on performance tasks
in learning, memory, problem solving, and creativity
(e.g., Fredrickson, 1998; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki,
1987). Emotions affect not only the verbal aspects of
cognition but performance on spatial tasks as well
(Thompson, Schellenberg, & Husain, 2001). Evidence
from both behavioral research and neuroscience show
that emotion arousal influences the content and increases the durability of memory (Cahill & McGaugh,
1998; Heuer & Reisberg, 1992).
Emotions Affect the Development of EPL
Emotionality, temperament, and environment can
impede or facilitate the development of EPL and other
facets of EK through a number of processes. For example, children who are dispositionally prone to experience negative emotions or who live in a harsh
environment that frequently elicits strong negative
emotions may have difficulty in regulating emotion
arousal and in forming connections between these intense emotion feelings and the appropriate language
for articulating them. Also, anger proneness or frequent anger experiences may contribute to externalizing aggressive behavior that is likely to elicit strong
negative reactions from parents, siblings, and peers.
The negative social feedback in these encounters
could amplify the child’s already intense anger and
further impede the opportunity to acquire EPL and
other facets of EK (Lochman & Lenhart, 1993).
Low emotion thresholds (Izard, 1993) or a highly
reactive emotions system (Davidson, 2000) and fre-
quent experiences of intense emotions can place severe restraints on information processing. The compelling motivation generated by intense fear or social
anxiety tends to drive escape behavior or avoidance.
Such emotion states and behavior restrict the cognitive and linguistic processes necessary for forming the
affective–cognitive structures that derive from labeling and articulating the emotion experience, its
causes, and its consequences.
A child with a highly reactive emotions system
would also have great difficulty in appreciating the
emotions of the peer who is the emotion-eliciting
stimulus. An intense negative emotion experience
would preempt appraisal processes, direct cognition
and action toward defensive coping, preclude accurate
interpretation of the peer’s signals of emotion, and
retard the development of EPL and other facets of EK.
Trait Emotions Affect Behavior
Trait emotions (e.g., shyness, fearfulness) characterize the temperament of some children and predispose them to attentional and behavioral problems, including social withdrawal (Kagan, 1994). Angerprone children tend to infer hostile intent on the basis
of others’ actions and engage in aggressive behavior
(Lochman & Lenhart, 1993). Individuals dispositionally prone to experience shame and anger tend to
experience these emotions at a higher level of intensity than individuals with a different disposition, and
the different levels of emotional intensity have consequences for behavior (Tangney, Wagner, Barlow,
Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). Characteristically
happy people tend to engage in more social interactions (Diener & Larsen, 1993). Such influences of
trait emotion on cognition and behavior affect one’s
adaptation to the social and physical environment.
Emotions Affect Temperament and Personality
Both theoretical and measurement models of temperament and personality contain either discrete or
dimensional emotion concepts (Rothbart, Ahadi, &
Hershey, 1994; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman,
Teta, & Kraft, 1993). Patterns of emotion expression
in toddlers predict their personality traits in preschool
(Abe & Izard, 1999b). Frequency of experiencing particular emotions relates significantly to particular
traits of personality (e.g., interest and joy positively
relate to extraversion–sociability, anger and contempt
negatively to agreeableness). A broad pattern of negative emotions virtually defines the trait of neuroticism.
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Emotions Affect Human Development
From early infancy, when emotion expression
serves as the primary means of social communication,
through adolescence, emotions figure prominently in
motivating developmental changes (Magai & McFadden, 1995). One can interpret many of the findings
from research on the formative years as support for
the notion that emotions have direct effects on developmental processes, differential effects in each major
period of development (Abe & Izard, 1999a).
EI or EA?
How do researchers describe these emotion-related
effects on basic systems and developmental processes? The effects clearly have adaptive significance.
Negative emotions serve protective and guidance
functions in the physical and mental domains, including mediating advantageous decisions. Positive emotions greatly enhance an individual’s resources and
capacities for effective interpersonal interactions and
intellectual endeavors. Apparently, the emotion systems themselves generate these effects, sometimes
without cognitive mediation and sometimes despite
rational processes that would lead to other outcomes.
So, should researchers conceive these effects as stemming from an intelligence that draws from the emotions or as a type of adaptiveness that derives directly
from the emotions themselves?
How do researchers choose between the constructs
of EI and EA? To choose, researchers need to decide
whether (a) cognition is about knowledge and intelligence is about the ability to acquire and use it, and (b)
whether emotion is about arousal, feeling states, and
the motivation for what we actually choose, often on
an emotional basis, to think and do. If one agrees with
both (a) and (b), one’s choice is EA, and thereby
acknowledges that socioemotional competence is not
so much a special kind of intelligence as it is a matter
of sensing or perceiving emotion cues and signals in
self, others, and contexts, and responding in accordance with the emotion motivation elicited by the
perception.
Perhaps studies that examine the effectiveness of EI
in predicting social skills and achievements should
also test alternative hypotheses relating to EA. Research on EA should seek to explain emotion-related
effects on basic systems, interpersonal interactions,
and adaptive behavior by studying the functions of
emotions and their distinct motivational features.
Such endeavors may profit from studies designed to
determine when a specific emotion works to the in-
dividual’s advantage. To accomplish this, researchers
will need to examine the person characteristics, contextual factors, and levels of arousal that increase the
likelihood that a particular emotion works effectively
to enhance behavioral outcomes and the effectiveness
of adaptation. Individual differences in emotion
thresholds, emotionality, and emotional styles suggest
that emotion effects on basic systems vary across persons.
Conclusion
In contrast to the rather pessimistic view of EI in
Roberts et al. (2001), developmental studies have
yielded consistent results attesting to the validity of
emotion-related abilities and their role in achieving
socioemotional competence. In contrast to the perspective of EI theorists, I have presented the view that
emotions make direct contributions to the functioning
of the perceptual, cognitive, and personality systems
and to the development of socioemotional competence.
Perhaps researchers should carefully weigh the
need for balance in allocating research efforts to EI
and EA. Research on the two constructs could lead us
down either of two quite different pathways—the
search for a new intelligence or the search for the
direct effects of the emotions and the individual and
contextual factors that determine the quality of these
effects. These two pathways may cross in the domain
of emotion–cognition relations, junctures that may
prove fruitful grounds for research. For example, proponents of either EI or EA may find it interesting to
study the individual and environmental factors that
contribute to an emotion perception bias and a deficiency in EK.
To optimize research on the direct and relatively
independent contributions of emotions to human development and adaptation, researchers may need to
examine more closely and understand at a deeper
(emotional) level our explicit and implicit allegiance
to and dependence on the rational person ideology
that flowered in the Age of Enlightenment. This ideology, and our penchant for explanations of adaptive
behavior in terms of rational processes or some form
of intelligence, still dominates psychology. Researchers readily acknowledge that effective adaptation requires intelligence and reason. Most researchers, however, remain reluctant to acknowledge that the
functioning of the emotion systems themselves and
their unique and compelling influence on other systems explain a significant part of our thought, our
choices, and our actions.
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Received June 21, 2001
Revision received July 4, 2001
Accepted July 6, 2001 ■