Nationalist Trends in Iran, 1921-1926
Author(s): Homayoun Katouzian
Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), pp. 533-551
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162216 .
Accessed: 17/09/2011 04:39
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Journal of Middle East Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
Int. J. Middle East Stud. o1 (I979), 533-551
Printed in Great Britain
533
Homayoun Katouzian
NATIONALIST
TRENDS
IN IRAN,
1921-1926
The first quarter of the twentieth century contains a fascinating chapter of
modern Iranian history. It was a period of the death agony of the Qajar state;
a period of revolutionary upheaval, sociopolitical disorder and disintegration,
and cultural and literary transformation, a moment both of joy and of sadness,
achievement and failure, which, in an unusually clear way, illuminated the long
distance between what there was, and what was desired to be. This period may be
analysed in three parts: the first decade, which covers the period of the Persian
Revolution; the second decade, which can be described as a period of interregnum, when, in the well-known phrase, power was lying in the streets waiting
to be picked up; and the remaining five years which was a period of dual
sovereignty, characterized by a ruthless struggle for political power.
The Persian Revolution destroyed the traditional center of despotic power
without producing an adequate substitute, which, in a sense, was a logical
outcome of the revolution itself. The revolutionaries had begun with a demand
for the establishment of independent judicial procedures, which was intended as a
step toward the destruction of arbitrary power and its institutions; and they had
ended by drafting a constitution that provided for the formation of a national
assembly, the complete separation of powers and, to some extent, the decentralization of power in favour of the provinces. But the country was economically
poor, technologically backward, politically disunited, and internationally a
victim of power politics. World War I nearly proved to be the last straw.
The 'central' government adopted a neutral position which, with a sizable
Anglo-Russian military presence in the country, could not be taken seriously.
This led to the formation of the so-called provisional government, by a group of
dissenting radical politicians, in the western province (Kirmanshah), which
declared war on the Allies. For a period of about three years the country was
afflicted by foreign military intervention, international gunrunning, provincial
strife, and political disintegration.
When World War I ended, the fate of Persia was in balance. At the centre,
the old Persian despotism had been replaced with a disunited, almost incoherent,
plutocratic 'system'. In the provinces, the centrifugal, regional, and tribal,
forces were threatening to tear the land asunder, a situation so typical of the
AUTHOR'S NOTE: This paper is the final version of a seminar paper, presented to the
Middle East Centre, when, in 1975-76, the author was a visiting fellow of St. Antony's
College, Oxford. I am grateful to the College and the Centre for their moral and material
support; and to John Gurney for useful comments on the earlier drafts of this paper.
But the responsibility for my views, and my errors, is mine alone.
0020-7438/79/0300-0408
$oI.50 ? I979 Cambridge University Press
534 Homayoun Katouzian
entire Iranian history upon the collapse of an established order, the fall of a
dynasty or, usually, even the death of a powerful despot. The presence of British
troops in different parts of the country had removed any trace of Persian
sovereignty and independence. There was national disunity, political conflict,
economic disruption and poverty, social insecurity, and administrative corruption and incompetence. At the same time the geopolitical situation of the
Middle East was being radically transformed. The Balkanization of the Arab
lands and the Bolshevization of the Russian Empire introduced important new
factors in the accounting balance sheet of international power politics in the
area. Persia and the Persians were, once again, caught in the middle.
THE JANGAL
MOVEMENT
The formation of the 'rebellious' Provisional Government in Kirmanshah had
been followed by an armed insurrection in the Caspian province of Gilan. This
was organized and led by a group of younger Mashruteh revolutionaries from
the region itself. It was headed by Mirza Kfchik Khan - a former scholar of a
traditional college - who had fought for the revolution in various capacities.
A Shi'ite Muslim and an unyielding patriot, Kuchik was an indefatigable fighter
and an incorruptible leader whose sole ambition was to rid the country of
foreign imperial domination and domestic administrative corruption. The angal
(Forest) Movement - as the Gilan revolution has come to be known in history was neither a 'separatist' nor a 'bourgeois nationalist' nor a Communist revolution. It predated the Bolshevik revolution in Russia; and it was a genuine reaction to the disillusionments and depressions which had followed the triumph
of 1909.1
The Russian Bolsheviks got involved with the Movement when, in May 1920,
Soviet troops entered the Caspian port of Enzeli in order to reclaim the Russian
naval vessels abandoned by the forces of (the White-Guard) General Denikin,
upon their defeat in the southern theatre of the Russian Civil War. This came as
a complete surprise to the British expeditionary force occupying the port as well
as the provincial capital, Rasht, who responded by a swift evacuation and retreat
(very probably) both for (logistic) military and (strategic) political reasons.
Yet, apart from the repatriation of their naval vessels, the Russian occupation
became, by accident or design, a useful instrument for Soviet diplomatic
manoeuvring: they were as anxious to secure their own backdoor from Britishinspired interference in Russia as was the British government to curb the spread
of Bolshevism southward. The Russians had already sent a note of protest to the
Persian government against the proposed Anglo-Persian treaty, known as the
1919 Agreement, initiated and actively canvassed by the British foreign office.
1 See Fahkra'i 1965 which is intended as a political biography of KOchik Khan. In
spite of its limitations, this book is a valuable source of information on Kuchik if only
because the author, himself a Jangal revolutionary, is likely to be less biased than those
who subsequently emigrated to the Soviet Union.
Nationalist
Trends in Iran, I92I-I926
535
The Russian landing in Enzeli provided the Soviet government with an
excellent opportunity to counteract the British tactics. To this end, they helped
forge a coalition between Kuchik and a group of Azerbijani 'Marxist' revolutionaries, led by Haidar Khan, which - with moral, material and technical support
from Russia - occupied Rasht and declared a revolutionary republic.
Haidar Khan Tariverdiev - variously known as Bombiste (The Bomb-maker),
Chirdq-barqi(The Electrician) and Amu-ugli (The Cousin) - had been a radical
Mashrfteh revolutionary who had specialized in underground activity and distinguished himself in the use of urban guerilla tactics against Muhammad 'Ali
Shah and his gang. He was a strong personality, a heroic figure, and a revolutionary
democrat no less committed and incorruptible than Kuchik.2 In reality there was
not, and there could not be, much difference between him and Kuichikin terms of
their basic goals and aspirations for the Persian political economy; in appearance
he (probably) regarded Kfchik as a 'bourgeois nationalist', and himself (certainly) a revolutionary Marxist. At any rate, political prejudice, vested interest,
and theoretical misunderstandings have now built up this mainly formalistic
division into an indisputable historical metaphysic.3 The real difference was that
Haidar was an early representative of Revolutionary Westernism (or Modernism)
and Kiichik, an example of Revolutionary Persianism, that is, they were men
with similar revolutionary aspirations for the country but with different, at times
contradictory, understanding of the Persian society and, hence, dissimilar
approaches for its revival and reorganization. Otherwise, the adoption of a
revolutionary Marxist model, or the use of Marxist jargon by Haidar, and his
subsequent - noble and ignoble - political imitators, was much more a question
of form than substance. To put it briefly as well as bluntly, an Iranian MarxistLeninist, both then and later, has been simply a revolutionary with some,
usually superficial, knowledge of Marxist theory and tradition, wishing to rid
the country of imperialism, and promoting rapid national economic development by the use of modern technology. Inevitably, this has been combined with
an emotional commitment - sometimes, even subservience - toward the Soviet
Union and other Communist powers.
The establishment of the Gilan republic was accompanied with the formation
of the Communist party of Iran, in Enzeli in July 1920. Alarmed by these
developments, the central Iranian government lost no time in negotiating for
a general settlement which would normalize Russo-Iranian relations. The
Russian response was rapid as well as positive; within only a few months of
its formation, the CPI 'concluded' that the Iranian revolution must await the
full bourgeois development of the country! In January 1921, the Russians
declared that they would evacuate their troops and personnel from Gilan once
2
See Kasravi
I950.
3The arguments about Haidar's 'Marxism-Leninism'
and Kichick's
'bourgeois
nationalism' still rage among Persian intellectuals, as evidence that there is no end of a
simple lesson. This (pseudo-) ideological classification was first developed by some Jangali
emigr6s in the Russian journal Novy Vostok, and through that, in the French journal
Revue du Monde Mussulman. See E. H. Carr I953.
536
Homayoun Katouzian
the British forces had been withdrawn from everywhere in Persia. On 24
February a military coup d'etat 'toppled' the Persian government and assumed
control. Two days later, the celebrated Perso-Russian treaty (of I92I) was
concluded and signed in Moscow. In May, the British forces left Persia but the
expected march of the Gilan revolutionaries on Tehran was inexplicably postponed until October, during which time the Russian personnel and technical
advisers were withdrawn from the province. The delay in action and the physical
withdrawal of the Russians may have already sealed the fate of the revolution.
But these events had some moral and 'ideological' implications which probably
did more in spelling the doom for the revolutionaries of Gilan. For, just as the
central Iranian army was advancing on the provincial republic, the Gilan coalition collapsed, and the two ('nationalist' and 'Marxist') factions of the revolution
engaged in a civil war among themselves. The Jangalis were routed; Haidar
was killed in prison; Kfichik retreated and froze to death; and the remaining
revolutionary leaders either capitulated or crossed the border into the Soviet
Union. Few must have realized that the gruesome public display of Kuchik's
head in Teheran was an ominous symbol of the emerging New Order in Persia.4
THE 1919
AGREEMENT
The British government was anxious to stabilize the Iranian political economy
so as to safegaurd their own regional as well as local interests. This desire had
become more intense and more urgent as a result of the October Revolution in
Russia. The Iranian plutocracy (many of whom were not mere 'British agents'
as it has been generally thought, both then and later) were equally anxious to
pull the country together and normalize the situation. Yet the coincidence of
national poverty, political disorder, social disunity, tribal and ethnic conflict,
and the economic disruption and dislocation which had followed Mashruteh
and World War I would render such an achievement very difficult.
Therefore, the British government (in fact Curzon, the foreign secretary)
decided to provide a catalyst to enable the Iranian elite of the right administrative calibre and political colour, to approach this difficult task. To this end, the
Foreign Office entered into negotiations with the cabinet of Vusfq ad-Dawleh an intelligent and strong, but unpopular, politician who was, mainly as a result
of this particular move, regarded as a British 'spy' - for a bilateral treaty of
technical assistance and economic cooperation. This resulted in the notorious
9 9 Agreement.
The main points of the agreement were the provision of a loan by Britain
to Persia; and the employment, by the Persian government, of British military
and civil (technical) advisers to help reorganize Persia's army, and state
administration. This looks like the first formal attempt at the provision of
financial and technical assistance from a developed to a 'developing country,'
which has become widespread since the Second World War - that is, 'foreign
4 For
details see Fakhra'i 1965, Carr 1953, and Serge I963.
Nationalist
Trends in Iran, I92I1-I926
537
aid.' Yet, it was rejected by the Persian political public with an emotional (and,
occasionally, physical) violence which bears no comparison with contemporary
attacks on foreign aid by dissenting political groups and parties in the countries
of the Third World. The British foreign office, and Curzon in particular,
were genuinely unable to understand the significance of this reaction; consequently they made the habitual mistake of all arrogant powers (or 'superpowers') who would blame the results of their own ignorance of an alien
culture on the activities of 'a few rabble-rousers,' 'the mob,' 'the subversive
elements,' etc. The overwhelming rejection of the 19I9 Agreement by the
Persian political public was not so much because of the letter, nor even the
spirit of the treaty. In fact, the Agreement had been rejected even before its
contents were known to any number of people; and it is likely that most of
those who have regarded it as a great conspiracy against the Iranian national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, have known very little of its contents.5
By the time the 1919 Agreement was concluded, the Anglo-Russian secret
treaty of I907 had been well-known; the subsequent role and tactics of the
British government in Persia, including political and military intervention,
had left no credibility at all for any claims of British goodwill toward Persia;
the British replacement of Ottoman suzerainty over the neighbouring Arab
lands, and especially 'Iraq, was far from reassuring; and the thinly disguised
British support for Shaikh Khaz'al, the ruler of Muhammara (later Kurramshahr), who was suspected of cessationist designs for the oil province, was
alarming. A detached analysis, based not only on the Agreement but also on a
knowledge of subsequent developments (including the publication of the relevant
documents thirty years later, and other revelations through memoirs, biographies, etc.) shows that the worst fears of the Persian people were unfounded; in
particular, it is now almost certain that the British did not intend to use the I919
Agreement as a vehicle for increasingtheir hold over Persia, let alone colonizing
it directly. But this guarded analytical conclusion, sixty years after the event,
itself reveals the extent to which the British government had acted, and reacted,
with real ignorance.
And, true to their misunderstanding of the situation, the British had made a
mistake in dealing with men who were least suitable for a peaceful implementation of such a policy, although perhaps in this regard they had had very few
options: by definition, popular politicians scarcely take unpopular political
decisions, especially in a 'developing country.' For, apart from his own unpopularity, Vusuq was - willy nilly - allied with two other politicians - Nusrat
ad-Dawleh (Firuz) and Sarim ad-Dawleh (Mas'fid) - whose personal integrity
5 The
political poet 'Ishqi accused VusCq of selling the country to Britain and, in a
scathing political attack, he told him that 'Persia is not your daddy's property'. DawlatAbidi, a leading independent politician told the British charge, Sir Percy Cox, that there
was nothing wrong with the articles of the Agreement, but everything wrong with the
Agreement itself; see Dawlat-Abadi 1950, vol. 4. Mustawfi, a one-time Persian diplomat
in London, wrote a whole pamphlet against the Agreement entitled 'Ibtl al-bdtil (Refutation of the Refuted), reprinted in Mustawfi 1962, vol. 3.
538
Homayoun Katouzian
and administrative ability fell far short of his own. Perhaps the charge of being
British agents has been more just against these two men than any other Persian
politician of this century, if only because future events proved that, in pursuit
of their narrow self-interest, they would be ready to offer their services to any
person or power. At any rate, such a triumvirate was wholly anathema to the
political public, even without their involvement in the Agreement!
THE COUP D'ETAT
OF 1921
The period I92I-1926
was a period of dual sovereignty:
a period of intense
struggle for political power both among rival men, and between competing
political visions. It was inaugurated by the coup d'etat of February 1921
(3rd Isfand 1299, Persian calendar) when a professional 'Cossak' Brigade led by
Reza Khan - who was later to found the Pahlavi dynasty - marched from the
provincial town of Qazvin, occupied the capital almost without bloodshed,
declared martial law, and put Sayyed Zia ad-Din (Tabi Taba'i), a hitherto
obscure journalist, in the office of prime minister. At least a few days before its
commencement the coup's imminence had been known in Tehran; indeed,
the Shah had ordered the capital's garrison that no resistance should be offered
against the intruders. Furthermore, the Qajar monarch immediately recognized
the coup and thus, as the National Assembly was still in recess, gave it some
retrospective legitimacy.6
In fact there had been no government to topple: Vusfiq's cabinet had been
already replaced by a 'caretaker' government led by Sephadar-i Rashti (Akbar),
a man hardly capable of taking care of anything even at the best of times.
In fact his so-called government was already withering away when, in anticipation of the coup, he resigned from office. In retrospect it is clear that the coup
had been intended as the alternative route to the achievement of the spirit of
the 1919 Agreement - that is, a political stabilization in Persia which would
not pose a threat to the main local and regional interests of the British Empire.
It is equally clear that Britain was somehow involved in the conception of the
coup, although it is highly likely that the British foreign office itself had not
conceived the idea. The full facts of the matter are not yet known; but it is
certain that the commander of the local British forces, General Ironside, had been
directly involved in its conception and execution. According to both written
and spoken memoirs, there had, at first, been other civilian and military nominees
for the leadership of the coup than those who finally led it: many are said to have
turned down the suggestion. At any rate it is certain that Reza Khan had been
hand-picked by Ironside who had been impressed by the man's personal and
martial qualities.7
6 See
Arf'a, I963.
7See Dawlat-Abadi 1950: IV; Mustawfi 1962: III; Khajeh-Niri,
Makki I944 and 1945. The role of General Ironside in this episode
knowledge.
1942 and 1943;
is now common
Nationalist
Trends in Iran, I921-1926
539
The coup makers immediately declared martial law and interned nearly all the
conventional politicians of all political persuasions, not even excluding Nusrat
ad-Dawleh, the opportunistic member of Vusuq's triumvirate who, returning
from London, had fancied himself as the natural candidate for premiership in the
new set-up. This was the beginning of an entirely new era in Persian history in
the profoundest sense of this term. Yet, it is a sign of the anti-authoritariannature
of the Persian public, and of the political atmosphere to which they had become
accustomed, that next to the opening words 'I command' of Reza Khan's martial
law declaration, printed on the city walls everywhere, there appeared overnight
the taunting response 'Go to hell' (Guh Mikhur - lit: have shit). They found it
not only unacceptable but also unbelievable that Reza Khan, or anyone else,
would seriously presume to take commandof their life. They were soon to know
better.
But it would be a mistake to think that the coupwas greeted merely with a mixture
of apathy and hostility: on the contrary, for reasons which will become clear in a
moment, it was given an enthusiastic, even euphoric, reception by many younger
political activists, including scores of poets and essayists, belonging to a revolutionary trend in Persian nationalism. For example, the poets 'Ishqi and 'Arif both of whom had been previously imprisoned for their outspoken opposition
to the 1919 Agreement - wrote songs, poems and articles in support of the coup
and its twin leaders: the political elite had been locked up; the communiques
issued by Sayyed Zia and Reza Khan were couched in unprecedented (radical
and vitalistic) nationalist terms, ending with slogans such as 'long live the
Iranian nation;' and within a month the new prime minister had declared the
19I9 Agreement - which he himself had previously supported in his journal dead and buried. In fact, when three months after the coup Sayyed Zia 'inexplicably' resigned from premiership and left the country, this was seen by the
radical nationalists not as an internal coup by Reza Khan (which is the more
likely explanation) but as a subtle counter-coup by the hated political elite: the
more so, as it was followed by the release of the political (elite) prisoners who
were still in gaol, and general elections. The deceptive normalization appeared both to the opponents and to the supporters of the coup - as a return to the status
quo ante. The song of lament written by Abulqasim 'Arif for the departure of
Sayyed Zia ('I would forfeit my life for your Black Cabinet, return!') is still
remembered.
DUAL SOVEREIGNTY:
THE CONTEST
OF MEN AND VISIONS
There were to be five more cabinets, led by the elite politicians of varying
political tendencies and (especially) methods, before Reza Khan, the (de facto)
permanent minister of war, became prime minister towards the end of 1923.
In this period, he rapidly consolidated his position in various fields: he tightened
his command over (the expanding) professional army, and gained total popularity
among both officers and men; he personally commanded the troops which finally
540
Homayoun Katouzian
routed the Janglis in Gilan; he began to put down tribal and regional rebellions,
highway robbery and brigandage; he established non-committal contacts with
the political elite, posing as an honest broker who was above conventional
political intrigue and petty rivalry; he gathered around himself younger men
of the civil service and the professions - many of them with modern, westernstyle if not Western, educational backgrounds -who made up the emerging
techno-bureaucratic elite of the country; he cast the image of an able and honest
patriot in the country at large; and, finally, he managed to win over the majority
of the deputies of the national assembly. In a short and decisive period he dug
in deep roots while the political elite - contemptuous of 'the illiterate former
private soldier' - were engaged in their conventional cut-throat competition.
They woke up to reality when it was too late.
The clash of ideas, and the unfolding of events, in this crucial quinquennium,
have been little understood in relation to the time and place in which they occurred.
Because, either inappropriate models or analogies have been applied to them; or
they have been evaluated merely in the light of subsequent events - that is, by
reading history backwards. For example, according to some models Reza Khan
appears as a 'strong' nationalist leader determined to effect social progress in a
country not yet ready for 'western-style parliamentary democracy'; indeed,
this was the view of the British legation in Tehran, and, through them, the
Foreign Office, in London. According to some other models, Reza Khan was a
'bourgeois nationalist' leader confronting 'reactionary feudals' and their 'religious supporters'; this was the view of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran and,
through them, the people's commissariat for foreign affairs in Moscow. In fact,
there is very little difference of substancebetween these two views: they are both
generalizations from the European social and intellectual experience, merely
couched in different ideological terms.8 According to a third (and much more
Iranian) model, the Persian public had -from the beginning- regarded Reza Khan
as a British 'spy' who would fulfil his mission in the service of British imperialism.
Yet, anyone who would care to examine the vast political, journalistic and
artistic (mainly poetical) literature of this period, would soon realize that
this is mainly a projection of later emotions backward to the contemporary
facts. Even Sayyed Hasan Mudarris, the most tenacious opponent of Reza Khan,
did not accuse him of being a British 'spy', and, in any case, did not oppose him
merely for this reason: indeed, with a rare clarity of vision he saw the real threat
in Reza Khan's bid for total power.
This subject is important in its own right; but it is indispensable for an
analytical understanding of the development of the Iranian political economy
since the foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty, which is best discussed by a classification and assessment of the main political tendencies of the period.
8 The
coincidence of the British and the Russian 'analytical' assessments of Reza
Khan, even though they used different jargons, is remarkable. For a summary of the
Russian view, see Carr I953. For a more detailed and documented British view, see
Waterfield 1973.
Nationalist
Trends in Iran, I92I-I926
541
'Nationalist' Trends
Three basic political tendencies may be identified since the triumph of the
Mashruteh revolution, regardless of the many more guises in which they
appeared. Furthermore, all the three tendencies could be described as 'nationalist'
from the viewpoint of European history and social science: the first tendency
may be called 'modern,' 'progressive,' 'radical' or 'forward-looking' nationalism;
the second, 'liberal,' 'democratic,' or 'bourgeois' nationalism; and the third,
either 'conservative,' 'insular,' 'backward-looking' nationalism, or indeed,
'obscurantist,' 'pro-feudal' 'black reaction'! It is sufficient to employ the above
terminology in order to show up the conceptual misunderstandings which they
formalize.
In fact, only the first tendency can be clearly identified as having a kind of
nationalist vision rather similar to its European counterpart. The reason is that it
drew considerably - though not entirely - on European cultural and historical
sources which had lately impressed the Persian intellectual consciousness. It was
hardheaded, modern-minded, impatient and acutely conscious of the ancient,
that is, pre-Islamic, glories of the Iranian Empire. It wanted to remove the
barriers which it believed religion had put in the way of Persia's cultural and
technological progress. It was weary of the slow processes of parliamentary and
judicial deliberations, and it scorned the corruption and selfishness which they
sometimes involved. It matched the learning, urbanity or parliamentary sophistication of the other tendencies, in its liveliness and energy, both in journalism
and in military and administrative activities. It was vocal, forthright and positive
in action; meritocratic in attitude, and contemptuous of the old 'aristocratic' and
religious values. It consisted of an amalgam of journalists, political poets
and essayists, westernized bureaucrats and military leaders. They were heterogeneous in their educational, technical and socio-economic backgrounds,
and otherwise unhomogenous in their motives and aspirations; and in any
case, not all of them continued within this broad tendency until the end. But
there is a sufficient amount of similarity in their methods, ideas and temper
to justify grouping them together within a distinct tendency.
Hardheaded nationalist sentiments began to be expressed in a scattered fashion
in the first instance by poets and journalists as early as the beginnings of the
First War, though they can even be traced back to the revolutionary period itself.
The poets Muhammad Reza 'Ishqi, Abulqasim 'Arif (Qazvini), Farrukhi
Yazdi, and Abulqasim Lahuti are but a few well-known examples of the literary
group within this tendency. Later, a number of distinguished intellectuals,
lawyers and soldiers, including Sulaiman Mirza Iskandari, 'Ali Akbar Davar,
'Abdul-Husain Taimur-Tash, Farrajullah Bahrami, 'Ali Dashti, Colonel
Habibullah Shaibani, Generals Amir-Ahmadi, Yazdan-Panah and AmirTahmasibi, etc., were added to the list and increasingly gathered around the
personality of Reza Khhn.
The literati filled in books and journals about the bygone glories which
542
Homayoun Katouzian
had ended in total poverty and helplessness. They popularized the stories of
the Achiminid and Sassanian military and cultural achievements and, in this
process, they stumbled upon Persia's historic defeat by the Arab nation, which
in turn they held responsible for all the religious superstition and obscurantism
that plagued the country at the time. Many of them were not anti-religious,
but nearly all were contemptuous of religious leaders and preachers. 'Arif
Qazvini wrote:
Ever since the Arabs got a foothold in Iran,
No word of happinesswas heard from the land of Sassan.9
'Ishqi wrote the 'opera' of the Resurrection of the Iranian Emperors0Oand
reacted sharply, in a poem, to a suggestion apparently made by some Turkish
journalists that Zoroaster had been a Turk and not an Iranian.11He was so
earnestly full of nationalistic fervor that he once wrote, referring to the depth of
his patriotic feelings:
I am in love, let my dismemberedheart bear witness,
I hold no other evidence but this shredded document.12
Lhuiti - the Gendarmerie major who organized the attempted Tabriz coup of
1922 and sought refuge in the Soviet Union upon its failure,13 had written,
as early as
191o:
Where is Balkh and Bukhara,
What became of Khiva and Kabul?
Where is India and Samarkand,
What became of Babylon and Zabul?14
Farrukhi-Yazdi, the nationalist poet, whose career was to experience all seasons
including membership of the National Assembly and death in prison,15 wrote
almost nothing else than patriotic political pieces of which this is a specimen:
We are the dear ones of Kaikavus
The Sons of Jamshid and of Cirus [Cyrus]
The offspringof Karan, Give and Tius,
(But) as we are deeply disappointedin England,
Lord Curzon has been visited with anger,
He has (now) resortedto passion plays.16
Once the poets and essayists had set the stage in this fashion, the politicians
and military leaders entered the scene. The latter were naturally more aware of
9 'Arif I946, 270.
10 'Ishqi, n.d., 222-232.
" Ibid., p. 350.
12 Ibid., p. 334.
13 See Hedayat
I963: 331-334. This had followed the uprising and tragic death of
Shaikh Muhammad Khiabani earlier. See ibid. See also Bahar 1954: I, whose moving
poetical requiem for Khiabani has the refrain: Gar khun-i Khiabani-i mazlum bijfushad;
sar ta sar-i Iran kafan-i surkh bipashad: If the innocent blood of Khiabani comes to boil;
the entire Iranian people could have a red shroud.
14 See 'Abbasi 1958: I, 204-207.
15 See Farrukhi 1953, Introduction. There is a strong probability that he was murdered
in prison (in 1939).
16 See 'Abbasi
1958: I, 438-440.
Nationalist
Trends in Iran, I921-1926
543
the practical constraints on the restoration of some of the past glories, but these
aspirations provided them with the ideal goals toward which they should strive,
and the methods of reform which they should employ. For it is commonplace although this was curiously unknown to most of the intellectual stage-managers that the pursuit of such goals usually requires means incompatible with the kind
of civil liberties, and sometimes even license, which the nationalist writers had
taken for granted. Thus, gradually a dividing line began to appear between the
pragmatic realism of the politicians, and the abstract idealism of the intellectuals
within this political tendency; and, as so often happens, these two groups, which
were so close to each other in terms of ideas and aspirations, eventually became
each other's deadly enemies.
Looking at the situation in retrospect, it was probably inevitable that the
practical leadership of this tendency would be assumed by a military leader, and
Reza Khan emerged as the obvious choice. A native of Savad Kuh in the Province
of Mazandaran, Reza Khan was a brigadier who had risen from the ranks during
the post-revolutionary period. He had been present in a number of counterinsurgency campaigns against the restorationist attempts of the relics of the old
despotism; and, in particular, he had distinguished himself in action in the
successful campaign led by the great revolutionary generals, Ephrim Khan ('the
Armenian'), and Sardar Bahadur (later, Sardar As'ad) against Salar ad-Dawleh,
the brother of the fallen monarch.17 His rapid promotion owed a lot to his
professional merits, the meritocratic character of revolutionary armies, and the
Persianization of the iranian officers' corps in the 'Cossak' Brigade, especially
after the rise of Bolshevism in Russia, had led to the disappearance of the
Imperial Russian officers previously 'seconded' to the Brigade. Brigadier Reza
Khan, later known as the Sardar Sepah - a title that is almost translatable into
'The Lord General' - was intelligent, hardworking, forthright, and ruthless,
with an astonishingly powerful memory, and a high degree of self-confidence that
through success degenerated into arrogance.18He had had very little formal
education, but he had accumulated a good deal of experience in military organization and leadership. He was nationalist in sentiment, pragmatic in choice of
means, and ruthless in the application of methods that he thought necessary for
the achievement of both personal and national objectives. He had an iron will
that on a number of occasions helped him to save his own life, or a cause that
without this quality might have been totally lost. He successfully combined two
conflicting qualities which are very rarely found in the same person: a short
temper and directness to the point of rudeness - and sometimes even obscenity and an ability to hold views, plans, and even personal grudges so close to his chest
that he would catch almost everybody by surprise each time he decided to reveal
his hand.19 He had no time for freedom but pretended to operate within a
framework of law and order, he was not democratic in attitude but there was an
17 See
Bahar 1944.
18See Dawlat-Abadi 1950; Mustawfi 1962, and Hedayat I963.
19 See Hedayat 1963, 385-386
and 403. See also Khajeh-Nuri
1942:
I, esp. pp. 90-92.
544
Homayoun Katouzian
element of populism in his behavior. Like his main rival and adversary, Sayyed
Hiasan Mudarris (some of whose personal qualities he must have secretly
admired) he was contemptuous of the old nobility and he regarded them
as utterly incapable of saving the situation. Mudarris may not have been guilty
of too much exaggeration when he said, at about this time, that there had been
only two men of political courage and masculinity left in the country, Reza Khan,
and himself.
The second - so-called 'liberal' or 'bourgeois nationalist' - political tendency
was more directly a product of the MashrzutehRevolution. This was represented
by a fairly genuine synthesis between Shi'ite anti-despotism and western
pluralism in support of personal freedom, legal justice and political powersharing. It was not predominantly or significantly religious in character. But it
realized that in the circumstances an attack on religion, its historical origins and
social traditions, would be incompatible with the spirit of the institutional
framework which it wanted to preserve for the body politic. It was symbolized by
respectable and popular political figures such as Mirza Hasan Mushir ad-Dawleh,
Mirza Husain Mu'tamin al-Mulk, Mirza Hasan Mustawfi al-Mamalik and
Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq as-Saltaneh (who was destined to lead the campaign
for the nationalization of Persian oil twenty-five years later). These men were
deeply committed to the preservation of the constitutionalist achievements of the
Persian Revolution; yet, at the same time, they were not averse to a certain
amount of housecleaning especially for the establishment of law and order
throughout the country. Their European education and experience added to
their upbringing in enlightened and sophisticated Muslim households had, in the
first instance, impressed a deep sense of legalism on their minds which did not
make it impossible for them to reach compromises within a broadly legalistic
framework. Personally, they were not the stuff of which martyrs are made as
long as they could help it; but their conduct was at times so correct, so apparently
open and indiscriminate that it earned some of them the ambiguous - if not
mildly pejorative - title of Vajih al-Milleh (national goody-goody). Their
'nationalism' was to a large extent empirical and, therefore, it had less to do with
the greater glory of the Persian nation than with a reassertion of the civil and
national dignity of the Persian people. This outlook was even more true of the
third political tendency which we shall discuss in a moment. In a purely relative
sense, they had been the Presbyterians of the Persian Revolution, and they
became the Directoirists of its aftermath: they were equally opposed to Jacobinism, Restorationism and Bonapartism.
The third and last major political tendency was much more radical, less
flexible, more obstinate and more entrenched in the old Persian civil and
religious culture; less Europeanized, and therefore, less acutely conscious of
nationhood but more of the community of Iranians. These men were not
religious obscurantists who might have been harking back to the early or middle
Qajar sociocultural arrangements. On the contrary, they were quite uncompromising on the issues of the defense of parliamentarygovernment and decentraliza-
Nationalist
Trends in Iran,
I92I-I926
545
tion of power. Indeed, in terms of technical skill, a few of them must be ranked
among the greatest parliamentarians that Persia has ever seen. They were the
inheritors of the early Shi'i opposition to centralized political authority; they were
Shi'ite Muslims who realized that their opposition to arbitrary power, and their
commitment to the defense of personal liberties and independent judicial procedures was - in the context of Persian politics - nearest to anything which might
be described as the Shi'ite political doctrine.20 In practice they normally found
themselves in alliance with the second political tendency, with whom they shared
a good deal of political objectives; and like them, they drew their public support
from the Bazar community and the urban crowd. They included men like the
poet Muhammad Hashim Mirza Afsar, Mirza Hashim Ashtiani, Sayyed
'Ibrdhim Zia al-Va'izin, Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali Tehrani, Firuz-Abadi, Ha'iriZadeh, Kazirini, the (manoeuvrable) poet-laureat Bahar and, above all, Sayyed
Hasan Mudarris, who in almost every respect was the very personification of
this movement. Many of them, including some of those mentioned above, later
changed course and withdrew from the public scene, but Mudarris remained
adamant until the bitter end.21
Mudarris was a native of Qumsheh (now Shahreza) a small town in the
central province of Isfahan. He was educated first at a madrisa in the city
of Isfahan, then in Najaf. He later found his way into the Iranian national
politics when he was selected as the representative of the Isfahani religious
leaders in the National Assembly. In no time this unknown provincial 'dlim who
had brought along with him little more than a sharp wit, and an even sharper
tongue, made a considerable reputation in the political circles of the capital.
World War I and the long parliamentary recession it brought found Mudarris in
the Provisional Government of Kirmanshah as their Minister of Justice. When
that government finally dissolved itself, he was among those of its leadership
who thought it safer to spend a period of grace in Istanbul before returning to
Tehran. On his return he opposed the 1919 Agreement, although his personal
relations with Vusuq ad-Dawleh, the prime minister on whom the fate of the
treaty directly depended, remained on the whole cordial. On the morrow of the
1921 Coup, when on the order of Sayyed Zia (Taba-Taba'i) almost every
conventional politician was arrested, Mudarris found himself in prison. And a
few months later, after the quick disappearance of Sayyed Zia from Persian
politics (at least for some considerable time to come), he secured a seat for
himself in the newly elected national assembly. It was from this time onward
that the battlelines were more and more clearly drawn for the final confrontation
less than five years later.
Mudarris was an accomplished parliamentarian, with electrifying oratorical
powers, who on a number of important occasions turned the parliamentary tide
20
For example, in a debate in the National Assembly (1921), Mudarrissaid that
'Muslim Persia must be Muslim and Iranian' Khajeh-Nuri 1943: II, I62.
21
He was murderedin prisonin 1938afternine yearsof banishmentin the old citadel
of Khaf in the province of Khurisan. ibid, pp. 334-336.
546
Homayoun Katouzian
in his own favor by the sheer weight of a speech or two, full of common sense,
wit and, sometimes, moral intimidation. He was in contact with people of all
classes and, if anything, he was noticeably less warm in his attitude toward the
nobility than he was toward the common people. He was democratic in his
political attitude, and he had no use either for high posts or for worldly possessions. Indeed, Flaubert's remark about Renan, 'If a man is someonewhy should
he want to be something,'fits his case perfectly. But, at the same time, he loved
to enjoy personal power, especially in a 'king-making' capacity. He was very selfassured to the point of being incautious and even tactless at times, and this was
an important factor in his downfall. He was a man of principle but, unlike some
of the leaders of the second tendency, he was not too particular about the means
he employed for the attainment of his objectives. Even when he used tactics
which could be easily taken as evidence of hypocrisy and inconsistency, however,
he applied them in such a way that would largely pre-empt such accusations.
For example, he surprised many by his defense of Nusrat ad-Dawleh's credentials for commission to the National Assembly barely six months after the latter's
activities in favor of the 1919 Agreement. But, at the same time, he spoke with
such contempt both of him and his role in that episode that it was difficult to
accuse him of inconsistency.22 Or, when in a moment of despair he made the
tactical mistake of contacting Khaz'al, the Shaikh of Muhammarra who stood
accused of being a separatist, a tyrant, and an agent of imperialism all at once,
he still made no bones about his sentiments towards him. He wrote:
I have, on two or three occasions, mentioned in my letters that the people of Tehran
generallydo not thinkwell of you; that you do not have a good reputationin the country,
and that all the people have a sense of hatredand dislike towardyou. Therefore, if you
would like your past to be forgotten, you would have to compensatefor it with good
deeds. ... This is the day on which you are being put to the test... if you pass it well,
your wrongdoingswill be inevitablymitigated . . . otherwiseit is not possible to deceive
the people of Tehran with words alone.... .23
This small passage is in fact highly representative of some of his prominent
personal characteristics; in particular, his directness, his inflexibility on points of
principle, and a self-assurance which sometimes bordered on arrogance. He once,
reputedly, sent a message to Sayyed Zia saying: 'You should have killed us all,
if you wanted to be allowed to succeed.'24 And he later proved, even though in
another context, to be as good as his word. He did not understand the modern
processes of politics and government, and yet he was a great politician; he was
dictatorial in personal manners, but democratic in social spirit. He was pragmatic in his choice of means but rigid in the defence of his principles. Mudarris
22 He
said, in a long and fascinating speech, that Nusrat's reputation had been 'tainted,'
but that now he was 'repentant' and had 'confessed to his errors.' He might not be honest
in his repentance, but they had to take his word for it; and if he changed his course again
he (Mudarris) would be as good as he had been in opposing him as a member of Vusufq's
triumvirate. Khajeh-Niuri I943: II, I59-I63.
23 See Mustawfi
III, 638.
I962:
24 Ibid., p. 267.
Nationalist
Trends in Iran, I92I-I926
547
was a star of the postrevolutionary 'liberal-anarchism'; he fell when the 'liberalanarchist' age was over.
THE UNEQUAL
Through
CONFRONTATION
the fourth session of the national assembly
(1923-I925)
it became
gradually clear that Reza Khan was bidding for a complete take-over. In fact,
Mudarris and his followers became alive to the threat and its full implications
earlier than others. The popular politicians of the second tendency were, at
first, not entirely convinced that this was so; and, in any case, they had been
rather impressed with Reza Khan's positive achievements (both then, and even
later). This was in part a reflection of differences in vision. For, what Mudarris
and his tendency were (rightly) most afraid of was a restoration of functional
despotism. They cared much less about the maintenance of law and order in the
provinces, the revival of 'the past Iranian glories,' etc., than the defense of the
hard-won achievements of Mashriteh against the increasing threats of revivalist
nationalism. On one occasion, Mudarris told one of his own sympathizers (who
had pointed out Reza Khan's merits to him) that after all the people had to be
safe 'from those whom they supply with a few rifles!'25
The illegal activities of the police and the gendarmerie, both of which the
war office had quietly brought under its own command, were increasing
daily; and it was becoming less and less possible to indulge in free (and sometimes
licentious) political activity and journalism which had been usually, but not
always, possible since World War I. Besides the annual budgetary increases
in the allocation for the army, there were illicit financial appropriations by the
ministry of war. This issue came to a head particularly when, in a parliamentary
speech, a member of the national assembly (Mu'in at-Tujjar, a leading Bazar
merchant) complained against it. Mudarris took up the theme and pointed the
attack at Reza Khan himself with reference to the manipulations of the Khaliseh
(state) properties, and indirect taxes by the war office. The confrontation that
followed was finally settled with a tactical retreat by the minister of war.26
In time, the leadership of both anti-despotic tendencies found themselves
in opposition to Reza Khan's tactics and aspirations. But it was Mudarris and
his group who took a consistent and wholly intransigent stand against him.
Mudarris in particular resorted to almost every possible tactic to prevent the
Sardar's assumption of complete power. He tried unsuccessfully to move the
Prince Regent into action. He rallied the leaders of the Bazar, the commercial
community, and entered negotiations with individuals whom he would have
otherwise not regarded as natural allies. In this way, he managed to alienate, at
least for a critical period, leaders of the second political tendency whose sympathies were generally much closer to his own than the other party's. For
example, late in 1922, he managed to bring down the government of the popular
and highly respected Mirza Hasan Mustawfi al-Mamalik by his masterly
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid., 537-546.
Khajeh-Nuri
1943:
II.
548
Homayoun Katouzian
parliamentary tactics, and tried to put the highly unpopular Mirza Ahmad
Qavam as-Saltaneh in his place. His own justification was simple and pragmatic:
he likened Mustawfi to a 'jeweled sword' which, however, was only useful during
peace time; and Qavam to a 'sharp sabre' which was absolutely indispensable for
war. But this did not prevent the national-revivalist poets 'Ishqi, 'Arif and Farrukhi from showering him with a barrage of abuse and obscenity. Yet, by will and
by circumstance, Reza Khan's fortunes continued to rise in spite of occasional
setbacks: he was elected to premiership, by the National Assembly, in 1924,
mainly because of the spinelessness of Mushir ad-Dawleh (a popular goodygoody), though this would have happened sooner or later;27 he overthrew, and
arrested, Khaz'al, the tyrannical Shaikh of Muhammara (who had been enjoying
British protection), hence enhancing his stature among his supporters and bystanders, and throwing his opposition into confusion or silent admiration; he
bought off a number of politicians and journalists from the opposite camps,
frightened some others into inaction, and won over many others who, in such
circumstances, always judge 'the truth' by the relative power of the contenders.
REZA KHAN BECOMES
REZA SHAH
The final battle was fought in two stages. Early in 1925 telegrams began
to arrive from all over the country for the establishment of a republic. Demonstrations and meetings were held, leaflets distributed, concerts given, and
speeches delivered propagating the virtues of a republican system. Reza Khan
pretended to be neutral, but the active involvement of the army in the republican
camp was symbolic. The opposition to republicanism - including the leaders
and supporters of the two anti-despotic political tendencies also closed ranks.
In fact, it was clear to many of the latter that Reza Khan's republic is the first
step toward the foundation of the Pahlavi dynasty.28 Some national-revivalist
intellectuals, notably the poet 'Ishqi - who had been increasingly showing signs
of a change of heart - defected to the opposition. But the government already
enjoyed quite a sizable majority in the National Assembly, and it would not be an
exaggeration to claim that but for the exceptional energy and astuteness of Mudarris the campaign would have been an undiluted success. It failed ingloriously.
After preparing the mood, both inside and outside the National Assembly,
Mudarris and his parliamentary allies tabled a motion of censure against the
very person of the prime minister, consisting of three points, the second of
27 Over a
dispute about the banning of a newspaper, Reza Khan sent a message to
Mushir ad-Dawleh, the prime minister, that he should either ban the newspaper or face
the prospect of being barred from entering the cabinet room. The weak and urbane
prime minister found the message so insulting as he resigned his office, and refused to
withdraw his resignation, even when Reza Khan had tried to retract or modify his words.
28 For example,
in a poem on the subject, the poet-laureate wrote: Dar pardeh-yi
jumhuri, kibad dar-i shahi; Ma bikhabar u dushman-i tamma' zirang ast: In the guise
of republic, he wants to become king; we are naive, and the greedy enemy is canny.
Bahar 1954: I.
Nationalist
Trends in Iran, I92i-I926
549
which accused him of no less than 'activities against the constitution and constitutional monarchy; and insulting the National Consultative Assembly.' This,
indeed, was a daring move which, in the circumstances, no one but the aging and
fearless Sayyed could possibly have led. It immediately created an atmosphere
of nervous tension for the government, even in spite of the fact that they enjoyed complete control over the internal security forces; and they had a clear
majority in the National Assembly. It looked as if the opposition had no hope
at all.
On the day on which the motion of censure was to be debated, a big demonstration had been organized by both sides outside the National Assembly.
Each party was hoping to provide moral support for its own deputies and taunt,
and intimidate, those of the other side. By all accounts the government lobby
was relatively thin, and their voices were quickly drowned by the supporters of
the opposition. The ranks of the latter swelled, especially when the news went
out that 'even before the formal declaration of a republican system' an old and
respectable religious dignitary, that is, Mudarris, had been struck inside the
assembly. This was true, and the timing was so perfect that one is tempted to
think that the Sayyed had planned it all down to the last detail. It happened
before the arrival of the prime minister when the Assembly was not yet in
session, but argument and controversy was raging among the deputies in the
lobbies and corridors. According to eyewitness accounts Mudarris was deliberately emotional in tone and provocative in content: a tactic which led to the
'explosion' of a lesser light in the government camp, a certain Dr. Ehya'asSaltaneh (Shaikh), who assaulted him. When the prime minister arrived at the
scene outside the Assembly, without knowledge of the blow to Mudarris and its
impact on the demonstrators, he was furious, and ordered the Assembly guards
to attack and disperse the crowd. A protracted and bloody battle was fought in
which the Sardar himself was personally involved, being showered - according
to Bahar, Dawlat-Abadi, Khajeh-Niri, etc. - with bricks and even shoes ('Not
flowers but bricks did they throw at him,' wrote 'Ishqi in a long semicolloquial
poem, entitled 'The Republic Saga,' whose publication certainly made a significant contribution to his own death by assassination not long afterward). The
next public figure to lose his temper, in the charged atmosphere of that day, was
the highly respected speaker of the Assembly - Mirza Husain Mu'ataminal-Mulk,
an 'independent,' who was particularly angry with the Sardar's order to the
Assembly guards to disperse the people by force without consulting him first.
Given his personal political sentiments, he must have felt as if he was being outmaneuvered in his own house, and by the use of his own servants (i.e., the
Assembly guards who were formally under his command). He lost his temper
and abused the prime minister, in front of many deputies, when Reza Khan had
managed to disengage himself - with the help of the poet-laureat - and enter the
assembly building. Mudarris had won. The republican movement was scrapped
and the government camp, whose star had reached its nadir, had to pause for a
while in order to heal its wounds. The Sardar himself adopted a very conciliatory
550
Homayoun Katouzian
policy toward the opposition, and in particular he tried to keep Mudarris happy
for a while by conceding to some of his demands in a private conference. This
attitude had been calculated to lull the opposition into inaction especially at a
time, after the collapse of the republican movement, when a concerted and
systematic effort might just have managed to deny him the final ascendancy, for
ever. In spite of this, however, the long-term balance of power had decisively
changed, and while Mudarris was still dizzy with his impossible triumph, the
second stage of the war was already being set. Mudarris had won the battle not
suspecting that he was about to lose the war.
In mid-October I925 a simple motion, signed by a number of deputies
including some who until recently had been in opposition, was tabled in the
National Assembly demanding the abolition of the Qajar dynasty and the
temporary transfer of the royal title to the prime minister, until a constituent
assembly had ratified the decision. The opposition, now sunk to a handful of
deputies some of whom had decided not to attend with or without apologies,29
desperately tried to use delaying tactics, but to no avail. Of the fourteen deputies
led by Mudarris he alone raised his powerful voice, shouting that even if they
took 'a hundred thousand votes it would still be illegal,' and stormed out of the
House without delivering a formal speech. Four of the 'independents' - Taqizadeh, 'Ala, Musaddiq and Dawlat-Abadi, in that order - delivered speeches
against the resolution. All speeches, except that of 'Ala which was no more than a
few words counseling caution, were reasoned, and moderate. They invariably
included praise for the achievements of the prime minister and support for his
continuation in office, but they argued that the proposed resolution would be of
no practical benefit, or that it had to be applied according to proper constitutional procedures. In particular, Musaddiq, who delivered an extremely wellprepared, reasoned, and yet emotional speech, said that he was opposed to the
move because if it turned the Sardar into a powerless constitutional monarch,
the country would lose the leadership of a very able politician, and if it turned
him into a dictator (which he very well knew would be the case) it would be
against the achievements of the Persian Revolution: he would not support such
a cause no matter whether he was 'abused,' 'cursed,' 'killed' or even 'mutilated.'
The speeches were answered, one by one, by four members of the Majority
Faction in a moderate tone.30 The assembly divided, and the motion was carried
overwhelmingly. The Qajars fell and an exciting chapter of Iranian history
ended.
Both the elections for the constituent assembly, and its deliberations, which
ratified the decision of the National Assembly, and conferred the royal title to
Reza Khan and his male issue, were no more than a farce: they must have
29The night before, an unsuccessful attempt had been made on the life of the poetlaureat with the express purpose of terrorizing the opposition, and bringing the wavering
members of the Assembly into line. Later that night the majority of deputies had been
individually summoned to a secret meeting in order to get their firm commitment for the
next day's historic vote. Dawlat-Abadi: IV.
30 For the full text of all the speeches, see Makki I945.
Nationalist
Trends in Iran, 1921-1926
551
surprised few men other than Sulaiman Mirza Iskandari, the parliamentary
socialist leader who had only then discovered that he had been deceived by
'the bourgeois nationalist leader' whom he had so consistently supported.
Yet it is also true that only a few men - this time Musaddiq among them could conceive of the long-term implications of this event. In fact, just after
Reza Khan's coronation early in 1926, the light-hearted urban crowd had made
up another one of their habitual anti-authority (but, in this case, not so offensive)
slogans: 'that which they've put on your head; they've just been pulling your
leg!'31 They would soon learn who was pulling whose what. For this was a
crucial strategic success for the despotic counter-revolution, which ruled over
Persia for the next fifteen years.
UNIVERSITY
OF KENT AT CANTERBURY
REFERENCES
'Abbasi, M. (1958). Tarikh-i matbu 'at va adabiyat-i Irdn dar dawreh-yi mashrztiyat.
2 vols. Tehran.
Arf'a, G. (I963). Under Five Shahs. London.
'Arif, A. (I325/1946). Divdn-i Mirza Abulqdsim 'Arif-i Qazvivi. Tehran.
Bahar, M. T. (I944). Tarikh-i mukhtasar-i ahzdb-i siasi dar Irdn. Tehran.
Tehran.
Bastani-Parizi, M. H. (1962). Mushir-ad Dawleh....
Browne, E. G. (I9o0). The Persian Revolution. London.
Carr, E. H. (1953). The Bolshevik Revolution. vol. 3, London.
Cottom, R. W. (I964). Nationalism in Iran. University of Pittsburgh Press.
Dawlat-Abadi, Y. (1950). Haydt-i Yahyd. 4 vols. Tehran.
Fakha'i, 'I. (I965). Sarddr-i Jangal.
Fakhra'i, 'I. (1968). Gilan dar junbish-i mashruitiyat. Tehran.
Farrukh, S. M. (1967). Khdtirdt-i sidsy-i Farrukh. 2 vols. Tehran.
Farrukhi, M. (1953). Divdn-i Farrukhi, ed. H. Makki. Tehran.
Fateh, M. (1954). Panjdh sdl naft-i Irdn. Tehran.
Hedayat, M. (I963). Kdtirdt va khatardt. 2nd. ed. Tehran.
'Ishqi, M. R. (n.d.). Kulliydt-i musavvar-i 'Ishqi, ed. A. A. M. Salimi. Tehran.
'I. (1942). Bdzigardn-i 'asr-i tald 'i: I. Tehran.
Khajeh-Nfri,
Khajeh-NCri, 'I. (943).
Bdzigardn-i 'asr-i tald 'i: II. Tehran.
Kasravi, S. A. (I950). Tdrikh-i mashruteh-yi Irdn.
Makki, H. (I944). Tdrikh-i bist saleh-yi Irdn. 3 vols. Tehran.
Makki, H. (1945). Nutqhdy-i tdrikhy-i Ductur Musaddiq. Tehran.
Mustawfi, 'A. (1962). Tdrikh-i 'ijtima 'i va 'iddry-i dawreh-yi Qdijrriyeh. 3 vols. Tehran.
Safa'i, 'I. (1962). Rahbardn-i Mashru-teh. 2 vols. Tehran.
Serge, V. (1963). Memoirs of a Revolutionary. London.
Waterfield, G. (I973). Professional Diplomat (a biography of Sir Percy Loraine). London.
31
In keh sarit guzashtan; sar bi sarit guzashtan.