Review: Cold-War Revisionism: A Critique
Author(s): J. L. Richardson
Source: World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Jul., 1972), pp. 579-612
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010458
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RPeviewoArticles
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM:
A Critique
ByJ.L. RICHARDSON
GabrielKolko,The Politicsof War: Allied Diplomacyand the WorldCrisis
andNicolson,
i968, 685 PP. ?4.20. New
of 1943-1945, London,Weidenfeld
York,RandomHouse,i968, $I2.95.
Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, London,
Gar Alperovitz,
Secker& Warburg,i966, 3I7 pp. 35S. New York,Simonand Schuster,
i965, $7.50.
GarAlperovitz,
Cold War Essays,GardenCity,New York,DoubledayAnchorBooks,I970, I50 pp. $I.45.
From Yalta to Vietnam:AmericanForeignPolicyin the
David Horowitz,
Penguin Books, i967, 465 pp. 50 p. New
Cold War, Harmondsworth,
underthetitle,The Free World ColosYork,Hill andWang (published
sus, I965, $6.95; revised
editions,
I970 and I97I).
have had a
THEwritingsof the so-calledCold-Warrevisionists
powerfulimpactin recentyears.In thecase of thenew generation
comingto politicalawareness,analogiesdrawn or suggestedbetween
Vietnamand theperiodof theoriginsof the Cold War carryimmedihisateconviction:manyothershavehad theirimageof contemporary
and thosenotpersuadedby therevitorychallengedor evenshattered,
sionistcase would acknowledgethat importantquestionshave been
critique.
havefavoredtherevisionist
circumstances
raised.Undoubtedly
thattheirworkshave
The revisionists,
however,havebeenfortunate
not been subjectedto the same criticalscrutinywhich theyhave diand even the casual utterancesof
rectedat the decisions,statements,
article
will attemptsuch a critical
This
the earlyCold-Warleaders.
analysis,focusingon the earlyperiodof the Cold War in Europe: it
was in relationto EuropethattheWesternimageof the Cold War as
of Communistexpansionismwas formed,and it is
the containment
Exceptperhapsfor
herethattherevisionist
challengeis moststriking.
the Korean war, therehas neverbeen so clearlydefineda Western
theorthodoxy(which one
imageoftheCold War in Asia: countering
had
there
Rusk
the
Dean
term
alwaysbeen a vigorous
view)
might
in Euschoolwhichheld thatAsia was beingmisperceived
dissenting
WORLD POLITICS
580
in the
consists
critique
oftherevisionist
The radicalism
ropeanterms.
betweentheEuropeanand Asian
of thissortof distinction
rejection
Westthatit is theoriginal
arenasoftheColdWar,andtheinsistence
ernimageoftheColdWarin Europewhichis at fault.
in seekingto define
a problemof demarcation
Thereis inevitably
school.Mostrecentstudiesof theCold War departin
therevisionist
influenced
whichwerestrongly
somedegreefromearlierconceptions
War as
Cold
"the
to
perceive
come
authors
as
accounts,
byparticipant
with
work.It is in accordance
toborrow
thetitleofa recent
History,"
as thosewho
to definetherevisionists
usage,however,
theprevailing
Westernimageof theCold War,not
wouldreplacethetraditional
imageof
model,butwithanother
kindofexplanatory
witha different
reprimary
thesamegeneraltype:thatis to say,one whichascribes
to theconflict.
to oneofthetwoparties
sponsibility
fromtwoothertypesof interpretation:
Thismaybe distinguished
thetwo
clashbetween
(a) thosethatseetheColdWaras an inevitable
economicand soexperience,
whosehistorical
superpowers,
emerging
theiraims,expectations,
rendered
and ideologies
cialsystems,
assumpand (b) thosethat,sceptical
of the
tions,and policiesincompatible;
causalconnections
andultimate
longer-range
ofunravelling
feasibility
consewould see the Cold War as the unintended
responsibilities,
a
conflict
two
of
the
interaction
beyond
spiral
powers,
quenceofthe
internal
politicsdeeplyin theirrelationships,
involving
theircontrol,
a productof avoidabledecisionsand over-reactions.'
butnonetheless
thethreetypesofinterpretation:
Needlesstosay,mostworkscombine
or inadof
most
extreme
inevitability
the
protagonistshistorical
only
on theone hand,
willruleoutsomeelementofcontingency
vertence
alofresponsibility
on theother;andquestions
orwiderdeterminants
longwhentheyareposedwithina relevant
fruitfully
waysarise-most
whentheyamounttono
leastfruitfully
context,
rangeandshort-range
men."
morethanthesearchfor"guilty
The worksunderdiscussion
maybe seenas thehardcoreofthere'Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (London i967) emphasizeshistorical
but perThe secondapproachhas not been workedout systematically
determinants.
There are tracesin Alperovitz,Cold War Essays; it is
vades muchof the literature.
and traditional
both revisionist
suggestedby an excellentshorthistorywhich reflects
(New York
insights,Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966
economicand ideological,are examinedin
i967). Americandomesticdeterminants,
the writingsof Lloyd C. Gardner: Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison I964), and Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy,
I1941-1949
(Chicago 1970).
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
581
visionist
school.Theylayheavystress
on theresponsibility
oftheleadersofoneside,theAmerican;
thereis a striking
disregard
forcontext.
Theymayalso,hopefully,
be seen as "first-generation"
revisionists.
Thatis to say,ifearlierhistorical
controversies
offer
an analogy,the
first,
polemical
generation
giveswaytomorediscriminating
successors
whodiscardtheexcesses
butretainwhatis of valuein therevisionist
critique.
Despitefirst
impressions,
thisprocess
hasscarcely
begunin the
caseoftheworksin question:theimpressive
scholarship
ofKolkoand
Alperovitz
doesnotleadthemtoavoidexcesses
thatarelesssurprising
in an overtly
polemicalworkof synthesis,
suchas thatof Horowitz.
It isnotpossible
toexamine
all theissuesraised,
andmuchofKolko's
in particular,
detailedresearch,
willremaina valuablestimulus.
This
articlewillexaminerevisionist
treatments
of six issues,centralto the
earlyCold War,whichexemplify
verygeneral,
pervasive
weaknesses
in thehandlingofevidence
and thetesting
ofhypotheses.
(i)
The roleofEastern
Europein theColdWar: (Was Ameriofinfluence
canopposition
toa Sovietsphere
thedecisive
first
phase
oftheCold War? Was Sovietpolicyreactive,
i.e.,was thetighta response
toWestern
control
eningofCommunist
hostility
rather
thanan originalSovietintention?);
(2)
The breakdownof East-Westcooperation(1945-46), with
toSoviet-American
economic
relations
andpolicy
specialreference
towards
Germany;
decisionto droptheatomicbomb,and the
(3) The American
deadlockovernuclearcontrol(theBaruchPlan);
subsequent
in GerSovietobjectives
beyondEasternEurope,especially
manyandFrance;
(4)
(5) The finaldivisionof Europe in I947: (Was this due to
the choiceof ideological
war as
Americanpolicy,in particular
collaboration?
Was thisthegreatlostopporagainstEast-West
ofthepostwar
tunity
period?);
(6) The foundingof NATO, and Westernrearmament:(Was
ofa Soviet
ofexaggerated
fearsofan unrealthreat
thistheproduct
or
a
sensible
ofWestern
invasion
Europe,
precautionary
policy?).
582
WORLD POLITICS
willthentakeup someofthewiderissuesraisedbythereviThearticle
sionist
studies.
discussion
of
The following
is notdependent
on a specific
definition
thenatureorthestarting
pointoftheColdWar.Lackingthediscipline
provided
by theoutbreak
and termination
of "hot"wars,writers
on
theColdWarhavefeltfreetosetitsstarting
pointat datesas diverse
as i9I7-I9, I938-39, I945, or i947-48, in accordancewiththeirgeneral
view of thecontest.Much of the confusion,
however,arisesfromfailure to distinguish
betweenthe stateof hostility
and conflict
whichhas
therelationsbetweenthe SovietUnion and theWestern
characterized
thatis termedthe
powerssinceI9I7, and thephaseof thisrelationship
Cold War. It would promoteclearerdiscussionifthisphasewerespecified,forexample,as theperiodduringwhichinternational
politicswas
betweentwo blocs led by the superdominatedby thebipolarconflict
so intenseas to ruleout mostformsof collaboration,
powers,a conflict
betweenthe
and characterized
by the breakdownof communication
withineach supertwosides,a climateoffear,suspicion,and repression
power,and a fearofwar hangingovertheworld,especiallyEurope.So
had itsoriginsin theperiodoftheBolshevikRevodefined,theconflict
the appeasementpolicyof the late
lutionand Westernintervention,
in I945-46; but it
I930's, and thebreakdownof wartimecollaboration
of Cold War untili947-48, thenbegan to
did not reachthe intensity
in themid-ig5o's,and bythemid-ig6o'shad beenreplaced
ease fitfully
bywhathas been termeda detenteor "limitedadversary"
relationship
in
not unlike many great-power
relationships the past.
include: Paul Seaburyand Brian
2Earlierdiscussionsof the revisionistliterature
Thomas, "Cold War Origins" (two articles),Journal of ContemporaryHistory, iii
(January i968), i69-98; Henry Pachter, "Revisionist Historians and the Cold War,"
Dissent, xv (November-December i968), 505-i8; Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and
the Interpretationof Cold War Origins," Perspectivesin American History, iv (1970),
3I3-47. Revisionist
authorsdiscussedin one or moreof these,in additionto Alperovitz,
Horowitzand Kolko,includeD. F. Fleming,W. A. Williams,Isaac Deutscher,P.M.S.
and Konni Zilliacus.CharlesMaier'sarticlediscussessome of the themesof
Blackett,
thepresentarticle,withless emphasison Europe but greaterattentionto the general
and perspectives
of the revisionist
assumptions
school.Some of my conclusionsare
verycloseto his: but as theyare approachedby different
routes,and as thispaperwas
firstdraftedbeforehis articleappeared,I have leftthemto standas originally
formulated.
3 The questionof datingthe startof theCold War, and its dependenceon different
of the conflict,
is discussedby Paul Seabury,The Rise and Decline of the
definitions
Cold War (New York i967), 4-i0. The definition
offeredabove raisesproblemsfor
insofaras it pointsto I947-48 ratherthani945 as the startof the Cold
therevisionists
War. But thisis notan attempt
to resolvetheissuesverbally:it is open to therevisionist
to arguethatthemain causesof the lapse intoCold War by i947-48 are to be found
not in theeventsof thoseyears,but in the eventsof i945 or earlier.
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
583
EASTERN EUROPE
ofUnitedStatespolicy
The transformation
assumptions
of thehistoric
leftistcontrol-sponat preventing
aimedspecifically
into a strategy
now
taneousorSovietimposed-inEasternEuropeis easilydocumented
thatarchivesfor I945-46 are being opened.It is clear thatthe United
arsenal-short
in the diplomatic
Statesappliedeverykindof pressure
of leftgovernments
of a land invasion-topreventthe institution
Cold War Essays,97).
(Alperovitz,
Much has been made of the remarkablemeetingbetweenTruman
and Molotovon April23, 1945, whenTruman,elevendaysin officeas
President,
decided,in accordancewiththeadviceof Harriman,Deane,
risking
to takea hardline overthePolishissue,thereby
and Forrestal,
a diplomaticbreak with the SovietUnion. Negotiationsin Moscow
betweenMolotov and the Americanand BritishAmbassadorshad
of the Yalta agreement
reacheda deadlockover the implementation
provisionalPolish government.
to reorganizethe Soviet-sponsored
was
WhethertheSovietstandwas in violationof theYalta Agreement
disputedamongtheAmericanleaders,but on thispointKolko argues
thatboth sides had hardenedtheirpositionssince the
convincingly
hard-wonYalta compromise,
both tendingto revertto theirformer
positions(p. 390). Truman'sfirstexercisein personaldiplomacyhad
been prefacedby his remarkto his advisersthat"he intendedto go
on withtheplans forSan Franciscoand if the Russiansdid not wish
to join us theycould go to hell."4
the actual courseof
However,so farwas thisfromforeshadowing
AmericanpolicythatHarryHopkinswas sentto Moscow to attempt
dito resolvethe deadlockwhich had developedin Soviet-American
plomacy,especiallyoverPoland. In thesetalksthe UnitedStatesconceded the mostsubstantialof the pointsat issueby agreeingthatthe
shouldbe limitedto theaddiofthePolishgovernment
reorganization
leadersto the Soviet-spontionof a smallnumberof Western-oriented
on a new
ratherthan recreatingthe government
soredgovernment,
basis.The outcomeof the Hopkins missioncastsseriousdoubton the
of the "delayed showdown"in Americandiplomacyadhypothesis
In acceptinga Communist-dominated
vancedby Alperovitz.5
governmentand in rapidlymovingto recognizeit (July5), the U.S. was
from
tacitlyabandoninganyattemptto pressforSovietdisengagement
4Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York
I951),
50.
5Alperovitzacceptsthe importanceof the concessionson Poland, but argues that
the Americanshoped to reversethe positionafterthe droppingof the atomicbomb
to reconcilewithpromptrecognition
or
(AtomicDiplomacy,p. 89). This is difficult
thefailureto attemptsucha policyafterHiroshima,indicatedbelow. At mostit was
or a formof face-saving.
a vagueaspiration
WORLD
584
POLITICS
statein EasternEurope-thestatein whichthe
themostsignificant
to pressitsdemands.
Westwas bestplaceddiplomatically
in the
offensive
diplomatic
Western
The somewhat
moresustained
wakeofHiroshima
andNagasakimustbearthemainweightof susto deny
thatthe Americaneffort
contention
tainingtherevisionist
to theinitiain EasternEuropeamounted
Russiaa sphereofinfluence
tionoftheColdWarbytheWest.The caseis a weakone.It is clear
climate:Truman
the psychological
enoughthatthe bombaffected
in theBalkans,Byrnesand Bevin
of influence
spokeagainstspheres
in Bulgariaand Hungary
forelections
thearrangements
condemned
and the firstmeetingof the
in theirbeingpostponed),
(resulting
ostensireacheda deadlock,
in September
CouncilofForeignMinisters
Sovietopposithrough
issues,butmoreplausibly
blyoverprocedural
in EasternEurope
on freeelections
insistence
tiontotheByrnes-Bevin
governments.
oftheremaining
oftherecognition
as a condition
an
Therewas,indeed, attempt
toprecipiwasnoshowdown.
Butthere
afterhavingretateone.On August2i, KingMichaelofRoumania,
calledforhisgovernment's
resigAmerican
hints,
ceivedencouraging
and Russiato assist
nationandappealedto theUnitedStates,Britain,
undertheYalta Declaration.
of a new government
in theformation
in
Despitepleasforpromptactionby the Americanrepresentative
toexpressing
limited
itself
and
generalsupport
Washington
Bucharest,
informed
withRoumanian
Byrnes
politicians.
placeda banoncontacts
that
theAmerican
representative
junctureis, as you know,to
Principalconcernof US Govtat present
keep theroad open to a solutionof Rumanianpoliticalcrisiswhich
to all threeAlliedGovts.We hopeno actionwillbe
willbe acceptable
thatcrisis
takenwhichmightseemto givegroundforSovietsuspicion
. . . We do not
intervention."
aboutby"Anglo-American
was brought
shouldbe givento the King rethinkthatanyadviceor assurances
difficult
position....'
gardinghispresent
buttheUnited
showdown,
The stagehadbeensetfora diplomatic
in Hungaryin
the
Western
response
Statesdrewback,foreshadowing
1956
and in Czechoslovakiain i968.
in EasternEuropein thispeofCommunist
support
The weakness
at Potsprivately
riodhasbeenwidelynoted.Stalinhadacknowledged
and
wouldbe anti-Soviet
dam that"anyfreelyelectedgovernment
in Hungaryin November
In theelection
I945
thatwe cannotadmit."7
couldwin onlyI7 per centof thevote,against57
theCommunists
6 Department
of
State,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates,DiplomaticPapers,
D.C. i967), 594. For documentson the crisis,see pp. 565.6og.
1945, V (Washington,
7 Philip E. Mosely, The Kremlinand WorldPolitics(New York i960), 214.
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
585
per cent for the Small Farmers'Party.Mikolajczyk'sPeasant Party
was thoughtto enjoysimilarsupportin Poland.
did littleto exploitthissituation.Their
The Westerngovernments
ofelectionsin Bulgariaand Hungary,
led to thepostponement
protests
whichhad the unintendedeffectof relaxingsome of the pressureon
thecourseofeventsin Poland
to influence
Moscow.Americanattempts
In parand ineffective.
in thesecondhalfof I945 wereill-coordinated
Department
ticular,therewas littlepressurefor elections.The State
soughtto attacheconomicconditionsto projectedloans to Poland,
conditionswhich seemedunrealisticto AmbassadorLane, but it dispoliticalconditions.U.S. policy-makcouragedhim fromformulating
erscould agreeon discouragingPolish applicationsforcredit,but this
was a tacitacceptanceof inabilityto influencean adversesituation.8
drewback in alarmfromthebreakdown
The Westerngovernments
and fromWashington
Ministers,
Foreign
of
meeting
oftheSeptember
and London thereemergeda chorusof assurancesthatthe two governmentsacceptedRussia'sneed forfriendlyregimeson its borders.9
At the DecemberCouncil of Foreign Ministers,progresswas made
towardsdraftpeace treatieswith the formerAxis satellites,and the
Polish patternwas repeatedin the case of Roumania: that is to say,
Britainand the United
additionsto the government,
afterface-saving
Statesextendedformalrecognition.
The behaviorof the Westernpowers,then,is not consistentwith
verdictof the
ofa seriousattemptto reversethemilitary
thehypothesis
of conthe
victims
were
and
Britain
States
the
United
war. Rather,
The position
hencetheirpolicyoscillations.
adviceand pressures,
flicting
the
bestwork
remains
in
what
W.
H.
McNeill
summed
well
was
up by
on theperiod:
in i945-46
at worldpacification
thattheeffort
a misfortune
It wassurely
rootedin theirrespective
to menso firmly
shouldhavebeenentrusted
Bevinand Molotovwere.... It doesnot
as Byrnes,
backyards
national
facedthe
everfullyand frankly
and British
appearthattheAmericans
forEastern
betweenthe two partsof theirprogramme
contradiction
wereinforRussiaand 'democratic'
government
Europe.Friendliness
in question;butByrnesand Bevin
in mostofthecountries
compatible
notto admitthe fact.10
eitherdid notknowor professed
8ForeignRelations(fn. 6), 374-76, 388-93, 41i-i6, 419, 422.
OThomas(fn. 2), i85-86, citesspeechesby Acheson,Byrnes,Eden, Macmillan,and
I945 and FebruaryI946.
Bevinin October-November
and Conflict
10W. H. McNeill,America,Britainand Russia: Their Co-operation
Affairs1939-1946 (London I953),
1941-1946, a volume of Surveyof International
698, 700.
586
WORLD POLITICS
in bothcapitalswereawareof
policy-makers
It is clearthatcertain
andthatmuchoftheadvicefromtheStateDepartthecontradiction,
in Eastwas thatSovietdominance
mentas wellas theForeignOffice
through
running
This theme,
ernEuropewouldhaveto be accepted.
fortheYaltaandPotsdam
papersprepared
oftheAmerican
a number
bytherevisionists.
hasbeenneglected
meetings,
wouldnotopposepredomiprobably
whilethisGovernment
Politically,
would
inthearea[PolandandtheBalkans]neither
nantSovietinfluence
to be completelynullified.
influence
it wishAmerican
In orderto attain[a] position. . . wherethereare someelements
to Moscow,it couldbe madeclearto Stalin
subservient
not completely
suchas thosein
toregimes
recognition
thatwe cannotaccorddiplomatic
changed....
BulgariaandRoumaniauntiltheyhavebeenfundamentally
configuramaynotwantto opposea political
WhiletheGovernment
tionin EasternEuropewhichgivesthe SovietUnion a predominant
woulditdesiretoseePolandbecomein fact
influencein Poland,neither
therecompletelyelimiinfluence
American
have
and
a Sovietsatellite
nated.
whichhe wouldlikefor
doesnotexpectthefullfreedom
Mikolajczyk
Polandand thePolishpeople.On theotherhandhe is hopefulthat
of thePeasantPartya reasonabledegreeof freethestrength
through
now. . . . he freelyaccepts
can be preserved
dom and independence
policymustfollowthe lead of Mosand foreign
thatPoland'ssecurity
cow."1
suggestthat
of expectation
of toneand modesty
The defensiveness
butofseeking
theSovietposition
itwasnota questionofchallenging
the
tosome,conceivably,
withinitsframework;
ofinfluence
a modicum
atconscious
a
was
in
policy
American
fundamentalism
democratic
tomakethemostofa weakhand.The policyis bestunderstood
tempt
thana policy
totalSovietcontrol-rather
one-to prevent
as a negative
or the
of politicaldemocracy
goals,therealization
aimedat positive
of
objectives
The
economic
market.
of a majorexport
achievement
imby Kolko to an
U.S. policyin EasternEurope,overemphasized
plausibledegree,foundtheirplaceas themainmeansby whichthe
to Soviet
someformofcounterweight
hopedtoestablish
policy-makers
Amerof
objective
power.The OpenDoorwasnot"theonlyinflexible
reasons
wereforgeographical
icanpolicy"(pp.402-3)-its implications
11BriefingBook PaperfortheYalta Conference;BriefingBook PapersforPotsdam
on the formerAxis Satellitesand on Poland; TelegramfromHarrimanto Secretary
of State, June 28, I945; in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers: The Conferencesat Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C. I955),
D.C.
234; The Conferenceof Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, I (Washington,
i960), 360-61,715, 728. (Emphasisadded.)
COLD-WAR
REVISIONISM
587
in EasternEurope fromelsewhere-butwas the conquite different
enough,to atunderstandably
attempted,
ditionwhichpolicy-makers
tachto theextensionof creditforreconstruction.
The secondEasternEuropean issue raisedby revisioniststudiesis
whetherthe communizationof that region,far frombeing the unfoldingofStalin'sdesign,was not indeeda reactionto hostileWestern
policies."In factwe now know,"Kolko writes,"thatthe Russians...
of BolshevizingEasternEuropeif-but onlyif-they
had no intention
(p. 6ig). HorowitzdevelopsDeutscher'sconcould findalternatives"
systemwas establishedonly
tentionthatthe totalitariansingle-party
aftertheTrumanDoctrinein I947 (pp. 86-9o).In evaluatingthisthesis
analy(blurredin mostrevisionist
to make a distinction
it is necessary
and
Parties
controlby the variousCommunist
ses) betweeneffective
Stalinistsystemof the monolithicbloc. The Stalinist
the full-fledged
whichdid notlong outlasthis rule,can plausiblybe presented
extreme,
tension
reactionto the climateof international
as his characteristic
since so little
whichhad developedby I947-plausibly, not certainly,
and it is possiblethathis comis knownof Sovietdecision-making,
pulsionto eliminateindependentcentersof power withinthe Soviet
thebreakwithTito,
systemmighthave led Stalinto the Cominform,
and the EasternEuropean purgeseven in a less tenseinternational
Much of thetension,afterall, was a consequenceof theway
context."2
hostileto the
Stalinchoseto reactto Westernmovesnot in themselves
of
the
recovery WesternEuSovietsphere,suchas theMarshallPlan:
unlessit was assumedthatthe
ropecouldnotbe consideredanti-Soviet
in its economiccollapse.
SovietUnion had a legitimateinterest
Thereis muchmoreevidencebearingon thequestionof Communist
controlbeforethefinalStalinistphase.Horowitz,followingDeutscher,
offersthe curiousargumentthat the Soviet seizure of massivewar
fromthe formerallies of Germanyshowsthat
bootyand reparations
to remaincapitalist,so unpopulardid
countries
these
Stalinexpected
Sovietpolicyrenderthe CommunistParties.The oppositeis far more
onlythe Communistscould be replausible:giventhisunpopularity,
lied on to cooperatewiththeSovietUnion,hencetheirpoliticaldomiof Sovietpolicy.How else could friendly
nancebecamean imperative
be ensured?
governments
But it is not necessaryto relyon a priorireasoning.It was widely
recognizedat thetimethatthe Communistpartieswere able to secure
above
keyministries,
a dominantpoliticalpositionthroughcontrolling
12Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, rev. ed. (New York i96i),
51-64, points
as a
in SovietrelationswithEasternEurope(the problemsof "domesticism")
to stresses
of the Cominform.
reasonforthe formation
WORLD
588
POLITICS
gaining
of theInterior(the police),and through
all theMinistries
from
country
each
governed
which
controlofthecoalitions
effective
1944-45
betweenthe
drawsa distinction
to i947-48. Hugh Seton-Watson
foran initialperiodin fourof the
whichgoverned
genuinecoalition
and the
andCzechoslovakia,
Hungary,
Bulgaria,
Roumania,
countries:
still
governments
"the
which
it,in
whichsucceeded
"boguscoalition"
by men
parties,but theseare represented
containnon-communist
butbythecommunists."'3
chosenno longerbythepartymembership
gavewayto theboguscoalitionin Bulgariaas
The genuinecoalition
I945, in Roumaniain MarchI945, in Hungaryin
earlyas January
February1947,and in Czechoslovakiain FebruaryI948. In Poland
was
of thegenuinecoalitionwhenMikolajczyk
therewereelements
in the government
(0945-46), thoughCommunistcontrolof the gov-
ofSovietpolicyfromthetimeofthe
objective
wasa primary
ernment
anditwas securefromtheoutset.
liberation,
ofthe
thepresence
Evenduringtheperiodofthegenuinecoalition
their
over
prevail
to
Communists
the
enabled
forces
Sovietoccupation
in theDecember
despitetheirlackof support
forexample,
partners;
theywereable to insistthata Communist
in Hungary,
1945 election
Duringthisphase,moreover,
of theInterior."4
Minister
be appointed
wereunand support
their
independence
whichhad retained
parties
incampaigns
systematic
brokenup through
andeventually
dermined
ofleadersandthedisqualification
and arrest
volvingtheintimidation
tookplaceaboveall againstMikolajSuchcampaigns
of candidates.
czyk'sPolishPeople'sPartyand againsttheSmallFarmers'Partyin
political
independent
I946. Thus the surviving
Hungarythroughout
werebrokenduringtheyearbeforetheTrumanDoctrineand
forces
theMarshallPlan.
presupshowsthatSovietand East Europeantheorists,
Brzezinski
of powerin the
butnota monopoly
domination
posingCommunist
as a
of thePeople'sDemocracy
deviseda doctrine
newgovernments,
intheordinary
states
typeofstate."Thosearenotcapitalist
transitional
states.Theirdeare theysocialist
meaningof theword.Butneither
is basedon thenationalization
ofSocialism
in thedirection
velopment
of those
and on theverycharacter
ofthechiefmeansof production
states."'5
wherepopular
wasCzechoslovakia,
tothepattern
Theonlyexception
andwherethegenuinecoaliwasgreatest,
fortheCommunists
support
'3Hugh
Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 2nd ed. (London
170.
14Ibid., I94.
1 Brzezinski (fn.
12),
32, citing an article by E. Varga.
i952),
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
589
stress;thepolariuntilearly1948,thoughunderextreme
tionsurvived
couldindeedbe tracedto the
in Czechoslovakia
zationoftheconflict
of 1947,butin everyothercaseCommunist
polarization
international
in I946.
in earlyI945 or consolidated
controlwas eitherestablished
motivaStalin'sultimate
that,whatever
is inescapable
The conclusion
in EasternEuropewas
Sovietsecurity
tion,hismethodof achieving
control
wasbeyond
inwhichCommunist
structures
political
toestablish
partieswas inofall independent
thedestruction
Whether
challenge.
in Polandand
totheirpopularity
tendedfromtheoutsetora response
to indebut givenStalin'sattitude
Hungarycannotbe determined,
it is plausibleto suppose
politicalforcesbeyondhis control,
pendent
deand,if necessary,
to neutralize
thattherewas a generalintention
There
themselves.
had consolidated
oncetheregimes
stroy
suchforces
thattheRussianshad no inis littletobe saidforKolko'shypothesis
EasternEurope;theydid not (exceptin
tentionof "Bolshevizing"
The reality,
any alternative."
appearto entertain
Czechoslovakia)
its
of theSovietsystem,
was that,due to thespecialcharacter
rather,
onlyby fargreaterinfringecouldbe satisfied
demandforsecurity
of EasternEuropethan
of thecountries
mentson theindependence
othergreatpowershavechosento imposeon statesin theirsecurity
in postwarEasternEurope
and thishasbeenthebasicreality
region,
in i945-46,just as in I948, I956, and i968.
THE BREAKDOWNOF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
linksbetween
significant
It is nowclearthatthefailureto establish
factorin the
was
a
major
economic
systems
theSovietand Western
forsuchlinkswereunderdisonsetoftheCold War.Two proposals
bythetime
cussionin theearlypartof I945 buthad beenabandoned
loansto assistSoviet
American
large-scale
ofthePotsdamconference:
fromGermanyin theorderof magand reparations
reconstruction,
bytheSovietleaders.In theabsenceof eitherkind
nitudedemanded
totradetomake
as Kolkopointsout,therewas"nothing
ofagreement,
as wellas penalin termsofrewards
meaningful
actionsandrealities
ties"(p. 401).
thanin earlier
in revisionist
emphasis
Thisissuehasreceived
greater
to the effect
Kolko citesSeton-Watson
"1In his discussionof Hungaryin I94445
evidence
did not have full control,but neglectsSeton-Watson's
thatthe Communists
in key positions
thattheywere strivingforit and thatsome of the non-Communists
The situationwas not unlikethatdescribedby
were dependenton the Communists.
controlled
wherethe Communists
WolfgangLeonhardin theSovietzone of Germany,
See WolfgangLeonauthorities.
whatat firstappeared"bourgeois"local governmental
hard,Child of the Revolution (London 1957), 287-372.
590
WORLD POLITICS
accounts,and it is one whichprimafacieaccordswith the revisionist
sincethe United Statescould have assistedgenerouslyin
standpoint,
Sovieteconomyand failedto do
of thewar-ravaged
thereconstruction
accountsconveya distortedimpressionof the
so. But the revisionist
and divertattentionfromthe actual circumstances
decision-making
ofthefailureto establisha bridgebetweenthetwo
and thesignificance
based
as theydo a policyofcrudeeconomicpressure
suggesting
systems,
on Harriman'sadvice,culminatingin the abruptcutoffof lend-lease
on V-E Day (Alperovitz,AtomicDiplomacy,p. 36; Kolko, p. 500).
There is stillmuchthatis unclearin the Americandecision-making
on theprojectedloan,followingMolotov'srequestfora $6 billioncredit
in JanuaryI945.'1 BothRoosevelt,priorto Yalta,
at 2? percentinterest
and Truman,priorto Potsdam,indicatedthat theywould raise the
issuewithStalin,but neitherdid so. Harriman'sviewpointwas more
suggest,and his policywas not adopted.
complexthantherevisionists
argued (0944-45) that
Althoughit is truethatHarrimanconsistently
postwarcreditsshouldbe used as a formof politicalpressure,he did
not advocatethe passivewithholdingof credits,but ratheran active
policyof using offersof creditas a leverto influenceSovietpolicy.
we can to assistthe SovietUnion through
"We shoulddo everything
creditsin developinga soundeconomy.... thesoonertheSovietUnion
can developa decentlifeforitspeoplethemoretoleranttheywill become."'8He contestedWashingtonsuggestionsthat the loan would
be of only marginalimportanceto the Soviet economyand urged
inHowever,as frictions
Washingtonto hastenitsreplyto Molotov."9
in
in
the
reluctance
with
Washington
fall
tended
to
Harriman
creased,
to WesternEurope and
to proceedwiththe loan, arguedforpriority
proposedonly small loans to Russia and Poland, despitehis earlier
realizationthatonlya largecreditofferedany prospectof influencing
the generaldirectionof Sovietpolicy.
mayhavebeena responseto thechanging
Harriman'sinconsistencies
climateof opinionin Washington,but theyalso throwsome lighton
to conceive
fundamentalobstaclesto the projectedloan. It is difficult
for a
or
conditions
of
economic
political
of a successfulnegotiation
overthespecialloan to
majorloan (comparethearduousnegotiations
Britainin I945-46). Whatlittleevidencethereis suggeststhattheSoviet
17
The fullestaccountis Thomas G. Paterson,"The AbortiveAmericanLoan to
Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, I943-I946," Journal of American History,
LVI (June 1i969), 70-92. See also Martin F. Herz, The Beginnings of the Cold War
(Bloomington i966), I53-74; Kolko, 333-40 and 499-502.
of State,January6, i945).
'8Foreign Relations (fn. 6), 946 (telegramto Secretary
See also recommendationsby Harriman, 845, 996.
19Ibid.,9g-g6, IOO9.
COLD-WAR
REVISIONISM
591
as in
ofconditions
to suggestions
leaderswouldhavebeenas sensitive
would
on theMarshallPlan.20The alternative
thelaternegotiations
relathatfriendly
in theexpectation
offer
havebeenan unconditional
proposed$io
Morgenthau's
tionswouldfollow.TreasurySecretary
showedlittleinterest.
billioncreditwas closerto this,but Roosevelt
torelations
wasmovingawayfromthisapproach
Washington
Official
policyon lend-lease
Roosevelt's
withMoscow,whichhad underlain
criticism.2'
withmounting
butwas meeting
The reasonsfortheAmericanfailureto respondto Molotov'sredrawnbythedecisionThe lessons
quest,then,appeartobe as follows.
againsta "special
withMoscowcounselled
fromtheirrelations
makers
foraswithconditions
withRussiathatwoulddispense
relationship"
hopelessness
the
sensed
decision-makers
the
time,
Atthesame
sistance.
was underThe Administration
conditions.
tonegotiate
ofan attempt
tomakeunprecedented
Congress
toseektopersuade
reluctant
standably
In terms
conditions.
favorable
sumsavailableunderunprecedentedly
America
and
Russia
emerging,
was
that
system
ofthenewinternational
was
ofrivalry
anda relationship
orrivals,
couldonlybe closepartners
to supposethatthe
it is difficult
or reappearing;
alreadyappearing,
couldhavetransofassistance
weresuchthattheoffer
circumstances
intopartnership.
rivalry
formed
issue
thereparations
failureto offera loan brought
Washington's
Therewasa hardenrelations.
economic
ofEast-West
intotheforefront
policybetweenYalta,whenRoosevelt
ing of Americanreparations
as a basis
theSovietproposalof$20 billionin reparations
hadaccepted
to Britain's
reverted
whentheAmericans
andPotsdam,
fordiscussion,
and insisted
ofrejecting
anyfixedsumforreparations
Yaltaposition
chargeon German
shouldbe thefirst
imports
thatthecostofessential
policyat Potsdamwas
The American
aheadofreparations.22
exports,
20See,forexample,the Sovietreactionto the cutoffof lend-lease.Althoughthere
appearsto have been no attemptto negotiatewiththe Sovietleaderson politicalconditionsforcredits,AmbassadorLane met withan angryresponsewhen he broached
Ibid.,415.
theissuewiththePolishgovernment.
21 See GeorgeC. Herring,Jr.,"Lend-Leaseto Russia and the Originsof the Cold
Journal of American History, LVI (June I969), 93-II4. Herring
War, I944-I945,"
of lend-leasein May I945 followeda deliberatedecisionto termishowsthatthecutoff
favorableconditionswhichapplied to Russia,and was in gennate the exceptionally
eral accordancewith Harriman's"quid pro quo" approach,but his accountplaces
lend-leaseand overzealousexecution
pressuresto terminate
emphasison congressional
neglectedby the revisionists-andhe showsthatHarrimanand
of thecutoff-factors
were shockedby the mannerin whichthe cutoffwas executed.
theStateDepartment
22 This had been a consistent
principleof Americanreparationspolicy prior to
forthe Occupationof Germany:The WashYalta.See Paul Y. Hammond,"Directives
Decisions(Birmingin Harold Stein,ed., AmericanCivil-Military
ingtonControversy,"
ham,Alabamai963), 43L.
WORLD POLITICS
592
from
deliveries
powershouldobtainitsreparations
thateachoccupying
partof the
itsownzone,butit was proposedthat,sincethegreater
zones,partof
was in theWestern
heavyindustry,
especially
industry,
fromthesezones (eventuallyagreedon as 25 per cent)
thereparations
to theSovietUnion (io per centfreeof charge,i5
be
supplied
should
Whateverits intenper centin exchangefordeliveriesof foodstuffs).
tion,the effectof thispolicywas to increasethe independenceof the
supremebody in
occupationzones at the expenseof the theoretically
towardsthe
to
move
and
thus
Council,
Control
Germany,the Allied
divisionof Germany.
Kolko presents
thepolicyas a deliberatechoiceofzonal autonomyin
full awarenessthat it amountedto an abandonmentof four-power
for
and foundations
laid the structure
control."In factthe conference
and theUnitedStatescreatedthebasisfora truncated
Germanpartition
Germany'sreturnto worldpower" (p. 575). The Americanswere alGermanyas a major
of industrial
readylookingtowardtherestoration
avoided the four-power
deliberately
economicpower: theytherefore
collaborationsoughtby the Russians,and opted for the partitionof
Germany.
and clear-sightpostulatesa degreeof consistency
This interpretation
of Americanpolicyat thetime,and pre-dates
ednessnotcharacteristic
the finalpartitionof Germany.This was not crystallizeduntil after
of a centralGermanadministheFrenchpreventedthe establishment
tration,and General Clay suspendedreparationsdeliveriesto Russia
as
forRussia'sfailureto deliverfoodstuffs
in April I946 in retaliation
agreedat Potsdam.This last,and decisive,stepcame shortlyafterthe
on the
in Germany:theagreement
mostnotablefour-power
agreement
thebasisforimtobe authorized.This was potentially
levelofindustry
plementingthe reparationsagreement,as the remainingindustry
would now be availableforreparations.
in midThere were differences
among American policy-makers
politicaldecisionat this
I945, but thereis no evidenceof a deliberate
partition.Much of the pressureforzonal
stagein favorof long-term
who were thinkingin termsof
autonomycame fromthe military,
Americandecisionson repaadministrative
considerations.23
short-term
rationsappearto havebeen governedby immediateconcerns:to avoid
economicand social breakdownin the Westernzones of Germany,
withthe accompanying
specterof communization;to avoid financing
massivereparations
paymentsthroughsubsidizingthe necessarylevel
of economicactivity;and to findsomebasis foragreementconsistent
afterit had becomeclearthattheyruledout a sum
withthosepriorities
23
Ibid., 418-20, 432-33,435.
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
593
of theorderof $20 billion,stilldemandedby theRussians.Byrnes's
agreethechancefora practical
offered
optingforzonalreparations
themain
mentin whichtheWestcouldnotlose,sinceit controlled
all the
butthereis no evidencethathe foresaw
reparations,
potential
leadershad abandoned
or thattheAmerican
implications,
long-term
for
prepared
BookPaperon Germany
theviewsstatedin theBriefing
Potsdam:
in foodand is almostcomis deficient
The U.S. zone of occupation
Itsoperamaterials.
lackingin coalandin othermajorindustrial
pletely
impracticable....The
wouldbe utterly
entity
tionas a closedeconomic
intoan Eastern
canbe readilyassimilated
economy
ofEasternGermany
by theWesternpowersof the
acceptance
economic
sphere.In contrast,
wouldcreate
a placefora WesternGermaneconomy
taskof finding
...24
difficulties.
extensive
policyas a major
BruceKuklickalso seesAmericanreparations
fromitsimmediback
buttracesit
ofGermany,
in thepartition
factor
the
villainof Cold War historiography,
ate sourcesto thatfamiliar
he argues,was more
charge"principle,
OpenDoor policy.The "first
maximwhichit appearedto be: theexports
thanthecommonsense
theimports
to offset
overreparations
whichwereto haveprecedence
be goodswhichGerwould,unlikereparations,
ruled"necessary,"
GermandevelopThiswouldpromote
manycouldsellcompetitively.
worldof
trading
in
the
multilateral
a
to
with
view
participation
ment
planning:itwasthiswhichwastotakeprecedence
American
wartime
"In clingingto theiridea of a worldecooverSovietreconstruction.
thepostheyprevented
bytheUnitedStates,
dominated
nomicsystem
the
with
arrangement
of
regional
sort
cooperative
sibilityof any
to
fundamentally
U.S.S.R.and pursueda policywhichcontributed
ofEurope."25
thedivision
like Kolko's,movesfarahead of the circumThis interpretation,
of earlyoccupationpolicy
stancesof 1945. It neglectstherestrictiveness
towardsthe German economy,and the pressuresof the economic
in Europe.
withwhichtheWesternAllieswereconfronted
emergency
The Americanswere not thinkingahead to the periodof competitive
exports:whattheywere insistingon was a supplyof goods or equipsufficient
to
mentthatmightotherwisebe earmarkedforreparations,
pay for the importsjudged essential.The Americanpolicy may be
criticizedas ungeneroustowardstheSovietally,but cannotreasonably
to the laterpolicy,announcedby Molotovin
be takenas tantamount
24Foreign Relations(fn. II),
440-4I.
25B. Kuklick,"The Division of Germanyand AmericanPolicy on Reparations,"
xxiii (JuneI970), 293; see also 28i.
WesternPoliticalQuarterly,
594
WORLD
POLITICS
Julyand by Byrnesin Septemberof I946, of promotingGermanrelevelsagreedat Potsdam.In the history
coverybeyondthe restricted
while
restrictions,
of the occupation,"Potsdam"standsfor stringent
restoration
theMolotovand Byrnesspeechesinitiatedthe competitive
of Germany.
divertatthe revisionists
In pressingsuchhindsightinterpretations,
tentionfroma developmentof centralimportanceto the Cold War,
economicrelations.
Soviet-American
thefailureto establishsignificant
at Potsdamresulted
The economicdivisionof Germanyforeshadowed
fromthe oppositionbetweenSoviet and Anglo-Americanpriorities,
to
the formerseekingabove all the maximumGermancontribution
the latterseekingto pay the minimumto avert
Sovietreconstruction,
economicand social breakdownin WesternGermany.But the more
fundamentaleconomicissue was that of directAmericancreditsto
was nota viablealterbyway ofreparations
Russia (indirectfinancing
native). The divisionof the world into two economicsystemswas
inevitable:the decisionon the loan ensuredthattherewould be very
littleeconomiccooperationbetweenthem.
ATOMIC WEAPONS:
HIROSHIMA
AND THE ISSUE
OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
In any view the discoveryof nuclearweapons and the subsequent
a majorelementin theCold War,especially
nucleararmsracerepresent
the
stillunformulated,
in itsinitialphasewhen,notionsof deterrence
firstreactionto atomicweapons (theireffectstypicallyexaggerated)
ofhumansociety;fears
was shockedawarenessofthenew vulnerability
of espionagewere
associatedwithnuclearweaponsand therevelations
to the climateof hysteriain the earlyyearsof the Cold
to contribute
War.
Alperovitzsees the atomic bomb as a fundamentalinfluenceon
stance
Americandiplomacyin 1945, encouragingTruman'santi-Soviet
and providingthe basis for his diplomaticstrategyof the "delayed
evidenceto
showdown."Althoughhe assertsthatthereis insufficient
establishthe presenceof a reverserelationship-theinfluenceof antiSovietdiplomacyon the decisionto use the bomb-the closingpages
of the thesis
of AtomicDiplomacyput forwarda powerfulstatement
forendingthewar,noreven
thatdroppingthebombwas notnecessary
for securingAmericanobjectivesin the Far East, but was seen by
relationship
as relevantto the broaderSoviet-American
key officials
in Europe(pp. 14, 236-42). The
outcome
tothepolitical
andespecially
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
595
evidencewhichhe assemblesdoes not establishthat calculations
concerning
Europewerea majorfactorin thedecisionto dropthe
bomb;26 it does,however,
his thesisthatgreaterconsiderareinforce
tionwas givento thepoliticalexploitation
ofthebombthanhasusuallybeenrecognized.
Butevenhere,whereAlperovitz
is on relatively
he
strongground,
failstoestablish
hiscentral
thatAmerican
from
hypothesis
diplomacy
wasshapedbya coherent
theoutstandMaytoJuly
ofsettling
strategy
ingissuesthrough
a diplomatic
confrontation
("showdown")afterthe
dropping
ofthebomb.As we haveseen,therewas in factno showdownoverEastern
Europe:itseemsevident,
moreover,
thattherewas
no planning
ofa showdown,
no thinking
through
of how,precisely,
wouldexploitthebomb.Rather,
therewasa moodon the
Washington
partofsomeAmerican
leaders-anexpectation
thatAmerica's
bargainingposition
wouldimprove,
coupledwitha desirefora rapidpolitical
settlement;
itwouldbemoreplausible
tointerpret
American
diplomacy
in theearlymonths
ofTruman'sPresidency
in termsof keepingoptionsopen,postponing
finaldecisions
untilthesituation
was clearer,
thanin terms
ofa "strategy"
ofthekindwhichAlperovitz
postulates.
The newPresident,
themostdemanding
seekingtomaster
ofoffices
at
a timewhentherushof eventsmighthaveseemedbeyondcontrol,
fromall sideswithcompeting
pressed
claimsandadvice,no doubtwelcomedanyrationalization
fordelayon complex
issuesonwhichhewas
stillbriefing
himself;
he was in no position
to imposea daringlongtermplanwhichrequiredperhapstwodecadesof hindsight
evento
formulate.27
ofexploiting
thebombwereonereasonwhythedeVaguenotions
cisionwhether
or not to dropit was not reopenedas the military
arguments
foritsusewereweakened
withJapan's
increasing
readiness
to surrender;
buttheywereprobably
notthemainreason.Alperovitz
overstates
American
awareness
oftheJapanese
and avoidsa
situation,
discussion
ofthekeydecisions
systematic
leadingto Hiroshima.
Kolko,
who doesexaminethedecisions,
is muchcloserto earlierinterpretations:themomentum
of theatomicprogram
and theexpectation
of
further
protracted
struggle
withJapansetup a powerful
biasin favor
26
Stimson,forexample,who was the advisermostconcernedwith the politicalimof thebomb,adviseda relatively
plications
accommodating
approachto Sovietdemands
in EasternEurope.
27 A readingof the earlychapters
of Truman'smemoirssuggeststhatthe postponementof Potsdamwas due lessto anyspecific
consideration
thanto his determination
to
mastertheissuesand optionsbeforehim,to avoid merelybeingsweptalongbyevents;
his interest
in the budget(dismissedby Alperovitz)was an important
aspectof this.
596
WORLD POLITICS
considered
ofthemilitary
use ofthebomb;theonlyrealalternatives
atomic
in Maywerean advancewarningto Japanor a demonstration
thebomb's"shock"potenstrike,
whichwasrejected
as undermining
tial,andhenceitsprospect
ofendingthewar; and in JulytheAmerievidence
ofJapan's
peacefeelers
canleadersdiscounted
theambiguous
in thepreceding
justbecausetherehadbeenso muchsimilarevidence
months(pp. 539-43;549-67).
exploredanyof theoptionsMechanism
prevailed.
No one seriously
thebomb....
neither
Japanese
surrender,
nordelay,norwithholding
The UnitedStateswouldtakeno chances.
Forprecisely
thesamereasons
ofmechanism
whichtheJapanese
in theirown desand conservatism,
decidedto use thebombas a known
peratewayshared,
theAmericans
and now predictable
meansof destroying
factor
of war,an economical
soldiersand civilians.
vast numbersof men,women,and children,
Well beforeAugust1945 theyhad reducedthisto a routine(Kolko,
566-67).
On theissueoftheinternational
control
ofnuclearweapons,Horowitzpresents
repudiating
thekindof
theUnitedStatesas wantonly
in September
agreement
proposed
byStimson
I945-directnegotiation
withRussiaon thenon-manufacture
of nuclearweapons-infavorof
thataftera
theunrealistically
one-sided
BaruchPlan,whichprovided
nuclearoperations
wouldbe managed
transition
period,all sensitive
bya majority
byan international
authority
whichwouldtakedecisions
vote;i.e.,therewouldbe no veto.
It is easy,withhindsight,
of theBaruch
theweaknesses
to identify
toa
toentrust
itssecurity
Plan:theSovietUnioncouldnotbe expected
international
Western-dominated
agencynor to removeits barriers
tothesubstantial
offoreign
number
experts
thatwouldhavebeeninAmericannuclear
volved,and thetransition
periodof a continuing
was an obvioustargetforSovietsuspicion.
However,it is
monopoly
worthrecalling
thattheBaruchPlan has beendiscussed
nostalgically
as D. F. Flemingand Philip
or approvingly
by suchdiversewriters
features
Noel-Baker,28
andthatitsprincipal
werethoseoftheAchesonLilienthal
which
byRobertOppenheimer,
Report,
heavilyinfluenced
viewthata nucleararmsrace
had beenbasedon thenotimplausible
as radicalas theinternational
couldbeprevented
onlybyan innovation
thatnothinglessmeasuredup to
of nuclearactivities:
management
ofthetask.
themagnitude
thattherewas an obviWhereHorowitzis at faultis in supposing
28D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins (London
Baker,The ArmsRace (London i958),
i8i-20i.
i96i),
I, 363-4I5; P. Noel-
597
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
a nucleararmsrace,along
ouslymorepromisingmeansforpreventing
thelinesproposedby Stimsonand by the SovietUnion. But Stimson's
at his finalCabiwas nota full-fledged
proposal,butratheran attempt,
of Americanpolicy.
net meeting,to argue for a basic reorientation
Had it been developedmorefully,it would have had to providefora
systemof inspectionto give assurancethatmaterialsfrom"peaceful"
nuclearfacilitieswere not being divertedto militaryends. The lack
convincingone-was thebasicWestofsucha system-ora sufficiently
ern objectionto Soviet"ban the bomb" proposals,whichwere just as
as the BaruchPlan
to suspiciousWesterngovernments
untrustworthy
was to the Russians.The BaruchPlan has rightlybeen criticizedas a
brilliantpropagandist
ploywhichby itsveryradicalismand one-sidedand indeed therewere voicesin the
ness obstructed
real negotiation,
control.
Westcallingformuchmoremodestmeasuresof international
It is unlikely,however,thattherewas anybasisforagreementon such
posedfor
proposalsin thisperiod,giventheproblemswhichinspection
of
theSovietGovernment.
Horowitzoverlooksthemagnitude thepracnatureof the
tical obstaclesto an agreementand the unprecedented
betweensuspicious
agreement
by an international
aspirationto prevent,
of a new, potentially
dominant
rivalpowers,thefurther
development
of
before
and
since,
weapon. The history disarmamentnegotiations,
Fleming,a participant
suggeststheunlikelihoodofsuchan agreement.
at the time,was aware of the intractabilin Americanpolicy-making
ityof theproblem:"The troublewas not in the BaruchPlan; it was
in the world. Nations which could not come togetherin sympathy
and understandingcould not be saved by legalisticformulas."29
SOVIET AIMS IN WESTERN EUROPE
scrupulegalistically
wayscrupulous,
Stalinwasin a bizarreByzantine
lous, in his bargainswith his bourgeoisallies....
He had committed
of thebourgeois
orderin postwar
himself
to respect
thepredominance
westernEuropeand he carriedout his obligations.
Long beforethe
TrumanDoctrinewas proclaimed,
Stalinhad veryeffectively
saved
western
Europeforcapitalism.30
of Frenchcapitalism
the
Duringthe criticalperiodin the history
withtheguidanceoftheSoviet
majorpartyoftheLefttookuponitself,
a tottering
system
of managingand restoring
Union,theresponsibility
ofgreatest
danger(Kolko,444-45).
duringitsmoment
theOld Orderand revolustoodbetween
OnlyRussianconservatism
tion (Kolko, 450).
29
Fleming(fn. 28), I, 373.
30 Isaac Deutscher,
"Mythsof theCold War,"in D.
Revolution(London i967), I7.
and
Horowitz,ed., Containment
598
WORLD
POLITICS
inhisimageofStalinas "the
KolkoandHorowitz
followDeutscher
dismostconservative
statesman
in theworld."Yet thereis a strange
crepancy
between
thegeneral
picture
formulated
aboveandthequalifications
whichKolkobeginstodevelopin hisaccountoftheItalianand
Frenchsituation
in I944-45. He concedes
thattherewas no chanceof
a violent
Communist
takeover
ofpowerwiththeAlliedarmiespresent
inFranceandItaly,andinFrancewiththefurther
factor
ofde Gaulle's
determination
to gain unfettered
controlof the armedforces.The
and theirleaderCommunists,
then,had to workwithinthesystem,
shipmadea virtueof this,overruling
opposition
fromsomeof the
As theparty
andworkResistance
ofpatriotism,
leaders.
reconstruction,
ingclassunitytheP.C.F. (Communist
PartyofFrance)couldextend
itsmembership
andsupport.
Forthefirst
timeitbecamea massparty,
as miliandwasabletoplaya leadingrolein thegoverning
coalition:
tantrevolutionaries
theCommunists
wouldhavebeenan isolatedminorityinvitingrepression.
ofproduction
andwage
as theparty
Still,theroleoftheCommunists
restraint
is a surprising
one and lendssomecolorto theDeutscherKolko theses.It appearsto havebeen the productof two strategic
choices,essentially
choicesby Moscow(the P.C.F. beingdominated
FrenchinbyThorezand hisMoscow-based
colleagues):to promote
of
fromtheUnitedStates,whichrequiredtherecovery
dependence
France'seconomy
and to induce
independent
ofmassive
U.S. support;
Franceto followan independent,
non-Western-bloc
foreignpolicy,
iftheP.C.F.wasbothrespectable
whichwouldbe assisted
and powerful.31
And indeed,Francesoughtto playsuchan intermediary
role
and was reluctantto abandonit even in I947.
The Frencheconomicand socialstructure
(the "Old Order")was
as suggested
neither
as vulnerable
andKolkonoras close
byDeutscher
intheCommunist
as presupposed
tocomplete
strategy.
recovery
Despite
torestore
theneedforAmerican
Communist
efforts
production,
credits
On theotherhand,thestillailingsocioeconomic
remained.
system
was
theonslaught
ofCommunist
ableto withstand
militancy
when,after
theopenbreakbetweentheSovietUnionand theWestin I947, the
launchedtheirpolitical
strikes
Communists
againsttheMarshallPlan.
hisdistinctive
Kolko,indeed,is thevictimofa myth-perhaps
contributionto revisionism-the
Lefton thepoint
mythof a revolutionary
of sweepingawaytheOld Orderthroughout
Europe,but foiledby
31
See, for instance, A. J. Rieber, Stalin and the French Communist Party (New
York i962), esp. 212-37.
COLD-WAR
REVISIONISM
599
theruthless
repression
ofWestern
armsandbyStalin'sRealpolitik.
AlthoughtheResistance
movements
wereimbuedwitha spiritofradical
change,theywereneither
unitednororganized
norwere
politically;
themajorpoliticalforcesin WesternEuroperevolutionary.
Communist
policyin WesternEuropein thisperiodwas one of
buildingup thestrongest
possiblepositionwithinthenew economic
and politicalstructures
whoselong-term
A
wereuncertain.
prospects
centralfeature
of thepolicy,in Germany
as well as in Franceand
Italy,was theattempt
to bringaboutan amalgamation
of theCommunistand Socialist
parties.
The unityof theLefthad strongappeal
to theSocialist
rankand file,butwas successfully
resisted
by theSocialistleadersin eachcountry,
who fearedCommunist
dominance
of
theunitedparty
whichwastobe organized
linesof
alongCommunist
"democratic
centralism."32
Thoughawareofthisstrandin Communist
policy,Kolkomisconstrues
it as a willingness
to abandontheParty,
tosubmerge
itsidentity
(p. 440)-a viewwhichwassharedbynoneof
theSocialist
leaders.
The Sovietreaction
totheMarshallPlan,and Sovietpolicytowards
at leastuntilI948, showthatStalinwas notprepared
Germany
to regardWestern
Europeas a capitalist
spherein whichhe wouldrefrain
fromintervention.
Admittedly,
theultimate
aimsof Sovietpolicyin
in
this
Germany
periodremainobscure.
Manycontemporary
Western
observers
saw Moscowmakinga bid forthesupportof Germannain 1946,whenMolotovannounced
tionalism
Sovietsupport
fora centralizedGermangovernment
and majorincreases
in the authorized
levelof Germanindustrial
production;
otherssaw theproposalfor
a centralized
government
as an attempt
to securea structure
easily
amenableto Sovietcontrol.
Djilas reports
his own puzzlement
over
confident
statements
byStalinandotherSovietleadersin thespringof
I946 thatall ofGermany
wouldbecomeCommunist,
a confidence
that
hadbeenreplacedin I948 byresignation
tothedivision
ofGermany.33
AdamUlam suggests
thatSovietpolicyin Germanywas tentative,
unclearas to whatwouldbestserveSovietinterests,
butcleareras to
whatitwishedto avoid:theconsolidation
of theWestern
zonesinto
a powerful
anti-Soviet
state.34
theSovietinterest
Certainly
inreparations
321bid.,2I2-I5;
B. D. Graham,The FrenchSocialistsand Tripartismei944-i947
(Canberra i965), 97-IoI; L. J.Edinger, Kurt Schumacher (Stanford i965), 97-104.
33M. Djilas, Conversations
withStalin (Harmondsworth
i963), II9: a passagenever
citedby the revisionists
but conveying
the same impression
of authenticity
as the rest
of hismemoir.
34AdamB. Ulam,Expansionand Coexistence(London i968), 44o-47.
600
WORLD POLITICS
and Soviet
to appealto Germannationalism,
cutacrossanyattempt
be readas giving
in I946-47 can quiteplausibly
proposals
diplomatic
is thatSovietpolicy
Whatcan be postulated
to reparations.
priority
to keepallmostly
unsuccessful,
engagedin a numberof endeavors,
thewestBerlin
and
base
in
up
a
power
open,
to
build
options
German
a voicein
diplomacy
and to obtainthrough
ernzonesof Germany,
the
of Germanyas a wholeand especially
theeconomy
controlling
the
to pressure
attempt
Ruhr.The Berlinblockadewas a last-ditch
a WestGermanstateor,
torefrain
fromcreating
Western
governments
failingthat,to oustthemfromBerlin.The Sovietmovespriorto this
to achievea voice
Western
efforts
totheearlier
havesomeresemblance
to conin theaffairs
ofEasternEurope,basedon a similarreluctance
position
the
strong
side;
given
the
other
to
region
completely
cedethe
partiesin Franceand Italy,thesemovesgavesuboftheCommunist
sparkedbytheMarshallPlanrecovery
theeconomic
stance-before
intoWestern
Europe.
tofearsofthespreadofcommunism
I947: EUROPE DIVIDED
thelinesof the Cold War in its
i947 saw theend of ambiguity:
bethe landmarks
maintheater,
Europe,werenow drawnclearly,
ConForeignMinisters'
theMarch-April
ingtheTrumanDoctrine,
by theSoviet
in Moscow,theMarshallPlan and itsrejection
ference
of the Cominform.
The pictureof these
Union,and theformation
as thatby Horostudies
such
revisionist
emerges
from
that
events
militantUnitedStatesthrowing
witz is that of an ideologically
thetimingand toneof theTrumanDoctrinededownthegauntlet,
at theMoscowForeignMinisters'
anyhopeof compromise
stroying
ofthe
counter-move-the
Stalin's
founding
andprovoking
Conference
Cominform.
althoughtheMarshallPlan was theoretically
Moreover,
in reality
officials
weredeWashington
opento Sovietparticipation,
so thattheonus
in maneuvering
toavoidthis,andsucceeded
termined
forthebreakwouldfallon theSovietleadersratherthanthemselves
critiqueof the con(pp. 7o-74).WalterLippmann'scontemporary
is enlistedin supportof the thesisthatthe final
doctrine
tainment
divisionof Europecouldhave been avoidedby a morefar-sighted
American
policy:theMarshallPlan,insteadofbeingplacedin a conwitha moreencouldhavebeencombined
textofideological
conflict,
effort
couldhavebeenmade
and a determined
diplomacy,
terprising
basednoton hardening
a Germansettlement
ideological
to negotiate
ofa neutralized
regionin CentralEurope,
frontiers
buton acceptance
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
601
of theAmerican,
whichwouldhaveinvolvedtheearlywithdrawal
forcesfromEurope.35
and Sovietoccupying
British,
ofthesituaOn examination
thereis littletobe saidforthisversion
to theTrumanDocthelong-term
objections
tionin I947. Whatever
relations
on Soviet-American
effect
itdidnothavetheimmediate
trine,
perhapsbecausethecombination
bytherevisionists,
thatis postulated
was so muchin accordwiththe
withharshrhetoric
of negotiation
it was theAmeriAt theMoscowConference
Sovietmodusoperandi.
bythelackofprogress,
whoweredismayed
Marshall,
cans,especially
relaxed.36
whileStalinwas relatively
bytheSovietUnion,
itsrejection
Plan,andinparticular
TheMarshall
ofthetwoblocsin Euforthefinalcrystallization
wasmoredecisive
of
characterization
rope,and thereis sometruthin the revisionist
support
fearedthelossof Congressional
Officials
attitudes.
American
yetdid notwishto takethe
forthePlanifRussiaweretoparticipate,
advocated
itwasa provision
her.Ironically,
forexcluding
responsibility
whichappearstohaveled totheSovietrejection
byWalterLippmann
thattheEuropeanstatescoof thePlan. This was therequirement
takingfulladreconstruction,
theirownplansforeconomic
ordinate
United
Statesa
submit
to
the
and
trade,
of
intra-European
vantage
of the
Molotov'srejection
requestbasedon theirjointcalculations.
dataand preparesuch
economic
to exchange
proposals
Anglo-French
on a directbilateralarrangeand his insistence
a collective
proposal,
fromthe
mentwiththeUnitedStates,led to theSovietwithdrawal
thatthe East European
on thePlan and insistence
Parisconference
thatthereweretobe two
Thisconfirmed
statesshouldalsowithdraw.
thefreedom
restricted
blocsin Europeand further
economic
separate
and
at thesametime,theirwavering
ofthe"satellite"
governments:
and
of
the
French
Italian
on
the
the
part
uncertainty
increasing
perhaps
thedecisionto found
Partiesappearto haveprecipitated
Communist
Stalinist"monothefull-fledged
whichintroduced
theCominform,
pola moremilitant
phaseofCommunist
lithic"bloc.It alsoinitiated
inWestern
strikes
Europeandinsurgency
bypolitical
icy,characterized
Asia.
in Southeast
toadmitthathisalternative
mightnothave
wasthefirst
Lippmann
35Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York
1947), discussed in Horowitz, 243-48.
36 At a meeting
betweenStalinand Marshallon April I5, Stalinrespondedto Marand
shall'spessimismwith the suggestionthat: "thesewere only the firstskirmishes
in dispute
forces. . . whenpeoplehad exhaustedthemselves
brushesof reconnaissance
JosephM. Jones,The FifteenWeeks
theythenrecognizedtheneed forcompromise."
(New York I955), 222-23.
602
WORLD
POLITICS
by the great
a Europefreefromoccupation
succeededin restoring
In callingfor"theMarshallPlan purgedof
powerson itsperiphery.
Lippmanndid not envisagethewithdrawal
theTrumanDoctrine,"
of American,
but merelythewithdrawal
influence,
of all American
one oftheaims
andSoviettroops.Sincethiswas presumably
British,
onemustaskwhat
on Germany,
conferences
oftheForeignMinisters'
deadlocks
usingto breakthefamiliar
Lippmannenvisaged
incentive
to thepossibleneedto pay
briefly
He referred
of thoseconferences.
theirarmies;andhe called
towithdraw
toinducetheSoviets
"ransom"
on bothsidesto lookaheadto thedangersof buildingup tworival
ofthetwohostileblocs.
Germanies
as members
withcerAs theissuewasneverputtothetest,itcannotbe asserted
a
Ten
later,
of
such
settlement.
years
no
that
was
chance
there
tainty
in hisReithLectures,
disengagement
whenGeorgeKennanproposed
in maintaining
manyvestedinterests
theobstacles
wereevengreater:
blocshadbythendeveloped.
But
in theirrespective
thetwoGermanies
in
even
all
at
I947.
a
not
promising
for
were
conditions
settlement
the
of four-power
agreement
thereweretheproblems
WithinGermany
ofa viablegovernment
andtheformation
on theformofgovernment
therewas no reason
willingto meetSovietdemandsforreparations:
resolved
would
be
anymoreeasily
latter
that
this
problem
to suppose
thanthesimilardilemmaafterWorldWar I (the morewillinga
thelesstheprospect
of its
to meetreparations
demands,
government
In thewiderEuropeancontext,
Lippmann(likeKennanin
viability).
fromEasternEuropeas well as
a Sovietwithdrawal
I957) proposed
powtoseewhatquidproquotheWestern
Itisdifficult
fromGermany.
ofcontroloveritssphereof
forSovietabandonment
ershad to offer
lacunaein
in EasternEurope.Indeed,one ofthesurprising
influence
is
he
forward
a geopoput
although
that,
I947 argument
Lippmann's
for
in place of Kennan'sideologicalexplanation
liticalexplanation
of
intoEasternEurope,he did not,in hisdiscussion
Sovietexpansion
takeaccountoftheSovietUnion's
Germanpeacetreaty,
hisproposed
in EasternEurope."7
in remaining
interest
Lippmann'sbrilsecurity
liantand wide-ranging
critiqueof Americanpolicyin I947 shows
in international
as thehazardsofpredictive
so clearly
analysis
nothing
havemoreforce
The negative
critique
pointsin Lippmann's
politics.
deserves
whichscarcely
ofan alternative,
to
thanhispositive
advocacy
37Indeed, at this point in his analysis he suggests that Soviet insistenceon retaining
forward military positions would show that Moscow's motive was to dominate Europe. Lippmann (fn. 35), 43-44.
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
603
of"missedopportunities,"
as is comingto
be elevated
intothecategory
be done in therevisionist
literature.38
NATO
AND REARMAMENT
theperiodin whichcommunism
parwas a majorthreat,
Throughout
was givento theproblems
ticularly
in Franceand Italy,littlethought
of a militarynature..
.
. There was stillsome willingnessin the West
devastation
visitedupon the Soviet
to take accountof theincredible
factsabout
Unionduringthewar.Indeed,one of themostsignificant
theformation
beganafter
themajorinternal
ofNATO is thattheprocess
werebeginningto subside.39
threatsto WesternEuropeancountries
If any revisionist
is comingto acquire the statusof the
hypothesis
bythe
new conventional
wisdom,it is thattheSovietUnion,devastated
secondWorld War, neverintendedto invadeWesternEurope,whose
and thatthefoundationof NATO
real problemsweresocioeconomic,
and the subsequentheavy rearmamentrepresenteda massiveoverreaction.This viewfollowstheanalysisofGeorgeKennan,who argued
unsuccessfully
against the premiseswhich led to the foundingof
NATO in I948-49. The Westernleaders,it is suggested,were led
analogyand the alarm engenderedby the
astrayby the Hitler-Stalin
Praguecoup and theBerlinblockade.A correctreadingof theseevents
would have emphasizedSovietcautionin theblockadeand the Soviet
zone in Czechoslovakia.
aim ofroundingofftheEastEuropeansecurity
It wouldhavebeenseenthattheSoviet"threat"to invadeWesternEuropewas a deterrent
one, analogousto the Americannuclear"threat"
theotherfromexploiting
againstRussiaitself,each aimedat deterring
its asymmetrical
By I949, WesternEurope was
militarysuperiority.
and the Sovietattemptto prevent
beginningto recovereconomically,
the formationof West Germanyhad been defeated:the stabilityso
lackingin thefirstpostwaryearswas on theway to being achieved.
Hindsightlends plausibilityto this analysis,but it is nonetheless
not onlybecauseit is impossibleto say what the
highlyquestionable,
ofso majora factorin contemporary
ofthenon-existence
consequences
38E.g., Horowitz,i9. It is possibleto suggesta parallelbetweenLippmannand
withinthemainstream
of American
HenryWallace,bothofwhomremainedessentially
policythinkingeven when opposedto pressingparticularissuesas the Truman Adchoseto. Thus Wallace,arguingfora moreconciliatory
ministration
line,insistedon
an "Open Door" to tradein EasternEurope (as, in different
words,did Lippmann).
See La Feber (fn. I), 37-39.
39 Robert
Hunter, Securityin Europe (London i969), i2. Hunter develops an original
of the Cold War as a consequenceof the lack of agreedguidelines
reinterpretation
forconflict
management.
WORLD POLITICS
604
as NATO wouldhavebeen,butalso,moreconinternational
politics
thatSovietintenwithconfidence
cretely,
becauseitcannotbe asserted
had therebeenno American
unchanged
tionswouldhaveremained
in Korea (which
intervention
guarantee
to Europeand no American
The past
wasbasedon thesamegeneralreadingofSovietintentions).
course
twodecadesin Europewouldsurelyhavefolloweda different
militarily
present
if theSovietUnionhad beentheonlysuperpower
in Europe.
theWesterngovernments
werethinking
largelyin poMoreover,
to an anticipated
Soviet
liticalterms:theywerenotso muchreacting
a sense
whichwouldpromote
a political
framework
invasion
as seeking
climate
in Western
Europe,andthusprovidethenecessary
ofsecurity
to cometo fruition-afactor
fortheeconomic
recovery
ofconfidence
Theywishedto avoida psychowhichevenKennanacknowledged.
theSovietUnion.Harriman's
vis-a-vis
of inferiority
logicalsituation
ittherewouldbe "a reorientation"
defense
ofNATO wasthatwithout
of thosethatbelievein apin Europeleadingto "a restrengthening
A littlelaterthissortofconsideration
led
andneutrality."40
peasement
to WestGermanrearmament:
the
theirobjections
manyto overcome
as theneedto
pointwas notso muchtheneedforGermandivisions
in prefframework
associate
withtheNATO security
WestGermany
erencetoanyalternative.
tobearin mindtheuncertainty
withwhichWestern
It is necessary
theirfuture
relations
withtheSoviet
leadersin I948-49 contemplated
oftheperiodwhenAmerUnion.Decisions
weretakenin anticipation
could
whatconfidence
ica wouldno longerhavea nuclearmonopoly:
Sovietpressures
therebe thatWesternEuropecouldthenwithstand
an American
And afterKorea,thequestionwas
without
guarantee?
posedin termsofa needforarmedforceson theground,to resista
Sovietattack.
potential
toanticipate
hostile
Sovietpressures?
No doubt
Butwasitreasonable
influenced
the
of
were
decisions
Western
by
memory over-optimistic
buttherewas sufficient
ofHitler'sintentions,
unpredictability
analyses
senseofhostility
in Stalin'spoliciesanda sufficient
andmutualincomleadersto concludethata military
forprudent
imbalance
prehension
in Russia'sfavorwouldbe dangerous.
andlackofmeaningful
communication
Giventhisuncertainty
with
werebasedincreasingly
decisions
on the
theSovietleaders,Western
maximthatpolicyshouldbe basedon an opponent's
capabilimilitary
on
and
"worst-case"
tiesratherthanhis presumed
rather
intentions,
40
Citedin La Feber (fn. I), 78.
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
605
theweakwe canobserve
In thiscontext
assumptions.
than"best-case"
alliance:
nessof Kennan'sargument
againsttheneedfora military
againstus.
strength
The Russianshad no idea ofusingregularmilitary
to an areawherewe wereweak
Whythenshouldwe directattention
and theywerestrong?Time and again,in theensuingweeks,I said
theRussiansare well armedand we are
to mycolleagues:"All right,
into
poorlyarmed.So what?We are likea man who has lethimself
alonetherewitha dog withvery
a walledgardenand findshimself
showsno signsof aggressiveness.
big teeth.The dog,forthemoment,
as betweenthe
The bestthingforus to do is surelyto tryto establish,
to do with
whatsoever
thatteethhavenothing
twoofus,theassumption
theyare neitherherenor there.If the
our mutualrelationship-that
whyshouldwe
to assumethatit is otherwise,
dogshowsno disposition
to the discrepancy?"'
raisethesubjectand inviteattention
couldnotassumethat
The replywas all tooobvious.Governments
thedogwouldremainpermanently
docile,buthad a dutyto supply
Nor couldthey,given
withsomeformof self-protection.
themselves
thattheRussians
themanyuncertainties,
relyon Kennan'sassurance
in any
argument,
no
particular
force.
This
intention
to use
had
weakenedbyKorea.
case,was greatly
hindsight
then,is partlythatevenif therevisionist
The argument,
at thetime:thedecisions
itwasnotveryconvincing
analysis
is correct,
setof
in thecircumstances,
andto acton theopposite
werereasonable
The greater
premises
wouldhavebeenvergingon theirresponsible.
The
thepolicyof rearmament.
themorereasonable
theuncertainty,
was theneedfora power
forNATO, however,
argument
strongest
A decisionagainsta Westernalliance
balanceand a security
system.
forEurope'spoliticaland
consequences
wouldhavehad momentous
economic
future.
wouldhavebeensubjectto strong
WestGermany
European
Sovietinfluence,
anditis difficult
toimaginethatthevarious
thesisapCommunities
The revisionist
couldhavebeenestablished.
whichdepolitics
pearstobe basedon a staticimageofinternational
in greater
detail.
servesto be examined
AssuMPTIoNs
REvISIONIST
in EuRevisionistinterpretations
typicallyimplythatdisturbances
ropeanpoliticsin theearlypostwarperiodweredue solelyto untimely
Americaninitiatives.
This may be a functionof a narrowlybipolar
to therevisionist
visionoftheperiod:thepawnsare of so littleinterest
historianthat he does not concernhimselfwith the variousactors
41George Kennan,Memoirs1925-1950
(London i968), 407-o8.
606
WORLD
POLITICS
oftheColdWar
history
is notthatevery
withinthem.The suggestion
butthatthereshould
mustenterintothedetailsofEuropeanpolitics,
the
ofthemainpoliticalforcesand theirevolution:
be an awareness
politicalforce,the
to emergeas an effective
failureof theResistance
Chrissocialdemocracy,
of Communism,
underpressure
realignment
when
It is discouraging
liberalism,
and conservatism.
tiandemocracy,
as
are presented
theLeftand thereactionaries,
characters,
cardboard
by
Mesmerized
ofthemosaicofEuropeanpolitics.
a sufficient
account
imageofpoliticalchange,Kolkoand hispredecesa one-dimensional
cleavofEurope'spolitical
character
sorsneglect
themulti-dimensional
periodwhen,as
postwar
in theimmediate
significant
ages,especially
system
whichkindofpolitical
in theI930's, therewasrealuncertainty
wouldwinoutovermuchoftheContinent.
theancientfallacyof the
thestaticimage,onediscerns
Underlying
and abthatconflict-improper
ofinterests,
theassumption
harmony
ofa villain.Thusthereis
be explained
bythepresence
normal-must
that
thatit was naturalforthebroadcoalitions
thetacitassumption
in theaftermath
ofwartocontinue
countries
mostEuropean
governed
andpolitics
was
In facttheywerenecessarily
transitional,
indefinitely.
wastobe established,
andwhich
withwhichkindofregime
concerned
discussion
of
Again,thetoneofrevisionist
forces
weretobe dominant.
to containment
suggests
theBaruchPlan or Lippmann'salternative
a warwhichhadseenthefinalcollapseofthe
after
thatitwasnatural,
theemergbetween
toexpectagreement
order,
Europeaninternational
for
order,and a degree
on a newbasis international
ingsuperpowers
of armscontrolneverachievedin thepast;thesewouldhavereprefeatsof statesmanship.
sentedextraordinary
order:theirbiof international
lacka conception
The revisionists
oftheinternational
intoa concept
system.42
polarfocusisnotdeveloped
levelalonetendstobe unrewarding,
at thesystem
negWhileanalysis
is equallyso; it was at therootof thefailureof
lectof thesystem
ofwar,and is thesourceofmuchof the
manyoftheclassictheories
aboutin searchof theguilty.Not to perceive
that
flaying
revisionist
ofinternational
orderin I945 inevtherewas a fundamental
problem
leadstocaricature.
itably
is Alperovitz's
A striking
perspective
exampleofthelackofa system
42
The termis used here not to referto any specificsystemstheory,but in the manner
of Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York I959); he posits three basic
images which underlie interpretationsof internationalconflict: the individual-psychological, the type of nation-unit,and the international system-the milieu in which
internationalpolitics takes place, whether envisaged as Hobbesian anarchy or as internationalsociety.
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
607
speculativeessay"The United States,the Revolutions,and the Cold
War: Perspectiveand Prospect"(Cold War Essays,75-121), which
seesAmericanCold War policyin termsof a traditionof anti-revolutionaryinterventionism,
impelledby a commonideologicalmotive.A
systemapproachwould suggestthathegemonialintervention
in supportofbusinessinterests,
forexample,is so different
fromintervention
to restraina competinggreatpower thatone explanationis unlikely
to fitbothcases.The one is a matterof marginaladvantage,the other
concernsthe basic power relationsof the system.This suggeststhat
Alperovitz's
Americanattitudes)maybe
remedy(to changegrassroots
no morerelevantthantheproposalsof thoseclassic"utopian"theorists
who neglectedsystempressures
in prescribing
remediesforthepreventionof war.
A furtherassumptionconcernsthe generalcharacterof American
foreignpolicy,viz.,the view thatit can be understoodin termsof an
overriding
or design.Two examplesare Alperovitz'sstrategy
strategy
of the delayedshowdownand Kolko's view of AmericanpolicytowardsGermanyat Potsdam.As we have seen,the one represented
a
mood ratherthana strategy;the othera policytendency,
but not the
dominantone.Whilethereareoccasionswhenpolicyis shapedbylongtermconsiderations-the
MarshallPlan would be a good exampleit is more typicallythe productof competinginterests
and analyses
withinthe executiveand pressuresfromwithout,and thiswas surely
A faultyimageleadsto theneglect
trueofthetwoexamplesmentioned.
of themoreplausiblehypothesis.
Relatedto thisis a faultnaturalto thecriticof policy,whicha critical historianshould,however,overcome:theneglectof the actors'pertheirperceptions
thefailureto reconstruct
and problems,or
spectives,
themin anydetail.Thus Truman,Byrnes,or Harevento characterize
rimanare presentedas uniformlyanti-Soviet;theirmore aggressive
or a policy
phrasesare seizedon out ofcontext-perhapsa provocation
argument-andare neverjuxtaposedwith theirmoreconciliatory
exthereis a dilemmahere:to enterintotheactor's
pressions.
Admittedly,
world,to inquire into his purposes,may blunt the criticaledge of
of understanding
need not lead to identifipolemic.But suchan effort
cationwiththeactor,thoughitwill breakdown simplestereotypes
and
thus underminestandardcriticisms.The historian-critic
should be
a moresubtlecritique:thealternative
equal to thetaskof formulating
is a failureto testhis hypothesis
againsta roundedview of the main
actors.
bearsfurther
The questionof testinghypotheses
examination.First,
608
WORLD POLITICS
thereistheselection
useofthe
ofevidence:
we havenotedtheselective
in theStateDepartment
One examevidence
Papersandothersources.
withStalin.Djilas'sobservations
pleistheuseofDjilas'sConversations
are justas damagingto a simplistic
as to any
revisionist
standpoint
othersimplistic
thisdifficulty
pointofview,butrevisionists
overcome
byselecting
forinonlythepassagesthatfitthedesiredinterpretation,
stance
Stalin's
remark
thattheGermans
werenotsuitedtoCommunism
-but nothisassertion
thatall Germany
wouldbe Communist.
One cannotavoidconcluding
thattherevisionists
violatethebasic
methodological
ruleformulated
byKarlPopper,thatone shouldseek
tofalsify
rather
thanverify
tofindconfirming
hypotheses.
It is possible
formosthypotheses;
evidence
a hypothesis
is notseriously
testeduntil
it has withstood
to disprove
attempts
it. The styleof therevisionist
histories
leavesan overwhelming
thatthishas not been
impression
attempted.
Rather,
thereis an amassingof favorable
evidence,
and a
neglectofawkwardevidence
or alternative
hypotheses.
Hencetheassertionof over-Machiavellian
basedon an ingenious
interpretations
ofa fraction
oftheevidence.
construing
Not infrequently
plausibility
is achieved
onlybylimiting
thediscussion
to an artificial
timeperiod;
ofsubsequent
consideration
events
wouldexposedifficulties
fortheinMoststriking
ofall,thereis thelossofa senseofthedisterpretation.
tinction
between
intended
andunintended
consequences.
Whatwe have,then,is notso muchColdWarhistory
as ColdWar
of visionappearsto stemfromthevalues
polemic.The narrowness
and assumptions
of thewriters.
As to values,therevisionist
writings
certaindangersin thecurrent
exemplify
trendin favorof "commitment"in thesocialsciences.
is thatscholarship
Whatis overlooked
is
a value,as wellas a discipline,
itself
andthatitsdemands
represent
the
essential
commitment
ofthescholar,
whichmayconflict
withhisother
socialand politicalcommitments.
Revisionists
are veryconsciousof
thisin commenting
on viewsopposedto theirown (cf.Alperovitz
on
Herbert
War
Feis,Cold
Essays,73). Thereis valuein whatmightbe
thenaivecommitment
of thehistorian
termed
to followhis material
of whereit maylead him: "Historians
regardless
oftendislikewhat
Thereis nothing
happenedor wishthatit had happeneddifferently.
can
about
it.
have
to
statethetruth
as theyseeitwithout
they do
They
thisshocksor confirms
whether
worrying
existing
prejudices."43
The
ofquarrying
revisionists,
however,
givetheimpression
purposefully
for
to fita structure
material
fullydesignedin advance.
43A. J.P. Taylor,The OriginsoftheSecondWorldWar,Forewordto secondedition
(Harmondsworth i964), 7.
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
609
of thevalue systems
The effect
of theNew Left,typicalof thereviis to projectbackontotheI940's theconflict
sionists,
ofvaluesin America whichpreoccupiesthemtwenty-five
yearslater.As a consequence,
mostof theEuropeanactorsdisappearfromview and a mythicalLeft
has tobe createdto represent
theforcesin conflict
withthecounterrevolutionary
UnitedStates.New Lefthistorians
lackawarenessofthevalue
systems
whichled socialistsand liberalsintoalignmentwithChristian
Democratsand conservatives
againstwhattheyperceivedtobe theoverridingtotalitarian
threat.
The disabilityof an intolerantvalue systemis accentuatedby the
commitment
to certainimagessuch as the counterrevolutionary
characterof Americanpolicy.In contrastto thosewho see thislargelyas
theconsequenceof attempting
to applypoliciesappropriate
to Europe
(i.e., in line with the predominantvalues and interests
of the Europeans) to the verydifferent
societiesof,forexample,SoutheastAsia,
the revisionist
worksback fromVietnamand postulatesa simplistic
revolutionary
situationin postwarEurope in orderto be able to assert
thattheUnitedStateshasplayeda monolithic
role
counterrevolutionary
in thewhole postwarperiod.44
DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
Rejectionof the image of the postwarperiod offeredby the revisionistsdoes not implythe rejectionof everyrevisionisthypothesis.
Perhapsthemajorrevisionsupportedby the evidenceis the abandonmentof the notionof the Americanleadersas innocentsabroad-the
Americanleaders were
gentlemanlyUncle Sam of the cartoonists.
muchmoreaware of the politicalissuesthanhas been supposed,and
to secureAmericanor non-Commuchmorereadyto take initiatives
munistinterests:theywere not merelyrespondingto Soviet aggressiveness,but anticipatedchallengesand soughtunilateraladvantages.
"Containment"
was not the purelydefensive,
reactivepolicydepicted
its
and
critics
alike.
The
idealiststrandin
by supporters
universalist,
Americanforeignpolicyhad hegemonialovertones.Americanswere
44Horowitz argues for continuity between American policy in Europe and the
Third World by suggestingsomewhat more subtle similarities;e.g., American resistance
to a Lippmann-typenegotiated settlementin Europe is likened to counterrevolutionary
policies elsewhere (pp. i6-ig). For Kolko the case is more straightforward:the U.S.
and Britain systematicallycut down the Left (as it were, a Greek model for Europe as
a whole). He can even assert: "The existence of Soviet power in Eastern Europe permitted more or less natural and indigenous forces to take their logical course, while
in Western Europe, American and British power contained these forces directlyor indirectly,a containmentthat became the preeminentunifyingelement in the Western
alliance afterI945, and which also hindered postwar economic recovery" (pp. i69-70).
610
WORLD POLITICS
insensitive
to theproblems
oftheSovietleaders,
henceproneto over-
reaction.
thatthe
However,the foregoing
critiquereflects
disappointment
gleanings
areso meager-assuming
of coursethatone is juxtaposing
revisionist
interpretations
notagainsttheworldviewof JohnFoster
Dulles,butagainstthemainstream
ofscholarship
on theperiod.This
is nottheplaceto developtheviewson ColdWar originsimpliedor
sketched
above,butitmaybe usefulto indicate
someoftheareasfor
further
research
whicharesuggested
bythisanalysis.
The first
wouldbe thedetailedreconstruction,
in thelightof the
in
evidence
nowavailable,
oftheinteraction
ofthetwoleadingpowers,
thespirit
ofPopper,
Taylor,andMcNeill:howfarwouldonenowbe
ledtomodify
thepicture
thatemerges
fromMcNeill'smasterly
survey?
American
foreign
policyis beginning
to receivethiskindof scrutiny,
butthesingle-actor
focusaccentuates
someof theshortcomings
discussedabove.
Thissuggests
a secondandmorethematic
approach,
thestudyofthe
Cold War in termsofthebreakdown
of an international
order-the
of
European
states
system
whichprovided
a framework
anda tradition
rudimentary
ideasforinternational
orderfromtheseventeenth
cenin thefirst
turyuntil1914; bothwereshattered
WorldWarandswept
awayinthesecond.Bythei950's it hadbecomecommonplace
tospeak
ofthenewbipolarframework,
andbythei960's somenewrudimenin theforeign
relations
ofthe
taryrulesofthegame,perhapsimplicit
wholeperiod,
andformulated
weremoreclearly
perceived
bythecontestants.
Butin theI940's it was notclearwhatthenew framework
wouldbe,norhow,in thewelterof competing
universalist
doctrines
andself-regarding
practices,
a setofrudimentary
could
understandings
bearrived
ofideology
isusually
at.Thesignificance
blurred
byattempts
torelateittothemotivation
ofoneortheothersuperpower:
fromthe
as a whole,itssignificance
oftheinternational
standpoint
system
was
thatofa barrier
tocommunication,
an "IronCurtain"
thatimpeded
the
ofunderstanding.
necessary
minimum
ofthepostwar
wasalsoboundup withthepartition
world
Ideology
It is verydifficult
to conceiveof any
between
twoeconomic
systems.
forcreating
a singleeconomicsystem,
"missedopportunity"
and the
analysishas pointedto majorobstaclesto linkingthe two systems
of thetwosystems
relations.
The crystallization
through
cooperative
it
as wouldseemthatit
is an areaworthfurther
research,
especially
reasonfortheonsetoftheColdWarthanthe
wasa morefundamental
quarreloverEastern
Europe.
COLD-WAR REVISIONISM
611
The absenceofagreement
on a framework
fortheinternational
sys-
temof the I940'S explainsmuch of the confusionoverwhich power,
Americaor Russia,was the potentialhegemonialaggressor.The revisionistsare correctthatin theworldas a whole the UnitedStateswas
byfarthesuperiorpower;but in Europethe SovietUnion,despiteits
wartimedevastation,
would evenmoreclearlybe dominantunlessthe
UnitedStateswerepresentas a power,as it had notbeen in the I930's.
Thus the decisionsof I947 and I949-50, in which the U.S. resolved,
contrary
to theprevailingexpectationin I945, to underwrite
Western
thenmilitarily,
wereindeedmajorturning
Europe,firsteconomically,
points.It is obvious,as the revisionists
insist,thatwar-wearyRussia
was unwillingto provokea warwiththeUnitedStates,butit is equally
obviousthat,withouttheAmericanpresence,Russiacould have dominatedwar-weary
Europe.
In theEuropeancontext,
EasternEuropewas notjustanotheranonymoussphereofinfluence.
Long an area ofRussianaspiration,
it had for
thegreaterpartof modernhistory
been dividedbetweentwo or more
powers.In I945, contrary
to thetwentieth-century
trendtowardsgreater
it felltotallyunderSovietcontrol-totheWestern
nationalautonomy,
Europeans,a loomingreminderoftheSovietcolossusand oftheirnew
vulnerability.
This suggestsa thirdpromisingarea forresearch:an examination
of Europeanviews of the earlyCold-Warissuesin orderto discern
how muchof Americanpolicywas in accordwitha wider"Western"
perceptionof the threatto liberalvalues,and how much of it was
uniquelyAmerican.
Researchalong the linessuggestedwould tendto removethe study
fromparticipant
oftheCold War further
accountsbybringingout the
of factorsof which theywere not, and could not have
significance
been,fullyaware: theirown perceptions;
diplomaticinteractions
from
of
both
and
the
wider
the standpoint
sides;
"systemic"implications
of theiractionsin an undefined,newly-forming
international
system.
Such researchis not likelyto overturncertainhypotheses
such as the
in the Cold War in Europe.However
existenceof a basic asymmetry
the
Stalin
survivalof the capitalist-democratic
cautiously,
challenged
orderin Westernand CentralEuropein thecrucialperiodof itsweakness.Thanksto Berlinand thepresenceof largeCommunistpartiesin
Franceand Italy,he had greaterleveragein theWest thantheUnited
Statescouldexertin EasternEurope,whateveritsinclinations.
Research
should,however,throwsome light on the escalationof Cold-War
tensionas itcametodominateworldpolitics.A fullaccountwouldhave
612
WORLD POLITICS
to relateexternalpolicyto the internalpoliticsof the superpowers
of the Europeanand Asian
and would have to show theinterrelation
schoolhas something
of theconflict.
In all thistherevisionist
theaters
if
but not if it simplyreversesthe errorsof the participants:
to offer,
Asia
fromethnocentrism,
misperceiving
Americanpolicyhas suffered
in Europeanterms,it is notan advanceto perceiveEuropeas an earlier
policywithtragicmisVietnam.That is merelyto confusesuccessful
calculation.