Seeing Money but Consuming Less
By Hai Tran
A Thesis
Presented to
The University of Guelph
In partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of
Master of Science
in
Marketing and Consumer Studies
Guelph, Ontario, Canada
© HAI TRAN, December, 2016
ABSTRACT
SEEINGMONEYBUTCONSUMINGLESS
Hai Tran
University of Guelph, 2016
Advisor: Dr. Sunghwan Yi
Money priming literature is substantial yet pragmatic behavioural application from money
priming has yet to be seen. This paper explores the relationship between money priming and its
influence on self-sufficiency leading to self-control in a healthy eating context. It was found that
cues of money abundance (high money) led to different behavioural changes than cues of money
insufficiencies (low money) such that; high money primed participants felt more self-sufficient
than low money primed participants. Even though the study did not find the effect for high
money primes leading to higher exertion of self-control, the theories proposed still withstand. It
is urged for future research within this subject area. The findings for this research contributes to
the literature on money priming, ego depletion and buffers of ego-depletion and stipulates ways
for exerting self-control using money cues.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The process of writing my thesis has not been without many challenges. I would like to
extend my sincerest thank you and gratitude to my advisor, Professor Sunghwan Yi, who,
without a doubt, has helped me with every challenge and obstacle that I have encountered. His
relentless criticism, albeit tough, always pushed me to the best of my abilities and reflects his
genuine concern. Professor Yi’s vast knowledge in the theories of consumer behaviour has been
invaluable and my work would not be at the level that it is without him. Thank you Professor Yi
for your guidance, it has been a privilege to work with you.
Secondly, I would like to say thank you to my committee member, Professor Vinay
Kanetkar, for his support and wisdom. I would also like to thank the department, Rita,
Domenica, Alanna and Cori for making our student lives as smooth and easy as it can be.
Throughout this process, academic guidance was sometimes not enough and, at most
times, moral support was desperately needed. I would like to say thank you to my sisters Hoa
Nguyen and May Nguyen for being the best support system I can ask for. Thank you for listening
to me cry when my laptop was stolen, thank you for the innumerous late night bubble tea runs
that helped me calm my nerves, and thank you for putting up with my irrational ranting.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0Introduction.................................................................................................................................1
2.0LiteratureReview.........................................................................................................................4
2.1
MoneyPriming........................................................................................................................4
2.2
MoneyPrimingEffects............................................................................................................5
2.2.1
Self-SufficiencyandAutonomy..............................................................................................5
2.2.2
MentalConstrual.......................................................................................................................5
2.2.3
SocialInfluence......................................................................................................................6
2.2.4
Pro-SocialBehaviour..................................................................................................................8
2.2.5
Self-Control.................................................................................................................................9
2.3
MoneyPrimingMethods.......................................................................................................12
2.3.1
SentenceDescramblingTask...............................................................................................13
2.3.2
Images.................................................................................................................................13
2.3.3
ReadingTask............................................................................................................................14
2.3.4
MoneyHandling...................................................................................................................15
2.3.5
Abundancevs.ScarcityMoneyPriming...............................................................................15
2.4
Self-regulatoryResources......................................................................................................17
2.5
BuffersofSelf-RegulatoryResources.....................................................................................19
2.5.1
Nature..................................................................................................................................19
2.5.2
Self-Awareness.....................................................................................................................20
2.5.3
Self-Affirmation,PositiveEmotionandGlucose..................................................................21
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3.0ResearchQuestions&Hypotheses.............................................................................................22
3.1
ResearchGap........................................................................................................................22
3.2
ResearchHypotheses............................................................................................................23
4.0ResearchMethod.......................................................................................................................26
4.1
ParticipantsandDesign.........................................................................................................26
4.2
MeasuringIVSandDVS.........................................................................................................29
4.2.1
Self-RegulatoryResourceDepletion.....................................................................................29
4.2.2
MoneyPriming..........................................................................................................................29
4.2.3
MeasureofSelf-Sufficiency.......................................................................................................29
4.2.4
Self-Control..........................................................................................................................30
5.0
Results...................................................................................................................................32
5.1
MoodScale...........................................................................................................................32
5.2
Self-regulatoryResourceDepletionManipulationCheck.......................................................32
5.3
TestingHypothesisH1:Self-Sufficiency.................................................................................34
5.4
TestingHypothesisH2...........................................................................................................37
6.0
Discussion..............................................................................................................................42
6.2
TheoreticalContributions......................................................................................................46
6.3
ManagerialandSocialImplications.......................................................................................47
6.4
Conclusion............................................................................................................................48
7.0
References.............................................................................................................................49
8.0Appendix...................................................................................................................................56
v
8.1
Scales....................................................................................................................................56
8.2
ExperimentStimulis..............................................................................................................57
8.2.1
MoneyPriming.........................................................................................................................57
8.2.2
Self-RegulatoryResourceManipulation...................................................................................58
8.2.3
AptitudeTask...........................................................................................................................64
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LIST OF TABLES
Table1:ParameterEstimatesforTypeofPopcornandAmountofPopcorn.......................................................38
Table2:ProbabilityEstimatesforTypeofPopcornandAmountofPopcorn.......................................................39
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure1:FrustrationLevelsforParticipantsUnderDifferentSelf-RegulatoryResourceConditions.....................33
Figure2:DifficultyLevelsforParticipantsUnderDifferentSelf-RegulatoryResourceConditions........................33
Figure3:Levelof'FightinganUrge'forParticipantsUnderDifferentSelf-RegulatoryResourceCondition..........33
Figure4:MainEffectofMoneyPrimingonParticipant’sTimeSpentonImpossibleTask....................................36
Figure5:DepletedParticipant'sTimeSpentonImpossibleTaskforDifferentMoneyPrimingConditions...........36
Figure6:Non-DepletedParticipant'sTimeSpentonImpossibleTaskforDifferentMoneyPrimingConditions...36
viii
1.0
INTRODUCTION
“Money makes the world go round”; a popular quote that many may have heard before.
The saying suggests how imperative money is to our society and whether you agree with the
saying or not, the importance of money in everyday life is unquestionable. Money allows us to
buy the things we want, exchange for the services we need, and even manipulate the social
system we live in (Zhou et. al, 2009). Money is said to be “the most emotionally meaningful
object in contemporary life; only food and sex are its close competitors as common carriers of
such strong and diverse feelings, significances and strivings” (Krueger, 1986). Because money is
such a salient part of our life, its value and the way we respond to money yields important
information and contribution to understanding human behaviour and wellbeing.
The first emerging field of study on money was based on economics, showing the
mathematical and theoretical effects of money and mainly limiting money as a tool for exchange
(Burgoyne & Lea, 2006). However, as money is more deeply explored, empirical studies show
that people’s response to money is not always common sense or what economic theory would
predict; for example, money illusion, a fallacy of preferring nominal rather than the real value of
money and discounting inflation (Burgoyne & Lea, 2006). As the body of literature on money
emerges, more researchers are now looking into the cognitive and behavioural effects from the
mere exposure to money. Studies, pertaining to the psychological effects of money, use money
cues or otherwise known as money primes to seek the relationship between money exposure and
the effect it has on cognitive and behavioural changes. This paper is primarily interested in the
effect of money priming on self-sufficiency and how this consequently affects self-control.
1
Self-control is defined as the ability to override impulses or habits in order to monitor,
regulate or meet certain expectations (Heather & Baumeister, 2016). Expectations can be selfimposed, such as someone who sets a New Year’s resolution to eat healthier, or society imposed
such as resisting the urge to react improper when dealing with conflict. The exertion of selfcontrol is needed to succeed in a variety of domains: developing a happy and stable relationship,
maintaining a healthy lifestyle, and controlling maladaptive behaviours (Heather & Baumeister,
2016). Unfortunately for us, the ability to exert self-control in every situation that confronts us is
almost impossible. The research in self-regulation reveals that our pool of self-regulatory
resources is limited and this pool is needed for acts of self-regulation in every domain. So once
our pool is depleted (i.e., ego depletion), we succumb to our habits and urges. Many studies have
then sparked to find ways to buffer ego depletion and this paper is interested in using the concept
of money primes for the aid of this effect.
This paper not only explores the moderating and buffering effects of money primes but it
also distinguishes the differences in the different types of money primes. Money can either be
seen as being abundant or plentiful or as insufficient or scarce and previous research shows that
exposure to these two different types of money primes will yield opposite priming effects (Vohs,
Mead, Goode 2006). In this paper, it is believed that the priming of money abundance (i.e., high
money) should buffer self-regulatory resource depletion and allow for better self-control and
regulation of unhealthy consumption behaviour while the prime of money insufficiencies (i.e.,
low money) should have no significant effect on self-regulatory resources. The first part of
literature review will look at money priming effects within the various fields of cognition,
consumption behaviour and intentions. Secondly, the methods of money priming are reviewed
and an important discussion on why distinguishing between high money vs low money cues is
2
imperative to the literature of money priming. The literature review will then move on to talk
about self-regulatory resource depletion and the different buffers of this phenomenon. The last
section will link how money priming can have an effect on self-control and how this
consequently impacts consumption behaviour due to its ability to buffer self-regulatory
resources. In the final section of this paper, the conceptual model, hypothesis, research studies,
contributions, limitations and future research possibilities for this type of study are discussed. In
conclusion this paper attempts to further add onto the research of self-regulatory resources, its
link to money priming and how this relationship can have an effect on consumption behaviour.
3
2.0
2.1
LITERATURE REVIEW
Money Priming
The term ‘priming’ is usually referred to the exposure of some type of information
leading to the activation of subsequent judgement, goals or behaviours, often outside of people’s
awareness (Molden, 2014). Priming works by subconsciously calling on our existing schemas
and the application of those schemas to a successive stimulus. For example, studies that primed
elderly words activated schemas of being old, weak and slow caused subjects to walk more
slowly as they left the lab (Bargh Chen & Burrows, 1996). The effects of priming are interesting
to social and cognitive psychologist because they are said to be unconscious and automatic,
beyond the individuals control (Molden, 2014).
The earliest study on priming originated in 1970 in which social psychologists primed
trait adjectives leading participants to apply these adjectives to other’s behaviours (Molden,
2014). As literature on priming progresses, there has been many skepticism and criticism on the
replicability of priming studies. Priming effects are often small and when manipulations are
weak, they produce weaker effects. Priming is of interest due to the subtle and subliminal nature
of the prime, however if effects are only large when prime manipulations are strong and obvious,
then would priming research be of no use? And if lack of awareness is necessary to prime
participants, then how unaware should participants be? Lastly, priming research is often hard to
replicate and direct replications often fail.
Nonetheless, priming research is still strong within the cognitive and social psychology
field. Priming research can help advance our understanding in social schemas, unlock the human
subconscious behaviours and develop our tools to shape judgements. In this section, we are
4
interested in the use of money as a prime and how money is able to elicit cognitive and
behavioural changes.
2.2
Money Priming Effects
2.2.1
Self-Sufficiency and Autonomy
The most important psychological change, relevant to this research, has found that money
priming elicits feelings of self-efficacy, sufficiency, and autonomy (Liu, Smeesters & Vohs,
2011; Vohs, Mead, &. Goode, 2006). Researchers Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) found that
cues of money brought about a state of self-sufficiency in participants. Nine experiments were
conducted to illustrate and confirm these effects. The most notable experiment found that when
participants were given a difficult or unsolvable task, those who were primed with money
concepts would work longer before requesting for help than those who were primed with neutral
concepts (Vohs, Mead, &. Goode, 2006). The concept of self-sufficiency will be a reoccurring
theme in this review and it plays an important part to this research paper.
2.2.2
Mental Construal
Money priming has been shown to elicit changes in mental construal. Literature on
conceptual thinking has shown that mental construals are affected by environmental situations.
For instance, in situations that are identified as problematic or threatening, individuals will adopt
a systematic, bottom up, concrete style of mental construal. In situations that are identified as
benign, individuals will adopt a top down abstract style of mental construal (Schwarz, 2002).
Hansen, Kutzner, and Wanke (2012) applied money priming into this line of construal level
5
research and found that because money priming elicits feelings of self-efficacy, participants will
also feel more in control of their environment and this will in turn evoke participants to adopt a
top down abstract mental construal. Their study showed that participants who were primed with
the concept of money identified actions as more abstract than concrete (ex. “Reading” would be
identified as “gaining knowledge” as opposed to ‘following the lines of print”) therefore
reflecting an abstract style of mental construal (Hansen, Kutzner & Wanke, 2012). Abstract
mental construal also affected the participant’s preference for products such that participants,
who were primed with money concept, preferred an alarm clock that had a positive central
feature and a negative secondary feature significantly more to participants who were primed with
non-money concepts. This increased preference and importance placed on products with positive
primary features is a reflection of abstract mental construal (Trope & Liberman, 2000).
2.2.3
Social Influence
As mentioned earlier, the feelings of autonomy and self-sufficiency are elicited through
the priming of money. When this happens, the idea of the self is activated, and money primed
participants become more self-oriented (Reutner & Wanke, 2012). This shifts the participants’
focus towards the needs for themselves, and less on the needs of others and this effect has been
found to affect both people’s behavior toward social influence and pro-social behaviour. In a
study by Reutner and Wanke (2012), the researchers believed that money priming should
enhance intentions to follow a recommended behavior when the argument relates to the message
recipients and reduce intentions to follow a recommended behavior when the argument relates to
the benefit of other people. In their study, participants either touched money or paper slips
(money prime vs. neutral priming) and were then given two persuasive arguments promoting a
6
reduction in meat intake and usage of tobacco. The two persuasive argument were either selfrelated or other-related (ex. Other-related argument argued that the crop used for the raising of
livestock could instead be used to feed starving people in the third world and smoking would
enhance the probability that children would eventually imitate one’s behavior and hence had a
higher risk of becoming smokers themselves. Self-related argument argued that high meat intake
enhanced the risk of developing illnesses such as pulmonary heart disease and smoking fostered
pre-mature skin aging.) The authors control for personal biases by asking participants how often
they ate meat, and how many cigarettes they smoked a day. The participants were asked how
persuasive they thought the message was and whether the argument had convinced them to
follow the recommended behaviour. As predicted, money priming reduced intentions to perform
the recommended behaviour for other-related arguments but increased intentions to perform the
recommended behaviour for self-related arguments compared to the control group (Reutner &
Wanke, 2012).
Along the lines of social influence, it has been found that participants, who are money
primed, became more sensitive and defensive to attempts that they felt violated their freedom
and self-sufficiency. Researchers Liu, Smeesters and Vohs (2011) argue that because money
priming elicits self-sufficiency and autonomy, attempts of social influence can be seen as
threatening and participants will behave in opposition in order to restore their sense of
independence. In their first study, a 2 (money vs. neutral prime) by 2 (command vs. no
command) experimental design was used. Participants were primed using a scrambled phrase
task and the two groups saw either neutral phrases or money related phrases. Afterwards,
participants read a detailed description of a scenario in which a student must decide which of the
two computer software packages to purchase, Wobble or Hawk. In the command condition, the
7
teacher of the course, Dr. Whim, stated, “It seems clear to me that Wobble is the better system,
so I think you should go with that. I’ll be disappointed if you do not go for Wobble.” In the nocommand condition, Dr. Whim said, “I do not want to influence your choice, so I’m not even
going to tell you.” As expected, participants in the neutral prime condition expressed higher
purchase likelihood for the option that was recommended by the authority figure than the
option’s purchase likelihood in the no-command condition and money primed participants
expressed a higher purchase likelihood for the option that was not recommended compared to the
option’s purchase likelihood in the no-command condition. Therefore, the authority’s command
backfired for money primed participants (Liu, Smeesters & Vohs, 2011). It can be argued that
commands in itself are inherently threatening to self-autonomy due to its demanding nature.
However, Liu, Smeesters and Vohs (2011) found similar effects in the second study when the
recommended computer software package option was offered in the form of an opinion as
opposed to a command.
2.2.4
Pro-Social Behaviour
Elicited feelings of independence and self-autonomy have also been found to affect
individual’s feelings towards pro-social behaviour. Money provides feelings of confidence and in
turn people are less likely to care about other’s approval and acceptance (Zhou, Vohs, &
Baumeister 2009). Therefore, money priming may make individuals feel less pressured to engage
in socially desirable actions like sustainable behaviors, as the need for social acceptance is
reduced (Capaldi & Zelenski, 2015). Money also activates feelings of being in control of one’s
environment (Hansen, Kutzner & Wanke, 2012), which may lead one to feel that they are less
vulnerable and better able to adapt to environmental problems and, thus, become less concerned
8
or motivated to be pro-environmental (Capaldi & Zelenski, 2015). Money priming has also been
found to decrease appreciation and concern for nature (Caruso et al., 2013) and if people feel less
connected and concerned about the natural world, they will be less willing to behave in ways that
protect it (Nisbet, Zelenski, & Murphy, 2009). Although there has been conflicting research
showing the causality between money priming and pro-social behaviour, Capaldi and Zelenski
found in their most recent 2015 study that money priming led to lower social value orientations
and decreased social connectedness however no significant effect was found in participant’s
willingness to engage in sustainable actions (Capaldi & Zelenski, 2015). More research is still
needed in this area of literature.
2.2.5
Self-Control
Lastly, but most importantly to our research is the behavioural changes in self-control and
ego depletion due to money priming. Ego depletion, or the depletion of self-regulatory resources,
is said to be connected to the loss of strength and if money priming has been found to increased
participant’s feelings of strength (Zhou, Vohs & Baumeister, 2009), it is possible that the idea of
money could buffer ego depletion effects. This notion does not go without support and
researchers Boucher and Kofo (2012) found that participants who are depleted of self- regulatory
resources but are primed with money concepts will do better on subsequent self-control tasks
than participants who are depleted of self-resources but are primed with neutral primes.
However, the researcher’s measure for self-control was neither applicable to consumer context
nor pragmatic. They used the Stroop (1935) task, by which participants had to say out loud and
as quickly as possible the color of the ink that each word was printed in instead of the actual
word (e.g., “green” printed in blue ink). By having to override the tendency to simply read the
9
word, it represented a common index of self-control. Even though the Stroop task could work as
a measure for self-control, it would be more valuable if research were conducted to see actual
behavioural changes due to money priming (eg. Money priming on eating, impulsive buying and
other maladaptive consumption behaviours).
The elicitation of self-control through money priming has been demonstrated in another
study by Mogilner (2010) when she found that participants, primed with money concepts, would
want to spend more time working. In her study, participants were primed with money, time or
neutral related scrambled words and were then asked to complete an ostensibly unrelated
questionnaire. The questionnaire listed everyday activities for participants to rate to the extent to
which they planned to engage in each activity over the next 24 hours. It was found that money
priming increased participant’s intention to spend more time at work as opposed to other hedonic
activities such as sex and socializing (Mogilner, 2010). It takes a degree of self-control to put
aside leisure activities for the purpose of work so it could be argued that choosing to work over
hedonic activities is an illustration of self-control.
In another study, researchers Tong, Zheng and Zhao (2013) found that participants,
primed with money concepts through a sentence construction task, would choose utilitarian
products as opposed to hedonic products in a subsequent consumption task compared to
participants primed with neutral concepts. The authors proposed that because money priming
activates the concerns of spending money wisely and the prevention system focus of trying to not
lose money, consumers would exercise self-control and choose utilitarian goods (Tong, Zheng &
Zhao, 2013). Theoretically, the selection of utilitarian good over hedonic good is said to be an
example of successful self-control (Kivetz and Zheng, 2006). This article shows that money
priming can bring about positive consequences such as helping consumers regulate their
10
consumption and increase self-control when faced with the decision between a hedonic and
utilitarian good. However, even though the authors found their predicted results, a concern with
their study is in their use of priming. It has been shown that the priming of money will activate
different mindsets depending on the context of the money prime (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006).
An individual struggling with financial problems will react and behave differently to money
primes compared to an individual that is not. The concept of abundance of money and scarcity of
money is briefly brought up in Tong, Zheng and Zhao (2013) third study when the researchers
found that the utilitarian product selection effect was negated when the prime was credit cards.
Their reasoning is that cash is often related to the cost of purchases and the association between
costs and credit cards is weaker. It could also very well be that the credit card prime elicited
mental associations of being able to spend outside one’s limit, which can activate feelings of
personal strength as opposed to feelings of costs and threats. Therefore, the researchers did not
find the same effect when credit cards are used. The concept of abundance money priming vs.
scarce money priming will be reviewed later on in this paper.
A proposed theory of the effect of money priming and self-control comes from construal
level theory. Fujita, Trope, Liberman and Levin-Sagi (2006) posit that self-control can be
conceptualized as acting in accordance to high-level mental construal. It is said that high-level
mental construal entails seeing events and objects for their superordinate, central features and
low-level mental construal as subordinate, incidental secondary features. So in self-control
conflicts, the primary self-control goal is associated with high-level construal while the
temptation or behaviour leading to self-control failure is associated with low-level construal. For
example, a student who wishes to perform well on a final exam is given an invitation to attend a
party. This causes a self-control conflict such that if the student goes to the party, he/she risks
11
doing well on the exam at the stake of seeing their friends. This self-control conflict suggests that
doing well on the exam would be a high-level concern while seeing their friends would be a lowlevel concern. Fujita et al. (2006) suggest that self-control entails putting one’s high-level
concerns before one’s low-level concern, an acting manner that is in accordance with high-level
mental construal. The author’s proposition was supported in a series of studies, in which highlevel mental construal was able to elicit self-control. In their first study, the authors manipulated
high or low level construal by asking participants to generate answers as to either why they
engaged in a certain action (a manipulation shown to elicit high-level construal), or how they
engaged in a certain action (a manipulation shown to elicit low-level construal). It was found that
participants, who were primed to use high-level construal, squeezed longer onto a handgrip that
caused discomfort, for the goal of having a better result on the test, than participants who were
primed to use low-level construal.
Therefore, according to construal level theory, money priming should elicit high-level
mental construal and subsequently increase self-control, and even though the notion of money
prime eliciting self-control in consumption behaviour has been found, no pragmatic experimental
design has been done to substantiate this effect. As of now there is no literature regarding the
effect of money priming on self-regulation and self-control in other consumption behaviour
domains such as eating, gambling and other maladaptive consumption behaviour.
2.3
Money Priming Methods
Similar to money priming effects, the ways in which money priming can be done is also
numerous. In this portion of the proposal, different money priming methods are reviewed and the
effect size of each manipulation has been recorded in the attached document: “Summary of
12
Articles Reviewed”. It is noted that even though money priming has yielded large effects in some
the studies reviewed, priming studies tend to produce on average only small to medium effects.
2.3.1
Sentence Descrambling Task
The sentence descrambling tasks seems to be the most popular and widely used method
of priming money concepts. In a sentence-descrambling task, participants are given sets of
scrambled words in which participants have to rearrange to create a comprehensible phrase. To
prime participants with money concepts, a large percentage of the sets of scrambled words will
have money concepts. For example, 20 out of 30 sets of scrambled words would be related to
money and a set could read “paying high job desk” which would be rearranged to “high paying
desk job”. Another way of sentence descrambling is to add in a word that participants would
have to leave out. For example “paying green high job desk” would become “high paying desk
job”. Using sentence descrambling tasks to prime money have been used in many research
studies and the effects of such priming include better performance on the Stroop task (Boucher &
Kofos, 2012), higher endorsement of a free market (Caruso, Baxter, Vohs & Waytz, 2013),
higher use of mental construal (Hansen, Kutzner & Wanke, 2012), higher defiance for
commands (Liu, Smeesters & Vohs, 2011), reduce interest in social activities (Mogilner, 2010),
increase choice for hedonic products vs. utilitarian products (Tong, Zheng, Zhao, 2013) and
reduced willingness to spend time helping others (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006).
2.3.2
Images
Another common method of money priming is the use of images. Some studies will use
faint images of bills in the background of a questionnaire or have it as the screensaver for an
13
unrelated computer task (Caruso, Baxter, Vohs & Waytx, 2013; Liu, Smeesters, &Vohs, 2011)
Pictures of coins, play money, and cash have also been used to prime money concepts (Vohs,
Mead, & Goode, 2006; Liu, Smeesters, &Vohs, 2011). Sometimes the images will be reinforced
with an identification task. In one study, participants were shown pictures of cash and credit
cards and were then asked to identify whether they prefer money or credit card as the medium
for exchange (money condition). In the control condition, participants were shown pictures of a
radio or CD and were asked to identify their preference of medium to listen to music to. It was
found that participants who were primed with money concepts preferred products with positive
central attributes compared to control groups (Hansen, Kutzner & Wanke, 2012). Overall the
method of using images to prime money have been found to elicit similar effects that a sentence
descrambling task would.
2.3.3
Reading Task
Money priming can be done through reading tasks. The participants are told to read
passages that will have concepts of money in the passage while participants in the control
condition will read passages that are neutrally themed. What is of most interest with this method
of priming is in Vohs, Mead and Goode’s (2006) study in which the researchers used this method
to prime money in two very different but similar contexts. The authors used this reading task to
manipulate high money vs. low money; so one group read a passage about growing up with
abundance financial resources while the other group read about growing up with meager
resources. Even though both passages were about money, the context of money was entirely
different and the authors were able to elicit completely opposite effects from their priming
method. Participants in the high money condition persisted significantly longer on a subsequent
14
anagram task before asking for help than participants in the low money condition. The act of
persistency and not asking for help correlates with how self-sufficient the participants felt
therefore high money was shown to produce self-sufficiency in participants and low money was
not (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006).
2.3.4
Money Handling
Lastly, priming money can be done through the actual handling of money. In one study,
the authors had participants put their hand in a bowl filled with either bills (money condition) or
paper slips (control condition) and participants are told to rummage through and predict the
amount of slips there are in the bowl. The participants who rummaged through the bowl of bills
had higher intentions to follow a recommended behaviour when the behaviour benefits are
related to the self than participants who rummaged through the bowl of paper slips (Reutner &
Wanke, 2012). In another study, the authors had participants count out either money bills or
paper slips, and participants who counted out money bills reported feeling stronger than
participants who counted paper slips (Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009).
2.3.5
Abundance vs. Scarcity Money Priming
Even though the general theme of self-sufficiency, autonomy and strength has been found
in money priming literature, it is said that money priming can still conjure up very two different
concepts. For example, a picture of a $100 bill might remind a wealthy person that they are rich,
which will make them feel more self-sufficient and autonomous, while this very same $100
image might remind a poor person of their unfortunate circumstances and how maybe they don’t
even have a $100 in their bank! As one can see, the same money prime can elicit two very
15
different feelings. This is why recent studies on money priming have started differentiating
between abundance of money vs. scarcity of money. Vohs, Mead and Goode (2006) found in
their second study that cues of money could have different effects depending on the context of
the money concept. In their second study, the authors manipulated money priming into two
different conditions; abundance of money (high-money) and limited amount of money (lowmoney). Participants in the high-money condition read about growing up having abundant
financial resources, whereas low-money participants read about growing up having meager
resources. After the manipulation, the participants were given a geometric figure and then told to
outline all segment once and only once without lifting the pencil or retracing any segments.
Unbeknownst to participants, the figure was unsolvable. After 2 min of working alone, the
experimenter and a confederate (who was blind to the participant’s condition) entered the room.
The experimenter said that the confederate was another participant who had just completed this
experiment and therefore could be asked for help, if needed. It was found that participants in the
high-money condition worked significantly longer than participants in the low-money condition
before asking for help. Therefore, it was only in the high-money condition that participants felt
more self-sufficient, supporting the notion that mere money priming can have different effects
depending on the context of the money prime (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006).
Another study illustrating the notion of low-money priming was done by researchers
Zhou, Vohs and Baumeister (2009). In their study, the researchers instructed half of the
participants to list their monetary expenditures for the past 30 days (activating low-money
priming or loss of money) while the other half of the participants were instructed to write about
the weather conditions over the past 30 days (neutral priming, or control group). It was found
that participants, who had to think about their money expenditures or money loss, reported
16
feeling less strong than participants who were instructed to write about the weather condition.
However, to make this study more valid, the authors should have added in a third condition of
high-money priming and compared this group to the control and low-money prime group. If
there were significant differences between the low-money group and high-money group, it would
be more credible to believe that money priming can elicit two very different effects depending on
the context of the money concept. The notion of high-money vs. low-money priming is fairly
new in this line of literature and it of interest to this study to use these two different primes.
2.4
Self-regulatory Resources
Money priming has been shown to elicit self-control and it has been stated that self-
control is impacted by self-regulatory resources. It is widely accepted that a person’s selfregulation resources come from a reservoir that is finite and limited such that an act of selfregulation will impact proceeding acts of self-regulation even if the act is not within the same
domain. So when ego-depletion occurs, individuals fail to sustain self-control because they run
out of energy or resources (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Baumeister and Heatheron (1996)
first explored this notion and used the strength model to justify their theory (Baumeister &
Heatherton, 1996). It is said that self-regulation requires strength and at any given time, a person
can only regulate so much of his or her behaviour. So when strength is depleted by demands in
one sphere of domain, self-regulatory breakdowns are more likely to occur in others (Baumeister
& Heatherton, 1996). It is said the strength model would explain why people, who become more
emotional, irritable and/or stressed, are more likely to increase their smoking, break their diets
and abuse alcohol or other drugs (Glass, Singer, & Friedman, 1969). The theory would also
explain why self-regulation tends to break down later in the evening when self-regulation
17
resources have already been used up throughout the day. This is why people tend to break their
diet, have regretful sexual acts, smoke, drink, and commit violent impulsive crimes later in the
evening (Baumeister & Heatheron, 1996). The notion of strength is an important concept
because as mentioned earlier, money priming has been shown to elicit feelings of strength (Zhou,
Vohs & Baumeister, 2009). Therefore, according to the strength model, money priming should
presumably have the ability to buffer any self-regulatory resource depletions.
A famous study showcasing the strength model theory was done by authors by Vohs and
Faber in 2007. The authors showed that when participants had to regulate their attention, mental
and emotional control, all of these behaviours depleted the same pool of self-regulating resources
and consequently affected a behaviour in a different domain; impulsive buying (Vohs & Faber,
2007). In their first study relating to attentional control, all participants watched a 6-minute
videotape and it was only the participants who were told to direct their attention on the woman’s
face (therefore depleting self-regulatory resources) had a higher willingness to pay for various
products. In the second study, the authors depleted self-regulatory resources through thought
suppression. Participants were told to write down anything that came to mind and it was only
participants in the depleted self-regulatory resources condition that were told to not think about a
white bear; consequently, by suppressing the thought of a white bear and depleting themselves of
self-regulatory resources, these participants ended up buying more products at the end of the
experiment. In the third study, the authors had participants present a passage and participants
who were told they had to use amplified facial expressions and multiple hand gestures (therefore
using more resources) also ended up purchasing more products at the end of the experiment
(Vohs & Faber, 2007).
18
2.5
Buffers of Self-Regulatory Resources
The literature on self-regulatory resource depletion is copious and as such it has sparked a
new field of research on the ways to which these resources can be restored. It has been widely
known that these resources can be restored through adequate rest and time, however researchers
have found other unexpected alleviations for the negative impacts of ego depletion.
2.5.1
Nature
It has been shown that viewing nature scenes and nature concepts can restore self-
regulatory resources even quicker than rest. In the article “Nature Gives us Strength”, researchers
Chow and Lau (2015) depleted the participants resources through a letter crossing task and
participants in the nature condition were then told to go through a picture album made up of 36
nature pictures depicting forests, lakes, gardens and mountains, while participants in the rest
condition were told to try and relax during their break. It was found that participants who spent
time looking at nature pictures would persist longer on a subsequent anagram task than
participants who were told to rest. Therefore, suggesting that exposure to nature scenes has more
restorative value than taking a rest (Chow & Lau, 2015). The authors extended their study by
showcasing this restorative effect on non-depleted participants. In their third experiment, only
half of the participant had their self-regulatory resources depleted and it was found that the effect
of nature exposure only interacted with depleted participants. Therefore, nature concepts cannot
increase the initial reservoir of resources; it can only restore the reservoir of its depletion (Chow
& Lau, 2015).
19
2.5.2
Self-Awareness
According to the cybernetic model of self-regulation, self-regulation is the act of
comparing the self against a relevant standard and the ability to reduce the discrepancy between
the self and the standard (Carver & Scheier, 1981). Therefore when self-awareness is increased,
the saliency between the standard self and self will also increase and people will be more
inclined to adjust or regulate their behaviour to meet this standard (Alberts, Martijn & Vries,
2011). Motivational intensity theory suggests that self-awareness increases motivation and
justifies the mobilization of resources. In other words; self-awareness would be able to prevent
regulatory failure due to ego depletion (Alberts, Martijn & Vries, 2011). Researchers Alberts,
Martijn and Vries highlighted this effect in their 2011 paper. They recruited 80 undergraduate
students for a 2 (high vs. low depletion) x 2 (high vs. low self-awareness) experimental design.
In the first task, the researchers had each student do an initial handgrip test to rule out differences
in strength. In the second task, participants were depleted of their resources by solving
calculations. In the high resources depletion condition, the participants had to solve difficult
calculations while being auditively distracted while in the low-resources depletion condition, the
participants solved easy calculations without distractions. The researchers primed for selfawareness by using a sentence descrambling tasks that used self-pronouns. After the task, each
participant had to redo the handgrip task and the amount of time and strength to which they held
the handgrip was measured and used as the dependent variable. The authors successfully found
that depleted participants who were primed with self-awareness performed better on the later
handgrip task than depleted participants who were not primed with self-awareness.
20
2.5.3
Self-Affirmation, Positive Emotion and Glucose
Ego depletion recovery research has found that self-affirmation; positive emotion and
glucose all have the ability to restore depleted self-resources (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009; Tice,
Baumeister, Shmueli & Muraven, 2007; Ren , Hu, Zhang, Huang, 2010; Gailliot et. al, 2007).
Self-affirmation sustains a person’s sense of moral adequacy, which softens any ego threats
therefore enabling people to demonstrate good self-control (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). Positive
emotion is able to counteract ego depletion because of its ability to broaden and recapture an
individual’s personal resources (Fredrickson, 2005). Lastly, because self-control relies on
controlled processes in the self and controlled processes are susceptible to glucose fluctuations,
glucose is then shown to have restorative capabilities for ego-depleted individuals (Gailliot et. al,
2007).
21
3.0
3.1
RESEARCH QUESTIONS & HYPOTHESES
Research Gap
Even though current literature has found links between money priming and self-control,
the current studies either do not use actual pragmatic consumption behaviour as a dependent
variable or they do not differentiate between abundance vs. scarce money priming. The use of
unhealthy eating as the context for self-control is due to its close relevancy to money priming
effects on self-control and construal order theory. Resisting unhealthy foods require a high
degree of self-control and many researchers explain the relationship through goal order theory. It
is said that eating healthy and managing your weight is a high-order goal (Fishbach et. al. 2003),
and intentions of unhealthy eating is a low-order goal. By setting up a goal to eat healthy, the
dieter sets themselves up for a long-term goal of a healthy lifestyle and sacrifices immediate loworder rewards of eating tasty, but unhealthy foods, that undermine long-term goals (Haynes,
Kemps, Moffitt, & Mohr, 2014). In accordance to goal order, it is posited that primary, or highorder, self-control goals are associated with high-level construal while the temptation, or loworder behaviour leading to self-control failure is associated with low-level construal (Fujita,
Trope, Liberman & Levin-Sagi, 2006). Furthermore, it has been shown that money priming
facilitates high-level mental construe and when participants are in a high-level mental construal
state of mind, they demonstrated higher levels of self-control (Hansen, Kutzner & Wanke, 2012).
Secondly, it is not only intuitive but also been shown that self-regulatory resources are an
important contribution to healthy eating behaviour. Studies found that the lack of self-regulatory
resources was associated with an unfavorable dietary pattern (Sproesser, Strohbach, Schupp &
22
Renner,2011) while self-control was positively related to healthy eating patterns and lower
intake of crisps and snacks (Junger & Kampen, 2010).
In this study, we use money primes as a buffer of ego depletion. It has been shown that
money priming can elicit feelings of self-sufficiency (Liu, Smeesters & Vohs, 2011; Vohs,
Mead, &. Goode, 2006) and feelings of self-sufficiency translate into behavioural changes such
that participants primed with money are shown to persist longer on difficult tasks, and
demonstrate better self-control (Tong, Zheng & Zhao, 2013; Boucher & Kofo, 2012; Reutner &
Wanke, 2012). The research proposed will then try to apply this elicitation of self-control onto
actual consumption behaviour in the context of unhealthy eating choices.
3.2
Research Hypotheses
When faced with hunger, one often day dreams of a delicious pizza, a juicy burger, or a
big steak dinner finished off with a cold scoop of ice cream. In fact, even when, not faced with
hunger, it is still hard to say no to desserts! Our bodies’ tendency to crave for high fat, high carb
food is actually quite natural and it is said to be linked to our evolutionary needs (Drewnowski &
Almiron-Roig, 2010). Many researchers argue that we are evolutionary hardwired to prefer
fattier foods because of its ability to provide us with more energy (Drewnowski, 1997).
Therefore, to be able to resist and override our want for unhealthy, but often tastier and fattier
foods, would require self-control (Heather & Baumeister, 2016). For this study, the ability to
resist a fatty food option for a healthier option is used as our measure of self-control. We predict
that participants who are temporary depleted of their self-regulatory resources and primed with
high money cues will exert better self-control than participants who are primed with low money
cues.
23
Secondly, it has been shown that because money priming will induce the feelings of selfsufficiency, one will feel powerful and in control of their environment (Hansen & Wanke, 2012).
The feelings of being in control of one’s environment would help bolster one’s ability to selfregulate and control their impulsive or unwanted behaviour. According to Bandura’s theory, selfsufficiency or self-efficacy influences all aspects of behaviour including the inhibition of existing
maladaptive behaviour (Strecher, DeVellis, Becker & Rosenstock, 1986), and to be able to
inhibit a negative behaviour is to essentially be able to exert and apply self-control. In the article
“The Role of Self-Efficacy in Achieving Health Behaviour Change”, Strecher et al. (1986)
review how self-efficacy affects behaviour changes in the health context such as smoking,
weight control, contraceptive behaviour, and alcohol abuse. This review article has found that
self-efficacy is a consistent predictor of short and long term success for the cessation or
reduction of maladaptive behaviour (Strecher et al., 1986). In addition, self-efficacy, when
manipulated, produced similar results such that the enhancement of self-efficacy was a factor
leading to the subsequent termination or declination of smoking. So if money priming is able to
elicit feelings of self-sufficiency and self-efficacy, it should then be presumed that these elicit
feelings will aid participants to resist unhealthy behaviours and exert self-control. This is why it
is believed that self-sufficiency is the main mediator for the effect that is expected to occur.
H1: Participants in the high money priming condition will feel more self-sufficient than
participants in the control and low money priming condition in both the depleted and nondepleted condition.
H2a: When self-regulatory resources are depleted, participants in the high money priming
condition are more likely to choose the low-fat bag of popcorn over the buttered bag of popcorn
in comparison to participants who are depleted of their self-regulatory resources in the control
24
and low money priming condition.
H2b: When self-regulatory resources are depleted, participants in the high money priming
condition are more likely to choose the small bag of popcorn over the large bag of popcorn in
comparison to participants who are depleted of their self-regulatory resources in the control and
low money priming condition.
Money Prime
Self-Control
Temporary Depletion of
Self-Regulatory Resources
H2c: Self-sufficiency will mediate the effect of money priming on self-control.
Money Prime
(High vs. Low vs. Control)
Self-sufficiency
Temporary Depletion of
Self-Regulatory Resources
Self-Control
25
4.0
4.1
RESEARCH METHOD
Participants and Design
A total of 329 undergraduate students were recruited from the University of Guelph
through the marketing and consumer studies research pool via SONA Systems (a cloud based
participant management software). Students participated in exchange for course credits that was
compulsory for their research component grade in their marketing classes. The number of
participants chosen was determined by a sample size calculator called GPower. In addition, when
looking at money priming literature, previous authors have also used approximately 50
participants for each of the conditions in their studies (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006). It is noted
that when determining the number of participants, a small to medium effect size was used due to
the nature of priming experiments. As stated earlier, priming effects tend to be small and
transient (Rohrer, Pashler & Harris, 2015).
The research question was tested using a 2 (Depleted vs. Full self-regulatory resources) x
3 (abundance of money vs. scarcity of money vs. control) factorial design. A total of 329
participants were recruited and they were randomly allocated to either the Depleted-Abundance,
Depleted-Scarcity, Depleted-Control, Full-Abundance, Full-Scarcity or Full-Control group.
Groups of six to eight participants met up in a lab and they were told that they are
participating in a research study that included two comprehension tasks, and an aptitude task. In
front of each participant are three sets of booklets, turned over with the numbers 1, 2 and 3. For
the first task, participants were instructed to flip over booklet number 1. Booklet 1 was the SRR
depletion task guised as the first comprehension task (refer to section 4.2.1 for more
information). Participants were instructed to go through a small paragraph of text and to cross
26
out every letter ‘e’ that they encountered. According to the assumption that self-control is the
ability to override initial response, participants are then required to form a habit and then to
break it repeatedly (Baumeister, 2000). This process of crossing out ‘e’s was then done to instill
the habit of automatically crossing out any ‘e’s that they saw. Once they were done crossing out
‘e’s from this page, participants went on to the second page where they we’re instructed to cross
out as many letter ‘e’s in 5 minutes as possible. Participants in the depleted condition were told
to cross out every letter e that they saw unless it was adjacent to a vowel or one letter removed
away from a vowel. By having to override their initial response to cross out every letter e,
participants had to exert more self-control and therefore deplete their SRR. Participants in the
full resources condition were only instructed to cross out as many ‘e’s as they saw, similar to the
instructions that they previously had in the first page of texts. After 5 minutes of doing this task,
participants responded to manipulation check items gauging the difficulty of the task, how
frustrating the task was and the extent of which they felt like they were fighting an urge while
doing the task, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale.
Participants were then instructed to flip over booklet number 2 which had their second
comprehension task. In this task, participants had to read a small paragraph and answer questions
regarding the paragraph. This task was used to prime participants of either high money or low
money cues (refer to section 4.2.2 for more information). Participants in the abundance group
were asked to read a passage about growing up with abundant financial resources, participants in
the low money prime read about growing up with having meager resources and participants in
the control group read a passage about a fictitious university (i.e., University of Chumington).
Participants in the high and low money priming condition were stressed to really put themselves
in the shoe of the author of the paragraph and imagine what it would be like to live in such a
27
condition. After reading the passage, participants were asked to write a couple sentences
depicting how they would feel if they lived in the conditions that was given to them, what kind
of things they would be able to afford (high money priming vs. low money priming) or how they
would feel if they attended the University of Chumington (control condition) and lastly a
multiple choice question regarding the paragraph (to check whether the participant actually read
the paragraph thoroughly or not).
Once everyone was done the second task, participants moved onto the third and final
booklet. The third booklet was the self-sufficiency measurement that was guised as an aptitude
task (refer to section 4.2.3 for more information). Participants were given five geometric shapes
and they were told to retrace the shapes without lifting their pencil or retracing a line twice.
Participants were told they had 15 minutes and were encouraged to use as much time within the
15 minutes as possible, however they were free to give up or ask for help at any time without any
repercussions. Unbeknownst to participants, the last shape was an impossible task and
participants were recorded how many seconds they spent on this impossible puzzle before giving
up or requesting for help. When participants gave up, or wanted extra help, they were told to put
up their hands and a researcher would come by. Once participants raised their hand, the
researcher came by and wrote on their page the time in seconds that it took them to give up. The
researcher then told them to move onto the final questionnaire. In the final questionnaire,
participants filled out a survey that asked for their demographic information, mood, diet and
weight lost concerns (in order to control for any confounding variables). Finally, they were told
that as a way of saying thank you for participating, they were allowed to take popcorn and were
given the choice between a large or small, buttered or low-fat, bag of popcorn.
28
4.2
Measuring IVS and DVS
4.2.1
Self-Regulatory Resource Depletion
The manipulation of self-regulatory resource depletion was taken from Baumeister
(2000) and Boucher and Kofo’s (2012) study and was guised as the first comprehension task.
Participants were told that they would be tested on how well they were able to understand and
follow instructions.
4.2.2
Money Priming
The method of money priming was taken from Vohs, Mead and Goode’s (2006) second
study and guised in our study as the second reading comprehension task. The researchers in this
study not only successfully primed money, but they also made the distinction between high
money vs. low money priming. The researchers were able to seize moderate to large opposite
behavioral effects (d=.65) with the two distinct money primes. Lastly, Vohs, Mead and Goode
(2006) found that using this type of money prime resulted in higher self-sufficiency in
participants who were primed with high-money and that self-sufficiency is the key mediator that
we are looking for in our study.
4.2.3
Measure of Self-Sufficiency
We measured the variation of self-sufficiency due to high vs. low money priming in two
ways. Firstly, a direct measure of self-sufficiency was measured through a self-reported six item
self-sufficiency Likert scale (Raskin & Terry, 1988). Participants determined how strongly they
agreed or disagreed with the following statement: I rarely depend on anyone else to get things
29
done, I like to take responsibilities for making decisions, I am more capable than other people. I
can live my life in any way I want to. I always know what I am doing and I am going to be a great
person. After reviewing the scale items, it was found that the scale items measured a person’s
overall personality which might not change enough from priming and therefore would be difficult
to be picked up through a scale. With this consideration in mind, a second indirect measure of selfsufficiency was used.
The third aptitude task was used as a guise to indirectly measure self-sufficiency. This
manipulation was taken from Vohs, Mead and Goode (2006) study and have been shown to be
elicit the desired self-sufficiency effect. Because persistence on an impossible task before giving
up has been shown to be an indirect measure of self-sufficiency (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 2006)
we gave participants a set of puzzle with the last one being impossible and recorded how long
participants spent on the puzzle without giving up.
4.2.4
Self-Control
As stated earlier, it is natural for our bodies to crave unhealthy, fatty, high calorie foods
due to our evolutionary needs (Drewnowski & Almiron-Roig, 2010). When presented with two
food options, our natural instinct would then to go for the better tasting but often fattier and
higher calorie food. By being able to resist the temptation and choosing the less fattening option,
we are making a choice that goes against our natural cravings and this will require the exertion of
self-control. Therefore, in order to measure self-control in a pragmatic consumption choice,
participants were told to choose between a bag of small or large, buttered or low-fat popcorn
before they left. By choosing the low fat bag of popcorn, participants are overriding their urge
30
and resisting the temptation for a better tasting but higher calorie buttered popcorn and by
choosing the small bag of popcorn, participants are exerting better portion control.
31
5.0
5.1
RESULTS
Mood Scale
Scale items ‘unpleasant’ and ‘negative’ were reversed coded and the four item mood
scale (good, pleasant, happy, and positive) were averaged out to create the overall PANAS score.
A one way ANOVA (independent variables: money priming condition and SRR condition,
dependent variable: PANAS) found that there were no significant differences between conditions
F(5, 329) = .191, p =.966). Therefore, neither money priming nor SRR had an effect on
participant’s mood.
5.2
Self-regulatory Resource Depletion Manipulation Check
A one way ANOVA (independent variable: self-regulatory resource condition, dependent
variable: level of frustration, level of difficulty, and the feeling of fighting an urge) analysis
showed us that depleted participants indicated that the ‘e’ task was more difficult (M = 2.72, SD
= .971) than nondepleted participants (M = 2.13, SD = 1.007), F(1,327) = 29.062, p < 0.001, and
that the ‘e’ task was more frustrating (depleted: M = 2.75, SD = 1.213; nondepleted: M = 2.44,
SD = 1.089), F(1, 327) = 6.230, p < 0.05. In the depleted condition, participants reported that
they were fighting an urge (M = 2.84, SD = 1.265) more than nondepleted participants (M =
2.77, SD = 1.302) however the effect was not significant, F(1, 327) = .247, p = 0.619. With the
following results, we are able to conclude that the SRR depletion task worked as it should and
we were able to successfully manipulate ego depletion across groups.
32
Figure 1: Frustration Levels for Participants Under Different Self-Regulatory Resource Conditions
Figure 2: Difficulty Levels for Participants Under Different Self-Regulatory Resource Conditions
Figure 3: Level of 'Fighting an Urge' for Participants Under Different Self-Regulatory Resource Condition
33
5.3
Testing Hypothesis H1: Self-Sufficiency
A reliability analysis for the six item self-sufficiency scale revealed a low Cronbach’s
alpha of only 0.614. Even when one of the scale items was deleted, Cronbach’s alpha was still
lower than 0.8, indicating that the scale items are not reliable and are not measuring the construct
self-sufficiency as we want it to. When examining the self-sufficiency scale, we found that the
scale items measured self-sufficiency as a long existing trait as opposed to a situational feeling of
self-sufficiency. This would explain why, when using the self-sufficiency scale as a dependent
variable, a 2 x 3 (self-regulatory resource condition x priming condition) ANOVA analysis
revealed no significant differences between conditions, p = 0.291. It is believed that because
priming tends to yield only small to medium effects, our money prime effects could not be
picked up by a scale that measured long term traits. If the scale had asked situational questions,
the results could have been different.
Nonetheless, when doing a 2 x 3 (self-regulatory resource condition x priming condition)
ANOVA test using participant’s task time on the impossible task as a measure for selfsufficiency, we found significant effects for money priming conditions, F(2, 329) = 6.038, p <
0.05, such that participants in the high money priming condition (M = 709.179, SD = 23.384)
spent significantly longer time on the impossible task than participants in the low money priming
condition (M = 594.003, SD = 23.493), p < 0.01, but no significant differences was found for
the control condition (M = 653.065, SD = 23.7060) . Interestingly enough, a significant
interaction effects was found, F(2,329) = 7.209, p < 0.01. A post hoc pair-wise comparison
revealed that high money primed depleted participants (M = 758.30, SD = 212.59) spent
significantly longer time on the impossible task than low money primed depleted participants (M
= 567.36, SD = 243.17), p < 0.01 and depleted participants in the control condition (M = 576.78,
34
SD = 270.936), p < 0.01. In the full condition, low money primed participants (M = 620.648, SD
= 295.912) spent significantly less time on the impossible task than participants in the control
condition (M = 729.352, SD = 207.6), p < 0.05 but there were no other significant interaction
effects. So, even though it was found that high money primed participants in the full condition
(M = 660.05, SD = 237.77) spent more time on the impossible task than low money primed
participants in the full condition (M = 620.648, SD = 295.912) the effect was not significant, p =
0.4. Consequently, our hypothesis H1 was only partially supported such that participants who
were primed with high money cues had higher self-sufficiency than participants in the low
money primed condition but there were no significant differences in the control condition. This
effect was also only found in the depleted condition and not throughout both the depleted SRR
and full SRR condition as predicted.
35
Figure 4: Main Effect of Money Priming on Participant’s Time Spent on Impossible Task
Figure 5: Depleted Participant's Time Spent on Impossible Task for Different Money Priming Conditions
Figure 6: Non-Depleted Participant's Time Spent on Impossible Task for Different Money Priming Conditions
36
5.4
Testing Hypothesis H2
Our dependent variables (choice of popcorn and amount of popcorn) can only be one of
two options: low fat vs. buttered, and small vs. large therefore a probit regression analysis must
be used. Secondly, our dependent variables are interrelated and therefore have the potential to be
correlated. For example, a participant might justify choosing a bag of buttered popcorn as long as
it is a small bag or that it is still healthy to eat a large bag of popcorn as long as it is low fat.
Consequently, choice of popcorn is most likely to influence type of popcorn and the reverse will
also be true. When dependent variables are said to be correlated, a bivariate probit regression
model should then be used. A bivariate probit model allows for two dependent binary variables
to be tested simultaneously and accurately predicts for correlation between the two dependent
variables (Greene, 2016). An assumption of correlation must be satisfied to use bivariate probit
analysis and correlation estimations (represented as rho) must be significant. If rho was found to
be insignificant, two separate probit models should then be used (Katchova, 2013). After running
the bivariate probit analysis, rho was found to be significant (𝛽 = −0.435, 𝜌 < 0.01). That is to
say, our two dependent variables (type of popcorn and amount of popcorn) are highly correlated.
The estimates from the bivariate probit model were then used for further data interpretations.
Using SAS, a bivariate probit regression analysis was ran for type of popcorn and amount
of popcorn for different SRR condition and money priming condition. The results are displayed
within Table 1:
37
Y1 = Type of Popcorn
Estimate
St. Error
t Value
Pr > |t|
Type_Pop.Intercept
-0.470
0.24
-1.93
0.05
Type_Pop.srrDeplete
-0.195
0.16
-1.23
0.22
Type_Pop.MonHigh
-0.047
0.33
-0.14
0.89
Type_Pop.MonLow
0.787
0.34
2.29
0.02
Type_Pop.SRRDepleteMonHigh
0.183
0.21
0.85
0.39
Type_Pop.SRRDepleteMonLow
-0.624
0.23
-2.69
0.01
-0.390
0.22
-1.75
0.08
Amt_Pop.srrDeplete
0.066
0.14
0.47
0.64
Amt_Pop.MonHigh
0.121
0.32
0.38
0.70
Amt_Pop.MonLow
-0.523
0.32
-1.66
0.10
Amt_Pop.SRRDepleteMonHigh
-0.127
0.20
-0.64
0.52
Amt_Pop.SRRDepleteMonLow
0.344
0.20
1.73
0.08
-0.435
0.09
-4.9
<.0001
Y2 = Amount of Popcorn
Amt_Pop.Intercept
Rho
Table 1: Parameter Estimates for Type of Popcorn and Amount of Popcorn
Using full SRR and control condition as the reference category:
Prob(Y1 = Butter) = 𝛽/ + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽4 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦1 + 𝛽: 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦2 + 𝛽< 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦1 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝑅 + 𝛽> 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦2 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝑅 +∈1
= -0.470 + -0.195SRR + -0.047Money1 + 0.787Money2 + 0.183Money1SRR + -0.624Money2SRR + ∈1
Prob(Y2 = Small) = ∁/ + ∁1 𝑆𝑅𝑅 + ∁4 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦1 + ∁: 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦2 + ∁< 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦1 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝑅 + ∁> 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦2 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝑅 +∈4
= -0.390 + 0.066SRR + 0.121Money1 + -0.523Money2 + -0.127Money1SRR + 0.344Money2SRR + ∈4
Using either low or high money condition as the reference category:
t = ( b1 – b2 ) /(( SE1+SE2)/2)
38
The probability estimates for all the conditions are seen in Table 2:
Probability for Type of Popcorn
SRR
Money
Depleted
C
0.72
0.03
0.52
0.01
H
0.58
0.03
0.56
0.02
*
0.02
**
0.03
C
0.64
0.03
0.53
0.02
H
0.59
0.03
0.55
0.02
*
0.03
**
0.01
L
Full
L
Mean
StdErr
Probability for Amount of Popcorn
0.58
0.83
Mean
StdErr
0.58
0.53
*significantly different from one another
** significantly different from one another
Table 2: Probability Estimates for Type of Popcorn and Amount of Popcorn
Testing H2a: The main effect of SRR (𝑡 −1.23 , 𝛽 = −0.195, 𝑝 = 0.22) for type of popcorn
was not significant. The main effect of money priming was found to be significant within the low
money priming condition such that participants in the low money priming condition were more
likely to choose buttered popcorn (𝑡 2.29 , 𝛽 = 0.787, 𝑝 < 0.05) relative to the control
condition. Significant effect was also found between high and low money priming condition such
that participants in the high money priming condition (𝛽 = −0.047) were less likely to choose
buttered popcorn than participants in the low money priming condition (𝑡 −2.49 , 𝛽 = 0.787,
𝑝 < 0.05)However high money priming was not significantly different to the control condition
(𝑡 −0.14 , 𝛽 = −0.047, 𝑝 = 0.89) therefore H2a was not supported. However, an interesting
interaction effect was found such that participants who were depleted of their SRR and primed
with low money would significantly be less likely to choose buttered popcorn 𝑡 −2.69 , 𝛽 =
39
−0.624, 𝑝 < 0.01) compared to participants who were not depleted of their SRR and primed
with low money. The probability estimates show that participants, when depleted of the selfregulatory resources, and primed with low money had the opposite effect of what was
hypothesized. When participants were not depleted of the self-regulatory resources and primed
with low money, they had an 83% chance of choosing buttered popcorn but when they were
depleted of the self-regulatory resources (and essentially more vulnerable to priming) and primed
with low money, they only had a 58% chance of choosing buttered popcorn.
Testing H2b: The main effect of SRRfor amount of popcorn was not significant (𝑡 0.47 , 𝛽 =
0.066, 𝑝 = 0.64). High money priming condition (𝛽 = 0.121) was found to be significantly
different from low money priming condition (𝛽 = −0.523) such that participants primed with
high money cues were more likely to choose a small bag of popcorn than participants primed
with low money cues (𝑡 2.01 , 𝑝 < 0.05). However, high money priming 𝑡 0.38 , 𝛽 = 0.121,
𝑝 = 0.70 and low money priming (𝑡 −1.66 , 𝛽 = −0.523, 𝑝 = 0.10) was not significantly
different from the control condition therefore our H2b is not supported. Interestingly, an
interaction effect was found to be marginally significant for participants who were depleted of
their SRR and primed with low money (𝑡 1.73 , 𝛽 = 0.344, 𝑝 = 0.08). We see the same effect
that was found for type of popcorn, such that participants who were depleted of the selfregulatory resources and primed with low money were found to be more likely to choose a small
bag of popcorn than participants who had full SRR and primed with low money. The probability
estimates show that participants, when depleted of the self-regulatory resources and primed with
low money had the opposite effect of what was hypothesized. When participants were not
depleted of the self-regulatory resources and primed with low money, they had a 53% chance of
40
a small bag of popcorn but when they were depleted of the self-regulatory resources (and
essentially more vulnerable to priming) and primed with low money, they had 58% chance of
choosing a small bag of popcorn.
Overall, it seems that low money priming had the inverse effect such that when participants were
depleted; low money priming had actually elicited participants to exert more self-control
(resulting in a less likely choice for a bag of buttered popcorn and a more likely choice for a
small bag of popcorn). Secondly, because our hypothesis H2a and H2b is not supported, an
analysis for the mediation effect of self-sufficiency would not be necessary and it is concluded
that our H2c is also not supported.
41
6.0
DISCUSSION
Our results show that in comparison to one another, low money priming led to lower self-
sufficiency scores while high money priming led to higher self-sufficiency scores within both
SRR conditions. However, the increase in feelings of self-sufficiency did not lead to higher
exertion of self-control and in fact the opposite effect of what was hypothesized was found to be
significant. Participants, when depleted of their SRR and vulnerable to low money priming, were
actually more likely to exert better self-control than participants who were full of their SRR and
primed with low money. It is believed that our method of money priming may have induced this
effect. In the money priming conditions, participants had to read a paragraph of text and in this
text, the paragraph ended with “I feel really worried and apprehensive about my future when I
start thinking about money.” (low money priming), and “I feel really comfortable and secure
about my future knowing that money is not my central concern.” (high money priming). Our
method of money priming might have not only primed the concept of money but also
conditioned our participants to feel carefree and optimistic (high money priming) or worried and
pessimistic (low money priming) and this would have had the opposite effect of what money
priming was intended to do.
A phenomenon known as depressive realism has found that when people are in a state of
depression or feel pessimistic about their future, they are more likely to be more rational and
have better judgement of their control compared to people who are non-depressed (Dobson &
Franche, 1989). In our low money priming condition, participants may have been induced to feel
more worried, anxious, and pessimistic about their future. As a coping mechanism for these type
of feelings, participants could have felt like they had to try harder in order to regain control back
42
in their life. Therefore, when confronted with the popcorn choice decision, participants would
then exert their self-control by choosing to eat healthier, in order to compensate for their feelings
of pessimism and lack of control about the future. Low money priming elicited pessimism,
leading participants to develop a coping mechanism of wanting to try harder and consequently
leading to a more rational and healthier choice of food intake. On the opposite spectrum,
participants in the high money priming condition would have felt more optimistic and confident,
eliciting a more heuristic and irrational judgment of their food intake leading to the choice of
buttered popcorn.
Although we measured participant’s mood using the PANAS scale and found that there
was no significant difference between conditions F(5, 329) = .191, p =.966), this could be
because we did not measure for feelings of optimism and pessimism. For future research, it is
encouraged that a more thorough pre-test is conducted to make sure that money priming does not
change participant’s mood and feelings about their future.
Secondly, our study design lacked a foundational aspect relating to goal pursuit. Goal
pursuit and self-control are very much interrelated. By setting a goal, people are either actively
restraining or pushing themselves closer to the goal and all goals require a certain degree of selfsacrifice and self-control. A goal of saving money requires one to restrain their spending, a goal
of getting a 90% on a test requires one to sacrifice leisure time in order to study more and a goal
of losing weight requires one to resist the temptation of that delicious donut. All requiring selfcontrol. That is to say, self-control is only applicable when there is a goal present. If one did not
have a goal of saving money, they would not use self-control to restrain their spending. If one
does not care to get 90% on a test, they would not sacrifice their leisure time and if one does not
care to lose weight, they would most definitely go for that delicious donut. Therefore, we made a
43
critical mistake of assuming that all participants in our study had a salient goal of healthy eating
when in fact this might not be true. If participants do not have an active or salient goal of healthy
eating in mind, their choice of a large bag of buttered popcorn would not pose and participants
would then not feel as if they had broken their self-control. Research has also shown that money
priming enhances motivation and goal attainment, only when a goal is present (Sarial-Abi &
Vohs, 2012). When a goal is not present, money concepts will not enhance any motivation.
Therefore, by not having a healthy eating goal salient, participants were not consciously trying to
fight or resist the temptation of unhealthy eating and therefore the money priming buffering
effect did not have an impact on participant’s popcorn choice.
6.1
Limitations and Future Research
A major limitation of our study is concerned with time. Because there was only a limited
amount of time to run the studies, participants had to be grouped in groups of six to eight. By
grouping participants together, participants could have had an influence on one another in terms
of when they chose to quit the impossible task, and what type of popcorn they chose. Even
though participants were all told not to look around and be influenced by their peers, this
limitation is still a concern. Another concern pertaining to time is the time of the day that
participants were asked to participate in the research study. Research studies were ran throughout
the day (from 9am – 6pm) and time could very well affect participant’s choice of popcorn.
Participants who are doing studies right before lunch (i.e. 11am) could be more likely to be
hungry than participants who participated right after lunch, and if participants are hungrier, they
are more likely to choose the more indulgent choice of popcorn (large bag of buttered popcorn).
44
For future research, studies should only be ran at the same time every day in order to control for
hunger levels.
Secondly, our study was already very lengthy and hard to manage so it was not in the
best interest to add in a goal activation task. By not activating a healthy eating goal task,
participants may not have felt like they were breaking self-control by choosing the buttered or
large size popcorn. Knowing this ahead of time, we tried to control for this variable by
measuring participant’s diet and weight control, but even when using these variables as control,
we found that it did not change the results. In the future, for a more accurate and reliable result,
studies with more time and resources, should have a goal activation component and see whether
this would yield a stronger money priming effect. Another concern with our study design is that
we left out the choice of not choosing popcorn. In hindsight, the choice of not having popcorn at
all would be considered the highest form of self-control. However, this was not a choice for
participants and if we were to replicate this study, the option of no popcorn would need to be
present to accurately measure participant’s self-control. .
A third limitation is concerned with our sample. Due to time and restrictions of
participants, only university students were recruited for the study. By only testing our hypothesis
on university students, we do not know if our results would hold true to a wider population of all
ages and education level. Future studies could be conducted to an unrestricted population in
order to get a more diverse sample that is more representative of the general population.
For future studies, researchers should look into other aspects of self-control. It would be
interesting to see if money priming is able to elicit self-control in the context of saving money. It
could be argued that because high money priming stimulates the feeling of having a lot of
money, people would be more careless with their finances and end up spending more than what
45
they normally would. Therefore, it would be important to see whether our high money priming
theory would still hold in the context of controlling one’s finances. Future research could apply
this high money priming theory into self-control in the context of gambling, smoking, time
management and more.
6.2
Theoretical Contributions
This paper adds to the growing research on money priming. A lot of the time, money is
often seen in a very negative light; people who are preoccupied with money are said to be greedy
and selfish, while money itself is said to be the ‘root of all evil’. However, this paper explores
into the various domains of money that can be beneficial to the psyche such as the elicitation of
self-control. We want to show that the concept of money might not be so detrimental to a
person’s wellbeing as most might think.
Secondly, this paper builds upon the literature of ego depletion and the ways to buffer
this effect. Ego depletion affects our everyday life; it impedes our ability to make sound choices,
hinders our ability to react rationally, and delays our productivity. This is why the body of
literature on the different buffers of ego depletion is excessive and continues to be a hot topic of
study. This paper is able to link the concept of money and ego depletion by suggesting money
priming as a buffer for the depletion of self-regulatory resources.
Lastly, by applying money priming effects into a pragmatic self-control consumption
behaviour situation, we open up the doors for further research within other self-control domains.
Previous studies have showed that money priming has the ability to elicit self-control but no
studies to this date have applied this theoretical contribution to a consumer behaviour context. It
46
is interesting to see that money priming has the ability to elicit self-control, but it is even more
interesting to see whether this elicitation can be transferred to real consumption behaviour.
6.3
Managerial and Social Implications
Despite the findings that were found in our study, we believe that our money priming
theories still hold. With that being said, companies that offer low-fat, low-calorie, healthy foods
can use this concept of money to possibly change consumption behaviour. By displaying subtle
signals of high money, whether it be in their ads, logos, or packaging, it could provoke
consumers to be more conscious of their food intake and reach for the healthier option. This
implication can be replicated in other domains such as health and fitness and cost-efficient
specialty stores. On the other hand, companies that offer products that are more indulgent or
requires one to splurge can use low money cues to entice purchase.
Social implications for this study are numerous. Self-control is a common factor
in many maladaptive behaviours; acts of violence, gambling, smoking, unhealthy eating and etc.
If people have better resources to deal with their lack of self-control, society would benefit
greatly. There would be less crime, less smokers which leads to less smoking related illnesses,
less obesity and less medical burden on society. Although this paper does not suggest that money
priming itself will be a cure for all these societal problems, it is still a step in the right direction
for studies upon this subject. This study can also aid the regular consumer to practice better selfcontrol. Maybe by carrying large bills with you when going shopping might actually aid in the
control of spending even though most might believe that carrying more money might lead to
spending more. The same rule can apply with healthy eating and other domains of self-control.
47
6.4
Conclusion
In conclusion, our H2a, H2b and H2c were not supported. We were not able to find the
significant effects of high money priming and low money priming on the choice of popcorn and
amount of popcorn. Instead we found the opposite effect such that low money priming increased
participant’s likelihood to choose a small bag of low-fat popcorn over a large bag of buttered
popcorn. It is proposed that improper manipulations, priming methods, and a lack of time and
resources contributed to the noise in the study and led to our results. Whereas, our H1 was
partially supported and we found that participants in the high money priming condition had
significantly higher feelings of self-sufficiency in comparison to participants in the low money
priming condition. Overall, we believe that our theories on money priming and its’ link to selfsufficiency and self-control are sound and future studies should be conducted to further explore
this connection.
48
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55
8.0
APPENDIX
8.1
Scales
Mood Scale (Allen & Janiszewski, 1989):
At this moment I am feeling:
Good
1
2
3
4
5
6
Bad
7
Unpleasant
1
2
3
4
5
6
Pleasant
7
Happy
1
2
3
4
5
6
Sad
7
Negative
1
2
3
4
5
6
Positive
7
Self-Sufficiency Scale (Raskin & Terry, 1988):
Strongly Disagree 1
2
3
4
5
6
1. I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done.
2. I like to take responsibilities for making decisions.
3. I am more capable than other people.
4. I can live my life in any way I want to.
5. I always know what I am doing.
6. I am going to be a great person.
7
Strongly Agree
Diet Scale (Moorman & Matulich, 1993):
On the scale below, please indicate how much you engage in the following activities.
None of the time
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
All of the time
1. Reduce my sodium intake.
2. Watch the amount of fat I consume.
3. Moderate my sugar intake.
4. Moderate my red meat consumption.
5. Cut back on snacks and treats.
6. Avoid foods with additives and preservatives.
56
Weight Control Scale (Oliver & Bearden, 1985):
Disagree
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Agree
1. I am careful about what I eat in order to keep my weight under control.
2. I feel I have a fairly good control of my weight.
8.2
Experiment Stimulis
8.2.1
Money Priming
Passage for High Money Condition:
I come from a very affluent family, so I have never had to worry about money. I grew up
in a really nice, big house, with a nanny and a couple of servants. My parents never spoke about
money with me because they dealt with all the financial matters. I have never really had to think
about money much. I know that since my family has money, I have been provided with more
opportunities than the average person. I am a very fortunate person, I have had the chance to
travel to Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia several times each, and I usually spend my summers
abroad. I can also participate in activities that I am interested in, such as sailing, horseback
riding, and skiing, rather than ones that I have to go into. I also have had the opportunity to
attend many diverse cultural events all over the world. I had my first job when I decided to start
working part time in my second year of University and obtained a job that I really enjoy. I work
because I enjoy it, rather than because I need the money. It’s really nice that I don’t have to
worry about money much. I feel really comfortable and secure about my future knowing that
money is not my central concern.
Passage for Low Money Condition:
I come from a family that doesn’t have much money. I grew up in a modest home,
though it was small enough that I had to share a bedroom with one of my siblings. My family
gets by okay usually, but occasionally there are times when my parents are pretty worried about
making ends meet. Because of our financial situation, my opportunities have been rather limited.
I haven’t really had the chance to travel anywhere, because we didn’t have any extra money for
excess expenditures, and I haven’t been able to go to many cultural events. We always made the
most of the money we had though, and once in a while we would go out for dinner to treat
ourselves. I have always had to be pretty responsible and mature for my age, like when I was
really young I had to get a job to help the family out. I didn’t like the job particularly, but it
helped pay the bills. Since it is so expensive to attend university, I am always on the lookout for
a better paying job. I try not to worry too much about money, but it is pretty difficult sometimes
and money is always in the back of my mind. I feel really worried and apprehensive about my
future when I start thinking about money.
57
Passage for Control Condition:
The University of Chumington, located in the city of Virmen, Australia. was established
in 1934. The institution offers over 40 undergraduate degrees, and 48 graduate programs. The
University of Chumington offers a broad range of magisterial and doctoral level program which
cover the full range of disciplines in the arts and humanities, social sciences, natural and physical
sciences, agriculture, and veterinary science. Doctoral enrolments account for more than onethird of graduate enrolment. The University of Chumington includes a regional campus at
Hodgetown that offers Associate Diploma programs in Agriculture, Horticulture, Environmental
Management and Veterinary Technology, as well as certificate programs in Veterinary Medical
Office Administration and Performance Horse Handler. Hodgetown’s Veterinary Technology
program is accredited by both the Australian Veterinary Medical Association and the American
Veterinary Medical Association. This campus also provides a range of continuing education and
professional development opportunities for Australia’s agri-food industry. The main campus
spans 1,007 acres, including a 408‑acre arboretum, a 218-acre heritage trust lands adjacent to the
main campus and a 55-acre research park which is the center of a major agri-bio cluster.
8.2.2
Self-Regulatory Resource Manipulation
Depleted Condition:
Please carefully read the following instructions:
On this page, you will see text. Please cross out every single “e” you see on this page. Don’t
worry about reading the text, simply cross out each “e” you see. Please do this as quickly and
accurately as possible. When you are done crossing out each “e”, move on to the following
pages.
PARAGRAPH 1
Yet, in spite of periodic revisions, the initial structural organization of global space in the LC
classification has remained. The United States and a particular region within it continue to be the
position from which the rest of the world is viewed. In the fourth edition of Class N, published in
1970, the regions of the world begin with America-North America before Central and South
America. Within North America, the United States precedes Canada and Mexico. The United
States itself is subdivided into the following regions: New England, Middle Atlantic States,
South, Central, West, and Pacific States. Individual states alphabetically. After North and South
America come Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and Pacific Islands. Within Europe, Great Britain
is listed first and subdivided into England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. In contrast, other
European countries form an alphabetical series down to Turkey, after which Bulgaria,
Montenegro, Rumania, and Serbia are appended.
Please carefully read the following instructions:
58
On the next few pages, you will see text. Please cross out every single “e” you see on these pages
EXCEPT if it is adjacent to another vowel or one letter removed from another vowel. Don’t
worry about reading the text, simply cross out each “e” you see. Please do this as quickly and
accurately as possible.
You will have 5 minutes to cross out as many “e’s” as you can using these instructions. Please do
not rush, but remember to go as fast and as accurate as you can.
Please let the experimenter know when you have finished reading these directions. DO NOT turn
this page until you are told to do so.
From the nineteenth century, History was to deploy, in a temporal series, the analogies that
connect distinct organic structures to one another. . . . History gives place to analogical organic
structures. . . . This event, probably because we are still caught inside it, is largely beyond our
comprehension.—Michel Foucault
This is an essay about knowledges of space and time that aspire to be global but remain local,
and about their inscription in the discipline of art history. It proceeds from the microcosm to the
macrocosm, from particular points on the spatial surface of art history to its broad, totalizing
plane, and thence to an awareness of the jagged, gerrymandered divisions of art history itself. It
wends its way from moments in the present and the lived past to distant pasts dimly remembered
in a discipline that typically studies the histories of everything but itself, conveniently forgetting
that it, too, has a history and is History. The intent is to examine notions that exist, as Foucault
suggests, at the level of a disciplinary unconscious- ness and to argue that Order, History, Space,
and Time do matter. Through them, art history is constituted and, in turn, constitutes objects,
narratives, and peoples. Yet what is made can be unmade or re-sited, re-structured, and re()formed, and what has become tangible and reified can revert to mere heuristic category, if first
consciously addressed.
The argument takes for granted that contemporary art history, like any other academic subject or
learned profession, is a practice, a discipline, a narrative, and a rhetoric with its own history,
protocols, and institutional structures. In the admittedly small but growing body of literature
about the history of art history, investigations of individual art historians have dominated
heretofore. There is, however, more than a little need for studies of the poetics of art history- and
of the means and consequences of its rise to the status of a discipline over the past two
centuries.3 As discipline, art history acquired and has been accorded the ability and power to
control and judge its borders, to admit or reject people and objects, and to teach and thus transmit
values to others.
If these structures are seldom noticed, much less studied, they are always present. They are
revived and replicated whenever a student attends an introductory class, reads a survey book, or
follows a prescribed curriculum, whenever a colleague retires, a chair justifies and a dean
endorses a replacement position, and a recent Ph.D. is hired, and whenever the discipline or a
subfield, such as Renaissance or medieval art, convenes its members or publishes its journal—
acts of scholarship but also of ritual, with their attendant consequences for the production of
social meanings and identities. And they are in operation whenever someone looks for a book on
a library shelf, or when a visitor to an art museum walks through its symbolically charged
59
spaces, thereby enacting and embodying a narrative of art, as Carol Duncan has recently
explained.
In this essay, the space and time created by the disciplinary gaze are at issue and the issue. They
can be encountered in a multitude of sites and performances. I choose three: a grid of fields into
which new Ph.D. dissertations are set, a library classification of art history, and the structure of
basic survey books. Because I seek to explore the typical, ordinary, or commonplace of
disciplinary order, I have deliberately avoided its most public and visual manifestation, the
museum. A topic of sustained interest these days, the art museum, both as a model of and model
for art historical classification, is certainly relevant to the inquiry, but that investigation is being
ably pursued by others.
In using the word "map" in the title of this essay, I am aware that I risk its being swept up into
that torrent of recent scholarship about maps and mapping, taken literally and allegorically/' Art
history's general relation to these important and ongoing discussions is by no means "surveyed"
here. The senses of map that I intend are surely allegorical, but they also are prosaic,
commonplace, or literal. That literalness comes easily to art historians: we work daily with maps,
plans, or diagrams. My inquiry extends that disciplinary routine to the visual and spatial aspects
of art historical classification. Thus, I take map as metaphor, but also, following Steve Pile and
Nigel Thrift, as a fetish, a speculum, a bounded and purified representation of mapper, mapping,
and mapped. . . . Maps are not empty mirrors, they at once hide and reveal the hand of the
cartographer. Maps are fleshly: of the body and of the mind of the individuals that produce them,
they draw the eye of the map-reader.
Fields
In June 1995, the annual listing of American and Canadian dissertations appeared, as is
customary, in the Art Bulletin, the principal journal of the art historical profession in North
America. There each year the work of beginning scholars is duly certified by the "little seal"8
and classed according to traditional categories:
Egyptian, Ancient Near Eastern, and Classical Art; Early Christian, Byzantine, and Medieval
Art; The Renaissance; Baroque and 18th-Century Europe; 19th- and 20th- century Europe;
Photography and Film; Art of the United States and Canada; Native American, Pre-Columbian,
and Latin American Art; Asian Art; Islamic Art; African Art; African Diaspora; Art Criticism
and Theory.
The list is neither natural, consistent, nor logical according to our cultural categories, much less
those of other societies, and presumably is a function of its compilers and the material to be
compiled. Only our familiarity with this ordering prevents us from laughing, as Foucault did
when, in the famous beginning to Les mots el les choses, he encounters Jorge Luis Borges's
description of the classification system of animals in "a certain Chinese encyclopedia."
Presumably, what had amused this philosopher and historian of science was the incongruous
classification of animals— incongruous, that is, by the criteria of Western rationality. But that
same rationality may be turned, as Foucault did and as I wish to do, on Western systems of order.
The ways and means that a certain version of logic is contravened in the Art Bulletin's listing is
60
both puzzling and revealing. The word "art," for example, is found in all categories except, for
reasons unknown, the "Renaissance" through "19th- and 20th-century Europe" and "African
Diaspora." Less arbitrary, surely, is the use of the definitive article "the" for only one category,
"The Renaissance," thereby making it a mono- lithic entity of unique significance. It is the
Renaissance, not the Middle Ages, that presides at the middle of a five-part narrative from the
beginning of art to the present in Europe. In this context, the Renaissance functions like China,
literally the Middle Kingdom, at the center of Chinese maps, or like Europe or America in maps
from these cultures.11 Indeed Renaissance art similarly presides at the heart of various museum
collections of universal intent and inspires the architectural styles and semiotic messages of
American muse- ums from the Gilded Age, such as the Art Institute of Chicago.
Full Resources Condition:
Please carefully read the following instructions:
On this page, you will see text. Please cross out every single “e” you see on this page. Don’t
worry about reading the text, simply cross out each “e” you see. Please do this as quickly and
accurately as possible. When you are done crossing out each “e”, move on to the following
pages.
PARAGRAPH 1
Yet, in spite of periodic revisions, the initial structural organization of global space in the LC
classification has remained. The United States and a particular region within it continue to be the
position from which the rest of the world is viewed. In the fourth edition of Class N, published in
1970, the regions of the world begin with America-North America before Central and South
America. Within North America, the United States precedes Canada and Mexico. The United
States itself is subdivided into the following regions: New England, Middle Atlantic States,
South, Central, West, and Pacific States. Individual states alphabetically. After North and South
America come Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and Pacific Islands. Within Europe, Great Britain
is listed first and subdivided into England, Scotland, Ireland, and Wales. In contrast, other
European countries form an alphabetical series down to Turkey, after which Bulgaria,
Montenegro, Rumania, and Serbia are appended.
Please carefully read the following instructions:
On the next few pages, you will see text. Please cross out every single “e” you see on these
pages. Don’t worry about reading the text, simply cross out each “e” you see. Please do this as
quickly and accurately as possible.
You will have 5 minutes to cross out as many “e’s” as you can. Please do not rush, but remember
to go as fast and as accurate as you can.
Please let the experimenter know when you have finished reading these directions. DO NOT turn
this page until you are told to do so.
61
From the nineteenth century, History was to deploy, in a temporal series, the analogies that
connect distinct organic structures to one another. . . . History gives place to analogical organic
structures. . . . This event, probably because we are still caught inside it, is largely beyond our
comprehension.—Michel Foucault
This is an essay about knowledges of space and time that aspire to be global but remain local,
and about their inscription in the discipline of art history. It proceeds from the microcosm to the
macrocosm, from particular points on the spatial surface of art history to its broad, totalizing
plane, and thence to an awareness of the jagged, gerrymandered divisions of art history itself. It
wends its way from moments in the present and the lived past to distant pasts dimly remembered
in a discipline that typically studies the histories of everything but itself, conveniently forgetting
that it, too, has a history and is History. The intent is to examine notions that exist, as Foucault
suggests, at the level of a disciplinary unconscious- ness and to argue that Order, History, Space,
and Time do matter. Through them, art history is constituted and, in turn, constitutes objects,
narratives, and peoples. Yet what is made can be unmade or re-sited, re-structured, and re()formed, and what has become tangible and reified can revert to mere heuristic category, if first
consciously addressed.
The argument takes for granted that contemporary art history, like any other academic subject or
learned profession, is a practice, a discipline, a narrative, and a rhetoric with its own history,
protocols, and institutional structures. In the admittedly small but growing body of literature
about the history of art history, investigations of individual art historians have dominated
heretofore. There is, however, more than a little need for studies of the poetics of art history- and
of the means and consequences of its rise to the status of a discipline over the past two
centuries.3 As discipline, art history acquired and has been accorded the ability and power to
control and judge its borders, to admit or reject people and objects, and to teach and thus transmit
values to others.
If these structures are seldom noticed, much less studied, they are always present. They are
revived and replicated whenever a student attends an introductory class, reads a survey book, or
follows a prescribed curriculum, whenever a colleague retires, a chair justifies and a dean
endorses a replacement position, and a recent Ph.D. is hired, and whenever the discipline or a
subfield, such as Renaissance or medieval art, convenes its members or publishes its journal—
acts of scholarship but also of ritual, with their attendant consequences for the production of
social meanings and identities. And they are in operation whenever someone looks for a book on
a library shelf, or when a visitor to an art museum walks through its symbolically charged
spaces, thereby enacting and embodying a narrative of art, as Carol Duncan has recently
explained.
In this essay, the space and time created by the disciplinary gaze are at issue and the issue. They
can be encountered in a multitude of sites and performances. I choose three: a grid of fields into
which new Ph.D. dissertations are set, a library classification of art history, and the structure of
basic survey books. Because I seek to explore the typical, ordinary, or commonplace of
disciplinary order, I have deliberately avoided its most public and visual manifestation, the
museum. A topic of sustained interest these days, the art museum, both as a model of and model
for art historical classification, is certainly relevant to the inquiry, but that investigation is being
ably pursued by others.
62
In using the word "map" in the title of this essay, I am aware that I risk its being swept up into
that torrent of recent scholarship about maps and mapping, taken literally and allegorically/' Art
history's general relation to these important and ongoing discussions is by no means "surveyed"
here. The senses of map that I intend are surely allegorical, but they also are prosaic,
commonplace, or literal. That literalness comes easily to art historians: we work daily with maps,
plans, or diagrams. My inquiry extends that disciplinary routine to the visual and spatial aspects
of art historical classification. Thus, I take map as metaphor, but also, following Steve Pile and
Nigel Thrift, as a fetish, a speculum, a bounded and purified representation of mapper, mapping,
and mapped. . . . Maps are not empty mirrors, they at once hide and reveal the hand of the
cartographer. Maps are fleshly: of the body and of the mind of the individuals that produce them,
they draw the eye of the map-reader.
Fields
In June 1995, the annual listing of American and Canadian dissertations appeared, as is
customary, in the Art Bulletin, the principal journal of the art historical profession in North
America. There each year the work of beginning scholars is duly certified by the "little seal"8
and classed according to traditional categories:
Egyptian, Ancient Near Eastern, and Classical Art; Early Christian, Byzantine, and Medieval
Art; The Renaissance; Baroque and 18th-Century Europe; 19th- and 20th- century Europe;
Photography and Film; Art of the United States and Canada; Native American, Pre-Columbian,
and Latin American Art; Asian Art; Islamic Art; African Art; African Diaspora; Art Criticism
and Theory.
The list is neither natural, consistent, nor logical according to our cultural categories, much less
those of other societies, and presumably is a function of its compilers and the material to be
compiled. Only our familiarity with this ordering prevents us from laughing, as Foucault did
when, in the famous beginning to Les mots el les choses, he encounters Jorge Luis Borges's
description of the classification system of animals in "a certain Chinese encyclopedia."
Presumably, what had amused this philosopher and historian of science was the incongruous
classification of animals— incongruous, that is, by the criteria of Western rationality. But that
same rationality may be turned, as Foucault did and as I wish to do, on Western systems of order.
The ways and means that a certain version of logic is contravened in the Art Bulletin's listing is
both puzzling and revealing. The word "art," for example, is found in all categories except, for
reasons unknown, the "Renaissance" through "19th- and 20th-century Europe" and "African
Diaspora." Less arbitrary, surely, is the use of the definitive article "the" for only one category,
"The Renaissance," thereby making it a mono- lithic entity of unique significance. It is the
Renaissance, not the Middle Ages, that presides at the middle of a five-part narrative from the
beginning of art to the present in Europe. In this context, the Renaissance functions like China,
literally the Middle Kingdom, at the center of Chinese maps, or like Europe or America in maps
from these cultures.11 Indeed Renaissance art similarly presides at the heart of various museum
collections of universal intent and inspires the architectural styles and semiotic messages of
American muse- ums from the Gilded Age, such as the Art Institute of Chicago.
63
8.2.3
Aptitude Task
Below here are 5 different geometric shapes. For this aptitude task, you must retrace the
shape without going over the same line twice, lifting your pencil or drawing additional lines.
You can try as many times as you want and the puzzles will get incrementally harder as you
progress. You have a total of 15 minutes to work on this task however you may give up at any
time before the 15 minutes.
In addition, there is a bag of popcorn available for you to take home once you are done this task.
You will still receive your popcorn if you decide to give up before the 15 minutes.
When you are finished the task or if you decide to give up, please stop the timer on your desk
and the researcher will come by to give you your popcorn, your final instructions and you are
free to leave.
1.
2.
64
3.
4.
5.
65