Transportation And Trade In Sub-Saharan Africa: What Direction Should Countries Take In Doha? Workshop Paper Post-July 2004 African Strategies for Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Negotiations November 2004 Transportation And Trade In Sub-Saharan Africa: What Direction Should Countries Take In Doha?* * This paper is an abbreviated version of a longer paper which is currently in progress. This paper is intended for general information purposes only, and should not be relied upon as legal advice nor is it intended to replace legal advice. It was drafted, under the coordination of Dr. Dominique Njinkeu by Tracey Epps, and has benefited from useful insights from several ILEAP advisors. Views expressed in this publication should not be attributed to ILEAP, its Board of Directors, its funders, or the institutions with which lead advisors are associated. Comments can be sent to the ILEAP Secretariat ([email protected]). This paper is not for citation. 1. Introduction The purpose of the paper is to provide background analysis to guide African countries in the request/offer process in the transportation sector in the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) Doha Round.1 The transportation sector as defined by the GATS is a diverse sector, including air, maritime, road and railway transportation services; and including both freight and passenger transportation services. Within each subsector, various activities are covered, including passenger and freight transportation, rental of transport equipment, maintenance and repair, and various supporting services such as cargo handling, storage and warehousing, freight forwarding, agency services, etc. Given both the size of the sector and the widely varying circumstances throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the paper focuses solely on freight transportation2 and includes case studies of two transit corridors: (1) Kampala-Mombasa; and (2) Douala-Ndjamena. The purpose of the case studies is to allow a closer analysis of transportation issues that will be of practical relevance to policymakers and trade negotiators in countries that use those corridors. The case studies will, however, also have relevance to other African countries where the situation bears likeness to that in the selected corridors. The paper will proceed as follows. Section two provides a brief overview of the transportation sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Section three describes how transportation services are dealt with in the GATS. Section four describes progress to date in the GATS negotiations. Section five discusses one of the case studies (Kampala-Mombasa), while section six provides some concluding remarks and questions intended to provoke discussion during the present workshop. 2. Transportation Services in Sub-Saharan Africa Two important distinctions need to be made at the outset of the discussion. First, there is a distinction between transport services that serve the public or commercial customers directly; and transport infrastructure that is used by transport service providers.3 This distinction can be seen, for example, between road provision and road haulage, or between port infrastructure and stevedoring services.4 The analysis here centres on transport services. Second, there is a distinction between the transport sector’s role as an enabler of development and of trade in goods, and its role as a sector which constitutes imports/exports in its own right. Our interest in The paper will also provide assistance to countries participating in the service section of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. 2 An analysis of passenger transportation would include specific concentration on urban transportation as well as general transportation of passengers by road, rail, sea or air. 3 Transport Sector Board - The World Bank Group, Public and Private Sector Roles in the Supply of Transport Infrastructure and Services by P. Amos (Washington D.C., 2004). 4 Transport Sector Board - The World Bank Group, Public and Private Sector Roles in the Supply of Transport Infrastructure and Services by P. Amos (Washington D.C., 2004). 1 the transportation sector combines both the reduction of transaction costs and the stimulation of economic activities in other sectors, in addition to transportation as a potential source of trade in services. Turning to transportation as a focus for reducing transaction costs, a key issue facing importers and exporters in sub-Saharan Africa is the high cost of freight. In 2001, freight costs as a proportion of import value (the “transport cost factor”) averaged 13.9 percent for sub-Saharan African countries. This compares to an average of 8.7 percent for developing countries overall.5 In landlocked countries in sub-Saharan African, the transport cost factor was even higher, at 20.7 percent.6 Landlocked countries face such high costs largely due to the additional costs and difficulties of transporting goods overland and through neighbouring countries. High transport costs result from a number of factors, including poor infrastructure, inefficient and unreliable transport services, coordination problems, border delays, and geographic and economic circumstances. The competitiveness of sub-Saharan African countries is seriously hindered by these costs which make exports less competitive and imports more expensive. Such costs often represent a more binding constraint to greater participation in international trade than tariffs and other trade barriers.7 It is important to unpack these costs according to the various transportation subsectors covered by the GATS, namely, maritime, land (road and rail), and air. Following is a brief examination of each of these subsectors, followed by a discussion of how negotiations under the GATS may impact transportation costs. Maritime: In 2002, the African merchant fleet held just 3.2 percent of the fleet of developing countries and 0.6 percent of the world fleet.8 Only about one-third of the African merchant fleet without open registers is registered in countries of sub-Saharan Africa.9 In terms of cargo, subSaharan Africa accounts for approximately 2.1 percent of world cargo.10 International shipping services tend to be concentrated in the hands of a small number of foreign carriers. In terms of intra-African maritime shipping, after independence, most coastal African countries established national shipping lines, supported by a United Nations charter reserving 40 percent of the nationally-generated freight for national carriers. However, most of these shipping lines have very little capacity to carry goods and many simply operate as shipping agents for the reserved national freight, chartering space on international carriers. A key issue for sub-Saharan Africa is the operational efficiency of ports. While this has improved in some ports with the introduction of private sector operators for container handling11, in many ports, productivity is extremely low, providing a great hindrance to both importers and exporters. {UNCTAD, 2003 #29 @ 116} {UNCTAD, 2003 #29 @ 116} 7 {The World Bank, 2001 #36 @ 97} 8 {UNCTAD, 2003 #29 @ 104} These figures do not include the Liberian open register. 9 {UNCTAD, 2003 #29 @ 106} 10 {UNCTAD, 2003 #29 @ 106} 11 {UNCTAD, 2003 #29 @ 114} 5 6 Land: There are a number of transport corridors that are critical for landlocked sub-Saharan African countries. Road transport is the dominant means of freight transport along these corridors.12 The cost ranges between US$1.38 and US$4.94 on major African transport corridors. This compares to the average unit cost for transportation in the US ($1.10 per kilometre) and the EU (US$1.10 per kilometre).13 There are several reasons for these high costs, including substandard and badly maintained roads and trucks, cumbersome administrative procedures, excessive controls, poor management information systems and port costs. Railways transportation on the transit corridors in sub-Saharan Africa have suffered due to poor infrastructure and management. Rail tracks built in colonial times often had low-weight rails and design standards which are insufficient for today’s traffic, and which have deteriorated due to poor maintenance, and a poorly managed rolling stock.14 As a result, rail transportation is largely secondary to road. In addition to poor infrastructure, railways in sub-Saharan Africa tend to be largely dominated by government monopolies which are poorly managed and inefficient. Finally, internal waterways transportation in sub-Saharan Africa has also suffered from insufficient investment and poor maintenance and safety standards.15 Air: Africa is the smallest region for air services in the world, reflecting its low income and lack of air transport infrastructure. In 2002, it accounted for only 1.6% of the world air cargo traffic. The use of air transport is very concentrated within Africa: the 10 biggest national markets account for 90% of cargo flights. Kenya was the most important single market for international cargo flights (i.e. intercontinental traffic and flights to other African countries) with 1,531 flights in 2001, followed closely by South Africa with 1,333 flights and Senegal with 1,218 flights. The low level, both in absolute and relative terms, of the intra-Africa cargo traffic illustrates an underdeveloped intra-regional trade pattern and deficiencies in air infrastructure. However, the importance of air transport relative to other modes of transport is increasing: the use of air transport expanded by 7.2% a year on average during the 1990s, compared to a rise of 4.4% in the use of road transport. Multimodal: While not a transport “subsector” as defined in the GATS, multimodal transport is increasingly a critical aspect of transport services. Multimodal transport is a door-to-door service which involves the use of one or more "modes" (i.e., road, rail, air, or inland water transport) in addition to shipping by sea. One transport provider organizes and ensures door-todoor transport, or multimodal transport. Multimodal transport services are limited in subSaharan Africa where there are numerous constraints including long inland turnaround times for containers, inadequate road infrastructure, limitations on the cross-border provision of trucking services, and different national standards regarding safety requirements, vehicle sizes, railway gauges, etc. This brief overview of the various transportation subsectors in sub-Saharan Africa highlights that, on the infrastructure side, transportation systems in sub-Saharan Africa are in critical need {UNCTAD, 2003 #29 @ 114} {UNCTAD, 2003 #29 @ 115} 14 See {Pedersen, 2000 #43 @ 13} 15 See {Pedersen, 2000 #43 @ 13} 12 13 of development. This is especially so in the area of land transport where road and rail networks are inadequate in many places, but is also true of air and maritime transport. On the services side, however, the problems are largely policy-induced. Inefficiency of services is a major stumbling block to lower transportation costs. Inefficiency has a number of causes, including state-ownership/monopolies, lack of competition, inadequate regulation, and red tape. Many state-owned ports, shipping lines, airports, airlines, and logistics companies that dominate the transport services sector are poorly managed and unresponsive to client needs, and tend to be starved of funds for much needed investments. Cumbersome border procedures, excessive paper work, and opaque administrative structures create additional burdens on transport services providers and users. These policy-induced problems may be addressed within the GATS framework and the next sections address this framework. 3. Transportation Services in the GATS As noted above, the GATS covers air, maritime, and land transportation services. Consideration also needs to be given to multimodal transport where activities cover pre- and onward transportation services in rail, road, inland waterways and seaways, and the commercially related auxiliary services (such as cargo handling, storage, warehousing, logistics activities, container stations and depots, container servicing, freight groupage, agencies, freight forwarding). Commitments in multimodal transport will comprise commitments within each mode of transport. For those subsectors they choose to commit, governments may set limitations specifying the level of market access and the degree of national treatment they are prepared to guarantee. A market access commitment provides that foreign service providers be granted access to the domestic market on terms no less favourable than those provided for in its Schedule. A national treatment commitment requires governments to afford treatment to foreign service providers that is no less favourable than that afforded to domestic providers. An important aspect of making market access and national treatment commitments is that governments are able to limit commitments to one or more of the “modes of supply” through which services are traded. It is therefore crucial to understand what each of the four modes of supply actually means in practice. Here, we examine this question. In addition, we include a table with examples of what each of the four modes of supply means in practice for various different subsectors (Appendix A). Mode 1 – Cross-Border Supply Mode 1 is defined as the supply of a service from the territory of one Member into the territory of another Member (“cross-border supply”). This mode of supply is similar to the traditional notion of trade in goods where both the consumer and the supplier remain in their respective territories when the product is delivered. For example, if a British shipping company transports freight for a Kenyan company from Mombasa to the UK, this would constitute an export for the UK, and an import for Kenya. Mode 2 – Consumption Abroad Mode 2 is defined as the supply of a service in the territory of a Member to the service consumer of any other Member (“consumption abroad”). This situation occurs when the consumer moves to the territory of the supplier. The consumer, although being in a foreign country, remains a resident of their home country, giving rise to transactions between residents and non-residents. This results in an import of services for the country of the consumer and an export for the country of the service provider. For example, if a Kenyan company purchases freight transportation services from a British shipping company to ship its flowers from Rotterdam to London, this would constitute an export for the UK and an import for Kenya. Mode 3 – Commercial Presence Mode 3 is defined as the supply of a service by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member (“commercial presence”). Commercial presence includes legal entities such as corporations, joint ventures, partnerships, representative offices, and branches. For example, if a British shipping company establishes a branch office in Mombasa, this would constitute an export for the UK and an import for Kenya. Mode 4 – Movement of Natural Persons The supply of a service by a service supplier of a Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member (“movement of natural persons”).16 For example, if a British citizen spends three months working at the Mombasa branch of a British shipping company, this would constitute an export for the UK and an import for Kenya. Each of the four modes is important for transportation services. Mode 1 is clearly important for international transport where services are provided across borders. Mode 2 is important for the repair and maintenance of transport equipment (e.g., vessels and other transport equipment) and also to ensure that consumers of transport services have access to foreign-based service providers. The need to establish a commercial presence to manage transport service operations makes Mode 3 extremely relevant. Mode 4 is also important as it touches upon the possibility of hiring foreign crewmembers and officers; an essential parameter of the operating costs of this often labour-intensive sector. 4. Why Commit to Liberalize Transportation Services? As discussed above, the transportation sector in sub-Saharan Africa is largely inefficient and contributes to high transaction costs which impede the ability of countries to trade internationally. To the extent that problems are policy-induced, the GATS can be a tool by which countries can seek to increase efficiency within their transport sector. Many sub-Saharan 16 It should be noted that the GATS does not apply to measures affecting individuals seeking access to the employment market, or to measures regarding citizenship, residence, or employment on a permanent basis. African countries have rules and regulations in place that drive up transport-related transaction costs and preserve monopolies in service markets.17 Many of these rules and regulations restrict market access for foreign providers and/or discriminate against foreign providers. The following are some of the key ways in which domestic rules and regulations can restrict market access and national treatment. Market Access: Common rules that restrict market access for foreign providers in the transport sector include: à à à à à à à à à à à à à à à Foreign ownership restrictions; Foreign equity ceilings; Restrictive incorporation requirements (e.g., requirements with respect to nationality of the board of directors, citizenship requirements) Requirements and prohibitions on activities; Authorization requirements not extended to foreign providers: Rules governing the conduct of businesses; Economic needs tests; Rules that prevent multimodal operators from undertaking door-to-door contracts (e.g., limitations on the cross-border provision of trucking services) Standards such as safety requirements, vehicle sizes, railway gauges, or coupling and braking systems also constrain the smooth cross-border movements of goods.18 Rules relating to customs procedures (e.g., burdensome documentation requirements). Emergency safeguards on the number of services suppliers, services operations and services output; Requirements with respect to concessions authorizations; Joint ventures and investment limitations; Requirement to appoint a local agent; and (For maritime transport) limitations on government-owned cargoes. National Treatment: Some of the rules and regulations noted under the heading of “market access” may also have the effect of discriminating against foreign providers. In addition, other rules and regulations that may result in discrimination against foreign provides include: à à à à à 17 18 Regulations which relate to performance requirements, where the requirements impose an added burden on foreign providers; Preferential treatment for domestic providers including subsidies and investment incentives; Discriminatory taxation; Requirement of establishment in the country concerned to provide cabotage services; and Discriminatory port charges. {The World Bank, 2001 #36 @ 109} {The World Bank, 2001 #36 @ 110} Just as government policy can drive up costs and increase inefficiency, it can also reduce transport-related transaction costs and improve efficiency. That is because doing away with overly restrictive rules and regulations and the administrative hassles and red tape that these entail, enables the more streamlined and efficient operation of service operations. By removing restrictions on foreign providers, and making it easier for them to provide services, government policy can result in more efficient, cheaper, and plentiful services. However, even assuming the benefits of liberalization in the transport sector, a key question for sub-Saharan African countries remains. Namely, what benefits are likely to accrue from making commitments in the transportation sector, and conversely, what detriments could follow? In other words, why make GATS commitments at all? Why not simply follow a course of liberalization in the absence of binding commitments? The answer is that there are potential benefits and negative consequences in each alternative. First, making GATS commitments is a means with which to signal credible commitment to ensure a favourable climate for both foreign and domestic investors. A commitment tells investors that the terms upon which they expend large outlays in sunk costs will remain fixed and sheltered from the arbitrary exercise of political or administrative discretion, and that the domestic market will be liberalized according to a fixed schedule.19 Second, the negotiating process may be able to be used to advance domestic liberalization of services where there are interest groups that resist reforms. Third, making commitments can be viewed as of practical value in light of the GATS negotiating structure in that making concessions in one area may assist in obtaining trade concessions elsewhere (whether in different sectors or subsectors, or in different modes). On the negative side, there is the danger that opening up markets to foreign operators may result in a concentration of operators. For example, it has been noted that a relatively small group of port operators has established a worldwide presence.20 A danger is that dominant operators may abuse their market power and that the benefits of liberalization may be captured to some extent by foreign firms. Another potential negative aspect of liberalizing commitments under the GATS is the nature and style of adjustments required in domestic economies, including labour market adjustments where increased foreign investment alters the make-up of the domestic labour market. A key issue for sub-Saharan African countries is thus the need to act in accordance with domestic reform priorities and overall development objectives. A key to successful liberalization is the development of appropriate regulatory mechanisms. Regulatory intervention is necessary to remedy market failures, to protect consumer interests and the environment, and to ensure the safety of services supplied. However, it is important for subSaharan African countries to ensure that they have the capacity to put in place the necessary regulatory mechanisms and that careful consideration has been given to identifying the most appropriate mechanisms. 19 20 {Cohen, 2004 #44 @ 15} {The World Bank, 2001 #36 @ 116} 5. The State of Play in GATS Negotiations During the Uruguay Round, Members were invited to schedule commitments in the transportation sector with respect to market access and national treatment. However, progress in the transport sector was limited. In maritime transport, only 39 Members offered commitments, most with significant limitations. Negotiations were extended until June 1996 but no agreement could be reached and as a result negotiations were suspended. Liberalization of air transport services was also very limited. Commitments were made by 45 Members but only related to three ancillary services – aircraft repair and maintenance, selling and marketing services, and computer reservation services. The GATS expressly excludes the issue of air traffic rights. Road transport attracted the most commitments (40 Members), while rail transport only attracted commitments from 10 Members. Of the commitments made during the Uruguay Round, the most restrictions were seen with respect to mode three (commercial presence). The Doha Round encompasses negotiations on services with the objective of broadening and deepening the commitments made during the Uruguay Round. To this end, offers and requests are currently being tabled. A total of 45 WTO Members (counting the EU as one) have now put forward offers. A preliminary analysis of 16 of these offers (including those made by the EC, US, Japan, and Canada) shows that offers are still relatively limited, with numerous restrictions of the type noted above applicable in mode three. 6. Case Study: Kampala-Mombasa Corridor As noted above, the paper will include a case study of both the Kampala-Mombasa corridor, and the Douala-Ndjamena corridor. To date, analysis has commenced only on the KampalaMombasa corridor. Work to date in this regard highlights the inadequate infrastructure with respect to inland transportation. In Uganda, for example, the dominant means of freight transportation is road (given the inefficiency of the railways), yet the poor state of many of the existing roads and the general paucity of the road network present a significant impediment to trade. Development of infrastructure in this regard is therefore critical. Uganda exporters and importers experience additional impediments when goods cross the Kenyan border en route either to or from the port at Mombasa and with the services at the port of Mombasa itself. It has been reported that port services in Mombasa are so inefficient that some traffic is diverting to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. The Kampala-Mombasa corridor is part of a wider transportation corridor covered by the Northern Corridor Transit Agreement (NCTA). This Agreement covers the use of transportation facilities of East Africa served by the port of Mombasa. The parties to the Agreement are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, DRC, and Uganda. It includes the rail network between Kampala and Mombasa; and the road routes from Mombasa via Malaba and Busia to Kampala. The objective of the NCTA is to promote the use of the Northern Corridor as a most effective route for the surface transport of goods between the parties. The parties have agreed to grant each other the right of transit through their respective territories and to provide all possible facilities, regulations and procedures for that purpose, without any discrimination. In addition to their role in facilitating trade, transport services along the Kampala-Mombasa corridor are important as imports and exports in their own right. On the export side, for example, both Uganda and Kenya have capacity to export transport services in one of several ways, including: (i) importers from third countries may pay for transport costs (either road, rail, internal waterways, or air) in accordance with the terms of purchase of goods from Uganda/Kenya (e.g., where the sale contract is on FOB terms); (ii) Ugandan or Kenyan exporters may pass on the costs of transport services to customers through sale contracts e.g., CIF or CFR; or (iii) foreign nationals or entities may purchase transport services in Uganda or Kenya e.g., when their goods need to pass through their territory in transit. With respect to the third means, Uganda and Kenya’s road and rail networks provide linkages to the sea for the land locked countries of Rwanda, Burundi, parts of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and southern Sudan. On the import side, as a landlocked country, Uganda is inevitably required to import transport services in order to move goods from Uganda to the sea, through the port either at Mombasa, Kenya or Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Of course, it also imports transport services whenever an exporter or importer pays for transport services to export/import goods to and from Kenya. Likewise, Kenya will import transport services when it sends goods to Uganda and utilizes Ugandan transport providers. Only Kenya made commitments in the Uruguay Round, and these were limited to air and road transport. Commitments were particularly limited in mode three where Kenya made no commitments in road transport. We understand that these commitments have not been expanded in Kenya’s Doha round offer to date. Both Uganda and Kenya have already taken steps towards liberalizing aspects of their transportation sectors, with varying degrees of progress. Committing such liberalization under the GATS would enhance the credibility of the programmes with foreign investors. Uganda and Kenya (as well as the other parties to the NCTA) need to pay particular attention to the KampalaMombasa corridor in the request/offer process. This is particularly important to Uganda as a landlocked country. Consideration needs to be given to where liberalization would help in improving the efficiency of services along the corridor, while respecting the obligations already entered into under the NCTA. For example, there might be merit in Uganda requesting Kenya to provide access for its (Ugandan) providers to provide services in Kenya and vice versa; and ensuring that commitments are made in each country so that multi-modal operators (whether domestic or foreign) are not restricted in their ability to provide services along the length of the corridor. Where infrastructure exists (e.g., the port at Mombasa), making commitments to liberalize the provision of services will likely (combined with other steps to encourage foreign investment) play a critical role in achieving greater efficiency of services. 7. Conclusion and Questions for Discussion Concluding Remarks The challenge for sub-Saharan African countries in the transportation sector is to evaluate their transportation sectors and determine where liberalization is desirable, and where making commitments under the GATS would be beneficial by consolidating liberalization programmes already in place, or assisting to implement a liberalization programme. Attention needs to be paid to the four modes of supply within each subsector in order to determine where liberalization would be most beneficial and where limitations might be warranted. Factors to consider will include the potential impact of commitments on investment, employment, and access to services. In addition, it is important that countries consider the best way of sequencing the steps involved in liberalization, and ensure that they have adequate regulatory capacity before moving ahead with commitments under the GATS. A key aspect of the transportation sector in many sub-Saharan African countries is lack of infrastructure and this needs to be considered when making commitments, as without the necessary infrastructure, there is little potential for services to be provided, whether by domestic or foreign providers. Where adequate infrastructure exists, liberalization will likely increase efficiency in the sector. In such sectors, foreign investment if it is forthcoming, may well be beneficial. Where countries are situated on a transport corridor such as the Kampala-Mombasa corridor, a key goal of the negotiations should be to improve efficiency of services along the corridor, while respecting any obligations entered into under regional agreements. Countries should thus be looking at multimodal service provision, with a view to opening the way for multi-modal providers to operate without undue restriction along the length of the relevant corridor. Further, where adequate infrastructure exists, making commitments to liberalize the provision of services will likely (combined with other steps to encourage foreign investment) play a critical role in achieving greater efficiency of services and should thus be seriously considered. Countries essentially have three choices in making offers in the Doha round; they can bind liberalizing reforms they have already made in accordance with the status quo, they can commitment to further liberalization, or they can make commitments that are below the status quo in terms of market access and national treatment. Where a country decides to bind the status quo, this will send a signal to investors that they are serious with respect to continued openness of the sector in question. Depending on the treatment that the status quo accords to foreign providers, this may be a significant step in terms of appearances to investors. Where liberalization has been undertaken, commitments to bind such liberalization should only be made where it has been established that the liberalization is working as anticipated and that a regulatory framework is in place to deal with increased investment and/or increased provision of services by foreign providers. A country may decide to bind below the status quo where they are not sure that the reforms already undertaken have been successful, or where there is concern that the current regulatory framework is not adequate to cope with increased investment and/or provision of services by foreign providers. Binding below the status quo may in some cases be a prudent move and may indicate to investors that while the country is open to increased investment and/or provision of services by foreign providers, it is not prepared to commit beyond its current means. Depending on how much more generous the commitments are from the country’s Uruguay Round commitments, making commitments below the status quo may in some cases still provide some bargaining power. Making commitments above the status quo is potentially risky where it is not yet clear what the impacts of liberalization would be (both social and economic), where the details of liberalization have not been fully worked out, and where an adequate regulatory framework is not yet in place. Questions for Discussion In what sectors/subsectors is liberalization potentially beneficial? Where has liberalization been undertaken with successful results? Did foreign investment follow liberalization? What lessons are there to be learned from countries’ previous experience with liberalization? Where is foreign investment desirable in the transport sector and, if commitments were made under the GATS, what is the probability of such investment being forthcoming? Given the lack of infrastructure with respect to road and rail transportation, is there any purpose to be served by making commitments under the GATS at this stage? It is unlikely, for example, that a foreign trucking company will invest in Uganda if there are no roads. Should commitments be made on a staggered basis? That is, make commitments where the infrastructure exists (e.g., port facilities and aspects of air transport) in an effort to attract foreign investment and improve efficiency, while focusing on infrastructure in regards to land transport. What export opportunities exist for sub-Saharan African countries in the transport sector? Do sub-Saharan African countries have the capacity to put in place the necessary regulatory mechanisms that need to accompany liberalization in the transport sector? What are the potential downsides to making commitments in the transport sector (economic or social)?
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