Land Tenure
Land
Tenure
and
Land Managementand
Alternatives
Land Management
Alternatives
© 2003 Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation.
All rights reserved.
ISBN 0642 58595 4
ISSN 1440-6845
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Publication No. 03/027
Project No. UT-32A
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Researcher Contact Details
Shane Broad
Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural
Research
University of Tasmania
GPO Box 252-54
Hobart TAS 7001
Amabel Fulton
Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural
Research
University of Tasmania
GPO Box 252-54
Hobart TAS 7001
Phone:03 62262651
Fax: 03 62262642
Email:sbroad@postoffice.utas.edu.au
Phone:03 62262651
Fax: 03 62262642
Email:[email protected]
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Foreword
Australian rural industries are constantly striving for greater efficiency of
production. One suggested method of achieving greater efficiency is to
separate land ownership and agricultural production. This separation is termed
“alternative land tenure.”
Alternative land tenure agreements are currently in place in Australia but they
are not common practice.
This report focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative land
tenure arrangements as well as barriers to the expansion of alternative land
tenure agreements and means of overcoming these barriers.
This project was funded from RIRDC Core Funds which are provided by the
Australian Government.
This report, a new addition to RIRDC’s diverse range of over 1000 research
publications, forms part of our Resilient Agricultural Systems R&D program,
which aims to foster agri-industry systems that have sufficient diversity,
flexibility and robustness to be resilient and respond to challenges and
opportunities.
Most of our publications are available for viewing, downloading or purchasing
online through our website:
• downloads at www.rirdc.gov.au/reports/Index.htm
• purchases at www.rirdc.gov.au/eshop
Simon Hearn
Managing Director
Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation
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Acknowledgements
This work was made possible with funding from the Resilient Agricultural
Systems sub-program of the Rural Industries Research and Development
Corporation, and the Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research.
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Definitions
An “agreement” is defined as a lease, sharefarming or joint venture agreement
“Alternative land tenure” is defined as the use of leases, joint ventures and/or
sharefarming/sharecropping agreements.
A “lessee” is defined as the second party or the person who utilises another
person’s land after obtaining agreement from the owner of the land.
A “lessor” is defined as a landowner who has an agreement with another party
involving the use of their land by that second party.
“Traditional land ownership” is defined as the farming operation where the
landowner directly manages the land and is responsible for production.
Abbreviations
•
“ALT” is an abbreviation for alternative land tenure
•
“p” or “p-value” refer to the statistical probability of the same event or
interaction occurring purely by chance
•
“n” refers to the number of respondents to a particular category
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Executive Summary
There are a number of ways a landowner who does not want to sell can keep
their land and continue to make an income at relatively low risk. Generally,
these options involve some form of land tenure agreement. Although renting
land may attract the landowner looking for a change, similar opportunities
are available to those looking to enter agriculture without buying land or
to landowners wanting to expand operations without making further land
purchases. Between them, the owner (lessor) and the tenant (lessee) create a
land rental market that is defined by supply and demand.
The separation of land ownership from farm business ownership is most
commonly seen in leasing and share-farming agreements where there is a
landowner and a lessee or sharefarmer. Many such agreements are wellestablished in Australian agriculture. Increasingly, agricultural businesses
are developing joint ventures and incorporating as companies to improve
efficiency, pool expertise and finances, and ultimately increase profits.
This publication focuses on some of the legal entities that are used in farm
business arrangements. It provides an insight into the most appropriate
arrangement for different situations.
The research shows that:
• Farm business arrangements are suited to people entering farming without
their own land.
• Farm business arrangements can allow farmers to expand their operations
without tying up financial resources in land purchases.
• An agreement should be appropriate to the both parties’ situations and
goals: different agreements bring different levels of risk and require varying
levels of input.
• Any arrangement entered into must be equitable for both parties.
Otherwise, it may result in resentment and under-performance; the
agreement may end prematurely or unsustainable practices may develop.
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Contents
Foreword .......................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements...........................................................................................iv
Definitions & Abbreviations ............................................................................ v
Executive Summary.........................................................................................vii
Contents ............................................................................................................ix
Introduction .......................................................................................................1
Literature review—the relationship
to previous research ......................................................................................... 5
Methodology ....................................................................................................23
Results ..............................................................................................................39
Discussion ........................................................................................................ 87
Recommendations ........................................................................................... 97
References ...................................................................................................... 101
Appendices ..................................................................................................... 109
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List of tables
Table 1: Summary of how research questions
were addressed in the survey ..................................................................................... 34
Table 2: Summary of pre-testing methodology. ................................................... 36
Table 3: Characteristics of the subjects interviewed ........................................... 40
Table 4: Land tenure arrangements ..........................................................................41
Table 5: Agricultural enterprisese ............................................................................ 42
Table 6: Role of spouse on the farm ....................................................................... 42
Table 7: Employment in the farm businessg ......................................................... 42
Table 8: Use of alternative land tenure in Tasmanian Agriculture ............... 69
Table 9: Major enterprises of landowners compared to their use of
alternative land tenure agreements .......................................................................... 70
Table 10: Major enterprises of landowners compared to their
previous use of alternative land tenure agreements ........................................... 71
Table 11: Breakdown of the products produced using
alternative land tenure agreements .......................................................................... 73
Table 12: Landowner interest in alternative land tenure agreements............74
Table 13: Most attractive alternative land tenure option .................................. 75
Table 14: Number attempting to enter into a desired agreement .................. 75
Table 15: Concerns landowners have with alternative land
tenure agreements ......................................................................................................... 76
Table 16: Benefits of alternative land tenure agreements ................................. 79
Table 17: Use of written agreements. ...................................................................... 81
Table 18: Terms of alternative land tenure agreements..................................... 81
Table 19: Relationship of the landowner to the second
party of agreements....................................................................................................... 82
Table 20: Relationships between expressed interest in entering
agreements and concerns landowners have with alternative
land tenure agreements................................................................................................ 84
Table 21: Relationships between expressed interest in entering
agreements and opinions of the benefits of alternative
land tenure agreements................................................................................................ 85
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
List of figures
Figure 1: Survey number calculations for 100 surveys returned ................... 32
Figure 2: Survey number results for 400 returns ................................................ 33
Figure 3: Number of returns required for a 98% confidence interval. ........ 33
Figure 4: Calculation for a 95% confidence interval .......................................... 33
Figure 5: Calculation for 1500 surveys .................................................................. 34
Figure 6: Overall the total number of times disadvantages
and benefits were mentioned were: ......................................................................... 48
Figure 7: Changes in the level of previous and current alternative
land tenure agreements compared to the landowners main
enterprises, bars indicate 95% confidence intervals ........................................... 72
Figure 8: Changes in the use of alternative land tenure agreements
across enterprises as a percentage of the total number of
agreements, bars indicate 95% confidence intervals........................................... 73
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One: Introduction
One: Introduction
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Australian agriculture is in transition phase. This transition involves a change
in the relationships between agribusiness and primary producers and between
landowners and those who manage land. These changes are essentially being
driven by declining terms of trade, policies of competing nations, economic
rationalism and deregulation (Gray et al., 1993) as well as a shortage of
resources, such as land and water. One of the main changes predicted is the
separation of land use and land ownership. The movement away from the
owner/operator system is termed “alternative land tenure”.
Tenure itself is the right or title by which land is held. Land tenure is an
extension of this principle and it is defined as “… the study of the diverse
strategies by which human groups exert claims on their resource base”. These
claims can vary in their formality and duration (Geisler and Salamon, 1993).
The tenure of most Australian farms is held by the person who manages the
land (the farmer). There are options other than this ‘traditional approach” of
the owner/operator and these are called “alternative land tenure arrangements”.
These arrangements are seen by several commentators as an opportunity
to “open up” the farming sector to development and improve the future
viability of Australian agriculture (Campbell, 1980; Bourne, 1997; Page, 1997;
Perkins, 1997; Johnson, 1998). It is suggested that alternative land tenure
arrangements could achieve increased development by:
•
increasing the availability of land and investment in the rural sector by
allowing access to land for entrepreneurial primary producers;
•
speeding up intergenerational transfer of responsibility to the younger
generation before their “youthful exuberance” is lost;
•
achieving economies of scale and other efficiencies (for example
specialisation or efficient use of large machinery);
•
allowing land to be utilised for the best purpose as designated by its position,
capability, soil type, climate et cetera;
•
allowing landowners to pursue off farm activities or early semi-retirement;
•
allowing an infusion of new ideas and added enthusiasm; and
•
allowing more appropriate or most appropriate combinations of financial,
physical and human resources.
There may be problems that stem from alternative tenure arrangements that
require investigation. These include environmental degradation (or “mining”)
that results from the cost price squeeze imposed on those utilising the land
and/or poor matching of human resources with physical resources. Another
problem could be the social disadvantages caused by a new system such as
stress, bankruptcy, disputes and loss of standing in the community.
Likewise an adoption of alternative land tenure may result in economic
pressure coming off those areas most sensitive to environmental degradation
therefore increasing sustainability.
Alternative land tenure arrangements are being adopted in Australian
agriculture. Therefore it is important to determine the outcomes of these in
Introduction •
order to focus landowner and primary producer attention on the benefits and
disadvantages. This will allow the agricultural sector to make informed land
tenure decisions and hopefully allow more efficient production in the rural
sector as a whole.
This document reports on the national and international literature on
alternative land tenure arrangements in agriculture. This research forms the
guidelines for the design of the research program as documented in the
Methodology section. Discussion of the research results allows conclusions to
be drawn and recommendations to be formulated.
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Two:
Literature
Two: Literature
review
review
~ the relationship
to previous research
~ the relationship to
previous research
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The research issues relating to land tenure have changed over time. Initially
investigators looked at the distribution of wealth between parties (this is still
the case in developing countries). Then the emphasis was changed to the
rights of tenants and the classification of agricultural land ownership. Present
studies have shifted focus to the social and environmental impacts of the
different types of land tenure. The continuing modern research is set to
“challenge the former meanings of ruralism, rurality and rural land tenure”
(Geisler and Salamon, 1993).
This review examines the main topics covered in the international and
Australian literature and research on agricultural land tenure. Firstly a brief
history of alternative land tenure will be discussed, followed by the benefits
and the social and environmental impacts of alternative land tenure. The
practicalities of alternative land tenure are then focused on in the sections
detailing the decision making processes of landowners, how the agreements
are organised or arranged, how well the arrangements are working and the
moral hazard of alternative land tenure. The arrangements used in Australian
agriculture are then discussed followed by a summary of Australian research.
2.1. The history of alternative land tenure
Sharecropping is as old as recorded history (Byres, 1983). The first record
of sharecropping was in the writings of the Greek Solon in 594-593 BC.
Solon refers to hekrçmori, literally “sixth-part men”. There is much debate as
to whether these people actually paid a sixth of their crop to their landlord
or some other fraction (Byres, 1983). Other sharecropping systems have
independently developed in Ancient China, Ancient India and were also
recorded in the history of the Roman Empire (Byres, 1983). Sharecropping
has proved to be pervasive and persistent over time (Pearce, 1983). The
widespread development and use of sharecropping indicates the efficient
nature of these arrangements with regard to labour and resources. This also
indicates that sharecropping is not necessarily agrarian exploitation, although
the history of tenancy and sharecropping are intertwined with product-sharing
rents, commonly reinforced by tenant indebtedness (Pearce, 1983).
By the 18th century in Great Britain the majority of farmers were tenants. This
involved a somewhat benign partnership with a landowner that could dictate
the terms and conditions of tenant farming (Gibbard et al., 1999). Legislation
has increased the strength of the tenant’s position in modern times, so much
so that it is now the tenant who dictates terms to the landowner. However, the
same pieces of legislation also appear to reduce the numbers of tenants because
landlords found the situation unfavorable or undesirable and stopped renewing
tenancies (Wilson, 1992; Gibbard, 1994; Gibbard, 1995; Stockdale et al., 1996;
Gibbard et al., 1999)
The United States has been debating the effects of widespread tenancy since
the turn of the last century. In 1911 the Country Life Commission was
concerned that the increasing number of tenants would result in farmers
becoming “a dependant class or shall be tenants by name, but laborers in fact
and working for an uncertain wage” (Rasmussen, 1999). The large numbers of
struggling tenants in the depression years of the 1930’s called into question the
American belief that agriculture was the “province of contented, independent
Literature review •
farm owners and a repository of the nation’s civic virtue” (Rasmussen, 1999).
The public also associated land degradation with the incidence of tenant
farming. Therefore legislation was enacted in an attempt to coerce tenants
to undertake conservation strategies. However, tenants had little incentive to
improve someone else’s property because it enabled the landlord to raise the
rent or sell the property, meaning the tenant was either financially worse off or
displaced from the farm (Rasmussen, 1999). Back then, as it is generally today,
private ownership of land was seen as the solution to land degradation in
agricultural production systems, because the owner/operator has less incentive
to exploit the land for short-term profit (Rasmussen, 1999).
Periods in history have seen traditional sharefarming agreements operate
successfully. Carmona and Simpson (1999) describe an agreement used in
Catalonian viticulture from the 1670’s until the early 19th century. The rabassa
morta was a prosperous sharefarming contract that benefited both landowner
and sharefarmer. Under these agreements the rabasser (sharefarmer) legally
owned the vines until 2/3 had died (rabassa morta is Catalan for dead vine).
Constant replacement of dead vines ensured the 2/3 figure was rarely reached,
meaning that agreements would often extend for generations. Landowners
benefited from this arrangement because marginal land could be planted at
no expense or risk and no supervision or labour was required for a one third
payment. The sharefarmers were provided with the opportunity to obtain a
saleable and heritable asset. The agreement also had the benefit of building
social capital in the region’s villages. It was only when the disease phylloxera
devastated the region’s vines that use of the contract declined (Carmona and
Simpson, 1999).
Modern times have seen a split in the ideals of tenure between the third
and first world nations. The first world countries like Australia see leasing
and sharecropping agreements as a method of increasing the efficiency of
production (Page, 1997; Perkins, 1997; Johnson, 1998) or in the US and
Canada as a means of restructuring farmer debt (Hayden, 1986; Thomassin
and Baker, 1989; Baker and Thomassin, 1991). Third world nations of Africa
and South and Central America see redistribution of land from landowners to
tenants and sharecroppers as a method of increasing production and national
wealth (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999). Both First World and Third World
countries want to increase production and efficiency of their agriculture, but
the method of achieving these goals is different. A possible reason for this
difference could be the relative importance of agriculture in the Third World
countries is higher than countries like Australia. In developing nations owning
land is also often the main method of accumulating wealth and transferring it
to the next generation (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999)
The World Bank’s ‘Land Reform Policy Paper’ in 1975, stated that owner/
operator farms are desirable in developing countries on the grounds of both
equity and efficiency (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999). However, the
programs that have been introduced as either aid packages or legislation in
individual nations have been resounding disasters. For example, when land
reform touted in Latin American countries discussed land redistribution to
tenants, the landowners simply evicted all the tenants and either left the land
idle, switched to livestock production or mechanised operations (with the aid
of subsidised loans) (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999). Other programs gave
the peasant tenants land but left them without credit facilities and working
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capital which resulted in them selling the land for less than its productive
capacity (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999).
Despite the chequered history of sharefarming and tenancy, the practice still
continues, which is an “eloquent testimony to its flexibility and intrinsic merit”
(Taslim, 1992). Legislation enacted by governments and ideas implemented
by policy makers to “improve” the practice are usually inappropriate and/or
ineffectual. Therefore an educational approach based on economic, social and
environmental benefits, might be a more appropriate role for government.
2.2. The benefits of alternative land tenure
The theoretical benefits of alternative land tenure alluded to in the
introduction are discussed at length in the Australian literature (Campbell,
1980; McDougall, 1986; Obst, 1986; Bourne, 1997; Page, 1997; Perkins,
1997; Johnson, 1998). These benefits are based on how landowners and
tenants/lessees could profit from economic efficiencies discussed in the
introduction. This makes most information on alternative land tenure
arrangements discussed by this group prescriptive rather than explanatory for
example Makeham and Malcolm (1993). In fact as far back as 1971 Makeham
perceived there was a need to “create conditions which facilitate the transfer
of ownership and/or management of non-viable units so that they can either
become viable, are retired from agriculture or leased” (Makeham, 1971),
without explaining how this could be achieved.
However, alternative land tenure agreements undoubtedly have advantages in
certain situations. Doye (1990) stated that “farmland can often be acquired
more easily, cheaply, and rapidly by renting rather than buying, particularly in
periods of tight credit and high interest rates”. Baker and Thomassin (1991)
follow similar lines by suggesting that long-term leasing of farmland will reduce
financial stress by removing the cost of the ownership component of farming,
reducing the cash flow required to enter agriculture and improving balance
sheet evaluations.
McDougall (1986) discussed the benefits of separating management and
finances in corporate agriculture compared with a family farm. The corporate
management of farming discussed is based on a company financing land
purchases, followed by the company appointing a salaried manager to each
property. One could argue that the definitions of alternative land tenure are
met by this model because ownership of land and management of production
are separated. However, the manager remains under the control of the
company. Therefore, there is also little difference between this manager and a
wage earner on any other farm.
The models of land management that companies like Tasman Agriculture and
Apple Fields use in New Zealand (and in the case of Tasman Agriculture, also
in Tasmania) unquestionably involve alternative tenure agreements. These two
companies invest in good quality dairy farms or land suitable for conversion
to dairy farms. They then install a mixture of managers, contract milkers,
and sharefarmers (Blunden et al., 1997). The companies now prefer 50/50
sharemilkers (an arrangement where the company supplies the land, fertiliser
and advice, while the sharemilker provides labour and the animals, and the
Literature review •
profit is then divided on a 50/50 basis). These arrangements benefit the
companies because:
• there are low transaction costs;
• production is efficient (it is in the interests of the sharemilker to have the
optimum stocking density and animal health);
• there are low funding costs because the agreements do not require the
purchase and maintenance of cows;
• there is low livestock risk; and
• they allow the appointment of highly motivated, “incentivised” managers
(Blunden et al., 1997).
Meanwhile the companies also benefit from capital gains that accumulate
due to the farms’ value appreciating over time. The farms also become highly
productive and therefore more valuable because the price for farms in New
Zealand is directly related to the production capacity (Blunden et al., 1997). In
effect the sharemilker develops the farm for the company once the physical
infrastructure is in place, thus increasing the farm value. The sharemilker
also benefits from the arrangement because the scale of the enterprises means
that capital accumulation is greater than on smaller farms. This means that the
sharemilker can become an owner/operator in their own right faster than other
sharemilking arrangements (Blunden et al., 1997). The sharemilker is also left
to ‘get on with the job’ because the owner does not live in close proximity to
the property (Blunden et al., 1997).
The success of some corporate agricultural systems has not gone unnoticed.
There have been calls in the literature for financial institutions to invest money
in agricultural land and businesses (McDougall, 1986; Flude, 1999). The
reasoning is that the capital appreciation of land combined with the benefits of
corporate finances (for example timely purchases of goods rather than “waiting
for the next wool cheque”) make an agricultural portfolio more attractive
than ten year bonds (Flude, 1999). Therefore, alternative land tenure cannot
only benefit primary production but the financial sector can also profit. Some
commentators have gone even further suggesting that farming should develop
commercial schemes like franchises for investment in agriculture (Lemmon,
1986). Thomassin and Baker (1989) however, claim that many young farmers
would find this type of contract arrangement too confining and inflexible
compared with other arrangements.
There is no research evidence as to how alternative land tenure is helping
landowners and primary producers. Therefore there is a major gap in the past
research conducted.
2.3. Social impacts of alternative tenure
Literature on the disadvantages of land tenure arrangements is concentrated
on economic, environmental and social effects (Grossman, 1992; Wilson,
1992; Geisler, 1993; Salamon, 1993; Gibbard, 1994; Gibbard, 1995; Stockdale
et al., 1996; Emigh, 1997; Fee, 1999). The social effects of any changes in
agriculture are especially important because many farmers consider farming to
be a lifestyle rather than a business (Campbell and Fisher, 1982; Gray, 1991).
Therefore, the social consequences of alternative land tenure must be studied.
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The land ownership situation in Great Britain has landlords owning large areas
of land. As a result the landlords become de facto town planners and influence
social structure, employment, access to land and housing and even the size
and distribution of the land’s population (Stockdale et al., 1996). (Salamon,
1993) followed a similar line by suggesting that land tenure systems underlie
the social divisions in rural society because the landowners control the most
valuable resource, the land.
Albrecht and Thomas (1986) discussed the concerns that various policy makers
had in the United States (US) in the 1930’s and 40’s about the development
of a landless peasant class seen in European countries. These concerns were
caused by the extent of tenancy (greater than 40% of farms) at the time.
However, this class did not develop in the US. In fact it was stated by Hottel
and Harington (1979), cited in Albrecht and Thomas (1986) that the number
of tenant farms had declined by 91%. However, comments made by Gibbard
(1995) suggested that the transformation of some tenants into landowners in
Britain (largely driven by government legislation), had resulted in the tenant
farmers not undertaking land ownership becoming regarded as “second-class
citizens” or a “second-rate minority in a society of landed farmers”. (Gibbard,
1995) also predicted that tenancies would only become available to farmers
that are already owner/occupiers in their own right. (Gibbard, 1995) claimed
that being an agricultural landlord in Britain no longer carries the status
that was previously attached to it. Therefore the change in agricultural land
ownership is also pushing social changes. Alternatively, social changes could
be pushing ownership changes.
These changes in social status are not only occurring to landlords but to
landowners in general. (Geisler, 1993) stated that in the United States of
America (USA) there was a declining significance of land as a source of
wealth and social standing and that the domestic importance of agricultural
occupations was also fading.
Lapping and Clemensen (1983) suggested that in the USA owning land
itself might become an elitist ethic because land is no longer a resource but
rather a commodity acquired for speculation where “the market functions in
response to speculative and investment demands”. These authors believed
that land ownership in New England (USA) was becoming concentrated in
the hands of a few and that the presence of both absentee and foreign (from
outside New England) land ownership deserved “serious attention and close
monitoring.” Lapping and Clemensen (1983) then cited Walter and Stoltzfus
(1982) “…whenever control of key community resources is no longer widely
spread among community members, democracy and the responsiveness to
local needs is no longer guaranteed.” These comments point to a substantial
loss of control for the farming communities if land becomes widely traded and
speculated upon.
Research in the USA has indicated that landowners have “abdicated” their
use rights in return for rental payments (Constance et al., 1996). Social trends
are seeing American landlords becoming increasingly “female, absentee and
divorced from knowledge and experience regarding agriculture suggest[ing]
that renter domination is likely to increase” (Constance et al., 1996). This
renter ‘domination’ could be in the form of local leasing monopolies of part
owners (lessees who also own land) dividing up leases in a district leaving
Literature review •
landlords with no choice but to accept their terms and conditions (Constance et
al., 1996).
Rogers (1985) claims that as farmers become more dependant on rental land
and landowners become more distant from their land geographically and
socially (through weaker family bonds and leaving the community), local
customs regarding tenancy may be ignored or forgotten. This can leave lessees,
previously with informal but secure tenure, vulnerable to the loss of land.
Uncertainty about the size of farming operations from year to year, can result
in lessees finding themselves unable to make medium to long-term plans
required for good management (Rogers, 1985).
An increasingly important social problem in agriculture is the high level of
equity required for entry. New farm entrants typically must have financial
backing of family members or be “gifted” at least a portion of land. This
restricts entrants into production agriculture (Baker and Thomassin, 1991).
As previously mentioned alternative land tenure agreements in the form of
long-term leases could be a solution (Thomassin and Baker, 1989; Baker and
Thomassin, 1991). Discussion of these arguments is significantly separated
from the agricultural ladder theory, as discussed in the literature (for example
Reiss, 1984; Kloppenburg and Geisler, 1985; Alston and Kauffman, 1998).
“Climbing” the agricultural ladder to eventual ownership is not the ultimate
goal of these lessees but rather obtaining control of a land resource for the
period of their working life, without the financial burden of ownership.
For alternative land tenure to be readily accepted in agriculture, policy
makers would have to adjust their definition of the family farm away from an
“ownership” concept but rather a “use” concept, in that land and buildings are
inputs required to produce agricultural commodities (Baker and Thomassin,
1991). There would also have to be a social change in the farming community
because traditionally farmers in developed countries like Australia, the US and
Canada have strived to own, or do own, all their land (Reiss, 1984; Schoney
and Pederson, 1989; Wright and Kaine, 1997).
The question still remains, should we be encouraging alternative land tenure
agreements as opposed to owner/operator farming? Research by Murdoch et
al. (1986) suggests that producers who rent most of the land farmed are more
likely to be in financial difficulty. However, others like Butz (1989) view
agricultural restructuring, off-farm migration and leasing as processes that can
benefits the parties involved. Those leaving the land can take advantage of
opportunities outside agriculture, while those that remain gain greater access to
property. This enables both groups to obtain a higher standard of living.
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2.4. Environmental impacts
of alternative tenure
Environmental degradation due to farming is not new. As far back as 2600
BC massive deforestation by Egyptian farmers caused wide scale land
degradation (Malafant et al., 1999). In fact the archaeological record indicates
that civilisations perished when their soil was not farmed sustainably. Now in
modern times the issue of sustainability is an important consideration in the socalled triple bottom line of economic, social and environmental sustainability.
Therefore, the environmental effects of changes in land ownership patterns
must be discussed.
In 1899 the American state of Iowa’s leading agricultural periodical Wallace’s
Farmer described a tenant as a “foreordained soil robber” (Rasmussen, 1999).
In fact in the US soil degradation was closely associated with tenancy. So
much so that some saw soil degradation as the “cause” of widespread tenancy
(Rasmussen, 1999). That is, soil degradation lead to less productive farms and
increased levels of tenancy.
Arguments concerning environmental damage caused by tenancy are echoed
in more recent times. Erwin (1982) discussed data from Missouri that clearly
showed that there was less erosion control on rented land.
Questions have also been raised in the US by Wunderlich (1993) about the
environmental consciousness of absentee landowners (that is landowners that
reside a significant distance from their land). In essence, are these landowners
as concerned about issues such as pesticide contamination of drinking water,
as resident owners? The fear is that they are not. The environmental
consciousness of absentee landowners is also queried by Dudley et al. (1992).
They cite Eckholm (1979) in writing, “these (absentee) owners do not realise
that conservation adjustments will improve farm income over a number of
years. Instead they want a high return on this investment now.” Constance et al.
(1996) also found that landlord participation in decision making was based on
economic rather than social or environmental factors.
Dillman and Carlson (1982) further detail three ways in which absentee
landowners exert negative influence on the adoption of erosion control
methods. Namely overt rejection of efforts due to it being seen as unnecessary,
abandonment of erosion control due to the landowner no longer being
involved in cropping decision making and the “convenient excuse influence”
where the lessee blames the landowner for not adopting erosion control (that
is “the landlord won’t let me”). Data showed little support for the first two
influences, leaving the “convenient excuse” as the most viable influence. The
same study suggested that local landlords (those that reside in the same district
as their land) were “a little more likely” to encourage erosion control (Dillman
and Carlson, 1982).
Lee (1983) questions not only absentee landowners’ awareness of conservation
issues but also corporate landowners. Lee (1983) claims that “some argue”
corporate owners lack a conservation ethic and will behave as absentee
landowners and attempt to maximise current income at the expense of soil
conservation. This is a strong counter point to the proposed benefits of
corporate agriculture as discussed by Lemmon (1986); McDougall (1986);
Literature review •
and Flude (1999). These arguments suggest that a change in agricultural
custodianship might result in unsustainable practice. These sentiments are
echoed in China where the conversion of state owned collective farming
to that of collectives owning land, but with limited management rights, has
resulted in the collectives becoming an “empty” entity where no one treasures
the land (Hu, 1997).
Ten year government leases of run country in the Central Otago region in
New Zealand in the 1880’s lead to the lessees exploiting the runs to their
fullest potentials especially during the later years of the lease. The lack of long
term conservation, coupled with few incentives to improve the runs and the
introduction of rabbits to the region, resulted in widespread desertification
(Mather, 1982). Buttel et al. (1990) concur by suggesting that tenancy could
be “a barrier to soil conservation because there is little interest in long term
productivity of land owned by someone else.” Buttel et al. (1990) also admit
that some studies have illustrated this problem while others have not.
The studies by Albrecht and Thomas (1986) in Texas focused on crop
producers and their methods. They found that farmers who rented most
or all of their farmland used better farming practices, were more involved
in the community and were the most productive. Kraft et al. (1996) had
similar findings with increased participation in the “Water Quality Incentives
Program” by renters and part renters compared with full owners (a program to
address water quality issues). However, this is not always the case as Hatley et al.
(1989) found that renters and part renters of property were under represented
in the Conservation Reserve Program studied (a program that aimed to reduce
erosion, promote long-term sustainability and more effective conservation
practices).
International literature indicates that short-term agreements are associated
with more environmental problems (Dillman and Carlson, 1982; Erwin, 1982;
Hinman et al., 1983; Lee, 1983; Buttel et al., 1990; Baker and Thomassin, 1991;
Constance et al., 1996; Hu, 1997; Rasmussen, 1999). The short-term planning
horizon results in low investment in conservation (Hinman et al., 1983; Lee,
1983) and poorer management, as previously mentioned by Rogers (1985).
This goes against theorists like Johnson who suggest that short-term leases
subject to periodic review evoke better responses from tenants in their choice
of inputs (Taslim, 1992; Banerji and Rashid, 1996). A second, and equally
important problem, is the lack of provision in leases for allocating and sharing
costs of various conservation practices (Hinman et al., 1983).
Thomassin and Baker (1989) discuss long-term leases, of 25 years or more,
as the answer to low investment in conservation by lessees due to a long-run
view being held by these lessees. However, in the Chinese example described
previously by Hu (1997), the people gaining the right to farm the collective’s
land without ownership (regarded as a kind of tenant farming system) has
resulted in the farmer acting as a miner to reap short term rewards at the
expense of maintenance and sustainability. This is despite having tenure for a
15-year term.
In Australia over 60% of the continent is classified and used as ‘farmland’,
which means that farming has a significant impact on Australia’s environment
(Malafant et al., 1999). It has been found in Queensland and the Northern
13
14 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Territory that leaseholds are not conducive to promoting maintenance and
improvement (Campbell, 1980) despite the additions of covenants to leases
with the purpose of preventing land degradation (Young, 1985), although
the Landcare movement might have ameliorated some of these problems.
Apart from these examples there has been little research on tenure related
environmental issues in Australia. Sustainability of any alternative land tenure
arrangements is a principal concern of all parties involved due to Australia’s
environmentally conscious political landscape.
2.5. The decision making processes
of the landowners and lessees/tenants
The decision-making processes of the landowners and lessees/tenants must
also be taken into account when discussing the question of land tenure.
Agricultural policy in Great Britain has been formulated to protect the interests
and preserve the autonomy of the farmer (tenant) to make production and
land use decisions (Wilson, 1992). This combined with large subsidies has
led to over production and public criticism of the environmental damage
caused by intensive farming methods (Cox et al, 1988 cited by Wilson, 1992).
For example the European Community (EC) headage payments (subsidies
on a per animal basis) have lead to an increase in stocking rates and the
resulting over-stocking is said to have caused damage to moorlands (Wilson,
1992). Alternatively, this might be used as an excuse for landlords to lower
stocking rates to allow more grouse habitat and therefore gain more income
from grouse shooting. However, recent changes in Britain, including set aside
programs and countryside schemes, might have lessened the impact of some of
these tenure related problems.
MacGregor (1988) cited by Wilson (1992), indicated that some landlords exert
a “negative influence over the region’s development” by the under-use of their
lands. Therefore domination of the landowning elite can have huge influence
on a region’s growth.
The Australian literature focuses on how farmers at times baffle economists
with their inefficient behavior. Some farmers keep racehorses or stud animals
they cannot justify economically because they admire fine animals (Campbell
and Fisher, 1982). Others have large machinery without the scale required
to utilise them efficiently in order to minimise physical exertion (Campbell
and Fisher, 1982). Farmers in general also accept less return on capital and
labour than other sectors because they feel an obligation of offering the
following generation the option of a rural life (Gray, 1991) or because they
derive satisfaction from being a primary producer (Campbell and Fisher, 1982,
Wright, 1997). Therefore as a social group landowners and primary producers
are not always driven by financial reward. Gray (1991) found in a survey
of 16 couples from a mixed farming area in western New South Wales, that
the attributes of farming which were the most valued were ‘being your own
boss’, ‘being part of a rural community’ and ‘working with and understanding
nature’. The survey also illustrated that ‘financial returns’ and ‘having an
opportunity to set up children in a business’ drew the most ‘not important’
responses. Wright and Kaine (1997) state that farmers attach considerable
value to “the farming way of life” and worry much less about returns on
investment. Winter and Short (1988) emphasise the importance of kinship and
Literature review •
neighbourly relationships in family farming.
Research needs to be conducted to see if the same issues are relevant in the
area of alternative land tenure.
2.6. How agreements
are organised or arranged
Scotland has legislated succession rights for tenants, which continue
indefinitely if a viable successor can be found. This can even be bequeathed
to a near relative (Stockdale et al., 1996). England and Wales also have similar
legislation except that the rights of succession finish after two generations
(Stockdale et al., 1996). This was introduced because the view of the legislators
of the time was that the best person to farm the land was the deceased persons’
son (Gibbard, 1995). Therefore the tenant would name a successor. This gives
the tenant the sole right of choosing who farms the property that someone else
owns. The concept of legislating a successor implies that one can inherit the
ability to farm and in so doing, in many ways, defeats the purpose of matching
human and physical resources, which as discussed could be the up side of
alternative land tenure.
In Australia, perpetual leases of pastoral land have been granted by the
government in some states. These leases give the lessee and the lessee’s
successors the right to use the leased land in perpetuity. However, there are
26 forms of lease available on pastoral land in Australia (Young, 1985). Other
forms of leases include term leases where the lessee has the right to use an
area of land for 30-50 years (Young, 1985). Initially leases were granted to
squatters who fanned out over the country seeking the choicest land (Condon,
1978). After World Wars I and II soldier settlements were established partly
by withdrawing land from lease agreements, with compensation for the lessee,
and then redistributing the land to the soldiers (Condon, 1978). Apart from
this scant record the Australian method of tenant selection is not mentioned
in the literature. The method of tenant selection used by private landowners is
also not discussed.
The examination of how land tenure arrangements evolve is discussed in the
literature. Agrawal (1999) and Emigh (1997) demonstrated a continuum
between a wage earner and a fixed rent farmer, with sharefarming in-between.
This continuum is a result of the level of efficiency of each party. If the
landowner is much more efficient than the worker then a wage will be offered.
If the relative efficiencies of both parties are approximately the same then
a sharefarming or profit share arrangement is the best option. Finally if the
relative efficiency of the worker is much higher than the landowner, a fixed
rent is the preferred option.
Taslim (1992) suggested that the quality of a landowner’s property could
determine the agreement used. Fixed renting is the best option for low quality
land that is not susceptible to environmental degradation; employing wage
earners is the preferable method for the cultivation of sensitive land; while
land of intermediate quality might result in sharecropping agreements being
used.
15
16 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
The continuum and land quality theories are generalised and it would be useful
to determine if they can be related descriptively or quantitatively to Australian
land tenure agreements.
The literature describes a variety of reasons for a landowner leasing land.
For instance, the agreed rent might be more than the landowner is currently
earning, the farm might be retained instead of sold due to potential for
capital gain, the lessor might want a break from farming without having to
sell the farm, or the lessor might want to retain ownership of a property
until a successor is found or old enough to assume management (Herbert,
1981). There remains a large gap in the research because there are no
studies that deal specifically with the practicalities of alternative land tenure
arrangements. Therefore, the reasons for landowners adopting or ceasing
tenure arrangements remain largely unknown.
It is known that there is a widespread reliance on verbal rather than written
agreements (Campbell, 1980). Kinship and neighbourly relationships in family
farming mean that formal, contractual relationships are modified or replaced
by informal ones (Winter and Short, 1988). Geisler and Salamon (1993) also
state that tenure agreements vary in their formality and duration. Although it
is recommended for a long-lasting and profitable relationship for both parties,
there is a need to get an agreement “right” and the agreement should not be
“roughed up on the back of an envelope” (Hansen, 1996). If the relationship
sours a legally binding document will help conflict resolution, although parties
that have taken the time to formalise an agreement have fewer problems
(Doye, 1990; Young, 1992; Hansen, 1996).
Some industry bodies in other countries have guidelines in place for entering
into tenure agreements. For example in New Zealand various types of
farming agreements are formalised. They have “29%” and “39%” sharemilking
agreements governed by the “Sharemilkers Act” as well as “50/50”
sharemilking and sharefarming agreements, leasing and farming partnerships
(Newman, 1982). With these agreements the level of inputs and assets
determines the percentage split between the landowner and the “sharemilker”.
This publication also stated that sharefarming agreements for annual crops are
usually organised around the landowner providing the land and seed, while
the sharefarmer provides the machinery, fuel and labour. The other costs such
as irrigation and fertiliser are shared equally. The profit is then divided on a
50/50 basis.
In Australia there has been similar development of guidelines in the dairy
industry. These guidelines come in the form of the National Share Dairy
Farming Guidebook (ADFF, 1997). The guidebook has chapters on issues as
wide as opportunities provided by the agreements, pre-agreement decisions,
agreement types and conflict resolution strategies. This set of guidelines spells
out methods of establishing and organising agreements in the dairy industry.
Young (1992) and Tomes and Bartholomew (1985) specify a number of
checkpoints that require a mutual understanding between parties before
entering a sharefarming or leasing agreement. A number of fact sheets and
circulars from various Australian State based agricultural departments have
focused on providing information for the establishment of sharefarming
agreements (Bensen, 1983; Australia, 1995; Warren, 1996). Inglis (1984)
Literature review •
goes through a similar process for sharefarming sheep specifically. Farm
management publications also tend to have at least a discussion of land tenure
(for example Boehlje and Eidman, 1984; Obst, 1986). Hansen (1996) briefly
describes issues that need discussion before entering into a sharefarming
agreement and suggests that calculating the returns to each party is a good
method of determining whether or not the exercise will be profitable.
Lessees can help themselves gain leases by being prepared. Parcel (2000)
recommends that lessees should promote themselves by producing and
circulating a resume in much the same form as any other employment situation
where a good impression of suitability and qualifications is required. Key
characteristics the resume should include are a statement of; experience,
management objectives, equipment owned, background, environmental views,
risk management strategies, insurance cover, references and a photograph.
There are few references on how to find a lessee or lessor. One paper
detailing US research by Doye (1990) indicated that two-thirds of lessees first
heard that land was up for lease from the landowner directly. Relatives and
neighbours were also significant sources of information and less than 10%
of lessees learned about land up for lease from newspapers or other sources.
Literature circulated by Australian agricultural departments (Young, 1992;
Tomes, 1999) mention that for lessors, potential tenants include; existing
farmers with surplus machinery; labour or management capacity who desire to
put these to use; people who want to achieve efficiencies of scale at low cost;
adult offspring who want more responsibility and proprietorship in the family
business; and farmers without enough capital to purchase land. Young (1992)
and Tomes (1999) also mention that potential lessors include; investors buying
land for capital gain and a yearly income; or farmers desiring a break from
farming for health reasons or to go on a holiday. Presumably if one of these
people can be found, either a potential lessor or lessee, then an agreement
might be reached.
2.7. How well the arrangements
are working for both the landowner
and the other party
In Scotland the issue of the suitability of arrangements has been addressed by
Stockdale et al. (1996). Their report indicates that legislative changes securing
the tenants’ right of succession have resulted in landowners being reluctant to
lease land. The rights of the tenants are so strong that landowners are entering
into agreements similar to limited partnership tenancies. The landowner invests
capital in the farming enterprise therefore becoming a ‘partner’ rather than
a landlord, to circumvent the Agricultural Holdings Legislation in Scotland,
even if the capital investment is £100 or less as in 61.5% of cases. Therefore
the legislation aimed at protecting the tenants is restricting their entry into new
and relinquished tenancies. Gibbard (1995) predicts that the concept of the
tenant farmer in England is “doomed to continue to decline”. This is a sure
indication of major problems and that the tenancy agreements are unsuitable
to most landlords in that country. Land prices also indicate the problem.
Gibbard (1995) states that vacant possession land has at times sold for twice as
much as tenanted land. Winter et al. (1990) found that the many permutations
17
18 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
of tenurial arrangements found in England and Wales had introduced
flexibility into land occupancy rates. However, tenancies had been restricted to
the existing social and economic structures of farming, rather than a means for
new entrants to gain access or a radical restructuring of the industry.
In the US, (Fee, 1999) claimed that rents are rarely fair. In fact Fee (1999)
stated that most rental agreements become obsolete from the moment they
are signed because of a constantly changing rental market. This means that
leases should be renegotiated each year to prevent conflicts and disparity
in the landlord/tenant split of income. This problem is compounded by
changes in technology and farming techniques moving faster than changes in
rental agreements (Reichenberger, 1999) as agreements only change under
considerable economic pressure (Schoney and Pederson, 1989).
The results of a survey conducted by John Scott, Professor of Farm
Management and Land Economics at the University of Illinois in the US,
found that 70% of the 630 respondents viewed their cropshare leases as
“unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” and only 3% viewed their leases as
“favorable” or “very favorable” (Fee, 1989). However, because this was the first
survey of its kind the author was not sure whether respondents were more or
less satisfied than in the past (Fee, 1989).
Kinship ties linking participants in sharefarming agreements have been found
to create an environment conducive to cooperation, eliminating the need for a
threat of eviction to motivate sharefarmers to maximise production and effort
(Sadoulet et al., 1997). In this fashion kinship ties eliminate the theoretical
problem of the sharefarmer not putting in extra effort because the landowner
also shares in the rewards without any extra effort. Kinship has also been used
in the past as a strategy for landowning immigrant families to help relatives
move from being tenants to landowners (Yoder, 1997).
In Australia, Campbell (1980) suggests that leasing land from private
individuals is rare and a definite disability from the “standpoint of facilitating
structural change over time”. Therefore structural change and perhaps
diversification could be encouraged if more landowners became lessors.
2.8. Moral hazard
and land tenure arrangements
Agrawal (1999) asserts that there is a double-edged moral hazard for the
people involved in tenure arrangements. The theory states that if one party
shirks a responsibility, either a formal or an informal responsibility, a loss of
reputation results. This is accentuated if the people involved have a close
relationship, for example neighbours, family or friends. The double edge is
the fact that two parties are involved, while the moral hazard is the chance that
a reputation could be permanently damaged.
Moral hazard is discussed in examples of sharefarming like the rabassa morta as
a key component to the agreement’s success (Carmona and Simpson, 1999).
Rogers (1985) suggests that security of tenure for lessees may depend on the
moral obligations of kin or community ties.
Literature review •
2.9. The Australian tenancy situation
The development of the land tenure system in Australia has been an
evolutionary process with each state or territory taking a slightly different
direction, although these systems were based on those brought to Australia
from Great Britain (Condon, 1978). Older settled areas in Australia like
Tasmania, New South Wales and Victoria tend to have large areas of privately
owned land (Campbell, 1980). Statistics produced by the Australian Bureau of
Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) demonstrate land is generally
managed by a family unit. Family farms are the dominant structural unit
in Australian agriculture, with 99.6% of properties family owned and 0.4%
corporately owned (Garnaut and Lim-Applegate, 1998). Family partnerships
are the operational structure on 82% of all farm businesses. However, ABARE
has no other tenure statistics currently available.
A 1997 study of potato growers in Tasmania showed that, of 147 valid returns
(25% of the total potato growing population), 72.8% of crops were grown
on the land owned by the operator, while 2.7% were sharecropped, 23.1%
were grown on leased or rented land and 1.4% of crops were managed on
the landowners’ behalf (Fulton, 2000). Therefore leasing in this industry is
the biggest alternative form of land tenure; however, the owner/operator still
dominates production. A census of land use practices in the Swan Hill district
in Victoria showed that 2.2% of farms in the district were leased to others,
which equated to 5.2% of the district’s land (Cutri, 1995).
While there are some similarities between the British and Australia situation,
agriculture in Australia is traditionally conducted by an owner/operator
(Fulton, 2000; Garnaut, 1998). That is, agricultural production is conducted
by the individual or family that owns and occupies the land. However, some
producers do utilise other peoples’ land. This can be seen as a de facto tenantlandlord arrangement. Therefore some of the findings in the British literature
are relevant to certain Australian situations.
The pattern of farm tenure in the dairy industry in Victoria was researched by
Eager and Sturgess (1970). The study showed that 85% of licensed dairy farms
in Victoria were owner operated, 11% were operated by a sharefarmer and that
cash renting was insignificant. The study also found that areas of higher income
had a higher incidence of sharefarming. Eager and Sturgess (1970) stated that
“clearly more research is needed before any definite conclusions can be made
about the reasons for the distribution of sharefarmers”. It appears that no
more research was conducted because their study and two national studies on
Australian national land tenure (urban and rural) in the 1940’s, are the only
examples of specific tenure frequency research in this country that could be
located by the author of this literature review.
19
20 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
2.10. Tenure systems in modern agriculture
British agricultural researchers have published numerous papers on the
question of tenancy and agriculture over a number of years (Wilson,
1992; Marsden et al., 1993; Gibbard, 1994; Gibbard, 1995; Stockdale et al.,
1996; Gibbard et al., 1999). Research into establishing the nature of tenure
arrangements used by a farming community and the implications for farm
management, was completed in England and Wales by Winter et al. (1990).
The results indicate that tenurial arrangements are complicated with many
permutations and agreements viewed as “unconventional”. Comparatively few
farmers could be classified simply as owners or tenants. It was also found that
17% of agreements were informal in nature.
In the USA the Department of Agriculture classifies land tenure into 3 forms,
full owners (owns all the land in the operation), part owners (owns land and
also rents/leases or sharefarms land) and tenants (leases all the land in the
operation) (Rogers, 1985). The Department’s monitoring has indicated over
time (1948-1978) an increase in the number of part owners, a decrease in full
owners and a relatively stable number of tenants.
In Australia, as previously noted, the most dominant form of tenure is the
owner/operator, although no studies to the extent of Winter et al. (1990)
have been conducted. However, farm management texts like Obst (1986)
and government literature Young (1992) and Tomes (1999), highlight other
options despite the absence of research into their frequency.
Boehlje and Eidman (1984) state that a lease must “combine the resources of
land, labour, capital and management contributed by both the landlord and
the tenant in an efficient manner. Furthermore the lease must provide for an
equitable share of income between landlord and tenant.” They then describe
three forms of lease; a cash lease where a specified sum is paid to the landlord
for the use of land for a specified period; a crop share lease where the tenant
and landlord share in both the incomes and expenses of producing various
crops; and flexible cash lease where a fixed percentage of production or yield
is used as a payment to the landlord.
Obst (1986) in the text Practical Farm Business Management and Pestana (1993)
in the text Australian Farm Business Management, discuss various sharefarming
arrangements along similar lines to the previously discussed New Zealand
models, where the sharefarmer’s share is determined by the level of inputs of
both the sharefarmer and the landowner. These include 50/50, 60/40 and
67/33 agreements where the 50/50 agreement has the most input of resources
from the sharefarmer, while the 67/33 agreement has the sharefarmer as
almost a paid labourer only, with very little capital input. These agreements
result in the sharefarmer receiving 50%, 40% and 33% of the agreed profits
respectively.
Literature review •
2.11. Summary of Australian research
The settlement of Australia and the granting of leases and redistribution of
land have been well documented in Australia literature since colonisation
began in 1788.
Modern Australian tenure research has mainly focused on the theoretical
economic benefits of alternative forms of land tenure. There has also
been research in parallel to this issue on why farmers are not ‘economic
men’ (Campbell and Fisher, 1982; Perkins, 1997). ABARE have produced
descriptive information on the structure of the management of farms in
Australia (Garnaut and Lim-Applegate, 1998), while the ADFF has produced a
guidebook on share dairy farming (ADFF, 1997).
The proportion of primary producers and landowners allocating resources
to alternative land tenure arrangements is mentioned in isolated studies.
Eager and Sturgess (1970) have described the tenure situation in Victorian
dairy farms and Cutri (1995) discussed the proportions of land leased for
horticultural operations in the Swan Hill district of Victoria. Limited tenure
research in Tasmania was conducted by Fulton (2000), who determined the
frequency of leasing and sharefarming in the Tasmanian potato industry.
Other issues documented are; that farm ownership is limiting structural change;
environmental issues and concerns; and the reliance on verbal rather than
formal agreements (Campbell, 1980). Australian literature includes guides
that discuss the practicalities of different alternative tenure arrangements, the
reasons for adopting alternatives and some of the hazards involved (Young,
1992; Tomes, 1999).
2.12. Further research required
Research is needed in the area of lifestyle issues and the Australian farmer.
This direction of research would determine if non-economic issues such as
lifestyle choices of the farming community, privacy, custodianship of land
and social pressures, were hindering the expansion of alternative land tenure
agreements.
Although Australian government literature describes the characteristics of
potential lessees and lessors, there is currently no research into the process
of selecting either a landlord or a tenant. This area needs to be researched
because it is currently unknown how arrangements are formed, and if
alternative land tenure arrangements are to be encouraged this information is
vital.
Specific alternative land tenure options available to Australian landowner have
not been discussed or researched. There is also little national research on the
frequency of land tenure arrangements in Australia. Where research has been
conducted, there are only isolated data that come from studies that are in two
out of the three cases directed at other issues apart from the tenure status of
the industries studied. A nation-wide study of the tenure status of Australian
farming systems would better equip researchers with information on whether
or not alternative land tenure needs encouraging.
21
Land Tenure
Land
Tenure
and
Land Managementand
Alternatives
Land Management
Alternatives
Three:Three:
Methodology
Methodology
24 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
3.1. Preliminary interviews
The aim of the preliminary interviews was to gain insights into a topic that
lacked Australian research. This was viewed as the best method on which to
base further more detailed research. Research questions for these interviews
were outlined after a preliminary review of Australian and international
literature and after an assessment of gaps in information were made.
These research questions were:
1. What are some of the alternative land tenure agreements in place in
Tasmania?
2. Does the separation of land ownership and land management have any
benefits?
3. Does the separation of land ownership and land management have any
disadvantages?
4. Are there any social or environmental impacts of this separation in the
farming community?
5. How are the agreements arranged?
6. How well are the arrangements working for both the owner and the other
party?
7. Do these alternative land tenure arrangements encourage enterprise
diversification?
8. Does moral hazard restrict land tenure arrangements?
9. How do the opinions of those involved relate to their circumstances?
Three types of land tenure relations were researched after general discussion
pointed to three main types being in operation in Tasmania. These were
leases; sharecropping and sharefarming; and joint ventures.
A lease is an agreement whereby a landowner (the lessor) allows another (the
lessee) to utilise the land asset for a fixed period and for a fixed sum. These
agreements can be both formal and informal and be for a short period or for
an extended period.
Sharefarming and Sharecropping are arrangements between an individual and a
landowner where the duties and profit are shared along agreed lines. Typically
one owns the land and the other manages the farm or crop. The returns are
then shared as a percentage of the farms’/crops’ profit.
Joint ventures are a formal, legal agreement entered into by an individual
with another party/ies, where the costs, profits and expertise of agricultural
production are shared for the cultivation of a crop.
It was decided that to best answer the research questions people involved
should be interviewed. This was based on evidence that face to face interviews
generally have higher response rates and fewer “don’t knows” and “no answers”
([Babbie, 1995 #51]). The research questions were also open-ended because
there was no other study upon which to base more focused questioning.
Furthermore, face to face interviews were chosen to help foster discussion and
allow more in depth answers, while giving the interviewer insights into what
the important issues were for the respondent.
Methodology •
To complete face to face interviews, two interview schedules were developed.
The first was designed for use with primary producers and the second was
designed for the interview of key informants in consulting and industry. Two
schedules were required because the primary producer was asked about land
tenure issues relating to them personally, while key informants were asked to
describe their involvement and their opinions of the results of land tenure
arrangements entered into by their clients or associates.
The interview schedule was comprised of two parts. The first section
was structured and based on determining the background of the person
interviewed. The questions determined the respondents age, marital status,
family background, education, business structure, their aspirations for
themselves and their children, their main agricultural activities and how their
opinions of weather of the last 12 months compared to their opinions of their
levels of out-put. Demographics were required to allow a comparison of the
different individual circumstances and their responses to the open-ended
questions. A modified interview schedule was developed for the interviews
with industry, research and consulting professionals (key informants). The
demographic questions aimed at finding the key informant’s level of education
and experience, while the second part of the schedule asked them to discuss
each agreement form separately, followed by three questions relating to the
land tenure issue as a whole.
The questions asked in the second part of the interview schedule related
specifically to the desired research questions, which aimed to explore different
arrangements in place and the negatives and positives of alternate land tenure
in general in Tasmania. These topical questions were semi-structured. This
form was chosen after reading the literature and finding that well structured
questions could not be as effectively applied as semi structured questions.
This was due to the differing circumstances of each individual making specific
questions irrelevant to different target areas of interest. Understanding the
scope of the issues was also important. So where possible the restriction of
some questions to very structured formats would have the undesirable effect of
stifling discussion.
To determine how appropriate the interview schedules were, pre-testing was
carried out once for each. After restructuring some questions and gaining
approval from researchers, the interviews commenced. After some initial
interviews the structure of the primary producer schedules’ demographics
section was altered by the removal of questions aimed at determining the
financial situation of the individual. This was due to the confusion and
discomfort that the questions caused. The removal of these questions aided
the smooth running of the interviews that followed. Copies of both interview
schedules are available in Appendix 1 for the Primary Producers/Landowners
and Appendix 2 for Key Informants.
Names of people to interview were obtained initially by informally asking
key informants for contact details of people involved in different land tenure
arrangements in the State. Confidentiality was assured. Other names were
obtained by asking interviewees if they knew of any one who would have
relevant information for the report.
The person to be interviewed was contacted by telephone in advance of the
25
26 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
meeting and a time arranged. The timeframe in which the interviews were to
be conducted eliminated some possible candidates.
An information sheet (Appendix 3) was mailed or faxed beforehand if at all
possible. If time did not allow this, the interviewee was presented with a copy
and given time to read it before the interview commenced. A consent form
(Appendix 4) was also supplied and signed before the interview took place.
Interviewees were asked to discuss their opinions on the various aspects of the
alternative land tenure agreements in which they are involved. Notes were
taken during the interviews and when permission was granted the interview
was taped. The tape was used to add to and validate the notes that were taken.
The notes were then transferred to a computer document. All opinions were
reported even those later deemed irrelevant. When the interview schedule was
completed a discussion often ensued. This both added to the answers already
recorded and cleared up any misunderstandings.
The resulting data was analysed by reading all the interviews and determining
what factors were commonly discussed and what were the major issues that
arose.
The relationships that the person was involved in could be compromised by
the revealing of the source of some information. Therefore confidentially
was a major ethical implication and this was guaranteed by the interviewee
remaining unnamed and all information that could allow the identification of
the respondent being withheld.
3.2. Case Study Methodology
Once the information from the preliminary research had been processed and
analysed and the final literature review was completed, a steering committee
was formed. This steering committee was made up of representatives from a
diverse range of businesses, occupations and individuals in the agricultural
sector. These included primary producers, financiers, consultants, accountants,
Landcare and both government and industry representatives.
The steering committee was presented with the research and asked to set a
direction for the project. The committee decided that case studies of different
types of land tenure should be conducted. This would involve interviews with
participants in a range of land tenure arrangements: share-farming, leasing,
joint ventures, corporate farming, contract farming and others.
The primary direction of these case studies would be to focus agreement
selection, impediments to adoption and strategies to address negative elements.
Using these directions as a framework a semi-structured interview schedule
(Appendix 5) was developed based on the schedule used in the preliminary
interviews. The participants were selectively targeted using information from
steering committee members and researchers at the university.
The people to be interviewed were first contacted by telephone and then sent
an information sheet (Appendix 6) and an introductory letter (Appendix 7). If
the participants were willing a time was arranged to meet.
Methodology •
The participants were asked to sign a consent form (Appendix 8) and then
asked questions as per the interview schedule. The interviews were also taped.
The interviews were then transcribed and mailed to the participants for
approval. After which any alterations were made and the case studies were
summarised into their final form. Some of the case studies were also developed
by reformatting the information contained in the preliminary interviews.
3.3. Survey Methodology
The preliminary interviews, the literature review and the case studies revealed
several issues relating to the use of alternative land tenure. However, the
information gleaned from the series of interviews could contain possible bias
due the small number of interviews conducted and the lack of randomisation
in the selection process. To add value to these results a survey was constructed.
A quantitative survey would also be useful for the purpose of benchmarking
both the current level of adoption of alternative land tenure and current
attitudes to alternate land tenure. A survey would develop baseline data in
order to determine changes in adoption and attitudes in the future. Without
relevant information from the present we would have difficulty proving that
attitudes and/or levels of adoption have changed at some other point in time.
3.3.1. Selection of survey recipients
The survey was conducted by assembling a list of landowners in Tasmania
and randomly selecting 1500. The provider of this information was the Land
Information System Tasmania (LIST). The information available from this
agency was land size, zoning, enterprise and postal address of the owner of
each registered parcel of primary industry land in Tasmania. This allowed a
random selection to be made so that each landowner has an equal chance of
being selected.
LIST was chosen as the source of addresses because it had a number of
advantages over other sources of the information namely the Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS), the Tasmanian Department of Primary Industry, Water and
Environment (DPIWE) and the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association
(TFGA).
The ABS is the ideal source of lists of people associated with various industries.
However, before undertaking any work, there would be two issues to be
resolved, namely approval by the ABS with respect to policy and legislation
and approval with respect to the collection methodology.
Any proposal must be approved by the Australian Statistician. This requires
a letter of recommendation to go from the Agriculture Program director in
Canberra to the Australian Statistician accompanied by a detailed assessment of
the proposal, full costings of the work to be undertaken and copies of the form
and letter to be dispatched.
The detailed assessment needs to include the project rationale, a statement on
implications for the ABS, an assessment of the request in terms of ABS policy
and legislation and an assessment of collection methodology.
27
28 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
With collection methodology, the ABS has to be satisfied with a number of
factors including the sample design, the provider load, and the processing
methodology on receipt.
For the ABS to design a sample on another party’s behalf it needs to have an
indication of the key variables of interest and the level of accuracy required.
For example, for the Agriculture Commodity Survey, the sample is designed to
produce estimates of designated principal commodities with Relative Standard
Errors of 2% at the national level. A statement of required quality like this
then determines how complex the stratification required is and how large the
sample needs to be.
In terms of provider load, that is the burden we place upon those filling in the
forms, the collection would have to be approved by a government department
called the Statistical Clearing House (SCH) and be issued with an SCH number
which has to be printed on the form. The SCH needs to satisfy itself that there
are no other sources of information and that the collection process will deliver
the information sought (Raine, 2001).
Another factor is cost. A mailout survey using the resources of the ABS
would cost a minimum of $20 000 and take approximately four months to
complete if all the requirements are met. This timeframe has the potential to
be significantly increased due to a survey blackout this year from June until
August for people to complete the national census. This means that the ABS
will not send out any surveys in this period in order to increase the rate of
census completion (Raine, 2001).
These factors meant that the ABS could not be used and an alternative was
required.
Both the TFGA and DPIWE have lists of farmers and landowners on various
databases. However, these databases were said to be incomplete, old and
unreliable.
LIST on the other hand has a comprehensive and up to date database, which
means that a valid random selection can be made.
3.3.2. Selection of survey method
It was decided to use a mail out survey instead of face to face interviews or a
telephone survey because: • the survey can be conducted and analysed by one person;
• the researcher has greater control over the survey than when
interviewing;
• each respondent is provided with the same instructions and tasks;
• interviewers do not have be trained;
• the money spent in a postal survey yields a much higher sample size;
and
• widely dispersed respondents can be reached inexpensively.
(Alreck and Settle, 1985).
However, the mail out survey requires a better design to stimulate higher
Methodology •
returns than telephone surveys and face to face interviews (Alreck and Settle,
1985).
Although the landowners to be selected were not necessarily involved in
primary production, the survey gathered attitudes and current practices of
those that control the key component of farm businesses and land tenure
agreements, the land asset (Schoney and Pederson, 1989; Doye, 1990).
The questions to be asked were based on new research questions derived
from the review of Australian and international literature, including previous
agricultural surveys, the case studies previously conducted interviews and the
original research questions for the preliminary interviews.
3.3.3. Research questions
for the survey with justification
In order to design appropriate survey research questions, one thing must
be kept in mind, “What do we really want to know?” The initial research
questions from the preliminary interviews were refined by keeping this goal
and the review of literature in mind.
The alternative land tenure arrangements discussed were: • Leasing
• Sharefarming/sharecropping
• Joint ventures
These are the structures that have been discussed in interviews and case
studies. Other structures are discussed in the literature for example franchising
(Lemmon, 1986), however these are theoretical possibilities and have not been
found to be in use in agricultural industries.
The research questions were:
1. How many landowners currently use alternative land tenure agreements?
Currently Australian literature lacks quantitative information on the number
of people in agriculture that utilise alternative land tenure agreements. Where
research has been conducted, there are only isolated data that come from
studies that are in two out of the three cases directed at other issues apart
from the tenure status of the industries studied. A quantitative study of the
tenure status of Australian farming systems will better equip researchers with
information on the underlying frequency of these agreements. This will also
allow researchers in the future to gauge long-term changes in the tenure status
of Australian farms.
2. How many landowners have used alternative land tenure agreements in the past?
Determining the previous frequency of alternative land tenure agreements will
allow researchers to gauge the level of acceptability of these agreements and
why these agreements are, or are not,
being used at the present time.
3. How many landowners would like to enter into alternative land tenure agreements?
Determining how many landowners are willing to enter into alternative land
29
30 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
tenure agreements (including searching for equity partners or investors) can
help researchers determine the level of future adoption and the level of overall
acceptance of alternative tenure strategies.
4. What issues concern landowners about alternative land tenure agreements?
The following issues, concerns and questions were raised by the case studies
and preliminary interviews.
• Alternative land tenure could result in depreciation of the land asset
(“mining” by lessees).
• Landowners might not get paid.
• Landowners might not get paid what the land is worth.
• Agreements could result in a reduced margin compared to owner/
operator farming.
• The landowners must make a commitment for “x” number of years.
• Personal conflicts might develop if a landowner has an alternative land
tenure agreement
• Alternative land tenure agreements could result in less privacy for the
landowner.
• Landowners want to farm themselves.
• Landowners do not think that, “other people will make money out of
your land.”
• Integrity of lessees might be questionable.
• Good management is subjective and therefore disagreements could
eventuate.
• Capital improvements not fairly rewarded in an agreement (more of a
problem for lessees).
• There is a lack of information about alternative land tenure?
• A lack of good employees makes an expanded operation difficult to
run.
• What is the legal status if things go wrong?
• An alternative land tenure agreement might result in “hassles”.
Interviews with lessees, lessors, key informants; case studies; and the literature
review revealed that there are some potential and perceived disadvantages
of alternative land tenure strategies. However this information was largely
qualitative in nature and possibly biased, due to a small sample size and a
non-randomised sampling procedure. Therefore, before valuable conclusions
can be drawn a valid statistically significant sample must be taken in order to
determine if the issues raised by the previous work are applicable to the wider
agricultural community.
5. Do landowners agree that there are benefits to the use of alternative land tenure agreements?
The same issues that were discussed in the justification of the previous
question also apply to this question. The same sources of information are also
drawn on. However, these questions draw more heavily on reviewed literature
than the previous question.
• Less work/more manageable workload?
• Secure income?
• Better returns on investment?
• Freedom to pursue other interests?
• Economies of scale?
• Better use of capital (eliminating the cost of ownership)?
• Gaining knowledge/experience/contracts?
Methodology •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Try a new enterprise with less risk?
Spreading of risk by using multiple sites?
Alternative to the pension or ability to retire and maintain an
interest in farming?
Ability to spell land/utilise fresh ground?
Better matching of resources (land, human and financial)
Create opportunities for agricultural development / investment /
employment?
Allow new/young entrants into agriculture?
6. What is the level of formality and duration of alternative land tenure agreements used?
Previous research indicates that the lack of formality when undertaking
alternative land tenure agreements can lead to unnecessary conflict.
Widespread use of informal agreements also implies that there is a high level
of trust between individual operators.
Combining results from questions 1-5 and ascertaining the level of formality
used by those to be surveyed will allow researchers to determine areas of
agreements that can be improved.
Knowledge of the duration of agreements is essential information because
Australian and international literature indicates that short-term agreements
have more environmental problems associated (Dillman and Carlson, 1982;
Erwin, 1982; Lee, 1983; Hinman et al., 1983; Buttel et al., 1990; Constance et
al., 1996; Hu, 1997; Rasmussen, 1999). Therefore, if short-term agreements
are the norm, then strategies will need to be put in place to ensure that
environment is not abused.
7. How well do landowners have to know the lessees?
This question combined with the previous question can aid researchers in
determining if trust is a major issue in establishing alternative land tenure
agreements. This particular question will also allow researchers to determine
the ability of parties from other areas, industry et cetera, to enter into these
agreements with incumbent landowners.
8. Do lifestyle issues have any bearing on adoption of alternative land tenure agreements?
As a social group landowners and primary producers are not always driven
by financial reward (Campbell and Fisher, 1982). Gray (1991) illustrates in
a survey of 16 couples from a mixed farming area in western New South
Wales, that the attributes of farming which were the most valued were ‘being
your own boss’, ‘being part of a rural community’ and ‘working with and
understanding nature’. While ‘financial return’ and opportunity to set up
children in a business’ drew the most ‘not important’ responses.
9. What are the characteristics of landowners that have used or are using alternative land tenure
agreements?
Cross tabulation of the characteristics of those who utilise alternative land
tenure agreements will allow targeting of information, education and policy
decisions.
31
32 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
3.3.4. Selection of survey numbers
The information provided by LIST contained 14080 entries in the “Primary
Production” category from the 29 councils around Tasmania. Each entry had
a primary industry code that indicated the use of that land (Appendix 9).
These codes also included 59 aquaculture entries and a mutton bird rookery.
It was decided that these entries would not add value to the survey so they
were removed. Forestry was included along with all forms of agriculture and
horticulture.
The graphical distribution of land area from the LIST primary production
database (Appendix 10) was not normal as it contained a large right-hand tail,
due to small numbers of very large landholdings and large numbers of smaller
properties. This fact along with the lack of reasonable justification meant that
a stratification of the sample was not attempted and a completely random
selection was chosen. Before a random sample was attempted the doubles
contained in the database had to be removed to ensure that every individual
had an equal chance of being selected.
This function was carried out using the SQL Distinct function of Microsoft
Access. This left 10237 entries.
Once the database of possible respondents and a draft of the research
questions were made, an estimate of the number of surveys required was
needed. The number chosen was based on answering the first two research
questions:
• How many landowners are currently using alternative land tenure
agreements?
• How many landowners have used alternative land tenure agreements?
In order to do this a number of assumptions had to be made.
1. The underlying percentage of landowners that use alternative land tenure
agreements is 10% (0.1), which is approximately half the incidence found
by (Fulton, 2000).
2. The response rate will be approximately 30% as per (Weatherley, 2000).
Therefore: -
Figure 1: Survey number calculations for 100 surveys returned
Assuming the incidence p = 0.1
Then by trial and error let the number of surveys, n=100
SE = p(1-p)/n
SE =  0.1*0.9/100
SE = 0.03
Therefore for 95% confidence intervals for
p (95%) = p ± 2*(SE)
p (95%) = p ± 2* (0.03)
Methodology •
This means that if 100 returns were collected and the incidence was 10% as
assumed you would be 95% sure that the true incidence in the population lies
between 4 and 16%.
The same process was repeated for other different numbers of surveys (n)
Figure 2: Survey number results for 400 returns
n = 400
SE = 0.015
p (95%) = 0.07, 0.13
Therefore if 400 surveys were returned you would be 95% confident that the
true incidence in the population lies between 7 and 13%.
Suppose that a confidence interval of 98% was required, how many returns
would be required?
Figure 3: Number of returns required for a 98% confidence interval.
Therefore
2 (SE) = 0.01
SE = 0.005
Which means
n = 3600
Clearly this in not practical as it would require 12000 surveys sent out,
assuming a 30% return. This is higher that the actual population. Therefore a
more modest calculation of a 95% confidence interval was calculated.
Figure 4: Calculation for a 95% confidence interval
Therefore
2 (SE) = 0.025
SE = 0.0125
Which means
n = 576
Assuming a 30% return rate this would mean 1920 surveys would have to be
sent out.
Another factor in the calculations was cost. More surveys mean more funding
is required. It was therefore decided that 1500 surveys should be sent. If
the results from sending out this number of surveys indicated that 10% of
respondents had alternative land tenure agreements, statistics would predict
that we could be 95% confident the true level was between 7.2 to 12.8%.
33
34 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Figure 5: Calculation for 1500 surveys
Assuming a 30% return
n = 1500 * 0.3
n = 450
SE = 0.01414
p(95%) = 0.072, 0.128
These calculations were based on assumptions. The data received would have
narrower confidence intervals if either a higher rate of return is achieved or
the underlying incidence of alternative land tenure agreements is higher.
3.3.5. Survey questions
With the research questions in place the next step was to design a survey that
would answer all these questions and at the same time be easy to complete.
Table 1: Summary of how research questions were addressed in the surveya
Research Question
Where research question was addressed
1. How many landowners currently use
alternative land tenure agreements?
Question 7
2. How many landowners have used alternative
land tenure agreements in the past?
Question 8
3. How many landowners would like to enter
into alternative land tenure agreements?
Question 9
4. What issues concern landowners about
alternative land tenure agreements?
Question 8e and series of questions in section 3
5. Do landowners agree that there are
benefits to the use of alternative land tenure
agreements?
Series of questions in section 3
6. What is the level of formality and duration
of alternative land tenure agreements?
Questions 7e, 7h, 8c and 8d.
7. How well do landowners have to know the
lessees?
Questions 7i, 8f and the ninth question in
question 11, section 3.
8. Do lifestyle issues have any bearing on the
adoption of alternative land tenure agreements?
Series of questions in Section 3
9. What are the characteristics of landowners
that have used or are using alternative land
tenure agreements?
Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14, and 15
As per Weatherley (2000)
a
Methodology •
3.3.6. Survey layout
In order to fit more information on less paper a landscape style with 2 columns
was chosen over the portrait style. However this could lead to confusion over
the transition from question to question. In order to overcome any difficulties
a number of strategies were put in place.
• A dividing line was drawn between the columns on each page.
• Clear progression instructions were given using text or arrows and boxes as
per (Fowler, 1995).
• The survey was divided up into 4 clear sections.
• The pages were clearly numbered using large bold print.
• A start and finish logo was added to give clear instruction on where the
survey started and finished.
A number of strategies were also used to ensure that the survey was completed
correctly.
• Detailed instructions were located on the actual survey.
• Before the questions started examples of how to mark the sheets were
given.
• Each question had clearly marked boxes.
• Italics were consistently used to give instructions throughout the survey.
• Definitions were given to limit confusion.
• Questions where opinions were asked (section 3) were definite stand-alone
statements.
3.3.7. Pre-testing the survey instrument
Once the basic structure of the survey was established and the format was
decided upon a pre-test was carried out in order to detect any problems or
faults in the survey design. This pre-testing was carried out in a number of
stages.
The first was the presentation of the survey to a class in the School of
Agricultural Science at the University of Tasmania. Each student was asked to
read an introductory letter and an information sheet. The students were then
supplied with a survey and asked to complete it as if they were a farmer or
their parents (if applicable). The principal guiding the pre-test, was to mimic a
landowner receiving a letter in the mail. Therefore no coaching was provided
and no questions were answered until the survey was completed. Students
were further asked to write on the survey their background in farming if any in
order to place a judgement on their knowledge of the questions asked. While
they were completing the survey a sheet with three comment codes was placed
on an overhead projector. These three codes were: A. Difficulty in reading the question as it is worded.
B. The question contains words or concepts that are not easily understood.
C. Difficulty in knowing or providing an answer for the question.
Students were asked to write an appropriate code, where applicable next
to a problem question. The students could also write comments next to the
questions if so desired.
Initially twelve pre-tests were carried out in this fashion. Problems and
recommendations were then evaluated and modifications to the survey were made.
35
36 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
This same process was then repeated with another group of 10 students and
modification to the survey made.
The next stage was a pigeon hole “mail-out” to staff and post graduate students
in the Agricultural Science Department of the University of Tasmania. These
staff and postgraduates were supplied with a survey, an information sheet
and the same comment codes provided to the student in the first two rounds
of pre-testing. A further seven pre-tests were completed. Once again slight
modifications were made.
The final phase of the pre-testing process was the pre-testing of landowners.
This was achieved by asking people at a “National Farm Walk” for the group
“Sustainable Grazing Systems” if they were landowners and if so would they
complete a survey after reading an introductory letter and information sheet.
The only refusals were from people who were not landowners. In all thirteen
landowners were pre-tested at the farm walk. Their comments were that the
survey was straightforward and easy to complete. Only very minor changes to
section 3 were required. At this point the pre-testing was concluded and the
final survey draft completed (Appendix 11).
Table 2: Summary of pre-testing methodology.
Pre-testing stage
Number involved in farming/
landowners
Number not involved in
farming
Initial student pre-test
7
5
Second student pre-test
8
2
Staff pre-test
4
3
Farm walk pre-test
13
Total
32
3.3.8.
10
Strategies to improve response rate
Surveys can have varying response rates. A survey of dairy farmers conducted
in Tasmania by Weatherley (2000) received a response rate of 30%. Therefore
a number of strategies were put in place to increase the motivation for
landowners to return the survey.
A covering letter (Appendix 12) was placed in each envelope, which included
the following: 1. Official letterhead.
2. The date on which the survey was mailed.
3. The name and address of the respondent (this was also designed to fit
into a plastic window on the envelope to act as the mailing address for the
postal system).
4. The purpose of the survey.
5. An explanation of how each respondent was selected.
Methodology •
6. A numbered reply paid envelope was supplied with an assurance of
confidentiality and an explanation that the reason for numbering the return
envelope was to check who had responded and not to match responses
with individuals.
7. A handwritten signature in blue pen to stand out as being personalised.
8. An explanation that the questions were derived from “numerous interviews
with landowners, lessees, sharefarmers, government, industry, accountants
and consultants” and were therefore meaningful.
Note: 1-7 As per de Vaus (1995)
Other strategies were also used:
1. Support was canvassed from the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers
Association (TFGA) and a supporting letter included in the envelopes
(Appendix 13).
2. A reply paid envelope was supplied.
3. An information sheet was printed on the back of the covering letter
(Appendix 14).
4. The survey was printed on yellow paper to make it stand out from the rest
of the envelope’s contents.
Before the survey was sent two press releases were sent to the statewide media.
The rural newspaper the Tasmanian Country printed a story about the survey the
week before the mailout (Appendix 15). Further support from the TFGA saw
an announcement of the association’s support for the survey in the president’s
personal information column in the same issue (Appendix 16) and in the
following week (Appendix 17).
An interview with ABC radio was also conducted immediately after the
mailout was completed and an advertisement was placed in the Tasmanian
Country one week after the mailing date (Appendix 18).
The final strategy was to send a follow-up letter to all the respondents that had
not returned the survey, encouraging them to complete and post the survey
back (Appendix 19).
3.3.9. Randomisation
The random selection was carried out using Microsoft Excel. The 10237
entries were pasted into a blank document. In a new column which was called
“Random Number” the command “=Rand()” was typed and dragged down so
that each entry had a random eight digit number next to it. The entries were
then sorted by the random number to give the list an order. The first 1500
entries were then selected and the postal addresses obtained from LIST.
The postal addresses were then formatted into a mail merge format. That is
separate names, addresses, town/city and postcode. Once this was completed
the list was sorted by each column in order to make the identification of
any missed doubles easier. Eight doubles and four invalid addresses were
located. These were replaced by the next twelve entries on the random Excel
document. One respondent was recorded in the database as “Unknown owner”.
This was changed to “landowner” and was not removed.
37
38 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
3.3.10.
Data analysis
Data analysis was carried out by first entering the surveys into Microsoft Excel
97 and then exporting the data to version 6.0 of the SAS program. Initially
frequencies of each variable were obtained. Then the significance of variables
and cross tabulations were tested using Chi-squared tests for discrete variables
and Wilcoxon sign rank tests for continuous variables.
Chi-squared tests were used to analyse the attitudinal information in Section
C of the survey. The ‘Strongly-agree’ and ‘Agree’ categories were combined as
were the ‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly-disagree’ categories. Although the ‘Neutral’
and ‘Don’t know’ categories were ignored for the purposes of the Chisquared test, these were taken into account when analysing the data. If the
‘Neutral’ and ‘Don’t know’ categories were approaching the levels of the two
combined categories, the conclusion from the analysis was that the results were
inconclusive.
Any statistical analysis method used could be open to criticism, as there is
no obvious way to fit all the respondents’ data into one null hypothesis. One
other option was to scale the responses and then analyse the averages of each
statement to determine significant responses. However, there is a need to
interpret the question on the basis of how it was asked (Raine, 2001). The
respondents were not given an opportunity to quantify their strength of
feeling, and therefore it would be presumptuous to suppose that those who
said they ‘strongly’ had feelings were twice as intense in these feelings as those
who did not.
Further consultation with University Academic staff from Agricultural Science,
Dr David Ratkowky and Social Science, Dr Bruce Tranter, supported the
proposed Chi-squared methodology.
Cross tabulations (Appendix 20) of attitudinal information were carried out
using the same system. However, because of uncertainty generated by the
‘Don’t know” and ‘Neutral’ responses a higher level of alpha=0.01, or 99%
confidence, was used instead of the traditional level of 0.05 or 95% confidence.
Land Tenure
Land
Tenure
and
Land Managementand
Alternatives
Land Management
Alternatives
Four:
Four: Results
Results
40 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
4.1. Results From The Preliminary Interviews
The initial data presented is the results of the initial section of the interview
schedule namely the demographics of the primary producers. Following
this each of the research questions are addressed and presented under subheadings.
There were in total 15 people interviewed. All were male. There were four
from the Coal River Valley, two from the Derwent Valley, two from the Huon
Valley, one from the North East, one from Launceston, two from the North
West and three from the Central North (Hagley/Cressy/Longford). These were
made up of 12 primary producers and three key informants. Two of these
were used as test cases so their demographics are not included. Tables 1 to 5
describe the characteristics of subjects and their involvement in alternative land
tenure arrangements.
Table 3: Characteristics of the subjects interviewed
Count or mean
Total number interviewed
15
Number used
14
Mean age (yrs)
Mean years in agriculture (yrs)
Mean generations in agriculture
b
Parents not farmers b
b
Mean number of children
Education
Range
44.4
a
Married
% of cases
28-58
24.6
4-41
3.3
1 -7th or 8th
st
2
18
9
82
2
b
0-4
b
Count
% of cases
Tertiary agriculture
3
27
Secondary
7
64
Trade
1
9
1975
Mean year finished education
Plans for continuation in farming
bc
Count
% of cases
Indefinitely
5
45
Until retirement
3
27
Unsure
2
18
Review after five years
1
9
Count
% of cases
North East
1
7
North West
2
14
Central North
3
21.5
Coal River
4
28.5
Derwent Valley
2
14
Huon Valley
1
7
Launceston
1
7
Location of subjects
N=14
Number of years involved in agriculture (ex childhood)
The question asked was: How long do you plan to farm for?
a
c
b
Primary producers only
Results
•
41
Table 4: Land tenure arrangements
Average aread (ha)
% of cases involvedd
Range d
Owned
291
91
42-660
Rented/leased
171
45
1.5-520
Sharecropped
1.8
9
0-20
Sharefarmed
0
0
Joint venture
6.6
27
1-70
Leased out
0.64
9
0-7
Total area involved
5180
Role(s) in land tenure arrangements discussed
Count
% of cases
Lessee
1
9
Lessee/landowner
7
64
Lessor/landowner
2
18
Lessee/lessor/landowner
1
9
Key informants
3
27
Test cases (landowner)
1
9
N=15
15
At the time of the interview
d
42 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Table 5: Agricultural enterprisese
Count
%
Sheep/wool
7
64
Cattle
6
55
Other livestock
1
9
Seedcrops
5
45
Poppies
7
64
Potatoes
3
27
Onions
2
18
Pyrethrum
1
9
Peas/beans
4
36
Brassicas
3
27
Other crops
3
27
Small fruits/berries
4
36
Machinery contracting
5
45
Each respondent (not including the key informants) could nominate
as many enterprises as they wished
e
Table 6: Role of spouse on the farmf
Count
% of cases
Not involved
5
55
Involved full-time
2
22
Involved part-time
2
22
Involved on a casual basis
0
0
N=9 (2 were “never married”)
f
Does your spouse work in the farm business part-time, full-time,
casually or not at all?
Table 7: Employment in the farm businessg
Mean
Range
Full-time
1.4
0-20
Part-time
0.91
0-10
Casual
4.5
0-23
Seasonal
9.3
0-60
Mean number of contractors used
2.4
0-6
n=11
g
Are any people working on the farm who are not family members?
Results
The biggest property owned by an interviewee was about 700 hectares, while
the smallest was 42 hectares. When the biggest lease of 1100 hectares was
taken out of the calculations the average lease was 72 hectares, while the
smallest lease was 1.5 hectares.
The biggest employer had 84 people working mixture of full-time, part-time,
casually and seasonally, while only one farmer worked without any employees
(apart from contractors). The farmers said the weather had been average, while
their output had been between average and above average.
When asked if they wanted their children to continue in agriculture seven said
‘yes’. However only four of these expected their children to continue and one
was unsure.
4.1.1.
Research Question 1:
Different Land Tenure Agreements
The respondents talked of many diverse alternative land tenure agreements
that are in place in Tasmania. The types of arrangements discussed were:
1. Sharecropping
(a) A ‘lease’ worked out as a percentage of the profit. The lessor provides land
and water, while the lessee provides the infrastructure and management.
The lessor gets a bigger percentage if he/she puts more in, as the returns
are split in terms of inputs.
(b) A sharecropping arrangement where the lessee pays the lessor a percentage
of the gross.
(c) A “traditional” split between landowners and sharecroppers of 1/3:2/3.
(d) Another “traditional split” between landowners and sharecroppers, is where
the farmer provides the seed and the fertiliser, while the sharecropper does
the work. The chemical costs are shared and the profits split 50/50 (this
has operated in the cereals industry).
(e) A sharecropping arrangement where there is a base payment per kg of
production plus an incentive for production over a particular yield.
2. Leases
(a) A ‘straight lease’ for a fixed sum per year.
(b) A ‘lease’ where the lessee pays the lessor 10% of the gross turnover.
(c) A lease where the lessee pays the lessor a fixed sum per year and then
when the agreement ends the land is to be sown to pasture at the lessee’s
expense.
(d) A lease where a fixed sum is paid each year and a fixed amount of fertiliser
is to be applied to the (grazing) property.
•
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
3. Joint Ventures
(a) A joint venture where there is a division of responsibility between the
landowners and a company and a division of sales/profits.
(b) A joint venture where several farmers got together and acquired machinery
and advice. They all grow the crop on their own properties, which they
jointly market.
4.1.2.
Research Question 2:
The Benefits of Alternative Land Ownership
Opinions of the benefits and disadvantages of alternate land tenures differed
from subject to subject. The number of times each point was mentioned
follows the comment in brackets (L=landowner, T=tenant, sharecropper or
lessee and K=key informant).
Economic benefits
According to the respondents alternative land tenure can provide:
• better utilisation of equipment; (L0,T2,K1);
• economies of scale; (L0,T1,K4);
• income for both parties involved; (L1,T4,K3);
• opportunities for investment by corporations (or individuals) without the
risk from their own lack of management skills (especially for people from
outside of agriculture); (L0,T1,K0);
• an opportunity for people with less capital to enter the farming sector;
(L0,T1,K0);
• existing farmers/contractors with the opportunity to increase turnover
without increasing capital; (L0,T1,K1);
• large producers with the ability to maintain large contracts sustainably;
(L1,T1,K0);
• a way to eliminate some of the costs of land ownership, for example capital
outlay. (L0,T4,K0);
• income for the lessor while waiting to sell a property; (L0,T2,K0);
• landowners with income when their industry is in a downturn; (L0,T3,K1);
• income to elderly farmers, which could be an alternative to the pension;
(L1,T0,K0); and
• the lessor with security of income; (L0,T3,K1).
 Totals = L3,T23,K11
Results
Environmental benefits
According to the respondents alternative land tenure can provide:
• the lessor with better nutrient status from residual fertiliser or applications
of lime; (L0,T4,K0);
• better rotations; (L0,T1,K0);
• the option of ‘resting’ or ‘spelling’ land; (L1,T2,K1); and
• proper targeting of specific conditions, soil types, aspect et cetera, by
a manager, in order to produce product on the most suitable land;
(L2,T1,K0).
 Totals = L3,T8,K1
Social and other benefits
According to the respondents alternative land tenure can provide:
• the ability to grow a crop that would have otherwise not been grown;
(L0,T2,K0);
• exposure for a landowner who is looking for a buyer (For example having
a crop grown on his/her property, especially a new enterprise, can illustrate
the possible productivity of the property and increase the likelihood of a
sale); (L0,T1,K0);
• the possibility of good managers producing product even if they can’t afford
to buy land; (L0,T1,K0);
• landowners with a method of gaining knowledge or expertise from a lessee
with the appropriate skills; (L1,T1,K0);
• landowners with the opportunity of determining if an enterprise is viable
on the property with limited risk; (L0,T2,K0);
• access to land or increased production without having to buy more land;
(L0,T2,K0);
• a reasonable return for the landowner while not being actively involved in
farming; (L0,T3,K0);
• access by new or young people to farming bringing the possibility with new
ideas; (L0,T3,K0);
• landowner or contractor with the ability to use ‘fresh’ ground for either
increased production or isolation from disease, cross pollination et cetera;
(L1,T2,K1);
• a method for a lessor to get access to a contract held by the lessee and
sometimes, following the agreement, become a producer in their own right;
(L2,T0,K1);
• a spreading of risk by using multiple sites; (L0,T2,K1);
• landowners with a smaller and/or more manageable workload and/or less
input; (L1,T3,K1);
•
45
46 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
• improved security for an absentee landlord because there is someone ‘to
keep an eye’ on the property; (L0,T1,K0);
• diversification of agricultural enterprises on a property or by a producer;
(L0,T1,K0); and
• either party with the option to terminate the agreement after an initial
period if it is unsuitable (for short-term leases); (L0,T2,K0).
 Totals = L5,T26,K4
4.1.3.
Research Question 3:
The Disadvantages
of Alternate Land Ownership
The people interviewed also discussed the disadvantages of the agreements
they were involved in, had been involved in or had heard about. The
number of times each point was mentioned follows the comment in brackets.
(L=landowner; T=tenant, sharecropper or lessee; and K=key informant). The
issues were as follows:Economic issues
• The lessee cannot afford to pay what the landowner thinks the property is
worth, either the landowner wants too much or the lessee can’t pay enough.
(L1,T2,K0).
• The lessee might go broke or otherwise not be able to pay their share.
(L0,T1,K0).
• Distance and time spent travelling between holdings. If the distance is too
great then doubling of equipment is required which halts gains from better
utilisation of equipment. (L0,T4,K0).
• There is a problem getting land to lease, especially long term leases, because
“there aren’t too many people leasing out land”. (L0,T1,K0).
• Development on a rental property are often not fairly rewarded which
makes capital improvements like lime application and underground water
mains unattractive to the lessee. (L0,T4,K0).
• If people are interested in alternative forms of land tenure there is nowhere
to go and get information on things like ‘what a standard agreement is’.
Because there is no information, people have to come up with their own
arrangements. (L0,T1,K0).
• There is a reduced margin for alternative approaches compared to an
owner/operator. (L1,T1,K0).
• One party might carry all the risk. (L0,T0,K1).
• Alternative land tenure is not relevant in the small fruits industry because
the cost of owning land is small compared to the cost of establishing an
orchard (unless suitable land comes in small areas on large properties,
which can be seen in the Derwent Valley). (L0,T2,K0).
 Totals = L2,T16,K1
Results
Environmental issues
• The lessee may not look after the land. The so-called ‘miners’ might arrive
and farm the land in an unsustainable manner. Therefore there is a risk of
degradation and depreciation of property value. (L1,T3,K5).
• In the past leasing has been seen as a ‘mining’ operation, that is the land is
farmed unsustainably. This makes people hesitant to lease land. (L2,T1,K0).
• Some lessees adopt the attitude that they own the land for the period of
the agreement and that they have every right to do whatever they like.
(L2,T0,K0).
• Identifying the best land for a purpose can lead to monocultures
developing. For example large areas have been identified as ideal for trees.
This was claimed to have caused volatility in the water levels and run-off in
some streams. (L1,T0,K0).
• Multinational companies can force the brokering of deals where profit is the
only concern, which can leave the land degraded. (L0,T1,K0).
• Pasture growth might not be vigorous after a lessee/sharecropper has left.
(L1,T0,K1).
 Totals = L7,T5,K6
Social and other issues
• Labour is a problem because the lack of good employees means that
lessees and landowners scale their operations so they can handle the load
themselves. “You can get plenty of people to work for $12 per hour but
they often aren’t any good, so you have to watch them all the time, so you
are better off doing it yourself”. Therefore both lessees and landowners are
unwilling to increase the size of their operation. (L0,T1,K0).
• Increased traffic flow on the property can result from having other people
working on a part of your property. (L1,T0,K0).
• Other people’s employees that you don’t know are also moving around
your property, which has security and aesthetic (privacy) implications.
(L1,T0,K0).
• In sharecropping there is always the potential that the split might not be
right making one party dissatisfied. (L1,T1,K1).
• Some farmers find it hard to accept others making money out of their land.
(L1,T2,K0).
• For the lessee it is easy to over extend and end up with too much work.
(L1,T1,K1).
• Some arrangement can bring about conflicts of opinion, arguments and
general ‘hassles’. (L0,T2,K0).
• What is the legal status if thing go wrong (for both informal and formal
agreements). (L1,T1,K0).
• The landowner has to know the lessee before he/she will commit to an
agreement. (L1,T2,K1).
•
47
48 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
• Farmers want to own land. (L1,T1,K1).
• There can be confusion without a written agreement and complications
could arise if one of the parties passes away. (L0,T1,K0).
• Informal agreements could lead to complications and misunderstandings if
the property is sold. (L0,T1,K0).
• If a lessee, who pays a fixed sum, has a bad year or loses a crop he/she is
still liable for the land payment. (L0,T1,K0).
• If a joint venture for a new industry is incorrectly set up, it can lead to one
person “stealing the show”. (L0,T0,K1).
• With medium to long term leases, as the time of handing control of the land
back to the landowner approaches, there is a disincentive to maintain the
property. (L0,T1,K0).
• It is subjective how land should be managed. (L0,T1,K1).
• There can be confusion without a formal agreement. (L0,T1,K2).
 Totals = L8,T17,K8
Figure 6: Overall the total number of times disadvantages and benefits were mentioned were:
Landowners
Tenants et cetera
Key Informants
Benefits
11
57
16
Disadvantages
17
38
15
4.1.4.
Research Question 4:
Social and Environmental Impacts
Alternative land tenure was said to have both negative and positive effects on
land management. There could be better targeting of the best conditions for
a crop, for example aspect, soil type et cetera. One respondent claimed that, “all
too often you do things that are not entirely appropriate because you own
the land, because it’s that paddock near the road” and that is next in line in
the rotation. Therefore using the best land for the best purpose would lead to
better utilisation of resources like water, land and labour and better industry
sustainability in the long term by producing more even yields. However there
were concerns over the potential for ‘mining’ on leased ground, even when
parameters are set because good management can be subjective. One farmer
might think he/she is using acceptable practice, while another might think that
it is unacceptable.
A fostering of co-operation among the people of a district was one social
benefit of alternative land tenure. This was especially evident in farmer lead
joint venture operations. However for these joint ventures to operate smoothly
good communication is essential. One respondent said, “ You have to be
proactive in advising and ensuring what needs to be done is done, and at the
right time. You have to be very articulate to others to get them to understand.”
Results
Honesty systems were often used for people the landowners knew well. Some
said the
“days of the handshake” are almost gone. A good written understanding
between the landowners and the lessee was talked of as a method of lessening
misunderstandings and therefore conflicts. Although some still found they
had trouble. One respondent thought that even a strong agreement might not
help in some instances, meaning legal proceedings would be the only form of
recourse if an agreement disintegrates. The element of trust required meant
that people nearly always knew the other party “well”.
More leasing would give some farmers more opportunities. However a lack
of skilled labour meant that some landowners do not expand their operation
beyond what they can handle themselves. This also stems from the fact that
there is often a lack of a career path for people interested in entering the
agricultural sector.
For the aging farmers alternative land tenure can be a way to remain in
agriculture without having the associated risk or worry. Alternative tenure
can be used as a way for a farmer to lower his/her workload by effectively
having less land to manage. It could be an alternative to the pension, where
the farmer would not have to sell his/her house or holding while still earning
money.
Alternative land tenure can lead to the development of new farm enterprises
and at the same time educate the landowner of the practices required. The
combination of both development and education can lead to some landowners
gaining contracts in their own right.
Increased traffic and having other people on your farm does sometimes
cause problems for a landowner. These relate to concerns over security and
aesthetics because there is an element of landowners wanting privacy.
4.1.5.
Research Question 5:
Organisation of Agreements
Most of the agreements came about from information heard on the
“grapevine”. For example landowner A heard that landowner B wanted to
lease some land so an approach to landowner B was made with an offer.
Sometimes the chain of events was reversed, that is where the person who
is known as “someone who is looking to lease land” gets approached by the
landowner. There was never any advertisement or promotion, although some
contractors in the North of the state were known to approach large numbers of
landowners in some districts.
In most cases an agreement is discussed with an element of bargaining. The
agreement can remain informal, be a simple written understanding or be a
legal document drawn up by the solicitors of the two parties.
•
49
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
4.1.6.
Research Question 6:
How Well the Arrangements Were Working
Most arrangements had some problems. These could be that the term of
the arrangement was not long enough, the other person was “difficult to
deal with”, there were misunderstandings, too much work was done by one
individual and so on. These problems were mostly small ones that the people
involved were prepared to handle. Generally the arrangements that worked
well and were mutually beneficial continued for long periods (depending on
the suitability of the land) and the ones that had large conflicts of one sort
or another or were unsuitable for the people involved, were terminated very
quickly.
4.1.7.
Research Question 7:
Encouragement of Enterprise Diversification
Alternate land tenure as discussed by the respondents had introduced new
enterprises to properties and areas not previously associated with that industry.
This occurred for three main reasons:
1. To illustrate a property’s productive capacity in order to facilitate a sale or a
higher price for the land.
2. To gain expertise and/or a contract in a new industry, with the goal of
becoming a producer in their own right.
3. Alternative income was required because there was a downturn in the
traditional industries.
Alternative land tenure also had the ability to allow landowners to diversify by
increasing the size and/or scale of their holdings, and by allowing landowners
to utilise other land types. For example one respondent leased a property
in order to move from purely wool growing and dryland cropping to more
intensive irrigated cropping. This also gave them increased cash flow and the
ability to move in and out of commodities if there was a need.
4.1.8.
Research Question 8:
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard or the ability to lose reputation in a district was almost a
prerequisite of entering into a deal. This means that only people that could
lose standing in a community for abusing a agreement were acceptable. This
in the opinion of the respondents means that the lessee is more likely to “do
the right thing”. If the person who wanted to use land was unknown or an
outsider in the district, the landowners would only be interested if they had
very good references and the agreement would be written and formal. There
was a moral obligation to ensure the agreement ran smoothly otherwise
entering into another agreement would be very difficult or impossible.
Results
4.1.9.
Research Question 9:
Differences in the Responses
and Opinions Due to Circumstances
Opinions varied according to the respondents’ circumstances. The differences
in the reply to questions related to whether they were the lessor or the lessee
and to some extent what district they were from and the industry in which
they were involved.
The interviews conducted illustrated that the lessee was more likely to be
concerned with production problems than the lessor. They were also likely to
see more advantages than disadvantages. The lessees were concerned by the
lack of long-term leases and landowners not wanting to get better production
or produce high value crops. The lessees thought that the landowners should
let the people with the appropriate skills manage the land without anyone
having to increase their fixed capital. Lessees thought that the landowners
would end up making more money for leasing rather than managing, especially
the graziers (because of the current downturn in the wool industry). They
also discussed more economic benefits, fewer environmental advantages or
disadvantages. The disadvantages the lessees tended to discuss were more
social or economic problems.
Other concerns the lessees had were travelling distance, the spreading of risk,
the possibility of a change in ownership and the fact that often developmental
works were not fairly rewarded. The lessees thought that alternative land
tenure offered opportunities to increase production, economies of scale,
produce better crops by targeting better conditions and greater financial
rewards for all involved.
However since most of the people interviewed were also landowners
themselves there were also some concerns of sustainability but these were not
discussed to the same extent as they were by the lessors.
The lessors interviewed were mainly concerned about how they would
be affected. They were concerned about who the person wanting their
land was and if unknown to them, what sort of record he had with other
producers. Evidence for this is that all the lessors knew their current lessees
before entering into the agreement. This concern stemmed from the ability
of the lessee to cause damage. The other issues they raised were the level of
sustainability, what the crop to be grown is, security/privacy, the other person
making “all the money”, and the fact that the income split might not be fair.
However lessors saw alternative land tenure as an opportunity to grow crops
on suitable land, to gain education or to gain a contract. They also thought
alternative tenure was a way of making money, but this was not their primary
concern. Overall the landowners saw an even spread between environmental,
economic and social benefits. However they were strongly focused on the
social and environmental negatives.
The key informants interviewed saw the benefits and disadvantages for both
sides. This is seen in the even spread of comments environmental or social in
nature. However they tended to focus heavily on the economic benefits, more
so than the landowners or lessees.
The people interviewed from the Central North had concerns about the
•
51
52 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
disadvantages of joint ventures with multinationals in the district. These
concerns related to the sustainability of the operations, the offerings of
incentives to certain people and increased competition for land. While areas
like the Coal River Valley, the Huon Valley and the Derwent Valley were
more concerned about large landowners not wanting to increase production
by allowing landowners access to their land. The different areas had different
concerns.
Certain industries also had different concerns. The people in the small fruit
industry (cherries and apples) thought that land ownership was irrelevant
because the cost of establishing the trees far outweighed the price of the land.
Therefore relatively little extra capital is required to give the orchardist the
“security” of land ownership. There is only a problem if the land was only
available in large blocks or not for sale. Having capital tied up in land was not
a real issue.
4.1.10. Other Matters Arising
The first thing that became apparent during the interviews was that the
landowners that become lessors usually had a good reason to lease the land.
Either:
• they could not get a certain contract and wanted one;
• they did not want to sell their asset in the current economic climate;
• they wanted exposure to a buyer;
• they wanted to gain knowledge;
• they were helping a friend;
• they could not take care of the land themselves; or
• there was financial pressure.
This might seem quite logical but money was not the sole driving force. In
fact it was often not the primary concern. The result of this was that the
landowners were somewhat picky of the situations they were willing to enter
into. For example the lessors did not lease to just anyone. There seemed to be
certain criteria in place. The biggest was they had to know the person to some
degree. Trust was always a key factor.
The main reasons for entering into leasing and sharecropping arrangements by
the lessee were financial, that is to make money. However other reasons were:
• to ‘spell’ or rest their own property
• to accommodate stock after the sale of a property
• the ability to use ‘fresh’ ground
• to maintain a contracted tonnage
• to gain isolation or better conditions of some description.
Results
4.2. Case Study results
4.2.1.
Introduction
Most Australian farming operations involve both owning and farming land.
These operations are constantly striving to become more efficient. The need
for this increased efficiency at the farm level is being driven by declining terms
of trade, deregulation and a shortage of resources, such as land and water.
Thinking of owning land and farming as being two different things can help
increase an agricultural operation’s efficiency and at the same time possibly
improve peoples’ lifestyles. This separation of land and farming is termed
‘alternative land tenure’. That is, the ‘farmer’ may be either the ‘landowner’ or
the land ‘manager’.
This separation of land and farming is most commonly seen in leasing
and sharefarming agreements, where there is a landowner and a lessee or
sharefarmer. However, far from returning to the landlord/tenant relationships
seen in Europe, Australian landowners and managers are also thinking ‘outside
the box’ and are using innovation to further develop these agreements and
structures to suit their businesses and aspirations. Australian landowners and
land managers are also using joint ventures to pool expertise and finances in
order to grow bigger than they possibly could alone, or inventive company
structures to reach external capital, as well as developing new agreements that
suit their situations.
These alternative land tenure agreements are currently used in Australia but
they are not common practice. Most operators or managers own the land they
farm. This ‘traditional’ approach has served agriculture well and our goal is not
to change this, but rather to highlight other viable options.
Numerous interviews with accountants, financiers, processors, policy
makers, agribusiness, consultants, landowners, sharefarmers and lessees have
highlighted the issues involved with alternative land tenure agreements. These
interviews allowed the targeting of case studies and the research of viable
options, which may be considered in five broad categories of alternative land
tenure:
(1) leasing
(2) sharefarming
(3) joint venture agreements
(4) incorporation
(5) innovative agreements
4.2.1.1.
Why do people use agreements?
When talking about alternative land tenure agreements a distinction has to be
made between the two groups involved. Typically there are people who own
land yet do not want to be running a farming operation, for simplicity we will
call these people “landowners”. Then there are people who want to run day
to day operation and yet do not own land or perhaps purchase more land,
we shall call this group “land managers”. Both of these groups have different
reasons for entering into alternative land tenure agreements.
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
4.2.1.2.
Landowners
Typically landowners who use alternative land tenure agreements that allow
others to farm their land, have compelling reasons for doing so.
(1) They do not want to farm themselves, yet they do not want to sell their
asset because;
• they want to retire but do not want to move from their land;
• they are waiting until a family member can take over; or
• land prices were depressed meaning they would not get enough
money for the land sold.
(2) They are looking to relieve financial pressure.
(3) They want to diversify;
• but do not have the expertise;
• but do not have a contract;
• to have more chance of selling; or because
• there is a downturn in their own industry.
(4) They can not take care of the land themselves.
4.2.1.3.
Land managers
The main reasons for entering into alternative land tenure agreements by the
land managers are to;
• expand operations;
• make money;
• gain more use out of machinery;
• maintain contracts;
• spell or rest their own land; or
• gain isolation or better conditions of some description.
These agreements are also suited to people looking to try new industries or
entrepreneurial farmers.
4.2.1.4.
Some self is assessment required
When deciding what agreement to choose, and indeed whether or not to enter
an agreement, the individual must honestly self assess some key issues:
• What are your current strengths?
• What are your limitations, for example expertise, resources?
• How much time and effort are you willing to commit?
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• How much finance can you access?
• What level of control do you require when involved in an
operation?
• How much risk can you tolerate?
Before entering these agreements most parties have generally done some form
of self assessment of goals and other requirements and chosen an agreement to
suit. “Our experience shows that before leasing or sharefarming, the landowner
needs to be certain and write down what they want from the land, for example
the level of development, expansion limits, returns et cetera, then get a lessee or
sharefarmer who is happy to work in those parameters.” On other occasions
the agreements evolve over a period of time to eventually meet the needs of
those involved. In some cases, when the desired combination of resources
cannot be captured using an existing agreement innovation has been required
to trailblaze new solutions.
To help follow what each agreement offers a box containing five categories is
displayed for each of the first four agreement types discussed. These headings
are:
• Management input - the time and effort spent ‘farming’
• Financial input - the amount of money required for the operation
• Financial reward - the proceeds you receive
• Financial risk - the amount of relative financial risk you will be
taking
• Watch out for - thing to be careful of or manage properly
The size of the enterprise can also be a good starting point when choosing an
agreement. In this case ‘Big’ means that an operation is complicated, large scale
and possibly involves several investors, while ‘Small’ means a relatively less
complicated operation dealing with limited finances and risk.
Big = joint venture or company
• Many diverse investors = company
• Few investors (2-4) with similar interests, goals = joint venture
Small = sharefarming or leasing
• Want to share in costs and sales receipts = sharefarming
• Want income only (landowner) or total operational control (lessee)
= lease
4.2.1.5.
What to look out for
Most agreements are struck between parties that each hold different resources.
These resources are a combination of land, water, contracts or markets,
expertise and finances. The resources that each player controls will determine
the extent of bargaining and eventually the agreement’s details. Therefore the
pros and cons have to be measured in terms of what each party has to lose
or gain. These pros and cons also include third party issues such as erosion,
possible land degradation, runoff et cetera.
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When entering into any new business arrangement both parties must ensure
that the agreement is equitable. If the landowner does not receive enough
income and other benefits the agreement will be short lived, to the detriment
of the land manager. However, if the landowner requires too much income
from the land then a rape and pillage mentality could develop because
unsustainable practice might be the only avenue to profit for the land manager.
“The miners could show up and rip up everything, replace nothing and leave
one hell of a mess!”
Unsustainable farming practice is only one possible pitfall of alternative
land tenure agreements. Most agreements are built on trust because as one
landowners said, “trust is the key to deals.” In small communities a breach of
mutual obligation can lead to a breakdown of friendships and even a loss of
standing in the community. “If people haven’t done the right thing in the past
they get a reputation very quickly. In fact doing the wrong thing once might be
enough to make it very hard to for them to pull in another agreement.” One
of the biggest barriers to alternative land tenure agreements is the landowner
being unwilling to give up control of the land. “Too few farmers with
underutilised land are willing to consider the option of leasing.”
These problems are best dealt with before the agreement starts by talking at
length about each other’s needs and then drawing up a written agreement.
This does not have to be a complicated legal document, as long as both
parties understand their positions, duties and obligations. “Just write it down
in laymen’s terms”. Mutual obligation, trust, hopefully a written agreement
and sometimes legislation, like company law, must hold everything together.
“Leasing land can be a satisfactory alternative for farmers. It is important to
draw up a sound agreement and stick to it.”
4.2.1.6.
The big picture
The benefits of alternative land tenure to rural Australia come mainly in
the form of potential economic development that can stem from increasing
production efficiency. For example, the ability to increase the size of
operations without increasing debt can result in economies of scale and greater
turnover. The ability to gain access to under-utilised land without having to buy
land means that capital can be directed at production and not loan repayments.
This means that Australia’s agricultural land is used more intensively generating
more money and more exports, as one farmer commented, “the failure to use
productive land through these methods (alternative land tenure) is a great loss
to agriculture.”
“Land can be held by the traditional owners while being farmed by
sharefarmers, contract growers or companies.” For landowners like this one,
allowing others to use their land means that family ties to land and their
region do not have to be broken even if these landowners do not want to
farm themselves. Another landowner commented that, “my property is now
leased because I am retired and I want to retain ownership of the property.”
These landowners can monitor operations on their land to ensure that the land
is farmed sustainably. “Most farmers wouldn’t sell if their lifestyle could be
maintained and there was no work involved.”
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These agreements are a “great idea to assist new and budding farmers” and
can create employment opportunities and generate income for a region. Many
people in agriculture “would support anything that enabled young enthusiastic
people to enter the farming industry with a low capital base”, because
“the industry is at great risk of losing all its young people due to a lack of
opportunities.”
The international experience has shown that is not the role of the Government
to force changes in agricultural land tenure because well meaning legislation
often favours either landowners or land managers, more than the other, which
can lead to division. The development of these arrangements must be driven
by mutual benefit, otherwise the landowners and land managers will not be
interested.
One of the best ways to demonstrate the benefits of alternative land tenure
agreements is to give real life descriptions of what landowners and land
managers are doing. These case studies paint a picture of the benefits and
disadvantages of each agreement category. The boxes show in shorthand what
the agreements offer.
4.2.2.
The leasing option -stepping back for some,
taking on more for others
Landowner
Management input: none
Financial input: cost of establishing agreement
Financial reward: agreed lease payment
Financial risk: losing lease payment
Watch out for: unsustainable practices
Lessee
Management input: running the operation
Financial input: input costs and lease payment
Financial reward: all profit
Financial risk: losing costs of production and potential profits
Watch out for: uncooperative landlords and low profit margins
4.2.2.1.
Key messages
When entering into a lease agreement the duration of the lease is an important
consideration. The lease period must take into account both parties wishes
because a lease that is either too long or too short is not ideal. Experiences of
lessees have shown that “it takes time to build a relationship with landowners.”
Leasing can bring benefits to both the landowner and the lessee as these case
studies have illustrated. Each party might have different reasons for entering
an agreement and yet still benefit, as demonstrated in the “getting your own
contract” case study.
Expansion is one of the leading reasons for leasing land. This can be tied
in with a push for diversification. This leads a business to invest capital for
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production and not for fixed assets. This is a great idea if a suitable longterm lease can be negotiated. “There has to be flexibility in this business but
everyone has to know where they stand”.
4.2.2.2.
What is leasing?
The leasing option is not restrictive as leases can take numerous forms. The
parties involved typically agree on an area, a time frame and rate and method
of payment. There are often clauses added and these are aimed at meeting the
needs of both sides. For example an agreement might stipulate that a cropping
paddock must be sown down to pasture after the crop is removed.
The typical land lease seen in agriculture is when a landowner allows another
to farm a defined piece of land for a set period and for a set payment. For
example, landowner ‘X’ leases person ‘Y’ 100 hectares for three years, at $100
per hectare per year. This could be any piece of land for any operation.
4.2.2.3.
Leasing case study 1 - fresh ground
Grower A runs a 160 hectare family horticultural operation that mainly grows
apples and cherries. Normally the cost of purchasing land is insignificant
compared with the $50,000-60,000 to establish and provide nets to cover a
hectare of cherries. “However, we wanted to establish a tree nursery and this
required land that had not been an orchard in the past, was close by and yet
had a degree of isolation.” Grower A therefore approached a large grazier in
the district with a lease offer that equated to more than the land could earn
running sheep.
Although not a primary concern, the lease allowed Grower A to avoid
purchasing land. “Some farmers don’t realise that they could make the same
money by leasing, while letting someone else do the work”.
Another party (a nursery business) followed in Grower A’s footsteps by also
arranging a lease agreement with the grazier. “This has limited the number of
rotations that we have available before the suitable land runs out.” In hindsight
Grower A may have been better off to have initially developed a longer-term
agreement for the constant supply of land every year for 10 years, which would
have excluded the nursery and prolonged the operation’s lifespan. “Now the
land is being used up faster than if we had a 10 year agreement and we will
eventually run out of land.”
4.2.2.4.
Leasing case study 2 - getting your own contract
Farmer B has a mixed farming enterprise that is grows various high value crops
as well as running some cattle and sheep. The farm was seen by many in the
district as unsuitable to the cultivation of potatoes. “People thought that the
farm couldn’t grow spuds.” Despite this Farmer B was approached by another
local farmer who asked to lease land. This farmer had a large potato contract
and had run out of land for the rotation of potatoes. Farmer B agreed because
he “wasn’t doing anything with the land.” The lease agreement was drawn
up by a local lawyer at the lessees’ request and expense. Farmer B thought,
“a more informal written agreement would have been alright”, but the lessee
insisted.
Directly resulting from this lease arrangement, the lessee was able to maintain
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a potato contract without the need to purchase more land. This agreement
lasted two years. After the agreement ended, Farmer B subsequently gained a
potato contract and has grown potatoes, on the farm, successfully ever since.
However, as Farmer B says, “You have to select the person carefully. A person
that you know is likely to be fair and reasonable”.
4.2.2.5.
Leasing case study 3 - resting the land
Farmer C has a cropping enterprise that also runs some cattle and some sheep
for prime lambs on a 300 hectare property. Farmer C leases a further 70
hectare block across a river that borders the home property, on a 3 year written
lease. “Some of my soils have been cropped extensively…so I approached the
owner when he brought two blocks at an auction. I asked if I could lease a
block and he said ‘yes’. It also gives me a bit more scope.” The lease was a
written document mainly to protect both parties in the event of a death or sale
of the property. “I knew him pretty well, he’s a good fellow and I have dealt
with him before.” “We discussed what each of us wanted out of the deal, then
we got a solicitor to draw up an agreement.” The owner subsequently sold the
property to another party but the agreement still holds.
This lease allowed Farmer C to rest the cropping land on the home property.
The agreement was also financially profitable. Farmer C limed the property
extensively and will not receive the full benefit of the soil conditioning,
therefore in hindsight a 5 year agreement would have been preferable.
However, at the time of negotiation only a 3-year agreement was available.
“I have probably benefited the most because I’ve made quite a bit of money,
more than the rent I have been paying.”
4.2.2.6.
Leasing case study 4 - diversification
Partners F have a family partnership that own 400 hectares of grazing land
with limited cropping ability, and they also have a number of lease agreements
that allows them to farm another 720 hectares. This largest lease involves
paying a trustee a set rate per year for the sole use of a 500 hectare property
on an irrigation scheme. “The property on the irrigation scheme allowed us
to diversify and move away from purely dryland cropping and wool growing.”
They also “don’t have heaps of capital tied up in land”. However, the property
is owned by a trust, the structure of which restricts the ability to of the partners
to arrange cost sharing for capital improvements. “You have to look carefully at
any investment to improve the property, like underground mains or drainage.”
The partners have also sold a 200 hectare block to an investor. After the sale
went ahead the partners asked to lease the block back and were accepted.
The third agreement the partners have is a 20 hectare block. The partners pay
the landowner 10% of sales receipts from the land, which is calculated on an
honesty system. This agreement is more like a sharefarming agreement because
the more the partnership earns the more the partnership has to split with the
owner.
These various agreements “are working quite well” for the partners because
they have had the opportunity to diversify, achieve economies of scale,
eliminate some of the costs of owning land, while at the same time freeing up
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capital. “The arrangements are also fairly mutual.”
“Farmers owning land has meant that the value of farms has been inflated over
their earning capacity. People buy the next door neighbour’s property simply
because it is next door and on the market and they pay too much for it.”
“Leasing allows you to move in and out of commodities and you can increase
turnover without increasing capital.”
However, there are risks. “If I were leasing land (to another) then the big
risk is the degradation that might occur. And because of the sheer nature of
farming, can the lessee afford to pay what you think the land is worth.”
4.2.3.
Sharefarming - sharing input costs
and revenue
Landowner
Management input: split according to the agreement (typically little labour
input)
Financial input: split according to agreement
Financial reward: agreed fraction or percentage of receipts
Financial risk: losing input costs
Watch out for: poor operators
Sharefarmer
Management input: split according to the agreement (typically most labour
input)
Financial input: split according to agreement
Financial reward: agreed fraction or percentage of receipts
Financial risk: losing input costs and the value of their labour
Watch out for: landowners who want too much control
4.2.3.1.
Key messages
Sharefarming agreements can be very successful.
“After 40 years of farming I entered a into a sharefarming agreement with one
of my employees. This has resulted in an agreement spanning 14 years and has
been satisfactory and beneficial in every way.”
The biggest success factor of sharefarming agreements is to have a fair split
of inputs and receipts. Both parties involved must have something to gain.
Another key ingredient is simplicity. Simple agreements are easy to understand
and both parties know their respective obligations.
4.2.3.2.
What is sharefarming?
A sharefarming agreement is similar to a lease in that it is typically an
agreement between a landowner and land manager except that the payment
is determined by the level of inputs from both parties. The inputs used in the
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calculations include the value of land, equipment, operational costs, the value
of labour and in-kind inputs.
For example, landowner ‘X’ has a sharefarming agreement with person ‘Y’. ‘X’
owns the land and pays for half the inputs; while ‘Y’ does all the work and pays
for half the inputs and the sales receipts are split 50/50. This operation could
be a dairy enterprise, a single crop or an extensive grazing property. The main
point is that land is an input like any other and a fair split of receipts based on
inputs will lead to a successful agreement. Sometimes for simplicity or due to
a tradition in the region, the split is a round figure or fraction like 20% to 80%
or ⅓ to ⅔.
4.2.3.3.
Sharefarming case study 1 - simpler is better
Farmer D owns a 200 hectare cropping property. Farmer D also has a
sharefarming agreement with a landowner who is trying to sell a grazing
property. The agreement is used to grow high value crops on 20 hectares. “I
provide all the infrastructure and management, while the owner provides the
land and the water and does nothing else.” The profit share arrangement is
calculated on a percentage basis. The inputs are calculated, including the cost
of the land. The gross sales, as per the returns docket, is then split according
the value of both parties input.
“I like this method more than a lease because both parties get what they put
in, which makes the deal more amicable. If the landowner wants a larger
percentage of the sales receipts then the landowner must put in more capital
and in doing so accept more risk,” for example by paying for the fertiliser or
chemicals. However, Farmer D recommends for the sake of simplicity that the
costs of individual inputs like fertiliser are not split because the calculations can
become too “tricky” and simplicity seems to make agreements “a lot easier”.
Farmer D also thinks that this system is better than traditional ⅓ to ⅔
splits because there is less chance of one party making a huge profit at the
annoyance of the other party. “I would rather have a good relationship with
the landowner than make extra profit so that the agreement can be renewed
the next year.” Farmer D is also a landowner and tries to view the agreement
from the position of the landowner. Farmer D tries to analyse the situation by
thinking, “Would I be willing to accept the deal that person is offering?”
“The owner gets a substantial income while waiting to sell the property. The
property has also shown its production capacity, which means exposure to
buyers and the land is more saleable.”
“This arrangement is also good for me because I get access to land, better
utilisation of equipment, income and longer rotations. Distance is probably the
only disadvantage.” The property is ten kilometers from the home base.
4.2.3.4.
Sharefarming case study 2 - see something new
Farmer E was approached by another farmer in the district who runs a
specialist operation involving a high turnover crop that requires small isolated
plots. Together the two parties involved selected a site on Farmer E’s property
that had the right combination of aspect, soil, water availability, et cetera.
Market forces determined how much Farmer E was paid for the area under
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the agreement. Farmer E thought, “how much can I get for this land”. “The
agreement involved a base payment per kg of production and an incentive
payment for production over a particular yield.” However, on other occasions
Farmer E has approached others regarding agreements on other portions of
the property.
Apart from a direct financial reward Farmer E also gained exposure to and
knowledge of the production of a high value crop. “The agreement only used
a small proportion of my property so I could continue normal operations
without any problems. It was also an opportunity to gain knowledge and
expertise in a new crop. There was also the potential to become a producer in
my own right, but it’s a steep learning curve.”
However, Farmer E was at times concerned with the aesthetics of increase
traffic flow on the property and the presence of the lessees employees on
the property, who were in some cases strangers. Farmer E illustrated these
concerns by stating that, “You don’t know what people are doing (on your
property). It’s a privacy issue”. “There is also the potential that the split might
not be right. The split has to be equal in both effort and risk. In a way you
could see yourself as an employee of the person you are sharefarming with.”
4.2.4.
Joint ventures - combining resources
Management input: depends on the enterprise
Financial input: can be small or large
Financial reward: can be greater than individually possible due to increased
scale
Financial risk: sharing information, expertise and capital reduces risk
compared with attempting an enterprise individually
Watch out for: getting in over your head
4.2.4.1.
Key messages
The pooling of resources and expertise in a joint venture agreement can help
an enterprise grow larger than the resources of a farm family or partnership
allows because owner/managers are often restricted by the lack of capital. Joint
ventures can also streamline businesses and deliver benefits to all parties.
4.2.4.2.
What are joint venture agreements?
A joint venture is a partnership that is formed to share expertise and risk.
These are typically arranged to carry out a specific enterprise and are
usually not the core business of the participants. Joint ventures can be both
incorporated, and therefore covered by the company law, or unincorporated
which are covered by contract law. In a legal sense a joint venture can
sometimes constitute a partnership. However, even in law there are no clear
definitions of what constitutes a joint venture. Therefore the concept is best
illustrated by examples.
4.2.4.3.
Joint venture case study 1 - having a go together
Farmer G had a contract with a local company to grow a small acreage of high
value product. Unfortunately the company failed leaving several farmers owed
money. The farmers managed to acquire some machinery and seed from the
company and decided to “have a go themselves”. They formed a joint venture
agreement, purchased some more machinery and then collectively sort advice
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from a consultant. Each farmer now grows a crop, which is harvested and
marketed by the joint venture.
“We have all gained experience in packaging and marketing a product. It
involves more than you think.” Farmer G does not see any disadvantages of
this arrangement after the three years that the joint venture’s has been running.
“If I had to change anything I wouldn’t have gotten involved with the (failed)
company in the first place, but the joint venture has been beneficial so I
wouldn’t change much there.”
4.2.4.4. Joint venture case study 2 - expanding with a large backer
Grower H has a joint venture agreement with a processing company. The
joint venture leases land for the production of crops. The processing company
carries most of the expenses for the growing of the crop. Grower H provides
expertise, equipment and labour used to produce the crops and receives a
payment based on the tonnage produced.
The agreement has allowed Grower H to move into a non-traditional growing
area and become a professional, solely focused on one commodity. “There
are financial rewards, it’s a business. You also get access to research results of
things like variety and fertiliser trials.” This agreement also gives Grower H
security. “In some instances crops have failed due to abnormal weather events,
like 15 inches of rain in January. Without the joint venture agreement one of
these events would have broken me. On a low yielding paddock I don’t make
any money, but then again it hasn’t cost me anything either.”
In return the processor gains a large supply of product from one grower. “This
streamlines their operations and effectively delivers crops to the factory at a
lower per unit costs than contracted growers can provide.”
The landowners that the joint venture leases land from also benefit. “The
leases have allowed them (the landowners) to fund their irrigation systems and
develop their farms.”
4.2.5.
Incorporation - investing in large operations
Management input: can be large for board members or small for shareholders
Financial input: can be substantial and involve borrowings
Financial reward: can be significant due to increased scale
Financial risk: usually limited to the investment
Watch out for: high debt to equity ratios
4.2.5.1.
Key messages
Using a company structure to run a large agricultural enterprise allows
investment from a diverse range of sources, not simply some tax advantages.
Again an enterprise has the ability to grow to a scale which would be difficult
for a single farm family or partnership to achieve. “There are opportunities
(in agriculture), but people have to be smart to get the best out of those
opportunities.” However, these operations due to their scale and potential
impact, should focus on environmental as well as financial sustainability.
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4.2.5.2.
Incorporation
The use of company structures in sections of Australian agriculture is nothing
new. Corporate agriculture can be used to divorce the social aspects of farming
from the equation leaving business and profit as the major motivational
forces driving the participants. As one landowner stated, “you should expand
the concept of alternative land tenure to examine opportunities for those
interested in improved capital efficiency on farms via incorporation.” New
forms of agricultural investment using different company structures are
emerging and these will perhaps be of greater significance in the future if
viable returns to capital can be achieved.
4.2.5.3.
Incorporation case study 1 - managing 23 dairy units
Company I owns and controls a number of dairy farming properties, with
the total area amounting to approximately 8000 hectares. The company has
operated by purchasing properties and then either upgrading the existing dairy
facilities or completing a conversion from scratch. The properties are split into
23 units that range from 250 to 1800 cow operations. Each unit is operated
by a farm manager or a farm management couple. “The farm managers operate
under an agreement that is a legal document that runs for one financial year,
from the 1st of July to the 31st of June.”
“The farm managers are basically contract milkers in that they provide labour
and some machinery, while the company provides land, equipment and cows.”
Some costs are split. “The farm managers receive an income based on the litres
of milk produced and run the units like it were their own.” The company has a
manager that overseas the entire operation and as part of the package provides
the services of a livestock manager and various consultants. “The present
arrangements developed through trial and error.” Company I looked at many
different options and have found that their current system “best suits their
operation”.
Company I has a very close relationship with all the farm managers and
benchmarks all the performances of each unit. “Good performance can be
rewarded by promotion to a bigger unit with more cows and the ability to
make greater returns, otherwise the agreements are rolled over for another
year. There are some instances when the agreements are not renewed.”
However, unlike dairy sharefarming agreements the farm managers have no
chance of increasing their stake and share of the milk receipts by purchasing
or breeding stock. “The agreement reflects the fact that the company wants to
maintain ownership of the livestock.” This allows the company to maintain the
control in the operation that their level of investment deserves. “The company
pretty much owns the bulk of the business so we direct the operations.”
“There will always be a percentage of farmers who own their own farms.
However, dairy farming has got to get bigger and bigger, you need more and
more cows to generate returns. The further this goes down the track, the
harder it will be for individuals to come up with the money required. To get
the most effective use of resources there will have to be some sort of equity
partnership.”
However, “unless syndicates, equity partnerships and corporates are
environmentally caring they could potentially run down the land.”
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“Conservation is very important to this company, especially on the farms that
have been developed.”
4.2.5.4.
Incorporation case study 2 - investing in a conversion
Company J was formed by a group of investors loosely involved in agriculture,
with the same purpose of purchasing a large grazing property and converting
it into a cropping and dairy enterprise. “It started off as a discussion between
four of us with loose associations with agriculture. Our theory was that the
future of farming lay in the development of substantial properties. This would
achieve economies of scale and scope.” “It was really a matter of developing
clear plans of what we wanted to do, then raising the money to purchase and
then develop a suitable property.”
The structure of the company is quite complex. “The number of shares are
divided up into pools of shares with each pool appointing a representative on
the company’s board.” A company structure from the investors point of view
“was the only way to go” because “the numbers (of investors) involved made it
impractical to think of joint ventures or partnership models.”
“The company model provides a forum where all can have a say. There is a
level of accountability in planning, development and from an operational point
of view.” The use of this company structure has also enabled the operation
to bring together a diverse group of investors with a common interest in the
project. “The strength of the board is that it allows you to get a wider range of
opinions and more objective decision making.”
Initially the board took a hands on role, which oversaw the development of the
property. “There were some difficulties operating as a board of directors in the
first few years. Some individual directors wanted to involve themselves in the
day to day management at the operational decision making level. This breaks
down responsibility and accountability.” The role of the board as it now stands
is to set policies and targets for the farm manager to achieve rather than plan
and manage the day to day running of the property. “We have a strong farm
manager. Strong from an empowerment point of view provided the operation
is within the management constraints, targets and budgets that are set…. This
makes the manager free to operate the property and more accountable for the
outcomes.”
“Conservation is very important to the company. In fact the vision statement
emphasises sustainability at all levels, including financial and environmental.
If the operation is not environmentally sustainable you are effectively
undermining your financial sustainability.”
“If we had to do anything differently, I would suggest that you initially make
stronger structures at the board level to differentiate between the manager’s
responsibilities and the boards’. You should also set out guidelines and
specifications for the properties conversion and then tender the process out to
another party as a turn key development.”
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4.2.6.
Innovative use of agreements - finding your
own solution
4.2.6.1.
Key messages
Sometimes agreements that are commonly used do not fit the goals and
boundaries of an operation. Those involved can create a suitable blend of
agreements or to develop new agreements to suit them. In these cases it is
typically innovation that leads to a solution, you can sample and use parts of
the four types already discussed that suit your operation or you can come up
with something completely new by searching for answers in different areas or
discussing options with experts.
4.2.6.2.
Case study 1 - lifestyle change
Partners K own approximately 600 hectares of cropping and grazing land.
Partners K is not a farmers but rather managers for the various tenancies on
the property. Two leasing agreements operate on 300 hectares of the property,
with the balance operated by three sharefarming agreements. “This has been
evolving for the past 15 years. Now the emphasis is on developing as many
centre pivot points as possible.”
“For the agreements involving the centre pivots we sort the assistance of an
agricultural consultant. This was because the figures don’t exist (on how much
rent should be paid). Most farmers with pivots irrigation operate it themselves.”
“Using these agreements has allowed us to sell our large equipment, invest in
centre pivot irrigation and make a substantial commitment to Landcare.” The
agreements also provide a secure income and improved lifestyle due to less
stress and more quality time with their families. The agreements are all written,
“not to be enforceable by law, but rather so that we don’t forget what we
agreed on”. Partners K now only do the jobs they like, while also focusing on
meeting the needs of the properties various tenants. “We maintain the property
including fences, buildings, sheds and we eradicate weeds. We also monitor the
other operators on the property and grow crops with the sharefarmers.”
“Most people (sharefarmers and lessees) have other enterprises, but these
agreements allow them to supplement and strengthen their other operations.”
“All the agreements have developed by initiating contact and understanding
each others needs. Most are local people that live within ten kilometers of the
property. However, it is only worth dealing with people that are committed
and efficient operators.”
Partners K are now in a better position financially than when they managed
the property themselves. One of the partners is also thinking of buying more
land to manage in this fashion. The partners are also interested in preserving
habitat on the property. “We have an area of wetland that we are looking to
protect by getting a covenant on the title.”
“The vast bulk of agreements have been satisfactory for all parties.” “The
lessees know that we are very co-operative and flexible. We have been known
to waive monies or give extra acres here and there if it helps at a certain time,
or in lieu of some other work they do for us. We might waive a rent payment if
they do some tractor work for us and so on.”
Results
4.2.6.3.
Case study 2 - access land for something new
Two partners saw an opportunity to establish a new agricultural enterprise.
To achieve this goal they established Company L. Company L needed access
to land in order to grow a new perennial crop. However, options available
to them were limited. “The cost of purchasing land and establishing the crop
would be prohibitive.” Therefore the company wanted a long-term agreement
that would protect their interest in the operation. “The problem was that our
business didn’t fit the mould of other agricultural industries like forestry, fruit
and vegetables. When we started the whole thing was speculative so a 25 year
lease was too risky.” The partners had to whittle down the options.
“We decided to engage the services of a law firm. The law firm indicated that
it was a caveat or nothing.” However, Company L thought that a caveat was too
onerous on the landowners. So in desperation they contacted an academic at
the nearest university, who suggested a profit a prendre.
“A profit a prendre met all our needs. A profit a prendre entitles a second party to
access and remove a product from land owned by another.” In this case the
profit a prendre grants Company L the right to enter a landowners property solely
for the purpose of the harvesting of the crop produced. The agreement is a
common law contract that can be registered at the Titles Office and enforced
for the term of the agreement irrespective of death of the landowner or sale
of the property. A profit a prendre can be seen as an easement with the right of
harvest or removal added to the right of access.
“The agreement is set up for 25 years so that the landowner gains access to
our technology, agronomic advice and markets and so on, while we gain access
to land and the crop for that period.” The profits are then split according to a
method stipulated in the contract. “The actual agreement is a comprehensive
20 page legal document that required a great deal of fine-tuning before it was
offered to landowners, but is now in place on around 30 properties.”
“We got the law firm to draft a document. Then we used a core group of
farmers who we knew well and were interested in our venture. We gave them
a copy of the agreement, got their feedback and redrafted it until everyone was
happy with it. This took two and a half years to get right. I’m too scared to add
up the legal fees. It cost us tens of thousands of dollars to get the agreement
right. We had to have an attractive agreement that gave us security, otherwise it
wasn’t worth having.”
“From here things went ahead in leaps and bounds.”
“This agreement can also be applied to other perennial crops in the same
fashion.” A profit a prendre can also be granted to a conservation organisation for
the purpose of preserving a part of a property, for example a tract of forest.
4.2.7.
Where to from here?
It is up to the individual farmers, partners or companies to determine what
is the best alternative land tenure option. If these people do not know what
their best option is then they should experiment and develop their own
agreement that suits their needs. The categories discussed are not restrictive
and should be used a guide only. There are many examples of alternative land
•
67
68 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
tenure agreements that cannot be easily placed into a category. For example,
some leases can also have a sharefarming component in their agreement,
like a smaller than normal lease payment together with a production sharing
component. Also companies can use joint ventures and so on. In fact most of
the agreements discussed in the case studies have been developed and fine
turned over a number of years.
The need for development and fine-tuning is partly due to a lack of industry
standard agreements; processes for bringing landowners into contact with
potential lessees; and information in general. However, these agreements are
entrenched in Australian agriculture and anecdotally on the increase.
If the ideas of alternative land tenure become entrenched in rural industries,
bolder more complicated forms of alternative land tenure could be attempted.
One such idea is a regional planning initiative that maps a region’s physical and
human resources, and then matches the two with finances derived externally.
The hope is that ideas like this could see land and human resources being used
for their most productive purpose and not confined to the limitations of the
farm boundaries, expertise and finances of the landowner.
A final note, before entering into any agreement, especially a long-term
agreement, the parties involved should be encouraged to seek the advice of the
state agricultural department, a consultant or a lawyer. However, short-term
agreements like a one to two year lease or sharefarming agreement might only
require the advice of a neighbour or friend with some previous experience.
Results
4.3. Survey Results
Of the 1500 surveys that were initially mailed 112 were either marked return
to sender or telephoned or wrote that they did not want to participate, did
not feel the survey was relevant to their situation or were otherwise unable to
complete the form.
The total number returned was 560.
Therefore the total response rate equals: 560 / (1500 - 112) * 100
= 40%
This is in excess of a previous comparable survey conducted in Tasmania by
Weatherley (2000) which achieved a response rate of 30%.
Summarised below is the analysis of the survey data that addresses the research
questions posed.
4.3.1.
Research Question 1:
How many landowners currently use
alternative land tenure agreements?
Out of the 560 surveys that were entered 35% of landowners indicated that
they were involved in alternative land tenure agreements. Calculation of 95%
confidence intervals indicates that the true underlying incidence in Tasmanian
agriculture could lie between 31% and 39%.
Table 8: Use of alternative land tenure in Tasmanian Agriculture
Number
Percentage of
Total
Percentage of ALT
122
22
59
Sharefarm
32
6
15
Joint Venture
54
10
26
Lease
n=208
One hundred and ninety-three respondents indicated that they were involved
in a total of 208 separate alternative land tenure agreements. Table 8
indicates that out of the 208 agreements leasing was the most popular form of
agreement, followed by joint ventures and then sharefarming.
A clear distinction must be made between the activities of the landowner and
the lessees, sharefarmers or joint venturers because these activities are not
necessarily the same. For example, a landowner might run cattle, but then
leases part of his or her land to a potato grower to grow potatoes. Table 9
details the enterprises of the landowners, while Table 11 deals with the actual
products that the agreement produces.
Landowners were initially asked to describe their operations by indicating their
main one or two agricultural activities on this land. However, due to the mixed
nature of Tasmania’s agricultural enterprises most indicated at least two and
•
69
70 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Table 9: Major enterprises of landowners compared to their use of alternative land tenure agreements
Landowners
not involved in
an agreement
Landowners
involved in a
agreement
Total number
(n)
Percentage
currently using
agreements
Horticulture
33
16
49
32.7
Cropping
69
66
135
48.9
Beef/Grazing
190
93
283
32.9
Wool/Sheep/Fat Lambs
111
58
169
34.3
Dairy
30
46
76
60.5
Forestry
19
15
34
44.1
Unused
11
2
13
15.4
Recreation/Hobby farm
13
1
14
7.1
3
4
7
57.1
Other
14
8
22
36.4
Totalsa
493
309
802
38.5
Main enterprise/s of the
landowner
Agistment
Landowners could enter multiple enterprises
a
frequently more activities. Therefore one agreement could be credited to more
than one enterprise, which explains the difference in the total percentages
(35% compared to 38.5%).
The results from the table indicate that landowners with dairy enterprises
have the biggest proportion of alternative land tenure agreements, followed
by cropping and forestry. Agistment also has a high proportion of agreements,
however this sample was too small to draw any conclusions. The beef and
sheep groupings have the biggest and third biggest number of enterprises,
however landowners with these classifications are, on average, engaged fewer
of alternative land tenure agreements than the other main enterprises (more
than 30 responses).
Results
4.3.2.
•
71
Research Question 2:
How many landowners have used alternative
land tenure agreements in the past?
Out of the 560 surveys that were entered 29% of landowners indicated that
they had been involved in alternative land tenure agreements in the past
(Table 10). Confidence intervals (95%) indicate that between 25% and 33% of
Tasmanian landowners have had alternative land tenure agreements in the past.
Those that have used agreements in the past are more likely to have current
agreements. Cross tabulating previous and current agreements revealed that
56% of previous agreement holders have current agreements compared to 28%
of those that have not had a previous agreement (p=0.001, n=518).
Table 10: Major enterprises of landowners compared to their previous use
of alternative land tenure agreements
Main enterprise/s of the
landowner
Landowners
not involved
in an
agreement
Landowners
involved in
a agreement
Total
number (n)
Percentage
with previous
agreements
Horticulture
30
15
45
33.3
Cropping
74
57
131
43.5
Beef/Grazing
191
81
272
30.1
Wool/Sheep/Fat Lambs
103
54
157
34.4
Dairy
49
23
72
31.9
Forestry
24
8
32
25.0
Unused
12
1
13
7.7
Recreation/Hobby farm
13
0
13
0
3
3
6
50
Other
14
7
21
33.3
Totalsa
513
249
762
32.7
Agistment
Landowners could enter multiple enterprises
a
Once again Table 10 details the enterprise of the landowners and not what the
actual agreement mentioned produces. Landowners also frequently indicated
more than one activity, which also means that one agreement could be credited
to more than one activity, again explaining the difference in total percentages
(29% compared to 32.7%).
This table indicates that enterprises with the highest percentages on past
agreements were cropping, followed by wool/sheep/fat lambs, horticulture,
dairy and beef/grazing.
72 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
100
90
Percentage
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ure
ult
rtic
Ho
Cr
op
pin
g
Be
ing
az
Gr
ef/
Sh
ol/
Wo
ee
a
p/F
bs
am
tL
iry
Da
try
res
Fo
u
Un
se
Re
d
a
cre
tio
o
n/H
y
bb
m
far
is
Ag
tm
t
en
Ot
he
r
Currently Using Agreements
Previous Agreements
Figure 7: Changes in the level of previous and current alternative land tenure agreements
compared to the landowners main enterprises, bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
Figure 7 illustrates that the dairy industry was the only industry to see a
statistically significant increase in the number of agreements (p-value of 0.001),
with some evidence of an increase in cropping and forestry. This figure also
highlights the unreliability of some of the categories with few entries, such as
‘Agistment’ and ‘Unused’.
The enterprises that were undertaken using alternative land tenure agreements
were not necessarily the same as the major enterprises each landowner
indicated. The actual enterprises the agreements were used to carry out are
illustrated in the following table.
Results
Agreement enterprise
•
73
Current
Percentage of total
Past
Percentage of
total
9
3.4
4
1.9
Cropping
42
15.9
33
16.1
Beef/Grazing
58
21.9
42
20.4
Wool/Sheep/Fat Lambs
34
12.9
33
16.1
Dairy
28
10.6
22
10.7
Forestry
22
8.3
5
2.4
Pasture
17
6.4
9
4.4
Poppies (specifically)
15
5.7
9
4.4
Potatoes (specifically)
27
10.2
37
18.0
Other
12
4.5
11
5.4
Total
264
Horticulture
205
Table 11: Breakdown of the products produced using alternative land tenure agreements
This table indicates that most agreements, by number, are used for the
production of beef, potatoes, other crops, then sheep and dairy products.
This was an open-ended question and respondents were not given categories
to assign answers to. ‘Potatoes’ and ‘poppies’ were significant answers, as was
‘cropping’, thus warranting separate categories. Other cropping enterprises like
peas and cereals were occasionally mentioned, however lower numbers meant
that these were consolidated into the ‘cropping’ category. However, when
some respondents indicated ‘cropping’ in their replies, growing poppies and/
or potatoes could have been part of their operation.
30
Percen tag e of Total Agreements
25
20
15
10
5
Figure 8: Changes in the use of alternative land tenure agreements across enterprises as a
percentage of the total number of agreements, bars indicate 95% confidence intervals
th
er
O
(s
pe
ci
fic
al
ly
)
ly
)
Po
ta
to
es
(s
pe
ci
fic
al
Po
pp
ie
s
Pa
st
ur
e
Fo
re
st
ry
D
ai
ry
W
ng
oo
l/S
he
ep
/F
at
La
m
bs
C
ro
pp
in
g
Be
ef
/G
ra
zi
H
or
tic
ul
tu
re
0
Past
Current
74 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Statistically significant changes were found in; forestry enterprises, which
increased from 2.4% to 8.3% of the total number of agreements, with a p-value
of 0.01; and potato growing, which decreased from 18% to 10% of the total
number of agreements, with a p-value of 0.02.
When the products produced using past agreements were compared to the use
of current agreements, it was found that crop, beef and dairy producers were
more likely to have a current agreement than people previously involved in
other enterprises.
• 64% with cropping agreements in the past had current agreements
compared with 34% of all other industries (p=0.001, n=546).
• 63% of beef producers with past agreements had current agreements
compared to 33% of all other industries (p=0.001, n=546)
• 68% of dairy producers with past agreements had current agreements
compared to 34% of all other industries (p=0.001, n=546)
4.3.3.
Research Question 3:
How many landowners would like to enter
alternative land tenure agreements?
Some landowners were interested in entering into alternative land tenure
agreements both now and in the future. More landowners indicated “Yes” than
“Maybe” when asked if they were interested in entering into an agreement
“Now”. When the time frame extended to 5 and 10 years the landowners
indicated “Maybe” more often than “Yes”. At all timeframes, however, “No”
meaning not interested, was the dominant answer.
Table 12: Landowner interest in alternative land tenure agreements.
Interest
Number
answering
%No
%Yes
%Maybe
%Yes %Missing
(of a total
&
Maybe
of 560)
Now
501
64.5
18.4
17.2
35.6
10.5
5 years time
465
59.6
12.9
27.5
40.4
17.0
10 years time
436
63.3
7.1
29.6
36.7
22.1
When the “Yes and “Maybe” categories were added together the figure was an
approximation of both the current and previous level of adoption of alternative
land tenure agreements as indicated by the results of research questions one
and two. However, there remain 60-65% of landowners that are not interested,
or even higher if those who did not answer the question are included.
Those that answered that they were interested in entering into an alternative
land tenure agreement now, in 5 years time and/or 10 years time were asked
what agreement would be the most attractive. These answers are contained in
the following table.
Results
Table 13: Most attractive alternative land tenure option
Agreement/s
Frequency
Percentage of total
answering
Sharefarming
39
14.9
170
64.9
44
16.8
All three
4
1.5
Sharefarming and Joint Venture
2
0.8
Leasing and Joint Venture
3
1.1
Leasing
Joint Venture
total n=262
This table indicates that leasing is the dominant form of alternative land tenure
desired. Those answering this question were also asked if they had attempted to
enter one of these agreements.
Table 14: Number attempting to enter into a desired agreement
Frequency
Percentage of total answering
Yes
100
38.8
No
158
61.2
n=258
This table indicates that nearly 39% of landowners interested in entering
into an alternative land tenure agreement have attempted to do so. This is
again within the confidence intervals of the number of respondents currently
involved in alternative land tenure agreements.
•
75
76 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
4.3.4.
Research Question 4: What issues concern
landowners about alternative land tenure
agreements?
Table 15: Concerns landowners have with alternative land tenure agreements, important results are highlighted
(SA=strongly agree, A=Agree, N=neutral, D=disagree, SD=strongly disagree, DK=don’t know)
SA
A
N
D
SD
DK
Total
Chi2
Pvaluea
509
17.4
0.000
510
90.4
0.000
507
20.4
0.000
507
127
0.000
514
146
0.000
514
371
0.000
512
31.3
0.000
509
362
0.000
509
0.07
0.792
507
3.10
0.078
510
114
0.000
511
195
0.000
512
109
0.000
512
267
0.000
Capital
improvements not
fairly rewarded
No
21
97
191
53
9
138
%
4.13
19.06
37.52
10.41
1.77
27.11
Hassles are a
concern
No
54
198
109
73
6
70
%
10.59
38.82
21.37
14.31
1.18
13.73
Leasing causes land
degradation
No
27
86
137
142
50
65
%
5.33
16.96
27.02
28.01
9.86
12.82
Getting paid is not a
concern
No
14
62
67
206
86
72
%
2.76
12.23
13.21
40.63
16.96
14.20
There is a lack of
information about
ALT
No
65
189
126
41
4
89
%
12.65
36.77
24.51
7.98
0.78
17.32
You have to trust the
other party to enter
an agreement
No
145
280
39
16
3
31
%
28.21
54.47
7.59
3.11
0.58
6.03
A lack of good
employees makes it
hard to expand using
leasing
No
43
156
126
90
12
85
%
8.40
30.47
24.61
17.58
2.34
16.60
There could be
different ideas
about what is good
management
No
74
342
45
17
2
29
%
14.54
67.19
8.84
3.34
0.39
5.70
Landowners will get
paid what their land
is worth
No
12
105
186
98
15
93
%
2.36
20.63
36.54
19.25
2.95
18.27
Agreements result in
land being locked up
for long periods
No
12
118
146
146
14
71
%
2.37
23.27
28.80
28.80
2.76
14.00
Agreements result in
less privacy
No
27
241
119
63
8
52
%
5.29
47.25
23.33
12.35
1.57
10.20
Most landowners
would rather farm
themselves
No
58
242
109
36
6
60
%
11.35
47.36
21.33
7.05
1.17
11.74
Landowners with
agreements have a
greater workload
No
8
51
136
208
31
78
%
1.56
9.96
26.56
40.63
6.05
15.23
Personal conflicts
won’t arise from
agreements
No
7
16
101
261
71
56
%
1.37
3.13
19.73
50.98
13.87
10.94
a
The probability corresponds to a Chi2 test of the null hypothesis (Ho) that the proportion of
respondents in the “For” (SA and A) category equals the proportion in the “Against” (D and SD)
category.
Results
The concerns table indicates that landowners agree with some of the concerns
raised by the case studies and interviews, namely: • Hassles are a concern for the landowner when entering an agreement.
• Getting paid is a concern when entering agreements.
• There is a lack of information about agreements.
• You have to trust the other party when entering an agreement.
• Sharefarmers and leaseholders might have different ideas of what good
management is compared to landowners.
• Agreements result in less privacy for the landowner.
• Most landowners do not want to enter agreements because they would
rather farm themselves.
• Personal conflicts might arise.
Cross tabulating these results against the use of current or previous agreements
highlighted that landowners without current agreements were more likely to
agree that hassles are a concern for landowners when entering an agreement,
with 86% concerned compared to 59% of landowners that have current
agreements (p=0.001, n=330).
The next significant cross tabulation was that those without current agreements
are more likely to think that there is a lack of information about alternative
land tenure, with 89% agreeing compared to 77% of landowners that currently
use an agreement (p=0.004, n=298).
The cross tabulations also indicated that landowners that have not used
agreements in the past were more likely to agree that “landowners would
rather farm themselves”, with 92% agreeing compared to 78% of landowners
that have used agreements in the past (p=0.001, n=327). The same percentages
were found when comparing current agreements with the same statement
(p=0.001, n=339).
The concerns table showed landowners do not agree that: • Leasing causes land degradation.
• Landowners with alternative land tenure agreements have a greater
workload.
When the results for the statement “leasing causes land degradation” were
compared to whether or not the landowners were currently using alternative
land tenure agreements, it was found that the disagreement with this statement
was biased by those with current agreements. The cross tabulation showed that
79% of those with current agreements disagreed with the statement compared
to 51% of those without current agreements (p=0.001, n=305)
Statements that capital improvements are not fairly rewarded and that there is
a lack of suitable employees for current landowners to increase scale by leasing
land, were supported by the Chi squared test. However, these questions had
large ‘Neutral’ and ‘Don’t Know’ responses and are therefore deemed to be
inconclusive.
•
77
78 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Concerns about not getting paid what the land is worth and concerns that
agreements result in land being locked up for long periods of time, were
not supported by the Chi squared test, with p-values of 0.941 and 0.078
respectively.
Results
4.3.5.
•
79
Research Question 5:
Do landowners agree that there are benefits of
alternative land tenure agreements?
Table 16: Benefits of alternative land tenure agreements, important results are highlighted (SA=strongly agree,
A=Agree, N=neutral, D=disagree, SD=strongly disagree, DK=don’t know)
SA
A
N
D
SD
DK
Total
Chi2
Pvaluea
7.39
0.007
4.8
0.029
259
0.000
200
0.000
245
0.000
111
0.000
253
0.000
240
0.000
78.5
0.000
141
0.000
351
0.000
248
0.000
0.41
0.521
182
0.000
141
0.000
362
0.000
326
0.000
A secure income results
from using agreements
No
22
131
170
91
18
78
510
%
4.31
25.69
33.33
17.84
3.53
15.29
100
Agreements result in a
higher margin for the
landowner
No
14
83
194
106
24
93
514
%
2.72
16.15
37.74
20.62
4.67
18.09
100
Landowners are free to
pursue other interests
No
38
309
86
26
7
45
511
%
7.44
60.47
16.83
5.09
1.37
8.81
100
Landowners can lease
fresh ground
No
30
253
128
27
5
69
512
%
5.86
49.41
25.00
5.27
0.98
13.48
100
Better matching of land,
human and financial
resources
N
Landowners can try
new enterprises with
less risk
No
25
239
120
62
%
4.90
46.86
23.53
12.16
Economies of scale
can be achieved using
agreements
No
50
250
109
14
%
9.86
49.31
21.50
2.76
Agreements allow
investment in
agriculture
No
36
281
103
27
%
7.07
55.21
20.24
Agreements can be
used as a substitute for
the pension
No
19
197
%
3.73
Agreements mean less
work for the landowner
No
%
New entrants or
young people can
enter agriculture using
agreements
N
78
324
45
12
%
15.20
63.16
8.77
2.34
Agreements don’t
create opp. for future
development
No
10
24
78
283
%
1.95
4.69
15.23
55.27
Using agreements gain
better returns from land
investments
No
12
82
196
89
%
2.34
16.02
38.28
17.38
Existing landowner will
increase turnover by
leasing land
No
26
256
121
34
%
5.09
50.10
23.68
6.65
Leasing spreads risks
by using multiple sites
No
16
247
116
46
%
3.14
48.43
22.75
9.02
Landowners can
spell land by leasing
another’s
No
31
374
53
14
%
6.04
72.90
10.33
2.73
Leasing results in a
better use of capital
No
71
306
75
16
%
13.84
59.65
14.62
3.12
o
%
o
42
266
107
21
2
68
506
8.30
52.57
21.15
4.15
0.40
13.44
100
9
55
510
1.76
10.78
100
3
81
507
0.59
15.98
100
2
60
509
5.30
0.39
11.79
100
125
48
19
102
510
38.63
24.51
9.41
3.73
20.00
100
41
255
100
61
8
44
509
8.06
50.10
19.65
11.98
1.57
8.64
100
6
48
513
1.17
9.36
100
55
62
512
10.74
12.11
100
14
119
512
2.73
23.24
100
6
68
511
1.17
13.31
100
6
79
510
1.18
15.49
100
1
40
513
0.19
7.80
100
2
43
513
0.39
8.38
100
a
The probability corresponds to a Chi2 test of the null hypothesis (Ho) that the proportion of
respondents in the “For” (SA and A) category equals the proportion in the “Against” (D and SD)
category.
80 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
The benefits table indicates that landowners agree with the following benefits
of alternative land tenure agreements: • Landowners are free to pursue other interests if they have an agreement.
• One benefit of leasing is that landowners can lease fresh ground.
• The agreements provide opportunities for better matching of land, human
and financial resources.
• Landowners can try new enterprises with less risk.
• Economies of scale can be achieved by using agreements.
• Agreements allow investment in agriculture.
• Agreements mean less work for the landowner.
• New entrants or young farmers can enter agriculture using leasing and
sharefarming agreements.
• Agreements create opportunities for future agricultural development.
• An existing landowner can increase turnover by leasing another person’s
land.
• Leasing spreads risks by using multiple sites.
• Landowners can spell land by leasing another’s.
• Using a lease results in better use of capital because to expand you don’t
have to buy more land.
The Chi squared test supported that agreements can be used as a substitute for
the pension, can provide a secure income and will result in a higher margin for
the landowner. There were a large number of surveys with ‘Neutral’ and ‘Don’t
Know’ responses, therefore the findings of the Chi-squared test would have
to be regarded as inconclusive. However, of those that did give an opinion to
these statements, the ones with current agreements were more likely to agree
that “a secure income results from agreements”, with 70% agreeing compared
to only 48% of landowners without current agreements (p=0.001, n=262).
The results for the proposed benefit of gaining better returns on their land
investment was not supported with the ‘Agrees’ and ‘Disagrees’ evenly spread
and a large number of ‘Neutrals’ (p-value of 0.521).
Results
4.3.6.
Research Question 6:
What is the level of formality and duration of
alternative land tenure agreements?
Table 17: Use of written agreements.
Previous
agreements
Percentage of
total answering
Current
agreements
Percentage of
total answering
Yes
71
46.7
101
52.9
No
58
38.2
75
39.5
Sometimes
23
15.1
15
7.9
n=152
n=191
Table 17 indicates that slightly more landowners currently use written
agreements than in the past. Although respondents ‘sometimes’ used written
agreements more in the past, which means that there can be no clear
distinction between the level of formal agreements in the past compared to the
present.
When the current and past agreement results were compared to the
landowners’ enterprise it was found that beef properties were more likely to
have informal, unwritten agreements and dairy properties were more likely to
have written agreements.
For the beef properties 47% of current agreements were unwritten and 12%
were written ‘sometimes’, compared to 32% unwritten and 4% ‘sometimes’
written for all other industries (p=0.004, n=191).
For dairy properties 66% of current agreements were written compared to 49%
of all other industries using written agreements (p=0.025, n=191).
Table 18: Terms of alternative land tenure agreements.
Previous
agreement
term
Percentage
of total
answering
Current
agreement
term
Percentage of
total answering
1-2 years
89
58.2
51
26.8
More than 3
years
49
32.0
112
58.9
Both
15
9.8
27
14.2
n=153
n=190
Table 18 indicates that agreements of more than three years are relatively more
common now than in the past.
When the terms of current and past agreements were compared to the
landowners’ enterprise the results indicated that; beef properties were more
likely to use both short and long-term agreements and the most likely to use
just short-term agreements; and the dairy and forestry industries were more
likely to have long-term agreements.
•
81
82 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
For beef properties 21% indicated that they used both short and long-term
agreements and 50% indicated that they only used long-term agreements. This
was compared to 8% of all other industries using both short and long-term
agreements and 67% using only long-term agreements (p=0.016, n=190).
Dairy properties had 76% using long-term agreements compared to 53% for all
other industries (p=0.007, n=190).
Forestry properties had 93% using long-term agreements compared to 56% for
the rest (p=0.016, n=190). Although there were only 15 entries, there were
no short-term agreements and only one respondent who indicated using both
short and long-term agreements.
4.3.7.
Research Question 7: How well do landowners
have to know the lessees?
Table 19: Relationship of the landowner to the second party of agreements
Second parties
relationship
Previous
agreements
Percentage
of total
answering
Current
agreements
Percentage
of total
answering
Family member
24
12.7
45
19.2
Neighbour
54
28.7
61
26.1
Company
13
6.9
34
14.5
Acquaintance
34
18.1
26
11.1
Friend
16
8.5
13
5.6
Previously
unknown
29
15.4
29
12.3
Contractor
12
6.3
12
5.1
Government
1
0.5
5
2.1
Other
5
2.7
9
3.8
n=188
n=234
This table indicates that landowners enter more agreements with neighbours,
family members, friends and acquaintances, although previously unknown
individuals make up approximately 12-15% of agreements.
This supports the finding of Research Question 4, where respondents agreed
strongly with the statement; “You have to be able to trust the other party to
enter into alternative land tenure agreements.” In fact this statement gained by
far the most ‘strongly agree’ responses, with 145, than any other statement in
Section 3 of the survey (the next highest was 78). This question also had the
fewest combined responses of ‘Neutral’ and ‘Don’t Know’.
Results
4.3.8.
Research Question 8: Do lifestyle issues have
any bearing on the adoption of alternative land
tenure agreements?
Particular statements contained in the results of Research Question 4 dealing
with the concerns of landowners, can be categorised as lifestyle issues. These
include: • Hassles could result from entering alternative land tenure agreements.
• Sharefarmers and leaseholders might have different ideas about what
constitutes good management.
• An agreement could result in less privacy.
• Personal conflicts might arise.
Landowners agreed with these concerns indicating that lifestyle issues could
be a barrier to the adoption of alternative land tenure agreements. The
landowners also agreed that most do not want to enter alternative land tenure
agreements because they would rather farm themselves. However, at the same
time these landowners agreed that landowners entering into alternative land
tenure agreements will be free to pursue other interests, will have less work or
a lower workload.
•
83
84 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Table 20: Relationships between expressed interest in entering agreements
and concerns landowners have with alternative land tenure agreements
‘No’ - Not interested in an agreement
Now
‘Yes’ - Interested in an agreement Now
No significant results.
Most landowners would rather farm themselves
17% more likely to Disagree with this statement than
‘Maybe’,
19% more likely to Disagree with this statement than
‘No’
(p=0.001, n=316)
‘No’ - Not interested in an agreement in
5 years time
‘Yes’ - Interested in an agreement in 5 years time
No significant results.
Leasing causes land degradation
22% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
23% more likely to Disagree than ‘No’ (p=0.002,
n=262)
Agreements result in land being locked up for
long periods
15% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
26% more likely to Disagree than ‘No’ (p=0.006,
n=248)
Agreements result in less privacy
20% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
27% more likely to Disagree than ‘No’ (p=0.001,
n=290)
Most landowners would rather farm themselves
23% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
26% more likely to Disagree than ‘No’ (p=0.001,
n=294)
‘No’ - Not interested in an agreement
in 10 years time
‘Yes’ - Interested in an agreement in 10 years time
A lack of good employees makes it
hard to expand using leasing
25% more likely to Agree than ‘Maybe’
23% more likely to Agree than ‘Yes’
(p=0.001, n=230)
Most landowners would rather farm themselves
27% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
32% more likely to Disagree than ‘No’ (p=0.001,
n=273)
Key:
‘Yes’ = Interested in entering and agreement
‘Maybe’ = Maybe interested in entering an agreement
‘No’ = Not interested in entering an agreement
This table of comparisons indicates that respondents interested in entering
into an alternative land tenure agreement are more likely to disagree with the
concerns associated with alternative land tenure agreements. When compared
to results from Table 15, perceived hassles, conflicts and privacy issues appear
to be greater concerns for landowners that are not interested in alternative land
tenure.
Results
•
85
Table 21: Relationships between expressed interest in entering agreements and opinions of the
benefits of alternative land tenure agreements
‘No’ - Not interested in an agreement Now
‘Yes’ - Interested in an agreement Now
A secure income results from using
agreements
20% more likely to Disagree with this
statement than ‘Maybe’
36% more likely to Disagree with this
statement than ‘Yes’
(p=0.001, n=238)
Agreements result in a higher margin for the
landowner
27% more likely to Agree than with this
statement than ‘Maybe’
30% more likely to Agree with this statement
than ‘No’
(p=0.001, n=204)
Better matching of land, human and
financial resources
10.5% more likely to Disagree than
‘Maybe’
11% more likely to Disagree than ‘Yes’
(p=0.002, n=303)
Landowners can try new enterprises
with less risk
16% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
18% more likely to Disagree than ‘Yes’
(p=0.002, n=304)
Agreements allow investment in
agriculture
9% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
13% more likely to Disagree than ‘Yes’
(p=0.005, n=316)
‘No’ - Not interested in an agreement in 5
years time
‘Yes’ - Interested in an agreement in 5 years
time
Better matching of land, human and
financial resources
11% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
13% more likely to Disagree than ‘Yes’
(p=0.001, n=274)
Capital improvements not fairly rewarded
38% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
19% more likely to Disagree than ‘No’ (p=0.004,
n=148)
Agreements allow investment in
agriculture
13% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
13% more likely to Disagree than ‘Yes’
(p=0.001, n=293)
A secure income results from using
agreements
36% more likely to Agree than ‘Maybe’
46% more likely to Agree than ‘No’
(p=0.001, n=222)
Agreements result in a higher margin for the
landowner
37% more likely to Agree than ‘Maybe’
40% more likely to Agree than ‘No’
(p=0.001, n=194)
‘No’ - Not interested in an agreement in 10
years time
‘Yes’ - Interested in an agreement in 10 years
time
Agreements allow investment in
agriculture
12% more likely to Disagree than ‘Maybe’
11% more likely to Disagree than ‘Yes’
(p=0.008, n=273)
A secure income results from using
agreements
32% more likely to Agree than ‘Maybe’
42% more likely to Agree than ‘No’
(p=0.002, n=203)
Key:
‘Yes’ = Interested in entering and agreement
‘Maybe’ = Maybe interested in entering an
agreement
‘No’ = Not interested in entering an agreement
Agreements result in a higher margin for the
landowner
35% more likely to Agree than ‘Maybe’
48% more likely to Agree than ‘No’
(p=0.001, n=180)
86 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
The comparisons of Table 21 indicates that respondents interested in entering
into an alternative land tenure agreement are more likely to agree with the
economic benefits of alternative land tenure, while those that are not interested
are more likely to disagree with the economic benefits.
Not only are landowners concerned about lifestyle issues but they are also less
likely to agree with the proposed economic benefits of alternative land tenure
agreements.
4.3.9.
Research Question 9: What are the
characteristics of landowners that have used or
are using alternative land tenure agreements?
Average age, sex, geographical region and percentage of working time spent
farming failed to reveal any significant differences between those involved in
alternative land tenure agreements compared to those who have never been
involved.
Significant results were:
• Those with previous agreements had larger landholding than those without
previous agreements - an average of 1254ha compared to 476ha (p-value of
0.001).
• Those with previous agreements had been farming longer than those
without previous agreements - an average of 26.3 years compared to 22.6
years (p-value of 0.02).
• Those with previous agreements had derived a higher percentage of
their total income from their land compared to those without previous
agreements - an average of 56% compared to 47% (p-value of 0.03).
• Those that have a farm manager are more likely to be currently involved in
alternative land tenure agreements (p-value of 0.001).
• Those that have a tertiary education, including Technical, Trade School and
TAFE were more likely to have current agreements, than those with an
education, up to and including, year 12 (p value of 0.001).
Land Tenure
Land
Tenure
and
Land Managementand
Alternatives
Land Management
Alternatives
Five:Five:Discussion
Discussion
88 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
The survey indicated that the level of use of alternative land tenure agreements
lies between 31% and 39%. This is much higher than the incidence found in
studies by Cutri (1995) and Fulton (2000), where the incidence was 2.2% and
23.1% respectively. Therefore there is a sizeable portion, approximately one
third, of Tasmanian landowners involved in alternative land tenure. This means
that the following discussion of the survey results in relation to the literature
and research questions, is relevant to Tasmanian landowners and farmers,
Tasmanian agriculture in general and policy makers in government.
The most popular type of agreement was a lease with 59% of agreements,
followed by joint ventures (26%) and sharefarming (15%).
The survey indicated that alternative land tenure agreements are entrenched in
Tasmanian agriculture and spread out across all industry sectors. The biggest
users of agreements, as a percentage of those involved in the industry, were
those in the dairy industry (60.5%). This is not a surprise as sharefarming has
been a major focus in this industry for a number of years. The beef/grazing
industry had the overall highest number of agreements, which reflects the
larger number of landowners indicating that this was one of their primary
enterprises.
The agreements were used in the production of all major commodities and
products, which were not necessarily the same as the main enterprise/s of the
landowner. The largest number of current and past agreements were used to
produce beef or for grazing. However, cropping and potato production when
combined outstripped the number producing beef indicating that alternative
land tenure agreements are entrenched in the cropping industries.
There were 11 different alternative land tenure agreements discussed in the
preliminary interviews, which were in place at the time of the interview or
had been used recently. The key informants mentioned three other forms of
joint ventures that were in the pipeline but were by no means certain to go
ahead. This shows amazing diversity considering that only 14 people were
used for the study. While the current survey did not specifically ask for details
of each agreement, the answers given and general comments showed that there
are many different agreements currently in use. Some fifteen respondents
indicated that they used alternative land tenure agreements but failed to
indicate if the agreement involved leasing, a share component or was a joint
venture. This indicates that either the questions were not posed in a fashion
that captured their agreement’s structure or there was a misunderstanding by
the respondent.
The survey also indicated that between 25 and 33% of landowners have had
alternative land tenure agreements in the past. The overlap of the confidence
intervals between this and those indicating present agreements means that we
cannot be certain that alternative land tenure agreements are becoming more
or less prevalent in agriculture. The survey asked for all previous agreements
that the landowner was involved in. Taking into account timeframes could
mean that fewer agreements were used in the past because ‘current agreements’
are likely to involve a smaller timeframe than all ‘previous agreements’.
Previous agreements are potentially from the entire working life of the
landowners who had an average of 24 years earning an income from farming.
Experience from the preliminary interviews indicated that landowners could
Discussion
not always remember all the agreements used, which means that real level of
‘previous agreements’ could be understated. Whichever case has more bearing
does not alter the conclusion that alternative land tenure has been and is being
widely used by Tasmanian landowners.
Statistical analysis indicated that landowners with previous agreements have
much larger properties than those without previous agreements, 1254ha
compared to 476ha. However, these averages were swayed by a small number
of large properties making the average users of previous agreements appear
much larger than they actually are.
The crops and products being produced by these agreements were varied and
covered all aspects of Tasmanian agriculture. Forestry and potato operations
were the only enterprises to have significant changes in the proportion of
the total number of alternative land tenure agreements. Forestry moved
from 4% of past agreements to 19% of all current agreements, while potatoes
decreased from 18% of agreements in the past to 10% of all current agreements.
Anecdotal reports support the increase in forestry agreements. The decrease
in the proportion of potatoes agreements could be due to the size of each
agreement increasing, with the production company Simplot using large-scale
joint ventures and leases to move into non-traditional potato growing areas.
Despite the proportional increase in the level of forestry production, crop,
beef and dairy production were the categories most likely to continue using
alternative land tenure agreements. When each industry was compared to all
the others these three were almost twice as likely to have both past and current
agreements. This might indicate a higher success rate of these operations or
better outcomes for landowners when alternative land tenure agreements are
used to produce crops or beef and dairy products.
Growing potatoes using alternative land tenure agreements was specifically
separated from cropping by the respondents and warranted a separate category.
However, when the number growing potatoes was added together with the
number of agreements that involve cropping and poppies, the new combined
category has approximately 29% of current agreements and 36% of past
agreements.
This high level of cropping agreements is perhaps an indication of extensive
agricultural industries diversifying by using leases et cetera to produce high value
crops. This could also indicate that producers of these high value crops are
branching out and expanding using alternative land tenure agreements instead
of purchasing more land. This strategy can also overcome any temporary
problems with crop rotations, disease, weeds et cetera on their own properties.
A result of more cropping using leases, sharefarming and joint ventures is
that alternative land tenure agreements have the potential to have a high
impact on the environment of farms due to the high input nature of cropping,
especially if entering new or non-traditional cropping areas. At the same time
these agreements have the potential to generate high returns and increase
employment.
•
89
90 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
The extensive agricultural enterprises of beef/grazing, wool/sheep/fat lambs
had the next highest incidences of alternative land tenure agreements followed
by forestry.
When respondents to the survey were asked if they were interested in entering
an agreement now, in five years or ten years time, the number indicating ‘yes’
or ‘maybe’ was an approximation of current and previous levels of adoption
of 30-40%. The number indicating ‘yes’, that is they were interested, dropped
as the timeframe extended into the future. This could be an indication that
landowners will soon lose interest if agreements cannot be arranged in the near
future or that landowners expect alternative land tenure agreements to become
more prevalent in the near future but not in the long-term. However, it is
reasonable to assume that decisions in general become less certain the further
into the future you project them.
The ‘no’ answers were more likely to come from those without current
or previous agreements, with interest in entering an agreement (‘yes’ or
‘maybe’ answers) around 30%. Of those with current agreements or previous
agreements the interest was approximately 60%.
Although “no” was still the dominant answer to these questions and there were
more “maybe” interested answers compared to “yes” these results illustrate that
there is interest in these agreements out there amongst landowners, even those
who have never had agreements. This is backed by the next question, which
indicated that 40% of those interested had attempted to enter one of these
agreements in the past.
Once again by far the most attractive agreement to those interested was a lease
with 65% of respondents. A joint venture or sharefarming agreement interested
15% and 17% of respondents respectively. The greater interest in leasing could
be related to this being the most commonly used agreement; it might be due to
the simple nature of a lease meaning less chance of conflict; or it might be the
most understood of all the three agreements discussed.
There still remain numerous landowners not interested in alternative land
tenure. This might stem from the concerns outweighing the benefits. The
survey results indicate that the answers of the people entering into alternative
land tenure agreements were not related to the demographic factors of age,
sex or location. The only interactions found were that those with previous
agreements or farm managers were more likely to have current agreements;
and those indicating a technical/TAFE/trade school or tertiary qualifications
were more likely to have current agreements than an those with an education
up to and including year 12. The first two interactions are common sense as
those previously involved have experience in using agreements and are likely
to renew arrangements. For those landowners with farm managers, paying a
wage for management or entering an agreement to manage an enterprise are
not that different. The final education interaction could be that a technical or
higher education opens up landowners to new ideas and therefore increases
the likelihood of adopting alternative land tenure agreements.
Landowners in general were concerned about general hassles, less privacy,
the other party having different management ideas, not getting paid and
the possibility of conflicts arising. They also thought that there is a lack of
Discussion
information about the agreements and a lack of suitable employees to expand
operations if they did lease more land.
However the respondents did not agree that leasing causes land degradation.
The landowners using alternative land tenure were the biggest factor in
opposition to the statement that “leasing causes land degradation”, where 79%
using agreements disagreed with the statement compared to 51% of all others.
This result contradicts the majority of international literature where leasing
is seen as accelerating land degradation (Erwin, 1982; Mather, 1982; Buttel
et al., 1990; Rasmussen, 1999), especially if the landowners no longer live
in the district (Dillman and Carlson, 1982; Dudley et al., 1992; Wunderlich,
1993; Constance et al., 1996). The preliminary interviews also illustrated
that “mining” or unsustainable farming practices were a major concern of
Tasmanian landowners. This suggests that either: • the preliminary interviews were biased in some way;
• there is no substantial land degradation caused by lessees, sharefarmers and
joint venturers in Tasmania;
• the lessees, sharefarmers and joint venturers cause no more land
degradation than the current landowners;
• there is land degradation and the landowners do not realise that it is
present; or
• the landowners do not live in the same area as their land and behave as the
literature indicates.
Without doing an environmental audit we cannot determine which is
the correct assumption. If environmental problems are found or develop,
international literature suggest that negative environmental outcomes can be
partially rectified by using crop-share agreements, encouraging a low turnover
of lessees, long-term leases and kinship ties (Dillman and Carlson, 1982;
Thomassin and Baker, 1989; Baker and Thomassin, 1991). These strategies can
also be encouraged as measures to prevent or limit environmental problems.
When comparing the results of the survey to the preliminary interviews, it
must be considered that the survey asked what people thought of the following
statement; “leasing causes land degradation”, not a broad question of the
disadvantages of alternative land tenure, which raised “mining” as a concern in
the preliminary interviews. The survey results disagreeing with this statement
could also be due to landowners being uncertain of what constitutes “land
degradation” or specifically what this means, although the pretests did not
indicate a problem with the phrasing of the statement. The term “mining” for a
landowner might mean taking more nutrients from the land without replacing
them with fertiliser, rather than degradation, erosion, weeds et cetera. A different
statement might be posed in future surveys. Perhaps, “leasing results in
unsustainable farming practices.”
Landowners, as a group, strongly agreed with the suggested benefits of
alternative land tenure agreements. That is: • alternative land tenure agreements provide opportunities for future
development;
• landowners are free to pursue other interests;
• landowners can lease fresh ground and spell their own land;
•
91
92 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
•
•
•
•
•
landowners can minimise the risk of new enterprises or spread risks of
current enterprises by using multiple sites;
agreements allow investment in agriculture, economies of scale, better
matching of human and financial resources with land, better use of capital;
agreements mean less work and a smaller work load for landowners;
existing landowners can increase turnover; and
new entrants or young farmers can enter agriculture, while older
landowners can use agreements as a substitute for the pension.
This agrees with the findings of the preliminary interviews and Campbell
(1980); Bourne (1997); Page (1997); Perkins (1997); and Johnson (1998).
These points show that landowners agree that alternative land tenure can
deliver a number of benefits both personally and to agriculture in general. Yet
despite a large interest in the agreements and wide knowledge of the potential
benefits there remain those who would rather not be involved. The reasons
behind this are likely to be either that the concerns outweigh the potential
benefits or that landowners and farmers place importance on the social and
cultural aspects of farming as suggested by Campbell and Fisher (1982; Gray
(1991); and Wright and Kaine (1997). The other alternatives could be that
landowners and farmers are simply not interested in making more profit;
increasing the overall efficiency of their farms; or their property might be
large, or underutilised, allowing an increase in scale or intensity of operations
without having to use an agreement.
This supposition was supported by the cross tabulations of interest in entering
an agreement now, in five or ten years time and attitudinal statements. The
landowners not interested in entering agreements were, as a group, more likely
to disagree with the proposed economic benefits of alternative land tenure
agreements. Those landowners that were interested in entering an agreement
were more likely to disagree with the lifestyle issues and agree with the
economic benefits. These results indicate that there are two different schools
of thought amongst landowners, and this is likely to have the biggest bearing
on the adoption of alternative land tenure agreements. However, a majority of
all landowners agreed that they would rather farm themselves and that they do
not want hassles, conflicts or less privacy.
The agreements that respondents were currently using were likely to be written
and for more than three years duration. However, there were differences in
the different industry types, with beef properties more likely to have shortterm informal agreements, while dairy properties were more likely to have
long-term written agreements and forestry land was more likely to have
long-term agreements. Overall there remain a large number of unwritten
and short-term agreements. The international literature suggests that shortterm planning horizons lead to an increase in land degradation and legally
binding agreements offer protection and aid conflict resolution (Doye, 1990;
Young, 1992; Hansen, 1996). These two points mean that there are a number
of landowners adding unknown risks to their operations, although having
a binding written agreement does not necessarily offer total protection. It
must be noted that the short-term and informal beef agreements are likely
to be opportunistic and low impact on the environment and finances of the
landowner. For example, a landowner might allow a neighbour to bale excess
pasture for some small cash payment.
Discussion
Perhaps the biggest hurdle for landowners becoming lessors was the ability to
trust the lessee. This was the single most supported question in the opinion
section (Section 3) of the survey. The issue of trust was also indicated as an
issue by most agreements being entered into with family members, neighbours
and friends with 50% of past and present agreements. This increases to 68%
and 62% respectively if acquaintances are also added. These results together
with the use of informal agreements by 40% of respondents agree with (Winter
and Short, 1988), who state the importance of kinship and neighbourly ties in
farming and how these bonds often mean formal agreements are replaced by
informal ones.
However, the survey did indicate that ‘previously unknown individuals’ hold
approximately 12% of current agreements and did hold 15% of previous
agreements. This means that some landowners are approaching or being
approached by strangers.
These findings agree with the results from the preliminary interviews, which
suggested that the majority of agreement opportunities are taken by those
people who have access to the local “grapevine” because most opportunities
are talked about and not advertised. Therefore if the person who wants access
to land does not know anyone in the district it will be difficult to know of
where the opportunities lie unless they are formally advertised.
Similar issues of trust were raised by Buttel et al. (1990). These concerns
could be addressed by the development of a certification system where good
operators can be recognised, allowing them to publicise their operational skills
and financial trustworthiness. If an operator steps out of line he or she should
lose this accreditation and therefore access to land. This would address the “not
getting paid” concern. Of course the system of trust currently in operation, that
is landowners will mostly deal with people they know, works the same way.
However, an extension of this ideal with an accreditation system would allow
outsider entrance for good, respectable operators and at the same time protect
those landowners entering agreements with strangers.
There is no doubt that accreditation is not needed for neighbours or good
friends, but it would allow good operators to prove they are responsible, which
would in return allow access to land that was previously only open to friends
or members of the local community.
Another problem is the lack of industry standard agreements. This was
illustrated by the preliminary interviews and also by a number of respondents
to the survey who indicated that they were involved in an alternative land
tenure agreement but did not, or could not, indicate which agreement form
they were using. Landowners are no doubt entering agreements that suit their
needs, however because there are no standards in place people must improvise
agreements. In some cases people informally agree to undertake certain tasks.
Informality is a common theme of many agreements and there is a widespread
reliance on verbal rather than written contracts, which is in agreement with
the findings of Campbell and Fisher (1982 and Geisler and Salamon (1993).
This improvisation or informality of agreements can lead to both confusion
and unfair or poorly devised agreements being struck. If potential lessees
could approach landowners with both accreditation and a standard agreement
•
93
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
in hand, some of the hindrances to different forms of land tenure would be
ameliorated.
To some extent any agreement has to be attractive to both parties. Therefore
a matching of the requirements of the two sides would help smooth out
problems and possibly facilitate a greater number of agreements being entered
into. For this to happen the most important concerns are obviously those of
the people that control the resource, the land.
These barriers would still be very hard to overcome completely. Farmers are
traditionally conservative and resistant to change as a whole. If alternative land
tenures are going to increase it is not going to happen overnight. There is still
a mentality that to farm you have to own land and if you own land you should
be doing things yourself. But as one respondent said, “As agriculture goes
forward the cost price squeeze forces agriculture to become more business
like.” To help landowners cope with changes in agriculture it is essential to
educate all landowners about the options of alternative land tenure agreements
as well as the benefits and pitfalls, especially those with an education ending
at or before year 12. The provision of information would address the current
situation with landowners agreeing that there is a lack of information about
alternative land tenure agreements.
As previously mentioned for many landowner/operators money is not the
only concern. They have a feeling of responsibility to the next generation
(Gray 1991) and often they do not know anything else apart from farming.
The question still remains; are alternative land tenure arrangements needed?
Campbell (1982) expressed the opinion that; “There is little evidence that
substantial economies could be achieved by increasing the scale of most
agricultural enterprises beyond that of an efficient family farm.” Some
respondents thought that alternative tenure only occurs in “bad times”. If
the need for more agreements does arise, accreditation, standard agreements
and codes of good practice might pry open opportunities for agricultural
expansion.
There still remains a problem for people outside of agriculture entering the
sector. The preliminary interviews and the survey results concluded that
alternate land tenure presents opportunities for new entrants and young
people. However this entry is stifled on two fronts. Firstly the person has
to be known in the district and secondly there are large amounts of capital
required. Even if the newcomer does not buy land they still require large
amounts of capital for machinery. Which bank would lend money to a
young person without substantial contracts or someone with land or capital
guaranteeing the loan? A catch 22 situation, you cannot get land or contracts
without money and you cannot get money without contracts or land. Therefore
as it stands new entrants will come from the agricultural sector in the form of
farmers’ children or from established producers, as predicted for tenancies in
the United Kingdom by Gibbard (1995). This situation could change if banks
could accept long-term leases as an asset.
Other possible entrants include investors with available capital. This allows the
possibility of partnerships, which involve three resources – human, physical
and financial – to be established. There might be a lessee, a landowner and
a financier involved. Finally there could be an establishment of a career path
Discussion
through alternate land tenures to encourage young outside entrants. These new
entrants could start as an employee, then become a sharefarmer, then a lessee
and some day finally own land themselves (as discussed by Agrawal, 1999 and
Emigh, 1997).
For those wishing for a graceful exit from agriculture alternative land tenure
agreements were seen as an option by 40% of respondents. This result was
not conclusive because many were concerned at being too reliant on an
agreement for income. “What would happen if the agreement failed, would
I have to farm again?” This was a common theme. If some of these concerns
could be countered then Tasmanian agriculture could see its ageing population
of farmers remaining involved in agriculture in the form of a landowner/
supervisor or even mentor of younger farmers. This would mean that these
elderly farmers do not have to give up all the benefits of their rural lifestyle by
selling up and moving into town.
Many respondents when giving opinions on the attitudinal statements of
section three of the survey when writing final comments wrote that their
attitudes were dependent on the agreement. In essence their opinion was
that “everything can be fixed by a good agreement.” Therefore this aspect of
alternative land tenure should be the major focus of the recommendations put
forward. However, there remains a large number of landowners that agree that
landowners “would rather farm themselves”. If this is the case then the use of
alternative land tenure agreements is not likely to increase dramatically if at all.
•
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Six: Six:
Recommendations
Recommendations
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1. A booklet along the same lines as the National Share Dairy Farming Guide Book
(ADFF, 1997) should be developed containing five major items:(a) a set of instructions detailing the benefits and possible pitfalls of leasing,
sharefarming and joint venture agreements;
(b) simple standard agreements for leasing, sharecropping, sharefarming and
joint ventures;
(c) a set of guidelines for good leasing/sharecropping practice;
(d) a set of instructions for conflict resolution; and
(e) a clear set of financial alternatives.
If this recommendation could be enacted then the booklet could act as a
blueprint to:
•
•
•
•
•
stimulate interest in, and awareness of the subject;
set benchmark industry standards;
allow lessees to approach landowners with all the required information in
hand (and vice versa);
allow the correct selection of the most appropriate agreement; and
encourage the people involved to meet the needs of the other party.
However, this should be developed in consultation with solicitors, consultants,
primary producers and other stakeholders to ensure that the document is
workable.
2. A certification system could be developed to help promote good practice
and allow access to land for those certified along industry standard
practice.
This would allow good producers to approach landowners with proof of good
practice and good intent and thereby gain access to land.
3. A submission to the Australian Bureau of Statistics should be made aiming
at including one or two questions about the use of alternative land tenure
agreements on the Agricultural Commodities Survey.
If questions could be placed on the Agricultural Commodities Survey a
better picture of alternative land tenure could be obtained and lead to better
information and if continued for a number of years provide researchers with
invaluable land tenure statistics.
4. An attempt should be made to benchmark values for leased land in the
agricultural districts of Tasmania, with indications of rentals for land of
particular classes, and for specific purposes.
If landowners could be made aware of potential leasing values then this might
encourage more agreements or allow landowners to make more informed land
tenure decisions.
5. Lobbying government to waive any stamp duties on alternative land tenure
agreements might encourage more legally binding agreements.
Recommendations •
6. The benefits of alternative land tenure should be publicised, along with
examples of successful agreements; to raise awareness of the issues in the
general community including potential investors and equity partners.
99
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Seven:
References
Seven: References
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Flude, P. (1999). A case for investment in rural enterprises. Agricultural
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References •
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Appendices
Appendices
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Appendix 1:
Research tool – primary producers
Start time: ................................................... Date…………………….
Introduction
My name is………………… and I am working on a project about alternatives to traditional land
ownership in Tasmania, with the Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR). The purpose
of this interview is to gather information from people that have a working knowledge of the operation and
performance of different land ownership and management strategies. This interview will take advantage of
your experience and opinions of issues related to this project.
Research Tool-Primary Producer
The aim of this section is to find out about you, your farm and your farming business.
Part 1
1.
How long have you been involved in agriculture (number of years excluding
childhood)?
2.
How many generations has your family been involved in agriculture?
3.
Were your parents farmers?
4.
What year were you born?
5.
Respondents gender
6.
What is your marital status?
Male
Female
(Circle)
never married
now married
separated
divorced
widowed
a de facto relationship
7.
Which of the following best describes who manages the farming business?
one member of the family
two or more members of the family?
an employed manager
a contract company
other (specify) ..................................
not sure
Appendices •
8.
What relation is the manager or managers to you? (Do not prompt)
yourself
your spouse
your son(s)/son(s)-in-law
your daughter(s)/daughter(s)-in-law
your father/father in law
your mother/mother in law
your brother/brother in law
your sister/sister in law
your granddaughter(s)
your grandmother
your grandfather
your employer
your employee
other (specify)..........................................
9.
Do you have any children?
Yes
No
10. How many children do you have? …..
11. How many of your children live away from home?….
12. How many of your children are financially independent?…..
13. Do you want any of your children to continue farming?
No
Yes
14. Do you expect any of your children to continue farming?
No
Yes
15. What is your level of education?
no formal education
primary
secondary with agriculture
secondary without agriculture
technical/trade
tertiary agriculture
tertiary other
other (specify)..........................................
16. In which year did you finish your formal education? (eg 1978)
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17. How are you employed?
employee full time
employee part time
self employed (on-farm)
self employed (off-farm)
self employed (on-farm) and employee part time (off-farm)
self employed (off-farm) and employee part time (off-farm)
self employed (on-farm) and employee full time (off-farm)
self-employed (off-farm) and employee full time (off-farm)
self employed and seeking work
Other (specify)..........................................
18. Are any contractors used for jobs such as fencing, milking or cropping operations?
Yes
No
How many contractors do you use?…..
19. Is your usual occupation “farmer”?
Yes
No
(If No) What is your usual occupation? (specify)
……………………………………………………………………………
20. Does your spouse work in the farm business full time, part time, casually or not at
all?
full time
part time
casually
not at all
21. Do any other family members work for the business in any of the following
situations? (How many?)
(if so fill in with numbers)
full time
part time
casually
seasonally
Do they receive a share of the profit
Do they work for board/pocket money
Do they work to help out
other (specify).………........................................
22. Are any people working on the farm who are not family members? Yes
No
(If Yes, are they? How many next to box)
part-time
full-time
casually
seasonally
other (specify).………........................................
Appendices •
23. What are your main agricultural activities?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
24. In general how has the weather been in the last 12 months?
Very favourable
Favourable
About average
Unfavourable
Very unfavourable
Don’t know
25. How would you describe your level of output in the last 12 months (in terms of
volume rather than money)?
Substantially below average
Below average
About average
Above average
Well above average
Don’t know
26. How long do you plan to farm for?
indefinitely
until retirement
until the children grow up
for a short time while we look for something else
only until we can sell
not sure
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Part 2
The questions your are about to be asked are specific to the research topic and they might require a more in
depth discussion.
27. How many hectares/acres are
preferred)
Hectares Acres (circle
owned by you/your family?
rented or leased by you/your family?
share-cropped by you/your family?
share-farmed by you/your family?
leased rented or share cropped to another farmer?
involved in a joint venture with another party?
28. Can you describe this/these arrangement/s? (Details? Also prompt are the arrangements
formal or informal?)
29. How did the arrangement/s develop?
30. What have you gained from the arrangement/s?
31. What has the other party gained from the arrangement/s?
32. What have been the disadvantages of the arrangement/s entered into (if any)?
33. What would you do differently if you could?
34. Who has benefited the most from the arrangement/s?
Appendices •
35. Are you involved in any other types of arrangements/agreements not already
mentioned?
36. Do have any ideas about whether or not the fixed nature of agricultural land
ownership is a problem for agriculture? (Why?)
37. Do you think that alternative land tenure approaches present opportunities for
future agricultural development? (Why?)
38. What are the downsides of alternative land tenure?
39. Do you know anyone who would have information relevant to this project? (Names
etc..)
Thank you again for your time. We value your contribution to the project. If you have
any questions about this survey or would like a copy of the final report, just contact
Shane Broad or Amabel Fulton on 03 62 262651.
Finish time: ...............................................
Length of interview............................mins
Interviewer declaration
I declare that this interview was conducted in accordance with briefing instructions
and the ethical guidelines of the University of Tasmania, the information gathered is
true and accurate and that respondent confidentiality will be maintained.
Signed: ................................................................................
Date: ..........................
Name: .................................................................................
115
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Appendix 2:
Research tool - key informants
Start time: ................................................... Date…………………….
Introduction
My name is ……………… and I am working on a project about alternatives to traditional land
ownership in Tasmania, with the Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR). The purpose of
this interview is to gather information from people that have a wide contact with the farming community.
This interview will take advantage of your experience and opinions of issues related to this project.
Research Tool- Key Informants
The aim of this section is to find out about you and your experience in agriculture.
Part 1
18. How long have you been involved in agriculture (number of years excluding
childhood)?…….
19. What year were you born?………………
20. Gender
Male
Female
(Circle)
21. What is your level of education?
no formal education
primary
secondary with agriculture
secondary without agriculture
technical/trade
tertiary agriculture
tertiary other
other (specify)..........................................
22. In which year did you finish your formal education? (eg 1978)……
23. How are you employed?
employee full time
employee part time
self employed (on-farm)
self employed (off-farm)
self employed (on-farm) and employee part time (off-farm)
self employed (off-farm) and employee part time (off-farm)
self employed (on-farm) and employee full time (off-farm)
self-employed (off-farm) and employee full time (off-farm)
self employed and seeking work
other (specify)..........................................
Appendices •
24. What is the aspect of agriculture that you are involved in?…………………………………………
…. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
25. How long have you been involved in this/these field/s? ……………………………………………
…… ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
Part 2
In the following section you will be asked about your knowledge and experiences in five different types of
land tenure arrangements. A guide to these tenure categories are:
1. Renting or leasing
2. Share-cropping
3. Share-farming
4. Joint ventures
These are designed to answer the main issues of the research report. We are interested in both successful and
unsuccessful arrangements. Finally you will be asked two general questions about your opinions of the topic
as a whole.
Renting or leasing
26. Can you briefly describe renting or leasing arrangements in which you have been
involved?
a.
What was/is your main role?
b.
How many clients or situations have you dealt with? (approximately)……………….
c.
Do you know how these arrangement/s developed? (can you explain?)
d.
Do you know of any benefits gained from the arrangement/s you have described?
e.
Do you know of any disadvantages of the arrangement/s you have described?
f.
In your opinion what could be done differently?
g.
Who do you think benefits the most from these arrangement/s?
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Share-cropping
27. Can you briefly describe share-cropping arrangements in which you have been
involved?
a.
What was/is your main role?
b.
How many clients or situations have you dealt with? (approximately)……………….
c.
Do you know how these arrangement/s developed? (can you explain?)
d.
Do you know of any benefits gained from the arrangement/s you have described?
e.
Do you know of any disadvantages of the arrangement/s you have described?
f.
In your opinion what could be done differently?
g.
Who do you think benefits the most from these arrangement/s?
Share-farming
28. Can you briefly describe share-farming arrangements in which you have been
involved?
a.
What was/is your main role?
b.
How many clients or situations have you dealt with? (approximately)……………….
Appendices •
c.
Do you know how these arrangement/s developed? (can you explain?)
d.
Do you know of any benefits gained from the arrangement/s you have described?
e.
Do you know of any disadvantages of the arrangement/s you have described?
f.
In your opinion what could be done differently?
g.
Who do you think benefits the most from these arrangement/s?
Joint ventures
29. Can you briefly describe joint venture arrangements in which you have been
involved?
a.
What was/is your main role?
b.
How many clients or situations have you dealt with? (approximately)……………….
c.
Do you know how these arrangement/s developed? (can you explain?)
d.
Do you know of any benefits gained from the arrangement/s you have described?
e.
Do you know of any disadvantages of the arrangement/s you have described?
f.
In your opinion what could be done differently?
g.
Who do you think benefits the most from these arrangement/s?
119
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
30. Can you think of any other arrangements/agreements not already mentioned?
General Questions
31. Do have any ideas about whether or not the fixed nature of agricultural land
ownership is a problem for agriculture? (Why?)
32. Do you think that alternative land tenure approaches present opportunities for
future agricultural development? (Why?)
33. What are the disadvantages of alternative land tenure?
34. Do you know of anyone who would have some information relevant to this
project?
Finish time: ...............................................
Length of interview............................mins
Interviewer declaration
I declare that this interview was conducted in accordance with briefing instructions
and the ethical guidelines of the University of Tasmania, the information gathered is
true and accurate and that respondent confidentiality will be maintained.
Signed: ................................................................................
Date: ..........................
Name: .................................................................................
Appendices •
Appendix 3:
Preliminary interview information sheet
Information Sheet
Project Title: The Separation of the Ownership and Management of Land in
Tasmanian Farming: the Benefits and Consequences
Chief Investigator:
Amabel Fulton, Rural Sociologist, TIAR.
Associate investigator:
University of Tasmania
Shane Broad, 4th year agricultural science student,
What is the purpose of the study? To determine what alternative land tenure
arrangements are in place in Tasmania and how well these arrangements are
working.
What is land tenure? Tenure is the right or title by which land is held. The
tenure of most Tasmanian farms is held by the person who manages the land
(the farmer). There are options other than this ‘traditional approach” of an
owner/operator and these are called “alternative land tenure arrangements”
(for example sharefarming and joint ventures).
What is TIAR? The Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR)
was formed as a partnership between the Tasmanian Department of Primary
Industry and Fisheries (DPIF) and the University of Tasmania in May 1997.
The Institute was formed to provide greater focus on agricultural industries
and agricultural research and development (R&D) and to ensure research
programs meet the needs and priorities of Tasmania’s agricultural industries.
Who is being interviewed? Subjects being sort for interviews are both key
informants in agricultural research and consulting and primary producers
involved in various land tenure arrangements.
What questions are being asked? The people interviewed will be asked about
their experiences of various forms of land tenure.
How will the interview proceed? You will be given a copy of this information
sheet to keep. An interviewer will undertake interviews at a time and place
suited to you. The interview itself will probably take up to an hour, depending
on how much information you wish to provide.
How will I know that the results will be confidential? Notes will be taken
during the interview and these will be used as a basis for the data review. This
data will be coded so that your identity remains confidential, and notes will
stored in a locked cabinet at the University of Tasmania.
Will my comments be anonymous? Yes. Your comments will appear in the
final report, but to ensure anonymity they will not be associated with your
name. If after the interview you have any concerns about the comments you
have made, please contact your interviewer and ask them to remove them from
your interview notes.
121
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Can I withdraw if I wish? Before you are interviewed, you will be asked to
give your consent to being involved in the review. If you do, you will be asked
to sign a consent form, to demonstrate your willingness to be participate. You
will be given a copy of the consent form to keep. If at any time you wish to
withdraw from the review process, you are free to do so by contacting the chief
investigator.
When will the report be available? The report will be completed in early
February. Once completed you will be invited to a seminar to discuss the
findings. You will also be sent a copy of the final report.
Contact persons For further information about the study, contact:
Shane Broad
62262651 (bh); 62242203 (ah);
[email protected],
Amabel Fulton
62262651 (bh); 62311419 (ah);
[email protected]; 03 62267450 fax, or
or send any inquiries c/-TIAR, GPO Box 252-54, Hobart 7001
Concerns or complaints If you have any concerns of an ethical nature or
complaints about the manner in which the project is conducted, contact Ms
Chris Hooper, at the University Ethics Committee (Human Experimentation)
on 62262763
Appendices •
Appendix 4:
Preliminary interview consent form
The Separation of the Ownership and Management of
Land in Tasmanian Farming: the Benefits, Costs and
Consequences
Consent Form
1. I have understood the ‘Information sheet’ for this study.
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me.
3. I understand that the study involves a series of questions that evaluate my
experiences and understanding of the issues involved in alternative land
tenure in Tasmania.
4. I understand that all research data will be treated as confidential.
5. Any questions that have been asked have been answered to my satisfaction.
6. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may
withdraw at any time without prejudice.
I agree that the research data gathered for the study may be published
provided that I cannot be identified as a subject.
Name of participant…………………………………………………………..
Signature of participant…………………………Date……………………….
7. I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to
this volunteer and believe that the consent is informed and that he/she
understands the implications of participation.
Name of investigator………………………………………………………….
Signature of investigator………………………..Date……………………….
123
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Appendix 5:
Research tool - case studies
Start time: ................................................... Date…………………….
Introduction
My name is………………… and I am working on a project about land ownership and management
alternatives in agriculture, with the Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR) and the Rural
Industries Research and Development Corporation (RIRDC). The purpose of this interview is to gather
information from people that have a working knowledge of the operation and performance of different land
ownership and management strategies. This interview will take advantage of your experience and opinions
of issues related to this project.
Research Tool-Case studies
•
The aim of initial questions is to find out about you and the businesses/people you deal with.
35. What year were you born?
36. Respondents gender
Male
Female
(Circle)
37. What is your level of education?
No formal education
Primary
Secondary with agriculture
secondary without agriculture
technical/trade
Tertiary agriculture
tertiary other
other (specify)..........................................
38. In which calendar year did you finish your formal education? (eg 1978)
39. Who is your employer? (self employed?)
40. What is the nature of the business? (production of carrots, processing company etc)
41. What are your main agricultural activities?
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………
Appendices •
42. How many work for the business? (including family members, approximately if necessary)
part-time
full-time
Casually
Seasonally
other (specify).………........................................
Family unpaid
Pocket money/board
43. Are any contractors used for jobs such as fencing, milking or cropping operations?
Yes
No
How many contractors do you use?…….
44. Does your business/employer own any land, approximate hectares or acres of each.
(circle preferred)
Land Owned
Hectares
Ownership
Acres
Individually
Partnership
Family
Company
Trust
Other (specify)………………………….
45. (For land owners) which of the following describes how you acquired your land?
(If combination write area next to the box)
Company purchase
Purchased from non-family member
Purchased from family member, (specify relationship)………………………….
Inherited (specify relationship)…………………….……
Other (please specify)………………………….
46. (If applicable) Do you consider yourself to be a farmer?
No
Yes
47. (if yes).
How much of your working time is spent farming (approximate %)
How much of your income is derived from farming (approximate %)
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
48. How would you rate the future outlook of agriculture?
Very good
Good
Average
Poor
Very poor
Don’t know
49. How important is conservation (preserving the environment) in your operations?
Very important
Important
Unconcerned / haven’t thought about it
Unimportant
Very unimportant
Don’t know
•
The next question concerns the tenure status of land you utilise or own. This case study is meant
to deal with your present situation, but previous experiences that relate to your decisions also need
discussion.
50. Are you involved in alternative land tenure arrangements? How much land is
involved? What is your capacity? (Approximate area will suffice)
Hectares
Acres (Circle)
Capacity
Other
Present Agreement/s
Share farming
Lessee
Land
Owner
Financier
(specify)
………...
Number of Each
Le.
LO
Fin.
Renting/leasing
Joint venture
Other (specify)
…………………...
“Other” is to include any other non owner/operator agreement the respondent can think of.
51. Can you describe the present arrangement/s?
Prompts tick appropriate
Formal
Informal
Long-term
Short-term
52. How did the present arrangement/s develop?
Oth.
Appendices •
53. Why are you using this type of agreement/s instead of another? (prompt: previous
experience?)
54. Where did you get information about these agreements?
55. What have you gained from the arrangement/s? (prompt: environmental, social, financial)
56. What has the other party gained from the arrangement/s? (Also prompt: environmental,
social, financial)
57. What have been the disadvantages of the arrangement/s entered into (if any)?
58. How have your past experiences changed your present tenure arrangements?
59. What would you do differently if you could?
60. Does your equity level affect your decisions on if/when and what arrangements
you enter into?
61. Who has benefited the most from the arrangement/s?
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Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
62. What conditions do you place/are placed on agreements? (Prompt: social, environmental
and financial)
63. What conditions should be placed on agreements? (Prompt: social, environmental and
financial)
64. Do have any ideas about whether or not the fixed nature of agricultural land
ownership is a problem for agriculture? (Why?)
65. Do you think that alternative land tenure approaches present opportunities for
future agricultural development? (Why?)
66. What are the downsides of alternative land tenure?
•
Part of the project is the communication of farm management options to the farming community,
therefore….
67. Would you be willing to allow us to suggest to the rural media that you and your
operation might make an interesting story? Yes
No
(Circle)
•
{get some refs if possible, for example agreements, documents etc…}
Thank you again for your time. We value your contribution to the project. If you have
any questions about this survey, contact Shane Broad or Amabel Fulton on 03 62
262651.
Finish time: ...............................................
Length of interview............................mins
Interviewer declaration
I declare that this interview was conducted in accordance with briefing instructions
and the ethical guidelines of the University of Tasmania, the information gathered is
true and accurate and that respondent confidentiality will be maintained.
Signed: ................................................................................
Date: ..........................
Name: .................................................................................
Appendices •
Appendix 6:
Case study information sheet
Information Sheet
Project Title: Land Ownership and Management Alternatives in Australian
Agriculture
Investigator:
Amabel Fulton, Rural Sociologist, TIAR.
Research Assistant:
Shane Broad, TIAR.
What is the purpose of the study? To determine what land management
alternatives to owners/operator farming are in place in Australia and how well
these arrangements are working.
What are some of the alternatives? The alternatives include leasing,
sharefarming, joint ventures, franchising, corporate agriculture, lease back
arrangements et cetera.
Who is funding the project? This project is jointly funded by TIAR and
RIRDC.
What is TIAR? The Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR)
was formed as a partnership between the Tasmanian Department of Primary
Industry and Fisheries (DPIF) and the University of Tasmania in May 1997.
The Institute was formed to provide greater focus on agricultural industries
and agricultural research and development (R&D) and to ensure research
programs meet the needs and priorities of Tasmania’s agricultural industries.
What is RIRDC? The Rural Industries Research and Development
Corporation (RIRDC) is a statutory Corporation formed in July 1990 by the
Commonwealth Government, to work closely with Australian rural industries
on the organisation and funding of their R&D needs. RIRDC manages and
funds priority research, which results in practical outcomes for industry
development.
Who is being interviewed? Subjects being sort for interviews are person’s
fields such as agricultural finance, research, consulting and primary production,
where their work involves contact or participation in various land management
strategies.
What questions are being asked? The people interviewed will be asked about
their experiences of alternative land management strategies (for example
sharefarming or leasing).
How will the interview proceed? You will be given a copy of this information
sheet to keep. An interviewer will undertake interviews at a time and place
suited to you. The interview itself will probably take up to an hour, depending
on how much information you wish to provide.
How will I know that the results will be confidential? Notes will be taken
during the interview and these will be used as a basis for the data review. This
129
130 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
data will be coded so that your identity remains confidential, and notes will
stored in a locked cabinet at the University of Tasmania.
Will my comments be anonymous? Yes. Your comments will appear in the
final report, but to ensure anonymity they will not be associated with your
name. If after the interview you have any concerns about the comments you
have made, please contact your interviewer and ask them to remove them from
your interview notes.
Can I withdraw if I wish? Before you are interviewed, you will be asked to
give your consent to being involved in the review. If you do, you will be asked
to sign a consent form, to demonstrate your willingness to participate. You
will be given a copy of the consent form to keep. If at any time you wish to
withdraw from the review process, you are free to do so by contacting the chief
investigator.
Contact persons For further information about the study, contact:
Shane Broad
62262651 (bh); 62242203 (ah); [email protected],
Amabel Fulton
62262651 (bh); 62311419 (ah); email-Amabel.Fulton@utas.
edu.au; 03 62267450 fax,
or send any inquiries C/-TIAR, GPO Box 252-54, Hobart 7001
Concerns or complaints If you have any concerns of an ethical nature or
complaints about the manner in which the project is conducted, contact Ms
Chris Hooper, at the University Ethics Committee (Human Experimentation)
on 62262763
Appendices •
Appendix 7:
Case study introductory letter
Dear David,
The Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR), part of the
University of Tasmania, is seeking the co-operation of primary producers for
the purpose of conducting a study into the changing face of land tenure in the
state.
Tenure is the right or title by which land is held. The tenure of most
Tasmanian farms is held by the person who manages the land (the farmer).
There are options other than this “traditional approach” of an owner/
operator and these are called “alternative land tenure arrangements” (for
example sharefarming and joint ventures). The alternatives are seen by
several commentators as an opportunity to “open up” the farming sector to
development and improve the future viability of Australian agriculture.
It is important to determine the outcomes of these alternative land tenure
arrangements in order to focus attention on their benefits and consequences.
This will allow informed land tenure decisions to be made and hopefully allow
more efficient production in the rural sector as a whole.
In the absence of other studies, TIAR seeks to determine if the rural
communities and rural industries in general, are going benefit to from freer
land tenure arrangements.
I am interviewing people with experience or knowledge of,
• Share-cropping
• Sharefarming
• Joint ventures
• Leasing or renting land
• Corporate farming
You will be asked about their experiences of various forms of land tenure.
A copy of the project’s information sheet is included with this letter. The
interview will probably take up to an hour, depending on how much
information you wish to provide.
Details of the interview
Time
Date
Address
:
:
:
Your comments will be confidential and anonymous and you can withdraw at
any stage.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further information or you
wish to change the appointment.
Yours Sincerely
Shane Broad
Research Assistant
131
132 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Appendix 8:
Case study consent form
Land Ownership and Management Alternatives in
Australian Agriculture
Consent Form
8. I have understood the ‘Information sheet’ for this study.
9. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me.
10. I understand that the study involves a series of questions that evaluate my
experiences and understanding of the issues involved in land ownership
and management alternatives in Australian agriculture.
11. I understand that all research data will be treated as confidential.
12. Any questions that have been asked have been answered to my satisfaction.
13. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may
withdraw at any time without prejudice.
I agree that the research data gathered for the study may be published
provided that I cannot be identified as a subject.
Name of participant…………………………………………………………..
Signature of participant…………………………Date……………………….
14. I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to
this volunteer and believe that the consent is informed and that he/she
understands the implications of participation.
Name of investigator………………………………………………………….
Signature of investigator………………………..Date……………………….
Appendices •
Appendix 9:
LIST codes
L - Primary Production
L1 - Farming
L10 - Farming-Mixed
L101 - Farming-Mixed-Not irrigated
L102 - Farming-Mixed-Part irrigated
L103 - Farming-Mixed-All irrigated
L104 - Farming-Mixed-Irrigat.scheme
L11 - Farming-Cropping
L111 - Farming-Cropping-Not irrigated
L112 - Farming-Cropping-Part irrigate
L113 - Farming-Cropping-All irrigate
L114 - Farming-Cropping-Irrig.scheme
L12 - Farming-Dairying
L121 - Farming-Dairy-Not irrigated
L122 - Farming-Dairy-Part irrigated
L123 - Farming-Dairy-All irrigated
L124 - Farming-Dairy-Irrigat.scheme
L13 - Farming-Poultry
L14 - Farming-Mutton Bird Rookeries
L141 - Farming-Mutton Bird-Private
L142 - Farming-Mutton Bird-Crown
L15 - Farming-Grazing/Pastoral
L151 - Grazing/Pastoral-Not irrigated
L152 - Grazing/Pastoral-Part irrigate
L153 - Grazing/Pastoral-All irrigated
L154 - Grazing/Pastoral-Irrig.scheme
L155 - Grazing/Pastoral-Open, run, bush
L16 - Farming-Pigs
L17 - Farming Specialty Animals
L18 - Farming-Horses
L181 - Farming-Horses-Not irrigated
L182 - Farming-Horses-Part irrigated
L183 - Farming-Horses All irrigated
L184 - Farming-Horses Irrigation scheme
L185 - Farming-Horses Open, run, bush
L19 - Farming-Speciality
L2 - Horticulture/Market Gardening
L20 - Orchard
L201 - Orchard-Not irrigated
L202 - Orchard-Part irrigated
L203 - Orchard-All irrigated
L204 - Orchard-Irrigation scheme
L21 - Hops
L211 - Hops-Not irrigated
L212 - Hops-Part irrigated
L213 - Hops-All irrigated
L214 - Hops-Irrigation scheme
L22 - Vineyard
L221 - Vineyard-Not irrigated
L222 - Vineyard-Part irrigated
133
134 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
L223 - Vineyard-All irrigated
L224 - Vineyard-Irrigation scheme
L23 - Soft Fruit & Nut
L231 - Soft Fruit & Nut-Not irrigated
L232 - Soft Fruit & Nut-Part irrigate
L233 - Soft Fruit & Nut-All irrigated
L234 - Soft Fruit & Nut-Irrig. Scheme
L24 - Market Garden
L241 - Market Garden-Not irrigated
L242 - Market Garden-Part irrigated
L243 - Market Garden-All irrigate
L244 - Market Garden-Irrigat. scheme
L25 - G’house/Nurse/Flower-No retail
L251 - G’house/Nurse/Flower-Not irrig
L252 - G’house/Nurse/Flower-Pt. irrig
L253 - G’house/Nurse/Flower-All irrig
L254 - G’house/Nurse/Flower-Irr.schem
L3 - Forestry
L31 - Forestry-Artificial Plantation
L311 - Forestry-Artificial-Authority
L312 - Forestry-Artificial-Private
L32 - Forestry-Nursery
L321 - Forestry-Nursery-Authority
L322 - Forestry-Nursery-Private
L33 - Forestry-Natural Bush
L331 - Forestry-Natural Bush-Authority
L332 - Forestry-Natural Bush-Private
L4 - Aquaculture
L41 - Aquaculture-Research Facility
L42 - Aquaculture-Fish Farm
L43 - Aquaculture-Licensed Beds
© COPYRIGHT AND DISCLAIMER . Map data is compiled from a variety
of sources and hence its accuracy is variable. If you wish to make decisions
based on this data you should consult with the relevant authorities. Apart from
any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of the report may be
copied without the permission of the General Manager, Information and Land
Services, Department of Primary Industries, Water, and Environment, GPO
Box ;44 Hobart 7001.
Appendices •
135
Appendix 10:
Distribution of the database
8.10. Distribution of the database
Distribution of LIST Dataset
5000
4500
4000
Number of Titles
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
Title Area in Hectares
Log Distribution of LIST Dataset
5000
4500
4000
Number of Titles
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1
10
100
1000
Log of Title Area in Hectares
119
10000
100000
�
Yes
..….….. acres
….….. hectares
73. Do you have a farm manager for your land
(apart from yourself)?
(Circle)
Yes
No
……….%
……….%
71. How much of your working time is spent farming your land?
(approximate %)
72. How much of your income is derived from your land? (approximate %)
….…..yrs
Yes
(c) Do you have a Joint Venture
agreement?
No
Sometimes
Sometimes
..……Number
..……Number
..……Number
Ha ………….. (or)………...Ac
Yes
No
No
No
No
Skip to Q8
(g) What is grown or produced using these agreements? ……………………...
…………………………………………………………………………………...
(f) How much land is involved?
(e) Do you use written agreements?
Yes
Yes
(b) Does the payment depend on
how much is produced?
(d) Do you use your land for these
agreement/s?
Yes
(a) Is there a fixed rent payment?
If you answer “Yes” to question a,b, or c please write how
many agreements you have in the Number column.
(Circle appropriate response)
74. Are you currently involved in a land lease/sharefarming/or joint venture agreement?
(Circle appropriate response)
Yes
No
Definitions:
� A lease agreement allows another person/s to use a landowner's property for a defined
period of time and payment.
� Sharefarming allows another person/s to work on a landowner's property where the
profits of the operation are shared along agreed lines.
� A joint venture is an agreement between individuals or companies where expertise,
finances and income are shared in order to produce an agricultural product.
Section 2: Ownership Arrangements
This section is designed to find out how your current land holdings are
managed, how your land holdings were managed in the past and if you farm
other people’s land
1.
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
70. For how many years have you been earning an income from your land?
69. What is the main agricultural activity on this land? (Tick the appropriate box. You can
indicate two if required)
Horticulture
Cropping
Beef
Wool/Sheep
Dairy
Other (please specify)…………………………
(or if you prefer)
68. How much land do you own?
Section 1: Your farm
This section is designed to find out about you and your current land
holdings.
Examples:
….…..
268 hectares
This survey is to be completed by the landowner. Please write your answers in the boxes
provided, tick or circle the appropriate response. Please answer every question unless
otherwise instructed.
Instructions
� Start �
136 •
Appendix 11:
Survey
Short-term
(1-2 years)
Long-term
(3 or more years)
Both
Contractor
Previously unknown
individual
……Number
Yes
Skip to Q9
No
Yes
(d) Were these written agreements?
(Circle appropriate box)
No
Long-term
(3 or more years)
Both
Both
(e) If you are not currently using any of the agreements mentioned in Question 7, why did
you stop? …………………………..……………………….…………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
Short-term
(1-2 years)
(c) Are these agreement/s….
(Tick appropriate box)
(b) What is grown or produced using these agreements?
……………………...…………………………………………………………………
………………...………………………………………………………………………
(a) Approximately how many
agreements have you been
involved in?
75. Have you ever been involved in a land
lease/sharefarming/joint venture agreement
(not including your current agreements)?
Other (please specify)……….…………………………………
Friend
Neighbour
Company
Acquaintance
Family member
(i) Which of the following best describes who the agreement/s were made with?
(Tick appropriate box/es)
(h) Are these agreement/s….
(Tick appropriate box)
7. Continued
2.
Contractor
Previously unknown
individual
No
No
Yes
Yes
In 5 years time?
(c) In 10 years time or more?
Maybe
Maybe
Maybe
Lease
Section 3: Your Opinions
Go to Section 3
Yes
No
No
No
Go to Section 3
Yes
(a) Have you tried to get investors in your
operations?(Circle)
77. Do investors (shareholders or equity partners)
have a stake in your operations? (Circle)
Yes
Joint Venture
(e) Have you tried to enter one of these agreements in
the past? (Circle)
Sharefarming
(d) Which agreement is the most attractive? (Circle your first preference) Refer to the
definitions at the start of Section 2 if required.
If you answered “No” to all the questions a, b and c, skip to question 10. If you
answered “Yes” or “Maybe” to questions a, b or c continue to questions “d” and “e”
below.
(b)
No
Now?
(a)
Yes
76. Would you like to enter into a land lease/sharefarming/joint venture agreement in one of
the following time frames?
(Circle an answer for each question)
Other (please specify)……….…………………………………
Friend
Neighbour
Company
Acquaintance
Family member
(f) Which of the following best describes who the agreement/s were made with?
(Tick appropriate box/es)
8. Continued
Appendices •
137
For a landowner getting paid is not a concern when entering
a lease/sharefarming or joint venture agreements
There is a lack of information about leasing, sharefarming
and joint ventures
Landowners are free to pursue other interests if they have
leasing/sharefarming or joint venture agreements
You have to trust the other party to enter into a
lease/sharefarming or joint venture agreement
A secure income results from leasing/sharefarming and joint
venture agreements
An agreement will result in a higher margin for the
landowner
Capital improvements by lessees are not fairly rewarded in
lease agreements
Hassles for the landowner are a concern when entering into a
lease/sharefarming or joint venture agreement
Leasing causes land degradation
Circling “1” means that you strongly agree with the
statement; circling “2” means that you agree with the
statement; circling “3” means that you are neutral or you
don’t have an opinion for the statement; circling “4”
means that you disagree with the statement; circling “5”
means that you strongly disagree with the statement; and
finally circling 6 means that you don’t know, or can't give
and answer.
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
Strongly Agree
2
Agree
1
Neutral
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Disagree
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Strongly Disagree
78. The following statements relate to leasing/sharefarming and/or joint venture
agreements. Answer the following questions by circling a number to indicate your
opinion.
We are interested in the opinions of large and small landowners and
landowners with and without experience in using leasing/sharefarming and
joint venture agreements.
The third section is designed to gather your opinions of leases,
sharefarming and joint venture agreements.
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
Don’t know
Most landowners don’t want to enter leasing/sharefarming
or joint venture agreements themselves because they would
rather farm themselves
New entrants or young farmers can enter agriculture using
leases or sharefarming agreements
1
1
1
Leasing/sharefarming and joint venture agreements mean
less work for the landowner
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
Agree
1
1
1
1
1
Strongly Agree
A lease or sharefarming agreement results in less privacy for
the landowner
Leases and joint ventures result in land being locked up for
long periods of time
Leasing/sharefarming and joint venture agreements allow
investment in agriculture
Leasing/sharefarming and joint venture agreements can be
used as a substitute for the pension
Leasing/sharefarming and joint venture agreements provide
opportunities for better matching of land, human and
financial resources
Leasing/sharefarming and joint venture agreements mean
landowners can try new enterprises with less risk
Sharefarmers and leaseholders might have different ideas of
what good management is compared to landowners
Economies of scale can be achieved by using
leasing/sharefarming and joint venture agreements
Landowners with leases/sharefarming or joint venture
agreements will get paid what their land is worth
One benefit of leases is landowner can lease fresh ground
A lack of good employees means that it is hard for current
primary producers to increase their scale by leasing land
Question 12 Continued
Neutral
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Disagree
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Strongly Disagree
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3.
Don’t Know
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
138 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Using leases results in better use of capital because to
expand you don’t have to buy more land
Landowners can spell land by leasing another’s
Leasing spreads risks by using multiple sites
Personal conflicts won't arise from leasing/sharefarming and
joint venture agreements
An existing landowner will increase turnover by leasing
another person’s land
Landowners with leasing/sharefarming and joint venture
agreements have a greater workload than other landowners
Landowners with leasing/sharefarming and joint venture
agreements gain better returns on their land investment
Leasing/sharefarming and joint venture agreements do not
create opportunities for agricultural development
Question 12 Continued
4.
Strongly Agree
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
Agree
1
1
Neutral
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Disagree
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Strongly Disagree
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Don’t Know
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
Male
Female
� Finish �
Thank-you for your time and cooperation
Please re-fold the survey, place in the reply paid envelope and post back to us.
If you lose your return envelope the return address is:
Land Management Survey C/o TIAR GPO Box 252-54, Hobart 7001.
If you have any queries contact Shane Broad on (03) 6226 2651.
Comments:……………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
No formal education
Primary School (years 1 to 6)
High School and/or College (years 7 to 12)
Agricultural High School and/or College (Years 7 to 12)
Technical/Trade School / TAFE
University (Agricultural course)
University (All other courses)
other (specify)..........................................
82. What educational institutes have you attended?
(Tick the appropriate boxes)
81. Gender (Circle Appropriate)
80. What year were you born? (eg 1967)
79. What is your postcode? (eg 7315)
Section 4: Demographics
The final questions are for demographic purposes.
Appendices •
139
140 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Appendix 12:
Survey covering letter
“Name”
“Postal Address”
“Town”
“Postcode”
April 30th, 2001
Dear “Name”
I am writing to you to ask if you would be prepared to complete a 15
minute survey being carried out by the Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural
Research (TIAR). The survey examines the level of leasing, sharefarming
and joint ventures used by Tasmanian landowners and their opinions of
these arrangements.
There is little information on this aspect of agriculture. This survey aims
to find out:1. The extent of leasing, sharefarming and joint venture agreements in
Tasmanian agriculture
2. Landowner’s opinions of leasing, sharefarming and joint ventures
agreements in Tasmania
3. How these arrangements can be improved (From the information
provided by questions 1 and 2)
The survey questions have been developed from numerous interviews
with landowners, lessees, sharefarmers, government, industry, accountants
and consultants.
Your name and address has been obtained randomly from a list of all
primary industry landholdings in Tasmania. We have chosen you randomly
because we require feedback from both large and small holdings and
landowners with or without experiences of leasing, sharefarming and
joint venture agreements.
The survey and your information is totally confidential. The reply paid
envelope enclosed has a printed code that identifies who has returned the
survey. This helps us follow up those that have not returned the survey.
However, when we receive the returned form the envelope will be kept
separately to the survey meaning the researchers will have no way of
associating the results with any individual. The published results will also
only refer to the findings from the whole sample of respondents and not
individual surveys.
A letter of support from the Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association
is attached. For more details on the survey refer to the Information Sheet
on the back of this letter.
Thank-you in anticipation of your completed survey.
Yours sincerely
Shane Broad
Research Assistant
Ph (03) 62262651
Appendices •
Appendix 13:
TFGA letter
Dear Member
The attached survey is being conducted by the Tasmanian Institute of
Agricultural Research and is fully supported by the TFGA.
The ageing farmer population, cost of land, land tenure and the barriers to
young people becoming farmers have been the subject of much debate within
the TFGA.
The survey will provide valuable information for the future land tenure
arrangements for farming in Tasmania. The results will help determine
the difficulties or otherwise currently being experienced by farmers and
landowners using leasing, sharefarming and joint venture agreements and
also provide a valuable reference resource for anyone considering any of the
abovementioned land tenure options.
On behalf of our farmers of the future, I encourage you to take the 15 minutes
or so that it will take to complete the survey.
Yours sincerely
Keith Rice
Executive Director
141
142 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Appendix 14:
Survey Information sheet
Information Sheet
Project Title: Land Ownership and Management Survey
Investigator:
Amabel Fulton, Rural Sociologist, Tasmanian Institute of
Agricultural Research (TIAR).
Research Assistant:
Research (TIAR).
Shane Broad, Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural
What is the purpose of the study? To determine the number of landowners
in Tasmania using leases, sharefarming and joint venture agreements and their
opinions of these agreements.
What are these agreements?
• A lease agreement allows another person/s to use a landowner’s property
for a defined period of time and payment.
• Sharefarming allows another person/s to work on a landowner’s property
where the profits of the operation are shared along agreed lines.
• A joint venture is an agreement between individuals or companies
where expertise, finances and income are shared in order to produce an
agricultural product.
Who is funding the project? This project is jointly funded by Tasmanian
Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR) and the Rural Industries Research
and Development Corporation (RIRDC).
What is TIAR? The Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR) is
the major publicly funded agricultural research organisation in Tasmania.
What is RIRDC? The Rural Industries Research and Development
Corporation (RIRDC) is a federal body that funds research, which results in
practical outcomes for agricultural development.
Who is being surveyed? A random selection of 1500 Tasmanian agricultural
title holders.
What questions are being asked? The questions asked are about landowner’s
experiences of leasing sharefarming and joint ventures and their opinions of
these agreements.
What will the survey be used for? The survey results will be used to design
agreements that meet the needs of Tasmanian landowners. The information
will also be used for a report required by RIRDC and will be the basis of a
chapter in a book in the “Farmer Option” Series.
Will my comments be anonymous? Yes. No individual surveys will be
discussed in the results, only aggregate data will appear in the final report.
There will be no means of identifying who has completed which survey.
Contact person If you have any concerns about the survey or you require
further information, contact:
Shane Broad
62262651; [email protected],
or send any inquiries C/-TIAR, GPO Box 252-54, Hobart 7001
Concerns or complaints If you have any concerns of an ethical nature or
complaints about the manner in which the project is conducted, contact Ms
Chris Hooper, at the University Ethics Committee (Human Experimentation)
on (03) 62262763.
Appendices •
8.15. Tasmanian Country story, April 27th, 2001
Appendix 15:
Tasmanian Country story, April 27th, 2001
128
143
144 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Appendix 16:
Kem
Perkin’s
in Country,
the Tasmanian
8.16. Kem Perkin’s
Column
in theColumn
Tasmanian
April 27th,
2001
Country, April 27th, 2001
129
Appendices •
145
Appendix 17:
Second article in Kem Perkin’s Column in
8.17. Second article in Kem Perkin’s Column
in Tasmanian Country,
th
Tasmanian
Country,
May
18
,
2001
th
May 18 , 2001
130
146 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Appendix 18:
Survey follow-up advertisement,
May 4th,advertisement,
2001
8.18. Survey follow-up
May 4th, 2001
131
Appendices •
Appendix 19:
Survey follow-up letter
“Name”
“Postal Address”
“Town”
“Postcode”
24th May, 2001
Dear “Name”
I am writing to you to remind you about the Land Management Survey being
carried out by the Tasmanian Institute of Agricultural Research (TIAR).
The survey sent to you earlier this month examines the level of leasing,
sharefarming and joint ventures used by Tasmanian landowners and their
opinions of these arrangements.
We have already received a number of replies. However more returns are
needed if the results are going to reflect the concerns and needs of Tasmania’s
landowners. So could you please complete the survey and send it back in the
reply paid envelope sent with the first letter.
We would like to remind you that the survey is totally confidential and the
published results will only reflect the findings from the whole sample of
respondents and not individual surveys.
If you have misplaced the survey or the reply paid envelope, or not received
one, contact Shane Broad on (03) 6226 2651 or c/-TIAR GPO Box 252-54,
Hobart 7001.
If you have already completed the survey we thank you for your cooperation
and apologise for the inconvenience.
Thank-you in anticipation of your completed survey.
Yours sincerely
Shane Broad
Research Assistant
Ph (03) 62262651
147
148 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
Appendix 20:
Cross tabulation tables
1. TABLE of Currently using agreements * education
CLTYN
EDUCATION
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |noformal|primary |upto y12| ag y12|TAFE etc| Ag uni|othr uni|
other| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
5 |
31 |
190 |
5 |
56 |
30 |
23 |
5 |
345
|
0.93 |
5.78 | 35.45 |
0.93 | 10.45 |
5.60 |
4.29 |
0.93 | 64.37
|
1.45 |
8.99 | 55.07 |
1.45 | 16.23 |
8.70 |
6.67 |
1.45 |
| 71.43 | 64.58 | 71.70 | 45.45 | 57.14 | 48.39 | 62.16 | 62.50 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
2 |
17 |
75 |
6 |
42 |
32 |
14 |
3 |
191
|
0.37 |
3.17 | 13.99 |
1.12 |
7.84 |
5.97 |
2.61 |
0.56 | 35.63
|
1.05 |
8.90 | 39.27 |
3.14 | 21.99 | 16.75 |
7.33 |
1.57 |
| 28.57 | 35.42 | 28.30 | 54.55 | 42.86 | 51.61 | 37.84 | 37.50 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
7
48
265
11
98
62
37
8
536
1.31
8.96
49.44
2.05
18.28
11.57
6.90
1.49
100.00
Frequency Missing = 24
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY EDUCATIO
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
7
17.301
0.016
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
7
17.078
0.017
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
8.553
0.003
Phi Coefficient
0.180
Contingency Coefficient
0.177
Cramer's V
0.180
Effective Sample Size = 536
Frequency Missing = 24
WARNING: 25% of the cells have expected counts less
than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.
Appendices •
2. TABLE of Beef land * Currently using written agreements
BEEF
CLTWRIT
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct unwritten| written|
Both | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
32 |
63 |
4 |
99
| 16.75 | 32.98 |
2.09 | 51.83
| 32.32 | 63.64 |
4.04 |
| 42.67 | 62.38 | 26.67 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
43 |
38 |
11 |
92
| 22.51 | 19.90 |
5.76 | 48.17
| 46.74 | 41.30 | 11.96 |
| 57.33 | 37.62 | 73.33 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
75
101
15
191
39.27
52.88
7.85
100.00
Frequency Missing = 369
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF BEEF BY CLTWRIT
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
10.826
0.004
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
11.012
0.004
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
0.538
0.463
Phi Coefficient
0.238
Contingency Coefficient
0.232
Cramer's V
0.238
Effective Sample Size = 191
Frequency Missing = 369
WARNING: 66% of the data are missing.
149
150 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
3. TABLE of Beef land * Term of current agreements
BEEF
CLTTERM
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Short | Long |
Both | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
25 |
67 |
8 |
100
| 13.16 | 35.26 |
4.21 | 52.63
| 25.00 | 67.00 |
8.00 |
| 49.02 | 59.82 | 29.63 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
26 |
45 |
19 |
90
| 13.68 | 23.68 | 10.00 | 47.37
| 28.89 | 50.00 | 21.11 |
| 50.98 | 40.18 | 70.37 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
51
112
27
190
26.84
58.95
14.21
100.00
Frequency Missing = 370
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF BEEF BY CLTTERM
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
8.319
0.016
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
8.457
0.015
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
1.016
0.314
Phi Coefficient
0.209
Contingency Coefficient
0.205
Cramer's V
0.209
Effective Sample Size = 190
Frequency Missing = 370
WARNING: 66% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
4. TABLE of Dairy land * Currently using written agreements
|
DAIRY
CLTWRIT
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct unwritten| written|
Both | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
59 |
70 |
15 |
144
| 30.89 | 36.65 |
7.85 | 75.39
| 40.97 | 48.61 | 10.42 |
| 78.67 | 69.31 | 100.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
16 |
31 |
0 |
47
|
8.38 | 16.23 |
0.00 | 24.61
| 34.04 | 65.96 |
0.00 |
| 21.33 | 30.69 |
0.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
75
101
15
191
39.27
52.88
7.85
100.00
Frequency Missing = 369
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF DAIRY BY CLTWRIT
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
7.345
0.025
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
10.840
0.004
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
0.115
0.734
Phi Coefficient
0.196
Contingency Coefficient
0.192
Cramer's V
0.196
Effective Sample Size = 191
Frequency Missing = 369
WARNING: 66% of the data are missing.
151
152 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
5. TABLE of Dairy land * Term of current agreements
DAIRY
CLTTERM
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Short | Long |
Both | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
41 |
77 |
26 |
144
| 21.58 | 40.53 | 13.68 | 75.79
| 28.47 | 53.47 | 18.06 |
| 80.39 | 68.75 | 96.30 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
10 |
35 |
1 |
46
|
5.26 | 18.42 |
0.53 | 24.21
| 21.74 | 76.09 |
2.17 |
| 19.61 | 31.25 |
3.70 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
51
112
27
190
26.84
58.95
14.21
100.00
Frequency Missing = 370
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF DAIRY BY CLTTERM
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
9.801
0.007
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
12.169
0.002
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
0.736
0.391
Phi Coefficient
0.227
Contingency Coefficient
0.221
Cramer's V
0.227
Effective Sample Size = 190
Frequency Missing = 370
WARNING: 66% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
6. TABLE of Forestry land * Term of current agreements
FORESTRY
CLTTERM
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct
Short | Long |
Both | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
51 |
98 |
26 |
175
| 26.84 | 51.58 | 13.68 | 92.11
| 29.14 | 56.00 | 14.86 |
| 100.00 | 87.50 | 96.30 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
0 |
14 |
1 |
15
|
0.00 |
7.37 |
0.53 |
7.89
|
0.00 | 93.33 |
6.67 |
|
0.00 | 12.50 |
3.70 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
51
112
27
190
26.84
58.95
14.21
100.00
Frequency Missing = 370
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FORESTRY BY CLTTERM
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
8.290
0.016
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
12.002
0.002
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
1.529
0.216
Phi Coefficient
0.209
Contingency Coefficient
0.204
Cramer's V
0.209
Effective Sample Size = 190
Frequency Missing = 370
WARNING: 66% of the data are missing.
WARNING: 33% of the cells have expected counts less
than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test.
153
154 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
7. TABLE of Previously using agreements * Landowners would rather farm
themselves
PLTYN
RATHERFA
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
203 |
18 |
221
| 62.08 |
5.50 | 67.58
| 91.86 |
8.14 |
| 70.98 | 43.90 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
83 |
23 |
106
| 25.38 |
7.03 | 32.42
| 78.30 | 21.70 |
| 29.02 | 56.10 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
286
41
327
87.46
12.54
100.00
Frequency Missing = 233
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF PLTYN BY RATHERFA
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
12.000
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
11.232
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
10.796
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
11.963
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
7.08E-04
(2-Tail)
1.07E-03
Phi Coefficient
0.192
Contingency Coefficient
0.188
Cramer's V
0.192
Effective Sample Size = 327
Frequency Missing = 233
WARNING: 42% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
155
8. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Landowners would rather farm themselves
CLTYN
RATHERFA
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
211 |
18 |
229
| 62.24 |
5.31 | 67.55
| 92.14 |
7.86 |
| 71.04 | 42.86 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
86 |
24 |
110
| 25.37 |
7.08 | 32.45
| 78.18 | 21.82 |
| 28.96 | 57.14 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
297
42
339
87.61
12.39
100.00
Frequency Missing = 221
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY RATHERFA
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
13.337
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
12.468
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
12.082
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
13.298
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
3.72E-04
(2-Tail)
6.33E-04
Phi Coefficient
0.198
Contingency Coefficient
0.195
Cramer's V
0.198
Effective Sample Size = 339
Frequency Missing = 221
WARNING: 39% of the data are missing.
156 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
9. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Agreements result in a secure income for
the landowner
CLTYN
SECINC
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
68 |
72 |
140
| 25.95 | 27.48 | 53.44
| 48.57 | 51.43 |
| 44.44 | 66.06 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
85 |
37 |
122
| 32.44 | 14.12 | 46.56
| 69.67 | 30.33 |
| 55.56 | 33.94 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
153
109
262
58.40
41.60
100.00
Frequency Missing = 298
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY SECINC
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
11.947
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
12.095
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
11.094
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
11.902
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
4.06E-04
(Right)
1.000
(2-Tail)
6.75E-04
Phi Coefficient
-0.214
Contingency Coefficient
0.209
Cramer's V
-0.214
Effective Sample Size = 262
Frequency Missing = 298
WARNING: 53% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
157
10. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Agreements result in hassles for the
landowner
CLTYN
HASSLES
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
175 |
27 |
202
| 53.03 |
8.18 | 61.21
| 86.63 | 13.37 |
| 69.72 | 34.18 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
76 |
52 |
128
| 23.03 | 15.76 | 38.79
| 59.38 | 40.63 |
| 30.28 | 65.82 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
251
79
330
76.06
23.94
100.00
Frequency Missing = 230
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY HASSLES
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
31.973
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
31.442
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
30.494
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
31.876
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
2.17E-08
(2-Tail)
3.04E-08
Phi Coefficient
0.311
Contingency Coefficient
0.297
Cramer's V
0.311
Effective Sample Size = 330
Frequency Missing = 230
WARNING: 41% of the data are missing.
158 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
11. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Leasing causes land degradation
CLTYN
LEASELD
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
87 |
92 |
179
| 28.52 | 30.16 | 58.69
| 48.60 | 51.40 |
| 76.99 | 47.92 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
26 |
100 |
126
|
8.52 | 32.79 | 41.31
| 20.63 | 79.37 |
| 23.01 | 52.08 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
113
192
305
37.05
62.95
100.00
Frequency Missing = 255
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY LEASELD
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
24.802
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
25.827
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
23.617
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
24.720
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
3.69E-07
(2-Tail)
6.35E-07
Phi Coefficient
0.285
Contingency Coefficient
0.274
Cramer's V
0.285
Effective Sample Size = 305
Frequency Missing = 255
WARNING: 46% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
12. TABLE of Currently using agreements * There is no information about
agreements
CLTYN
NOINFO
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
159 |
18 |
177
| 53.36 |
6.04 | 59.40
| 89.83 | 10.17 |
| 62.85 | 40.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
94 |
27 |
121
| 31.54 |
9.06 | 40.60
| 77.69 | 22.31 |
| 37.15 | 60.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
253
45
298
84.90
15.10
100.00
Frequency Missing = 262
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY NOINFO
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
8.268
0.004
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
8.114
0.004
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
7.348
0.007
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
8.240
0.004
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
0.999
(Right)
3.59E-03
(2-Tail)
5.01E-03
Phi Coefficient
0.167
Contingency Coefficient
0.164
Cramer's V
0.167
Effective Sample Size = 298
Frequency Missing = 262
WARNING: 47% of the data are missing.
159
160 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
13. TABLE of Farm manager * Currently using agreements
FMANAGER
CLTYN
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
No
|
Yes | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
322 |
146 |
468
| 59.85 | 27.14 | 86.99
| 68.80 | 31.20 |
| 91.48 | 78.49 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
30 |
40 |
70
|
5.58 |
7.43 | 13.01
| 42.86 | 57.14 |
|
8.52 | 21.51 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
352
186
538
65.43
34.57
100.00
Frequency Missing = 22
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FMANAGER BY CLTYN
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
18.123
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
17.213
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
16.994
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
18.089
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
2.85E-05
(2-Tail)
4.08E-05
Phi Coefficient
0.184
Contingency Coefficient
0.181
Cramer's V
0.184
Effective Sample Size = 538
Frequency Missing = 22
Appendices •
14. TABLE of Interested in an agreement now * Agreements result in a secure
income for the landowner
FLTNOW
SECINC
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
61 |
75 |
136
| 25.63 | 31.51 | 57.14
| 44.85 | 55.15 |
| 44.53 | 74.26 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
48 |
11 |
59
| 20.17 |
4.62 | 24.79
| 81.36 | 18.64 |
| 35.04 | 10.89 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
28 |
15 |
43
| 11.76 |
6.30 | 18.07
| 65.12 | 34.88 |
| 20.44 | 14.85 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
137
101
238
57.56
42.44
100.00
Frequency Missing = 322
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLTNOW BY SECINC
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
23.671
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
25.001
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
12.048
0.001
Phi Coefficient
0.315
Contingency Coefficient
0.301
Cramer's V
0.315
Effective Sample Size = 238
Frequency Missing = 322
WARNING: 57% of the data are missing.
161
162 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
15. TABLE of Interested in an agreement now * Agreements result in a higher margin
FLTNOW
HIGHMARG
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
40 |
79 |
119
| 19.61 | 38.73 | 58.33
| 33.61 | 66.39 |
| 46.51 | 66.95 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
34 |
19 |
53
| 16.67 |
9.31 | 25.98
| 64.15 | 35.85 |
| 39.53 | 16.10 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe|
12 |
20 |
32
|
5.88 |
9.80 | 15.69
| 37.50 | 62.50 |
| 13.95 | 16.95 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
86
118
204
42.16
57.84
100.00
Frequency Missing = 356
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLTNOW BY HIGHMARG
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
14.361
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
14.306
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
2.697
0.101
Phi Coefficient
0.265
Contingency Coefficient
0.256
Cramer's V
0.265
Effective Sample Size = 204
Frequency Missing = 356
WARNING: 64% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
163
16. TABLE of Interested in an agreement now * Agreements result in better matching
of resources
FLTNOW
BETMATCH
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
143 |
19 |
162
| 47.19 |
6.27 | 53.47
| 88.27 | 11.73 |
| 50.71 | 90.48 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
74 |
1 |
75
| 24.42 |
0.33 | 24.75
| 98.67 |
1.33 |
| 26.24 |
4.76 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
65 |
1 |
66
| 21.45 |
0.33 | 21.78
| 98.48 |
1.52 |
| 23.05 |
4.76 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
282
21
303
93.07
6.93
100.00
Frequency Missing = 257
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLTNOW BY BETMATCH
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
12.425
0.002
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
14.512
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
10.068
0.002
Phi Coefficient
0.202
Contingency Coefficient
0.198
Cramer's V
0.202
Effective Sample Size = 303
Frequency Missing = 257
WARNING: 46% of the data are missing.
164 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
17. TABLE of Interested in an agreement now * You can try new enterprises with less
risk
FLTNOW
NEWLRISK
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
126 |
51 |
177
| 41.45 | 16.78 | 58.22
| 71.19 | 28.81 |
| 52.94 | 77.27 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
56 |
7 |
63
| 18.42 |
2.30 | 20.72
| 88.89 | 11.11 |
| 23.53 | 10.61 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
56 |
8 |
64
| 18.42 |
2.63 | 21.05
| 87.50 | 12.50 |
| 23.53 | 12.12 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
238
66
304
78.29
21.71
100.00
Frequency Missing = 256
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLTNOW BY NEWLRISK
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
12.612
0.002
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
13.370
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
10.050
0.002
Phi Coefficient
0.204
Contingency Coefficient
0.200
Cramer's V
0.204
Effective Sample Size = 304
Frequency Missing = 256
WARNING: 46% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
18. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement now * Agreements allow
investment in agriculture
FLTNOW
ALLOWINV
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
159 |
25 |
184
| 50.32 |
7.91 | 58.23
| 86.41 | 13.59 |
| 55.40 | 86.21 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
69 |
1 |
70
| 21.84 |
0.32 | 22.15
| 98.57 |
1.43 |
| 24.04 |
3.45 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
59 |
3 |
62
| 18.67 |
0.95 | 19.62
| 95.16 |
4.84 |
| 20.56 | 10.34 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
287
29
316
90.82
9.18
100.00
Frequency Missing = 244
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLTNOW BY ALLOWINV
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
10.735
0.005
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
13.036
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
7.018
0.008
Phi Coefficient
0.184
Contingency Coefficient
0.181
Cramer's V
0.184
Effective Sample Size = 316
Frequency Missing = 244
WARNING: 44% of the data are missing.
165
166 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
19. TABLE of Interested in an agreement now * Most landowners would rather farm
themselves
FLTNOW
RATHERFA
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
185 |
18 |
203
| 58.54 |
5.70 | 64.24
| 91.13 |
8.87 |
| 67.03 | 45.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
42 |
16 |
58
| 13.29 |
5.06 | 18.35
| 72.41 | 27.59 |
| 15.22 | 40.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
49 |
6 |
55
| 15.51 |
1.90 | 17.41
| 89.09 | 10.91 |
| 17.75 | 15.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
276
40
316
87.34
12.66
100.00
Frequency Missing = 244
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLTNOW BY RATHERFA
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
14.482
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
12.249
0.002
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
2.167
0.141
Phi Coefficient
0.214
Contingency Coefficient
0.209
Cramer's V
0.214
Effective Sample Size = 316
Frequency Missing = 244
WARNING: 44% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
167
20. TABLE of Interested in an agreement in 5 years time * Agreements result in a
secure income for the landowner
FLT5YT
SECINC
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
53 |
61 |
114
| 23.87 | 27.48 | 51.35
| 46.49 | 53.51 |
| 43.09 | 61.62 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
31 |
7 |
38
| 13.96 |
3.15 | 17.12
| 81.58 | 18.42 |
| 25.20 |
7.07 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
39 |
31 |
70
| 17.57 | 13.96 | 31.53
| 55.71 | 44.29 |
| 31.71 | 31.31 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
123
99
222
55.41
44.59
100.00
Frequency Missing = 338
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY SECINC
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
14.205
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
15.251
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
2.476
0.116
Phi Coefficient
0.253
Contingency Coefficient
0.245
Cramer's V
0.253
Effective Sample Size = 222
Frequency Missing = 338
WARNING: 60% of the data are missing.
168 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
21. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement in 5 year time * Agreements result
in a higher margin
FLT5YT
HIGHMARG
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
36 |
70 |
106
| 18.56 | 36.08 | 54.64
| 33.96 | 66.04 |
| 45.00 | 61.40 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
23 |
8 |
31
| 11.86 |
4.12 | 15.98
| 74.19 | 25.81 |
| 28.75 |
7.02 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
21 |
36 |
57
| 10.82 | 18.56 | 29.38
| 36.84 | 63.16 |
| 26.25 | 31.58 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
80
114
194
41.24
58.76
100.00
Frequency Missing = 366
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY HIGHMARG
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
16.664
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
16.677
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
0.739
0.390
Phi Coefficient
0.293
Contingency Coefficient
0.281
Cramer's V
0.293
Effective Sample Size = 194
Frequency Missing = 366
WARNING: 65% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
22. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement in 5 years time * Capital
improvements are not fairly rewarded
FLT5YT
CAPINFR
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
54 |
28 |
82
| 36.49 | 18.92 | 55.41
| 65.85 | 34.15 |
| 55.10 | 56.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
15 |
17 |
32
| 10.14 | 11.49 | 21.62
| 46.88 | 53.13 |
| 15.31 | 34.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
29 |
5 |
34
| 19.59 |
3.38 | 22.97
| 85.29 | 14.71 |
| 29.59 | 10.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
98
50
148
66.22
33.78
100.00
Frequency Missing = 412
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY CAPINFR
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
10.888
0.004
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
11.399
0.003
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
2.034
0.154
Phi Coefficient
0.271
Contingency Coefficient
0.262
Cramer's V
0.271
Effective Sample Size = 148
Frequency Missing = 412
WARNING: 74% of the data are missing.
169
170 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
23. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement in 5 years time * Leasing causes
land degradation
FLT5YT
LEASELD
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
56 |
81 |
137
| 21.37 | 30.92 | 52.29
| 40.88 | 59.12 |
| 58.95 | 48.50 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
5 |
36 |
41
|
1.91 | 13.74 | 15.65
| 12.20 | 87.80 |
|
5.26 | 21.56 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
34 |
50 |
84
| 12.98 | 19.08 | 32.06
| 40.48 | 59.52 |
| 35.79 | 29.94 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
95
167
262
36.26
63.74
100.00
Frequency Missing = 298
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY LEASELD
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
12.182
0.002
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
14.044
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
0.159
0.690
Phi Coefficient
0.216
Contingency Coefficient
0.211
Cramer's V
0.216
Effective Sample Size = 262
Frequency Missing = 298
WARNING: 53% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
171
24. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement now * Agreements result in better
matching of resources
FLT5YT
BETMATCH
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
116 |
17 |
133
| 42.34 |
6.20 | 48.54
| 87.22 | 12.78 |
| 45.49 | 89.47 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
49 |
0 |
49
| 17.88 |
0.00 | 17.88
| 100.00 |
0.00 |
| 19.22 |
0.00 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
90 |
2 |
92
| 32.85 |
0.73 | 33.58
| 97.83 |
2.17 |
| 35.29 | 10.53 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
255
19
274
93.07
6.93
100.00
Frequency Missing = 286
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY BETMATCH
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
13.929
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
17.120
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
10.425
0.001
Phi Coefficient
0.225
Contingency Coefficient
0.220
Cramer's V
0.225
Effective Sample Size = 274
Frequency Missing = 286
WARNING: 51% of the data are missing.
172 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
25. TABLE of Interested in an agreement in 5 years time * Agreements result in land
being locked up for long periods
FLT5YT
LANDLOCK
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
69 |
61 |
130
| 27.82 | 24.60 | 52.42
| 53.08 | 46.92 |
| 61.61 | 44.85 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
9 |
28 |
37
|
3.63 | 11.29 | 14.92
| 24.32 | 75.68 |
|
8.04 | 20.59 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
34 |
47 |
81
| 13.71 | 18.95 | 32.66
| 41.98 | 58.02 |
| 30.36 | 34.56 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
112
136
248
45.16
54.84
100.00
Frequency Missing = 312
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY LANDLOCK
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
10.108
0.006
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
10.500
0.005
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
3.309
0.069
Phi Coefficient
0.202
Contingency Coefficient
0.198
Cramer's V
0.202
Effective Sample Size = 248
Frequency Missing = 312
WARNING: 56% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
173
26. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement in 5 years time * Agreements allow
investment in agriculture
FLT5YT
ALLOWINV
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
131 |
24 |
155
| 44.71 |
8.19 | 52.90
| 84.52 | 15.48 |
| 49.25 | 88.89 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
48 |
1 |
49
| 16.38 |
0.34 | 16.72
| 97.96 |
2.04 |
| 18.05 |
3.70 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
87 |
2 |
89
| 29.69 |
0.68 | 30.38
| 97.75 |
2.25 |
| 32.71 |
7.41 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
266
27
293
90.78
9.22
100.00
Frequency Missing = 267
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY ALLOWINV
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
15.461
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
17.673
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
13.173
0.001
Phi Coefficient
0.230
Contingency Coefficient
0.224
Cramer's V
0.230
Effective Sample Size = 293
Frequency Missing = 267
WARNING: 48% of the data are missing.
174 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
27. TABLE of Interested in an agreement in 5 years time * Agreements result in less
privacy for the landowner
FLT5YT
LESSPRIV
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
139 |
25 |
164
| 47.93 |
8.62 | 56.55
| 84.76 | 15.24 |
| 60.43 | 41.67 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
22 |
16 |
38
|
7.59 |
5.52 | 13.10
| 57.89 | 42.11 |
|
9.57 | 26.67 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
69 |
19 |
88
| 23.79 |
6.55 | 30.34
| 78.41 | 21.59 |
| 30.00 | 31.67 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
230
60
290
79.31
20.69
100.00
Frequency Missing = 270
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY LESSPRIV
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
13.628
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
12.121
0.002
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
2.474
0.116
Phi Coefficient
0.217
Contingency Coefficient
0.212
Cramer's V
0.217
Effective Sample Size = 290
Frequency Missing = 270
WARNING: 48% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
175
28. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement in 5 years time * Most landowners
would rather farm themselves
FLT5YT
RATHERFA
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
158 |
12 |
170
| 53.74 |
4.08 | 57.82
| 92.94 |
7.06 |
| 60.54 | 36.36 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
27 |
13 |
40
|
9.18 |
4.42 | 13.61
| 67.50 | 32.50 |
| 10.34 | 39.39 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
76 |
8 |
84
| 25.85 |
2.72 | 28.57
| 90.48 |
9.52 |
| 29.12 | 24.24 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
261
33
294
88.78
11.22
100.00
Frequency Missing = 266
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT5YT BY RATHERFA
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
21.374
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
16.461
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
1.397
0.237
Phi Coefficient
0.270
Contingency Coefficient
0.260
Cramer's V
0.270
Effective Sample Size = 294
Frequency Missing = 266
WARNING: 47% of the data are missing.
176 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
29. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement in 10 year time * Agreements
result in a secure income for the landowner
FLT10YT
SECINC
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
54 |
61 |
115
| 26.60 | 30.05 | 56.65
| 46.96 | 53.04 |
| 49.09 | 65.59 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
17 |
2 |
19
|
8.37 |
0.99 |
9.36
| 89.47 | 10.53 |
| 15.45 |
2.15 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
39 |
30 |
69
| 19.21 | 14.78 | 33.99
| 56.52 | 43.48 |
| 35.45 | 32.26 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
110
93
203
54.19
45.81
100.00
Frequency Missing = 357
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT10YT BY SECINC
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
12.103
0.002
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
13.731
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
2.275
0.131
Phi Coefficient
0.244
Contingency Coefficient
0.237
Cramer's V
0.244
Effective Sample Size = 203
Frequency Missing = 357
WARNING: 64% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
177
30. TABLE of Interested in an agreement in 10 years time * Agreements result in a
higher margin
FLT10YT
HIGHMARG
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
34 |
71 |
105
| 18.89 | 39.44 | 58.33
| 32.38 | 67.62 |
| 46.58 | 66.36 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
12 |
3 |
15
|
6.67 |
1.67 |
8.33
| 80.00 | 20.00 |
| 16.44 |
2.80 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
27 |
33 |
60
| 15.00 | 18.33 | 33.33
| 45.00 | 55.00 |
| 36.99 | 30.84 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
73
107
180
40.56
59.44
100.00
Frequency Missing = 380
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT10YT BY HIGHMARG
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
13.083
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
13.245
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
3.396
0.065
Phi Coefficient
0.270
Contingency Coefficient
0.260
Cramer's V
0.270
Effective Sample Size = 180
Frequency Missing = 380
WARNING: 68% of the data are missing.
178 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
31. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement in 10 year time * Most landowners
would rather farm themselves
FLT10YT
RATHERFA
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Agree |Disagree| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
156 |
12 |
168
| 56.73 |
4.36 | 61.09
| 92.86 |
7.14 |
| 63.93 | 38.71 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
14 |
9 |
23
|
5.09 |
3.27 |
8.36
| 60.87 | 39.13 |
|
5.74 | 29.03 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Maybe |
74 |
10 |
84
| 26.91 |
3.64 | 30.55
| 88.10 | 11.90 |
| 30.33 | 32.26 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
244
31
275
88.73
11.27
100.00
Frequency Missing = 285
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT10YT BY RATHERFA
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
20.744
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
15.127
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
2.455
0.117
Phi Coefficient
0.275
Contingency Coefficient
0.265
Cramer's V
0.275
Effective Sample Size = 275
Frequency Missing = 285
WARNING: 51% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
32. TABLE of Previously used agreements * Term of current agreements
PLTYN
CLTTERM
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct | Short | Long | Both | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
18 |
74 |
10 |
102
|
9.57 | 39.36 |
5.32 | 54.26
| 17.65 | 72.55 |
9.80 |
| 35.29 | 66.67 | 38.46 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
33 |
37 |
16 |
86
| 17.55 | 19.68 |
8.51 | 45.74
| 38.37 | 43.02 | 18.60 |
| 64.71 | 33.33 | 61.54 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
51
111
26
188
27.13
59.04
13.83
100.00
Frequency Missing = 372
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF PLTYN BY CLTTERM
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
16.890
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
17.084
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
1.684
0.194
Phi Coefficient
0.300
Contingency Coefficient
0.287
Cramer's V
0.300
Effective Sample Size = 188
Frequency Missing = 372
WARNING: 66% of the data are missing.
179
180 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
33. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Previous agreements produced crops
CLTYN
PCROP
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
No
| Yes
| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
0 |
341 |
12 |
353
| 62.45 |
2.20 | 64.65
| 96.60 |
3.40 |
| 66.47 | 36.36 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
1 |
172 |
21 |
193
| 31.50 |
3.85 | 35.35
| 89.12 | 10.88 |
| 33.53 | 63.64 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
513
33
546
93.96
6.04
100.00
Frequency Missing = 14
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY PCROP
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
12.299
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
11.632
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
11.017
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
12.276
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
6.04E-04
(2-Tail)
1.04E-03
Phi Coefficient
0.150
Contingency Coefficient
0.148
Cramer's V
0.150
Effective Sample Size = 546
Frequency Missing = 14
Appendices •
181
34. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Previous agreements produced beef
CLTYN
PBEEF
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
No
|
Yes | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
338 |
15 |
353
| 61.90 |
2.75 | 64.65
| 95.75 |
4.25 |
| 66.93 | 36.59 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
167 |
26 |
193
| 30.59 |
4.76 | 35.35
| 86.53 | 13.47 |
| 33.07 | 63.41 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
505
41
546
92.49
7.51
100.00
Frequency Missing = 14
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY PBEEF
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
15.280
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
14.470
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
13.981
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
15.252
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
1.33E-04
(2-Tail)
1.53E-04
Phi Coefficient
0.167
Contingency Coefficient
0.165
Cramer's V
0.167
Effective Sample Size = 546
Frequency Missing = 14
182 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
35. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Previous agreements produced dairy
products
CLTYN
PDAIRY
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
No |
Yes | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
346 |
7 |
353
| 63.37 |
1.28 | 64.65
| 98.02 |
1.98 |
| 66.03 | 31.82 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
178 |
15 |
193
| 32.60 |
2.75 | 35.35
| 92.23 |
7.77 |
| 33.97 | 68.18 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
524
22
546
95.97
4.03
100.00
Frequency Missing = 14
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY PDAIRY
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
10.814
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
10.221
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
9.369
0.002
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
10.794
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
1.42E-03
(2-Tail)
2.16E-03
Phi Coefficient
0.141
Contingency Coefficient
0.139
Cramer's V
0.141
Effective Sample Size = 546
Frequency Missing = 14
Appendices •
36. TABLE OF Currently using agreements * Cropping land
CLTYN
CROP
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
No
|
Yes | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
284 |
69 |
353
| 52.01 | 12.64 | 64.65
| 80.45 | 19.55 |
| 68.77 | 51.88 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
129 |
64 |
193
| 23.63 | 11.72 | 35.35
| 66.84 | 33.16 |
| 31.23 | 48.12 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
413
133
546
75.64
24.36
100.00
Frequency Missing = 14
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY CROP
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
12.551
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
12.227
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
11.823
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
12.528
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
3.39E-04
(2-Tail)
5.52E-04
Phi Coefficient
0.152
Contingency Coefficient
0.150
Cramer's V
0.152
Effective Sample Size = 546
Frequency Missing = 14
183
184 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
37. TABLE of Previously used agreements * Cropping land
PLTYN
CROP
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
No
|
Yes | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
297 |
74 |
371
| 56.57 | 14.10 | 70.67
| 80.05 | 19.95 |
| 75.00 | 57.36 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
99 |
55 |
154
| 18.86 | 10.48 | 29.33
| 64.29 | 35.71 |
| 25.00 | 42.64 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
396
129
525
75.43
24.57
100.00
Frequency Missing = 35
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF PLTYN BY CROP
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
14.599
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
13.972
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
13.761
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
14.572
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
1.38E-04
(2-Tail)
2.19E-04
Phi Coefficient
0.167
Contingency Coefficient
0.164
Cramer's V
0.167
Effective Sample Size = 525
Frequency Missing = 35
Appendices •
38. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Dairy land
CLTYN
DAIRY
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
0|
1| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
0 |
323 |
30 |
353
| 59.16 |
5.49 | 64.65
| 91.50 |
8.50 |
| 68.72 | 39.47 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
1 |
147 |
46 |
193
| 26.92 |
8.42 | 35.35
| 76.17 | 23.83 |
| 31.28 | 60.53 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
470
76
546
86.08
13.92
100.00
Frequency Missing = 14
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY DAIRY
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
24.492
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
23.352
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
23.228
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
24.447
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
1.23E-06
(2-Tail)
1.99E-06
Phi Coefficient
0.212
Contingency Coefficient
0.207
Cramer's V
0.212
Effective Sample Size = 546
Frequency Missing = 14
185
186 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
39. TABLE of Currently using agreements * Previously using agreements
CLTYN
PLTYN
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
No
|
Yes | Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
No |
263 |
67 |
330
| 50.77 | 12.93 | 63.71
| 79.70 | 20.30 |
| 71.86 | 44.08 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Yes |
103 |
85 |
188
| 19.88 | 16.41 | 36.29
| 54.79 | 45.21 |
| 28.14 | 55.92 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
366
152
518
70.66
29.34
100.00
Frequency Missing = 42
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF CLTYN BY PLTYN
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
1
35.844
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
1
35.070
0.001
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square
1
34.653
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
35.775
0.001
Fisher's Exact Test (Left)
1.000
(Right)
2.86E-09
(2-Tail)
4.07E-09
Phi Coefficient
0.263
Contingency Coefficient
0.254
Cramer's V
0.263
Effective Sample Size = 518
Frequency Missing = 42
Appendices •
187
40. TABLE of Interested in entering an agreement in 10 year time * A lack of good
employees makes expanding using leases difficult
FLT10YT
LACKEMPL
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
1|
5| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
0 |
107 |
33 |
140
| 46.52 | 14.35 | 60.87
| 76.43 | 23.57 |
| 69.93 | 42.86 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
1 |
10 |
9 |
19
|
4.35 |
3.91 |
8.26
| 52.63 | 47.37 |
|
6.54 | 11.69 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
2 |
36 |
35 |
71
| 15.65 | 15.22 | 30.87
| 50.70 | 49.30 |
| 23.53 | 45.45 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
153
77
230
66.52
33.48
100.00
Frequency Missing = 330
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT10YT BY LACKEMPL
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
15.792
0.001
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
15.652
0.001
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
14.801
0.001
Phi Coefficient
0.262
Contingency Coefficient
0.253
Cramer's V
0.262
Effective Sample Size = 230
Frequency Missing = 330
WARNING: 59% of the data are missing.
188 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
41. TABLE OF Interested in entering an agreement in 10 year time * Agreements
allow investment in agriculture
FLT10YT
ALLOWINV
Frequency|
Percent |
Row Pct |
Col Pct |
1|
5| Total
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
0 |
133 |
23 |
156
| 48.72 |
8.42 | 57.14
| 85.26 | 14.74 |
| 54.07 | 85.19 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
1 |
25 |
1 |
26
|
9.16 |
0.37 |
9.52
| 96.15 |
3.85 |
| 10.16 |
3.70 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
2 |
88 |
3 |
91
| 32.23 |
1.10 | 33.33
| 96.70 |
3.30 |
| 35.77 | 11.11 |
---------ˆ--------ˆ--------ˆ
Total
246
27
273
90.11
9.89
100.00
Frequency Missing = 287
STATISTICS FOR TABLE OF FLT10YT BY ALLOWINV
Statistic
DF
Value
Prob
-----------------------------------------------------Chi-Square
2
9.628
0.008
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
2
10.833
0.004
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square
1
8.894
0.003
Phi Coefficient
0.188
Contingency Coefficient
0.185
Cramer's V
0.188
Effective Sample Size = 273
Frequency Missing = 287
WARNING: 51% of the data are missing.
Appendices •
189
42. Statistics for the Use of previous agreements * Total land area
N P A R 1 W A Y
P R O C E D U R E
Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) for Variable TOTAREA
Classified by Variable PLTYN
PLTYN
No
Yes
Sum of
Scores
N
368
153
90682.5000
45298.5000
Expected
Under H0
96048.0
39933.0
Std Dev
Under H0
1564.97116
1564.97116
Mean
Score
246.419837
296.068627
Average Scores Were Used for Ties
Wilcoxon 2-Sample Test (Normal Approximation)
(with Continuity Correction of .5)
S =
45298.5
Z =
3.42818
Prob > |Z| = 0.0006
T-Test Approx. Significance = 0.0007
Kruskal-Wallis Test (Chi-Square Approximation)
CHISQ = 11.755
DF = 1
Prob > CHISQ = 0.0006
Averages
No
Yes
476 ha
1254 ha
Note: Wilcoxon scores show significant difference in averages, averages calculated
using data on Excel spreadsheet
190 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives
43. Statistics for the Use of previous agreements * Percentage income derived from
the landowners land
N P A R 1 W A Y
P R O C E D U R E
Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) for Variable PRECINCO
Classified by Variable PLTYN
PLTYN
No
Yes
N
Sum of
Scores
Expected
Under H0
Std Dev
Under H0
Mean
Score
359
149
88106.0
41180.0
91365.5000
37920.5000
1492.44827
1492.44827
245.420613
276.375839
Average Scores Were Used for Ties
Wilcoxon 2-Sample Test (Normal Approximation)
(with Continuity Correction of .5)
S =
41180.0
Z =
2.18366
Prob > |Z| = 0.0290
T-Test Approx. Significance = 0.0294
Kruskal-Wallis Test (Chi-Square Approximation)
CHISQ = 4.7698
DF = 1
Prob > CHISQ
Averages
No
Yes
= 0.0290
47%
56%
Note: Wilcoxon scores show significant difference in averages, averages calculated
using data on Excel spreadsheet
Appendices •
191
44. Statistics for the Use of previous agreements * Number of years earning an
income from the stated land
N P A R 1 W A Y
P R O C E D U R E
Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) for Variable NOYEARS
Classified by Variable PLTYN
PLTYN
No
Yes
N
Sum of
Scores
350
148
84022.0
40229.0
Expected
Under H0
87325.0
36926.0
Std Dev
Under H0
1466.18910
1466.18910
Mean
Score
240.062857
271.817568
Average Scores Were Used for Ties
Wilcoxon 2-Sample Test (Normal Approximation)
(with Continuity Correction of .5)
S =
40229.0
Z =
2.25244
Prob > |Z| = 0.0243
T-Test Approx. Significance = 0.0247
Kruskal-Wallis Test (Chi-Square Approximation)
CHISQ = 5.0750
DF = 1
Prob > CHISQ = 0.0243
Averages
No
Yes
22.6 years
26.3 years
Note: Wilcoxon scores show significant difference in averages, averages calculated
using data on Excel spreadsheet
192 •
Land Tenure and Land Management Alternatives