Asian Conflicts Reports
 Recent Trends in Naxal Violence, India
 Illicit Networks & North Korea’s WMD Program
 Transnational Security Threats in Bangladesh
 Reinforcing Secularism in Bangladesh
ISSUE 13 | SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 2010
Recent Trends in Naxal Violence
Medha Chaturvedi
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2
3
Over the last decade
Naxalite violence has
escalated the level
and reach of violent
attacks
Naxal use of IEDs
and other advanced
weapons is straining
the capabilities of
security forces
The new anti-Naxal
command is
attempting to build a
collaborative strategy
at state and federal
levels
An analysis of the Naxal movement reveals a shift in their style of violence since November
2005, when about 1,000 Naxalites stormed the police lines around the Jehanabad district prison,
Bihar, in a bid to free their jailed comrades. Called “Operation Jail Break”, the action resulted in
the escape of over 375 prisoners, including 130 Naxal cadres, and the death of eleven policemen
in the ensuing gun battle. The precursor to this attack was the September 2004 merger of two
militant Naxalite factions, the People‟s War Group (Communist Party of India – MarxistLeninist) and the Maoist Communist Centre (India), to form the Communist Party of India
(Maoist).
Following these developments, violence has escalated over large parts of India, and the
trend in Naxal violence has changed. Kanu Sanyal, founding leader of the Communist Party of
India (Marxist-Leninist), admitted in 2007 that the Naxal movement has lost touch with its
original motives, and deviated from its path to become a terrorist group. Most of the older
generation of Naxalites abhor the large-scale violence that the Naxals are unleashing at present.
Originally, the main objective of Naxal violence was to seize power through an agrarian
revolution, in order to then replace the existing feudal system through land reform. Now,
however, their demands have deviated to encompass a general revolution and the overthrow of
the existing political system and establish a parallel apparatus of governance. A severing of links
with the Nepalese Maoists has accompanied this change. The Indian Maoists criticized the
Nepalese Maoists, led by Prachanda, for ending the revolution and incarcerating their People‟s
Liberation Army (PLA) in UN-supervised barracks, as part of their adoption of the
parliamentary path. The criticism from the Indian Maoists intensified after Prachanda‟s 2009
victory in Nepal‟s general elections.
The Naxals have also shifted from being an agrarian revolution to expanding their reach to
the far ends of the forested tribal corridor along the east-central heartland of India (the “Red
Corridor”). This shift has resulted in the inclusion of tribal and forest rights in the Naxal
agenda. Mining activities, the setting up of new industries and the building of infrastructure in
these areas has resulted in the large-scale displacement of the local tribal populations. There
have been no proper rehabilitation measures put in place by the government to accompany this
development. This has created a trust deficit in the area and, finding that the Naxal cadres
sympathize with their loss of homes and exploitation, the tribals have sided with them against
the government.
The Naxals are also using female cadres and young girls in their attacks. However, the Naxal
leadership has yet to include any prominent females.
There has been a spurt in violence against security personnel, including state police and
central paramilitary forces (CPMF). Naxals have started ambushing police parties in transit and
looting their weapons. This is the Naxals‟ primary source of arms. In 2008, 45 security
personnel were killed, in 2009 the number significantly increased to 312. So far, this year, the
number stands at 227.
The government has substantially increased its deployment of security personnel in Naxalaffected areas, and this has probably contributed to the increase in casualties. Also, questions
have been raised about the training and preparedness of security forces who, critics feel, are
slack in following standard counter-insurgency operating procedures.
Of late, a pattern of coordinated simultaneous Naxal attacks on newly deployed security
reinforcements has emerged. Police lines have come under attack concurrently with wider
attacks against infrastructure. According to Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF) estimates,
there are between 10-15,000 armed Naxalites, in comparison to 60,000 security personnel, in the
Red Corridor. However, guerrilla tactics of targeting and ambushing in hit-and-run operations
are successfully employed by the Naxals.
In its embryonic stages, the Naxal movement was primarily village-based, and distanced
from centers of government power. However, the Red Corridor has seen a significant
expansion over the last few years, especially in the resource-rich eastern tribal parts of the
country. This has led the Union government to take a more serious view of the situation,
and precipitated an unprecedented level of connection between the government and rural and
tribal areas.
The states most affected by Naxal violence, West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, account for about 85% of the total coal
reserves of the country. There are also rich mineral reserves in almost all of these affected
states. This has allowed the Naxals to wield influence over the country‟s economic growth
prospects, thus escalating the Naxal problem to one of national significance.
Moreover, Naxal activities, which were earlier confined to rural and forested areas, are now
being initiated in urban areas also. Top Naxal leaders, including Kobad Gandhy, who was
arrested in New Delhi last year, have been making attempts to garner support and funds from
urban laborers, students, human rights activists, social workers and sympathizers. This has led
to an increase in public interest on the issue. In 2008, armed Naxals targeted two towns in
Orissa. They have also warned of carrying out future coordinated urban attacks, but their
capability to do so remains in doubt. Spurts of Naxal activity and efforts for garnering support
in urban India are indicative of future problems.
When the Naxal movement started, axes and sickles were the primary weapons used to
attack government machinery. In recent times, however the Naxals have started using
sophisticated weapons technology along with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The use of
IEDs in the Red Corridor has increased in the recent years by 50%. In addition, Naxal cadres
are being given extensive weapons and explosive handling training. Some of the CDs recovered
during anti-Naxal operations in Andhra Pradesh show a near military like training for the cadres.
The CPMF have limited capability to detect and disengage IEDs, and the Naxal cadres
capitalize on this. The escalation of violence in these areas is partly a result of a sharp increase in
the number of arms available to the Naxals. In 2009 the Naxals used rocket launchers, and are
now reportedly in the process of developing remote controlled-IEDs, as opposed to their
traditional manual ones. Security agencies and local police have indicated the presence of at least
two factories making IEDs, small bombs and mortar shells by reusing gelatin sticks, which are
sourced from mining areas in the dense forests along the foothills of Jharkhand and
Chhatisgarh. The Naxals are also using Claymore Mines which don‟t need to be buried
underground but can be fitted to a tree to cause intensive damage. There have been reports of
Naxals using weapons smuggled from outside of the Red Corridor.
Unlike in the past when each state had its own anti-Naxal policy, the present trend indicates
efforts to formulate a consolidated unitary strategy against the Naxal menace. This is evident in
the recent move by the Federal Government to set up a unified anti-Naxal command for
operations over the four worst affected Naxal states (Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and
Jharkhand). The government has also created state and central level intelligence sharing
mechanisms to ensure the smooth flow of intelligence inputs among the states and between
them and the center.
In 2009, the Indian government launched Operation Green Hunt, which deployed over
50,000 CPMF personnel in the worst Naxal affected regions. In 2005, the Salwa Judum
emerged, a popular anti-Naxal movement led by the people of Chhattisgarh, and this was later
adopted by the government, who has been funding and training Special Police Officers (SPO)
under it ever since. This year, in addition to strengthening local police stations, the government
has sanctioned 34 additional battalions of central forces and 16,000 additional SPOs to be
deployed in these areas.
In terms of development, the Road Transport and Highways Ministry has sanctioned funds
to improve road connectivity in the 34 worst affected districts, at a cost of US$9.5 million. The
government is also investing heavily in the National Rural Health Mission, rural electrification,
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (education for all), the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act and the distribution of supplementary nutrition and forest rights at the central
level. In a report by the Planning Commission in April 2010, government has approved a total
of Rs 16,251.6 crore (US$162.5 billion) for development tasks in the Red Corridor. However, to
implement these schemes, the government has to first come up with an anti-corruption strategy
to ensure that the funds allocated reach their targets.
While the government is aiming at a comprehensive Naxal strategy, there are impediments
in the form of resistance by the locals and systemic corruption within the local political
establishment. Based on the recent trends, it is clear that the Naxalites are looking to intensify
their activities. It is now up to the government to devise a unique counterstrategy based on the
appeasement of socioeconomic concerns. This will be vital if India wants to put an end to this
growing menace for good.
Illicit Networks and North Korea’s WMD Program
Katsuhisa Furukawa & Naoko Noro
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North Korea continues to
find new routes to
circumvent international
sanctions to procure illicit
weapons material and
technology
Exploitation of dualuse technologies and
expertise help
advance the North
Korean weapons
program
Effective response
requires cooperation
among government,
industry, and
academia to build
“web of prevention”
North Korea has been active importer and exporter of weapons and associated knowledge and
goods through the combined use of both legitimate and clandestine networks abroad. The
international community has placed sanctions against North Korea; however, North Korea has
managed to manipulate those sanctions and advanced its programs on nuclear weapon and
ballistic missile programs steadily over the past decades. International isolation and sanctions
failed to dissuade North Korea from pursuing arms export to foreign countries as well. North
Korea has developed sophisticated skills and plans to sustain its arms procurement and trade,
both in the realms of nuclear and conventional weapons, which strike at the points of weakness
in international efforts for non-proliferation.
North Korea‟s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, including missiles, are
among the top security concerns for Japan. Japan has invested a significant amount of efforts to
enforce sanctions against the North Korea; however, North Korea still continues to be able to
use its operatives within Japan and abroad in order to procure illicitly a variety of materials,
equipment, and machineries, as well as information and technologies.
North Korean Illicit procurement activities in Japan are operated through networks of
North Korean related organizations in Japan. In areas related to weapons programs, it is
believed that the Korean Association of Science and Technology (Kakyo) plays a key role in
procuring intangible assets. Kakyo is an association of scientists, engineers, and manufacturers of
North Korean origin resident in Japan. Through a series of raids and arrests in 2005 and 2006, it
was revealed that Kakyo received direct orders from the External Relations Division of the
(North) Korean Workers Party to acquire certain advanced technologies in Japan and transfer
them to North Korea. It is also believed that Kakyo contributed to the DPRK missile and
nuclear weapon programs, although Kakyo denies such charges. Moreover, the Nishiarai
Hospital, which was a primary provider of funds for Kakyo, was believed to have close
connection with Pyongyang. The hospital was also suspected for involvement in the abduction
of Japanese citizens. Furthermore, Japanese police suspected that some Kakyo members with
excellent academic backgrounds in engineering might have been involved in the North Korean
missile programs.
In addition, North Korea has continuously attempted to procure dual-use materials, goods,
equipment, and machineries from Japan via third countries and regions (such as China, Taiwan,
and Southeast Asian countries), despite tightening sanctions by the Japanese government. There
have been a number of incidents of the illegal export of dual-use items from Japan to North
Korea. In 2009, North Korea arranged an illegal export of dual-use equipment from Japan to
Myanmar via Malaysia. This case suggests that North Korea may have begun to help Myanmar
develop its own ballistic missile capabilities. Experts also suspect that Pyongyang may also use
Myanmar as a turntable to route items to North Korea. North Korea has been quick to adapt to
the toughening of international regulations and sanctions by skillfully finding new routes for
illicit procurement.
Furthermore, North Korea has developed sophisticated techniques, such as masking
(disguising the export commodity so that it does not require an export license); hand carrying
the export commodity when travelling abroad; using the recipient country‟s embassy in Japan to
put the commodity in a diplomatic pouch; deconstructing the commodity and exporting the
parts separately; and exploiting local custom offices with relatively poor administrative capability
to enforce export control.
Japan has not been the only location of North Korea‟s illicit procurement. North Korea
illegally procured dual-use items from companies in Europe. The Namchongang Trading
Corporation (NCG), which is on the UN Security Council‟s sanction list, was involved in a
number of trade transactions in Germany, including the procurement of goods believed to be
used for the Yongbyong nuclear center. Yun Ho-Jin, the director of NCG, was believed to be a
central figure of the NCG‟s procurement activities. Yun used a company in China as the end
user of the dual-use commodities and pretended to be an intermediary for this Chinese
company. North Korea exploited weak export control systems in China and successfully
smuggled shipments from China to North Korea. Yun has managed to remain at large. This is
one example of how North Korean individuals manage illicit procurement.
Similarly, North Korea has also proven skilful in manipulating international sanctions on the
arms trade. Most recently, this was demonstrated in the December 2009 Thai authority‟s seizure
of a cargo aircraft carrying weapons from North Korea. The weapons transfer was carried
through an extremely complicated route in order to conceal the ultimate end user. Moreover,
the cargo aircraft went through a complicated chain of lease agreements involving several small
companies in multiple countries in order to conceal its registry. This case revealed the possible
links between arms traders in the former Soviet Union region and North Korea.
The Japanese authorities have drawn attention to the similarity between this and another
case of North Korean arms trading almost a decade ago, in which North Korea tried to import
MiG-21 jet fighters belonging to the Kazakh air force through a small Czech company. Both
cases share similarities, such as involvement of arms smuggling networks originating from the
former Soviet Union region, and the use of complicated cargo routes to disguise real buyer of
the shipments. North Korea continues to exploit the existing arms trade network in the former
Soviet Union region, which remains a weak point in international non-proliferation cooperation.
Given that there are many uncertainties and much unrevealed information regarding North
Korea‟s illicit procurement and proliferation activities, there are likely to be more incidents
uncovered in the future.
In order to meet the challenge of proliferation, an international web of prevention is
necessary. First, it is critical to strengthen international cooperation to suppress illicit networks
in many parts of the world, by mobilizing all relevant stakeholders, including those in the areas
of intelligence, law enforcement, export control, customs and border control, as well as science
and technology. Those stakeholders should strengthen international cooperation by exchanging
information about previous cases of export control violations in order to detect signs of
violation effectively. Second, multilateral law enforcement cooperation should be further
strengthened, given that illicit networks cut across multiple countries. Especially, China and
Taiwan must be engaged robustly in this regard. Third, the law enforcement of respective state
should be strengthened in order to enforce non-proliferation laws and regulations effectively.
But the strengthening of export control is only a part of solution. With the unprecedented
speed of progress in science and technology, the number of dual-use technologies has increased
dramatically, making it difficult to enforce export control over intangible assets. As shown,
Japan has confronted considerable difficulties in applying export controls over the transfer of
dual-use technologies, knowledge, and information in the past.
Hence, it is necessary to seek a better governance structure within the academic/scientific
community to manage intangible assets with significant dual-use risks. Legal measures alone are
not up to this task, as it may conflict with privacy and human rights as well as the necessity to
sustain a competitive and innovative environment in the scientific community. In Japan, for
example, the government cannot regulate the access of students and researchers to research
program with dual-use potential at universities, based upon whether their parents or
grandparents were born in North Korea. Such regulation would be in direct conflict with the
Japanese Constitutional provisions protecting individuals‟ human rights and prohibiting
discrimination. Moreover, strict legal regulation on technologies may undermine scientific
innovation.
Thus, it is necessary to develop not only regulatory but also voluntary measures to manage
sensitive technologies with significant dual-use risks, within scientific and academic
communities. Close cooperation among intelligence, law enforcement, national security and
scientific communities is essential for this purpose. In addition, legal and administrative tools, as
well as voluntary measures in the areas of intellectual property rights or ethics in science (such
as code of conduct), could contribute to strengthening the non-proliferation of intangible dualuse assets.
Along with these international/domestic legal frameworks and regulatory/voluntary
measures, the international community needs to develop an international “web of prevention”
against WMD proliferation, and this must work through the close cooperation between
government, industry and academia in respective countries.
Transnational Security Threats Facing Bangladesh
Major General Muniruzzaman (Retd)
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Bangladesh faces a
host of increasingly
complex transnational
security threats
driven by non-state
actors
Militant groups active
in Bangladesh have
established links with
international and
regional terror
organizations
South Asian nations
must develop a
cooperative forum for
addressing threats on
a collective, regional
basis
The twenty-first century brings with it an increasingly complex and urgent set of security
challenges, many of which are transnational in scope. Such threats are often driven by non-state
actors, such as organized crime groups, terrorists, or alien smugglers. Bangladesh faces a host of
transnational security threats, including terrorism, arms and drug smuggling, human trafficking,
climate security, financial crime and transnational organized crime, all of which jeopardize its
already fragile economy and impede social and political development. Bangladesh is geostrategically significant for a number of reasons: It is the world‟s 7 th most populous nation with
more than 150 million people. It is also the third largest Muslim nation in the world in terms of
demographic strength. Bangladesh sits in close proximity to two „would be‟ superpowers –
China and India. Hence, if unchecked, the transnational problems facing Bangladesh will have
serious consequences for the entire region. Keeping this in mind, a concerted effort needs to be
taken across the region so that a common platform can be created to address the transnational
security issues.
Terrorism and religious militancy: Terrorism and religious militancy have become a
major concern for Bangladesh. Terrorism and religious militancy in Bangladesh have caused
severe damage to the moderate image of the nation. Terrorism has threatened people‟s lives, the
country‟s economy, and Bangladesh‟s political establishment and religious pluralism. Terrorism
has generated insecurity and instability within the state and society. A number of Islamist
militant groups and their offshoots have sprung up in the country over the course of the last
two decades, among which Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jama‟atul
Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Hizbut Touhid,
Islami Samaj, Hizb-ut Tehrir, and Alla‟r Dal, are prominent. These terror outfits also maintain
and harbor linkages with other transnational/international terrorist groups.
Intelligence sources reveal that the militant groups active in Bangladesh have established
links with international and regional terror groups and receive support, assistance, training and
funding to carry out activities within and beyond the national boundaries. It is alleged, for
instance, that the HuJI-B was formed in Bangladesh, drawing inspiration from al-Qaida, and
that the group continues to maintain active links with the al-Qaida network and remnants of the
Taliban militia. The police in the neighboring Indian state of Assam suspect that JMB is also
trying to expand its operations into Indian territory. The HuJI-B, for its part, is believed to have
links with terrorist groups based in Pakistan. According to intelligence sources, HuJI-B also has
connections with insurgent groups operating in Northeast India.
Transnational criminal organizations: Globalization, trade liberalization, and faster
connectivity have played a critical role in the development of transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs). The notion of the “global village” has fundamentally changed the
context in which both legitimate and illegitimate businesses operate. This has created immense
opportunities for transnational criminal activity. TCOs from countries all over the world have
formed strategic alliances to traffic in drugs, arms, intellectual property, humans, archeological
treasures and a number of other lucrative but illegal trades. In Bangladesh, for instance, a wellorganized criminal network exists that traffics women and children to India, Pakistan and the
Middle East for prostitution and domestic work, while children are sent to the Middle East to
become camel jockeys.
Arms, drugs and human trafficking: Illegal firearm trafficking is a serious transnational
problem for Bangladesh. Bangladesh is now increasingly being used as a transit route by
transnational militant and insurgent outfits for smuggling weapons. According to intelligence
sources, the north, south and southeastern parts of the country, especially Chittagong,
Khagrachhari, Bandarban, Sandwip, Haluaghat and emerging Char Islands, are being used for
transportation of illegal small arms. Alarmingly, illegal arms trafficking has also picked up in
southwestern Bangladesh. Law enforcement agency sources have identified 29 points in six
border districts where arms traffickers are active in carrying out the illicit trade. The districts are
Kushtia, Meherpur, Chuadanga, Jhenidah, Jessore and Satkhira. The smugglers use at least four
points on the Kushtia border, five in Jhenidah, four in Chuadanga, three in Meherpur, six in
Satkhira, and seven in Jessore.
Bangladesh has become an attractive transit point for narcotics destined for international
markets. Bangladesh‟s long and porous borders have made the country vulnerable to transborder smuggling. Drug trafficking – mainly of heroin, hashish, opium, phensidyl, pathedine, or
other psychotropic substances like methamphetamines and precursor chemicals like acetic
anhydride – poses a real challenge to the nation. A host of factors have contributed to
Bangladesh having become a lucrative narco-transit zone for the transnational drug trade,
including easy access to international air and sea links, and modest detection and interdiction
capability. According to Bangladesh‟s DNC, international drug barons and mafia networks
often find “Bangladesh as a safe and alternate trafficking route when the Indian and Myanmar
routes become risky”.
Human trafficking is a global problem and Bangladesh is one of the worst victims. Studies
have uncovered that over a million women and children have been trafficked out of the country
in the last 30 years. According to a UNICEF report, approximately 400 women and children in
Bangladesh are victims of trafficking each month. Another study reports that approximately
300,000 Bangladeshi children and women between the ages of 12 and 30 have been trafficked to
India alone in the last 10 years. Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid, an organization based
in Pakistan, in its annual report reveals that around 200,000 Bangladeshi girls and women were
trafficked to Pakistan over the same period.
Climate change and water security: Because of its unique geographic, topographic,
demographic and socio-economic characteristics, Bangladesh is regarded as one of the most
vulnerable countries in the world facing the adverse impacts of climate change. The anticipated
effects of climate change, including sea level rise, higher temperatures, enhanced monsoon
precipitation, and an increase in cyclone intensity, could exacerbate existing stresses that already
hinder development.
The Himalayan River Basin countries, including China, Bangladesh, India and Nepal, share a
common ecology and river system. Being a lower riparian country, the availability of river water
in Bangladesh depends much on the flow of water from the upstream countries. Fifty-four
rivers enter Bangladesh from India. The availability of river water in Bangladesh, both during
the monsoon and the dry season, is determined by the level of water-flow from upstream. But,
the various dams constructed by the Government of the India and the ongoing river linking
project will render negative ecological and environmental changes in Bangladesh. Besides, the
scarcity of water may generate movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Bangladesh
and these IDPs may try to seek refuge and a livelihood beyond the state boundaries. Since India
virtually encircles Bangladesh from three sides, India is likely to experience an en masse influx of
IDPs from Bangladesh, a result that could potentially destabilize the bilateral relation between
the two neighboring countries and generate conflict at various levels.
The way forward: In recent times, transnational security problems have been burgeoning
in across South Asia. Thanks to a weak economy, fragile democracy and social fragmentation, it
has become difficult for Bangladesh to address these transnational security threats on its own.
The transnational nature of the threats also demands a collective and comprehensive approach
to face the challenges posed. In this regard, policy planners can adopt the following measures to
establish a common platform to counteract the transnational security challenges facing
Bangladesh.
Capacity building: South Asian states do not have the institutional capacity to face the ever
evolving challenges posed by transnational actors. States should emphasize building and
strengthening institutional capacity with a view to facing the challenges effectively.
Regulatory framework: A regional regulatory framework is essential to stop trans-boundary
movement of illicit goods and infiltration of terror groups. A regulatory framework is also
indispensable to face the challenges of trans-boundary water sharing.
Political will and cooperation: Owing to the lack of political will and cooperation, South Asian
countries have repeatedly failed to fight transnational security problems successfully. Political
will and cooperation between and among states in South Asia is necessary.
Intelligence sharing: Countries must share intelligence to prevent threats from posing
inordinate risks. The process will also generate confidence building measures between countries.
Legal regimes: An absence of all-encompassing regimes to counter transnational security
threats remains a critical challenge for South Asia. Countries should join hands to plug the legal
loopholes in the existing system and to introduce effective laws.
Social awareness and global consensus: Creating social awareness and developing a global
consensus against transnational security threats would provide a leap forward in addressing
these challenges. International organizations also have an important role to play in bringing
states to a common forum to address the challenges, and in developing effective solutions.
Reinforcing Secularism in Bangladesh
Moinul Khan
1
2
3
Recent judicial action
is restoring principles
of secularism in the
Bangladesh
Constitution
State secularism
could mark a shift
away from “Islamic”
foreign policy
alignment
Ban on fatwa as
grounds for
arbitration promotes
secular values and
advances women’s
rights
This year Bangladesh has experienced three important judicial interventions as part of an
attempt to reinforce the inherent secular values of Bengali culture. Each intervention is aimed at
furthering Bangladesh‟s counter terrorism efforts and hindering the process of Islamic
radicalization in Bangladeshi politics. Bangladesh is the home to over 150 million people, 88%
of whom are Muslim, making it the third largest Muslim majority country. Although between
1999 and 2005 the country encountered Islamic militancy, including terrorist bombings in 63
out of its 64 administrative districts, terrorist groups have been largely successfully contained. In
addition, after an effective counter terrorism drive, which included banning Islamic militant
groups and arresting their leaders and members, Islamic militancy has been largely expunged
from Bangladeshi politics. Since 2007, there have been no major terrorist incidents recorded.
The government has also introduced tougher anti-terrorism laws that empower the central bank
to freeze the accounts of suspected terror financers and that make terrorism offences liable to
tough penalties, including the death sentence and life imprisonment. The drive has been
successful because of a political consensus that religious militancy is not consistent with wider
Bengali cultural norms and must be eliminated. In this context, the recent judicial verdicts are
reflective of a legacy of secular tolerance and peaceful co-existence among different
communities within Bengali culture.
The most important development is the verdict on religion and secularization given by the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, the highest judicial body of the country, released on
July 28, 2010. The Appellate Division‟s decision upheld the 2005 High Court‟s verdict that the
constitution‟s 1979 Fifth Amendment was illegal. The Fifth Amendment was incorporated into
the constitution in 1979; it provided legality to military rule (between 1975 and 1979) and
dropped the principle of state secularism, inserting certain Islamic values instead. The Supreme
Court has now reinstated some of the provisions of the original 1972 Constitution, including
those that outline the principles of secularism. Article 12 of the original constitution that offered
“Secularism and Freedom of Religion” will be brought back. It provides that, “the principle of
secularism shall be realized by the elimination of - (a) communalism in all its forms; (b) the
granting by the State of political status in favor of any religion; (c) the abuse of religion for
political purposes; (d) any discrimination against, or prosecution of persons practicing a
particular religion”. In Article 8 (1) of the constitution, which provides for the four fundamental
principles of state policy, the Fifth Amendment replaced secularism with “absolute trust and
faith in the Almighty Allah”. This original provision on secularism will also now be restored.
The court in the observance argued that secularism means both religious tolerance as well as
religious freedom, and that the State must not be seen to favor any particular religion. Rather, it
should ensure protection to the followers of all faiths without any discrimination, including
even to an atheist.
The verdict also paves the way for deleting Clause 2 of Article 25 that provides the State
shall endeavor to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim
countries based on Islamic solidarity. This means the there is no longer any constitutional
obligation to strengthen the external relations with the Islamic countries on religious grounds.
The other critical development is the restoration of a ban on religious political parties.
According to the original 1972 constitution religious parties were banned, but this was
withdrawn in the 1979 Amendment. This ban will now be re-imposed. In October 2009 the
present government outlawed one Islamic party, Hijb-ut Tahir, on security grounds. Four other
Islamist organizations, Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, Harkatul Jihad al Islami, Jagrata Muslim
Janata Bangladesh and Shahadat-e al Hikma, were banned in 2005 for their suspected militant
connections.
However, “Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim” (in the name of Almighty Allah) which was inserted
through the Fifth Amendment will stay in the preambles of the constitution as an introductory
remark, but no longer as part of the Constitution. Article 6 of the amended constitution
identifies the nation as “Bangladeshi” instead of “Bengali” and will also remain intact. In 1988, a
second military-led government, which took over in 1982 and ruled till 1990, inserted Islam as
the State religion. However this change will not be affected by the verdict of the court.
However, now that the Fifth Amendment has been declared illegal it is likely that these later
amendments will be challenged in court, since one of the fundamental bases of the constitution
will be the principle of secularism.
argue that this decree has been used a means of oppressing women. For example, in the case of
The second development is the High Court Division of the Supreme Court‟s new ban on Fatwa.
Fatwa is interpreted as an Islamic decree on local arbitration or interpretation on aspects of
religious law issued by respected clerics. However, the misuse of Fatwa has regularly been
reported in the media and protested by woman‟s movements, while many human rights activists
argue that this decree has been used a means of oppressing women. For example, in the case of
extra-marital affairs such decrees often subject women to cruel punishments including caning,
whipping, stoning and beating in public places. It was alleged in the petitions to the High Court
that a number of deaths, suicides and incidents of grievous hurt of women were reported arising
from punishments given in Fatwa.
In the verdict on July 8, 2010, the High Court declared illegal all kinds of extrajudicial
punishment including those made in the name of Fatwa in local arbitration. The court directed
the authorities concerned to take punitive action against the people involved in enforcing fatwa
against women. The court decreed that according to the rules of the constitution no citizens will
be subject to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment. The petitioners in the
writ filed with the High Court while praying for the directives to stop the cruel punishment to
women in the name of Fatwa made a reference to Bangladesh‟s international obligations under
the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.
The third development is a judicial intervention on matters of Islamic attires, declaring a
ban on the compulsory wearing of the burqa by women against their will. The High Court on
August 22, 2010, issued a suo moto order giving the directive to the government to make sure
that women are not under compulsion to wear burqa or religious dresses at educational
institutions and offices. The court also ordered government to enforce that no cultural activities
or sports in the educational institutions are restricted in any manner to women because of their
dress. This High Court order was issued following news reports that students of local Rani
Bhabani Women's College were not allowed to enter the college premises without veils. Earlier, on
April 8 this year, the High Court ruled that women must not be forced to wear veils or cover
their heads against their choice while working at public and private educational institutions. The
court decreed that dress is a matter of personal choice and asked the Secretary in Charge of
Education to ensure that women are not harassed by their superiors at educational institutions.
The ban on the mandatory directives to wear burqa is a landmark in the struggle for women
rights in Bangladesh. That dress is a matter of personal choice has now been guaranteed in the
constitutional provisions as stated in the court order. For many Bangladeshi‟s the burqa is
considered a foreign (Arabian) outfit rather than an example of general Islamic custom. Instead,
in Bengali culture the sari and salwr-kamiz are the local dresses which most women prefer to
wear both in casual and formal occasions. The High Court‟s verdict will have impact positively
on the choice of dress code for women in a Muslim country where political identity is primarily
based on Bengali culture and language.
These three recent legal interventions of the highest judicial court in Bangladesh are
extraordinary when set against the backdrop of fundamentalism trends in some Muslim majority
countries, and will likely play an important role in promoting secular values and women‟s rights
in the country. These critical developments will also have profound implications in the future, as
the constitution and laws are being amended in accordance with the directives of the Supreme
Court and a change in the government will hardly make any effect on these amendments. A
Parliamentary committee on constitutional provisions has already been constituted in order to
implement the directives of the Supreme Court.
Asian Conflicts Reports
Council for Asian Transnational Threats Research
Editors
Dr. Julian Droogan | Macquarie University, Australia
Mr. Shanaka Jayasekara | Macquarie University, Australia
Dr. Kongdan Oh Hassig | Institute for Defence Analyses, Washington, D.C.
Dr. Caroline Ziemke | Institute for Defence Analyses, Washington, D.C.
About the Authors
MEDHA CHATURVEDI is a Research Officer, Institute of Peace and Conflict
Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, India
KATSUHISA FURUKAWA is a Fellow of the Research Institute of Science and
Technology for Society (RISTEX) in the Japan Science and Technology
Agency (JST)
NAOKO NORO is Associate Fellow of the RISTEX-JST, Tokyo, Japan
MAJOR GENERAL MUNIRUZZAMAN (Retd) is the President of the Bangladesh
Institute for Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS)
MOINUL KHAN is a Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Policing, Intelligence
and Counter Terrorism (PICT), Macquarie University, Australia, studying the
role of radical Islam in Bangladeshi politics
The Council for Asian Transnational Threats Research includes as
its members:
Afghanistan: Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies | Australia: Centre for Policing,
Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Macquarie University | Bangladesh: Bangladesh Institute
of International and Strategic Studies | Bangladesh: Bangladesh Institute for Peace & Security
Studies| India: Institute of Conflict Management | Indonesia: Center for the Study of Islam
and Society, State Islamic University of Indonesia | Japan: Research Institute of Science and
Technology | Malaysia: Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism | Pakistan:
Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies | Philippines: Strategic and Integrative Studies Center |
Philippines: Philippine Institute for Political Violence and Terrorism Research | Singapore:
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Nanyang University | Sri
Lanka: Sri Lanka International Centre for Terrorism Research and Conflict Management |
USA: Institute for Defense Analyses |
For inquiries about CATR or Asian Conflicts Reports:
Dr. Caroline Ziemke,
SFRD, Institute for Defense Analyses,
4850 Mark Center Drive,
Alexandria VA, 22311, USA.
E-mail: [email protected]